AUSTRIA V.

REYES
Facts:
1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll have
been declared by the former as her legally adopted children.
2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners
who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed.
3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest
kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with
law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held that
the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence.
Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid
RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does
not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide
the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art.
850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to
be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side
especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
whole estate as in this case.

REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU, 19 SCRA 85 (1967)

DOCTRINE: Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the death of the testator, or born subsequent thereto. Among other things, Reyes
holds that omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must be a total omission, such that
if a compulsory heir in the direct line received something from the testator under the terms of the will,
such heir cannot be considered preterited

FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast
estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.
1. When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these
properties in a will to Salud Barretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros
Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and
FelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in barrio San
Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerard. In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she
prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the
minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed. As a
consequence, SaludBarretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation
of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
2. Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two will. In the first
will, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs. In the second will, she revoked the same and
left all her properties in favour of Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and the first
rejected.
3. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, husband of the deceasedSalud, as guardian of
the children, it was determined by the lower court that Salud was not a child of Maria Gerardo
and her husband, Bibiano. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
same.
4. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo as a legitimate heir of Maria
Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased BibianoBarretto,
which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo (fishpond property). Hence, this action
for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
5. Milagros then moved to declare the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the Distributee,
SaludBarretto, was not a daughter of the Sps. The nullity of the project was based on Art. 1081 of
the Civil Code of 1889 which provided that :
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been been
included, shall be null and void.
The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties received under the project of partition.
ISSUE: WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and that Salud did
not acquire title thereto

HELD: NO
1. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir in the late BibianoBarretto's last will and
testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be
one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not
null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or
descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and
the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one
of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for BibianoBarretto was at liberty to assign the free
portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on
the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of
BibianoBarretto.
2. Where the testator allotted in his will to his legitimate daughter a share less than her legitime,
such circumstance would not invalidate the institution of a stranger as an heir, since there was no
preterition or total omission of the forced heir.
3. Where a partition was made between two persons instituted as heirs in the will, and one of them
was found out later not to be the testators daughter, while the other was really his daughter, it
cannot be said that the partition was a void compromise on the civil status of the person who was
not the testators daughter. At the time of the partition, the civil status of that person was not
being questioned. There can be no compromise on a matter that was not an issue. While the law
outlaws a compromise over civil status, it does not forbid a settlement by the parties regarding the
share that should correspond to the claimant to the hereditary estate.
4. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate, which the
court may accept or reject. It is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and
determines the persons entitled thereto. It is the final judicial decree of distribution that vests title
in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous, it should have been corrected by an opportune
appeal; but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem,
unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a
decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of
partition becomes irrelevant.
5. A distribution in the decedents will, made according to his will should be respected. The fact
that one of the distributees was a minor (Milagros) at the time the court issued the decree of
distribution does not imply that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution.
The proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate is a proceeding in rem. It is binding on
the distributee who was represented by her mother as guardian.
6. Where in a partition between two instituted heirs, one of them did not know that she was not
really the child of the testator, it cannot be said that she defrauded the other heir who was the
testators daughter. At any rate, relief on the ground of fraud must be obtained within 4 years
from its discovery. When Milagros was 16 years old in 1939, when the fraud was allegedly
perpetrated and she became of age in 1944, and became award of the fraud in 1946, her action in
1956 to set aside the partition was clearly barred.

AZNAR V. DUNCAN
DOCTRINE: The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is further explained in this case.
While the traditional concept of omission, based on Roman Law, means that the compulsory heir was not
instituted as an heir, the same was abandoned so that if a compulsory heir were given a legacy by the testator
in the will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the said compulsory heir can no longer claim the benefit
of Article 854.
One point deserves some consideration. Admittedly, the testator was a citizen of the State of
California. Under the present Civil Code, "testate and intestate succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration." (Article 16,
Civil Code) In the foregoing case, the estate of the testator was distributed in accordance with Philippine law,
taking into account the fact that Article 854 was made to apply. This point needs clarification.
FACTS: Edward Christensen was a citizen of California and was domiciled in the Philippines. When he
died he left a will which alleged that he had only one child (Lucy Duncan), and that he was giving a
devise of P3,600 to Helen Christensen (whom he alleged was not related to him).
1. In the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Helen was a natural child of the deceased and that
the properties of the decedent are to be divided equally between Helen and Lucy pursuant to the
project of partition submitted by the administrator.
2. Lucy argued that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Art 906 NCC which states
that: Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same may be fully satisfied. Moreover, considering the
provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen, but left
her to a legacy although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively
disinherited within the meaning of Art 918 NCC. Thus, under Arts 906 and 918, Helen is only
entitled to her legitime, and not to a share equal to that of Lucy
ISSUE: Whether the estate should be divided equally among the two children (Art 854) OR whether
Lucys share should just be reduced to meet the legitime of Helen (Art 906)
HELD:Helen should only be given her legitime since there was no preterition. Manresa defines preterition
as the omission of the heir of the will, either by not naming him at all, or while mentioning him as father, son,
etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, not assigning to him some part of the
properties.
The decision in Neri v. Akutin is not applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left all his
property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting
the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to them, or at least, some of them." In the case at bar the
testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00.

NERI V. AKUTIN
FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to
the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first
marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with
the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he
had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be
a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to their father.
ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance
in this case?
HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that
testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them
already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage.
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in
so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the
institution of heirs.

Facts: Testator in his will left all his property by universal to the children by his second marriage, the
respondents, with preterition of the children by his first marriage, the petitioners. The court annulled the
institution of heirs and declared total intestacy. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents
on the ground that there is no preterition and assuming if there was, the effect would not be the annulment
of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of bequest made to them.
Issues: Whether receipt in advance of shares in the properties of the decedent a ground of preterition?
Held: Upon the findings of facts, all the parcels that corresponds to the decedent is on the hands of the
administrator after the inventory was filed in court thus the property of the deceased has remained intact
and that no portion has been given to the first marriage. The testator left all his property by universal title
to the children by his second marriage and that without expressly disinheriting the children by first
marriage, he left nothing to them upon erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his
property than those given to the children by the second marriage. This is accordingly a case of preterition
governed by Art. 184 of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and
intestate succession should be declared open.

NUGUID V. NUGUID
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the testamentary capacity
of the testator and the due execution of the will. However, if it should appear on the face of the will that the
sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity,
then a probe into the testamentary disposition, and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for
practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the court is justified in
declaring the entire will void if the only testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the institution of the
universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the testamentary disposition would be the same
as the nullification of the will itself.
FACTS: Rosario Nuguiddied on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitime or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

1. On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner
prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed
be issued to her.
2. On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground
therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors - who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line - were
illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
3. On August, 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto,
oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
4. On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.
5. The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition
without cost.
ISSUE: WON the will is a complete nullity.
HELD: Yes.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise and bequeath all of the
property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister RemediosNuguid, age 34,
residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this
seventeenth day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

Sgd. (Illegible)
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. x xx

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to

nullify; to abolish; to do away with. (Citations omitted.)

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line - her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid
and Paz SalongaNuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anularasiempre la institucion de
heredero, dandocaracterabsoluto a esteordenamiento," referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of
the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir - nothing more. No
specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the court says that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
The statement in Article 854 that, annulment notwithstanding, 'the devices and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious." Legacies and devices merit consideration only when they are so expressly given
as such in a will.
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal
heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced
heirs suffer from preterition
The disputed order declares the will in question "a complete nullity." Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn
merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the will provides for the institution of
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Facts: Rosario Nuguid died single without descendants. Surviving her was her parents
the oppositor and six brothers and sisters. She left a will wherein the petioner submitted
for probate and prayed for the letters of administration be issued to her. On opposition
the parents said that by the institution of the petitioner as universal heir of the
deceased, compulsory heirs in the direct line were illegally preterited thus the institution
is void.
Issue: Whether the compulsory heirs of the direct line were illegally preterited.
Held: Studying the facts and the law applicable to the case, oppositors received
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime neither they were
expressly disinherited a clear case of preterition. The one-sentence will of the testator
institute the petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or
bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the court says that the nullity
is complete. There is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of
petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will.

ACAIN V. CA
Facts: On May 29, 1984 petitioner, one of the children of Segundino Acain who was designated to
received all the properties of the testator his brother upon his death who however predeceased said
testator, filed a petition for a probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters
testamentary on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioners and his siblings
were instituted as heirs. Motion to dismiss was filed by the private respondents on the grounds that
petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings as he is merely a universal heir and the
widow and adopted daughter were preterited.
Issue: Whether or not private respondents have been preterited.
Held: Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein or, they are neither instituted as heir nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, preterition may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir and that she is not of the direct line. The
adopted daughter however, whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner cannot be
denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both were deprived of at least their
legitime. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. The universal institution of
petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

PALACIOS V. RAMIREZ
DOCTRINE: Some commentators of the Civil Code have expressed the opinion that a fideicommissary
substitution is in fact a disguised case of successive institutions. This is because both the first and the
second heirs inherit from the testator and not from one another. The beneficial use and possession of the
inheritance are first given to the first heir for a lifetime at most, and thereafter transferred to the second
heir. The law requires that the first and second heirs must be one degree apart from each other. This
limitation became the objective of two divergent views. One view holds that the one degree apart rule
refers to one transfer. Ramirez settled the controversy by holding the more restrictive view.

In an obiter, the Court opined that the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership of land
does not permit an alien to acquire the same by testamentary succession. Would such a ruling apply to a
case where the foreign beneficiary is both a testamentary and a compulsory heir?

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only a
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila
1. The widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian
who lives in Spain
2. The administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to
be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en pleno dominio in satisfaction of her
legitimee; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez en nuda
propriedad. Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the
remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
3. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the ground that the fideicommissary
substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree, as provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: WON the fideicommissary substitutions are invalid.

HELD: Yes, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void.
The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir
originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.

The word degree was construed as generation and this interpretation has been followed in the present
Code, by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted. The Code this clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation
from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first
heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.

There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by
Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits that the testator contradicts the
establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties of the subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners.

The Court ordered to distribute the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez as follows:
thereof to his widow as her legitime;
thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to
Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

SOLANO V. CA
FACTS:
Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano Meliton died during the
pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted him while asking for the probate of the will of the
decedent. RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the
hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC declared Garcias as
illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3
children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir from
decedents will.

RULING:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Melitons will, and as a result, Sonias
institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid
The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the testator had
the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator
could freely dispose of Sonias share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The
usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all together.

DY YIENG SEANGIO
Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioners
opposed contending that Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause, thus, the intestate proceedings are
to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of
the will. A petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was
subsequently filed by petitioners before the RTC. Private respondents moved for its
dismissal on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of
Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code as the will
only shows an alleged act of disinheritance and nothing else. Petitioners filed their
opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent and that the rule on preterition does not
apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the

exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. The RTC issued its order dismissing the
petition for probate proceedings as the will clearly shows that there is preterition
since the other heirs were omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue: WON the will executed is a holographic will.
Ruling:
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Holographic wills, therefore, should be construed in a manner where the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator should be taken into account. Considering that the questioned document is
Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. It is settled that testate proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.