1-

;qenLeRizR;;xkspj;ks%

1.

The two (entities) grasped as 'you' and 'I',

2-

fok;fokf;.kks%

2.

Which are respectively the observed and the observer,

3-

re% izdkkof}:)LoHkko;ks%

3.

Being opposite to each other in their nature like darkness

light...

4-

brjsrj HkkokuqiikkS
brjsrjHkko&vuqiifk%

4.

Are known to be mutually dissimilar; so the features of one can

never be of the other.

5-

bfr vr% vLeriz;xkspjs fokf;f.kfpnkReds ;qeRizR;xkspjL;

fok;L; r)/kekZ.kka p v/;kl%A

5.

Therefore, adhyasa, the superimposition of the features of the

entity 'you' on the conscious observer 'I'.

6-

rf}i;Z;s.k fok;f;.k% r)ekZ.kka p fok;s v/;kl%

6.

And conversely, the superimposition of the features of the observer

on the observed,

7-

feF;k bfr Hkforqa ;qDre~~

7.

Can rightly be deemed illusory.

fl)k;ka

r)ekZ.kke~

vfi

a n d

lqrjka

8-

rFkkfi vU;ksU;fLeu~ vU;ksU;kRedrke~ vU;ksU;/kekZap v/;L;

brjsrjkfoosdsu vRlUrfofoDr;kss% /keZ/kfeZ.kksa% feF;kKkifufek%
lR;ku`rs feFkquhd`R; vge~ bne~ ee bne~ bfr uSlfxZd% v;a
yksdO;ogkj%A

8.

Nevertheless, superimposing one entity and its features on the

distinctly differing other entity and its features indiscriminately due
to wrong understanding, missing up the changing and the
unchanging, there is this natural usage in people 'I am this', 'This
is mind'.

9-

vkg d% v;e~ v/;kl% uke bfrA mP;rs&Le`fr:i% ij=

iwoZn`VkoHkkl%

9.

If asked, 'What is this thing called adhyasa?' the reply is 'it is the
memory of a previously seen (object) a p p e a r i n g a s a n o t h e r
(object)'.

10-

ra dsfpr~ vU;=kU;/kekZ/;kl% bfr onfUrA

10.

Some (say), it is superimposing of the features of the one on

another;

11-

dsfprq ;= ;r~ v/;kl% rr~ foosdkxzgfucU/ku% Hkze bfr

11.

It is the delusion resulting from not discriminating the two.

12-

vU;s rq ;= ;r~ v/;kl% rL; ,o foijhr/keZRodYiukepk{krs bfrA

12.

Others say, wherever there is adhyasa of one on another, it is

imagination of the opposite features of the other on the one.

13-

loZFkk vfi rq vU;L; vU;/kekZoHkklrka u O;fHkpjfrA

13.

Whatever it be, there is no deviation (from the rule) that the

dharma of one is seen in another.

14-

rFkk p yksds vuqHko% ^kqfDrdk fg jtror~ voHkklrs*] ^,d% pUnz%

lf}rh;or~* bfrA

14.

(That say) 'Shell appears like silver', 'One moon as if with a second'.

15-

dFka iqu% izR;xkRefu vfok;s v/;kl% fok; r)ekZ.kke~\ loksZ fg

iqjkofLFkrs fok;s fok;kUrje~ v/;L;fr ;qeRizR;;kisrL; p
izR;xkReu% vfok;Roa czohfk\

15.

'If so, how can there be adhyasa of an observable or its features

on the inner Self which is not an observable? All do adhyasa of an
observable on another observable in front. You also assert unobservability of the Self.

16-

mP;rs&u rkor~ v;e~ ,dkUrsu vfok;% vLeRizR;;fok;Rokr~

vijks{kRokr~ p izR;xkReizfl)s%A

16.

The reply is Not unobservable as a rule because, it is the well known

experience of everyone that he is an object of I-awareness.

17-

u p v;e~ vfLr fu;e% iqjksofLFkr ,o fok;s fok;kUrje/;flrO;e~

bfrA vizR;{ks vfi fg vkdkks ckyk% ryefyurkfn v/;L;fUrA

17.

(And) there is no rule that an observable can be superimposed only

on an observable perceived in front; the unconditional sky is seen as
coloured by impetuous people.

18

,oe~ vfo:)% izR;xkRefu vfi vukRek/;kl%A

18.

In this way, there is no contradiction in the adhyasa of the non-Self

on the inner-Self.

19-

resre~ ,oa y{k.ke~ v/;kla if.Mrk vfo|k bfr eU;UrsA rf}osdsu p

oLrq Lo:iko/kkj.ka fo|ke~ vkgq%A r= ,oa lfr ;= ;r~ v/;kl%
rRd`rsu nksks.k xq.ksu ok v.kqek=s.k vfi l u lEc/;rs A

19.

Scholars consider adhyasa of this nature as avidya. Recognition of

its distinctiveness and the determination of the nature of that
thing they call as vidya. This being so, where there is adhyasa of one
on another, even an iota of the good or bad of the one does not stick
to the other.

20-

re~ ,re~ vfo|k[;e~ vkRekukReuks% brjsrjk/;kla iqjLd`R; losZ

izek.kizes;O;ogkjk% ykSfddk% oSfndk% p izo`kk% lokZaf.k p
kkL=kf.k fof/kizfrks/keks{kijkf.kA dFka iqu% vfo|kor~ fok;kf.k
izR;{kknhfu izek.kkfu kkL=kf.k p bfrA mP;rsnsgsfUnz;kfnkq
vga&eekfHkekujfgrL; izekr`okuqiikkS izek.kizo`;uqiiks%A u fg
bfUnz;kf.k vuqiknk; izR;{kkfnO;ogkj% laHkofrA u p
vf/kBkue~ vUrjs.k bfUnz;k.kka O;ogkj% laHkofrA u p
vu/;LrkReHkkosu nsgsu dfn~ O;kfiz;rsA u p ,rfLeu~ loZfLeu~
vlfr vlaxL; vkEru% izekr`Roe~ mii|rsA u p izekr`Roe~ vUrjs.k
izek.kizo`fk% vfLrA rLekn~ vfo|kof}k;kf.k ,o izR;{kknhfu
izek.kkfu kkL=kf.k p]

20.

All worldly and Vaidika activities involving the valid means of

knowledge (Pramana) and the corresponding objects (Prameya)
start on the basis of this mutual superimposition called avidya; so
also the Shastra - Scriptures - dealing with injunction (Vidhi),
prohibition (Nishedha) and emancipation, liberation (Moksha).
How again, Pramanas like pratyaksha - direct perception etc. and
Shastra are matters applicable (only) to one with avidya? We say:
Pramanas do not work in the case of one who cannot have
knowership, because of the lack of conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in the
body, in the sense organs etc. Activity of direct perception etc. is not
possible without employing the sense organs. Sense organs cannot
function without the body. (Therefore) no
one without adhyasa
(in them) can function through the body. When none of these is
present, the unattached Atman cannot become a knower. Without
the knowler, the pramana cannot function. Therefore, pramanas
such as direct perception etc. and the Shastra are matters related
only to the one with avidya.

21-

iokfnfHk% p vfokskkr~A ;Fkk fg iokn;% kCnkfnfHk%

Jks=knhukalacI/ks lfr kCnkfnfoKkus izfrdwys tkrs rrks fuorZUrsA
;Fkk n.Mks|rdja iq:ke~ vfHkeq[ke~ miyH; ^eka gUrqe~ v;e~
bPNfr} bfr iykf;rqe~ vkjHkUrs] gfjr&r`.k&iw.kZikf.ke~ miyH; ra
izR;fHkeq[khHkofUrA ,oa iq:kk% vfi O;qRiUufpkk%

21.

Also because not being different from beasts etc. Just like: when the
ears (organs of perception) etc. come into contact with sound etc. if
the cognition of sound etc. is unfavourable, they withdraw from
that and proceed towards them if (the sound is) favourable, just as
(when) seeing a man with a raised stick in hand the animals run
away thinking 'he desires to kill me', but approach that man when
seen with his hand full of green grass. In the same way, men even
the intelligent recede in the presence of shouting sturdy (people) of
fierce looks with raised swords, but approach men of opposite
nature. Therefore, the pramana-prameya activity of men is the
same as that of the beasts. It is well known that the activity of beasts
with regard to direct perception etc. is without discrimination.
Because of this apparent similarity, it can be concluded that during
the activity of pratyaksha etc. of even wise people, is the same.

22-

kkL=h;s rq O;ogkjs ;|fi cqf)iwoZdkjh u vfofnRok vkReu%

ijyksdlacU/ke~ vf/kf;rs] rFkkfi u osnkUros|e~ vkuk;k|rhre~]
visrcz{k=kfnHksne~ vlalkjh vkReroe~ vf/kdkjs vis{;rs]
vuqi;ksxkn~ vf/kdkjfojks/kkr~ pA

22.

It is true, that one who does not know that he can have contact with
other worlds, could get the eligibility to do scriptural activities
intentionally. Nevertheless, the eligibility does not require (the
knowledage of) the essence Atman known only through Vedanta
which transcends hunger etc. free from differentiations of
Brahmana, Kshatriya etc. free from birth and death because, it is
not useful and also opposed to the eligibility (for doing karma).
Before the knowledge of Self of this kind, Shastras are the topic for
the ignorant. That is why Shastra that say 'Brahmana shall do yajna'
etc. proceeds on the basis of adhyasa in the Atman like caste, state
of life, age, condition etc.

23-

v/;klks uke vrfLeu~ rn~ cqf)% bfr vokspkeA rn~ ;Fkk

iq=Hkk;kZfnkq fodyskq ldyskq ok vge~ ,o fody% ldyks ok bfr
ck/ekZu~ vkRefu v/;L;fr] rFkk nsg/kekZu~&LFkwy% vga] d`k% vga]
xkSj% vga] frBkfe] ya?k;kfe p bfrA rFkk bfUnz;/kekZu~&ewd%]
dk.k%] Dyhc%] cf/kj%] vU/k% vge~ bfrA

23.

We said that adhyasa is the cognition as 'that' which it is not. It is like

features of the [ersons outside like son, wife etc. who are ill or well
are superimposed on himself (and he says) 'I am myself ill or well'.
Similarly, the features of the body in 'I am fat', 'I am fair', 'I stand', 'I
go', 'I jump'. Similarly, the features of the senses in 'I am dumb, oneeyed, impotent, deaf, blind'. Similarly, the features of the internal
organ viz. Desire, resolve, doubt, discrimination. In this way,
imposes the 'conceited I' on the inner Atman which is the witness of
all his thoughts and in the reverse way, superimposes the allwitnessing inner Atman on the internal organs etc.

24-

,oe~ v;e~ vukfn% vuUrks uSlfxZdks v/;kl% feF;kizR;;:i%

dr`ZaRo&Hkks`RoizorZd% ldyyksdizR;{k%A vL; vuFkZgsrks% izgk.kk;
vkReSdRo&fo|kkizfrik;s losZ osnkUrk% vkjH;UrsA ;Fkk p v;e~
vFkZ% losZkka osnkUrkuka rFkk o;e~ vL;ka kkjhjdehekalk;ka
iznkZf;;ke%A

24.

In this way, the adhyasa of the nature of an illusory cognition which

has no beginning, no end, natural, causing doership and enjoyership
is directly noticed by all. It is for the destruction of this cause of all
meaningless nonsense by providing the vidya of oneness of Atman.
(That all the Vedanta start off), that this is the purport of all the
Vedanta, we will demonstrate in this Sharirak mimansa.

vFkkrks czftKklk lw- 1-1-1

vFk& vuUrj] vr% blfy,] czftKklk% cz ftKklk
Atha afterwords, atah therefore, Brahmajijnasa discussion of
Brahman.

1-

osnkUrehekalkkkL=L; O;kfp[;kflrL; bne~ vkfnea lw=e~A v=

vFkkCn% vkuUr;kZFkZ% ifjx`Urs u vf/kdkjkFkZ%] czftKklk;k
vuf/kdk;ZRokr~A eaxyL; p okD;kFksZ leUo;kHkkokr~A vFkkZUrj
iz;qDr% ,o fg vFkkCn% JqR;k eaxyiz;kstuks HkofrA

1.

This is the first sutra of the Vedanta mimansa sutra which is being
cimmented upon. Here the word 'atha' is used in the sense of 'after'
not in the sense of 'begin' here. And Mangala auspicious has no
syntactical relation with the meaning of the sentence. 'Atha' used in
another sense can achieve the purpose of auspiciousness by the
mere sound of it.

2-

iwoZizd`rkis{kk;k% p Qyr% vkuUr;kZO;frjsdkr~A lfr p

vuUr;kZFkZRos ;Fkk /keZftKklk iwoZd`ra osnk/;;ua fu;esu vis{krs]
,oa czftKklk vfi ;RiwoZo`ka fu;esu vis{krs r}DrO;e~A
Lok/;kk;kuUr;Za rq lekue~A

2.

The reference to what has gone before, does not contradict the
meaning 'afterwards'. Study of the Vedas is mandatory before the
desire to know dharma. Also it is expected to know about 'That',
before beginning the study of Brahman. However, for studying the
Vedas, both are included.

3-

uuq bg dekZocks/kkuUr;Za foksk%A u] /keZftKklk;k% izkd~ vfi

v/khrosnkUrL; czeftKklksiiks%A ;Fkk p g`n;k|onkukuke~
vkuUr;Zfu;e% foof{krRokr~ u rFkk bg e% foo{kr% kskksfkRos
vf/kd`rkf/kdkjs ok izek.kkHkokr~A

3.

Could 'the knowledge of karma' qualify the word 'atha;? (i.e.

discussing Brahman is after acquiring the knowledge of karma). No.
Even prior to the discussion of karma, discussion of Brahman is
possible for the one who has learnt Vedanta. For example, just as
there is an intention to tell a sequence in the cutting of the heart
etc., there is no intention to tell any sequence here. There is no
evidence for a sequential relationship of (the type of) subsidiary
(karma) and principal (karma) or of (the type of) eligibility of the
person already eligible.

4-

/keZczftKkl;ks% QyftKkL; Hksnkr~ pA vH;qn;Qya /keZKkua rr~ p

vuqBkukis{ke~A fu%Js;lQya rq czfoKkua p vuq BkukUrjkis { ke~ A
HkO;% p /keZ% ftKkL;% u Kkudkys vfLr iq:kO;kikjrU=Rokr~A bg
rq Hkwra czftKkL;e~] fuR;Rokr~ u iq:kO;kikjrU=e~A

4.

Between the desire of dharma and Brahman, there is also difference

in the fruit of knowledge of dharma and it depends on the
performance (of karma). But the knowledge of Brahman has
moksha as its fruit and it does not depend on any performance. The
topic in desiring dharma (viz. Karma) is not there at the time of
knowing, because, it is dependent on the person's performance (of
karma). But the topic of discussion is existent Brahman which does
not depend on human performance.

5-

pksnukizo`fkHksnkr~ pA ;k fg pksnuk /keZL; y{k.ka lk Lofok;s

fu;qtkuSo iq:ke~ vocks/k;frA czpksnuk rq iq:ke~ vocks/k;fr
,o dsoye~] vocks/kL; pksnuktU;Rokr~ u iq:k% vocks/ks fu;qT;rsA
;Fkk v{kkFkZlafudksZ.kkFkkZocks/ks] r}r~A rLekr~ fde~ vfi oDrO;a
;nuUrja czftKklk mifn;rs bfrA

5.

There is also difference in the response (on listening) to the Vaidika

sentences. The features of the sentence explaining dharma is that it
engages the person in its topic (of karma). But Brahman related
sentences merely inform the person (about Brahman). Since
knowledge is produced from the sentence itself, the person is not
directed to get the knowledge. This is the case of knowing an object
when it is in contact with the sense organ. Therefore, it is to be told,
what is that after which(we are) instructed to take up discussion of
Brahman.

6-

mP;rsA fuR;kfuR;oLrqfoosd% bgkeq=Hkksxfojkx%

kenekfnlk/kulEir~] eqeq{kqRoa pA rskq fg lRlq izkd~ vfi
/keZftKklk;k /oZa p kD;rs cz ftKkflrqa Kkrqa p u foi;Z;sA
rLekr~ vFkkCnsu ;FkksDrlk/ku&lEi;kuUr;Ze~ mifn;rsA

6.

It will be told: discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal,

dispassion for things of enjoyment here and elsewhere (in the
other worlds), the wealth of practices such as control of mind,
control of senses etc.., and the desire for moksha. Only if they are
present in a person, it is possible to have desire to know Brahman
and also know It, either prior to knowledge of dharma or after it; not
otherwise. Therefore, by the word 'after' is taught 'after (the
possession) of the wealth of practices mentioned above.

7-

vr% kCn% gsRoFkZ%A ;Lek}sn ,o vfXugks=knhuka Js;% lk/kukuke~

vfuR;Qyrka nkZ;fr&^r|Fksg deZfprksyksd% {kh;r ,oesokeq=
iq.;fprks yksd% {kh;rs* Nk] 8@9@6 bR;kfn%A rFkk czfoKkukr~
vfi ija iq:kkFkZa nkZ;fr ^czfonkIuksfr ije~* rS 2@9
bR;kfn%A rLekr~ ;FkksDrlk/kulai;uUjrja czftKklk drZO;kA

7.

(The word) 'Therefore signifies reason. Veda itself shows that the
agnihotra etc. which are means to prosperity have an impermanent
fruit (by telling)'. As here (the enjoyment) acquired by karma
perishes, that acquired elsewhere through karma also perishes
etc. Similarly it shows also that the supreme goal of man results
from knowledge of Brahman (by telling) 'One who knows Brahman
attains the Supreme' etc. Therefore, after acquiring the foresaid
wealth of means, desire to know Brahman is possible.

8-

cz.ks ftKklk czftKklkA cz p o{;ek.ky{k.ka ^tUek|L; ;r%*

bfrA vr ,o u czkCnL; tkR;k|FkkZUrje~ vkkfDrO;e~A

8.

Brahmajijnasa is discussion of Brahman. Brahman is defined by the

feature to be told as '(That) by which the creation etc. of this
(world)'. For this very reason, there cannot be the doubt of any
other meaning like jati (caste, creed) for the word Brahman.

9-

cz.k% bfr deZf.k kBg] u ksks] ftKkL;kis{kRokr~ ftKklk;k%

ftKkL;kUrjkfunsZkkr~ pA uuq kskkBhifjxzgs vfi cz.k%
ftKklkdeZRoa u fo:/;rs] lEcU/klkekU;L; fokskfuBRokr~A
,oefi izR;{ka cz.k% deRoe~ mRl`T; lkekU;}kjs.k ijks{ka edZRoa
dYi;rks O;FkZ% iz;kl% L;kr~A u O;FkZ%
czkfJrkkskfopkjizfrKkukFkZRokr~

9.

'Of Brahman' is in the Sixth Case in accusative sense and not in the
residuary sense because, discussion requires what is desired to be
known and nothing else is indicated for discussion. 'Even
acd3epting the Sixth Case in the residuary sense, Brahman being
the object of discussion is not violated because, the general
relationship has to end in the principal object itself'. Even thus,
discarding the direct objectness of Brahman imagining indirect
objectness is a vain effort. 'It is in vain if it is said that it has the
premise of enquiring into everything dependent on Brahman
without exception.' No. With the acceptance of the principal,
whatever is dependent on it will also be covered. Brahman is the
principal because it is most desired to be attained by knowledge, If
the principal is accepted as the object of discussion, those things
without discussing which the discussion of Brahman will not be
complete, will all be implied; hence they need not be started
separately in the sutra just as, when it is said 'Here goes the king',
the going of the king along with his retinue is implied.

10-

JqR;uqxekPpA ^;rks ok bekfu Hkwrkfu tk;Urs* rS- 3@1 bR;k|k%

Jqr;%] ^rn~ foftKklLo] rn~ cz bfr izR;{ke~ ,o cz.k%
ftKklkdeZRoa nkZ;fUrA rr~ p deZf.k kBhifjxzgs lw=s.k vuqxra
HkofrA rLekn~ cz.k% bfr deZf.k kBhA

10.

This is also in conformity with Shruti. Shruti like 'from where

these being originate' etc. explicitly show that Brahman is the
principal object of discussion (by telling) 'Discuss That; That is
Brahman'. That will conform to the sutra if the Sixth Case is accepted
in the accusative sense. Therefore, 'Of Brahman' is in the Sixth Case
in the accusative snese.

11-

Kkrqe~ bPNk ftKklk A voxfri;ZUra Kkua lUokP;k;k% bPNk;k% deZ]

Qyfok;Rokn~ bPNk;k%A Kkusu fg izek.ksu voxUrqe~ bVa czA
czkoxfrfgZ iq:kkFkZ%A fu%ksk&lalkj&chtkfo|k|uFkZfuogZ.kkr~A
rLekn~ cz foftKkflrO;e~A

11.

Jijnasa is the desire to know. The knowledge culminating in

experience is the object of desire expressed by San suffix, because
the fruit is the object of desire. The knowing of Brahman is the
pramana i.e. the valid means of knowledge through which
experience is desired. The experience of Brahman is the human goal
because it destroys tracelessly all the evil seeds of samsara
transmigration or worldly life in general like avidya etc. Therefore,
Brahman has to be discussed.

12-

rr~ iqu% cz izfl)e~ vizfl)a ok L;kr~A ;fn izfl)a] u

ftKkflrO;e~A vFk vizfl)a u ,o kD;a ftkkflrqe~ bfrA
mP;rs&vfLr rkon~ cz fuR;kq)cq)&

12.

'That Brahman again could well-known or unknown. If well-known,

it need not be discussed; if unknown, it cannot be discussed.' We
say: There does exist Brahman which is by nature pure, enlightened
and free, omniscient and endowed with all powers. If the word
Brahman is extracted in conformity with the meaning of the root
'Brahm', the meanings of eternal purity etc. will emerge. Also
because of being the Atman of all, the existence of Brahman is well
known. Everyone indeed cognizes Its existence, no one says 'I do not
exist'. Had not the existence of Atman been well-known, everyone
would have hold 'I do not exist'. That Atman is Brahman.

13-

;fn rfgZ yksds cz vkReRosu izfl)e~ vfLr] rr% Kkre~ ,o bfr

vftKkL;Roa iqu% vkiUue~A u] rf}kska izfr foizfriks%A nsgek=a
pSrU;fofkVe~ vkRek bfr izkd`rk% tuk% ykSdk;frdk% p izfriUuk%A
^bfUnz;kkf.k ,o psrukfu vkRek* bfr vijs A eu% bR;U;sA
foKkuek=a {kf.kde~ bfr ,dsA kwU;e~ bfr vijsA ^nfLr
nsgkfnO;fefjDr% lalkjh drkZ HkksDrk* bfr vijsA ^HkksDrk ,o dsoya u
drkZ* bfr ,dsA vfLr rn~O;frfjDr% bZoj% loZK% loZkfDr% bfr
dsfpr~A vkRek l% HkksDrq% bfr vijs A ,oa cgo% foizfriUuk%

13.

If Brahman is well-known to people as the Self then, since it is

already known, the objection that it need not be discussed, comes
back!' No, because, there are conflicting views as to its unique
nature. Common people and Lokayitikas conceive of Atman as the
mere boy qualified by animation; others, as animated sense organs;
yet others as mind; others as mere momentary cognition; others as
void; still others say there is samsari (one leading a worldly life)
different from the body who is doer and enjoyer. Some say that, he
is enjoyer alone and not doer. Some say, there is, as different from
him, omniscient and omnipotent Ishvara. He, the Atman, is the
enjoyer, say others. Thus, there are different views based on
reasoning, questions (both sound and) fallacious. Accepting anyone
of these without enquiry would deprive one of moksha and may
also end up in grief. Therefore, by telling that discussion of Brahman
where all the unarguable logic is included and the fruit is
moksha, beginning the Vedanta-vakya speculation.

TkUek|L; ;r% lq-1-1-2

(It is that) Yatah = From which, Janmadi=Creation etc., Asya= of
this universe (happen).

kkL=;ksfuRokr~ lq-1-1-3
Of the Shastra, it is the cause (so, Brahman is omniscient)

rkq leUo;kr~ lq-1-1-4

Tu - but, tat + Brahman (knowledge is through Shastra because
of,) Samnvyat - Prefect Agreement