Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No.

8, pp 1321 1339, 2005

Islamic Militancy in East Africa

JEFFREY HAYNES
ABSTRACT This paper examines the relative political signicance of domestic

and transnational Islamic militancy in three East African countries: Kenya,

Tanzania and Uganda. It seeks to identify, describe and account for the sources
and signicance of such militancy, with a focus upon the signicance of
al-Qaeda and regional aliates. The paper argues that, encouraged by the post9/11 international fall out, regional Islamic networks work towards improving
the perceived low political and economic status of Muslims in Kenya, Tanzania,
and Uganda. At present, however, the political signicance of Islamic militancy
in the three countries is low.
Al-Qaeda bomb attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 ushered in a new era
of security concerns in East Africa linked to the perceived growth and
interaction of domestic and transnational expressions of militant Islam.1 Since
then both local and Western governments and policy makers have frequently
expressed concern over the sub-regions perceived potential to be a new front
for Islamic militancy.2 They noted that sizeable Islamic communities live in
the hinterlands and coasts of a broad band of East African countriesfrom
Sudan to Tanzania. Earlier developments in Somaliainvolving serious
clashes in 1993 between local Islamic militants and US troopsunderlined the
potential for growth in inuence of transnational Islamic militancy, especially
that of al-Qaeda, which had built contacts with local warlords.3 Al-Qaeda was
implicated in the killing of 18 US peacekeepers in 1993, leading to the
withdrawal of all US forces from the region. Contemporaneously Somalia
became a haven for Arab ghters expelled from Pakistan, where many
underwent religious and guerrilla training.
During the 1990s Somalia was judged to be a key entry point for Islamic
militants into East Africa. Inltration was facilitated by the fact that Somalia
has a lengthy border with Kenya, and an extensive, unguarded coastline along
the Red Sea. A consequence has been an apparent growth in expressions of
Islamic militancy in, inter alia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.4 Each of these
countries has been characterised by widespread political repression, economic
crises, rapid social change, uneven industrialisation, and swift urbanisation;
each country has experienced extensive economic, social and political
problems. A consequence is that many Kenyans, Tanzanians and Ugandans,
including members of their minority Muslim communities, are at or near the
Jerey Haynes is in the Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan
University, Calcutta House, Old Castle Street, London E1 7NT, UK. Email: je.haynes@londonmet.ac.uk.
ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/05/08132119 2005 Third World Quarterly
DOI: 10.1080/01436590500336807

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JEFFREY HAYNES

bottom of the economic ands political hierarchy, and some harbour deep
feelings of disappointment and disillusionment in relation to economic and
political outcomes (Haynes, 1996). According to an American researcher, Ted
Dagne (2002: 5): From 1991, when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan, alQaeda has been building a network of Islamist groups in both the Horn of
Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) and East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania,
and Uganda). Dagne believes that, as in South Asiaespecially Afghanistan
and Pakistanal-Qaeda was able to exploit extant circumstances of
widespread poverty, ethnic and religious competition and conict, poorly
policed state borders, and often corrupt and inecient government ocials to
create a regional terror centre in East Africa.
Concern over the growth of sub-regional Islamic militancy is expressed by
various sources, including the CIA: since 9/11 that agency has taken the threat
of Islamic militancy in East Africa very seriouslyto the extent of
withdrawing from Asia some of its best agents in charge of observing
Islamist movements and re-posting them to various countries in the
sub-region (see http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_aairs/speeches/2002/dci_
speech_02062002.html). Following the 7 July 2005 bombings in London
UK security agencies have also paid more attention to the Islamist threat
believed to emanate from East Africa.5 Observers suggest that Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania are targets for the expansion of transnational Islamic
militancy, seeking to exploit novel spaces for growth.6 Ronfeldt and Arquilla
(2001) contend that East Africa is the focal point for a war of networks,
rather than a Huntingtonian clash of civilisations. That is, rather than a
traditional army, a hierarchical political party, or guerrilla groups, there is a
loose network of militant Islamic movements, whose operations are
encouraged by the ease of communications provided by and via the internet.
To Marchesin (2001) such Islamic networks comprise an important new
realm of threats, especially to incumbent, unrepresentative governments:
non-military phenomena of general, vague and exible forms, embodied in a
plethora of informal organisations, typically autonomous cells acting
without any imperative contacts with an organisational head.
This is not to claim that 9/11 was the starting point for such Islamic
networks. Before 11 September there is evidence that Kenya and Tanzania
were already targets of Islamic terrorism. On 7 August 1998 al-Qaeda
operatives used truck bombs against the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The explosions killed 240 Kenyans,
12 Tanzanians and 11 Americans, and injured over 5000 people, mostly
Kenyans. Four years later, on 28 November 2002, two simultaneous attacks
were conducted against Israeli targets in Mombasa, Kenya. Suicide bombers
drove a truck into an Israeli-owned hotel, killing 10 Kenyans and three
Israelis, and injuring over 20 Kenyans. Around the same time terrorists tried
to shoot down an Israeli aircraft using surface-to-air missiles; had they
succeeded they would have killed more than 200 passengers on board.
In sum, recent expressions of Islamic militancy in East Africainvolving
local operatives who may or may not be aliated to al-Qaedaare judged by
both local governments and Western security agencies and governments to be
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ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN EAST AFRICA

a signicant and growing threat to stability and Western interests in the East
African sub-region. Kenya and Tanzaniaboth countries attract hundreds
of thousands of Western tourists each yearrepresent soft targets for such
attacks, with several factors, including poor security, inadequate border
controls, and the ability of terrorists to blend in to local populations,
facilitating the inltration of foreign Islamic militants, including al-Qaeda
operatives.7 Following the London bombings there was increased focus on
the region by Western security agencies.8
Further, there are suggestionsand, according to both government and
academic sources in East Africa (see below), rm evidencethat some
among the burgeoning number of transnational and local Islamic NGOs aid
and abet the growth of Islamic militancy in the sub-region. They pursue this
goal by blurring distinctions between social, economic, political and religious
functions and goals in directions that are commensurate with the objectives
of the militants. Typically, the goals of Islamic NGOs active in East Africa
include:
. provision of relief and humanitarian assistance to poor (Muslim)
communities during emergencies, natural disasters (prolonged drought
and oods), famine and epidemics;
. improvement of medium- and long-term development outlooks, with a
focus on community development, improving agricultural yields, clean
water and improved provision of health and education, especially in the
least-developed African Muslim countries;
. dawa (that is, Islamic call, an equivalent to Christian evangelism) and
conversion to Islam;
. publishing, broadcasting and disseminating Islamic teaching and
values.
Salih (2002: 1 2) argues that some Islamic NGOs in East Africa have been
used as a vehicle for spreading political Islam at an accelerated rate
combining faith and material rewards among the disfranchised Muslim
poor . . . becoming cronies to militant Muslim groups, including an emergent
tide of indigenous African Islamic fundamentalist movements. Ghandour
(2002) contends that the characteristics of such Islamic NGOs include not only
an exclusive reference to Islam and an often powerful social legitimacy, but
also sometimes ambiguous bonds with militant Islamists. This may place
them in conict with African governments, as well as with Western NGOs and
states. In addition, Ghandour also claims that some Islamic NGOs act as
intermediaries between
Islamic nanciers and recipients operating in the environment of Islamist
activists. It is extremely dicult for Western intelligence services to identify,
localise and block the nancial ows towards violent [Islamic] groups, because
the NGOs are very active mediators that cover their tracks. Practically there are
no direct relationships between powerful Islamic nancial backers and Islamic
activist organisations (Ghandour, 2002: 129).

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JEFFREY HAYNES

Following the August 1998 Nairobi bombing, Kenyas government banned

ve Islamic NGOsMercy Relief International, the Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation, Help African People, the International Islamic Relief Organisation and Ibrahim Bin Abdul Aziz Al Ibrahim Foundationbecause of their
alleged sympathies towards the aims of local Islamic fundamentalists and
alleged mediatory role in relation to the nancing of local militant Islamic
organisations (Achieng, 1998; Salih, 2002: 24 25). In addition, Kenyan
police and FBI agents from the USA raided the oces of Mercy Relief
International. According to John Etemesi, Director of the Co-ordinating
Board for Kenyas NGOs, the governments actions were necessary as the
NGOs had allegedly been working against the security interests of Kenyans
(quoted in Achieng, 1998).
Following 9/11 there was a clampdown on numerous Saudi Arabian,
Sudanese and Gulf charities, businesses and NGOs in Tanzania; all were said
to have active links with al-Qaeda. In late 2001 the countrys central bank
froze 65 bank accounts of such companies (Kelley, 2001). Sources in the
banking industry in Dar es Salaam said the accounts belonged to several
banks on the initial post-9/11 list issued by the US government of 20 globally
sought international companies said to be al-Qaeda- owned and -run
businesses. Most of the companies were said to have branches in both
Tanzania and Kenya, having moved there when bin Laden left Sudan in 1996
(Jamestown Foundation, 2003b). In addition, Tanzanias government also
expressed concern about what it regarded as several questionable Islamic
NGOs. These included the African Muslim Agency, a Kuwaiti organisation
engaged in the construction of mosques, schools and hospitals, and the
Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance Development Group, a joint
Tanzanian Saudi investment venture established in 1995, whose activities
include a focus on gender-related poverty (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a:
3 4; Intermediate Technology Development GroupEastern Africa, 2002).
As well as in Kenya and Tanzania, Islamic NGOs have also been active in
Uganda, with similar concerns, including: relief assistance to refugees and
homeless people; founding and running orphanages, health centres and
vocational training centres; and dealing with displaced persons and victims of
natural disasters. The International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) is one
of the most active Islamic NGOs in Uganda; it is also active in Kenya. The
IIRO was established in 1978 as a humanitarian NGO to provide assistance to
victims of natural disasters and wars all over the world, because some 80% of
refugees and victims, it claims, are Muslims. The IIRO claims that its relief
programmes are directed solely towards the provision of medical, educational
and social support for those in desperate need. It also aims to encourage local
entrepreneurs by sponsoring viable economic projects and small businesses
that can help victims nd employment and earn a living. To full these
objectives, the IIRO has established a wide network of national and
international contacts with various Islamic and non-Islamic relief organisations, institutions and individuals, operating in several countries in Europe,
Asia and Africa (see http://www.gm-unccd.org/FIELD/NGO/IIRO/Res.
htm). The major part of IIROs nancial contributions come from private
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ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN EAST AFRICA

donations in Saudi Arabia, and an endowment fund (Sanabil Al-Khair) was

established to generate a stable income to nance IIROs various activities.
The NGO has several departments, including Urgent Relief and Refugees;
Health Care; Orphans and Social Welfare; Education; Agricultural Aairs;
Architectural and Engineering Consultancy; and the Our Children project
(see
http://www.arriyadh.com/English/organizations/charity_org/islamic_
relief_org.htm).
The European Intelligence Agency contends that assistance to Ugandan
Islamistsboth from al-Qaeda and the Sudanese National Islamic Front
was provided through various Islamic NGOs, operating in Uganda. These
included, inter alia, the IIRO, as well as the Islamic African Relief Agency, the
World Islamic Call Society, the International Islamic Charitable Foundation,
Islamic African Relief Agency, and the Africa Charitable Society for Mother
and Child Care (European Intelligence Agency, in Marchesin, 2003: 4).
Table 1 lists the Islamic NGOs that have been alleged to be supportive of
Islamic militancy in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in recent years.
Western intelligence sources suggest that the growth of Islamic militant
networks in East Africa was facilitated and promulgated by a shared sense of
transnational Islamic identity that stems from long-established historical,
cultural, linguistic and trade ties to the Arab world. They also suggest that

TABLE 1. Islamic NGO s in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania alleged to support Islamic
militancy and terrorism
Islamic

NGO

(home country in brackets)

The Africa Charitable Society for Mother and Child Care

Help African People (Kenya)
Islamic African Relief Agency* (Sudan)
Muslim World League* (Saudi Arabia)
World Islamic Call Society (Libya)
International Islamic Charitable Foundation (Kuwait)
International Islamic Relief Organisation (Saudi Arabia)
Ibrahim Bin Abdul Aziz al Ibrahim Foundation (Saudi Arabia)
Mercy Relief International (USA)
Al Haramain Islamic Foundation* (Saudi Arabia)
The African Muslim Agency (Kuwait)
Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance Development Group
(Saudi Arabia)

Where the

NGO

is active

Uganda
Kenya
Kenya, Uganda
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
Uganda
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
Kenya, Uganda
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
Tanzania
Tanzania

Note: *These organisations were on the list of 25 Islamic charities and NGOs whose records of their
activities the US Senate Finance Committee requested from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in
January 2004 (for complete list, go to http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/164). This inquiry was part of an
investigation into possible links between Islamic NGOs and terrorist financing networks. Committee
Chairman Charles Grassley and senior Democrat Max Baucus stated in a contemporaneous letter to the
IRS that many of these groups not only enjoy tax-exempt status, but their reputations as charities and
foundations often allows them to escape scrutiny, making it easier to hide and move their funds to other
groups and individuals who threaten our national security. See http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/
Jan/15-147062.html.
Source: Salih (2002).

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JEFFREY HAYNES

the proselytising of various Islamic militantsincluding but not restricted to

bin Laden and his second in command, the Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiriis
aimed at exploiting popular dissatisfaction as a result of decades of
undemocratic rule, endemic and serious corruption, and growing poverty
and developmental disappointments (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a;
2003b).
Concern with the inuence of external Islamic militant groups was one of
the raisons detre of the US-sponsored East African counter-terrorism
initiative (EACTI), announced by President Bush in June 2003. The stated
purpose of EACTI was to root out local manifestations of Islamic terror
groups and to destroy their regional networks.9 The inauguration of EACTI
underlines how the US government believed that in recent years East Africa
had become a safe haven both for Middle East-based Islamic terrorist
groups and indigenous militant Islamic organisations.
In sum, explanations for the recent rise of Islamic militancy in East Africa
suggest that its increased prominence is linked to the growing inuence of
regional networks with headquarters in various Arab countries known to be
logistical hubs of Islamic militancy (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and
United Arab Emirates) (Marshall, 2003; Salih, 2002). Various countries in
the East African sub-regionincluding Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
provide new opportunities for the recruitment and mobilisation of new
members for militant Islamic organisations, including al-Qaeda, its aliates
and oshoots. Further, East Africa is said to oer favourable grounds for the
spread of transnational Islamic militancy as a result of highly porous land
and sea borders, widespread corruption, largely dysfunctional structures of
law enforcement, endemic organised criminality (involving everything from
drugs and people smuggling to weapons tracking) and growing numbers of
weak and failed states. These factors imply multiplication of grey zones
where state power is much diminished or even absent.
In the rest of this paper we will examine the recent impact of Islamic
militancy in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda and assess the comparative
importance in each country of domestic and transnational sources of Islamic
militancy.
Islam and politics in Kenya
Domestic Islamic militancy
Muslims amount to around 6% of the total population of Kenya,
concentrated in the coastal, northeast and eastern provinces.10 Over time,
Muslim opposition to Kenyan African National Union (KANU) single-party
rule was linked to the perception that primarily Christian ethnic groups
including, the Luhya, Kamba and Kalenjinbeneted disproportionately
under KANU rule, while Muslims were politically and economically marginalised. After nearly three decades of single party rule, legalisation of
pluralistic political activity in December 1991 was the catalyst for the
emergence of political Islamic groups with strong ethnic connections. In
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ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN EAST AFRICA

February 1992 a senior KANU ocial warned mosque guardians not to allow
their premises to be used for political meetings, as this would be illegal.
Religious parties were not allowed to register for the 1992 elections,
preventing the newly formed Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), led by Khalid
Salim Ahmed Balala, from competing at the polls. The IPK had its power
base in Mombasa and in Lamu, a centre of the Yemeni Alawiyya
brotherhood. The party was founded by a group of Asian intellectuals and
businessmen to tap popular Muslim discontent on two main issues. The rst
was the question of the introduction of sharia law for the countrys Muslim
population, many of whom felt discriminated against by the wholesale
application of perceived Christian (that is, European-derived) law. The
second was a sense of economic resentment on the part of many coastal
Muslims, especially over land issues (Africa Condential, 1993). Many
Mombasans saw that outsiders, including white skinned foreigners and
Kikuyus, were buying up quantities of local land at this time. This issue
helped to focus pre-existing economic resentment based on a perception that
Kenyas Muslims were discriminated against. As a response, the KANU
government sponsored a rival Muslim movement, the United Muslims of
Africa (UMA), with the aim of countering the appeal of the IPK, whose
political muscle was demonstrated by a series of riots in Mombasa, Voi and
several other coastal cities at this time. The aim of UMA was to split the
Muslim constituency along ethnic lines in order to diminish its potential
collective political impact. Abdullahai Kiptonui, a Muslim and prominent
KANU gure, encouraged young Kenyan Muslims to ght for their ethnic and
religious grievances by targeting Asians.
Transnational Islamic militancy
At around this time several al-Qaeda cadres left Somalia for Kenya and within
months several had married local Kenyan women, settled into society and
begun to form sleeper cells (Bowers, 2002). Four years later, in 1998, after
lying low and plotting attacks, most al-Qaeda cell members left Kenya for
Pakistan days before two US embassies were bombed. Addressing the
mourners in Nairobi after the bombing, the then Kenyan president, Daniel
arap Moi, stated that those behind the bombing could not have been
Christians. These remarks were widely publicised and drew criticism from
Muslim leaders, who claimed that their religion was being wrongly associated
with violence. Sheikh Ahmad Khalif, head of the Supreme Council of Kenyan
Muslims, commented that Islam like any other religion does not support the
killing of innocent people for whatever reason (Salih, 2002: 24 25).
The day following the bombing, the Islamic Liberation Army of the People
of Kenya (ILAPK), an al-Qaeda cover organisation, issued a communique
that included the following:
the Americans humiliate our people, they occupy the Arabian peninsula, they
extract our riches, they impose a blockade and, besides, they support the Jews
of Israel, our worse enemies, who occupy the Al-Aqsa mosque . . . The attack

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JEFFREY HAYNES

was justied because the government of Kenya recognized that the Americans
had used the countrys territory to ght against its Moslem neighbors, in
particular Somalia. Besides, Kenya cooperated with Israel. In this country one
nds the most anti-Islamic Jewish centers in all East Africa. It is from Kenya
that the Americans supported the separatist war in Southern Sudan, pursued by
John Garangs ghters. (ILAPK communique in Arabic, published in London on
11 August 1998 and quoted in English in Marchesin, 2003: 2).

It is suggested that al-Qaedas brand of Islamic militancy will be

unlikely to appeal to many Kenyan Muslims, mainly because of its
apparently indiscriminate use of extreme violence in pursuit of its
religious and political goals (Al-Qaeda hiding in plain sight, 11 January
2004, available at http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000607.php). Such
a view is underpinned by the claim that, for centuries, a relatively liberal
and mystical brand of Islam has developed on the East African coast, a
perception of Islam quite dierent from the rigid interpretation of the
Quran promoted by al-Qaeda. It therefore comes as a surprise that there
are indications that Islamic militancy has made some progress, especially
among young and poor Muslim constituencies in Kenya, particularly in
certain urban areas, including Nairobi and Mombasa. According to
Professor Moustapha Hassouna, professor of security studies at the
University of Nairobi:
Kenyans do not have the wherewithal, nor the character, to start up their own
homegrown international terror organization. . . . But Muslims here are becoming more radical or political in their outlookand I can see their sympathies
being used by outside terror interests (quoted in Harman, 2002).

Supporting this view, Sheikh Ali Shee, chairman of the Council of Imams
and Preachers of Kenya and a prominent religious leader in the Indian Ocean
port of Mombasa, contends that al-Qaeda has corrupted some of our young
people . . . We were not always like this . . . we have a history of openness (see
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000607.php).
As noted earlier, the coasts distinctive Arab avourthe region has
absorbed waves of immigrants from Yemen and Oman over the centuriesis
said to make it relatively easy for Arabs to t in among the local population.
Moreover, Kenyas notoriously weak security forces, coupled with the
historically poor relations between the police and coastal Muslims, have
apparently allowed al-Qaeda operatives to work undetected (Associated
Press, 2004). In sum, it is clear that some Muslims in Kenya are resentful, not
just about calamities across the larger Islamic world, but also about
discriminationreal and perceivedat home. Seeking to recruit, al-Qaeda
has tried to exploit the resentment many Kenyan Muslims feel towards their
government. This is not only because of the perception that they are
discriminated against compared with Christians. It is also fuelled by the fact
that since independence in 1963 successive governments have enjoyed strong
ties with both the USA and Israel.
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ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN EAST AFRICA

According to Harman (2002: 1), some of the same outside inuences that
have spread radical Islam to other parts of the worldthe Internet, a
rallying to the Palestinian cause, and outsiders fomenting anti-Western
sentimenthave encouraged some among Kenyas hitherto moderate
Muslim community to be drawn to radical acts in pursuit of fundamental
political and religious change. Second, Kenya has been targeted by Saudi
Arabian money, with Wahhabi Islamic schools and mosques growing in
number. This is said to encourage the transformation to militancy among
Kenyas traditionally tolerant Muslim communities, not least because some
of the imams are notable for preaching anti-Western rhetoric, in the context of
references to extra-regional conicts. Such conicts include the Palestinian
Israeli conict, the Chechen war and the US-led campaigns in Afghanistan
and Iraq. This focus enables the imams to present a picture of a beleaguered
Islam under sustained assault by the West.
A third factor encouraging growth of Islamic radicalism in Kenya is the
countrys close proximity to Somaliaa country that lacks a viable
government and law and is the home of both numerous weapons and alQaeda training camps (Phillips, 2002). A Somalia-based militant Islamic
organisation, al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (the Islamic Union) actively spreads its
inuence in Kenya (http://www.meta-religion.com/Extremism/Islamic_
extremism/al-ittihad_al-islami.htm).11 The ease of penetration of militant
groups from Somalia is almost certainly facilitated by a further factor:
Somalis, with their vast regional diaspora, have good communications and
transport routes, and are said to be East Africas best black-market
merchants, not only in cars and spare parts, but also in drugs, ivory and
arms. Kenya has a large Somali population, including more than 250 000
Somali refugees, many in refugee camps along the border. According to
Professor Hassouna, Somalis are everywhere . . . If they wanted to set up a
network, they could (quoted in Harman, 2002, p. 1). Diculties experienced
by Kenyan authorities in guarding the coasts and borders in the northeast
region may well encourage the activity of Islamic militants from Somalia.12
With such concerns in mind the Kenyan government engaged enthusiastically with the US-sponsored EACTI. The USA strongly backed antiterrorism legislation proposed by the government of Kenya in 2004.
However, Kenyan democracy advocates and civil society groups, having
only recently got rid of one-party, one-man rule, were opposed to the
initiative, seeing in the legislation the seeds of new political oppression. In
addition, some Kenyan Muslims argued not only that EACTI was part of a
generalised anti-Muslim initiative but also that the proposed new legislation
was basically anti-Muslim. It would, they feared, aggravate the alienation
in that community that opened the door to terrorist inltration in the rst
place (Lyman, 2004: 2). As a result of pressure from civil society, the Kenyan
government eventually agreed to redraft the legislation.
In conclusion, the political and economic circumstances of Kenyas postcolonial history have served to make many of the countrys Muslim minority
believe that they are second-class citizens. The proximity of Kenya to
regional hubs of Islamic militancynotably Somaliahave facilitated the
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JEFFREY HAYNES

growth of transnational Islamic militant networks, including some linked to

al-Qaeda. It is dicult, however, to estimate the appeal of an Islamic
militancy that appears to regard use of indiscriminate bombs as a legitimate
political and religious tool. Partly as a result, the likelihood is that the appeal
of such Islamic militancy in Kenya will be restricted to a relatively small
stratum of Kenyas Muslim minority.
Islam and politics in Tanzania
Domestic Islamic militancy
One cannot dismiss the possibility of Tanzania being brought into the
frontline of anti-Western terrorism, something that was graphically underscored by the August 1998 US embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam. However,
the notion that the country has begun to degenerate into a new territorial
beachhead for transnational Islamic extremism is misplaced, reecting a poor
understanding of the specic sociopolitical and religious makeup that is
characteristic of this part of East Africa (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a: 1).13
About a third of mainland Tanzanias population is Muslim, scattered
among the countrys numerous ethnic groups, although the greatest
concentrations are found in the coastal areas. Over 95% of the population
of the island of Zanzibar (around 700 000 people) are Muslim. In general,
there is a high percentage of Muslims living on the coast and along the precolonial trade routes that linked the mainland to a larger Muslim-orientated,
Indian Ocean trading system. Inland pre-colonial centres of trade, such as
Tabora and Kigoma, also have high percentages of Muslims. In other areas it
is possible to nd high percentages of Christians, especially in the southwest
and north-central areas of the country. While there are some ethnic identities
and geographic areas that coincide with a certain religious tradition, often
other identities, such as class divisions or support for political parties, are
cross-cutting and do not reinforce these religious divisions (Heilman &
Kaiser, 2002: 697 698).
As in Kenya, the general context of the emergence of Islamic-based
opposition to the state in the early 1990s was that of the fracturing of the oneparty system and the tentative beginnings of political pluralism. Also as in
Kenya, many among Tanzanias Muslims have long argued that they are
economically discriminated against. Yet, until recently, there appeared to be
little tension between Tanzanias Muslim communities and the government,
no doubt in part because Muslims enjoyed senior political positions, or
between Muslims and Christians, a reection of the almost unique social
consensus achieved under the rule of President Nyerere (1964 85).
Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world and any benets of
economic liberalisation from the 1990s aected relatively few people. In
addition, hoped-for benets accruing from political liberalisation have been
slow to arrive and this has begun to place strains on national social cohesion.
It is plausible that economic and political disappointments and frustrations
might be channelled into religiousincluding Muslimextremist movements.
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On the other hand, to date religion has not served as a primary fault-line for
sustained political violence and conict in the country (Haynes, 1996).
It is important, however, to note a signicant catalyst for the emergence of
political Islamic groups in Tanzania: a government announcement in early
1992 that, in order to reduce public spending, it would henceforward transfer
the countrys health and education system to the control of the countrys
powerful Catholic Church. This fuelled an outburst of resentment from the
Council for the Propagation of the Quran in Tanzania (CPQT, known as
Balukta), which had earlier risen to prominence with erce criticism of
Tanzanias national Muslim organisation, Baraza Kuu ya Waislamu wa
Tanzania (Bakwata). Balukta radicals accused Bakwata representatives of
self-serving, corrupt practices, while denigrating its attempts to promote
Islam in the country. Attempting to take over Bakwata, Balukta militants
occupied its headquarters until ousted by order of President Mwinyi.
Bakwatas wider resentment against Christians was made plain in a series of
inammatory sermons broadcast from Dars central mosque in March 1992;
this action triggered street battles in the capital between Christian and
Muslim youths (Shaikh, 1992: 240). In April 1993, following further
religious-based violence, Balakta was banned. In the mid-1990s a Muslimbased political party emerged, the Civic United Front (CUF), whose main
support base was on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. In a move that was
condemned by the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) government, the CUF
publicly raised the issue of separation from the mainland in a move that
reected deep-seated resentment among the Muslims of the islands of what
they perceived as mainland domination of the union between Tanganyika
and Zanzibar (Africa Condential, 1994).
In late 2001 some among the Muslim community in Dar es Salaam
protested at the US bombing of Afghanistan, while expressing support for
Osama bin Laden. As Bakari and Ndumbaro (2001: 5) note, the domestic
conict between the ruling CCM and CUF took place in a global context where
the USA and many of its Western allies are quick to interpret organised
political activity by Muslims as a terrorist security threat. In contrast, in
Tanzania some Muslims view the USA, Western capitalism and Christianity
as a challenge to Islam. After 9/11, in common with its counterparts in
Kenya and Uganda, the Tanzanian government sought the Wests cooperation in ghting terrorism and took part in EACTI. On the other hand,
the Tanzanian government, with a much larger Muslim minority than that of
Kenya, was reserved in its support for post-9/11 US policy in Afghanistan.
Part of its reluctance can be linked to the problem of longstanding tension
between the mainland and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, more than
95% Muslim. According to Shinn (2002), the government did not want to
stir up this potential hornets nest and will probably focus the debate on the
need to alleviate poverty and other ills. In Zanzibar two groups openly
challenge the authority of traditional elders: Imam Majelis (Imam Society)
and Daawa Islamiya (Islamic Call). Both organisations have gained some
popular following in Pemba (the smaller of the two main islands that make
up the Zanzibar chain) (Jamestown Foundation, 2003b).
1331

JEFFREY HAYNES

In 2002, before the announcement of EACTI, there was a spate of violent

incidents, including armed takeovers of moderate mosques in Dar es Salaam
and a rebombing of a tourist bar in Stone Town that left several people
injured. A militant Islamic movement, Simba wa Mungu (Gods Lion), was
specically singled out for fomenting much of this unrest. A covert
organisation, Simba wa Mungu, was alleged to take its lead from a radical
cleric, Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, who was accused of actively inciting attacks
against foreigners and morally corrupt Muslims who failed to adhere to a
purist Islamic line.
Transnational Islamic militancy
In May 2003 the British Foreign and Commonwealth Oce warned that an
international terrorist group could be planning an attack on the island of
Zanzibar (The East African, 2003). In addition, the government of the USA
has repeatedly advised its nationals in recent years to avoid all non-essential
travel to Tanzania as long as the current poor security situation prevails.
Both London and Washington appear to be particularly worried that an
imported radical Wahhabist undertone is making inroads in Tanzania and
that it is a focal point for al-Qaeda indoctrination, recruitment and training
(Jamestown Foundation, 2003a: 1). In short, in recent years the US and
British governments have expressed concern that external extremist
inuencesfrom, inter alia, Sudan and Saudi Arabiahave inltrated
Tanzania, serving to radicalise indigenous Muslim beliefs and undermining
Tanzanias well known political moderation.
Most attention has focused on Zanzibar for two main reasons: 1) it has an
overwhelmingly Muslim population; and 2) it has not enjoyed the same rate
of economic growth and social development as the mainland. In addition, at
least two al-Qaeda operatives have been identied as originating from the
island: Khalfan Khamis Muhammad, one of those convicted in connection
with the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam;
and Qaed Sanyan al-Harithi, a suspected East African al-Qaeda cadre killed
in Yemen in 2002 by a CIA operative (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a: 1;
2003b).
The preaching of a radical cleric, Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, has evoked
particular interest. The sheikh is an outspoken individual who has been linked
to the storming of the Mwembechai Mosque in Dar es Salaam in 1999 (during
the liberation of which four Muslims were killed) and has frequently been
detained as a threat to Tanzanian national security. Sheikh Ponda is, in the
words of one Western diplomat, the public face of radicalism in Zanzibar, an
important theological instigator for contemporary militant activism in both
Tanzania and, more generally, East Africa (Jamestown Foundation, 2003a:
4). In February 2002 riot police used live ammunition and tear gas to disperse
a banned demonstration by a Muslim group at Mwembechai Mosque. Many
demonstrators were beaten and 53 people were arrested. Most were released
after some weeks, but eight were charged with the killing of a police ocer at
the demonstration. The eight, who included Sheikhs Ponda Issa Ponda and
1332

ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN EAST AFRICA

Mussa Kanducha, were released in August 2002 and the murder charges
dropped (Amnesty International, 2003). In 2003 Ponda was on bail pending
charges that he had sought to forge pan-regional Islamic ties with extremists
in Kenya and Burundi.
In addition, the inuence of Saudi Arabiathe eective ideological source
of much of todays radical Wahhabismis said to be growing in Tanzania.
On the one hand, this appears to reect the curtailment of available
scholarships from states such as Yemen, Egypt and Algeria. On the other
hand, it is indicative of the lucrative nancial incentives that continue to be
oered by Saudi educational and non-governmental charities. Saudi Arabia
spends $1 million a year building new mosques, madrasas and Islamic centres
in Tanzania (Dalrymple, 2004). This is said to deect Tanzanian Muslims
away from states that the West considers to be relatively acceptable, such as
Egypt, and towards oneSaudi Arabiathat is judged to have inuential
individuals and groups with extremist religious outlooks and interpretations
(Jamestown Foundation, 2003b).
In sum, there appear to be signs of a gradual hardening of indigenous
Muslim identity in Tanzania, a development with political connotations.
Armed takeovers of moderate mosques are a recurrent problem in Dar es
Salaam, while some radicalised students returning from overseas religious
study trips seek to promulgate militant Islamic beliefs among the countrys
Muslims. There appear to be growing links between militant Muslims
indigenes and foreign radicals, including some with al-Qaeda links.
Islam and politics in Uganda
Domestic Islamic militancy
Along the East African littoral Islam is by and large the religion of discrete
ethnic groups, communities often excluded from the exercise of state power.14
As a result, Islam has periodically assumed the mantle of mobilising the
ideology of resistance to central rule, as some Muslims judge power to be
exercised primarily in the interests of certain (Christian) groups. In extreme
circumstances various sectarian forms of Islam, such as Asian Ismailis, have
found themselves the focal point of what can only be described as ethnic
cleansing. This occurred in 1972 in Uganda, when the late president, Idi
Amin Dada, himself a Muslim, expelled the Asian Ismailis at very short
notice, and without compensation for their assets, which they were forced to
leave behind. As a result, Amin and his cronies were able to enjoy their
conscated land and property at no cost, in a move that was, however,
politically popular with some non-Muslim Ugandans.
Whereas in some other Muslim minority African countries, such as Ghana,
Islamic leaders have managed intermittently to enter the framework of state
power, their counterparts experience in Uganda has been dierent, an
outcome reective of deep-seated religious and ethnic tensions that have
endured over time. Religious rivalries between Catholics (around half the
population), Anglicans (a quarter to a third) and Muslims (under 10%) have
1333

JEFFREY HAYNES

been both contextualised and exacerbated by wider regional divisions

between north and south.
Over time religious establishments, both Christian and Muslim, were
manoeuvred and controlled by those in power to ensure their rm grasp on
authority. The National Association for the Advancement of Muslims
(NAAM) was founded in 1964, a year after independence from colonial rule.
Adoko Nekyon, a cousin and close condante of Milton Obote, then
Ugandas prime minister, initially led the NAAM. Later, however, the
allegiance of Ugandas Muslims divided between two competing national
bodies. Kakungulu, an uncle of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, led the
Uganda Muslim Community (UMC), while the NAAM was closely associated
with the interests of non-Bugandan Muslims. The government regarded nonBugandan Muslims who by and large did not belong to the NAAM as disloyal
to the state (Mutibwa, 1992: 68). Nevertheless, the state found it impossible
to control dissident Bugandan Muslims, just as these were unable
signicantly to inuence state policies. UMC leaders were used as
intermediaries between the state and the Bugandan Muslims, although
without leading to a rapprochement between the two groups.
Under Amins rule (1971 78), prominent Muslims, both Bugandan and
non-Bugandan, found themselves targeted as putative recipients of Arab
nancial largesse. Rich Arab statesespecially Libya and Saudi Arabia
believed that it was incumbent upon them to proselytise Islam in Africa, and
especially in a country such as Uganda, so centrally placed in the region.
Colonel Qadda, who appeared to believe that as many as 70% of Ugandans
were Muslims, condemned Christianity as an agent of imperialism in a speech
at Makerere University in March 1974 (Mutibwa, 1992: 109 10). Pirouet
(1980: 19) alleges that Qaddas visit to Uganda led directly to the murder of
two prominent Christian politicians: Michael Ondoga, the Foreign Minister,
and Charles Arube, a prominent Kakwa.15 Following Amins political
demise and exile in 1979, Ugandas Muslims were politically marginalised in
the 1980s and 1990s, not least because many non-Muslim Ugandans regarded
Islam in the country to be intimately associated with Amins excesses.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Chande (2000: 355) reports, several hundred
Ugandan Muslim students studied at the Islamic University of Medina.
Returning home, some preached a strict or puritanical form of Islam
inuenced by Wahhabist ideas encountered in Saudi Arabiathat until then
had been virtually unknown in Uganda. The growth of this reformist trend
was inuential in strengthening an international network that for the rst
time linked Ugandan Muslims to the major centres of Islam in the Middle
East. Pan-Islamic activism in Uganda, associated with the Wahhabist and/or
Sala movements, coincided with growing Islamic awareness both in East
Africa and more generally. This activism was eventually to turn in a political
direction, a development not new to Uganda, where religion and politics have
often interacted, notably with state attempts to control the institutions of
civil society. By the mid-1980s, according to Chande (2000: 355), the
emerging divisions between the young Salas and the traditional ulama of
popular Islam had begun to harden.16
1334

ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN EAST AFRICA

This period also saw growing activism by the international Jamaat

Tabligh, a movement that originated on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent
(Chande, 2000: 355). From the early 1990s, various indigenous but
numerically small groupsincluding, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),
the Uganda Liberation Tigers, Sheikh Abdul Kyesas Saved and deserters
from the Uganda Muslims Salvation Frontwere inuenced by the ideas of
Jamaat Tabligh, calling themselves Tabligh, meaning militant faith
(Marchesin, 2003; Perouse de Montclos, 2000). Kayunga (1993) claimed
that Tabligh was a serious threat to Ugandas domestic security, beneting
from networks of sympathisers scattered in the countrys largest urban areas.
From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s Tabligh was associated with a number
of minor terrorist attacks on southern and central towns and cities, including
a wave of grenade attacks carried out from 1995 to 1997. Although since
1998 Tabligh has been seriously undermined by government reprisals, it
managed to carry out three new bomb attacks in the Ugandan capital on
June 4, 2001 (Marchesin, 2003: 4). Partly as a result, Marchesin (2003: 4)
recently claimed that Uganda was the country in East Africa where Islamic
fundamentalism seems to be most deep-rooted.
Transnational Islamic militancy
Regarding external ties to domestic Muslim militants, from the 1990s the
radical Islamic movement in Uganda built ties with foreign Islamic radicals,
notably among Sudanese and Afghan extremist groups. Both the Sudanese
National Islamic Front and al-Qaeda (then based in Sudan) played an
important role in providing support to Ugandan Islamic militants. Al-Qaeda
helped to set up camps for training the ghters of the ADF (see http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/adf.htm). When Osama bin
Ladens organisation settled in Afghanistan in 1996, members of the ADF
went there to undergo training as explosives experts. Following bin Ladens
departure, Sudan continued to support Ugandan Islamists, including the
ADF. However, this support is said to have stopped after Sudan and Uganda
signed a peace agreement in December 1999. Meanwhile, al Qaeda planned
to assassinate Ugandas president, Yoweri Museveni, in Kampala in 1999
(European Intelligence Agency, in Marchesin, 2003: 4).
After 9/11 Museveni was strongly supportive of the US-led war on terror,
to the extent that Uganda emerged as the main ally of the USA in East Africa.
In addition, the leader of the Muslim minority, the mufti of Uganda, stated
publicly his support for US attacks against bin Laden and the al-Qaeda
network in Afghanistan. President Museveni, drawing on documents
captured by the US armed forces, stated publicly at the end of 2001 that
bin Laden and al-Qaeda had targeted Uganda for attack. According to
Museveni, bin Ladens goal was to extend the militant Islamic network to the
Great Lakes region; he added that bin Laden condemned Uganda for working
with the US government on behalf of southern Sudanese rebels opposed to the
government in Khartoum (Shinn, 2002). In May 2003 the Ugandan
authorities arrested a Somali and a Pakistani suspected of planning an attack
1335

JEFFREY HAYNES

in Kampala. Following the arrests, Ugandan security services arrested about

200 foreigners, mainly from Somalia, Arab countries and Asia.
In conclusion, as in Kenya, the political and economic circumstances of
Ugandas post-colonial history encouraged some among the countrys
Muslim minority to believe that they were second-class citizens, muscled
out of political and economic favour by Christian groups. Also as in Kenya,
Ugandas proximity to regional hubs of Islamic militancynotably Sudan
appears to have encouraged development of a network involving local and
foreign Islamists. While it is dicult to estimate the overall appeal of Islamic
militancy in Uganda, it seems likely that not many local Muslims would be
tempted join Islamic militant groups, for two main reasons. First, the brand
of Islamic militancysometimes involving the use of extreme political
violenceis unlikely to appeal to the mass of ordinary Ugandan Muslims.
Second, such a perception may well be linked to the fact that much of
Ugandas post-colonial history has been characterised by conict between
ethnic and/or religious groups. It may well be the case that, as Uganda is
nally enjoying a prolonged period ofrelativepolitical stability17 and
economic growth, then decreasing numbers of people, including Muslims,
will be willing to join political campaigns rooted in violence. Consequently,
the likelihood is that in the short and medium term the appeal of Islamic
militancy in Uganda will be restricted to a relatively small stratum.
Conclusion
Islamists in Kenya are pushing to expand Islamic law, or sharia, to include
sentences of amputation in certain crimes, as well as stoning in cases of
adultery, practices already in place in Nigeria. The chairman of Kenyas
Council of Imams and Preachers, Ali Shee, has warned that Muslims in the
coastal and northeastern provinces will break away if sharia is not expanded.
Tanzania is experiencing a similar push for Islamic law. Saudi Arabia is
funding new mosques there, and fundamentalists have bombed bars and
beaten women they thought inadequately covered. Mohammed Madi, a
fundamentalist activist, told Time magazine in September 2003: We get our
funds from Yemen and Saudi Arabia . . . Ocially the money is used to buy
medicine, but in reality the money is given to us to support our work and buy
guns (Marshall, 2003).
Militant Islamic individuals and groups associated with al-Qaeda, such as
Somalia-based Al-Ittihad al-Islami, have been active in recent years in
Kenya, a development that has alarmed Kenyas government. However, the
prospect of any of the East African countries we have examined degenerating
into bastions of radical Islam is at present a relatively remote possibility. This
is for three main reasons. First, although as we have seen there are radical
elements in all three countries, their inuence is currently quite marginal.
None is likely to emerge as a major recruiting pool for al-Qaedas
transnational terrorism. In addition, the proselytising inuence of Islamic
militants is inherently constrained by the broader Islamic context in Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda: many Muslims are relatively apolitical (when it comes
1336

ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN EAST AFRICA

to religious issues), moderate and tolerant in orientation. Even in Zanzibar,

with a majority Muslim population with political and economic grievances,
there is no indication that at present there are serious moves to islamicise
society, for instance by introduction of a fully edged Islamic sharia criminal
system.
Second, even the groups that do seek a more Islamic agenda pursue their
objectives through discussion and negotiation. For example, in Tanzania
both Imam Majelis and Daawa Islamiya are legitimate registered entities.
Neither encourages the type of revolutionary civic action that characterises
the radical theorising of Islamic organisations in, for example, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Third, there is no evidence that Muslims in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
are interested in taking up arms against the indel West. Many may be
unhappy about US or UK policies in relation to Afghanistan, Iraq and the
Palestinians, but this does not imply that more than a tiny minority actively
seek to belittle Western society as a principle or practice tout court. Despite
the alleged connection between East African Islamists and bomb attacks in
London in July 2005, at the time of writing (early August 2005) there is no
evidence suggesting that they were anything but the work of a few disgruntled
radicals.
Finally, with the exception of a few militantssome of whom are noted in
this paper, such as Khalfan Khamis Muhammad and Qaed Sanyan alHarithithere have been remarkably few examples of individual Islamic
militants committing themselves to the wider al-Qaeda cause. This is not to
suggest that there will be no future acts of terrorism carried out in East Africa
but it is to propose that the likelihood of such an event is linked more to
considerations of the regions porous borders and sometimes less than
ecient police and security services than to any concerted indigenous support
for transnational Islamic extremism.
Notes
1 I refer to various sources of information in the rst section of the articleboth governmental and
academic. While the individual reliability of sources may be called into question, their overall import is
to arm the growing signicance of transnational Islamic militancy that may or may not have an alQaeda dimension. I suggest, however, that this does not necessarily lead to the growing signicance of
Islamic militancy in relation to the politics of the individual countries in focus in the article.
2 It is possible, although at the time of writing (early August 2005) not veried, that there were links
between Islamist groups in East Africa, notably Somalia, and the bomb attacks on London in July
2005. Several of the alleged perpetrators of the failed 21 July attacks were of Somali or Eritrean origin.
3 The inltration of al-Qaeda into Somalia was facilitated by the fact that the country had become a
collapsed or failed state by this time; that is, a polity without an eective central government and with
a generalised breakdown of law and order.
4 Kenya and Tanzania are a focus of this paper because of the destructive terrorist attacks in those
countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s with which Islamic militan ts were implicated. Uganda is
also a focal point as that country has also been identied as a likely source of Islamic militancy in East
Africa.
5 The bombings were claimed by a previously unknown organisation, The Secret Organization of alQaeda in Europe (http://news.com.com/E-mail+trac+doubles+after+London+bomb+blasts/21001038_3-5778088.html?tag=nl).
6 McGrory et al. (2005).

1337

JEFFREY HAYNES
7 The US Foundation for the Defense of Democracies claims that Islamic terrorists can easily blend into
the Muslim populations of the coast. See http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/
research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=157584&attrib_id=7451.
8 McGrory et al (2005).
9 A US Department of Defense ocial, Vincent Kern, told more than 120 senior African military ocers
and civilian defence ocials gathered at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) seminar on 10
February 2004 that, in June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million, 15-month Eastern Africa
counter-terrorism initiative under which the United States is expanding and accelerating [US] counterterrorism eorts with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania and Eritrea. The programme,
Kern said, was designed to counter terrorism by focusing on coastal and border security; police and
law enforcement training; immigration and customs; airport/seaport security; establishment of a
terrorist tracking database; disruption of terrorist nancing; and community outreach through
education, assistance projects and public information. Kenya, for example, was to receive training and
equipment for a counter-terrorism police unit aimed at building an elite Kenyan law enforcement unit
designed to investigate and react to terrorist incidents. See http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/
tp-20040212-24.html.
10 For accounts of the relationship between Islam and politics in Kenya, see Cruise OBrien (1995) and
Oded (2000).
11 Al-Ittihad is on the US list of terror groups, and has been watched closely since 9/11. In 1993 members
of al-Ittihad killed 18 American soldiers in Somalia, speeding up the withdrawal of the USA from that
country. According to Marchesin (2003), al-Itahaad provided logistical support to those who
committed the 1998 attack in Nairobi. The organisation is also suspected of having co-operated with
al-Qaeda during the dual attack in Mombasa in 2002.
12 Concerned with the inuence of Somali Islamic radicals in Kenya, the then president, Daniel arap Moi,
actively engaged in peace eorts in Somalia from the early 1990s. During the 1990s Kenya organised
numerous peace conferences as the Kenyan government was concerned that continuing instability in
Somalia could lead to region-wide instability. In July 2001 Kenyan ocials closed the border with
Somalia because of illegal arms smuggling into Kenya (Dagne, 2002: 18; Kelley, 2001).
13 For accounts of Islam and politics in Tanzania, see Heilman and Kaiser (2002); and Lodhi and
Westerland (1997).
14 For accounts of Islam and politics in Uganda, see Constantin (1995); and Oded (1995).
15 The Kakwa people amount to less than 1% of the total population of Uganda.
16 According to Chande (2000: 355), The Sala reputation rests on their scholarly activities and the
challenge they pose (given their skills in the Arabic language) to the monopoly on religious education
held by traditional scholars. Their eorts have made Islamic education more accessible.
17 I duly note the continued conict between the government and the Lords Resistance Army that has
seriously aected parts of the Acholi-dominated north.

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