ROMUALDEZ MARCOS V.

COMELEC
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet
the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing seven months to since
childhood. The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of
time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended
as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that
place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification
the Comelec suspended her proclamation.
Imelda
thus

case, Imelda won in

appealed
to
the

the election. But

Supreme
Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the
Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already lose
jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:

1. Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of
the May 9, 1995 elections.
2. Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?
3. Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?

Held:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary
residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following reasons:

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades.
None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.

c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile.
What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence
may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is
that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil
law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of
law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to
make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the
Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after
the
elections.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the
theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.

3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)

JALOSJOS V. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His
application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the
ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition
was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo
filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency
requirement
of
the
local
government
code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to
show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal
presence
in
such
place
coupled
with
conduct
indicative
of
such
intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
one;
and
(c)
a
person
can
have
but
one
domicile
at
a
time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement
for
provincial
governor
of
Zamboanga
Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively
changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the

Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up
his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man
must
have
a
domicile
or
residence
somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his
brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a
candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that
Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San
Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national partymates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of
Zamboanga
Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent
it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations.
The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC
gravely
abused
its
discretion
in
holding
otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect
the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to
their
manifest
will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he
was elected in the local elections of 18 January 1988, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, and on the ground
that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. Miguel
admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent
resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the
United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent
resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987. The COMELEC with the exception
of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr. held that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish
that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States
Held:
Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited
States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrants (not a visitors or
tourists) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently (See Question 21 of Miguels application). To be qualified to run for elective
office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any
elective office. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green
card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on 18 January 1988, he
was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. (Wrote permanently on the
question of his length of intended stay)

NICOLAS-LEWIS V. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought registration and certification as
overseas absentee voters however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a COMELEC
letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the oneyear residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution.
When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was
not enacted for the petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency
under the Constitution.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections because of COMELEC's refusal to
include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of
the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating thatall qualified overseas Filipinos,
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so, observing, however, that the conclusion of
the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.

Issue:
Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the circumstances the same has already been
rendered moot and academic?

Held:
The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners
participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in the petition is the
propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, which however, remains
unresolved.
The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile
retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
[Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope
of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of
suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of 1-year residency
requirement.
RULING:

Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of
Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under
the
Section
5(d)
of
the
same
Act.
By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to actual
residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country may be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the
residency requirement of said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.
Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the same
article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual
citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote.

The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

Article V, Section II
The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other
persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

JAO V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the deceased Spouses Ignacio and
Andrea Jao who died intestate in 1988 and 1989.Private respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in the RTC of Quezon City over the estate of his parents. Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, private respondent Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator, alleging that petitioner
Rodolfo was dissipating the assets of the estate. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue. He alleged that his parents did not reside in Quezon City during their lifetime but in Angeles City,
Pampanga. He submitted documentary evidence showing that his deceased parents were residents of Angeles City,
Pampanga. Private respondent Perico countered that his parents resides in Quezon City and in fact, actually resided in
petitioners house as shown in the death certificate presented before the court. Petitioner argued that his parents stay in
Quezon City was merely transitory and that the death certificates could not be deemed conclusive evidence of the
decedents residence. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent Perico. The CA affirmed in toto the trial courts
decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.
Held:
Yes. The settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City. As provided for under the Rules of Court, the estate
of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. The Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of death,
not to the permanent residence or domicile. In the case of Garcia-Fule vs CA, it was held that the term resides connotes ex
vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. xxx resides should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No
particular length of time is required; however, the residence must me more than temporary. In the case at bar, it was found
that the decedents have been living in Quezon City at the time of their death and some time prior thereto, and as was also
shown in the death certificate presented by private respondent. Thus, the venue for the settlement of the decedents
intestate was properly laid in the Quezon City.

CARGILL, INC. V. INTRA STRATA ASSURANCE CORPORATION

Facts:

Cargill (foreign) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware.

Cargill executed a contract with Northern Mindanao Corporation (NMC) (domestic), whereby NMC agreed to
sell to petitioner 20,000 to 24,000 metric tons of molasses to be delivered from Jan 1 to 30 1990 for $44 per
metric ton

The contract provided that CARGILL was to open a Letter of Credit with the BPI. NMC was permitted to draw up
500,000 representing the minimum price of the contract

The contract was amended 3 times (in relation to the amount and the price). But the third amendment required
NMC to put up a performance bond which was intended to guarantee NMCs performance to deliver the molasses
during the prescribed shipment periods

In compliance, INTRA STRATA issued a performance bond to guarantee NMCs delivery.

NMC was only able to deliver 219551 metric tons out of the agreed 10,500. Thus CARGILL sent demand letters
to INTRA claiming payment under the performance and surety bonds. When INTRA failed to pay, CARGILL
filed a complaint.

CARGILL NMC and INTRA entered into a compromise agreement approved by the court, such provided that
NMC would pay CARGILL 3 million upon signing and would deliver to CARGILL 6,991 metric tons of
molasses. But NMC still failed to comply

RTC in favor of CARGILL

CA CARGILL does not have the capacity to file suit since it was a foreign corporation doing business in the PH
without the requisite license. The purchase of molasses were in pursuance of its basic business and not just mere
isolated and incidental transactions

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is doing or transacting business in the Philippines in contemplation of the law and
established jurisprudence/ Whether or not CARGILL, an unlicensed foreign corporation, has legal capacity to sue before
Philippine courts.

Held: YES

According to Article 123 of the Corporation Code, a foreign corporation must first obtain a license and a
certificate from the appropriate government agency before it can transact business in the Philippines. Where a
foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without the proper license, it cannot maintain any action or
proceeding before Philippine courts, according to Article 133 of the Corporation Code

Doing Business
o

.. and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and
contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and
object of the business organization.

Since INTRA is relying on Section 133 of the Corporation Code to bar petitioner from maintaining an action in
Philippine courts, INTRA bears the burden of proving that CARGILL was doing business in the PH. In this case,
we find that INTRA failed to prove that CARGILLs activities in the Philippines constitute doing business as
would prevent it from bringing an action.

There is no showing that the transactions between petitioner and NMC signify the intent of petitioner to establish
a continuous business or extend its operations in the Philippines.

In this case, the contract between petitioner and NMC involved the purchase of molasses by petitioner from
NMC. It was NMC, the domestic corporation, which derived income from the transaction and not petitioner. To
constitute doing business, the activity undertaken in the Philippines should involve profit-making.

Other factors which support the finding that petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines are: (1)
petitioner does not have an office in the Philippines; (2) petitioner imports products from the Philippines
through its non-exclusive local broker, whose authority to act on behalf of petitioner is limited to soliciting
purchases of products from suppliers engaged in the sugar trade in the Philippines; and (3) the local broker
is an independent contractor and not an agent of petitioner.

To be doing or transacting business in the Philippines for purposes of Section 133 of the Corporation Code, the
foreign corporation must actually transact business in the Philippines , that is, perform specific business
transactions within the Philippine territory on a continuing basis in its own name and for its own account

CARGILL is a foreign company merely importing molasses from a Philipine exporter. A foreign company that
merely imports goods from a Philippine exporter, without opening an office or appointing an agent in the
Philippines, is not doing business in the Philippines.

MACALINTAL V. COMELEC
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A.
9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting
provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period
required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used.
Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has
the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrantwho executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is
considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If
the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

A.
Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at
least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators
and party-list representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which
enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to
a foreign country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been
found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not
having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to

vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years
after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final
judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of
the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent
authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign
service establishments concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such
person is no longer insane or incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or
permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent
residence in another country implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin. However, same
Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an
affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed
in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be
entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for
otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

STEELCASE V. DESIGN INTERNATIONAL SELECTIONS, INC

Facts:
Petitioner Steelcase, Inc. is a foreign corporation existing under the laws of Michigan, USA and engaged in the
manufacture of office furniture with dealers worldwide. Design International Selections, Inc. (DISI) is a corporation
existing under Philippine Laws and engaged in the furniture business, including the distribution of furniture.
Steelcase and DISI orally entered into a dealership agreement whereby Steelcase granted DISI the right to market, sell,
distribute, install and service its products to end-user customers within the Philippines. The business relationship
continued smoothly until it was terminated after the agreement was breach in 1999.
Steelcase filed a complaint for sum of money against DISI alleging that DISI had an unpaid account of US $600 thousand.
It also prayed that DISI be ordered to pay actual or compensatory damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs
of suit. Meanwhile, DISI alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and to contain the required allegations
on Steelcases capacity to sue in the Philippines despite that Steelcase was doing business in the Philippines without the
required license to do so, and that the complaint should be dismissed because of Steelcases lack of legal capacity to sue in
Philippine courts.
The RTC dismissed Steelcases complaint. It has likewise concluded that Steelcase was doing business in the
Philippines as contemplated by RA 7042 (The Foreign Investments Act of 1991) and since it did not have the license to do
business in the country, it was barred from seeking redress from Philippine courts until it obtained the requisite license to
do so. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Steelcase contends that it is DISI is an independent distributor of Steelcase products and not an agent or conduit of
Steelcase. Moreover, DISI is acting as Steelcases appointed local distributor, and is transacting business in its own name
and for its own account.
Issue:
Whether or not Steelcase had been doing business in the Philippines without a license
Decision:
The phrase doing business is clearly defined in Section 3(d) of RA 7042 (Foreign Investments Act of 1991) which states
that the phrase doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison
offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines totalling 180 days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the
Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to
that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. The second
sentence of Section 3(d) states that the phrase doing business shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a
shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business nor appointing a representative
or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own account.
On such account, the appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute doing business unless
it is under the full control of the foreign corporation.

Steelcase, therefore, is foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines by its act of appointing a distributor falls
under one of the exceptions under RA 7042.