Ref No

Ref No

4
5
6

Ref No

4
5
6

FMECA of PUMP pumping water from Coales

Potential failure modes

motor winding failure

bearing failure

seal leakage

Potential causes

Over loading
Poor wire grade
Power Supply Anomili
Humidity
Improper Lubrication
Over heating
Vibration
Improper Lubrication
CONTAMINATION
Brinelling
Misalignment
Corrosion
Tight Fits
Accelerated seal face wear
O-ring failure
Small leakage
Seal embrittlement
pitting,

unbalancing of rotors

structural failure

flow rate/ pressue loss

cavitation
deposition
Impact loading
Rusting
impeller degradation
rotor missaligment
poor lubrication

FMECA of BLOWOUT
Potential failure modes

Failure to close on drill pipe

through
annular

Potential causes

Failure of Control Signal to Annular

or C&K Valves

Failure to close on drill pipe

through
annular

Failure of Control Signal to Annular

or C&K Valves
Inability to Operate C&K Valves
Failure to Close or open Annular
Failure to Close Pipe Ram

Failure to close on drill pipe

through pipe
rams

Failure to Supply Hydraulic Fluid & Pressure

to pipe ram
Failure to Open Pipe Ram on Demand

Failure to seal or partial seal on

drill pipe
through annular
Unintentional closing / opening
Annulars
Choke & Kill lines stack Mechanical
failure
Tubing and piping Subsea Control
Hydraulic external leak or
mechanical failure
SPM Valve Double acting Subsea
Control Hydraulic External or
Internal Leak or Mechanical Failure

Failure of Annular to Seal on Demand

Failure to Maintain Adequate Sealing
Unintentional Closing without control
Unintentional Opening without any
acquated signal from control system
Impact loading
Rusting
Hydraulic sealing failure
Diaphram leakage
Mechanical Wear
Mechanical Wear
Rusting
Seal Leakage

FMECA of
Potential failure modes

Potential causes

Insufficient strength to
provide structural
support for the
forces inacurred
during crane
operation

Frame
structure fail because
of metal fatigue

Unable to carry and

manoeuvre the
fright in a risk free and
effective manner
using the boom
hoist system.

Weak anchoring
Loading above threshold
Hoist Winch brake failure
Failure of locking mechanism

manoeuvre the
fright in a risk free and
effective manner
using the boom
hoist system.

Vibrations in the sling while

hooking because of heave
Unintentional closing / opening
Annulars
Choke & Kill lines stack Mechanical
failure
Tubing and piping Subsea Control
Hydraulic external leak or
mechanical failure
SPM Valve Double acting Subsea
Control Hydraulic External or
Internal Leak or Mechanical Failure

Failure of Annular to Seal on Demand

Failure to Maintain Adequate Sealing
Unintentional Closing without control
Unintentional Opening without any
acquated signal from control system
Impact loading
Rusting
Hydraulic sealing failure
Diaphram leakage
Mechanical Wear
Mechanical Wear
Rusting
Seal Leakage

MP pumping water from Coalescer to second stage recycler and degasser

Local effects of failure

global effects of failure

(P) Occurance

(S) Severity

Instant stop of
pumping

Water from the

coalser will no more
be in closed loop
rather it will be
flushed

Before complete
shutdown the system
Pressure/ Flowrate
would be very little
drop and can be
effected but on
permanent shutdown
shutdown the
recycling will
shutdown
Pressure/ Flowrate
drop and process
area spillage

Process area can be

dirty but negligible
effect on system
cycle

Decrease in efficiency
of pump, can result in
overall failure

Noise/vibration in
process area

Complete stop plus

spillage

Immence leakage

Low Efficiency

Negligible effect on
system/ access water
can be flushed

FMECA of BLOWOUT PREVENTER (BOP)

Local effects of failure

global effects of failure

(P) Occurance

(S) Severity

Oil Spillage, Structure

intergrity goes to
plastic limit state

Can result to messive

oil spillage, field
shutdown for long
time, platform fire
and sinking

Oil Spillage, Structure

intergrity goes to
plastic limit state

Can result to messive

oil spillage, field
shutdown for long
time, platform fire
and sinking

Oil Spillage, Structure

intergrity goes to
plastic limit state

Can result to messive

oil spillage, field
shutdown for long
time shutdown,
platform fire

Can result to messive

oil spillage, field
Messive Oil Spillage,
shutdown for long
Enviroment Pollution
time shutdown,
platform fire
Production Stop,
OIl Spillage, Process
Hydrocarbons
hault
spillage, Envirnment
Huge maintenance
Complete stop plus
involved, Production
spillage
hault plus spillage
Relatively less oil
spillage

Maintenance Involved
and production stop

Relatively less oil

spillage

Maintenance Involved
and production stop

FMECA of Crane
Local effects of failure

global effects of failure

(P) Occurance

(S) Severity

Frame, boom or
anchor fracture and
failure of load being
carried

Injury or fatality of
the person on site,
platform facilities or
equipment damage

multi-plate disc lock

mechanism
that is used as
locking brake
only, pawl
lock acctuated
mover is stopped

Platform deprived
from rigging facility

that is used as
locking brake
only, pawl
lock acctuated
mover is stopped

Platform deprived
from rigging facility

Can result to messive

oil spillage, field
Messive Oil Spillage,
shutdown for long
Enviroment Pollution
time shutdown,
platform fire
Production Stop,
OIl Spillage, Process
Hydrocarbons
hault
spillage, Envirnment
Huge maintenance
Complete stop plus
involved, Production
spillage
hault plus spillage

Relatively less oil

spillage

Maintenance Involved
and production stop

Relatively less oil

spillage

Maintenance Involved
and production stop

(D) Detectability

Risk Level P*S*D

Mitigation / Requirements

Circuit should be
fused, Fully insulated,
Regulated Power
Supply

Preventive
Maintenance

Preventive
Maintenance

Conndition
Monitoring

Scheduled Checks

Preventive
Maintenance

(D) Detectability

Risk Level P*S+D

Mitigation / Requirements

36

Designed with higher

safety factors and
have redundency if
possible

36

Designed with higher

safety factors and
have redundency if
possible

30

Designed with higher

safety factors and
have redundency if
possible

25

Preventive
Maintenance

48

Conndition
Monitoring

16

Scheduled checks

48

Scheduled checks

24

Preventive
Maintenance

(D) Detectability

Risk Level P*S+D

Mitigation / Requirements

30

Fatigue life inspection

of crane after two
years and inspection
of local cracks

32

Scheduled inspection
of internal parts, xray immaging can be
used for microscopic
crake detection

of internal parts, xray immaging can be

used for microscopic
crake detection

32

25

Preventive
Maintenance

48

Conndition
Monitoring

16

Scheduled checks

48

Scheduled checks

24

Preventive
Maintenance