FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127934. August 23, 2000]

ACE HAULERS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND EDERLINDA ABIVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals1[1] affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 106, except for the award of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, which was deleted. The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision reads as follows:

The case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular mishap which
took place on June 1, 1984, involving a truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers
Corporation and driven by its employee, Jesus dela Cruz, and a jeepney
owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven by Rodolfo Parma. A third vehicle, a
motorcycle, was bumped and dragged by the jeepney, and its rider, Fidel
Abiva, was run over by the truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers
Corporation, causing his death. Upon his untimely demise, Fidel Abiva left
behind a wife, respondent Erderlinda Abiva and their three (3) children.
On July 27, 1984, a criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide was filed against the two drivers, Dela Cruz and Parma, docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-37248 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 103.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay

plaintiff:

While the criminal action was pending, on March 11, 1985, respondent
Ederlinda Abiva filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a
separate civil action for damages against the two accused in the criminal
case, as well as against Isabelito Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers Corp.,
the owners of the vehicles involved in the accident and employers of the
accused.

1. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) as actual damages;

In her complaint, respondent Abiva prayed that:

2. the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as moral damages;

1. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment be immediately issued against the

properties of the defendants as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered;

3. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages;

4. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees;
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2[2]
The facts, culled from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
1
2

2. Defendants in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of P200,000.00 as actual

damage;
3. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys
fees;
4. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of moral and exemplary
damages which this Court may reasonably assess.
On January 31, 1986, petitioner Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz filed
a motion to dismiss bringing to the trial courts attention the fact that a criminal
action was pending before another branch of the same court, and that under

the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the filing of an independent civil

action arising from a quasi-delict is no longer allowed. Furthermore, said
defendants alleged that respondents private counsel actively participated in
the criminal proceedings, showing that the respondent was in fact pursuing
the civil aspect automatically instituted with the criminal case.
On February 21, 1986, respondent filed an opposition to the motion arguing
that she was not pursuing the civil aspect in the criminal case as she, in fact,
manifested in open court in the criminal proceedings that she was filing a
separate and independent civil action for damages against the accused and
their employers, as allowed under Articles 2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
On February 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the action for damages on the
ground that no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution in a case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Respondent Abivas motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was
also denied by the trial court. She then elevated the case before the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) by way of a petition for certiorari, docketed
as Civil Case No. 09644. The appellate court reversed the dismissal order of
the trial court. It was then petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation and Jesus dela
Cruzs turn to appeal the judgment of the IAC before the Supreme Court. On
August 3, 1988, the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the petition
for review of Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz for failure to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the
questioned error. The case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
In the meantime that the petition for review was pending before the Supreme
Court, fire razed the portion of the Quezon City Hall building which housed
the trial courts and the records of the case were among those that the fire
reduced to ashes. It was not until March 26, 1992 that the records of the case
was reconstituted by the trial court.
While the pre-trial proceedings in the civil action for damages was still being
set and reset upon motion of the opposing parties, on July 6, 1992, the RTC,
Quezon City, Branch 83 rendered judgment in the criminal case, finding as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt

the guilt of both accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz for the offense
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, this Court finds them guilty of
said offense charged and hereby sentences each of them to suffer and
undergo imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN
(10) DAYS also of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
Accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz are hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of the deceased Fidel O. Abiva, jointly or pro rata, the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnification for his death and the
amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) by way of actual
damages.
SO ORDERED.
On March 9, 1993, the pre-trial conference of the civil case was finally set on
April 6, 1993, and notices thereof were sent to the parties and their respective
counsel. On the appointed date, however, no representative nor counsel for
petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation appeared. Consequently, upon motion of
respondent Abiva, the petitioner was declared as in default. Furthermore,
defendants Jesus dela Cruz, Isabelito Rivera and Rodolfo Parma were
discharged as defendants, and the case against them dismissed.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ruling against petitioner
Ace Haulers Corporation. The trial court summarized its findings thus:
Hence, Mrs. Ederlinda Abiva as part of plaintiffs evidence, testified that she is
43 years old, a widow and housekeeper, residing at Cefels Subdivision,
Deparo, Novaliches, Quezon City. She told the Court that she is the widow of
Fidel Abiva, who died on June 1, 1984 after he was ran over by Isuzu Cargo
Truck Plate No. NWY-T Phil 93 owned and operated by the defendant Ace
Haulers Corporation, then driven by Jesus dela Cruz and that because of the
death of her husband, she suffered damages, among which, moral,
exemplary and actual damages for her expenses and attorneys fees. She
claimed that she is lawfully married to the late Fidel Abiva as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract (Exhibits A and A-1). Out of their wedlock, (sic) they
begot three (3) children, namely: Noel, Gina and Argentina with ages 25, 21
and 15, respectively. Her husband died on June 1, 1984 at around 11:45 p.m.

(Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2), because of the vehicular accident which involved
the wheeler truck of Ace Haulers Corporation driven by Jesus dela Cruz, a
jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, then driven by Rodolfo Parma and a
motorcycle driven by her husband. Her husband, after his death, was
autopsied, as reflected in an Autopsy Report (Exhibit C) and by the
Postmortem Finding (Exhibit C-1). This was also covered by a police report
(Exhibit D) which shows that Jesus dela Cruz is the driver of the defendant
(Exhibit D-1). This fact is reiterated in a sworn statement which she executed
relative to this vehicular accident (Exhibit E) wherein the said driver
mentioned and confirmed the name of his employer (Exhibit E-1). A criminal
case was lodged against the drivers of the two vehicles and a Decision was
rendered thereon in Criminal Case No. Q-37248 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Jesus dela Cruz and Rodolfo Parma finding both of them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. (Exhibits F, F-1, F-2, F3, F-4 and F-5). This decision has now acquired finality as no appeal was
taken by the accused. It is established, however, that prior to the filing of the
instant case, Mrs. Abiva pleaded to Ace Haulers to compensate her for the
death of her husband. But her plea went (sic) to deaf ears. She was thus
constrained to file this case for damages.
Further testimony of Mrs. Abiva revealed that before the death of her
husband, he was employed with Philippine Airlines (PAL) earning
P4,600.00.00 a month, as evidenced by the Pay Statement covering the
period of 4-15-84 in the amount of P2,065.00 (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3);
that when he died, he was only 40 years old and healthy, and that based on
the life history and pedigree of his family where some of its members lived up
to 100 years, she expects her husband to live for no less than 15 years more
and could have earned no less than P828,000.00 for the family. But this, her
family was deprived, because his life was snatched away by this accident
while her husband was riding in a motorcycle which he bought for P11,850.00
(Exhibits H and H-1) which was also totally wrecked.
Resulting from her husbands death, Mrs. Abiva told the Court that she
incurred expenses for his burial and funeral in the total amount of no less
than P30,000.00 and for his wake of six days, in the amount of about
P40,600.00 (Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-6). She also spent
around P80,000.00 as litigation expenses, in her quest for justice since she
has to engage the services of four (4) counsels from the time of the filing of
this case before the Hon. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, then Presiding Judge of

this Court who once dismissed this case, and which led eventually to an
appeal by certiorari which was later elevated up to the Supreme Court.
(Exhibits K, K-1, K-2, K-3, K-4, K-5 and K-6). Blaming the defendant, Mrs.
Abiva claimed that had Ace Haulers exercised diligence, care and prudence
in the selection and supervision of its employees, her husband would have
been spared from this accident. Hence, her prayer for the award of
P200,000.00 for the death of her husband, who by now, could have risen in
the promotional ladder to a senior Executive of PAL and could be earning
about P30,000.00 salary per month by now. She further prays for award of
moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 exemplary damages of
P100,000.00, attorneys fees of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of
P50,000.00.
After the testimony of Mrs. Abiva as the lone witness for the plaintiff, counsel
formally offered his exhibits and rested his case.
Gathered from the evidence presented, testimonial and documentary, the
Court finds enough legal and factual basis to grant the claim for damages by
the plaintiff. The insinuations of negligence on the part of defendants driver is
amply shown as one, who drove his vehicle fast, impervious to the safety of
life and property of others, his utter lack of care and caution and his
unmitigated imprudence, rolled into one, all these predicated the occurrence
of this accident which took away a precious human life.
Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict x x x (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
Corollary to this, is the civil law concept that:
The obligations imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible
(Art. 2180, 1st paragraph, New Civil Code)
xxxxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, x x x
(Article 2180 paragraph 5, New Civil Code).
Taken in their appropriate context, and predicated on the evidence adduced
which has not been evidentiarily traversed by the defendant, this Court is left
to (sic) no other recourse but to grant the remedies and reliefs which in her
complaint plaintiff prays for, all of them having been by her adduced
evidence, preponderantly shown and established and out of which, she has
shown herself to be completely deserving.3[3]
On September 13, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. 4[4]
On January 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, except for the award of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, which is hereby set aside, the Decision appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respect.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.5[5]

The issues raised are whether or not in an action for damages arising from a
vehicular accident plaintiff may recover damages against the employer of the
accused driver both in the criminal case (delict) and the civil case for
damages based on quasi delict, but not recover twice for the same act; (2)
whether the Court of Appeals erred in not lifting the order declaring petitioner
as in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference; and (3) whether
the damages awarded in the civil case were excessive, much more than the
previous award in the criminal case.
In Padua v. Robles,5 we held that Civil liability coexists with criminal
responsibility. In negligence cases, the offended party (or his heirs) has the
option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. x x x Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission. 6
Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.7
Hence, in this case, respondent Abiva shall have the choice which of the
awards to take, naturally expecting that she would opt to recover the greater
amount. It has not been shown that she has recovered on the award in the
criminal case, consequently, she can unquestionably recover from petitioner
in the civil case.

As to the second issue raised, we find that petitioner was rightly declared as
in default for its failure to appear during the pre-trial conference despite due
notice. This is a factual question resolved by the Court of Appeals which we
cannot review.8
As to the third issue regarding the award of damages to respondent Abiva,
we find the award of actual damages to be supported by preponderant
evidence. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss
must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. 9 However, there is no basis
for the award of moral damages, which is hereby deleted. The person
claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough
that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as
the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be
shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive. 10
The attorney's fees awarded is reduced to P20,000.00 which is ten (10%)
percent of the amount of actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals, 11 with modification. The Court
deletes the award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages,
and reduces the attorney fees to twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
8
9
10
11

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107725. January 22, 1998]
ESPERO SALAO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and JOWIE APOLONIO, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XIV, Malolos, Bulacan, which ordered petitioner Espero Salao to pay
private respondent Jowie Apolonio P20,000.00 in actual damages,
P10,000.00 in moral damages, and P15,000.00 in attorneys fees, as well as
the appellate courts resolution of October 23, 1992 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
This case originated from a complaint for damages filed by the private
respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted on him by petitioner on August
24, 1986. Private respondent, then a senior student at the Philippine Air
Transport and Training Services, Inc., testified that on August 24, 1986, at
around 6:30 p.m., he saw a friends jeep parked outside the compound of the
petitioner. Upon entering the compound he saw his friend having drinks with
petitioner. He therefore decided to join them but petitioner saw him and drove
him away for being a drug addict. As he was leaving petitioner hit him on the
head with a gun and threatened him with further harm. Only the timely
intervention of private respondents brother, Gary Apolonio, and petitioners
mother, Lourdes Salao, saved him from further injuries in the hands of
petitioner.i[2]
Private respondent submitted in evidence a certification and receipts, ii[3] in
support of his claim for damages. The expenses were incurred for an
operation at Martinez Memorial Hospital which necessitated private
respondents confinement there from September 4 to 9, 1986. iii[4]
The private respondents claim was corroborated by his brother, Gary
Apolonio, who testified that while he was buying cigarettes from a store in

front of petitioners residence, he saw the latter hit his brother on the head
with a gun, even as he accused him of teaching petitioners son, Dennis, how
to abuse drugs. Gary said he had to take his brother to the hospital because
of injuries on the head caused by petitioner. iv[5]

Obando, Bulacan found him not guilty and accordingly dismissed the case
against him.

Dr. Antonio Sarrosa testified that he operated on Jowie Apolonio for a

fractured skull at the Martinez Memorial Hospital. v[6]

First. It is settled that issues not raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal in this Court without violating the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.x[11] In the case at bar, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals, assigning two errors allegedly committed by the trial court,
to wit:

On the other hand, petitioner claimed it was private respondent who tried to
assault him and he only acted in self defense by hitting private respondent
with his gun. According to petitioner, on August 24, 1986, between 5 and 6:30
p.m., he was surprised to see private respondent inside their yard having
drinks with his nephew and the latters friends. Because he told the group to
stop drinking, private respondent resented his order and left. Later, petitioners
wife arrived and told him that private respondent was very angry and making
threats against petitioner. As petitioner went to buy cigarettes at the store of
his sister-in-law located also within the compound, private respondent
shouted at him and hit him. Petitioner claimed that, in self defense, he pulled
his gun and hit the private respondent with it. He asked the group to throw
private respondent out of the compound. vi[7]
Petitioner also claimed he was going to file charges against private
respondent but was persuaded not to do so by private respondents mother
because they were neighbors.vii[8] He said he counseled his sons not to keep
private respondent in their company as he suspected him to be engaged in
illegal acts and trying to make his sons do the same. viii[9]
The trial court found the private respondents version of the incident to be
more convincing than that of the petitioner which it found to be
uncorroborated and self-serving.ix[10] Accordingly, it rendered judgment
against the petitioner. The trial court also denied petitioners subsequent
motion for reconsideration and new trial.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision in toto and
later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then brought
this appeal questioning the award of damages and attorneys fees to private
respondent. In his Reply to Private Respondents Comment, he raised as
additional ground the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries
and grave threats based on the same incident, the Municipal Trial Court of

The appeal is without merit.

1. The Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of and hearing the case without
plaintiff first availing the conciliation process provided by PD 1508; and
2. The Trial Court erred in denying defendant-appellants motion for
reconsideration and alternatively motion for new trial.
The propriety of such award of damages and the effect of petitioners acquittal
in the criminal cases were not questioned by petitioner. Consequently, he is
barred from raising these questions for the first time in this appeal.
Second. Petitioner has not shown that the award of damages is not
supported by evidence. For example, the award of P20,000.00 for actual
damages is based on hospital bills and receipts for medicine which private
respondent properly identified in court and formally offered in evidence. xi[12]
That private respondent is competent to testify regarding the authenticity and
due execution of these documents is beyond doubt. Rule 132, 20 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuiness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed
to be.

no civil liability to the private respondent. Petitioner invokes Rule 111, 2(b) of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:

Needless to say, this factual finding of the trial court, especially because it
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and petitioner in this case has
presented no rebutting evidence, is well nigh conclusive in this appeal. xii[13]

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. xvi[17]

The award of P10,000.00 for moral damages is likewise appropriate. This

being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral
damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court, as provided by Art.
2219(1) or (2) of the Civil Code. The evidence gives no ground for doubt that
such discretion was properly and judiciously exercised by the trial court. The
award is in fact consistent with the rule that moral damages are not intended
to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action. xiii[14]

The civil liability referred to in this Rule is the civil liability arising from crime
(ex delicto). It is not the civil liability for quasi delict which is allowed to be
brought separately and independently of the criminal action by Art. 33 of the
Civil Code.xvii[18] The civil liability based on such cause of action is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. xviii[19]
Indeed, because the offended party does not intervene in the criminal
prosecution, it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil
action may not have been presented by the public prosecutor in the criminal
action with the result that the accused in the criminal case may be acquitted.
This is what happened in the recent case of Heirs of Guaring v. Court of
Appealsxix[20] where, because the only survivor in a motor car accident whose
testimony proved to be pivotal in the civil case was not called to testify in the
criminal prosecution of the driver of the other vehicle, the latter was acquitted
on reasonable doubt.

With regard to the award of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees, petitioner invokes
rulingsxiv[15] that in view of the policy against placing a premium on the right to
litigate, awards for attorneys fees must be based on findings of fact and law,
expressed in the judgment of the trial court, which bring the case within the
exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code. In this case, the award
of attorneys fees is based on the trial court finding that because of this case
private respondent was compelled to secure the services of counsel for
P20,000.00.xv[16] (The actual award is for P15,000.00) Art. 2208(2) provides:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: . . . .
(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; . . .
Contrary to petitioners contention, there was compliance by the trial court
with the rule regarding attorneys fees.
Third. Nor is there merit in petitioners claim that his acquittal in the criminal
action for serious physical injuries constitutes a definitive finding that he has

We therefore hold that petitioners acquittal in the criminal case for serious
physical injuries and grave threats is not conclusive of his liability for
damages to private respondent. This case is separate, distinct and
independent of the criminal action and requires only a preponderance to
prove it.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000]
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO
P. DY (for herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis
Rafael, all surnamed Dy), respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] affirming the
decision and supplemental decision of the trial court,[3] as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the appeals
interposed by both accused and Reyes Trucking Corporation and affirming the Decision and
Supplemental Decision dated June 6, 1992 and October 26, 1992 respectively.
"SO ORDERED."[4]
The facts are as follows:
On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan an amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless
imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property, reading as follows:
"That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being
the driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A-867 registered

in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles
of beer grande, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated the same while along the
National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in said Municipality, in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and ordinances and without taking
the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property, causing by
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan
Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @
Pacquing, due to irreversible shock, internal and external hemorrhage and multiple injuries,
open wounds, abrasions, and further causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the
amount of P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and damages to his
Nissan Pick-Up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total amount of P2,000,000.00.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.
"(Sgd.) FAUSTO C. CABANTAC
"Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor"
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the
offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a
reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged.[5] On November
29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a
complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de
Tumol, based on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the
other vehicle involved in the accident). The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not
withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents
withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would
prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action.[6] However, they did not withdraw the separate civil
action based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused
driver.[7]
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint
trial of the same.
The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be undisputed, are as follows:
"The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short) from the
latters San Fernando, Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of
vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a
duly licensed driver. Aside from the Corporations memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to
physically inspect their vehicles before each trip (Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMCs Traffic
Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20,
1989 (Exh. 17). In addition to a professional drivers license, it also conducts a rigid examination
of all driver applicants before they are hired.
"In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao,
Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande"
bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper

("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00 oclock that same morning while the truck was
descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it
approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the trucks right lane going
south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven because the
potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca
saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade
this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the
incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost
control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a
result, Duncas vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road
and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped. (see Exh. A-5, p. 8, record).
The Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-14, pp. 9-11, record), and its two
passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly (Exh. A-19) from
external and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp. 15 and 16, record).
"For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the
time of his death he was 45 years old. He was the President and Chairman of the Board of the
Dynamic Wood Products and Development Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing
establishment, from which he was receiving an income of P10,000.00 a month (Exh. D). In the
Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy
appear to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each with par value of P100.00 per share out of its
outstanding and subscribed capital stock of 60,000 shares valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K-1
& 10-B). Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns (Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net income of
P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle University graduate in Business
Administration, past president of the Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the
Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976, respectively, and World Vice-President of Jaycees
International in 1979. He was also the recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. C).
His children were all studying in prestigious schools and spent about P180,000.00 for their
education in 1988 alone (Exh. H-4).
"As stated earlier, the plaintiffs procurement of a writ of attachment of the properties of the
Corporation was declared illegal by the Court of Appeals. It was shown that on December 26,
1989, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units
of Truck Tractors and trailers of the Corporation at its garage at San Fernando, Pampanga.
These vehicles were kept under PC guard by the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the
Corporation to operate them. However, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dissolved
the writ (p. 30, record) and on December 29, 1989, said Sheriff reported to this Court that the
attached vehicles were taken by the defendants representative, Melita Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31,
record). The defendants general Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per day for the nonoperation of the six units during their attachment (p. 31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran,
proceedings on December 10, 1990)."[8]
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep.
Act No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum
to three years, six months and twenty days as maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy.
Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;
"2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual
damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and
"3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED.
"Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.
"(Sgd.) ARTEMIO R. ALIVIA
"Regional Trial Judge"[9]
On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from the joint decision.[10]
On the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint decision so
as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private respondents in the event of
insolvency of the accused.[11]
On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion by
inserting an additional paragraph reading as follows:
"2:A Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the damages
awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused but deducting
therefrom the damages of P84,000.00 awarded to said defendant in the next preceding
paragraph; and x x x"[12]
On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental
decision.[13]
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated
December 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case.[14]
On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision affirming that of the trial court, as set
out in the opening paragraph of this decision.[15]
On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended decision.[16]
On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[17]
Hence, this petition for review.[18]

On July 21, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.
[19]
On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment.[20] On April 13, 1998, the Court granted leave to
petitioner to file a reply and noted the reply it filed on March 11, 1998.[21]
We now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the case.
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the petition, which, however, boil down to two (2) basic
issues, namely:
1.....May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for
the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver
despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the
truck driver?
2.....May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing
of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged
in the information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property?[22]
We grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to the trial court for
determination of the civil liability of petitioner as employer of the accused driver in the civil action quasi ex delicto
re-opened for the purpose.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising
from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any
other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused.[23] This is the rule against double recovery.
In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to
the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both
types of liability."[24]
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as
employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private
respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be
vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is
founded on at least two specific provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action
predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the
employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer
for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action
based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the
employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.[25] The
second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held
subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches

when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that
renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.[26]
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the
accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily
liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation
to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with
the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.[27]
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when
private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action,
they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil
action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.[28]
The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of accused
truck driver became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on
quasi delict.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioneremployer of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as
the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the
waiver of the civil action ex delicto.
It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file
a civil action against the driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in
the criminal action. However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made
because private respondents did not withdraw the civil action against petitioner based on quasi delict. In such a
case, the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear that the
reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other available civil actions arising
from the same act or omission of the accused. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are the civil
actions deemed waived upon such reservation or filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically provides:
"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation
of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others."
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the
same act or omission of the offender. The restrictive phraseology of the section under consideration is meant to
cover all kinds of civil actions, regardless of their source in law, provided that the action has for its basis the
same act or omission of the offender.[29]
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict,
may be held liable thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision. Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal
from such dismissal and could not be granted affirmative relief.[30]
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to promote their objectives and assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding"[31] or

exempted "a particular case from the operation of the rules."[32]

Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in
dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not appeal from the
dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court
so that it may render decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the evidence.[33]
With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action
against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong,[34] "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the
crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo
Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for
recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the
petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting
the accused became final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The
damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was
void because the action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal
action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount of damages
alleged in the amended information, the issue is de minimis. At any rate, the trial court erred in awarding
damages in the criminal case because by virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a separate civil action or
the filing thereof, "there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case
there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused.[35]
As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained
for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer.[36]
The injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.[37]
Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." There
is no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to
sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
maximum." This is erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or
series of crimes.[38]
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if erroneous, as it is, because it has become final
and executory.
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the
act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of
the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as homicide through reckless
imprudence, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide; or simple imprudence causing damages to property."[39]

There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the
guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997, and the joint decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19424, dated June 6, 1992.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property, defined and penalized
under Article 365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, with violation of the automobile law (R. A. No. 4136,
as amended), and sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
maximum,[40] without indemnity, and to pay the costs, and
(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders the case re-opened to determine the liability of the defendant
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation to plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendants counterclaim.
No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

ii

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