Certification Review Project

Reviewing the Draft Certification Model:

A Case Study in the Philippines
15 August 2014

Report prepared by Philip Tamminga and Marybeth Redheffer

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... 3
1.

Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 4

2.

Background and objectives for the field research ................................................................................ 5

3.

The humanitarian context in the Philippines ........................................................................................ 8

4.

Application of humanitarian principles and quality and accountability standards in the response... 10

5.

Approaches to principles, accountability and quality in the Caritas network .................................... 12

6.

Integrating quality and accountability into partnership relationships................................................ 17

7.

Compatibility with the Government of Philippines approach to quality and accountability............. 21

8.

Compatibility with the Philippines Council for NGO Certification process ......................................... 22

9.

Other stakeholders views of certification .......................................................................................... 23

10.

Conclusions and recommendations ................................................................................................ 25

Annex 1. List of Interviewees ...................................................................................................................... 29

Acknowledgements
Seven months after Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) struck, organisations in the Philippines were still
heavily engaged in relief operations and the transition to recovery activities, and barraged by constant
evaluations and external visits. The research team expresses their deep gratitude to the people from
dozens of organisations that took the time to meet and share their views and experiences with us. Very
special thanks are due to Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Caritas Switzerland and teams in Tacloban and
Cebu and Caritas Philippines (referred locally as NASSA) for hosting the study and facilitating field visits
and contacts with other stakeholders. We would like to acknowledge the special role of CAFOD for its
early and continual commitment and support for the case study as a means to increase knowledge and
learning in the sector. This was reflected in its efforts to ensure participation of their partners in the
Philippines, and through seconding an additional consultant, Robert Schofield, to support organising the
field research and interviews. Finally, we offer a special thanks to the many barangay leaders and
community members who met with the team and shared first-hand their experiences recovering from
the devastation of Haiyan and their relationships with aid agencies.
Philip Tamminga and Marybeth Redheffer

1. Introduction
How can certification of humanitarian organisations contribute to greater effectiveness and
accountability in humanitarian action? The Certification Review Project, sponsored by the Steering
Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), has been researching what a relevant, sustainable
certification model might look like and how to achieve it. The project aims to learn from, and improve on
current approaches to monitoring, reporting, verification and certification mechanisms in the sector, and
identify the key elements that would ensure that any potential certification model for the sector is
sustainable and clearly demonstrates how it adds value to humanitarian action.
The project developed a draft verification and certification model based on research and wide
stakeholder consultations. The model has been used as a framework to facilitate a more structured and
focused debate amongst stakeholders around the role of external verification and certification. Between
March and June, four country case studies (Ethiopia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the Philippines) were conducted to assess the core assumptions behind the draft certification model. The
case studies sought to determine if and where certification could add value to an organisations work in
the context of different crisis responses, and how any model could be made sustainable. The case
studies also serve to understand the practical implications of certification for organisations, how it could
potentially reinforce their own quality and accountability systems and generate more information on
how certification could or could not contribute to improving humanitarian action.
This Philippines case study is the fourth and final country report. The case study aimed to understand
how the draft model would apply within a partnership network in this case, the Caritas Internationalis
network - with a focus on programming funding and/or implemented by CAFOD, CRS, Caritas Switzerland
and Caritas Philippines (NASSA). Research was carried out between June 9th to June 20th in Manila,
Tacloban, Cebu City and communities in Tabon-Tabon, Burauen and Bantayan.
The research team was comprised of Philip Tamminga, SCHR Certification Review Project Coordinator
and Marybeth Redheffer, an independent consultant, with additional support provided by Robert
Schofield, a consultant for CAFOD. The team interviewed key staff in each of the participating
organisations, as well as representatives of national government and local authorities, UN agencies,
donor governments, and other national and international NGOs engaged in the response.
The case study findings have provided a better understanding of how NGO partners and their
stakeholders view the potential relevance, costs and benefits of external verification and certification.
The project also gained more understanding of the relevance and usability of proposed core assessment
criteria for participating NGOs; and of the implications, including in terms of perceived risks and benefits
of certification, for a variety of humanitarian NGOs and their stakeholders in a context like the
Philippines.

Structure of the report

The report covers the findings from the field research in the Philippines, and offers conclusions and
recommendations around the potential role of certification mechanisms and the feasibility of the
proposed model. Section 2 explains the background to the field research, as well as the objectives,
methodology and limitations. Section 3 describes the humanitarian context in the Philippines, including
the mechanisms used for coordination of the response to Typhoon Haiyan. Section 4 provides some
general observation around how humanitarian principles, accountability and quality are reflected in the
response to Haiyan, while Section 5 analyses how different Caritas members working in the Philippines
4

address the main areas of proposed certification model in their humanitarian programming, as well as
their views of the model. Section 6 offers observations on quality and accountability in partnership
relationships such as those in the Caritas network, and what this implies for the proposed models.
Section 7 explains the Philippine governments approach to disaster management and regulation of
NGOs in addition to government views of certification. Section 8 describes the Philippines Council for
NGO Certification and its views on the proposed model. Section 9 other stakeholders views of the
model, and finally, Section 10 offers conclusions and recommendations from the field research.

2. Background and objectives for the field research

The project consulted widely with stakeholders to develop a draft certification model with proposed
assessment criteria and core requirements to describe a principled, accountable and effective
organisation. The proposed core requirements are grounded in existing commitments, standards and
good practices adopted by the humanitarian community, including the current draft version of the Core
Humanitarian Standard (CHS). The proposed process for assessing and validating an organisation and
granting certification involves organisations making a commitment to reflect the core requirements in
their policies and practices, submit evidence on how these requirements are being applied, and, if
relevant and appropriate to the organisation, undergo a third party external verification process to
certify that the core requirements are being applied in practice.

Objectives of Philippines field research

The objective of the field research was to increase understanding of how organisations apply, measure
and promote humanitarian principles, quality and effectiveness, and accountability in their humanitarian
work, and the potential role and contribution of external verification and certification in support of those
efforts. The field research aimed to test and validate the draft certification models key assumption that
external reporting, verification and certification mechanisms can contribute to improved humanitarian
actions. Research in the Philippines also explored the issue of partnership in terms of how organisations
attempt to ensure that partner organisations comply with humanitarian principles and quality and
accountability standards. The field research also analysed the most useful, relevant, appropriate
approach for certification for the humanitarian sector, and aims to contribute this learning to other
ongoing processes, such as the CHS process.
This Philippines case study is one of four case studies designed to review the main elements of the
proposed certification model from the perspective of actors in different crisis contexts. Other countries
include Ethiopia, Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The countries were selected
to assess the relevance, usefulness and feasibility of the model in a mix of different types of crises and
responses. Countries were also selected in order to assess the model for alignment against national
legislation or other certification-like systems for NGOs. The Philippines case study benefits from the
lessons learned from previous case studies. The overall results from the case studies will be used to
revise the core assumptions behind the model and develop recommendations on the most relevant and
appropriate certification model might look like for the sector.

Participating Organisations
The participating organisations were selected to ensure a balance between international and national
NGOs, currently certified (under HAP or a national level certification system, for example) and non5

certified, members of wider networks, and SCHR members. For the Philippines case study, the main
focus was on members of the Caritas Internationalis, a network of 162 organisations affiliated with the
Catholic Church.
Specifically, the field research looked at the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)s
National Secretariat for Social Action-Justice and Peace (NASSA)1 and three of its partners: CAFOD (the
official Catholic aid agency in the UK and Wales), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), and Caritas Switzerland.
NASSA coordinates programmes in partnership with over a dozen different Caritas members and other
partners, and is heavily engaged in the response to Typhoon Haiyan and other emergencies.
CAFOD initially volunteered to participate in the case study based partly on its own interest in
certification - CAFOD is both HAP and People In Aid certified. For Typhoon Haiyan, CAFOD has seconded
staff to NASSA and funds relief, recovery and capacity support programmes implemented by NASSA, as
well as programmes managed and implemented through US-based Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and
Caritas Switzerland. 2
CRS has a long-standing history of humanitarian and development programming in the country going
back many decades.3 Its current humanitarian programme has a budget of approximately $70 million for
the next three years covering shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and livelihood needs. For
the Haiyan response, CRS is implementing directly with community-based organisations (CBO) and local
government, though it normally it would work through local Caritas or Church partners. This decision
was based on discussions with NASSA, where the initial assessment was that the scale and scope of
programming proposed was greater than NASSAs capacity to implement.
Caritas Switzerland has had development projects in the country since 1972, and is working through four
main partners for the response to Haiyan, not all associated with the NASSA or the church network, and
again in part based on an assessment of NASSAs capacity for implementation. Initially, they provided
around two million Swiss francs for emergency relief (food, materials to build temporary shelters,
cooking supplies, water containers, flashlights and hygiene kits), with an additional 6 million Swiss francs
destined for school reconstruction.4

Methodology
The case study methodology consisted of document reviews, key informant interviews, focus groups and
direct observation to compare and contrast NASSA, CAFOD, CRS and Caritas Switzerlands current
policies and partnership practices around the three main pillars of the proposed model: humanitarian
principles, accountability and quality and effectiveness. Staff members were interviewed for their
experiences and perspectives around the use and application of quality and technical standards,
accountability mechanisms and the role of external evaluation and verification processes, as well as the
their views on the proposed certification model. When possible, the team crosschecked this with direct
observations and other stakeholders and also traveled to the field to observe the projects and engage
with local communities and local authorities in Tacloban and Bantayan.
The field research also included collecting inputs and perspectives on the usefulness and relevance of the
proposed model from various stakeholders, including government, UN agencies, and national and
1

http://nassa.org.ph/
http://www.cafod.org.uk/About-Us/Where-we-work/Asia/Philippines
3
http://crs.org/typhoon-haiyan/
4
https://www.caritas.ch/en/what-we-do/worldwide/disaster-aid/philippines-help-for-haiyan-victims/
2

international NGOs, and NGO umbrella, coordination or certification bodies. To the extent possible, the
research team also gathered information on the costs of different approaches to monitoring and
assessment in order to generate a clearer understanding of the costs and benefits of a potential external
verification and/or certification model.
Over fifty people participated in interviews and group discussions. This included representatives from
CRS senior management, programme and field-based project staff in Tacloban and Caritas Switzerland
staff in Cebu City (Bantayan), as well as local partners and stakeholders. Senior representative from the
federal governments National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC),
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and the Office of the President for Recovery
and Reconstruction (OPARR) were interviewed, as well as local government representatives in Tacloban
and Santa Fe. The research team also met representatives of several national and international NGOs
working in the Philippines, including other members of the Caritas Internationalis network, the
Philippines International NGO Network (PINGON), and the IFRC. UN agencies interviewed included
OCHA, UNICEF and WHO in Manila and in the field offices, including several cluster leads at the field
level. Representatives from DFID and Swiss Development Cooperation were also interviewed (For a
complete list of interviewees, see Annex 1).

Limitations
Part of the field research was conducted in Manila, mainly focusing on gathering the views of key donor
and UN stakeholders from the policy perspective. The bulk of the field research took place in Tacloban
and Bantayan, with field trips to various project sites and interviews with actors based in Manila. One
limitation was that NASSAs full capacity was mobilised for the response to Haiyan, and as such, was not
able to fully participate in the field research process, though they did support the research and
participated in several interviews. Indeed, most actors, including other Caritas partners, still considered
the response to be in an emergency relief phase, only now slowly entering to recovery activities. As such,
it was extremely difficult for key stakeholders to dedicate time to what they often considered yet
another evaluation from external consultants. Nevertheless, the research team was able to meet a
high number of staff from the main organisations engaged in the response, as well as people from
several affected communities.
The research team originally intended to use the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) as a framework to
discuss assessment criteria with participating organisations; however, a revised draft was not ready at
the time of the research. The research team decided not to conduct a full assessment of the models
proposed indicators as it was felt this could be counterproductive to the CHS process, which was about
to begin shortly after. Nevertheless, there is a good level of alignment with the models proposed
criteria and the CHS, as both projects have been continually sharing information and learning as they go.
In addition, the research team was not able to access several relevant evaluations that were either
underway or recently completed and other tools. This includes the latest version of Caritas
Internationalis internal minimum standards and assessment system, which is under development.
Finally, due to scheduling conflicts, the team was unable to immediately meet with CAFOD headquarters
and programme staff in London to discuss the model in relation to its Philippines programme. This work
is pending, and will be integrated into the final version of this report.

3. The humanitarian context in the Philippines

The Philippines is exposed to numerous natural hazards due to its location on the Pacific Rim of Fire.
Between 1980 and 2010, on average six typhoons hit the Philippines per year, with natural disasters
affecting around 3.7 million people per year.5 Typhoon Haiyan was one of the worst to hit the Philippines
in history, affecting 14 million people, killing 6,200 and displacing 4 million.6
The Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Strategic Response Plan requested US$781 million to respond to the
needs of three million affected people.7 To date, 58 per cent of the total amount has been committed.8
The clusters with the greatest needs were food security and agriculture (currently funded at 76.2 per
cent), emergency shelter (currently funded at 41.8 per cent), early recovery and livelihoods (currently
funded at 27.7 per cent), WASH (currently funded at 76.0 per cent) and health (currently funded at 62.4
per cent). At the time of the field research, the response was slowly making the transition to recovery
activities, although it was evident that in many areas there were still significant needs, particularly in
shelter and food security.

Coordination mechanisms
The government has been praised internationally for its disaster risk management legislation and for its
role in promoting more coherent approaches to disaster management and risk reduction. Republic Act
10121, or the Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, lays the foundation for
disaster management in the Philippines. One of its main objectives is to uphold the peoples
constitutional rights to life and property by addressing the root causes of vulnerabilities to disasters,
strengthening the countrys institutional capacity for disaster risk reduction and management and
building the resilience of local communities to disasters including climate change impacts.9 It
emphasizes the importance of local participation and strengthening capacity for disaster risk
management at all levels of government. Many elements of the IFRCs model disaster law are integrated
into draft legislation, and the cluster system is specifically referenced in national law.
The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) has overall oversight of all
disaster-related programmes and activities.10
The council includes representation from various
government ministries, which also take the lead with the various clusters. The NDRRMC has established
many tools and guidelines to facilitate the work of international actors who want to engage in the
response, and NGOs are strongly encouraged to participate in the clusters and share information with
national and local authorities.
The Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Division (a department of the Department for Social
Welfare and Development) is responsible for registering NGOs to work in different thematic areas.11
NGOs are expected to register with the DSWD before undertaking disaster management activities,
though DSWD officials reported that this is not universally the case. Registered NGOs are required to
submit their qualifications and annual reports to DSWD for review, and an accreditation process, which
entails a more detailed assessment of the NGOs capacity and performance, including, when possible,
5

http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=135
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PHL131Rev1_Hayan.pdf
7
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/SRP_2013-2014_Philippines_Typhoon_Haiyan.pdf
8
http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R32sum_A1043___3_July_2014_%2803_02%29.pdf
9
http://www.gov.ph/2010/05/27/republic-act-no-10121/
10
http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/index.php
11
http://www.dswd.gov.ph/
6

field visits and interviews with beneficiaries. However, DSWDs assessment and monitoring capacity is
limited and was quickly overwhelmed by Haiyan. Before Haiyan there was better oversight of NGOs.
They look at the NGOs capability of handling large scale disasters and resources, reported a
government official.
The research team spoke to organisations that had been accredited. They noted that DSWD asks for
financial reports, annual reports and speaks to beneficiaries. They talk to the beneficiaries to make sure
we are actually working there, but not about the quality. It could be stronger. Its not really a standard.
They dont have anything on accountability to beneficiaries. You can do whatever you want as long as
you report what you are doing, said one interviewee. That said, a new process for licensing and
accreditation is reportedly underway with more stringent requirements.
The frequent exposure to natural disasters and the corresponding engagement with the international
humanitarian system (over the past three years, OCHA has opened and closed eight sub-offices to
support the response to various typhoons) means that the Philippines government is very familiar with
current international policy debates and approaches to disaster management. Similar to other megadisasters, coordination was a significant challenge. However, as in other mega-disasters, the scale and
scope of damages by Haiyan showed a gap in terms of legislation and policies on paper and actual
capacity to implement and coordinate relief and recovery programmes.
The influx of international medical teams, militaries, UN agencies and multitude of NGOs, some of which
were new to humanitarian situations, presented difficulties for the NDRRMC and DSWD to carry out their
roles. In practice, there were (and continue to be) many actors acting outside of established
coordination mechanisms, and difficulties in ensuring adequate coordination between the national,
regional and local levels.
Part of the difficulties may have been due to the fact that established national coordination protocols
appeared to be circumvented in favour of other mechanisms. For example, the Department of Finance
was designated to lead overall response efforts, when it would normally be the NDRRMC and relevant
Cabinet Secretaries along with the DSWD. Another contributing factor may have been that the UN
declared the emergency as an L3 emergency (the first time for a natural disaster), which in theory meant
a significant surge in capacity from UN agencies to support the governments response and more
streamlined procedures.
In practice, there were multiple coordination fora government coordination, military coordination and
the international humanitarian actors, and it is doubtful that the L3 designation simplified coordination.
For the cluster leads, particularly shelter, the sheer volume of participating organisations (reported at
over 100 NGOs) limited opportunities for basic information sharing, much less effective coordination and
quality assurance. Frequent complaints were heard about the L3 designation, meaning that
organisations were feeding the machinery rather than contributing to genuine information sharing and
coordination. Local organisations were often not involved in coordination. Clusters are an exclusive
club. Local organisations arent participating because they arent accessible. Its hard to find out where
theyre meeting, maintained one interviewee. Although the meeting schedules are published on the
internet by OCHA, many people felt that they didnt know how to access them.
Within the Caritas network, NASSA and its partners held regular planning and coordination meetings, as
do other networks, such as the Red Cross Red Crescent, ACT Alliance members or the Philippines
International NGO group, PINGO. Humanitarian Country Team meetings continue to take place, chaired
by OCHA, with the participation of UN agencies, and INGOs such as CRS, Plan and Save the Children, but
9

with little representation of local and national NGOs. A similar set-up exists within the government - a
council for humanitarian policy-making, which grants four seats to international NGOs.
Many interviewees, including government officials, reported that they simply did not have the staff
resources to send someone to each forum to share information and plans. Many interviewees reported
that the government did not have the capacity or was not actively encouraged - to participate in
national and provincial level clusters. The research team heard claims from many aid agencies that they
did not know what the government was doing, with similar complaints raised by government officials
and cluster leads about NGOs. As one interviewee said, Communication and coordination was the
biggest key element missing in the early response right after Yolanda hit.
Another example of the difficulties of establishing appropriate coordination mechanisms for the nature
of the disaster was the establishment of the Office of the Presidential Assistance on Rehabilitation and
Recovery (OPARR). OPARR is charged to manage and coordinate the transition from the cluster system
(supported through OCHA) to a new nationally driven sectoral approach (supported through UNDP).
Under the OPARR approach, the 11 existing clusters would be merged into five sectors, with very little
clarity on where the management authority would lie in terms of government ministries, or how the
existing portfolio of cluster relief work would be transferred to OPARR. Several respondents expressed
concerns about handing over cluster coordination to OPARR, including local authorities who worried that
local priorities might be neglected in favour of national level priorities. However, in regional consultation
meetings, OPARR officials assured stakeholders that the approach was aimed to facilitate the work of all
agencies and that these details would be worked out.

4. Application of humanitarian principles and quality and

accountability standards in the response
General Observations
Principled humanitarian action
Several of the core criteria of the proposed model (consistent with the CHS) centre on ensuring aid
efforts are impartial and independent from political or other objectives. In the context of Typhoon
Haiyan, there were challenges to apply the principle of impartiality, where aid is defined and delivered in
proportion to needs.
The research team heard of numerous examples where organisations (including foreign governments)
focused only on easy to access locations, at the expense of communities away from the urban areas of
Tacloban or Cebu City. Several stakeholders reported organisations spending too much time staking out
and defending their territory or beneficiary communities, or worse, media attention, at the expense of
rapid and high quality assistance. One strategy used by WHO and the government to minimise this was
to provide subtle incentives such as access to fuel a scarcity in the early days of the response to shift
the focus of foreign medical teams to harder to reach areas where needs were greater.
Similarly, the use of more comprehensive needs assessments with sex and age disaggregated data
(SADD) and strategies to include gender analysis into assessments and programme designs appeared
weak in the relief phase. For several stakeholders consulted, particularly local authorities, recovery
planning and livelihoods programmes often failed to fully assess and understand the local context and

10

economic drivers in urban areas like Tacloban. Instead, many aid agencies had preconceived ideas of
fisheries or agriculture or micro-business programmes that did not match the reality of the context.
With regard to the independence of aid efforts, many stakeholders, including representatives from
governments, commented that while aid was not overtly politicized, partisan power struggles at the
national, regional and local level influenced aid decisions. Similarly, foreign governments were equally
singled out for sometimes putting their own political priorities over the needs and priorities of affected
people and the government, with the example given of government-sponsored foreign medical teams.
Corruption was often mentioned as another issue that affected applying needs-based approaches. Many
stakeholders interviewed mentioned suitcase NGOs (local and international) with limited transparency
on their plans, experience or competency. Nevertheless, most of the NGOs interviewed had processes in
place to minimize these risks to principled approaches.

Accountability toward affected populations

Pillar Two of the proposed model includes several criteria around an organisations accountability to
affected people, including opportunities to participate in defining programme design, transparent
communications, and mechanisms for feedback and complaint. For the research team, this was clearly
an area of consistent weakness in the overall response.
Seven months after the typhoon, very few of the aid organisations interviewed had fully integrated
strategies for beneficiary engagement and participation or feedback and complaints mechanisms in
programmes. As a crosscutting issue, accountability had only recently been integrated into the work
plans of the different clusters. The IASCs Accountability to Affected People (AAP) framework an
integral part of the Transformative Agenda- was not well known to many UN or other stakeholders
interviewed, though INGO representatives were generally more aware of accountability initiatives in the
sector and within their own organisations. Most organisations interviewed acknowledged that this was a
weakness, but justified the lack of progress based on the urgency of meeting immediate needs. The
argument, however, seemed difficult to sustain seven months into the response.
Community members interviewed, while expressing gratitude for the aid provided, also highlighted
many examples of where they felt that aid agencies did not listen to and respond to their needs,
concerns and complaints. Several felt that some aid actors including well-known and very experienced
INGOs - were disrespectful, unprofessional and not transparent in the way they related to affected
populations.

Quality, effectiveness and continuous learning

This was another area were the research team felt the overall response did not meet many of the criteria
set out in the proposed model, or other quality standards established in the sector. The research team
readily observed huge disparities in the quality, consistency and coherence of relief supplies provided,
often in the same community. In some places, community members in one barangay received Sphere
compliant typhoon resistant shelters, while in neighbouring barangays; some NGOs built small, poor
quality shelters. In other cases, people were given materials and training to rebuild, others received
materials and no training, while many others continue to live in tents. Interviewees reported that some
organisations simply handed out emergency aid to whomever they met, with no assessment of needs.
Another organisation paid such a high rates for its cash for work programme that people reportedly quit

11

their jobs to participate. Several stakeholders provided examples of aid organisations using poor or outdated practices, including ones that were potentially dangerous to affected populations.
In terms of effectiveness, multiple organisations reported arriving at an area to carry out a project to find
that another organisation was already implementing similar projects, without informing or coordinating
through local authorities or clusters. There were cases of some people receiving the same emergency
assistance from several organisations while people in rural areas received much less assistance. Also, as
noted above, in some cases needs assessments were incomplete, or set out priorities that did not match
the local context, leading to poorly designed interventions that are unlikely to effectively meet the needs
of the population.
It was also evident to the team that the issue of quality control and quality assurance was generally
lacking overall. For many organisations, the main priority was a rapid response with as wide coverage as
possible, at the expense of quality. To their credit, cluster leads attempted to ensure as much coherence
as possible in terms of programme implementation, but the sheer volume of actors participating in
clusters, and the lack of a specific mandate for monitoring quality meant their role was limited. This was
similar for their government counterparts.
In terms of learning, there appeared to be few opportunities or mechanisms for knowledge sharing or
learning, unless integrated as a regular part of an organisations internal monitoring and evaluation
processes. It also seems unlikely that the record number of evaluations (including this case study)
undertaken to review the response to Haiyan will make a significant impact on how current activities are
carried today, much less influence practices in future disasters. In fact, this was one of the most
consistent complaints and requests made by organisations, who saw little added value from official visits
and evaluations that came to the country.

5. Approaches to principles, accountability and quality in the Caritas

network
General framework
Over the past few years, the Caritas Internationalis network has been developing a set of internal
minimum standards to guide the humanitarian work of its members. The standards are based on Church
canon, international standards such as Sphere, and other standards around good financial and
management practices, organised into four blocks: Law and Ethical Codes; Governance and Organisation;
Finance and Accountability; and, Stakeholder Involvement. The standards are still in progress, but the
intention is that as of 2015, all Caritas members must demonstrate that they are working towards
meeting the requirements in the coming years.
A previous focus group discussion in Rome with Caritas Internationalis and several member agencies
showed a high degree of compatibility between the proposed model and the Caritas minimum
standards. Where the proposed model differs slightly is in the increased emphasis on accountability to
affected people and performance and learning and the focus on field-based verification.
Individual Caritas members, particularly larger northern and European based members like CAFOD and
CRS, have well developed programme management processes in place, including accountability and
performance management systems. Several southern members are also engaged in initiatives to
12

improve quality, accountability and effectiveness of their humanitarian programmes, or have otherwise
demonstrated conformity with rigorous donor requirements. NASSA itself follows many examples of
good practices in the sector, such as participatory needs assessments; however, the team was unable to
verify in detail the extent to which these are embedded in policies and practices.
CAFOD, for example, is both HAP and People in Aid certified, and participates in the DEC.
CRS is a full member of InterAction and other bodies engaged in quality and accountability issues. CRS
has well established resources and standards to which they refer when designing and implementing
programs. The Good Enough Guide, Sphere, cluster standards, USAID standards and approximately 30
internal policies and procedures are some of these reference materials. CRS is working towards
standardizing monitoring and evaluation and will require audits of its field programmes by headquarters
starting in late 2015.
At the Tacloban field office, four staff were dedicated to quality and accountability, monitoring and
evaluation and protection issues, with at least 12 more staff anticipated (of a total staff projected at 250)
as recovery activities scale up). The role of these staff is to support programme managers in ensuring
that humanitarian principles, quality and accountability standards are met. All staff at all levels receive
comprehensive training in CRSs Code of Conduct, which provides clear guidance and examples in the
local language of what is expected in terms of actions and behaviours (including issues around
corruption, abuse of power and exploitation).
At the headquarters level, Caritas Switzerland has an Internal Desk for Quality, Standards, and Donor
Requirements at its headquarters, which is tasked with liaising with the field. There are also two staff
working on an internal knowledge management system. Caritas Switzerland indicated that some internal
standards exist, such as a code of conduct and disaster risk reduction and gender standards. They are
available on an internal intranet for knowledge management, though headquarters representatives
admitted that these are not as accessible as they could be given that some are only available in German.
They are currently working to make everything available in English. The research team did not have
access to these internal standards.
Caritas Switzerland headquarters also referred to HAP and Caritas Internationals minimum standards as
references for their work. However, one of the main references appears to be Caritas Switzerland
compliance with ZEWO requirements. ZEWO Is an NGO that certifies that Swiss non-profit organisations
meet mainly governance and financial management standards as a means to assure donors that the
funds are raised appropriately and ethically, and that money is spent as it was intended: The ZEWO seal
of approval certifies that the donations will be used economically, effectively and for their designated
purpose. It stands for organisations which offer transparent information and true and fair financial
reporting, have independent and appropriate control mechanisms, provide open communications and
which procure their funds in a fair manner.12
At the field level, Caritas Switzerland has a very limited presence. Staff reported that the main reference
for programme standards was not based on internal standards, but mostly on donor reporting
requirements, especially those of their major donor, Swiss Solidarity. Swiss Solidarity requires recipient
organisations to be certified (normally through ZEWO) to apply for funding from Swiss Solidarity and
must explain how they meet Swiss their requirements in every project. Their requirements include
technical standards for specific sectors, such as construction, as well as general good practice like
beneficiary participation. Caritas field office also considered international standards like the Red Cross
12

http://www.zewo.ch/ueber_uns/about-us
13

Code of Conduct and Sphere important references. Field staff indicated that they were not aware of the
implications of ZEWO certification in the field, perhaps beyond some work required from financial and
administrative staff.

Principled humanitarian action

All members of the Caritas network subscribe to humanitarian principles in their relief work, as outlined
in the draft Caritas Internationalis minimum requirements. Although Caritas is a faith-based organisation
guided by Catholic Church canon and teaching, there is a strong commitment to the principle of
impartiality with aid based on needs and provided without discrimination based on religion or other
factors. In a predominantly Catholic country, Caritas is well situated to draw on the strong Church
network at the local level to reach people in need. Yet it also is a trusted and respected actor in regions
like Mindanao, with a long-running conflict and a significant Muslim population.
NASSA, CRS and Caritas Switzerland staff interviewed all agreed that humanitarian principles are
considered important for their work. However, there were few mechanisms to ensure they are included
in programming. A project wouldnt be accepted if it didnt comply with humanitarian principles, but
there is nothing formalized to check for them, reported one staff member. The proposal writing
process and final evaluations were highlighted as key moments when humanitarian principles are
referenced, but there is little follow up in monitoring or reporting how they are being applied.
One area where principled approaches are reflected in programmes is the extensive use of needs
assessments to define programme priorities and target beneficiaries. NASSA, CRS and Caritas
Switzerland all used adequate mechanisms at the community level to assess needs and ensure project
beneficiaries were selected and prioritised based on the degree of vulnerability. However, there were
stark differences in approaches, determined in part to the financial and technical resources and
experience available to each organisation. As an example, at the time of the field research, CRS was
training staff on the use of tablets and other ICT tools to carry out assessments and monitoring.
Meanwhile, in the neighbouring community NASSA used more traditional approaches such as a massive
wall mural with detailed handwritten information and pictographs depicting family members and needs
in each household in the barangay.

Accountability toward affected populations

CRS
According to several CRS staff interviewed, despite its strong internal accountability policy framework
and procedures, project beneficiaries could have been more involved in the early response. However,
the need to respond quickly coupled with limited staff resources superseded more participatory
approaches. Once the initial emergency phase passed, this seems to have improved, and the research
team saw ample evidence of how CRSs accountability commitments were translated into specific actions
aimed at ensuring affected populations could exercise their rights. In fact, CRS stood out compared to
the majority of other actors working in the Tacloban area for the depth and quality of its accountability
mechanisms.
As an example, in the shelter programmes, beneficiaries were given a menu of options from which to
choose. They also work with the affected community to develop indicators for success and other project
indicators. Program staff goes to the field at least quarterly to do focus groups, surveys, and discussions
with beneficiaries and report back to them on the results. Based on beneficiaries preferences, the
14

programme has begun to include cash transfer. The second phase of their livelihood programme was in
the design stage at the time of the field research, following a month long study on what the community
considers suitable.
Field visits to CRS projects and discussions with community members showed widespread appreciation
with the quality of the response, the opportunities for feedback, and the attitude of CRS staff and
volunteers, especially compared to other NGOs and government officials working in the same area. This
is an area where CRS has made improvements following a real time evaluation that revealed that people
did not know how to give feedback and were afraid to do so. In an effort to address this, a staff member
was hired to specifically work on protection and accountability issues. Since then, more feedback has
been received, and stronger mechanisms are in place to monitor and act on complaints. The most
common complaint received has been in reference to beneficiary selection. They are also working to
expand the range of people who provide feedback and are piloting a Facebook page to see if it is an
appropriate means of receiving feedback from younger people.
Caritas Switzerland
Caritas Switzerland made an effort to include beneficiaries in the planning and programme design,
however, the need to respond quickly sometimes limits participation. There is a dilemma between
pressure from donors and media to act quickly and participatory means. They are sometimes sacrificed,
noted a staff member. Another echoed this sentiment. In terms of beneficiary accountability, we try to
do planning with them and with the local authorities. Sometimes the deadlines are too tight though, so
we have to come up with something and then go back to them and either try to convince them or adapt
it if we can.
The research team did not see evidence of formal mechanisms to ensure accountability, but there does
seem to be an internal knowledge of what they consider best practice and would like to see included in
programmes. For example, Caritas Switzerland staff report that they generally develop beneficiary
selection criteria with the community, but if the community does not mention certain things, they will
suggest it. They also report always having complaint mechanisms available in their programmes and
check for beneficiary satisfaction in evaluations. They also report including non-beneficiaries in their
consultations.

Quality, effectiveness and continuous learning

CRS
CRS has a well-developed approach to continuous learning and improvement. The organisation develops
a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation binder for each program, following extensive discussions
internally, as well as consultations with affected populations. Once developed, they use the indicators,
regular monitoring and real time evaluations, to assess progress and take corrective actions. In fact, it
was the real time evaluation that was used to pinpoint the need to improve communication with
affected populations. Following the evaluation, they made changes to ensure beneficiaries knew how to
provide suggestions, as well as to make them feel more comfortable doing so. They also involve key staff
members in self-assessment exercises to review the indicators that may need closer attention.
In terms of the quality of the response, CRS appears to have successfully applied the most relevant
technical standards into its programmes. Indeed, field observations of projects showed CRS projects
were often significantly better quality than projects implemented by other INGOs in the same area. Field
15

staff at the community level demonstrated a good understanding of technical standards and how they
were applied in accordance to the specificities of the local context.
Following the response, CRS produces lessons learned documents. Regional headquarters centralize
these documents and share them with other country programmes to foster learning among the
countries of the region. Staff report using these documents when designing new programs, although
several staff identified the need for a formalized tool to facilitate incorporating lessons learned from
previous programs in the design of new programmes. Plans are reportedly underway to create this tool.
Staff turnover appears to be quite low compared to other organisations, which helps to maintain
institutional knowledge. Nevertheless, their use of formalized tools to capture lessons would help to
avoid making the same mistakes should staff leave the organisation.
Caritas Switzerland
As with accountability, internal practices for quality and learning do not appear to have been formalized.
Each project creates a list of issues to be included in project monitoring for quality and effectiveness.
Normally, this comes from donor requirements, according to staff. These requirements are used as the
foundation to develop a monitoring and evaluation system for each project. Progress is then monitored
on this basis. We write the proposal based on donor requirements and that will be the focus in the
monitoring of course, because it will be checked. Other standards mentioned in project proposals, such
as Sphere, are reportedly also used. It is up to the discretion of the field sector experts to implement the
project in line with the standards. Again, staff recognized that this is an area for improvement: Our
quality management is probably addressing the right topics but could improve by formalizing it more
through templates. It would help to keep it in discussion.
Caritas Switzerland headquarters does have a scorecard that is developed based on the country strategy,
but can vary somewhat from country to country. It is used to self-assess progress toward the annual
plan. In addition, they recently started doing long term evaluations to learn from the impact of their
work from five to more than 15 years ago. The evaluations look at how their programmes have affected
beneficiaries several years later. The aim is to capture lessons that could influence future programme
design. Other lessons learned documents are also available on the intranet.
Both headquarters and field staff felt that they are likely covering the most important issues, but could
benefit from formalizing their quality procedures: We have internal standards but they are not written.
We just kind of know them. It would be good as an institution to have a common policy on good
practice. Current practice for developing proposals may be an area that could be improved to increase
use of standards at the field level. At present, the field office is responsible for writing the technical
component of the project and headquarters for adding the narrative to explain how best practice and
quality standards will be incorporated. This could risk creating a divide in which standards remain only a
policy on paper at the headquarters level rather than something that is integrated in implementation in
the field. However, one staff member felt that the proposal process helped to raise the right issues in
internal discussions and another mentioned that issues included in proposals become part of their
monitoring.

Views on the proposed certification model

The majority of staff interviewed from different Caritas organisations were generally supportive of the
proposed certification model, though raised questions about how it would be implemented and the
degree of support from external stakeholders like donors. Several questioned how the model differed
16

from the Caritas Internationalis minimum requirements, but on explanation, saw that the two
approaches could be complementary and compatible with each.
Most CRS staff interviewed were positive regarding certification and the model. They considered that a
common standard and assessment framework would be useful for the sector and for their own work.
Some envisioned the model as a checklist to refer to throughout programming, and also appreciated the
idea of an objective external verification mechanism to assess the quality of CRSs accountability
mechanisms and performance.
Notwithstanding the general support, a few failed to see the added value of certifying NGOs and raised
numerous questions regarding its utility. In natural disasters situations like Haiyan, some staff
maintained that the government would not have time to filter organisations based on those that are
certified, and politically would not refuse to grant them access. Several doubted that their major donors
would adopt a common standard for reporting while smaller and medium sized donors were already
considered very flexible in their requirements. Several suggested that based on the experience in the
Philippines, organisations that are not following good practice are unlikely to participate in certification:
So whats the point for these organisations? asked one. Even organisations who would undergo
certification are not immune from individual stupidity. They could be certified and have a few bad
people. Staff also offered several suggestions to improve the model, specifically that UN agencies be
included in certification, and that the model integrate organisations use of sex and age disaggregated
data (SADD).
Caritas Switzerland staff would appreciate if certification led to having one set of standards, adding that
it would benefit those affected by crises if quality improves. They also thought donors would be happy to
use it. They are already making arbitrary decisions, so lets make them base it on something, said one
respondent. Some staff members were fearful of duplicating existing standards and creating additional
work. They stressed the amount of time they spend on administrative requirements and had difficulty
believing that all donors would adopt a common standard for reporting, as some donors had highly
specific requirements.
They were also concerned about certification possibly excluding national and local NGOs: It would be
sad if some organisations are excluded because some partners really do good work. Who is to say that
our standards will be better? Maybe the local organisations are doing it better. They felt that cost of
certification could be an issue for local organisations. Staff highlighted that in order for certification to
have value it needs to go beyond headquarters and the policy level to look at actual implementation in
the field. They also felt that organisations should have to reapply for certification regularly.

6. Integrating quality and accountability into partnership

relationships
General observations
One of the key questions guiding the field research in the Philippines is how the draft model would apply
to organisations working through partnerships arrangements or networks. One immediate challenge
faced by many INGOs and UN agencies arriving in the country was finding local implementing partners.
As a middle-income country with strong capacity, many INGOs and UN agencies do not have a large or
continual programming presence in the country, making this a new experience for some. Several
organisations reported fierce competition for local partners. In some cases, partners selected were
17

based on expediency and availability, not on complementarity or a shared commitment to an equitable

partnership. In other cases, direct implementation of programming activities by international actors
supplanted local capacities, with the assumption that there was insufficient capacity or experience for
local actors to implement.
Another difficulty is that many INGOs have focused their work in the Philippines on poverty reduction
and development activities. For many, when Haiyan struck, the logical decision was to use existing
partnership relationships to shift their work to relief and recovery. This also created challenges,
however, as their development partners were often unfamiliar with how the humanitarian sector works
and had little experience implementing relief programmes. One INGO reported the philosophical
difficulties for its partners, a micro-finance organisation, to shift to a mind-set where aid is a provided
freely to those in need.
According to many respondents, despite the frequency of disasters, there are few national NGOs that
have dedicated humanitarian programming. An exception is the Philippines Red Cross, which has strong
capacity and a national network, and has been supported by the IFRC, ICRC and other Red Cross Red
Crescent partners over a long period, and the partnership relationships appeared to work very
effectively.

Approaches to partnerships in the Caritas network

Specifically looking at the CARITAS network and partnership relations, CRS had significantly more
resources and experience around quality and accountability than other CARITAS members operating in
the Philippines, which was clearly demonstrated in their systems and processes. Indeed, CRS stands out
compared to many INGOs for the quality of their programmes and their accountability mechanisms.
However, in this context, CRS was directly implementing projects in part because their local CARITAS
counterpart, NASSA, felt it didnt have the capacity to undertake the large-scale shelter and WASH
programmes proposed by CRS. Instead, NASSA coordinated with CRS, but managed its own programmes,
using its own approaches and building on its existing relationships with communities. The contrast
between the two approaches was stark CRS used Ipads for needs assessment, for example, while
NASSA used traditional paper-based murals to map out needs in communities but the results appeared
to be similar, and both organisations might be able to meet many of the core requirements. In contrast,
CARITAS Switzerland worked with local partners, but an assessment of their systems, processes and
overall approach suggests that it might find it difficult to meet several of the proposed criteria. This
raises questions about the degree to which skills can be transferred between partners, and how to build
long-term capacities, and whether or not the models assessment process can fairly distinguish between
different levels of capacities.
The research team was not able to explore in depth how CRS works to ensure its partners follow quality
standards as CRS is implementing directly. Nevertheless, staff who had worked with CRS in other
countries reported that CRS normally does this well, in part due to their connection to local churches.
They never work with a partner without training them and will then continue to work with them. They
dont drop the bad ones but give them more training, said one staff member. It is generally the
responsibility of the program manager to hold partners accountable for adhering to standards.
Caritas Switzerland selects its partners using a partner assessment tool. The tool covers issues of
financial management, which is one of the most important, the mission and vision of the organisation,
how they monitor and implement projects, how decisions are made, coordination, learning and their
18

political orientation. The partners first assess themselves based on how well they believe they are doing
in each area, Caritas then assesses the partner, and this is used as the basis for discussion. The
organisation also has the opportunity to rate Caritas. They undergo this exercise annually. Staff upholds
that Caritas will work to build the capacity of partners, as this is one of their objectives, but also looks for
partners that already have capacity. In the case of Haiyan, Caritas Switzerland selected four local
organisations as partners. Caritas Philippines, or the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
National Secretariat for Social Action-Justice (CBCP-NASSA), was not among those selected, as Caritas
Switzerland did not feel that they could reach the required level in time, but report trying to build their
capacity nevertheless.
In order to ensure that their partners work meets their standards, Caritas Switzerland adopts several
techniques. They share their donor requirements with the partner, follow up on their reporting, monitor
their work in the field and usually have a staff member accompany them throughout the entire project.
Admittedly, this person tends to come from a technical background, such as a construction expert, so
he probably checks more for technical things than accountability and humanitarian principles, reported
Caritas. Furthermore, in the Caritas network, one international Caritas is responsible for one Philippine
diocese. In the case of Caritas Switzerland, the Cebu diocese is their responsibility.
Asking CAFOD about whether an agreed assessment framework could be helpful for selecting partners or
for guiding capacity-building, CAFOD outlined that their approach is to start from where the partner is at,
and design interventions together on those areas that the partner is able to work with. This may well
mean that all of the requirements within an assessment framework cannot immediately be achieved,
but, using the principle of continuous improvement, could be realised over time. Anything that the
partner feels is being imposed would jeopardise its commitment and buy-in and create an imbalance in
the power dynamic.
All CAFOD partners receiving over 20,000 GBP a year must do a MANGO Financial Health Check, and put
together an action plan to address any problem areas. NASSA are currently working on that as a
condition for further funding. CAFOD project appraisals have questions and guidance referring to
SPHERE, HAP and accountability (but this does require the staff member to be familiar with these
standards). CAFOD also require regular (every 3-6 months) narrative and financial reporting (including
transaction listings) and external audits (for most projects and carry out regular monitoring visits to see
projects and discuss progress and challenges with partner staff.
CAFOD regularly monitors its humanitarian programmes and is adaptive in its approach, taking into
account the changes in context and its partners changing capacity over time. They are developing
recovery projects with other NNGOs in the Philippines (one a new partner, one a previous partner), so
contribute to sustainable local capacity, alongside commitment to support NASSA, CRS and Caritas
Switzerland.
From the CAFOD head quarters perspective, there were a number of factors in the decision to work with
their three partners. The scale of the natural disaster was almost unprecedented. It was clear that no
one agency would be able to deliver a comprehensive and robust humanitarian response at the scale
required. The other factor was around the ability to absorb funding. The DEC appeal raised 95 million,
one of its most successful appeals in terms of funds raised in recent years, and CAFODs allocation as a
member agency was significant. In addition CAFOD raised its significant own funds. In order to ensure
appropriate response at scale, to the expected levels of quality and to ensure accountability to donors
and requirements as a DEC member, CAFOD decided to work with a number of partners. NASSA was
selected because there was a history and proven track record of partnership, which provided significant
19

reach through diocesan social action centres in affected communities. CRS and Caritas Switzerland had
also been partners before in other parts of the world and there is confidence in their ability to deliver a
quality response (in a timely manner and scale) as well as meeting the compliance requirements of some
of CAFODs donors. CRS were present and responding in Leyte and East Samar, and Caritas Switzerland
had strong local partners in northern Cebu, with staff in place managing their projects. Following
discussions with CAFOD staff they submitted project proposals which were approved for support.
All three CAFOD partners are Caritas agencies. As such, they subscribe to the same principles that inform
CAFODs approach towards quality, accountability and effectiveness. Both NASSA and CRS have
significant accountability requirements to donors, which need to be understood, appreciated and
factored into the partnership engagement. The challenges that have arisen have not come from a
misalignment of views on quality, accountability and effectiveness which are well aligned, but rather
from the operational challenges of responding to devastation caused by the worst typhoon in living
memory.

Local partners views of certification

The research team had the opportunity to meet with several of partner organisations working with
Caritas members or other INGOs to capture their perspectives. One organisation utilized beneficiary
satisfaction surveys, suggestion boxes, monitoring and evaluation in order to monitor quality,
accountability and effectiveness. Another organisation had developed a number of tools, such as
feedback mechanisms, transparency boards, SMS messages and a mood meter for workers, but
attributed this to their experience working as a partner of another international NGO. The other
organisation gave us inputs for Q&A. We had two people working with us on this since the start, so Q&A
was integrated in the design. They asked us to mainstream Q&A in the manual of operations. They gave
us a template but we needed to think about it according to our needs.
However, for many local organisations, their international partners did not assess or trust their capacity
as a partner and they would have liked to have been trained: They also cant assume we are experts in
humanitarian aid. They should have trained us and engaged us. That was needed at the start. They didnt
do this because they said it was an emergency. Partner organisations in general also missed greater
transparency from their international partners. In several cases, local partners reported requesting to
see project documents and the budget, but this was not shared until the end. Are INGOs willing to treat
INGOs in the same way they are requiring LNGOs to do this? Overall, the organisations did feel that
their capacity for humanitarian response had improved following Haiyan, though it is perhaps too early
to tell.
One frequent suggestion coming from field consultations was that international partners (mainly funding
partners) should be required to invest in building their local partners capacities so they can gradually
work towards meeting and standards or certification requirements if they want to
Partners were afraid that certification would exclude and alienate small organisations that are not
interested in participating. We discussed this as a team and have nothing against certification but could
it exclude some organisations from engaging in humanitarian assistance? This may be unfair if they cant
complete the certification due to financial or time constraints and you need local participation of
partners in humanitarian assistance. One partner noted that humanitarian work should be given freely
and it is the local people who are always the first to respond, which seemed to imply concern that
certification could hinder this local response. Should the model be adopted, they suggested checking to

20

see if partners have been trained in HAP and Sphere, as well as providing capacity building for small
organisations to participate.
From a head quarters perspective, CAFOD believe that they have to be mindful of the partners capacity
to engage in capacity development activities versus humanitarian relief activities and strike an
appropriate balance. Their partners are not always incentivised to work towards certification. The time
and investment needed to become certified could outweigh the perceived benefits of certification,
particularly for a church-based organisation that doesnt have an INGO-style way of working. For some of
their other partners who are already working to high standards and comply with the Caritas
Internationalis (CI) Management standards as verified by CI, there are questions around the necessity to
be further certified.

7. Compatibility with the Government of Philippines approach to

quality and accountability
The proposed model is compatible with the governments approach to quality and accountability, and
government representatives at all levels (local and national were very supportive of the idea of certifying
NGOs). From the perspective of many government officials, there was simply not enough capacity to
assess, coordinate and manage the number of actors given the large influx of groups following disasters
like Haiyan.
Currently, the main emphasis for the government in terms of quality and accountability is focused on
government ministries themselves, with several initiatives to improve transparency and accountability to
citizens. A national Commission on Audit monitors the work of government agencies, although there is a
push from some within the government to also include NGOs, either through the same mechanism or
the development of something similar. The Commission of Audit primarily focusing on whether the
actions fulfilled the purpose and followed procedures, especially financial procedures, with little mention
of accountability to affected populations or quality. However, the guidelines are being revised and may
include more elements around quality and accountability according to some representatives
interviewed. In this sense, the proposed models focus on NGOs was seen a very complementary to
government efforts as it meets a gap identified by all government and local authorities interviewed.
Government representatives seemed especially positive about the idea of certifying international NGOs
or NGOs with which they are not familiar. Its hard to figure out who people are when they arrive.
Certification would come in handy because there would be no need to verify as long as theyre certified,
said one official. Many officials complained about the competency and capacity of some NGOs. In the
words of one official Sorry, but lets face it; lots of NGOs that came simply arent in the same league as
the Red Cross and others. The same official went on to propose that smaller, less experienced NGOs
should work in partnership under the umbrella of a more experienced NGO. Another government official
echoed the sentiment: Certification should help to know if organisations have capacity. The only
potential problems from this are for individuals who dont know what theyre doing, citing the example
of an informal group of volunteers who set up an NGO. Certification would have helped.
The lack of information and transparency of organisations coming into the country was frustrating for
government officials. At the national level, the government was unaware of many organisations that
went directly to affected areas. At the local level, government officials also complained about a lack of
information about plans and strategies discussed at the national level, with little information sharing or
21

participation of local officials. With the designation as an L3 disaster, it meant that many of our longterm interlocutors were not there, and new people and new organisations came in, explained one.
These people didnt know our systems, didnt know the context, and they way they communicated with
people raised unrealistic expectations that we have to deal with later. Another representative
suggested that NGOs should coordinate and police themselves rather than tie up resources of the
government: Instead of 100 voices in coordination meetings, one single coordinated voice would be
better.
Municipalities offered similar complaints regarding information sharing with NGOs, adding that a lack of
coordination had led to duplicating efforts in some areas and leaving gaps in more isolated areas. One
government official stated, Very few NGOs informed us of their projects and their progress. We need
this information to coordinate and give feedback when other organisations come to us. For example
there was a boat repair project and they gave people the same boat they had before but the coral reef
near the island was damaged so the fish were depleted. They will need to go out further and get bigger
boats. If there were proper coordination this would not have happened because we would have
discussed it earlier. Similarly, another municipality reported, I gave a list of affected families to one
NGO and they gave the list to another organisation, which gave it to another. The other organisations
should have checked with us because it was no longer updated and that meant that some neighbours
received assistance three times and others received nothing. The NGOs do not coordinate with us.
Government representatives interviewed stressed the importance of preparedness work in anticipation
of future crises, where NGOs and their counterparts in civil society and government would have the time
to build relationships and trust, and agree on ways of working. In the absence of this, a registry of NGOs
that agreed to common set of standards, combined with an external verification mechanism on their
competencies and experience was seen as a very positive step towards more coherence and a way of
allowing government officials at all levels to better distinguish who to work with.
Not all government officials offered complaints or criticisms. One reported that they had all the
information they need from the organisations and that they met to share ideas. Another felt that they
did not have a right to complain as they organisations had come to help their constituents, also adding
that despite the disparities in the assistance provided, the government did not have a clear standard to
which it could refer to be able to say that certain projects did not comply.

8. Compatibility with the Philippines Council for NGO Certification

process
The research team also met representatives from the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) to
discuss alignment and compatibility with the existing certification system in country. The PCNC has
previously engaged in the project sharing information and participating in a consultation and learning
event in Bangkok, Thailand prior to Haiyan, so this was an opportunity to follow up directly on the issue
of certification. The PCNC was formed in 1995 after concerns by the government that it would not be
able to regulate the growing number of NGOs effectively. After engaging in dialogue with national NGOs,
the government suggested that an alternative would be for the NGO sector to develop a body to selfregulate and certify NGOs, in return making donations to certified NGOs tax deductible.

22

PCNC certification is based on assessment of an organisations vision, mission, and goals; governance;
administration; program operations; financial management; and networking.13 There are three levels of
certification depending on the size and experience of the organisation. The PCNC certification criteria
focus on governance, internal management issues and mission and vision, but do not mention
requirements in terms of programming or accountability.14 PCNC has certified more than 300 Philippine
NGOs at a cost of approximately US$ 200.15
The PCNC Seal of Good Housekeeping does not directly target organisations engaged in humanitarian
response activities. Nevertheless, representatives interviewed agreed that given the frequency of natural
disasters in the Philippines, specific standards and clear examples of good practices would benefit those
organisations wanting to contribute to a response. An international certification system would therefore
not be incompatible with the PCNC approach, and in fact could act as an incentive for local and national
organisations, including businesses, to work towards applying good practices.
The research team spoke to several organisations that were certified by PCNC, applying for certification
or considering applying and their opinions varied. One noted, Its about branding. It shows that we are
following a set of standards. Others mentioned the emergence of fake NGOs and that certification
helped to show that they were legitimate and professional. Another reported, We were certified and
havent seen much benefits. Its expensive for us. It did improve our administration system though.
This is an area for further research and discussions if an international model is agreed and implemented,
with potential to work with the PCNC on ensuring complementarity and affordability.

9. Other stakeholders views of certification

The research team consulted numerous other stakeholders from the UN, INGOs, national NGOs and
donor governments to capture their perspectives regarding the certification model. Overall, most were
supportive of the idea, several were undecided and a few were more critical. For those supportive of
certification, many pointed to numerous potential benefits that could result from moving forward with
the model. They highly appreciated the idea of having a common standard against which organisations
could be assessed and reported on. According to one interviewee, We have lots of standards and its
not clear what is actually being implemented. If there were a common standard, it wouldnt duplicate
them. It would just take it to the next level and could help us achieve our goals. It would be an advantage
for the communities we are serving and will drive people to do better, leading to better value for money
both for donors and for beneficiaries.
Some noted that it would also be useful when working with partners that may be less familiar with best
practice. If we have common standards, its something that everyone can relate to and comply with. It
would be a big help not only for NGOs. We are engaging more with the private sector and trying to build
their capacity, said one interviewee. They also found the three pillars of the model to cover the most
important issues, and generally overlapped with different standards they were already using. Beyond the
common standards, they stressed the importance of monitoring and verifying compliance with the
standard: If you dont have a monitoring mechanism, then whats the point? There is a need for
verification. On a similar note, another interviewee reported being highly surprised over the quality of

13
14

15

http://www.pcnc.com.ph/related-literature.php
http://www.pcnc.com.ph/related-literature.php

http://www.pcnc.com.ph/ngo-list.php?a=A
23

work done by some renowned international NGOs: They should know better. Certification could be
good to get everyone on the same page.
Finally, several proponents of certification felt that it would help to improve the reputation of the
humanitarian sector, as well as make it more professional. Several Philippine NGOs raised the issue of
fake NGOs who do not actually implement projects and are only used to raise money for the founders,
damaging the broader image of NGOs in the Philippines. There are some fake NGOs in the Philippines
and they are giving a bad name to NGOs overall. Certification could help to give us more prestige,
maintained one interviewee.
Various concerns were also raised regarding the proposed certification model. A few had basic questions
about its added value. Is it really necessary given that we already have HAP and Sphere? said one
interviewee, Its not clear what the added value is. It feels like a decision has been made and Im still at
the so what? stage, said another. A Philippine organisation described PCNC and DSWD requirements,
adding, If there are so many accreditation agencies, what would be the added value?
Some also feared that this would add additional reporting and administrative requirements, inferring
that donor harmonization was not likely. There is a danger that if a critical mass says yes to certification,
the others will have to as well because donors will start to require it. It could become another box to
check unless donors harmonize their requirements, affirmed one interviewee. Some organisations
complained of the many different reporting requirements for different donors and were hesitant to have
to add more administrative work. I am concerned about possible duplication of certification. I dont
want it to be an additional burden. I am happy with the mechanism we have, maintained another
interviewee. Another representative suggested There is a risk that as donors will tend to only fund
organisations with certification, and that they use this as an excuse to not follow up with their partners
and say that they need less staff. Capitals are already not listening and acting on what it going in the
field, asserted the interviewee.
However, perhaps the most common concern among those interviewed related to concerns of excluding
smaller or national organisations. The financial costs were stressed, as well as actual capacity to meet
the standards. The danger of any certification system is if it excludes. In order to be successful it needs
to lift up the majority, suggested one interviewee, and It could be a problem for smaller organisations
to comply. Not because of the cost or administrative burden but because of being able to comply with
the standards. I am apprehensive of the disparity and worried about the exclusion of smaller
organisations, noted another. Some associated the perceived administrative burden with additional
costs, apart from the actual cost of certification, leading some to wonder whether they would be able to
afford it.
Interviewees also offered a number of suggestions regarding the best way to apply the model. One of
the most common suggestions referred to expanding certification beyond NGOs to reflect the wide
range of actors engaged in humanitarian action. UN agencies were generally the first to be mentioned,
but interviewees also suggested including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
governments and the private sector. We need a process to hold them accountable, said one
interviewee, a statement echoed by many. NGOs have to work to get money from donors, while UN
agencies get it far too easily. I have seen shocking things in the UN and the worst thing is that everyone
knows and no one with power does anything. UN agencies often act as donors and they are not fulfilling
good practice, asserted an interviewee. Many felt that the model was applicable and relevant to all
types of partners, but added that their buy-in and understanding was essential to success.

24

Several expressed the need for certification to look closely at actual practices and implementation, and
not simply at what is on paper, as some of the certification schemes with which they were familiar do. It
needs to be as close to the field as possible, not in capitals. It needs to check whats being done in the
field because whats on paper can be very different. Everything looks nice, noted an interviewee.
Similarly, there were also comments suggesting that the model should have teeth with incentives for
compliance and consequences for failure to comply.
Others felt that resources should be provided to smaller organisations to help them build their capacity
and consequently, be certified. It should not be overly complicated, they stressed, but very practical with
specific ways to improve their work, staff capacity and programmes. There was even a suggestion to
think carefully about the terminology and possibly call it an award or prize to avoid making smaller
organisations feel threatened. A few thought that it was worth considering developing different levels of
certification, with more easily attainable standards for small organisations and support to help grow to
the next level.

10. Conclusions and recommendations

The Philippines field research findings show perhaps the strongest degree of support for certification by
all stakeholders compared to the other case studies. Overall, most of those consulted during the field
research supported the idea of certification and found the model to be useful and relevant. Part of this
is clearly influenced by the nature of the crisis and the response to Typhoon Haiyan, which unfortunately
repeated many of the issues that led to calls for a certification system for NGOs following other major
disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami or the Haiti earthquake.

Applying humanitarian principles, accountability and quality standards in large-scale disasters

In the context of Typhoon Haiyan, there were challenges to apply the principle of impartiality, where aid
is defined and delivered in proportion to needs. There were numerous examples provided of where
organisations (including foreign governments) focused only on easy to access locations, at the expense
of communities away from the urban areas of Tacloban or Cebu City. Several stakeholders reported
organisations spending too much time staking out and defending their territory or beneficiary
communities, or worse, media attention, at the expense of rapid and high quality assistance.
Many stakeholders, including representatives from governments, commented that while aid was not
overtly politicized, partisan power struggles at the national, regional and local level influenced aid
decisions. Similarly, foreign governments were equally singled out for sometimes putting their own
political priorities over the needs and priorities of affected people and the government. Corruption was
often mentioned as another issue that affected applying needs-based approaches. Nevertheless, most of
the NGOs interviewed had processes in place to minimize these risks to principled approaches.
The research team observed that INGOs including several very experienced ones - had delivered substandard responses. Similarly, accountability mechanisms were in general very weak and inconsistently
applied, and only now, seven months after the event, were slowly being rolled out through the clusters.
Arguments offered by many that the scale and scope of the disaster precluded fully applying technical
standards or accountability principles seemed somewhat disingenuous. In this sense, the models
assessment process could potentially serve both as a check for compliance, but also as a baseline for
future improvements in performance.

Compatibility with external systems and requirements

25

In broad terms, the model was very much in line with national level legislation to facilitate the
governments coordination of international disaster response. Government representatives at all levels
were strongly supportive of certification as a way to assist them to carry out their coordination functions.
One important observation (similar to Pakistan) was that provincial and local governments wanted
access to a registry of NGOs that would help them to navigate a complex system where they are often
responsible for setting aid priorities, but are not sure who is the most appropriate partner or how to
monitor NGOs work.
In the context of a major disaster, many INGOs and UN agencies reported difficulties in finding local
NGOs to implement programmes, leading to examples of competition for partners. In this respect, the
model was less useful perhaps in selecting partners, as there were simply too many needs and too few
partners to make a difference. In most cases, donors and UN agencies had significant surge capacity,
which could presumably been used to assess, select and monitor partners. Nevertheless, in the longer
term, the model could be used as a means to pre-select potential partners (including regional and
international partners), and work with them to build capacity, as reported by many actors.
Similarly, the model is not incompatible with the national NGO certification body, PCNC, approach,
though it does differ in the level of specific requirements related to humanitarian work, and has a
greater emphasis on field level verification. However, the PCNC is open for further discussions on the
potential to collaborate with any potential international model. Indeed, PCNC has already engaged with
InterAction and HAP.
Finally, the model appears also to be compatible with the Caritas Internationalis draft minimum
standards, although a more thorough comparison is required once the standards are approved and
adopted. This suggests that the model can be adapted to recognise existing networks quality assurance
processes and add value by focusing on field level verification of quality and accountability.
From CAFODs perspective, the key things that any organisation engaged in humanitarian work should be
able to demonstrate would be: adherence to humanitarian principles Humanity, impartiality and
independence; good communication with and participation of those affected by crisis in the design and
delivery of responses; financial transparency and accountability; sufficient and appropriate capacity to
deliver responses to technical and quality standards (for example shelter programmes need engineering
support and donated/used medicine needs certificate of origin to assure it is genuine and efficacious);
commitment to and evidence of learning; and, mechanisms for providing beneficiary feedback and
addressing beneficiary grievance.

Feasibility of the model

The basic elements of the model resonate with stakeholders, who considered that it captured the most
important areas of humanitarian action. At the programming level, the assessment criteria were
considered relevant and appropriate, and the process was able to generate valid conclusions about how
participating organisations interpret and apply key quality and accountability concepts in programmes.
While most stakeholders generally preferred a model that promotes continuous learning, there was a
significant number of stakeholders who felt certification should equally focus on compliance with quality
and accountability standards. Indeed, it was evident very quickly that there was little consistency in the
quality of assistance in several key areas like shelter and WASH, despite the massive roll-out of L3
resources into clusters and coordination, etc.

26

Certification was seen as potentially very useful in helping to differentiate between actors with
experience and competency, from those with less capacity to respond effectively. Many stakeholders
saw external verification as an incentive for organisations to apply good practices, and a way to
compensate for the limitations of coordination mechanisms like clusters or national level bodies to
actively monitor and review quality and accountability of responses. One key concern expressed by many
actors, including government and national NGOs, was the risk that suitcase NGOs were potentially
diverting resources and providing inappropriate assistance from more credible and professional
organisations. For some, certification potentially provided a framework that would help filter out such
actors by providing government authorities with more information on an organisations experience.
Many also reinforced the idea that the assessment framework could provide organisations clearer
expectations on what is expected from them. That said, many of the complaints made about quality,
accountability and performance were against INGOs with awareness and experience with existing
standards. In addition, as several stakeholders pointed out, organisations that do not apply good
practices are often outside of the system, and as such may not be aware or interested in certification.
While all stakeholders agreed on the value of a certification system, most also acknowledged that
certification as such might only mitigate, not eliminate, the influx of large numbers of unprepared and
inexperienced organisations in the response phase. Nevertheless, certification was seen as an important
filter to distinguish more capable organisations from others, and, importantly, as a means to hold even
the most experienced organizations accountable for meeting quality and accountability standards. This
was especially a point of view expressed by national and local government authorities, and to a certain
extent, reflected in comments from beneficiary communities interviewed.
In terms of the feasibility of applying the model to NASSA, Caritas Switzerland and CRS, the experiences
varied. All three demonstrated that they attempted to apply many of the core concepts and criteria
proposed in the model, though with different degrees of compliance. The resources and experience of
CRS in issues of quality and accountability was evident, and the organisation was clearly recognised by
other stakeholders as an example of good practices. For Caritas Switzerland, the evidence was more
difficult to find, in part because the research team did not have access to complete documentation.
Based on interviews with staff and stakeholders, however, it is clear that more work is needed to
systematically and consistently apply core criteria in its programmes. Finally, as the national Caritas
network, NASSA also demonstrated that it met many of the models proposed criteria, though with clear
differences in the approach and resources available compared to its partners.
This reinforces the message from many stakeholders that any model must be flexible enough to
acknowledge different and diverse approaches to apply quality and accountability in programming. It
also suggests that a model that focuses on continuous learning and improvement, rather than a
prescriptive model with a very narrow interpretation of what constitutes good practices, is more
appropriate.
Finally, in terms of partnerships, the research findings suggest that many international organisations
often did not consider the capacity, experience and vision of local organisations. There was wide
agreement that it is important for international partners to support their local partners in meeting
accepted standards and good practices, but this was not always observed in practice. However, the
approach should not be one of imposition of external approaches, but of accompanying them to finding
approaches that are appropriate for the local context and culture. The nature and quality of the partner
relationship should be included as part of the assessment criteria, in part, to ensure that the system as a
whole is moving towards more equitable relationships between actors at all levels. CAFOD warn that any
mechanisms need to take into account that smaller local NGOs and CBOs are usually first responders,
27

and provide particular expertise in terms of understanding local need, culture and context. They should
not be excluded from humanitarian participation, funding or co-ordination mechanisms.
One observation is that when there is a large concentration of NGOs working in the country, it may be
more cost effective to carry out multiple organisational assessments in the same time frame. This would
also allow for more accurate comparisons between the performance organisations working in the same
context, and therefore identify examples of good practices and innovations that could be integrated into
organisational learning.

Recommendations
Explore ways to include local organisations
One of the biggest concerns related to the possible exclusion of smaller organisations. Numerous
suggestions were offered regarding ways to include them, though some may be more feasible than
others. Local organisations would certainly appreciate support in being able to meet the standards for
certification. One the one hand, this means capacity building in humanitarian action and programme
management, as many are new to humanitarian action and do not have as many resources as CRS, for
example, to dedicate to ensuring the quality of their programmes. On the other, it may mean exploring
ways to help with the financial costs associated with certification. Some organisations found the national
NGO certification costs to be too expensive, but the high number of participants seems to indicate that
many consider it affordable. However, an international system would clearly be more expensive and
some thought should be given to ways to encourage organisations to participate.
Avoid creating an additional administrative burden
Quite a few stakeholders were concerned of adding yet another set of requirements, as their
organisations already spend significant time and resources fulfilling the different administrative and
reporting requirements of their donors and other certification bodies. In fact, those who supported the
model were often most excited about the prospect of only having one set of requirements to follow. For
some, however, this does not seem probable. Some of their donors had such specific requirements that
they had difficulty imagining that these would disappear if the model were implemented. Others
received the bulk of their funds from large donors who they did not think would be willing to replace
their requirements with those of the model. It is important to keep this in mind if the model is
implemented, as some organisations will be facing requirements on many different fronts, therefore the
certification process should aim to create as little administrative burden as possible.
Consider expanding the model to include other humanitarian actors
Stakeholders interviewed understand that it makes sense to begin with NGOs, but many expressed
strong feelings that it should be expanded to include other humanitarian actors as soon as possible in
order to have a larger impact on the quality of humanitarian action. This could include UN agencies, the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the private sector and even governments. The
project should continue to engage with these actors to discuss the possibility of their future
participation.

28

Annex 1. List of Interviewees

Manila
Caritas Internationalis
Position
members group discussion

Organisation

Date

Parisa Karbassi

Programme Director

STEP NASSA (CAFOD)

6/9/2014

Karin Uckrow

Country Finance Director

Caritas Germany

6/9/2014

Kelly Schut

Head of Finance

Caritas Czech Republic

6/9/2014

Roman Asefaha

Funding Officer

Caritas International Belgium

6/9/2014

Ron Langford

Policy Advocacy Advisor

Cordaid

6/9/2014

Joseph Chacko

Country Director

CAFOD, Caritas Philippines/NASSA

6/9/2014 and
6/10/2014

Julie Breen

Executive Secretary

Trocaire

6/9/2014

Joshua Kyller

Program Manager

CRS

6/9/2014

AM Leida Pacano

Program Manager

NASSA

6/9/2014

Aida Vidal

Program Manager

Development & Peace

6/9/2014

Jo Ignacio

Program Manager

NASSA

6/9/2014

Luke Spykes

Program Manager

NASSA

6/9/2014

Oliver Behn

Project Officer

CAFOD

6/9/2014

Mike Bonke

Programme Manager

Caritas Austria

6/9/2014

Marcel Raymond

Chief Humanitarian Delegate

Caritas Switzerland

6/9/2014

Fr. Edwin Gariguez

Executive Secretary

NASSA

21.06.14

Paul G. Del Rosario

Humanitarian Programme
Coordinator

Oxfam

09.06.14

Javad Amoozegar

Country Director

ACF

09.06.14

Roland Roescheisen

Head of Manila Office

Arche Nova

09.06.14

Philippine International
NGO Group (PINGO)

29

Ismael Wiflried Zina

Emergency Response
Coordinator

ADRA

09.06.14

Carin van der Hor

Country Director

Plan International

09.06.14

Stephane Moissange

Programme Manager

Handicap International

09.06.14

Emily Beadle

Programme Manager

ACTED

09.06.14

Teresa Bayombong

Director of Programs

CARE

6/10/2014

Christie Suyin Jamoralin

Coordinator

Citizens' Disaster Response Center

6/10/2014

Minnie Anne Calub

Emergency Programme
Manager

National Council of Churches in the

Philippines

6/10/2014

Luis Morales

Director

Philippines Council for NGO

Certification (PCNC)

09.06.14

Sonny Carpio

Managing Trustee and COO,

Aboitiz Foundation

09.06.14

Other NGOs

(also PCNC Board member)

Brian Macdonald

Head of Operations

Catholic Relief Services

Marcel Fortier

Head of Delegation

International Federation of Red Cross 10.06.14

and Red Crescent (IFRC)

Edgardo Ollet

Director, Plans and Programs

Division

Office of Civil Defense-National

Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Council

09.06.14

Vilma Cabrera

Assistant Secretary

Department of Social Welfare and

Development (DSWD)

20.06.14

Priscila Ylana-Miteya

NGO Standards Branch

DSWD

20.06.14

JJ Duke

Former INGO Coordinator

Tacloban Mayors office

21.06.14

David Carden

Head of Office

UN OCHA

09.06.14

Dr Julie Lyn Hall

Country Representative

WHO

09.06.14

Government
representatives

UN Agencies

30

Tacloban
Name

Position

Organisation

Date

Renee Lambert

Head of Office

CRS

11/06/20

Joshua Kyller

Head, Emergency Programs

CRS

CRS Tacloban Office

14
11/06/20
14
Emily Nohner

Manager, MEAL

CRS

11/06/20
14

Emily Reid
Emily Naubackeur
Ana Ferrera
Holly Fuller
Howard Brian Bacayana
Ruel Bansali
Idalia Amaya
Christine June Esmediana
Marjorie Uka
Community member focus
group discussions
Wilfredo Gerilla

Protection & Accountability

Manager
Accountability Advisor
Livelihoods Program Manager
Urban Shelter Program Manager
WASH Officer
Shelter Engineer
Program Manager, Grants &
Compliance
WASH Officer (Burauen)
WASH Officer (Tabon-Tabon)

Community member

11/06/20
14
CRS
CRS
CRS
CRS
CRS
CRS

12.06.14
12.06.14
12.06.14
12.06.14
12.06.14
12.06.14

CRS
CRS

13.06.14
13.06.14

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Vivien Lagario

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Liza Vigal

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Rosaly Radam

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Ester Coranes

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Lina Barera

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Felipe Cinco

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Oscar Camora

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Bernardo Dacome

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Alejandro Bantillan

Community member

Burauen

6/13/201
4

Ereberto Coranes

Community member

Burauren

13/6/201
4

Joey Calooy

Community member

Burauren

13/6/201
4

Emelita Cayobit

Community member

Burauren

13/6/201
4
31

Eden Refuerzo

Community member

Burauren

13/6/201
4

Ma. Suzzete Iroy

Community member

Tabon-Tabon

13/6/201
4

Iriza Tonido

Tabon-Tabon Barangay

Tabon-Tabon

13/6/201
4

Susana Cagutom

Community member

Tabon-Tabon

13/6/201
4

Nilda Ala

Community member

Tabon-Tabon

13/6/201
4

Other NGOs
Lex Kassenberg
Alexa MacLean
Joanna Watson
Jonathan Brigham
Ronald Abao
UN and Clusters
Kasper Engborg
Margaret Sheehan
Dave Hodgkin
Catherine Alcaraz
Christie Joy Bacal
Enrika Fatima Hidalgo
Local Authorities
Lila Aquitania

Country Director (outgoing)

Country Director (incoming)
Field Manager
Shelter Delegate
Program Manager
Head of Office (Tacloban)
Field Coordinator
Shelter Cluster National Technical
Coordinator
Communications with
Communities Officer
Accountability to Affected
Populations Officer
Early Recovery and Livelihoods
Cluster
Chief of Staff

CARE
CAREC
Save the Children
IFRC
DSAC NASSA
UN OCHA
UNICEF
Shelter Cluster
UN OCHA
UN OCHA
UNDP

Tacloban Mayors Office

6/12/201
4

Federico C. Anido
Donor Government
Representatives
Sallee Gregory

Executive Assistant, CDRRMO

Tacloban Mayors Office

Field Team Leader

UKAid - DFID

Cebu
Caritas Switzerland staff
Yvonne Affolter

Program Coordinator

Caritas Switzerland

Lukas Fiechter

Program Officer

Caritas Switzerland

Marcel Reymond

Chief Humanitarian Delegate

Caritas Switzerland

Felix Ylala

Project Officer

Caritas Switzerland

32

Other NGOs
Marivic Codinera

Luchie Almagro-Blanco

Information Education
Communication Officer

A2D

Visayas Regional Coordinator

PhilDHRRA

Salvador de la Fuente

Mayor

Madridejos

Jose Esgana

Mayor

Santa Fe

Albert Camay

DRM Advisor

Santa Fe

Brigit Vaes

Shelter Cluster Lead

N/A

Michel Rooijackers

Deputy Country Director

Save the Children

Ivan Ledesma

Livelihood Cluster Lead

ILO

Construction Project Manager

SDC

6/13/2014

Local authorities

UN Agencies and Clusters

Donor Governments
Guillaume Roux-Fouillet

33