PEOPLE vs PURISIMA

insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

FACTS:

It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if
concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned
above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the
presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or
punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the
act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the
circumstances so warrant.

> These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated (4
cases) in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
> Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with
"illegal possession of deadly weapon".
> On a motion to quash filed by the accused, an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed
to state one essential element of the crime.
> However, all the motion filed by the accused were dismissed.
> In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the
submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense charged is missing
from the Information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon"
penalized under PD No. 9?
RULING:
NO. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint
or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the
offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused
and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be
designated or mentioned in the charge.
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's
residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool
or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was
either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,

Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and
valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the
murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of
bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course
not all can be so heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most
convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to
imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors,
which only God knows where it came from.
Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of
an accused.
The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the
Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged.
The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the
crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the
Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned.

PEOPLE vs BUAYABAN
FACTS:
> Charged the appellant Pedro Tumulak and his co-accused Paulino Buayaban,
Larry Betache, Marciano Toacao and Yoyong Buayaban, of the crime of "robbery in
band with homicide.
> The said accused confederating together, conspiring and helping one another, with
intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shot with a gun Dioscoro Abonales, on the neck thereby inflicting
wound which directly caused his death, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal, rob and carry away cash.
> Upon arraignment, accused Pedro Tumulak, Paulino Buayaban and Larry Betache
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Their co-accused, Marciano Toacao and
Yoyong Buayaban, remain at large.
> The trial court, however, found the evidence of the prosecution more convincing
and rejected the defense of alibi set up by appellant and his co-accused. Appellant
Pedro Tumulak and his companions were positively identified as the perpetrators of
the crime by eyewitnesses.
> The court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide.
> Some of the accused withdraw their motion to appeal. Hence, the instant appeal
leaves only Pedro Tumulak as the lone appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band with homicide?
RULING:
NO. In the information, the People erroneously charged the accused with
"robbery in band with homicide." There is no such crime in the Revised Penal
Code. The felony is properly called robbery with homicide. In the landmark case
of People vs. Apduhan, Jr., we ruled that if robbery with homicide is committed by a
band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as robbery with homicide
under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but the circumstance that it was
committed by a band would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance.
Section 8. Designation of the offense.- The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation.- The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Section 8 simply provides that the information or complaint must state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and
generic aggravating circumstances. With regard to Section 9, we held in People
vs. Nerio Suela that the use of the word must in said section 9 indicates that the
requirement is mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule
110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the
trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not
stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure
are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.
In this case, we cannot properly appreciate the ordinary aggravating circumstance of
band in the commission of the crime since there was no allegation in the information
that more than three armed malefactors acted together in the commission of the
crime.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant Pedro
Tumulak of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE vs DELIM
FACTS:
> Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias "Bong"
and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder under an information.
> Armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and
once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation, conspiring with one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold,
hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, abuse
of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
> Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim
and Ronald Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a
carpenter.
> Accused denied having been in the house of and of abducting and killing him.
> The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding the accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as stated in the
information?
RULING:
NO. It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an
information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime
charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific
intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific
intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental
deprivation of the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is
merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by,
the killing of the victim. The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in
the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the
accused is charged with that of murder or kidnapping.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the
malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was
seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of
the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose

of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that

the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or
liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably
then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide
defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal in its full period.

PEOPLE vs FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
> For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant
Isaias Fernandez y Veras, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Republic Act
No. 6539, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to death.
> Above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner
thereof, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and drive away a motor vehicle,
with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, the accused
attacked, assaulted and shot the said Clifford Guinguino y Gorio, which caused his
death.
> Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
indictment. He waived pre-trial.
> At the trial, herein appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi in his bid to
escape culpability.
> Court finds the accused ISAIAH FERNANDEZ Y VERAS, also known as Isaias
Fernandez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 14 of Republic Act
6539, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act 7659 (Qualified Carnapping where
the driver of the carnapped vehicle, Clifford Guinguino, was killed in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof) sentences him to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
> In view of the imposition of the death penalty, elevated to this Court for automatic
review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficiency of the evidence to sustain appellants
conviction?

RULING:
YES. For circumstantial evidence to be a sufficient basis for a
conviction, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) there must be more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering the evidence on record, with the submission of the parties, we find the
prosecution evidence sufficient to sustain appellants conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, we find no reason to deviate from the trial courts assessment as to
appellants culpability for carnapping with homicide.
We find that sufficient circumstantial evidence exists, consistent with appellants guilt,
and inconsistent with his innocence.
Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, both
aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information.
Being favorable, to the appellant, this new rule can be given retroactive effect
as they are applicable to pending cases.
In this case, the allegation of being part of a syndicate or that appellant and
companions had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of
committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime
group, was neither alleged nor proved by the prosecution. Hence, we agree that it
was error for the trial court to sentence appellant under Article 62 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.
No aggravating circumstance having been alleged or proved properly in this case,
the provisions of Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. Without
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance found in the commission of the offense, the
lesser penalty for the offense, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed on
appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, finding
appellant ISAIAS FERNANDEZ y VERAS a.k.a. ISAIAH FERNANDEZ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 6539 is AFFIRMED and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE vs MASAPOL
FACTS:
> Before this Court on appeal is the Decision of by the Regional Trial Court,
convicting the appellant Andres Masapol of the crime of Rape, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
> The said accused, with lewd designs, and by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with one
Beatriz O. Pascuin, against her will.
> On his arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
> After the parties adduced their testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial
court rendered its Decision, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
> The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he forced and
intimidated Beatriz into having intercourse with him. He contends that the testimony
of Beatriz is inconsistent with her statement to the barangay captain. The
prosecution even failed to adduce any medical certificate to corroborate her
testimony. He contends that the fragility of the evidence for the prosecution.
> WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing findings that the prosecution was able
to prove the guilt of accused ANDRES MASAPOL of the crime of rape of which he is
presently charged.
> The appellant assails the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE TO WARRANT SUCH CONVICTION?
RULING:
NO. The appeal has no merit.
For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as
basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or
innocence of the accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which has
nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of
the accused. Even if the offended party may have erred in some aspects of her
testimony, the same does not necessarily impair her testimony nor corrode her
credibility.
The general rule is that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a
witness in contrast with what was stated in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit
her. Affidavits given to police and barangay officers are ex parte. Such affidavits are

often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the

investigating officer.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence a medical certificate to prove
that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her and that she sustained injuries when
she resisted the appellant did not enfeeble the case for the prosecution. A medical
examination and a medical certificate are merely corroborative and are not
indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case.
The prosecutor proved that the appellant used a knife, a deadly weapon, in
forcing Beatriz to submit to his lustful desires. Under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, the use of a deadly weapon such as a knife to commit a
crime is a special aggravating circumstance which requires the imposition of
reclusion perpetua to death. However, such circumstance was not alleged in
the Information as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Although the said rules took effect only on December 1,
2000, long after the commission of the crime on July 17, 1992, the same
should be applied retroactively because it is favorable to the appellant. Hence,
such circumstance should not be appreciated against the appellant. In the
absence of any modifying circumstance, the appellant should be sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional
Trial Court, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant Andres Masapol is
found GUILTY of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

PATULA vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).
> The said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores,
having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers
of said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the
sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying with her
obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands
therefore, and with intent to defraud the said company, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but
instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said company.
> Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information.
> The RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted not to present evidence for
her defense the Prosecutions evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted.
> Court finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa.
> Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion.
> Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her] Constitutional and statutory
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her because,
while the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, the evidence presented against her and upon which her conviction was
based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or included in the Information under
which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and that said judgment likewise
blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in
that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
documents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not falsification should be proved in estafa as a means in
committing the crime?
RULING:
NO. The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and
cause of the accusation in the information should never be taken for granted by the
State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly
charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other
than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the
crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded
the estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal
Code within the context of the substantive law and the rules. Verily, there was no
necessity for the information to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because
falsification was not an element of the estafa charged.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime charged in the
information is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the
prosecution could not prove falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since
the information charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par.
(1b) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court holds that there is no necessity of alleging
the falsification in the Information as it is not an element of the crime charged.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will
constitute as one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate
offenses. The complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is
committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or
goods from another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of
committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to conceal the
misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are committed. In
the instant case, when accused collected payments from the customers, said
collection which was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or
erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were
contrived to conceal some amount of her collection which she did not remit to the
company
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a
judge must rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such
evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused
guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so
herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who
had no obligation to prove her innocence. Her acquittal should follow.

PEOPLE vs DEGAMO
FACTS:
> Before us for automatic review is a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
imposing the supreme penalty of death on appellant Roneto Degamo alias Roy for
the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime.
> Upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty.
> Before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed the complaint to be
amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim
has become insane.
> Above-named accused RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy, being then armed with a
bladed weapon, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein ELLEN
VERTUDAZO, against her will and in her own house.
> Upon re-arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
> RTC convicted the accused of rape with extreme penalty of death.
> Hence, this automatic review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not amendment in the information can be done after the accused
has pleaded for the crime?
RULING:
YES. A discussion of certain procedural rules is in order before going into
the merits of the case. It has not escaped our notice that the complaint for rape with
use of a deadly weapon was amended after arraignment of appellant to include the
allegation that the victim has become insane by reason or on the occasion of the
rape. Although the penalty for rape with the use of a deadly weapon under the
original Information is reclusion perpetua to death, the mandatory penalty of death is
imposed where the victim has become insane by reason or on the occasion of rape
as alleged in the Amended Information.
Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an amendment after the plea
of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided: (i) leave of
court is obtained; and (ii) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the
accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already
been arraigned.
In Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag,we had occasion to state that a substantial
amendment consists of recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The

following were held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which
relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not
alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) amendment, which does
not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.
We further elucidated in the Teehankee case that the test as to whether an
amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is
whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence
which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one
form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form
and not of substance.
Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of
substance as it falls under all of the formal amendments enumerated in the
Teehankee case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane
by reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the
penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge
another offense different from that charged in the original Information.
Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original information for rape
committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a deadly
weapon where the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape.
The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant.
Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the amendment.
Furthermore, it is also settled that amendment of an information to charge a
more serious offense is permissible and does not constitute double jeopardy
even where the accused was already arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge, where the basis of the more serious charge did not exist, but comes
as a subsequent event. In this case the basis for the amendment was the
psychosis of complainant which was determined after the filing of the
information.
Besides, the trial proper started only after appellant had been re-arraigned and
appellant never objected to the amendment at any stage of the proceedings. It
is basic that objection to the amendment of an information or complaint must
be raised at the time the amendment is made, otherwise, silence would be
deemed a consent to said amendment. It is a time-honored doctrine that
objection to the amendment must be seasonably made, for when the trial was
had upon an information substituted for the complaint or information without
any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. It cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.

VILLAFLOR vs VIVAR
FACTS:
> An Information for slight physical injuries was filed against Respondent Dindo
Vivar. The case stemmed from the alleged mauling of Petitioner Gian Paulo Villaflor
by respondent. After the severe beating he took from respondent, petitioner decided
to leave the premises together with a friend who was in the restroom when the
mauling incident took place. On his way out, petitioner again met respondent who
told him, Sa susunod gagamitin ko na itong baril ko.
> When the injuries sustained by petitioner turned out to be more serious than they
had appeared at first, an Information for serious physical injuries was filed against
respondent. The earlier charge of slight physical injuries was withdrawn.
> At the same time, another Information for grave threats was filed against
respondent.
> Respondent posted a cash bond for serious physical injuries. Instead of filing a
counter-affidavit as required by the trial court, he filed a Motion to Quash the
Information for grave threats. He contended that the threat, having been made in
connection with the charge of serious physical injuries, should have been absorbed
by the latter. Thus, he concluded that charge for grave threat should be dismissed,
as the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
> Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) denied the Motion to Quash.
> Thus, he was duly arraigned for grave threats and he pleaded not guilty.
> Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC; It ruled the dismissal the
two criminal cases for serious physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 23787) and grave
threats (Criminal Case No. 23728) on the ground that the public prosecutor had
failed to conduct a preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation be considered a ground to quash the criminal informations for serious
physical injuries and grave threats filed against the accused-respondent?
RULING:
NO. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial.
However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the
information. The trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in

abeyance the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
Hence, the RTC in this case erred when it dismissed the two criminal cases for
serious physical injuries and grave threats on the ground that the public prosecutor
had failed to conduct a preliminary investigation.
We believe that a new preliminary investigation cannot be demanded by
respondent. This is because the change made by the public prosecutor was
only a formal amendment.
The filing of the Amended Information, without a new preliminary
investigation, did not violate the right of respondent to be protected from a
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution; an open and public accusation of a
crime; or from the trouble, the expenses and the anxiety of a public trial. The
Amended Information could not have come as a surprise to him for the simple and
obvious reason that it charged essentially the same offense as that under the
original Information. Moreover, if the original charge was related to the amended
one, such that an inquiry would elicit substantially the same facts, then a new
preliminary investigation was not necessary.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the
grounds on which an accused can move to quash the complaint or
information. These are: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the
court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged (c) the court trying
the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who filed
the information had no authority to do so; (e) the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged, except in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses; (g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;
and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or is in jeopardy of being
convicted or acquitted of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the above-mentioned section is there any mention of a lack of a
preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. Moreover, such
motion is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. In the present case, the RTC therefore erred in granting herein
respondents Motion to Quash
Furthermore, we stress that the failure of the accused to assert any ground for a
motion to quash before arraignment, either because he had not filed the motion or
had failed to allege the grounds therefor, shall be deemed a waiver of such grounds.
In this case, he waived his right to file such motion when he pleaded not guilty to the
charge of grave threats.

PEOPLE vs FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
> Before the Court is Federico Conrado's appeal from the decision * of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) convicting him and the other accused of the
crime of rape and sentencing them each to suffer inter alia two (2) death penalties.
> The above-named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned offended party Rebecca M. Soriano (a househelper), a virgin and 15
years old, by means of force and intimidation and against the will of the latter.
> Assisted by counsel, the accused Fernandez and Conrado, uncle and nephew
respectively, pleaded not guilty on arraignment and underwent trial.
> In the trial court's decision holding that the guilt of both accused had been
established beyond shadow of any doubt.
> As already stated, the defense of both accused is alibi, which is not even
corroborated by a single defense witness.
> WHEREFORE, the Court finds each of the accused MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ,
alias "Moding" and FEDERICO CONRADO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
crimes of rape, hereby sentences each of them to suffer two (2) penalties of death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a violation of the rule against duplicity of
offenses when the accused were convicted for two counts of rape?

RULING:
NO. The trial court is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of
offenses in that, the accused were convicted for two (2) crimes of rape even when
under the criminal complaint against them, there is only one (1) crime of rape
alleged. The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
states that there should be only one (1) offense charged in a criminal
complaint or information, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant a
necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not be confused in his
defense. But it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is
committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the
complaint; and failure of the accused to interpose the objection constitutes
waiver. Conrado, after he had been convicted by the court a quo, can no longer
assail its judgment by raising this issue. Neither can he claim, as he now does, that
he was denied the information that he was to be tried for two (2) separate crimes of
rape. The acts complained of, as constituting the offenses, were stated in the 2 June
1982 complaint in ordinary and concise language that any person of common
intelligence would be able to understand and thereby know what acts he was to
defend himself against.

The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to two (2)
crimes of rape is proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. As clearly
found by the trial court:
Both accused have, obviously, conspired and confederated to commit the crime,
considering that they entered the bathroom where Rebecca was, together and at the
same time. Accused Fernandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly around her
neck, while accused Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body, to
prevent her from struggling or resisting. Then after accused Fernandez had raped
Rebecca, accused Conrado raped her. Both accused, thereafter, fled from the scene
of the crime together and at the same time. All these circumstances show beyond
shadow of any doubt conspiracy on the part of both accused, which renders each of
them liable for two (2) crimes of rape, . . .
In a long line of decided cases, it has been held by this Court that in multiple
rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally
committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because
each of them (accused) cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated
by the others, by acts without which it would not have been accomplished.

PEOPLE vs LOPEZ
FACTS:
> The above-named accused together with one John Doe, whose identity has not yet
been established, armed with a short firearm, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot ROGELIO SELDERA and RODOLFO PADAPAT which caused
their immediate death and wounded MARIO SELDERA on his breast to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs.
> According to Dr. Bustos reports, the cause of death of the victims was cerebral
hemorrhage and cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to gunshot wounds.
> Accused-appellants defense was alibi but was not considered by the court.
> Accused Federico Lopez @ Amboy Lopez is hereby declared GUILTY of the crime
of Double Murder With Frustrated Murder beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby
sentenced to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information is defective since it charged the accused of
more than one offense?
RULING:
YES. The Information is formally defective as it charged more the one
offense in violation of Rule 110, 13 of the Revised Rules of Court. However, because
of his failure to file a motion to quash, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived
objection based on the ground of duplicity. The dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision finds accused-appellant guilty of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, but
sentences him for two separate counts of murder and one count of frustrated
homicide. We hold that accused-appellant was guilty of two counts of murder and
one count of attempted murder. Under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex
crime is committed only when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies. As the victims in this case were successively shot by accusedappellant with a shotgun, each shot necessarily constitutes one act. Accusedappellant should thus be held liable for three separate crimes.