Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office
of
the
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

Solicitor

PHILIPPINES,

General

plaintiff-appellee,

for

plaintiff-appellee.

PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of
Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel
de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney
Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case,
he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case
of
Aquino,
et
al.
vs.
Blanco,
et
al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice."
Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the
above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney
Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private
Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which
bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court
ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged
in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil
liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had,
therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the
civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the
offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of
San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in
the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice
of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the
offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the
apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider
plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now
Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice.
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement
in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all
respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO
CAYETANO,
petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of
a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to
an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where
he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees
for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. ( Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley
and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no

direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in
the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they
are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law
for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to
the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on
Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who
are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with
the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of
the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing
practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis
supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are
the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well
as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend
their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business
counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally
tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that
in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The
business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram,
supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the
full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at
least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the
most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client
and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles
are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice,
a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation
law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences
of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have
prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of
futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of
the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches
for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons
and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with
the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of
the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming
involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation
(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter
the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and
the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities;
and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and
laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to
be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating
work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels .
(Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm
to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic
and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the
last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities.
And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities,
he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to
grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 8655%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two
years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans
and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked
with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately
the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (19861987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129
Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted
to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations

officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No.
2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as
key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled
"Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily,
a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation
of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of
the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract.
A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the
recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for
foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose
kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat
no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject

to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by
the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law
is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for
ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of
the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not
lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over
ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition
be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained
since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission
in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has
been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her
beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his
word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator
was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me
that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the
appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require
the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement
of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be
resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art.
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to
judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have
been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such
standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession
actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said
to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his
profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager,
other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in
the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves
no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to
be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets
the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he
did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were
isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the
practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs.
Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to
such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain
points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we
are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not
the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose
between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion
that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications,
I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we
would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its
definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities
accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The
stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets
and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation
Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any
activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact,
again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner.
He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his
knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main
source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act
and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of
court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that
"because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law
even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if
only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and
finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as
a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the
petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would
be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one
of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically
stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability,
proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of
law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational
limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an
activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice
of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real
estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no
active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words
shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked
in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for
M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in
the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough
attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of
having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him.
Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but
not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with
the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has
to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name
only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having
been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the
use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of
which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice
of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to
the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any
person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a
lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not
he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts
for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it
would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I
don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances
where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice."
Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate
is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his
stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and nonprofessional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning
an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.
Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of
law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The
principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business
of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business;
(4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services."
Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or
perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523;
Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the
case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768).

Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09
citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such
legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of
law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the FactFinding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not
categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also
should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not
within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the
background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for
that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me
that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the
appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require
the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to

enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement
of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be
resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art.
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to
judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have
been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such
standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession
actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said
to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his
profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager,
other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in
the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva,
supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal
knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial

Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves
no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to
be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets
the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10)
YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he
did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities
peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were
isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the
practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs.
Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to
such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain
points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his
nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we
are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not
the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose
between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion
that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications,
I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we
would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its
definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities
accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The
stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets
and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation
Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any
activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact,
again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner.
He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his
knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main
source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act
and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of
court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that
"because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law
even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if
only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and
finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as
a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the
petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would
be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one
of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically
stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability,
proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of
law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational
limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an
activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice
of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real
estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no
active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words
shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr.
Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked
in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for
M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in
the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough
attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of
having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him.
Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but
not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with
the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon
investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has
to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name
only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having
been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services
rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the
use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of
which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice
of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to
the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any
person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a
lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not
he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts
for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it
would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I
don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances
where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice."
Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate
is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his
stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and nonprofessional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning
an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.
Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of
law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The
principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business
of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business;
(4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services."
Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or
perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice
gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523;
Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the
case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644)
such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of
law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary
public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09
citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such
legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of
law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the FactFinding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not
categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also
should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not
within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143
SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the
background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for
that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53869 March 25, 1982
RAUL A. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH 11, presided
by HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, District Judge; BRIGIDA VERA CRUZ, joined in and assisted by her
husband JOSE VERA CRUZ, and PRIMITIVO CANIA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. L-51928 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R.
BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO
DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
These two cases (L-53869 and L-51928) filed in May, 1980 and September, 1979, respective, involved the prohibition in
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter, which used to read:
Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court
with appellate jurisdiction, ...
The antecedents facts follows:
L-53869
On September 27, 1979, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed by Raul A. Villegas against the
Vera Cruz spouses and Primitivo Cania, Jr. (private respondents) before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI,
then presided by Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay (Civil Case No. 431-L). An answer, dated October 11, 1979, was filed by private
respondents through their counsel, Assemblyman Valentino 1. Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa from the
province of Cebu. Raul A. Villegas "challenged" the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi as counsel of record on the
ground that he is barred under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial
Courts or Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial
Courts or Courts of original jurisdiction. After the Opposition and Reply to the Opposition were filed, Judge Dulay issued
an Order inhibiting himself from the aforesaid case because Assemblyman Legaspi was likewise the lawyer of his wife in
two pending cases. The case was re-raffled and redocketed as Civil Case No. R-18857, and transferred to Branch II,
presided by Judged Francisco P. Burgos (respondent Court).
In an Order, dated February 27, 1980, Judge Burgos denied the disqualification of Assemblyman Legaspi, as well as the
Motion for Reconsideration filed thereafter. Hence, this recourse to certiorari and Prohibition.
A temporary Restraining Order was issued ex-parte by this Tribunal on May 22, 1980 enjoining respondent Court from
acting in Civil Case No. R-18857 below.
L-51928
Edgardo P. Reyes filed, on July 3, 1979, Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch
XXI, against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and private respondent Eustaquio T.C. Acero to annul
the sale of Excelsior's shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) to Eustaquio T.C Acero, allegedly on
the ground that, prior thereto, the same shares had already been sold to him (Reyes). Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez

entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was questioned on the ground that it was barred by
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, above-quoted.
Initially, this case (L-51928) was filed as a Supplemental Petition to L-51122 (Eugenio Puyat, et als. Hon. Sixto T.J. de
Guzman), but this Court ordered it docketed separately. And since the issue involved is on all fours with L-53869, the
Court opted to resolve Case No. L-51928 jointly with L-53869 instead of with L-51122 as originally directed.
The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L.
Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance.
A comparison of Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any Assemblyman from appearing as
counsel "before any Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction", and the "similar" provision of Section 17,
Article VI, of the 1935 Charter is elucidating. The last sentence of the latter provision reads:
... No member of the Commission on Appointments shall appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a
collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction.
A significant amendment is the deletion of the term "collegiate". Further, the limitation now comprehends all members of
the Batasang Pambansa, and is no longer confined to members of the Commissions on Appointments, a body not provided
for under the 1973 Constitution.
Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a national plebiscite held on April 7, 1981,
Section 11 now reads:
SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction, ...
The term 'collegiate" remains deleted , and the terminology is now "Court without appellate jurisdiction."
Although the cases at bar were filed prior to the aforesaid amendment, they should be resolved under the amended
provision. We abide by the proposition that "as a general rule, the provisions of a new Constitution take effect
immediately and become operative on pending litigation." 1
Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel" "before any Court without
appellate jurisdiction.
"Appearance" has been defined as "voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction". 2 "Counsel" means "an adviser, a
person professionally engaged in the trial or management of a cause in court; a legal advocate managing a case at law; a
lawyer appointed or engaged to advise and represent in legal matters a particular client, public officer, or public body". 3
Ballantine's Law Dictionary says a counsel is "counselor, an attorney at law; one or more attorneys representing parties in
an action". 4 Thus, "appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction by a legal advocate or
advising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another. This is the common, popular
connotation of this word which the Constitution must have adopted. In one case, 5 in resolving the question of what
constitutes 'appearance as an advocate," the Court held that "advocate" the Court held that "advocate" means one who
pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or judicial court, a counselor.
Judging from the prescribed criteria, there should be no question that Assemblyman Valentino L. Legaspi, in preparing the
Answer for private respondent-spouses in Civil Case No. R-18857 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
appears as their counsel. Similarly, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez appears as counsel for Excelsior in Civil Case
No. 33739 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI. They represent and plead the cause of another
before a Court of justice.
The next poser then arises: are the Courts of First Instance, where Assemblyman Legaspi and Fernandez, respectively,
appear as counsel of record, Courts with appellate jurisdiction?
There are authorities to the effect that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a case already instituted and does not create that cause 6 Or, that it necessarily implies that the subjectmatter has been instated in and acted upon by some other court whose judgment or proceedings are to be reviewed. 7 In an

early Philippine case, 8 it was held to mean jurisdiction to review the judgment of an inferior court. And, that it calls for
and demands previous legitimate jurisdiction by a court of origin. 9
By law, Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original jurisdiction. 10 However, under the same statute, their
jurisdiction has been stated to be of two kinds: (a) original and (b) appellate. 11 They have appellate jurisdiction over all
cases arising in City and Municipal Courts in their respective provinces except over appeals from cases tried by Municipal
judges of provincial capatals or City Judges pursuants to the authority granted under the last paragraph of Section 87 of
the Judiciary Act. 12
It is rather clear that Courts of First Instance, by virtue of a specific bestowal by the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
can be Courts with appellate jurisdiction. And, by the deliberate omission of the word "collegiate" in both the original and
amended Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the obvious intention of the framers is that Courts of First
Instance, as appellate Tribunals, no longer fall within the ambit of the previous prohibition. They are single-Judge Courts
with appellate jurisdiction from decisions and orders of City and Municipal Courts. 13 Stated otherwise, under the
amended proviso, Courts of First Instance are not Courts without appellate jurisdiction.
It is contended, however, that the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took cognizance of the suits in the exercise of
their exclusive original and not appellate jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen Fernandez and Legaspi are still prohibited
from appearing before said Courts as counsel. There is merit to this contention.
It should be borne in mind that Courts of First Instance have dual "personality". Depending on the case before it, said
Courts can be either of appellate or original jurisdiction. The question then to be resolved is whether or not Assemblymen
can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance in cases originally filed with them.
We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective the Constitutional provision, appearance by legislators before
Courts of First Instance should be limited to cases wherein said Courts exercise appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the
time-honored principle that whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a Constitution, whether the same be
a prohibition or a restriction, must be deemed implied and intended in the provision itself. 14
It bears repeating that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Charter, it was provided that members of the Commission
on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction."
The intent was clear that members of the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court
inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of the Commission on
Appointments could not appear before Courts of First Instance. Uppermost in the minds of the framers was "appellate
jurisdiction" more than Court. Under Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the scope of the prohibition was
expanded to embrace all members of the National Assembly who were barred from "appear(ing) as counsel before any
Court without appellate jurisdiction." Consistently, the principal criterion is "appellate jurisdiction." So that, when a
legislator appears in an original case filed with a Court with "appellate jurisdiction."
Appellate practice is all that is permitted because of the admitted predominance of lawyers in the legislature. 15 Their
office has always favored them with the influence and prestige that it carried. Today, as before, it is only "appellate
practice" that is allowed with the significant difference that, this time, the Court need not be a collegial body. This so
because with the removal of the legislative power to review appointments the source of power and influence that members
of the National Assembly could unduly exert in the exercise of the legal profession has been greatly minimized.
This is a situation where the restricted meaning must prevail over the general because the nature of the subject matter of
the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended. 16 In fact, the original emandement proposed by Antonio V.
Raquiza, Delegate of the First District, Ilocos Norte, in Resolution No. 345 entitled "Prohibiting Members of the National
Assembly to Use Their Office As a Means of Promoting Sel-Interest" was to bar a National Assembly member from
appearing as counsel before any Court. In the "Whereas" clauses, that proposal was believed to be an "improvement" over
Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution and the purpose of the proposed amendement was explained as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Constitutional provision enumerates the kind of court or administrative cases where a legislator
cannot appear. In our proposal he is absolutely barred because it is feared that the practice of his
profession will interfere with the performance of his duties or that because the power of his office might
influence the administration of justice.

... (Emphasis supplied) 17

The co-author of Resolution No. 345. Delegate Leocadio E. Ignacio from the lone District of Isabela, and Floor Leader of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, elucidated further on the purpose behind the prohibition when he wrote in his
Position Paper that 'The prohibition against appearing as counsel is necessary because of the under influence which
members of Congress enjoy when they practice before the Courts and especially before administrative agencies. It is an
accepted fat that our legislature is composed of a predominance of practicing lawyers, and who are therefor expected to be
naturally not averse to exerting all influence that they can muster in the pursuit of their profession." Continuing, he said:
"The inability to practice as counsel ... should be part of the sacrifices entailed in running for the position of lawmaker. 18
The amendement proposed by Delegate Gonzalo O. Catan, Jr. of Negros Oriental even went further: "No member of the
National Assembly shall, during his term of office, appear as counsel, directly or indirectly, in any Court or administrative
body ..." 19 Delegate Emerito M. Salva from the Second District, Ilocos Norte, substituted his own amendment, thus:
Section 13. No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of office, practice directly or
indirectly any occupation or profession or be allowed to engage directly or indirectly in any trade,
business, or industry. 20
and explained:
10.2. Explaining the substitute amendment, Delegate Salva said that the assemblymen should render fulltime service to the national. He pointed out that they should be barred from the practice of their respective
professions since they would reasonably be compensated for devoting their time to the work of the
National Assembly. 21
While Section 11, Article VIII, as finally adopted by the Constitutional Convention, did not carry the several amendments
proposed, they are reflective of the sentiment prevailing at the 1971 Constitutional Conventional, and reinforce the
condition that appearance as counsel by Assemblymen was meant to be confined to appellate practice and not unlimited
practice before Courts of First Instance. That sentiment has been carried over the amendment ratified in the April, 1981
plebiscite. For, there is no substantial difference between "Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction" (the
original 1973 provision) and "Court without appellate jurisdiction' (the amended provision).
The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence upon the
administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus
preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a signed Judge of the Court of
First Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely diminished where the latter Court acts in the exercise of its
appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that a party represented by an Assemblyman by virtue of his
office possesses is more felt and could be more feared in original cases than in appealed cases because the decision or
resolution appealed from the latter situation has already a presumption not only of regularity but also of correctness in its
favor.
In fine, "appellate practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason, justice and public interest.
The limited application to "appellate practice" is a view-point favored by constitutionalist of eminence, Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, in his scholarly work "The Constitution of the Philippine, 22 where he said:
It is to be noted that at present he may appear as counsel in any criminal case, but he cannot do so before
any administrative body. Also, while it is only appellate practice that is allowed a member of the National
Assembly, formerly, such a limitation applied solely to a Senator or Representative who was in the
Commission on Appointments, a body abolished under the present Constitution. Those differences should
be noted (Emphasis supplied) 23
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando also expounded on the reason behind the Constitutional prohibition, thus:
... The need for it was felt by the 1934 Constitutional Convention, a sentiment shared by the last
Constitutional Convention, because of the widespread belief that legislators found it difficult to resist, as
perhaps most men, the promptings of self-interest. Clearly, the purpose was and is to stress the fiduciary
aspect of the position. There is thus fidelity to the maxim that a public office is a public trust. ... 24

Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as counsel,
were acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they must be held barred from appearing as counsel
before said Courts in the two cases involved herein.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for, the Order issued on February 27, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, is hereby set aside, and Attorneys Estanislao A. Fernandez and Valentino
Legaspi hereby declared prohibited from appearing as counsel before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch
XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, and before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. r-18857,
respectively. The Restraining Order issued heretofore in L-53869 is hereby made permanent.
No costs in either case.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta,
Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5377

June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer suspended from
the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge
within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to
practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the practice of law.1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents
allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law.
This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and
disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be disbarred, not merely
suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this court denied complainant Lingan's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for
Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the
Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's
suspension from the practice of law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued
the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's
suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of
eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended."11
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as Commission on Human
Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his
suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further
injury and prejudice to [his] rights."12
This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not render advisory
opinions.13
On May 8, 2009, this court received a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan alleged
that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution suspending
Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and
instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a notary public." 15 According to
complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar
and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in
effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the
order of suspension]."17 The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have ordered Atty.
Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give
"favorable attention and action on the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the period of
suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to file their
respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Executive Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law during
the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as Regional Director
during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]" 21
this court's order of suspension. According to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no
power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court require him to submit a
certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from performing his functions as Regional
Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on Human Rights be
required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to perform his functions as Regional
Director while he was suspended from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the practice of law did not include
his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his suspension from the practice of law]
to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory
principle in law that what is not included is deemed excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective motions to lift order
of suspension considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further ordered Atty. Baliga and the

Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his
functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009
provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective motions to lift relative
to their suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public and SUBMIT certifications
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel,
stating that respondents have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law during the entire period of their
suspension and disqualification, unless already complied with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on Human Rights [CHR]
stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped from the performance of his functions for the
period stated in the order of suspension and disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of complainant against
them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to lift order of
suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing his
functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally,
managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These managerial functions allegedly
included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional office and its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of
investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation
of all other services and assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at the regional
level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement of funds and expenditure of the
[Regional Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of the legal services
matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithful[ly]
[complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the penalty imposed
upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a
public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a
"bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different
thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and would "abide by
whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment, complainant
Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from the
Commission on Human Rights stating that he was suspended from office and desisted from performing his functions as
Regional Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and only performed
generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order of
suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of
Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/
Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had
supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held
his position as Regional Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional Director, complainant
Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have followed the initial resolution of the
Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his

motion for reconsideration of the Commission on Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing
ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga
"[no longer has that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga
be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to resume his
practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for issuance of a notarial
commission.
On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and recommendation Atty.
Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human
Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga
"should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director] which
[required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions
as Regional Director which required the practice of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the
Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended
holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission on Human
Right's filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift oneyear suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not
practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty.
Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as Regional Director. The
Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of [Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require
the practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the]
matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from the practice of
law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, 60
this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the
Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with power to investigate "all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into regional offices with each
office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional
office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and
the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of the legal
officer or investigator;67

d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate courses of action and
protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas
within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by
members of the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the bar.72 Investigating human
rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action
and protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer
require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of
law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice
law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice
of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or
suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective immediately." 75
From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he has been without authority to
practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/
Attorney VI. As the Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his post, for want of
eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is without prejudice to the investigation to
be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not
generally allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines resolved to put into
effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the
discharge of his functions and responsibilities as Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the
period for which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights did not violate
Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the Commission on Human Rights
Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his
motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was also
immaterial.1wphi1 He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority to
practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty.
Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground
for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six months
for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite lack.of authority to
practice law.1wphi1
We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering its first
resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga
and sternly warned him that repeating the same offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with
CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the Honorable
Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally
blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of his
oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority to secure a
commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act as a notary public in accordance with the rules and
regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth by the Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June
2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer
reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for having
contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege,
the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission.
Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege
the Commission grants of every official and employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him pursuant to the
Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty. Baliga from the office may be too
harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the
admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the
penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the
service.80 (Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty.
Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.81
The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of suspension from
the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees, 82 it
can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions."83 To enjoy the
privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree
of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession."84
WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga
shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service on
Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the
Commission on Human Rights.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6705

March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. 1 Alfonso
Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc.
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries,
Inc. until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, and its operations
ceased in 1997.
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda,
Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the
criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116
of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have
inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and
sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for
the months of January and February 1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the
month of April 1996.
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the
criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five
years. Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. Respondent argues that it was his sworn
duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counteraffidavit without mental reservation.
Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would
exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainants statement during the hearing conducted on 12
February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted
by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x.
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondents act was tainted with personal interest, malice and
bad faith.
Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat
employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of
the employees or present them for cross-examination.
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from
complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy
services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that
rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents asking,
intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all
show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with,
the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees.
Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant.
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against
complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January
1999. Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Due to IBP
Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner
Funa").
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funas
Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former
clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The
Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will
conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B"
of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of
Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the
personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat.
Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in
I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 19961997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain
inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which
he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It
should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he
previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations
that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the
Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if
Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related
and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were
of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with
Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this
matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see
Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil.
647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that
are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which
required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal
complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and
violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." However, this rule is subject
to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists,
when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client
relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his]
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with [his] official functions."
Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of
interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment. In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
previously represented him.
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period
since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent
used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the
preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential
information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing
conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyerclient relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill."
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self
to the public as a lawyer.
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel
of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between
consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government
prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainers fee." Thus, as correctly
pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility
unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondents admission that he received
from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to
Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred
from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the
public.
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of
profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. We find this penalty appropriate for respondents
violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for
SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as
an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City, G.R. No. 154464
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus TINGA, J.,*
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro CHICO-NAZARIO,
Manila, Public Respondent.
Acting Chairperson,
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
VELASCO, JR.,*
Private Respondent.
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ
Promulgated:
September 11, 2008

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May
10, 2001and July 31, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the
plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla
Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before
the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a
fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear
before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel
for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected
alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, On March
6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares.
The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred
from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for
remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served. In an Order dated
April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based
1

on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of
pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for
the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but
Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but
the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order dated July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following
errors:
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE
LATTERS BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF
THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY
LITIGANT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID
NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH
AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE
COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party
litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. A becoming
regard of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the
RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals. The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the
nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his
practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by
the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays
more important concerns before us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1.
Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without

compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer,
to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited
by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure
to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on
December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to
prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized schools clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an
attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has
merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a
party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal
or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of
proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his
litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, petitioner, not being a
lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at
his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a
counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be
subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the
petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in
courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced.
The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it
was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules
of Court through Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. The rationale for this ruling was
articulated in People v. Holgado, where we declared that even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in
the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the
Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant
in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his
claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that
he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student
may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts.
Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by
ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial
when she said: Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of
arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the respondents
impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case against the respondent for
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt
the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be
based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear and
convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

*SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several
actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as
the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx.
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to ask complainant
whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that
complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents
imputations of complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with
the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance,
tone of voice and how the words were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate,
malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding
appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade him
from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and criminal
cases including him to further complainants illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a
judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in
barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating in todays hearing both
lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent stated: Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel

(referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which complainant replied:
The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that complainant is not
a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not
inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated out of
indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case
the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of
judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another
malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge
Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant as
counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other;
to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise denied, movant not
having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares when said
Judge stated in Tagalog in open court the same was dismissed by the Honorable Courts Third Division which
stated among others: That the questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in
reaction to complainants actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already
lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the
complainant. Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondents suspension
from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondents averment that the
utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not hold water for the same was (sic)
not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the complainant had
been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 021031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was not
allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against him by
Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious
language in his dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner, substance and
tone of his voice which was not refuted by him in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive
but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination
required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose relative to
complainants appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for others if he had
complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not to
offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the recommendation
of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec. 12 of
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be
reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with
his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigators report.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava, the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the Board
of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required of the
decisions of courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court
the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also
an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of
legal reasoning.
In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain any
findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in
the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and
the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court has opted to resolve the
case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases. This case falls within the exception.
We hold that respondents outburst of does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court that
complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge,
in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer. Such single outburst, though uncalled for,
is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or
the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be
held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that
the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A
partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea, this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from its
commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the same
rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably

rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when
they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not practice law by acting for himself
any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation
usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal
advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the public
as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to
maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a
lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more
circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.