Case 13-4840, Document 116-1, 09/22/2015, 1603743, Page1 of 35

134840cv
KnifeRights,Inc.v.Vance

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit
________________

AugustTerm,2014

(Argued:January13,2015Decided:September22,2015)

DocketNo.134840cv
________________

KNIFERIGHTS,INC.,JOHNCOPELAND,PEDROPEREZ,KNIFERIGHTSFOUNDATION,
INC.,NATIVELEATHER,LTD.,

PlaintiffsAppellants,

v.

CYRUSVANCE,JR.,inhisOfficialCapacityastheNewYorkCountyDistrict
Attorney,CITYOFNEWYORK,

DefendantsAppellees.*
________________
Before:
KATZMANN,ChiefJudge,KEARSEandRAGGI,CircuitJudges.
________________

*TheClerkofCourtisdirectedtoamendtheofficialcaptionasshownabove.
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This appeal challenges a judgment of the United States District Court for
theSouthernDistrictofNewYork(Forrest,J.)dismissingforlackofstandingan
asappliedvaguenesschallengetoaNewYorklawcriminalizingthepossession
ofgravityknives.N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(5),265.01(1);see42U.S.C.1983.
Plaintiffs,twoindividualsandabusinesspreviouslychargedwithviolationsof
thelaw,andtwoorganizationsadvocatingwithrespecttokniferights,maintain
thattheysatisfactorilypleadedtheactualorimminentthreatofharmnecessary
to the injuryinfact element of constitutional standing. We agree that the
individual and business plaintiffs have standing to pursue declaratory and
injunctivereliefinthiscase,butnottheadvocacyorganizations.

AFFIRMEDINPARTANDVACATEDANDREMANDEDINPART.
________________

DANIEL L. SCHMUTTER, Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis LLP,

Woodbridge,NewJersey,forPlaintiffsAppellants.

BENJAMIN E. ROSENBERG (Patricia J. Bailey, on the brief), Assistant

DistrictAttorneys,forCyrusR.Vance,Jr.,DistrictAttorneyof
New York County, New York, New York, for Defendant
AppelleeCyrusR.Vance,Jr.

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MICHAELJ.PASTOR,SeniorCounsel(KristinM.Helmers,Counsel,on
the brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York, New York, New York, for Defendant
AppelleeCityofNewYork.
________________

REENARAGGI,CircuitJudge:
In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs John
Copeland,PedroPerez,NativeLeather,Ltd.,KnifeRights,Inc.,andKnifeRights
Foundation,Inc.,invoke42U.S.C.1983tochargetheCityofNewYorkandthe
New York County District Attorney, Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., with applying New
York law criminalizing the possession of gravity knives, see N.Y. Penal Law
265.00(5), 265.01(1), in such a way as to render the proscription
unconstitutionallyvague,therebydeprivingplaintiffsofthenoticemandatedby
due process. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Katherine B. Forrest, Judge), dismissed plaintiffs amended complaint for
lackofsubjectmatterjurisdiction,seeFed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(1),concludingthatno
plaintiffhaddemonstratedstandingtopursuethatchallenge.SeeKnifeRights,
Inc.v.Vance,No.11Civ.3918(KBF),2013WL5434610(S.D.N.Y.Sept.25,2013).
Plaintiffsnowappeal,arguingthattheyeachsatisfactorilyallegedtheimminent

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threat of harm necessary to demonstrate the injury in fact required for

constitutionalstanding.
Forthereasonsstatedherein,weconcludethatplaintiffsCopeland,Perez,
and Native Leather adequately allege standing, but that the organizational
plaintiffs, Knife Rights and Knife Rights Foundation, do not. Accordingly, we
affirmthejudgmentofdismissalastoKnifeRightsandKnifeRightsFoundation,
but we vacate the judgment against Copeland, Perez, and Native Leather and
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings as to these three
plaintiffsconsistentwiththisopinion.
I.

Background
A.

StatutoryFramework

Under New York law, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth

degreeisaclassAmisdemeanorpunishablebynomorethanoneyearinprison.
See N.Y. Penal Law 70.15(1), 265.01(1). Switchblades and gravity knives are
amongtheweaponsspecificallyproscribedby265.01(1).NewYorkdefinesa
switchbladeknifeasanyknifewhichhasabladewhichopensautomatically
byhandpressureappliedtoabutton,springorotherdeviceinthehandleofthe

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knife. Id. 265.00(4). It defines a gravity knife as any knife which has a
bladewhichisreleasedfromthehandleorsheaththereofbytheforceofgravity
ortheapplicationofcentrifugalforcewhich,whenreleased,islockedinplaceby
meansofabutton,spring,leverorotherdevice.Id.265.00(5).TheNewYork
Court of Appeals has explained that the latter definition distinguishes gravity
knivesfromcertainfoldingknivesthatcannotreadilybeopenedbygravityor
centrifugalforce.Peoplev.Dreyden,15N.Y.3d100,104,905N.Y.S.2d542,544
(2010).
Plaintiffs assert that, consistent with these definitions and judicial gloss,
265.01(1)hasbeenenforcedwithoutcontroversyfordecadesbyreferencetothe
essentialattributeofbothswitchbladeandgravityknives,i.e.,thelackofany
mechanical resistance (or bias) against opening from the closed position that
must be overcome in order for [these knives] to open. Am. Compl. 2.
Plaintiffscomplainthat,morerecently,defendantshaveconstruedthedefinition
of gravity knife in such a way as to render the statutory prohibition
unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, defendants have applied the law to any
folding knifeeven ones designed to resist opening from the closed position

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(commonfoldingknives1)ifitwouldbepossibleforsomepersontoopenthe
knifebymeansofawristflickingmotion.Id.3.2Plaintiffsarguethataperson
inpossessionofacommonfoldingknife,particularlyonethatthepersonhimself
is unable to open with a wrist flick, cannot be expected to know that his
possession is criminal because some asyetunidentified person may be able to
flickopentheknife.Onthisappeal,wedonotconsiderthemeritsofplaintiffs
vaguenessclaim,butonlytheirstandingtopursueit.Becausepastenforcement
efforts against certain plaintiffs are relevant to their standing, we proceed to
summarizethoseefforts.

1 While common folding knives is not a statutorily defined term, the parties
haveemployeditintheirpaperstoreferenceknivesdesignedtoresistopening
fromtheclosedposition.Am.Compl.3;seeAppellee(Vance)Br.6n.4.We
dolikewiseinthisopinion.

2 The parties dispute whether wrist flicking necessarily implicates centrifugal

force, compare Appellee (Vance) Br. 4447, with Appellants Reply Br. 24, a
questionthatweneednotansweronthisappeal.
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B.

DefendantsEnforcementEffortsAgainstPlaintiffs
1.

CopelandandPerez

PlaintiffsJohnCopelandandPedroPerezare,respectively,anartistandan
artdealer.Bothhadroutinelycarriedfoldingknivesforuseintheirworkuntil
2010whensuchknifepossessionresultedineachmanseparatelybeingcharged
with violating 265.01(1). Perez was so charged on April 15, 2010, when New
York City police officers observed him at a Manhattan subway station with a
metalclipprotrudingfromhispocket.Inquiryrevealedthecliptobepartofa
Gerber brand common folding knife that Perez had purchased approximately
two years earlier at Tent & Trail, an outdoor supply store in Manhattan.
Plaintiffs assert that the charging officers were unable themselves to flick open
Perezsknife,butbasedonthepossibilitythatsomeonecoulddoso,theyissued
Perez a desk appearance ticket charging him with unlawful possession of a
gravityknife.
Somemonths later, on October10, 2010, Copeland wassimilarly charged
whenpolice,observingametalclipinhispocket,foundhiminpossessionofa
Benchmadebrandcommonfoldingknife,purchasedtheyearbeforeatParagon

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SportsinManhattan.PlaintiffsassertthatontwooccasionsbeforeOctober2010,
CopelandhadshownhisBenchmadeknifetoNewYorkCitypoliceofficersand
inquiredastothelegalityofitspossession.Onbothoccasions,theofficerswere
unable to flick open the knife and so returned it to Copeland, advising that its
possessionwaslegal.Bycontrast,theofficerswhostoppedCopelandinOctober
2010wereabletoopentheknifebygraspingtheknifeshandleandforcefully
flicking the knife body downwards and, thus, issued Copeland a desk
appearanceticketforviolating265.01(1).Am.Compl.30.
Perez and Copeland each retained counsel to defend the 265.01(1)
chargesbydisputingthatthedevicesintheirpossessionwereproscribedgravity
knives. The question was never resolved because, in both cases, the parties
agreedtoadjournmentsincontemplationofdismissal,anonmeritsdisposition.
See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 170.55(2); Hollender v. Trump Vill. Coop., Inc., 58
N.Y.2d 420, 423, 461 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (1983) (explaining that adjournment in
contemplationofdismissalisneitheraconvictionnoranacquittal).
In this action, Perez and Copeland assert their continuing interest in
carryingcommonfoldingknivesinNewYorkCitybutmaintainthattheydonot

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do so for fear of again being charged with a 265.01(1) violation, given their
inability to determine which common folding knives defendants might deem
prohibitedbythatlaw.
2.

NativeLeather

PlaintiffNativeLeatheroperatesaretailstoreinManhattan,whereitsells,
amongotherthings,commonfoldingknives.PlaintiffsallegethatinJune2010,
defendantVanceinitiatedenforcementactionsagainstnumerousNewYorkCity
knife retailers, claiming that an undercover investigation had revealed the
retailerssaleofproscribedgravityknives.Manyretailersresolvedtheseactions
by agreeing to pay fines, totaling an aggregate of nearly $1.9 million; to
surrendervariousfoldingknivesintheirinventories;andtorefrainfromfuture
sales of gravity knives. Seven retailers, including Native Leather, did so by
enteringintodeferredprosecutionagreements.
Under its agreement, Native Leather not only paid a monetary fine and
forfeited certain folding knives, but also adopted a compliance program
approvedbythedistrictattorneysofficeandpledgedtopermanentlyceaseand
desist from selling any prohibited gravity knives in the future. J.A. 251.

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Pursuanttoitscomplianceprogram,NativeLeatherhasadesignatedemployee
test each common folding knife in its inventory by making several attempts to
open the knife by means of a wristflicking action. Native Leather only sells
commonfoldingknivesthatthedesignatedemployeecannotflickopenoneven
asingleattempt.
Although most provisions of Native Leathers deferred prosecution
agreementhavenowexpired,itassertsthatitmaintainsitscomplianceprogram
to avoid running afoul of defendants interpretation of the statutory
prohibitionofgravityknives.Am.Compl.45.Atthesametime,itprofesses
concernthatitsprogramcannotassurethatsomeotherpersonwillnotbeable
toflickopenoneofitsknivesdespiteitsownemployeesinabilitytodoso.Id.
Thus, it complains that, while it wishes to sell a wide assortment of common
foldingknives,itdoesnotdosobecauseitcannotconfidentlydeterminewhich
suchknivesdefendantswilldeemgravityknivesinviolationof265.01(1).
3.

KnifeRightsandKnifeRightsFoundation

Knife Rights is a membership advocacy organization that promotes

legislative and legal action, as well as research, publishing, and advocacy, in

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support of peoples ability to carry and use knives and tools. Id. 10. Knife
Rightsalsoseekstovindicatethelegalrightsofindividualsandbusinesseswho
areunabletoactontheirownbehalfinlightofthecostsandtimecommitments
involved in litigation. Id. 47. Knife Rights asserts that defendants have
charged or threatened to charge certain of its members with violations of
265.01(1). As a result, some (unidentified) members have refrained from
carryingorsellingfoldingknivesforfearofbeingsocharged.
KnifeRightsFoundationisanonprofitorganizationintendedtopromote
education and research regarding knives and edged tools. Id. 13. Knife
Rights Foundation alleges that it haspaid or contributedtowards . . . some of
the monetary expenses that Knife Rights has incurred . . . in consequence of
Defendants threatened enforcement of 265.01(1), which expenditures have
come at the expense of other organizational priorities of Knife Rights
Foundation.Id.52.
C.

PriorProceedings

OnJune9,2011,plaintiffsCopeland,Perez,andKnifeRightsinitiatedthis
action, seeking (1) a declaration that N.Y. Penal Law 265.00(5) and 265.01(1)

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are unconstitutionally vague as applied to common folding knives, and (2) an

injunctionpreventingdefendantscontinuedenforcementofthesestatutesasto
such knives.3 Defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to, inter alia, Fed. R.
Civ.P.12(b)(1)and(c),whereuponplaintiffssuccessfullysoughtleavetoamend.
This resulted, among other things, in the addition of Native Leather and Knife
RightsFoundationasnamedplaintiffs.
Defendantsthereafterrenewedtheirmotionfordismissal,arguingthatthe
courtlackedsubjectmatterjurisdictionbecausenoplaintiffallegedtheinjuryin
fact necessary to satisfy Article IIIs caseorcontroversy requirement. The
district court agreed and entered judgment for defendants on September 25,
2013.AstoplaintiffsCopelandandPerez,thedistrictcourtdeterminedthatany
injurywascompletelyhypotheticalandhighlyspeculative,becauseneither

3 Plaintiffs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the
application of the switchblade prohibition of 265.00(4) and 265.01(1) to
commonfoldingknivesdesignedtoresistopeningfromtheirfoldedandclosed
positions. On appeal, however, plaintiffs challenge dismissal only by reference
tothe265.00(5)gravityknifeban.SeeAppellantsBr.3(Switchbladeknives
arenotatissuehere.).Accordingly,plaintiffsappeartohaveabandonedtheir
challengetotheswitchbladeban,andwedonotconsiderithere.SeeHughesv.
Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local No. 45, 386 F.3d 101, 104 n.1 (2d Cir.
2004).
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hadallegedthemakeandmodelofknifethathewantstocarryorspecifically
describe[d] it. Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance, 2013 WL 5434610, at *4 (internal
quotationmarksomitted).AstoNativeLeather,thedistrictcourtstatedthatthe
storesdesiretoskirttheedgesofthelawdoesnotcreateaninjurysufficientfor
ArticleIIIstanding.Id.ThedistrictcourtfurtherconcludedthatKnifeRights
and Knife Rights Foundations expenditure of resources to avoid an entirely
hypotheticalpossibilitythatthegovernmentspolicieswillinjuretheirmembers
didnotconferstandingbecausethethreatofharmtotheorganizationsandtheir
memberswastoospeculative.Id.at*5.
Plaintiffssoughtreconsideration,arguingthatthedistrictcourthadfailed
to consider their request for leave to amend and providing the court with a
proposed second amended complaint indicating that, but for the alleged
vagueness in defendants application of 265.01(1), plaintiff Copeland would
purchase,possess,anduseanotherBenchmademodel10210foldingknife,and
that plaintiff Perez would purchase, possess, and use another Gerber model
05785foldingknife.ProposedSecondAm.Compl.54,59.Thedistrictcourt
denied reconsideration, noting, among other things, that amendment would

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unduly prejudice defendants because discovery had been completed and

summaryjudgmenthadalreadybeenawardedintheirfavor.
Thistimelyappealfollowed.
II.

Discussion
A.

DismissalforLackofSubjectMatterJurisdiction
1.

TheJurisdictionalRequirementofStanding

Toensurethatpersonsarenotdeniedlibertywithoutdueprocess,thelaw
requires that criminal offenses be defined with sufficient definiteness that
ordinarypeoplecanunderstandwhatconductisprohibitedandinamannerthat
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v.
Lawson,461U.S.352,357(1983);accordJohnsonv.UnitedStates,135S.Ct.2551,
255657(2015).Astatutethatfailstodosoisdeemedunconstitutionallyvague.
PlaintiffsheresueforajudicialdeclarationthatN.Y.PenalLaw265.00(5)and
265.01(1)areunconstitutionallyvagueasappliedtocommonfoldingknives,and
foranorderenjoiningthefutureapplicationofthesestatutestosuchknives.
A courts jurisdiction to hear such a vagueness challenge is limited to an
actualcaseorcontroversy.SeeU.S.Const.,art.III,2.Thedoctrineofstanding

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givesmeaningtotheseconstitutionallimits,SusanB.AnthonyListv.Driehaus,
134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014), by requiring a plaintiff to allege[] such a personal
stakeintheoutcomeofthecontroversyastowarranthisinvocationoffederal
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the courts remedial powers on his
behalf, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 49899 (1975) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To establish Article III standing, then, a plaintiff must show (1) an
injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the
conductcomplainedof,and(3)alikel[ihood]thattheinjurywillberedressed
byafavorabledecision.SusanB.AnthonyListv.Driehaus,134S.Ct.at2341
(alterationinoriginal)(quotingLujanv.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555,560
61(1992)).
The district court here concluded that plaintiffs failed to carry their
standingburdenatthefirstelement.Wereviewplaintiffschallengetothislegal
conclusion de novo, borrowing from the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard, which
instructs us to construe the pleadings in plaintiffs favor, accepting as true all
materialfactualallegationscontainedtherein.SeeW.R.HuffAssetMgmt.Co.v.
Deloitte&ToucheLLP,549F.3d100,106(2dCir.2008).

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For an alleged injury to support constitutional standing, it must be

concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting
Lujanv.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.at560(otherquotationmarksomitted)).
The Supreme Court has described the imminence requirement differently in
differentcontexts,withoutspecifyingwhetherthedescriptionsaresynonymous
ordistinct.See,e.g.,Clapperv.AmnestyIntlUSA,133S.Ct.1138,1150&n.5
(2013) (employing certainly impending standard while acknowledging cases
referencing substantial risk standard, but declining to address possible
distinction); accord Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (An
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly
impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur. (quoting
Clapper));seealsoHedgesv.Obama,724F.3d170,19596(2dCir.2013).
Where,ashere,certainplaintiffsassertinjuryfromthreatenedprosecution,
theSupremeCourthasinstructedthatimminencedoesnotrequireaplaintiffto
expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the
threatfor example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced.

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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 12829 (2007) (collecting
cases);accordSusanB.AnthonyListv.Driehaus,134S.Ct.at2342;seegenerally
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 480 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(observing that declaratory judgment procedure is an alternative to pursuit of
the arguably illegal activity). Rather, in the context of preenforcement
challenges to criminal statutes, imminent injury can be established byplausible
allegationsthataplaintiffinten[ds]toengageinacourseofconductarguably
affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by . . . statute, and there
exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder. Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2342 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Natl
Union,442U.S.289,298(1979)).4Theidentificationofacrediblethreatsufficient

4 The Supreme Court has not limited standing to pursue preenforcement

challenges only to plaintiffs intending conduct arguably affected with a
constitutionalinterest.SeeMedImmune,Inc.v.Genentech,Inc.,549U.S.at122
25, 12831 (recognizing standing to challenge patent validity based on clear
threat of action for breach of license or infringement). Nevertheless, plaintiffs
intended conduct here is affected by such an interestspecifically, the due
processinterestinhavingnoticeofconductcurtailedbycriminalstatutes.While
manypreenforcementchallengeshaveimplicatedtheFirstAmendmentrightof
freeexpression,see,e.g.,SusanB.AnthonyListv.Driehaus,134S.Ct.at234244;
Holderv.HumanitarianLawProject,561U.S.1,1516(2010);Babbittv.United

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tosatisfytheimminencerequirementofinjuryinfactnecessarilydependsonthe
particular circumstances at issue. A credible threat of prosecution, however,
cannotrestonfearsthatareimaginaryorspeculative.Babbittv.UnitedFarm
WorkersNatlUnion,442U.S.at298(quotingYoungerv.Harris,401U.S.37,42
(1971)).Norisitevidentwhereplaintiffsdonotclaimthattheyhaveeverbeen
threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a
prosecution is remotely possible. Id. at 29899 (internal quotation marks
omitted). That is hardly this case, at least not as to plaintiffs Native Leather,
Copeland,andPerez.
2.

Native Leather Demonstrates a Credible Threat of Imminent

ProsecutionforIntendedConduct

NativeLeatherassertsthatithasinthepastsold,andwishesagaintooffer
for sale, a variety of common folding knives that it does not think violate

FarmWorkersNatlUnion,442U.S.at297301;Ellisv.Dyson,421U.S.426,430,
43335 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 459, many of these same cases
have also presented the due process interest in avoiding vague criminal
prohibitions,seeHumanitarianLawProject,561U.S.at7,1011,1825;Babbitt,
442U.S.at29596,303;Ellis,421U.S.at428,430,43335.TheCourthasdrawn
no distinction between these constitutional interests in pronouncing a credible
threatofprosecutionsufficienttoestablishstanding,norhavedefendantsurged
ustodosohere.
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265.01(1) because they have a mechanical bias in favor of the closed position
that must be overcome in order to open them. It does not do so, however,
becauseitcannotconfidentlydeterminewhichsuchknivesdefendantswilldeem
proscribed gravity knives, and it does not wish to risk prosecution. This
professed fear of prosecution is hardly conjectural or hypothetical, given that
defendantVancerecentlyidentifiedNativeLeatherasa265.01(1)violatorand
pursuedenforcementactionagainstit.InSusanB.AnthonyListv.Driehaus,the
SupremeCourtlocatedasubstantialthreatoffutureprosecutioninahistory
ofpastenforcement.134S.Ct.at2345.Thepastenforcementthereincludeda
determination that probable cause supported a complaint that petitioners had
madestatementsviolativeofthestatelawwhoseconstitutionalitytheywishedto
challenge. See id. at 2339. The threat is even more substantial here because in
SusanB.AnthonyList,thecomplaintwaswithdrawn,seeid.at2340,whilehere,
Native Leather was officially charged, paid fines, surrendered property in
purported violation of law, implemented a prosecutionapproved compliance
program, and entered into a deferred prosecution agreement that expressly
threatenedfuturechargesifitstermswerenotsatisfied.SeegenerallySteffelv.

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Thompson, 415 U.S. at 456 & n.4 (recognizing imminent threat where parties
stipulatedthatarrestwarrantswouldbesoughtifplaintiffengagedinspecified
conduct); see also Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Assn, 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988)
(recognizing imminent threat where challenged statute would require plaintiffs
to take significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal
prosecution). One of these terms required Native Leather to permanently
ceaseanddesistfromsellingknivesprohibitedby265.01(1),J.A.251,thevery
statute that plaintiffs maintain defendants apply in a way that creates
constitutionally impermissible vagueness. While the agreement had expired in
all other respects approximately nine months before Native Leather joined this
lawsuit, the totality of these circumstances demonstrates a credible threat of
imminentprosecutionifVanceweretodeterminethatNativeLeatherwasagain
offering for sale common folding knives that he deemed proscribed gravity
knives.Certainly,defendantsdonotdisavowsuchenforcement.See,e.g.,Susan
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2345 (citing absence of disavowal as
furthersupportofcrediblethreat).Thus,NativeLeatherisnotrequiredeitherto
pursue arguably illegal activity, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 480

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(Rehnquist,J.,concurring),ortoexposeitselftocriminalliabilitybeforebringing
suit to challenge the constitutionality of [the] law threatened to be enforced,
MedImmune,Inc.v.Genentech,Inc.,549U.S.at129.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), is not to the contrary.
There, a plaintiff who had been placed in a chokehold by police effecting his
arrestsuedfordeclaratoryandinjunctiverelieffromanallegedmunicipalpolicy
ofexcessiveforceinarrest.Seeid.at9798,110.TheSupremeCourtconcluded
thatplaintifflackedstandingtochallengetheallegedpolicybecausehefailedto
establish (1) an imminent threat that he would again be stopped by police,
particularlyasheexpressednointenttoviolateanylawinthefuture;or(2)the
blanket application of chokeholds by arresting Los Angeles police officers. See
id.at10506. By contrast, here NativeLeather hasexpressed its intent (but for
thefearofprosecution)toengageintheveryconductthatprompteddefendants
prior enforcement action. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at
2346(identifyingimminentharmwhereplaintiffallegedintenttoengageinsame

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speechthatwassubjectofpriorenforcementproceeding).5Moreover,whileno
defendantinLyonsthreatenedplaintiffwithfuturechokeholds,defendantshere
expressly threatened to prosecute Native Leather for 265.01(1) violations, as
determined by Vance, if Native Leather violated any term of its deferred
prosecution agreement, including the pledge permanently to cease and desist
fromsellinggravityknives.SeeSteffelv.Thompson,415U.S.at456&n.4.6

5WhilepetitionersinSusanB.AnthonyListpleadedthespecificstatementsthey
intended to make in future election cycles to support their professed fear of
futureprosecution,see134S.Ct.at2343,wedonotunderstandsuchspecificity
tobeessentialtostanding,particularlywhere,ashere,astatuteischallengedfor
unconstitutional vagueness, see, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S. at 1516 (concluding that plaintiffs who professed intent to provide
designatedterroristgroupswithsimilarsupporttothatpreviouslyprovided
but who did not specifically describe future supporthad standing to pursue
vagueness challenge to prohibiting statute). Thus, we reject the district courts
determination that in this casewhere certain plaintiffs have already been
subjected to enforcement actions for violating a statute whose application they
submit does not allow them to determine what is proscribedthese plaintiffs
mustspecificallyidentify,bymakeandmodel,thecommonfoldingknivesthey
wishtosellorpossesstodemonstratestanding.

6 Lyons might also be distinguished for another reason: it did not involve a
vagueness challenge. In Lyons, plaintiffs claim focused on the actions of law
enforcement and, in particular, the possibility that an officer might use
unconstitutionalforceinafutureencounter.Bycontrast,plaintiffsclaimshere

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Accordingly,totheextentthedistrictcourtconcludedthatNativeLeather
failedtosatisfytheinjuryinfactelementofstanding,wevacateitsjudgmentin
favorofdefendantsandremandforfurtherproceedings.
3.

Copeland and Perez Demonstrate a Credible Threat of

ImminentProsecutionforIntendedConduct

Copeland and Perez assert that they have in the past carried, and wish
again to carry, common folding knives, but do not do so because they cannot
confidently determine which such knives defendants will deem gravity knives
prohibited by 265.01(1), and they do not wish to risk prosecution. Their
professedfearisalsonotconjecturalorhypothetical.Eachmanhasalreadybeen
chargedwitha265.01(1)violationforcarryingacommonfoldingknife.Each
was obliged to retain counsel to secure an adjournment in contemplation of
dismissal.SeeSusanB.AnthonyListv.Driehaus,134S.Ct.at2345.Tobesure,
that nonmerits disposition, unlike the deferred prosecution agreement
applicable to Native Leather, did not expressly threaten future prosecution if
Copeland or Perez were again to carry the knives prompting charges against

focusontheactionsandreasonableapprehensionsofprivateactors,whoseekto
engageinconductwhoselegalitytheycannotreasonablydetermine.
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them. But certainly nowhere in the record of this litigation have defendants
disavowed that they would criminally charge Copeland and Perez again in the
same circumstances. See id. at 2345; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S.at16(recognizingimminentthreatwheregovernmenthadnotargued...
thatplaintiffswillnotbeprosecutediftheydowhattheysaytheywishtodo);
seealsoBabbittv.UnitedFarmWorkersNatlUnion,442U.S.at302(notingthat
plaintiffswerenotwithoutsomereasoninfearingprosecutionwherestatehad
not disavowed any intention of invoking the criminal penalty provision).
Indeed,thecontrarycanbeinferredfromdefendantVancesdefenseofthewrist
flick test supporting these plaintiffs past arrests. See Appellee (Vance) Br. 44
47.7
Thus,CopelandandPerezarenotsimilarlysituatedtotheplaintiffinCity
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, because (1) they affirmatively wish to

7Vancemakesthispointinurgingthiscourttoconcludeasamatteroflawthat
N.Y. Penal Law 265.00(4)(5) and 265.01(1) are not void for vagueness as
appliedtocommonfoldingknivesdesignedtoresistopeningfromtheirfolded
andclosedposition.SeeAppellee(Vance)Br.4155.Wedeclinetoruleonthis
matterinadvanceofthedistrictcourt,whichhasnotyethadanopportunityto
construe the statutory text or to review the record evidence developed in
discoveryastodefendantsapplicationofthestatute.
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engage in the very conduct that resulted in defendants charging them with
violationsof265.01(1);and(2)therecordindicatesthat,uponbecomingaware
of any such conduct by plaintiffs, defendants would again charge them with
violationsoflaw.8
Becausethesecircumstancesdemonstrateacrediblethreatofprosecution,
neither Copeland nor Perez is required to pursue arguably illegal activity or to
expose himself to criminal liability before bringing suit to challenge the
constitutionalityofthelawthreatenedtobeenforced.SeeMedImmune,Inc.v.
Genentech,Inc.,549U.S.at129;Steffelv.Thompson,415U.S.at480(Rehnquist,

8 In Lyons, the Supreme Court emphasized that plaintiff had nowhere asserted
that Los Angeles police always employed a chokehold in citizen encounters, or
thatthecityauthorizedsuchconduct.SeeCityofLosAngelesv.Lyons,461U.S.
at106.Thus,itwasnomorethanconjecturetosuggestthatineveryinstanceof
a traffic stop, arrest, or other encounter between the police and a citizen, the
policewillactunconstitutionallyandinflictinjurywithoutprovocationorlegal
excuse. Id. at 108. By contrast, the crux of plaintiffs claim here is that
defendants generally apply the State laws prohibiting . . . gravity knives to
include Common Folding Knives thatin their viewcan be readily opened
with a wristflicking motion, with the result that NYPD officers arrest and
chargeindividualsfoundcarryingsuchCommonFoldingKniveswithCriminal
PossessionofaWeaponintheFourthDegree,and[Vance]prosecutesthealleged
offenses.Am.Compl.3;seeid.1516(allegingthatdefendantscontinue
toenforceandthreatentoenforcegravityknifeprohibition).
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J., concurring). To the extent the district court concluded that these plaintiffs
failedtosatisfytheinjuryinfactelementofstanding,wevacateitsjudgmentin
favorofdefendantsandremandforfurtherproceedings.
4.

KnifeRightsandKnifeRightsFoundation
FailToDemonstrateStanding

We reach a different conclusion as to the standing of organizational

plaintiffsKnifeRightsandKnifeRightsFoundation.
Insofarastheseplaintiffssuedonbehalfoftheirmembers,[i]tisthelaw
ofthisCircuitthatanorganizationdoesnothavestandingtoasserttherightsof
itsmembersinacasebroughtunder42U.S.C.1983.Nnebev.Daus,644F.3d
147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). Plaintiffs argue that Nnebe and the
precedentonwhichitreliesconflictwithWarthv.Seldin,422U.S.at511.Butas
Nnebeobserved,thiscourthasreaffirmeditsruleastoorganizationalplaintiffs
representative standing even after Warth v. Seldin; thus, individual panels are
bound by the implicit determination of prior panels that the rule survives
Warthuntilsuchtimeas[ourpriordecisions]areoverruledeitherbyanenbanc
panelofourCourtorbytheSupremeCourt.Nnebev.Daus,644F.3dat156

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n.5(alterationinoriginal)(quotingUnitedStatesv.Wilkerson,361F.3d717,732
(2dCir.2004)).9
Insofarastheorganizationalplaintiffssueontheirownbehalf,theymust
independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. See Havens
RealtyCorp.v.Coleman,455U.S.363,37879(1982)(holdingthatorganizations

9 Our precedent appears to have framed standing in the context of

organizational claims under 1983 more as a statutory than as a constitutional
question.SeeLeagueofWomenVotersv.NassauCnty.Bd.ofSupervisors,737
F.2d155,160(2dCir.1984)(ThisCircuithasrestrictedorganizationalstanding
under 1983 by interpreting the rights it secures to be personal to those
purportedlyinjured.);Aguayov.Richardson,473F.2d1090,1099(2dCir.1973)
(Friendly, C.J.) (framing question as whether the welfare organizations have
standing under the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and its jurisdictional
implementation, 28 U.S.C. 1343(3), and concluding that neither language of
statute nor its history suggests that an organization may sue under the Civil
Rights Act for the violation of rights of members). As such, our adherence to
thisprecedentinconcludingthatKnifeRightsandKnifeRightsFoundationlack
standing might be understood to speak to the plausibility of their
representationalclaimunder1983,ratherthantoourownpowerunderArticle
III.SeegenerallyLexmarkIntl,Inc.v.StaticControlComponents,Inc.,134S.Ct.
1377,1387&n.4(2014)(observingthatwhetherplaintiffcomeswithinthezone
of interests protected by statute requires us to determine, using traditional
toolsofstatutoryinterpretation,whetheralegislativelyconferredcauseofaction
encompasses a particular plaintiffs claim, but that the absence of a valid (as
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subjectmatter
jurisdiction, i.e., the courts statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case(emphasisinoriginal)(internalquotationmarksomitted)).
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standingtosueonitsownbehalfrequiressameinquiryasincaseofindividual:
Hastheplaintiffallegedsuchapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthecontroversy
as to warrant his invocation of federalcourt jurisdiction? (internal quotation
marksomitted));accordNnebev.Daus,644F.3dat156.KnifeRightsandKnife
Rights Foundation attempt to carry this burden by citing the expenses they
incurredinopposingdefendantsapplicationof265.01(1).Evenassumingthat
suchexpendituresperceptiblyimpairedtheseorganizationsactivities,theyat
bestdemonstratepastinjury.HavensRealtyCorp.v.Coleman,455U.S.at378
79(concludingthatnonprofitorganizationestablishedstandinginitsownright
to pursue Fair Housing Act challenge to apartment owners racial steering
practices, where organizations ability to provide counseling and referral
services to its clients had been perceptibly impaired by need to devote
significantresourcestoidentifyandcounteractdefendantschallengedpractices
(internalquotationmarksomitted)).Suchinjurymightadmitstandingtosuefor
compensatory damages. See id. But it is not an injury that can be redressed
through the prospective declaratory and injunctive relief sought in this action.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (Because

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respondentallegesonlypastinfractionsof[law],andnotacontinuing...or...
futureviolation,injunctivereliefwillnotredressitsinjury.);seealsoCityofLos
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 11213 (recognizing standing to pursue damages
remedy for past injury, but denying standing to seek injunctive relief absent
imminentthreatoffutureharm).
In their reply brief, plaintiffs briefly suggest that injunctive relief would
redress future injury by precluding defendants from applying 265.01(1) in a
waythatwillprompttheseorganizationstoincuroppositionexpenses.Evenif
these organizations voluntarily incurred future expenses could satisfy the
injuryinfactelementofstanding,cf.Clapperv.AmnestyIntlUSA,133S.Ct.at
1155(holdingthatplaintiffscannotmanufacturestandingbyincurringcostsin
anticipation of nonimminent harm), such expenses would not be incurred
becauseKnifeRightsandKnifeRightsFoundationthemselvesfaceanyimminent
threat of prosecution under 265.01(1). Thus, because these plaintiffs do not
allegeacrediblethreatthattheywillbeprosecutedunder265.01(1),seeHolder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 15, they must show that both
anticipatedexpendituresandensuingharmtotheirorganizationsactivitiesare

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certainlyimpending, Clapper v. Amnesty IntlUSA, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. They

havenotevenattemptedtomakesuchashowing.
Accordingly,weaffirmthatpartofthejudgmentdismissingKnifeRights
andKnifeRightsFoundationforlackofstanding.
B.

DenialofLeaveToAmend

Plaintiffs contend that, even if their first amended complaint fails to

demonstrate standing, the district court erred in denying their request to file a
secondamendedcomplaint.FederalRuleofCivilProcedure15(a)(2)statesthata
partymayamenditspleadingsmorethanonceonlywiththeopposingpartys
written consent or the courts leave. At the same time, the rule instructs that
courtsshouldfreelygiveleavetoamendwhenjusticesorequires.Id.This
comportswiththelawsstrongpreferenceforresolvingdisputesonthemerits.
Williamsv.CitigroupInc.,659F.3d208,21213(2dCir.2011)(internalquotation
marks omitted). At the same time, it affords district courts considerable
discretiontodenyamendmentwhentherehasbeenunduedelay,badfaithor
dilatorymotiveonthepartofthemovant,repeatedfailuretocuredeficienciesby
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by

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virtueofallowanceoftheamendment,[or]futilityofamendment.Ruotolov.
CityofNewYork,514F.3d184,191(2dCir.2008)(quotingFomanv.Davis,371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am.,
N.A.,626F.3d699,725(2dCir.2010).
Where, as here, parties appeal the denial of leave to amend, we review
onlyforabuseofdiscretion,seeWilliamsv.CitigroupInc.,659F.3dat212,which
ordinarily we will not identify absent an error of law, a clearly erroneous
assessment of the facts, or a decision outside the available range of permitted
choices,seeGrullonv.CityofNewHaven,720F.3d133,140(2dCir.2013).
Plaintiffs contend that the district courts determination that amendment
wouldbeespeciallyprejudicialtodefendantswasinfectedbyfactualerroras
reflected in statements that summary judgment motions had already been filed
andgranted,andthatdiscoveryhadconcluded.KnifeRights,Inc.v.Vance,No.
11 Civ. 3918 (KBF), 2013 WL 6182921, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013). Upon
review of the record, it appears that no summary judgment motions had been
filedordecidedinthecase,andthatthedepositionofplaintiffsproposedexpert
remained to be taken. Nevertheless, we do not think the district courts

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misstatements on these points reflect a clearly erroneous assessment of the

relevantfacts.Thecourthad,indeed,grantedjudgmentinfavorofdefendants,
albeit on motions to dismiss rather than on motions for summary judgment.
Moreover, the misstatement was of no significance because the proposed
amendment sought to supplement plaintiffs pleadings as to standing, the very
issueonwhichdismissalhadbeengranted.Thus,thereisnoreasontothinkthat
thedistrictcourtwasreferencinganyotherjudgmentthantheoneithadinfact
granted.
As for the outstanding defense deposition of plaintiffs expertwhose
opinions plaintiffs presumably knewplaintiffs do not assert that the
proceeding would have made any difference to the challenged dismissal
determination. Thus, the misstatement as to the status of discovery was not
materialtothedenialofleavetoamend.
Plaintiffs further fault the district courts determination that amendment
wouldhaveprejudiceddefendantsbyrequiringfurtherdiscovery.Weidentify
no error in this conclusion as it pertained to plaintiffs Knife Rights and Knife
Rights Foundation. To cite a single example, the fact that the second amended

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complaint alleges injury to both organizations activities, whereas the first

amended complaint alleged such injury only to Knife Rights Foundation,
supportsthedistrictcourtsadditionaldiscoverydetermination.
As to Native Leather, Copeland, and Perez, the additional discovery
challengeappearsmootasplaintiffssoughtleavetoamendtoavoiddismissalof
theirfirstamendedcomplaint,andweherevacatethatdismissalastothesethree
plaintiffs. Nevertheless, we note that the proposed amendment identifies the
makesandmodelsofthecommonfoldingknivesthatCopelandandPerezassert
theywishtopossessmattersthatmayberelevanttothefurtherpursuitofthis
action,butthatwouldnotappeartorequirefurtherdiscovery.Thus,wedonot
foreclosethedistrictcourtonremandfromtakingsuchstepswhetherbyway
of amendment, a simple interrogatory response, or otherwiseas it may deem
warranted to make these knife models part of the record, so as to facilitate
orderlyfutureproceedings.

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III.

Conclusion
Tosummarize,weconcludeasfollows:
1.

Plaintiffs Native Leather, Copeland, and Perez have standing to

challenge defendants application of N.Y. Penal Law 265.00(5) and 265.01(1)

because each has expressed a present intent to possess such knives (but for
defendants challenged enforcement actions) and each has demonstrated a
credible threat of prosecution based on defendants (a) recent enforcement
actions against them, (b) express threat to prosecute Native Leather further
underthetermsofadeferredprosecutionagreement,and(c)continueddefense
ofthewristflicktestthatallegedlypromptedplaintiffspastviolationcharges.
2.

OurprecedentprecludesKnifeRightsandKnifeRightsFoundation

fromassertingstandingonbehalfoftheirmembersunder42U.S.C.1983.Nor
can these organizational plaintiffs demonstrate standing to sue on their own
behalf based on claimed injury to their activities from expenditures diverted to
oppose defendants actions. Such past injuries cannot be redressed by the
declaratory and injunctive relief sought in this action, and plaintiffs fail to

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demonstrate that any future expenditures and attending injuries are certainly
impending.
3.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs

motion for leave to amend their complaint a second time to address defects in
standing.
Accordingly,thedistrictcourtsjudgmentofdismissalisAFFIRMEDasto
KnifeRightsandKnifeRightsFoundation,andVACATEDastoNativeLeather,
Copeland, and Perez. The case is REMANDED as to these three plaintiffs for
furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

35