G.R. No.

L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE FLORENLIANA
CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch
XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

The Public Land Law provides:

CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

AQUINO, J.:p

xxx xxx xxx

This case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that
"no private coporation or associaiton may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed on ethousand hectares in area". * That prohibition is
not found in the 1935 Constitution.

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine

laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens,
in its application filed on December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation of its title to two lots with a total
area of one hundred sixty-five square meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an
assessed value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-50801).
The Republic of the Philippines opposed theh application on the grounds that the
applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and
that the applicant and its prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application (pp. 6566, Rollo).
After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal and the Municipality of Tanay
filed a joint opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots, Lot No.
1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of
Jose Abad Santos and E.Quirino Streetsin the town of Tanay.
The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war which broke out
in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and
MInerva Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing sapouses constructed a house therereon.
Because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land,
the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on August 13, 1976.
The said land was included in the1968 cadastral survey made in Tanacy by the
Bureau of Lands, Plan AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into two lots,
Lots Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be used to
widen the two street serving as the land's eastern and southern boundaries.
The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and taxes had been paid
thereon up to 1977. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly
agricultural land. It is not included in any military reservation. Since 1927, it has
formed part of the alienable portion of the public domain.
After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision dismissing the application because
in its opinion the Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said
land since under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or
natural persons can apply for judicial confirmationof their imperfect titles to public
land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial court assumed that the land which
it seeks to register is public land.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under abona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)
SEC. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in
possession of the qualifications specified in the last preceding section may
apply for the benefits of this chapter.
We hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public
land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public
land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its
registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course
or has to be dismissed.
This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho vs. Director of
Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892, which rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a
pervasive principle of public land law and land registration law, that "all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest." (Cario vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S.
449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132).
The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil.
424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the
public domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and through
his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be public" and becomes private property.

From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No.
5440.

That ruling is based on the Cario case which is about the possession of land by
an Igorot and his ancestors since time immemorial or even before the Spanish
conquest. The land involved in the Susi case was possessed before 1880 or since
a period of time "beyond the reach of memory". That is not the situation in this
case. The Meralco does not pretend that the Piguing spouses and their
predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial.

In contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of
owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had
become private land in the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the constitutional
prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is
not applicable to the said land.

In the Susi case, this Court applied section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 which
corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of
the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the
conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title.

The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b) of the Public Land
Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could
secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land.

On the other hand, in Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, 510-11, it was held that while
occupants of public land, who have applied for the confirmation of their title, "teian
asimismo a su favor la presuncion juris et de jure de que habian cumplido con
todas las condiciones necesarias para la concesion del titulo; pero hasta que el
titulo se expida notenian el concepto juridico de ser los verdaderos dueos del
terreno in este dejo de pertenecer a los terrenos publico del Estado susceptibles
de enajenacion."

In reply to these contentions, the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not
private land because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no
composition title from the Spanish government nor possessory information title or
any other means for the acquisition of public lands such as grants or patents
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals and De Jesus, L-40912, September 30, 1976, 73
SCRA 146, 157; Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and
Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177;
195; Lee Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372, 378-9;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38
SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs. Reyes and Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs
of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600, 603).

That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a pice of land, over which an
imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For that reason in
the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of
the applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect title was
pending in the Bureau of Lands, the levy and execution sald of the land were void.

For that same reason, lands over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed
are governed by the Public Land Law. Such lands would not be covered by the
Public Land Law if they were already private lands. The occupants' right to the said
lands is characterized in the Uy Un case, not as ownership in fee simple, but
as derecho dominical incoativo.
The Meralco in its concluding argument contends that if the Piguing spouses could
ask for the confirmation of their imperfect title to the said lands, then why should
the Meralco, as their transferee, be denied the same right to register the said land
in its name, there being no legal prohibition for the Piguing spouses from selling
the land to the Meralco? This Court is disposing of that same contention in the Oh
Cho case said:
The benefits provided in the Public Land Act (meaning the confirmation of an
imperfect title under section 48[b]) for applicant's immediate predecessors-ininterest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they
could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate
predecessors-in-interest should comply with the condition precedent for the
grant of such benefits.
The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they
had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's
immediate predecessors-in-interest (meaning the Piguing spouses in the
instant case) failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was
transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their
possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors-in-interest,
may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a
person as the applicant who is disqualified. (75 Phil. 890, 893.)
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant
has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain
as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The lower court;s judgment dismissing Meralco's application is affirmed. Costs
against the petitioner-appellant. SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J.: concurring:
I concur in the result. I am of the opinion that the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed
is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. However, the petitioner is relying on Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act for
the confirmation of its title and Mr. Justice Aquino is correct in holding that said
provision cannot be availed by juridical entities.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the ruling of the Court that Meralco "as a juridical person" is disqualified
to apply for its registration under Section 48(b).. 1 I dissent insofar as the opinion of
the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect, under the particular
circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I
would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach
followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, 2 where the legal question raised,
instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By
legal fiction 3 and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solutionwould be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b)
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability.
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of herico vs. Dar, 1 the
decision in which I am the ponente, as reiterating a supposedly well-established
doctrine that lands of the public domain which, by reason of possession and

cultivation for such a length of time, a grant by the State to the occupant is
presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is
segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose under the public lands laws or statutes. He would thus consider
said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the
prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands
which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares." 2
I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become
private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an
incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, through the
prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect
title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may
be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such judicial title,
only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the
land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form
of disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in
the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the
issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved is undoubtedly public
land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to acquire title
thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is
that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by the Director of
Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a
State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger
than that set for free patents.
It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the
land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some
statements are found in many cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to
the effect that such land has ceased to be a public land. What these statements,
however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass
of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority
granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land
covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The
fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public
land" gives rise to the very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the
land referred to is still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for
in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the
evidence.
The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already
private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an idle exercise, if We consider the
provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been
lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." As previously
stated, by express provisions of the Constitution, no corporation or association may
hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed, 1,000
hectares in area. 4Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is
considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or
Iglesia which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning of the
aforecited provision of the New Constitution. This observation should end all
arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land.
Although it may further be observed that supposing a corporation has been in
possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it apply for
judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to its owner after
possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed
obvious it may not. If its possession is not from the beginning but has
commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the
corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it may not.
This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority
opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by
applicable authorities. I was impelled to write it only because in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is
my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then is
more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case
should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in this separate opinion, which
I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a
nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia in Cristo,
a religious corporation sole, in the second case (both admittedly Filipino
corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for judicial confirmation of
their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from
strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from private
persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding
the filing of the applications).
This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine
since the 1909 case of Carioand the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case
of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a
possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable
public land for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under
amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself
mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title" and "by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the
public domain and has become private property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the
1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporation holding
lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present cases. What Meralco
and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased
to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale
to them and therefore their applicatins for confirmation of title by virtue of their
predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.
The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two
(1) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an
assessed value of P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before
World Warr II which broke out in the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land
on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who
constructed a house thereon. But because the Meralco had instealled the "anchor
guy" of its stell posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco
on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since
1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as
distinguished from strictly agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not
included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part
of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.
The land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists
of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of
313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was
acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot
owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already
possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military
reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands
on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of
the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon.
Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and
dismissed the application, holding that under both the provisions of the new
Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a
natural person, is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the public
land.
On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in
support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis
of the evidence submitted by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case
accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the name of the
Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant ]Iglesia]
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse
possession of the land . . . under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than
thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the
registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.
Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for
registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated
since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a
long line of cases down to the 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in
question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be lands of the public domain
upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest
who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of
acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that
accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new
judgment entered granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia
case should stand affirmed.

their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall beconclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases,
is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon
completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land
such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and owned
by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent judge in the
Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land
until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the
issuance of the certificate of title?
1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi
vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held
therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the
public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at
the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual
personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property.
(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26,
1894" as then provided for in section 45(b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926; whereas at present, as provided for in the corresponding
section 48, par.(b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force
since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged possession was reduced to "at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the
main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case, this
Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now
section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive
presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The text of the
corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is
reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced
statutory period of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application.")
Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for
the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the
Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property at least by presumption"
as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of
Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect and Susi as
the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the
supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be
land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the
specific facts of the case, that:
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure,
established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,
that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied
with for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal function, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of
the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption , of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling
the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
which he had no longer any title or control, and the sake thus made was void and
of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right." 6

The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:

2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court
in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows:

It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on
June 22, 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons who have
occupied lands of the public domain but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of

In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs.
Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual
physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate

of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending
Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the
possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts an
application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No.
2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)." and "(C)onsidering
that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which
apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer
be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the
decree, which theory does not apply here because the property involved is
allegedly private in natural and has ceased to be part of the public domain , we are
of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving
plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."

grant to the property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive

prescription over the land which thereby became private property. The very
definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106
of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other
real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down
by law." The law does not provide that one acquires ownership of a land by
prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is
the ruling in Cario vs. Insular Government 13, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court
speaking through Justice Holmes held that

In Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the abovequoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:

It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument
that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot
chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read
every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply
to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public
domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession
thereof.

To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.
590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains
his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title."

If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had
already become, operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the
judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to
recover the possession thereof and hold it.

5. Since the public land because private property upon completion of the 30th year
of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's
predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land
to the Meralco, there is no justification for denying the Meralco's application for
registration of its duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest
had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided by the
Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and
Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to
register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because
neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private
corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation
on the right of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public
domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be public land
but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation
of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its
predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and
unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by
acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself.
There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being transferred to the
Meralco by right of purchase and traditio for it is not claimed that there is any
legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership of the land
to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco,
even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.

In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession,
the land in question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.

In Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where possession has
been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner,
there is a presumption juris et de jure that all necessary conditions for a grant by
the State have been complied with and he would have been by force of law entitled
to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government,
8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).
In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 the Court once more reiterated the Susi
doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that
after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be
reopened to be declared and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. . . .
Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. This is as provided in
Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: . . . As interpreted in several cases
when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent."
3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of
alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the
Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to
and becomes private property upon a showing of open and unchallenged
possession under bona fideclaim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-ininterest for the statutory period of thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly
backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the
statute that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a
corporation from filing the application for registration of the private property duly
acquired by it.
4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco
case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-ininterest had possessed and occupied as owners the land in question for at least
over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having possessed the same since the last world war
in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who
built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the
same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-ininterest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality

that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just
give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is
there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the
end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the
rituals as the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding
to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose
of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to
apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to
the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold
and own private lands) and granting the application for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case,
save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was
granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition
and respondent judge held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the
public domain and had become private property, the title to which could be duly
issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest.

8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of
165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for
its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to
furnish electrical service to the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the
Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious
needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition
of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is
beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural
resources by corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or
disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth
and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit
but for the sole use and benefit of the public.

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph
(9), Exhibit 'M-l');

9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro

wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1)
from the 1909 case of Cario and the 1925 case of Susidown to the 1980 case
of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary pronouncement in Mr.
Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said
land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of
the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the
Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement
in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court
has not overturned, as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the
unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice
De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpretated in several
cases . . . the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The and, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain , and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent."

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the
land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

In only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that

Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the
question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land, is,
however, entirely pointless or an idle exercise, if We consider the provision
of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight
of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain'" (at page 2)
that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private
land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which
admittedly are 'corporations or associations' within the meaning of the aforecited
provisions of the New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments of
the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might
mislead one to the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership
may not own private landswhen the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and
section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935
Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to
own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section
11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco
case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for
affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such
are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable
as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said
land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from
time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than
Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land
sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials
of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the
Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part
of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'),
during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17,
1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the
correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in
question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of
Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

NARVASA, J.:
xxx xxx xxx
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of
five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it
from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is
a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
December 23, 1959;

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to

agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of
the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it
can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel,
from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are
members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or
for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title
judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-ininterest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands
under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article
XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that
the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter
in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in
effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding
lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the
public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they
were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. CastroBartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila
Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of
which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the
Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them,
by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the
Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court,
assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground
that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural
persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco
appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon
the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under
section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's
application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no
distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to
which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands
of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to
judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases
beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thruSusi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which
developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of
some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument
that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot
chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read

every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more
categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act
No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of
said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin
Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs.
Director
of
Lands, 7 Mesina
vs.
Vda.
de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac
vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself
and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be
of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of
the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when
Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution
then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor
was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there
can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did,
there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which
the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect"
title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental
circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public
domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or
invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held,
in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application
to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand
and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.

retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such
natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because
of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco
vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence,
i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they
had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and
the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of
the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this
would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more
efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the
dissent in Meralco.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may
not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution
of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 117778).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of
a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<re||an1w> 15

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent

vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and reestablished, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of
searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting
that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition
that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that
context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its
own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the
1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and
registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same
benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be
binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject
of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time
no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The
objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather
than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was
a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of
the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that
there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the
June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case
of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse
and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the
Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the
old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes
private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But
since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents
and discarding theMeralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in
the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my
views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established
in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period
"already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but agrant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in

question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public

domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell
to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief
who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his
application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court
(as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the
decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' ( acrediten), as
well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called
upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine
dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when
the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that
such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by
operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The
land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property,
which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as
respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so
expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property,
qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or
defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or
acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion,
for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels
on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no
prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024
hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition.
Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent
corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million
investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community,
particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the
land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the
Infiels had beenipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally
sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the
Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title
proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they
lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable
and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy
of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership
have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the
opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of
such application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938
was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31,
1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and
lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation
of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the
Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired
and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent
insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that
the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural personstransferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable

obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be
distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the
legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another
case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction,
I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application
under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from
no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in
the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling
on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought
to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they
were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all
that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural
citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for
the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such
as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the
required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do
so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory
period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for
confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the
land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the
law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are
already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for
confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law
and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes
the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should
not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its
rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the
decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of
complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the
application for confirmation of title to theprivate land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area;
nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of 500 hectares
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision
prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company
vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI
of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in
this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the
land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous
"literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles,
and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent
in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality
that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is
there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect
in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with
the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of
all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets
when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11)
which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the
intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino
[UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed
457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a
general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation
and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under
which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly
susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while
the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension
of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond
the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or
supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to
make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois
Liquor Control Com.)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy.
The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the
policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that
policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

Section 2. Declaration of State Policies. - The State shall recognize

and
promote
all
the
rights
of
Indigenous
Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated
within the framework of the Constitution:
a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within
the framework of national unity and development;
b)The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well being and
shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domain;
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs
to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It
shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and
policies;
d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless
of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human rights and
freedoms without distinctions or discriminations;
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs
concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect for their
cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit
on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national
laws and regulations grant to other members of the population and
f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong
expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring maximum
ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as
other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more
responsive to the needs and desires of these communities.
Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary
mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights,
taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, their
rights to their ancestral domains.
CHAPTER
DEFINITION OF TERMS

II

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the

following terms shall mean:
a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, themselves or through
their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence
of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into
by government and private individuals, corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It
shall include ancestral land, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural,
and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable
or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies
of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which their
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land

occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans
who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership,continuously, to the present
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and
other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots,
rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Indigenous

Peoples Rights Act of 1997."

c) Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title - refers to a title formally

recognizing the rights of possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over

RA 8371 AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE

RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

their ancestral domains identified and delineated in accordance with

this law;
d) Certificate of Ancestral Lands Title - refers to a title formally
recognizing the rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands;
e) Communal Claims - refer to claims on land, resources and rights
thereon, belonging to the whole community within a defined territory
f) Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules,
usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually
recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs;
g) Free and Prior Informed Consent - as used in this Act shall mean the
consensus of all members of the ICCs/IPs to; be determined in
accordance with their respective customary laws and practices, free
from any external manipulation, interference and coercion, and
obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of the activity, in a
language an process understandable to the community;
h) Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples - refer to a
group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription
and ascription by other, who have continuously lived as organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who
have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied,
possessed customs, tradition and other distinctive cultural traits, or
who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and culture, became historically
differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time
of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of nonindigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present
state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic,
cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced
from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains;
i) Indigenous Political Structure - refer to organizational and cultural
leadership systems, institutions, relationships, patterns and processed
for decision-making and participation, identified by ICCs/IPs such as,
but not limited to, Council of Elders, Council of Timuays, Bodong
Holder, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature;
j) Individual Claims - refer to claims on land and rights thereon which
have been devolved to individuals, families and clans including, but
not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies and tree lots;
k) National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - refers to the
office created under this Act, which shall be under the Office of the
President, and which shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans
and programs to recognize, protect and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs;
l) Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains
which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim
of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and
are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest;
m) Nongovernment Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit
voluntary organization that has been organized primarily for the
delivery of various services to the ICCs/IPs and has an established
track record for effectiveness and acceptability in the community
where it serves;
n) People's Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary
organization of members of an ICC/IP which is accepted as
representative of such ICCs/IPs;
o) Sustainable Traditional Resource Rights - refer to the rights of
ICCs/IPs to sustainably use,manage, protect and conserve a) land, air,
water, and minerals; b) plants, animals and other organisms; c)
collecting, fishing and hunting grounds; d) sacred sites; and e) other
areas of economic, ceremonial and aesthetic value in accordance with
their indigenous knowledge, beliefs, systems and practices; and

p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as

memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied,
possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory
devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from
their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.
CHAPTER III
RIGHTS TO ANCESTRAL DOMAINS
Section 4. Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral
lands/domains shall include such concepts of territories which cover not
only the physical environment but the total environment including the
spiritual and cultural bonds to the area which the ICCs/IPs possess,
occupy and use and to which they have claims of ownership.
Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership. - Indigenous concept
of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources
found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity.
The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral
domains are the ICC's/IP's private but community property which
belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.
Section 6. Composition of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral
lands and domains shall consist of all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs as referred under Sec. 3, items (a) and (b) of this Act.
Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. - The rights of ownership
and possession of ICCs/IPs t their ancestral domains shall be recognized
and protected. Such rights shall include:
a. Rights of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred
places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains;
b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. - Subject to Section
56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories
traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities
for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation
and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interfere with, alienation
and encroachment upon these rights;
c. Right to Stay in the Territories- The right to stay in the territory and
not be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their
free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than
eminent domain. Where relocation is considered necessary as an
exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with the
free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and
whenever possible, they shall be guaranteed the right to return to
their ancestral domains, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease
to exist. When such return is not possible, as determined by
agreement or through appropriate procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be
provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at
least equal to that of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to
provide for their present needs and future development. Persons thus
relocated shall likewise be fully compensated for any resulting loss or
injury;
d. Right in Case of Displacement. - In case displacement occurs as a
result of natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the
displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary
life support system: Provided, That the displaced ICCs/IPs shall have
the right to return to their abandoned lands until such time that the
normalcy and safety of such lands shall be determined: Provided,
further, That should their ancestral domain cease to exist and
normalcy and safety of the previous settlements are not possible,
displaced ICCs/IPs shall enjoy security of tenure over lands to which
they have been resettled: Provided, furthermore, That basic services

and livelihood shall be provided to them to ensure that their needs are
adequately addressed:
e. Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. - Right to regulate the entry of
migrant settlers and organizations into the domains;
f. Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. - For this purpose, the
ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated systems for the management
of their inland waters and air space;
g. Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. - The right to claim parts of
the ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes,
except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare
and service; and
h. Right to Resolve Conflict. - Right to resolve land conflicts in
accordance with customary laws of the area where the land is located,
and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to
amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary.

Section 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. - The right of ownership and

possession of the ICCs/IPs, to their ancestral lands shall be recognized
and protected.
a. Right to transfer land/property. - Such right shall include the right to
transfer land or property rights to/among members of the same
ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned.
b. Right to Redemption. - In cases where it is shown that the transfer
of land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a nonmember of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of
the ICCs/IPs,or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or
price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same
within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of
transfer.

Section 9. Responsibilities of ICCs/IPs to their Ancestral

Domains. - ICCs/IPs occupying a duly certified ancestral domain shall
have the following responsibilities:
a. Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a
balanced ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting the flora and
fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;
b. Restore Denuded Areas- To actively initiate, undertake and
participate in the reforestation of denuded areas and other
development programs and projects subject to just and reasonable
remuneration; and
c. Observe Laws- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act
and the rules and regulations for its effective implementation.
Section 10. Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion. - Unauthorized
and unlawful intrusion upon, or use of any portion of the ancestral
domain, or any violation of the rights herein before enumerated, shall be
punishable under this law. Furthermore, the Government shall take
measures to prevent non-ICCs/IPs from taking advantage of the ICCs/IPs
customs or lack of understanding of laws to secure ownership,
possession of land belonging to said ICCs/IPs.
Section 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be
recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the
territories identified and delineated.
Section 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title under
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration
Act 496. - Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to

individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their

predecessors-in -interest, have been in continuous possession and
occupation of the same in the concept of owner since the immemorial or
for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same
ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the
Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are
agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural, residential,
pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this Section shall be exercised within twenty
(20) years from the approval of this Act.
CHAPTER IV
RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT
Section 13. Self-Governance. - The State recognizes the inherent
right of ICCs/IPs to self-governance and self-determination and respects
the integrity of their values, practices and institutions. Consequently, the
State shall guarantee the right of ICCs/IPs to freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.
Section 14. Support for Autonomous Regions. - The State shall
continue to strengthen and support the autonomous regions created
under the Constitution as they may require or need. The State shall
likewise encourage other ICCs/IPs not included or outside Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordillera to use the form and content of their ways of
life as may be compatible with the fundamental rights defined in the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and other internationally
recognized human rights.
Section 15. Justice System, Conflict Resolution Institutions and
Peace Building Processes. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to use
their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution
institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other
customary laws and practices within their respective communities and
as may be compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights.
Section 16. Right to Participate in Decision -Making. - ICCs/IPs
have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, at all levels of
decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and
destinies through procedures determined by them as well as to maintain
and develop their own indigenous political structures. Consequently, the
State shall ensure that the ICCs/IPs shall be given mandatory
representation in policy-making bodies and other local legislative
councils.
Section 17. Right to Determine and Decide Priorities for
Development. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to determine and
decide their own priorities for development affecting their lives, beliefs,
institutions, spiritual well-being, and the lands they own, occupy or use.
They shall participate in the formulation,implementation and evaluation
of policies, plans and programs for national, regional and local
development which may directly affect them.
Section 18. Tribal Barangays. - The ICCs/IPs living in contiguous areas
or communities where they form the predominant population but which
are located in municipalities, provinces or cities where they do not
constitute the majority of the population, may form or constitute a
separate barangay in accordance with the Local Government Code on
the creation of tribal barangays.
Section 19. Role of Peoples Organizations. - The State shall
recognize and respect the role of independent ICCs/IPs organizations to
enable the ICCs/IPs to pursue and protect their legitimate and collective
interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
Section 20. Means for Development /Empowerment of ICCs/IPs. The
Government
shall
establish
the
means
for
the
full
development/empowerment of the ICCs/IPs own institutions and
initiatives and, where necessary, provide the resources needed therefor.

CHAPTER V
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

not limited to water and electrical facilities, education, health and

infrastructure.

Section 21. Equal Protection

and Non-discrimination of
ICCs/IPs. - Consistent with the equal protection clause of the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and
International Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due recognition of
their distinct characteristics and identity, accord to the members of the
ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the
citizenry. It shall extend to them the same employment rights,
opportunities, basic services, educational and other rights and privileges
available to every member of the society. Accordingly, the State shall
likewise ensure that the employment of any form of force of coersion
against ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.

Section 26. Women. - ICC/IP women shall enjoy equal rights and
opportunities with men, as regards the social, economic, political and
cultural spheres of life. The participation of indigenous women in the
decision-making process in all levels, as well as in the development of
society, shall be given due respect and recognition.

The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms
as enshrined in the Constitution and relevant international instruments
are guaranteed also to indigenous women. Towards this end, no
provision in this Act shall be interpreted so as to result in the diminution
of rights and privileges already recognized and accorded to women
under existing laws of general application.

Section 27. Children and Youth. - The State shall recognize the vital
role of the children and youth of ICCs/IPs in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being. Towards this end, the State shall
support all government programs intended for the development and
rearing of the children and youth of ICCs/IPs for civic efficiency and
establish such mechanisms as may be necessary for the protection of
the rights of the indigenous children and youth.

Section 22. Rights during Armed Conflict. - ICCs/IPs have the right
to special protection and security in periods of armed conflict. The State
shall observe international standards, in particular, the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949, for the protection of civilian populations in
circumstances of emergency and armed conflict, and shall not recruit
members of the ICCs/IPs against their will into armed forces, and in
particular, for the use against other ICCs/IPs; not recruit children of
ICCs/IPs into the armed forces under any circumstance; nor force
indigenous individuals to abandon their lands, territories and means of
subsistence, or relocate them in special centers for military purposes
under any discriminatory condition.
Section 23. Freedom from Discrimination and Right to Equal
Opportunity and Treatment. - It shall be the right of the ICCs/IPs to be
free from any form of discrimination, with respect to recruitment and
conditions of employment, such that they may enjoy equal opportunities
as other occupationally-related benefits, informed of their rights under
existing labor legislation and of means available to them for redress, not
subject to any coercive recruitment systems, including bonded labor and
other forms of debt servitude; and equal treatment in employment for
men and women, including the protection from sexual harassment.
Towards this end, the State shall within the framework of national laws
and regulations, and in cooperation with the ICCs/IPs concerned, adopt
special measures to ensure the effective protection with regard to the
recruitment and conditions of employment of persons belonging to these
communities, to the extent that they are not effectively protected by the
laws applicable to workers in general.
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to association and freedom for all trade
union activities and the right to conclude collective bargaining
agreements with employers' conditions. They shall likewise have the
right not to be subject to working conditions hazardous to their health,
particularly through exposure to pesticides and other toxic substances.
Section 24. Unlawful Acts Pertaining to Employment. - It shall be
unlawful for any person:
a. To discriminate against any ICC/IP with respect to the terms and
conditions of employment on account of their descent. Equal
remuneration shall be paid to ICC/IP and non-ICC/IP for work of equal
value; and

The State shall provide full access to education, maternal and child care,
health and nutrition, and housing services to indigenous women.
Vocational, technical, professional and other forms of training shall be
provided to enable these women to fully participate in all aspects of
social life. As far as possible, the State shall ensure that indigenous
women have access to all services in their own languages.

Section 28. Integrated System of Education. - The State shall,

through the NCIP, provide a complete, adequate and integrated system
of education, relevant to the needs of the children and Young people of
ICCs/IPs.
CHAPTER VI
CULTURAL INTEGRITY
Section 29. Protection of Indigenous Culture, traditions and
institutions. - The state shall respect, recognize and protect the right of
the ICCs/IPs to preserve and protect their culture, traditions and
institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national
plans and policies.
Section 30. Educational Systems. - The State shall provide equal
access to various cultural opportunities to the ICCs/IPs through the
educational system, public or cultural entities, scholarships, grants and
other incentives without prejudice to their right to establish and control
their educational systems and institutions by providing education in their
own language, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of
teaching and learning. Indigenous children/youth shall have the right to
all levels and forms of education of the State.
Section 31. Recognition of Cultural Diversity. - The State shall
endeavor to have the dignity and diversity of the cultures, traditions,
histories and aspirations of the ICCs/IPs appropriately reflected in all
forms of education, public information and cultural-educational
exchange. Consequently, the State shall take effective measures, in
consultation with ICCs/IPs concerned, to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good
relations among ICCs/IPs and all segments of society. Furthermore, the
Government shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned
media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. The State shall likewise
ensure the participation of appropriate indigenous leaders in schools,
communities and international cooperative undertakings like festivals,
conferences, seminars and workshops to promote and enhance their
distinctive heritage and values.

b. To deny any ICC/IP employee any right or benefit herein provided

for or to discharge them for the purpose of preventing them from
enjoying any of the rights or benefits provided under this Act.

Section 32. Community Intellectual Rights. - ICCs/IPs have the right

to practice and revitalize their own cultural traditions and customs. The
State shall preserve, protect and develop the past, present and future
manifestations of their cultures as well as the right to the restitution of
cultural, intellectual, religious, and spiritual property taken without their
free and prior informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions
and customs.

Section 25. Basic Services. - The ICC/IP have the right to special
measures for the immediate, effective and continuing improvement of
their economic and social conditions, including in the areas of
employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation,
health and social security. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights
and special needs of indigenous women, elderly, youth, children and
differently-abled persons. Accordingly, the State shall guarantee the
right of ICCs/IPs to government 's basic services which shall include, but

Section 33. Rights to Religious, Cultural Sites and Ceremonies. ICCs/IPs shall have the right to manifest, practice, develop teach their
spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to
maintain, protect and have access to their religious and cultural sites;
the right to use and control of ceremonial object; and the right to the
repatriation of human remains. Accordingly, the State shall take effective
measures, in cooperation with the burial sites, be preserved, respected
and protected. To achieve this purpose, it shall be unlawful to:

a. Explore, excavate or make diggings on archeological sites of the

ICCs/IPs for the purpose of obtaining materials of cultural values
without the free and prior informed consent of the community
concerned; and
b. Deface, remove or otherwise destroy artifacts which are of great
importance to the ICCs/IPs for the preservation of their cultural
heritage.
Section 34. Right to Indigenous Knowledge Systems and
Practices and to Develop own Sciences and Technologies. ICCs/IPs are entitled to the recognition of the full ownership and control
and protection of their cultural and intellectual rights. They shall have
the right to special measures to control, develop and protect their
sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, including human and
other genetic resources, seeds, including derivatives of these resources,
traditional medicines and health practices, vital medicinal plants,
animals and minerals, indigenous knowledge systems and practices,
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literature,
designs, and visual and performing arts.
Section 35. Access to Biological and Genetic Resources. - Access
to biological and genetic resources and to indigenous knowledge related
to the conservation, utilization and enhancement of these resources,
shall be allowed within ancestral lands and domains of the ICCs/IPs only
with a free and prior informed consent of such communities, obtained in
accordance with customary laws of the concerned community.
Section 36. Sustainable Agro-Technical Development. - The State
shall recognize the right of ICCs/IPs to a sustainable agro-technological
development and shall formulate and implement programs of action for
its effective implementation. The State shall likewise promote the biogenetic and resource management systems among the ICCs/IPs and
shall encourage cooperation among government agencies to ensure the
successful sustainable development of ICCs/IPs.
Section 37. Funds for Archeological and Historical Sites. - The
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to receive from the national government all
funds especially earmarked or allocated for the management and
preservation of their archeological and historical sites and artifacts with
the financial and technical support of the national government agencies.
CHAPTER VII
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (NCIP)
Section 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural
Communities /Indigenous Peoples (NCCP). - to carry out the policies
herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on
ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the
ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their
rights thereto.
Section 39. Mandate. - The NCIP shall protect and promote the
interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs,
customs, traditions and institutions.
Section 40. Composition. - The NCIP shall be an independent agency
under the Office of the President and shall be composed of seven (7)
Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be the
Chairperson. The Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines from a list of recommendees submitted by authentic
ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7) Commissioners shall be appointed
specifically from each of the following ethnographic areas: Region I and
the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island Groups including
Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern
and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central
Mindanao: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7)
Commissioners shall be women.
Section
41. Qualifications,
Tenure,
Compensation. The
Chairperson and the six (6) Commissioners must be natural born Filipino
citizens, bonafide members of ICCs/IPs as certified by his/her tribe,
experienced in ethnic affairs and who have worked for at least ten (10)
years with an ICC/IP community and/or any government agency involved
in ICC/IP, at least 35 years of age at the time of appointment, and must
be of proven honesty and integrity: Provided, That at least two (2) of the
seven (7) Commissioners shall be the members of the Philippine Bar:

Provided, further, That the members of the NCIP shall hold office for a
period of three (3) years, and may be subject to re-appointment for
another term: Provided, furthermore, That no person shall serve for more
than two (2) terms. Appointment to any vacancy shall only be for the
unexpired term of the predecessor and in no case shall a member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity: Provided,
finally, That the Chairperson and the Commissioners shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the Salary Standardization Law.
Section 42. Removal from Office. - Any member of the NCIP may be
removed from office by the President, on his own initiative or upon
recommendation by any indigenous community, before the expiration of
his term for cause and after complying with due process requirement of
law.
Section 43. Appointment of Commissioners. - The President shall
appoint the seven (7) Commissioners of the NCIP within ninety (90) days
from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 44. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the
NCIP shall have the following powers, jurisdiction and function:
a) To serve as the primary government agency through which ICCs/IPs
can seek government assistance and as the medium, thorough which
such assistance may be extended;
b) To review and assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs including existing
laws and policies pertinent thereto and to propose relevant laws and
policies to address their role in national development;
c) To formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects
for the economic, social and cultural development of the ICCs/IPs and
to monitor the implementation thereof;
d) To request and engage the services and support of experts from
other agencies of government or employ private experts and
consultants as may be required in the pursuit of its objectives;
e) To issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;
f) Subject to existing laws, to enter into contracts, agreements, or
arrangement, with government or private agencies or entities as may
be necessary to attain the objectives of this Act, and subject to the
approval of the President, to obtain loans from government lending
institutions and other lending institutions to finance its programs;
g) To negotiate for funds and to accept grants, donations, gifts and/or
properties in whatever form and from whatever source, local and
international, subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines, for the benefit of ICCs/IPs and administer the same in
accordance with the terms thereof; or in the absence of any condition,
in such manner consistent with the interest of ICCs/IPs as well as
existing laws;
h) To coordinate development programs and projects for the
advancement of the ICCs/IPs and to oversee the proper
implementation thereof;
i) To convene periodic conventions or assemblies of IPs to review,
assess as well as propose policies or plans;
j) To advise the President of the Philippines on all matters relating to
the ICCs/IPs and to submit within sixty (60) days after the close of
each calendar year, a report of its operations and achievements;
k) To submit to Congress appropriate legislative proposals intended to
carry out the policies under this Act;
l) To prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the Office of the
President;

m) To issue appropriate certification as a pre-condition to the grant of

permit, lease, grant, or any other similar authority for the disposition,
utilization, management and appropriation by any private individual,
corporate entity or any government agency, corporation or subdivision
thereof on any part or portion of the ancestral domain taking into
consideration the consensus approval of the ICCs/IPs concerned;
n) To decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various
offices within the Commission:
o) To promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
implementation of this Act;
p) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be directed by
the President of the Republic of the Philippines; and
q) To represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international conferences
and conventions dealing with indigenous peoples and other related
concerns.
Section 45. Accessibility and Transparency. - Subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law or by rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, all official records, documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as research
data used as basis for policy development of the Commission shall be
made accessible to the public.
Section 46. Officers within the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the
following offices which shall be responsible for the implementation of the
policies herein after provided:
a. Ancestral Domains Office - The Ancestral Domain Office shall be
responsible for the identification, delineation and recognition of
ancestral land/domains. It shall also be responsible for the
management of ancestral lands/domains in accordance with the
master plans as well as the implementation of the ancestral domain
rights of the ICCs/IPs as provided in Chapter III of this Act. It shall also
issue, upon the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs
concerned, certification prior to the grant of any license, lease or
permit for the exploitation of natural resources affecting the interests
of ICCs/IPs in protecting the territorial integrity of all ancestral
domains. It shall likewise perform such other functions as the
Commission may deem appropriate and necessary;
b. Office on Policy, Planning and Research - The Office on Policy,
Planning and Research shall be responsible for the formulation of
appropriate policies and programs for ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited
to, the development of a Five-Year Master Plan for the ICCs/IPs. Such
plan shall undergo a process such that every five years, the
Commission shall endeavor to assess the plan and make ramifications
in accordance with the changing situations. The Office shall also
undertake the documentation of customary law and shall establish
and maintain a Research Center that would serve as a depository of
ethnographic information for monitoring, evaluation and policy
formulation. It shall assist the legislative branch of the national
government in the formulation of appropriate legislation benefiting
ICCs/IPs.
c. Office of Education, Culture and Health - The Office on Culture,
Education and Health shall be responsible for the effective
implementation of the education, cultural and related rights as
provided in this Act. It shall assist, promote and support community
schools, both formal and non-formal, for the benefit of the local
indigenous community, especially in areas where existing educational
facilities are not accessible to members of the indigenous group. It
shall administer all scholarship programs and other educational rights
intended for ICC/IP beneficiaries in coordination with the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and the Commission on Higher
Education. It shall undertake, within the limits of available
appropriation, a special program which includes language and
vocational training, public health and family assistance program and
related subjects.
It shall also identify ICCs/IPs with potential training in the health
profession and encourage and assist them to enroll in schools of
medicine, nursing, physical therapy and other allied courses
pertaining to the health profession.

Towards this end, the NCIP shall deploy a representative in each of the
said offices who shall personally perform the foregoing task and who
shall receive complaints from the ICCs/IPs and compel action from
appropriate agency. It shall also monitor the activities of the National
Museum and other similar government agencies generally intended to
manage and preserve historical and archeological artifacts of the
ICCs /IPs and shall be responsible for the implementation of such other
functions as the NCIP may deem appropriate and necessary;
d. Office on Socio-Economic Services and Special Concerns - The
Office on Socio-Economic Services and Special Concerns shall serve as
the Office through which the NCIP shall coordinate with pertinent
government agencies specially charged with the implementation of
various basic socio-economic services, policies, plans and programs
affecting the ICCs/IPs to ensure that the same are properly and
directly enjoyed by them. It shall also be responsible for such other
functions as the NCIP may deem appropriate and necessary;
e. Office of Empowerment and Human Rights - The Office of
Empowerment and Human Rights shall ensure that indigenous sociopolitical, cultural and economic rights are respected and recognized. It
shall ensure that capacity building mechanisms are instituted and
ICCs/IPs are afforded every opportunity, if they so choose, to
participate in all level decision-making. It shall likewise ensure that the
basic human rights, and such other rights as the NCIP may determine,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations are protected and
promoted;
f. Administrative Office - The Administrative Office shall provide the
NCIP with economical, efficient and effective services pertaining to
personnel, finance, records, equipment, security, supplies, and related
services. It shall also administer the Ancestral Domains Fund; and
g. Legal Affairs Office - There shall be a Legal Affairs Office which shall
advice the NCIP on all legal matters concerning ICCs/IPs and which
shall be responsible for providing ICCs/IPs with legal assistance in
litigation involving community interest. It shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the basis of complaints filed by the ICCs/IPs against a
natural or juridical person believed to have violated ICCs/IPs rights. On
the basis of its findings, it shall initiate the filing of appropriate legal or
administrative action to the NCIP.
Section 47. Other Offices. - The NCIP shall have the power to create
additional offices as it may deem necessary subject to existing rules and
regulations.
Section 48. Regional and Field Offices. - Existing regional and field
offices shall remain to function under the strengthened organizational
structure of the NCIP. Other field office shall be created wherever
appropriate and the staffing pattern thereof shall be determined by the
NCIP: Provided, That in provinces where there are ICCs/IPs but without
field offices, the NCIP shall establish field offices in said provinces.
Section 49. Office of the Executive Director. - The NCIP shall create
the Office of the Executive Director which shall serve as its secretariat.
The office shall be headed by an Executive Director who shall be
appointed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines upon the
recommendation of the NCIP on a permanent basis. The staffing pattern
of the office shall be determined by the NCIP subject to existing rules
and regulations.
Section 50. Consultative Body. - A body consisting of the traditional
leaders, elders and representatives from the women and youth sectors
of the different ICCs/IPs shall be constituted by the NCIP from the time to
time to advise it on matters relating to the problems, aspirations and
interests of the ICCs/IPs.
CHAPTER VIII
DELINEATION AND RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS
Section 51. Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains. Self-delineation shall be guiding principle in the identification and
delineation of ancestral domains. As such, the ICCs/IPs concerned shall
have a decisive role in all the activities pertinent thereto. The Sworn
Statement of the Elders as to the Scope of the territories and
agreements/pacts made with neighboring ICCs/IPs, if any, will be
essential to the determination of these traditional territories. The
Government shall take the necessary steps to identify lands which the
ICCs/IPs concerned traditionally occupy and guarantee effective

protection of their rights of ownership and possession thereto. Measures

shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs
concerned to land which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
Section 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation
of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following
procedures:
a. Ancestral Domains Delineated Prior to this Act - The provisions
hereunder shall not apply to ancestral domains/lands already
delineated according to DENR Administrative Order No. 2, series of
1993, nor to ancestral lands and domains delineated under any other
community/ancestral domain program prior to the enactment of his
law. ICCs/IPs enactment of this law shall have the right to apply for the
issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) over the
area without going through the process outlined hereunder;
b. Petition for Delineation - The process of delineating a specific
perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP
concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by
a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c. Delineation Paper - The official delineation of ancestral domain
boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall
be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon
filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be
done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all
times include genuine involvement and participation by the members
of the communities concerned;
d. Proof required - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the
testimony of elders or community under oath, and other documents
directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the
area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners
which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3. Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old
improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages;

g. Notice and Publication - A copy of each document, including a

translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be
posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A
copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and
regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow
other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from
the date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such
newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid
substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed
sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available;
h. Endorsement to NCIP - Within fifteen (15) days from publication,
and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim
that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is
deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the
submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral
Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or
fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in
case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant
due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for
denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided,
furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet
and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the
conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the
selection below.
i. Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other
Government Agencies - The Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that
the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Department of the Interior and Local Government,
and Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming
jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such notification
shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed;
j. Issuance of CADT - ICCs/IPs whose ancestral domains have been
officially delineated and determined by the NCIP shall be issued a
CADT in the name of the community concerned, containing a list of all
those identified in the census; and
k. Registration of CADTs - The NCIP shall register issued certificates of
ancestral domain titles and certificates of ancestral lands titles before
the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.

4. Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning

boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other
ICCs/IPs;
5. Survey plans and sketch maps;
6. Anthropological data;
7. Genealogical surveys;
8. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests
and hunting grounds;
9. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as
mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and
10. Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect
of the community.
e. Preparation of Maps - On the basis of such investigation and the
findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the
NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical
descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks
embraced therein;
f. Report of Investigation and Other Documents - A complete copy of
the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared
by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

Section 53. Identification,

Ancestral Lands. -

Delineation

and

Certification

of

a. The allocation of lands within any ancestral domain to individual or

indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants shall be left to the
ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and
traditions;
b. Individual and indigenous corporate claimants of ancestral lands
which are not within ancestral domains, may have their claims
officially established by filing applications for the identification and
delineation of their claims with the Ancestral Domains Office. An
individual or recognized head of a family or clan may file such
application in his behalf or in behalf of his family or clan, respectively;
c. Proofs of such claims shall accompany the application form which
shall include the testimony under oath of elders of the community and
other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or
occupation of the areas since time immemorial by the individual or
corporate claimants in the concept of owners which shall be any of the
authentic documents enumerated under Sec. 52 (d) of this act,
including tax declarations and proofs of payment of taxes;
d. The Ancestral Domains Office may require from each ancestral
claimant the submission of such other documents, Sworn Statements
and the like, which in its opinion, may shed light on the veracity of the
contents of the application/claim;

e. Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of

ancestral land claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
publication of the application and a copy of each document submitted
including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs
concerned in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A
copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and
regional offices of the NCIP and shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow
other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from
the date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such
newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid
substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed
sufficient if both newspapers and radio station are not available
f. Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall investigate and inspect each application, and if found to
be meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey of the area being
claimed. The Ancestral Domains office shall reject any claim that is
deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification.
In case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains office shall give the
applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the
grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case
of conflicting claims among individual or indigenous corporate
claimants, the Ancestral domains Office shall cause the contending
parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to Sec. 62 of this Act. In all proceedings for the identification
or delineation of the ancestral domains as herein provided, the
Director of Lands shall represent the interest of the Republic of the
Philippines; and
g. The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on
each and every application surveyed and delineated to the NCIP,
which shall, in turn, evaluate or corporate (family or clan) claimant
over ancestral lands.
Section 54. Fraudulent Claims. - The Ancestral Domains Office may,
upon written request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which
have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim
found to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or
community may be cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing
of all parties concerned.
Section 55. Communal Rights. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas
within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, shall be
presumed to be communally held: Provide, That communal rights under
this Act shall not be construed as co-ownership as provided in Republic
Act. No. 386, otherwise known as the New Civil Code.
Section 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights
within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.
Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. - The
ICCs/IPs shall have the priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the
ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be
allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural
resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable
for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and
written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the
community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to
allow such operation: Provided, finally, That the all extractions shall be
used to facilitate the development and improvement of the ancestral
domains.
Section 58. Environmental Consideration. - Ancestral domains or
portion thereof, which are found necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover, or reforestation as determined by the appropriate agencies with
the full participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be maintained,
managed and developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned shall
be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
such areas with the full and effective assistance of the government
agencies. Should the ICCs/IPs decide to transfer the responsibility over
the areas, said decision must be made in writing. The consent of the
ICCs/IPs should be arrived at in accordance with its customary laws
without prejudice to the basic requirement of the existing laws on free
and prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be
temporary and will ultimately revert to the ICCs/IPs in accordance with a
program for technology transfer: Provided, further, That no ICCs/IPs shall

be displaced or relocated for the purpose enumerated under this section

without the written consent of the specific persons authorized to give
consent.
Section 59. Certification Precondition. - all department and other
governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from
issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with
any ancestral domain. Such certificate shall only be issued after a fieldbased investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domain Office of the
area concerned: Provided, That no certificate shall be issued by the NCIP
without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs
concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency
or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new
concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there
is pending application CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall
have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any
project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation
process.
Section 60. Exemption from Taxes. - All lands certified to be
ancestral domains shall be exempt from real property taxes, specially
levies, and other forms of exaction except such portion of the ancestral
domains as are actually used for large-scale agriculture, commercial
forest plantation and residential purposes and upon titling by other by
private person: Provided, that all exactions shall be used to facilitate the
development and improvement of the ancestral domains.
Section 61. Temporary Requisition Powers. - Prior to the
establishment of an institutional surveying capacity whereby it can
effectively fulfill its mandate, but in no case beyond three (3) years after
its creation, the NCIP is hereby authorized to request the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) survey teams as well as
other equally capable private survey teams, through a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), to delineate ancestral domain perimeters. The DENR
Secretary shall accommodate any such request within one (1) month of
its issuance: Provided, That the Memorandum of Agreement shall
stipulate, among others, a provision for technology transfer to the NCIP.
Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest,
where there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as
delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP
shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes
arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if
the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional
boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process
shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That
in any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral
domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be
brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Section 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and
practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land where the conflict arises shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships,
hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes. Any doubt or
ambiguity in the application of laws shall be resolved in favor of the
ICCs/IPs.
Section 64. Remedial Measures. - Expropriation may be resorted to
in the resolution of conflicts of interest following the principle of the
"common good". The NCIP shall take appropriate legal action for the
cancellation of officially documented titles which were acquired illegally:
Provided, That such procedure shall ensure that the rights of possessors
in good faith shall be respected: Provided, further, That the action for
cancellation shall be initiated within two (2) years from the effectivity of
this Act: Provided, finally, That the action for reconveyance shall be a
period of ten (10) years in accordance with existing laws.
CHAPTER IX
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 65. Primary of Customary Laws and Practices. - When
disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve the dispute.

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional
offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be
brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification
shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with
the NCIP.
Section 67. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. - Decisions of the NCIP
shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
review.
Section 68. Execution of Decisions, Awards, Orders. - Upon
expiration of the period here provided and no appeal is perfected by any
of the contending parties, the Hearing Officer of the NCIP, on its own
initiative or upon motion by the prevailing party, shall issue a writ of
execution requiring the sheriff or the proper officer to execute final
decisions, orders or awards of the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP.
Section 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP. - The NCIP shall
have the power and authority:

ancestral lands or domains as stated in Sec. 10, Chapter III, or shall

commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24,
Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI hereof, shall be punished in
accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided,
That no such penalty shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment:
Provided, further, That neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines
be imposed. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of any
ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In which case, any
person who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months but not more
than twelve (12) years or a fine not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000) or both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of
the court. In addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the ICCs/IPs
concerned whatever damage may have been suffered by the latter as a
consequence of the unlawful act.
Section 73. Persons Subject to Punishment. - If the offender is a
juridical person, all officers such as, but not limited to, its president,
manager, or head of office responsible for their unlawful act shall be
criminally liable therefor, in addition to the cancellation of certificates of
their registration and/or license: Provided, That if the offender is a public
official, the penalty shall include perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.

a. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and

disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its
internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this Act;

CHAPTER XII
MERGER OF THE OFFICE FOR NORTHERN CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES (ONCC) AND THE OFFICE FOR SOUTHERN
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES (OSCC)

b. To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue

subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements and
other document of similar nature as may be material to a just
determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted
in pursuance of this Act;

Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC. - The Office for Northern Cultural

Communities (ONCC) and the Office of Southern Cultural Communities
(OSCC), created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C
respectively, are hereby merged as organic offices of the NCIP and shall
continue to function under a revitalized and strengthened structures to
achieve the objectives of the NCIP: Provided, That the positions of
Regional Directors and below, are hereby phased-out upon the effectivity
of this Act: Provided, further, That officials and employees of the phasedout offices who may be qualified may apply for reappointment with the
NCIP and may be given prior rights in the filing up of the newly created
positions of NCIP, subject to the qualifications set by the Placement
Committee: Provided, furthermore, That in the case where an indigenous
person and a non-indigenous person with similar qualifications apply for
the same position, priority shall be given to the former. Officers and
employees who are to be phased-out as a result of the merger of their
offices shall be entitled to gratuity a rate equivalent to one and a half (1
1/2) months salary for every year of continuous and satisfactory service
rendered or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on
the basis of the highest salary received. If they are already entitled to
retirement benefits or the gratuity herein provided. Officers and
employees who may be reinstated shall refund such retirement benefits
or gratuity received: Provided, finally That absorbed personnel must still
meet the qualifications and standards set by the Civil Service and the
Placement Committee herein created.

c. To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose

appropriate penalties therefor; and
d. To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending
therefore it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect
social or economic activity.
Section 70. No restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. - No
inferior court of the Philippines shall have the jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the NCIP or any
of its duly authorized or designated offices in any case, dispute or
controversy to, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws
relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.
CHAPTER X
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS FUND
Section 71. Ancestral Domains Fund. - There is hereby created a
special fund, to be known as the Ancestral Domains Fund, an initial
amount of the One Hundred thirty million pesos(P130,000,000) to cover
compensation for expropriated lands, delineation and development of
ancestral domains. An amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000) shall
be sourced from the gross income of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) from its lotto operation, Ten millions pesos (P10,000,000)
from the gross receipts of the travel tax of the preceding year, the fund
of the Social Reform Council intended for survey and delineation of
ancestral lands/domains, and such other source as the government may
be deem appropriate. Thereafter such amount shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act. Foreign as well as local funds which
are made available for the ICCs/IPs through the government of the
Philippines shall be coursed through the NCIP. The NCIP may also solicit
and receive donations, endowments shall be exempted from income or
gift taxes and all other taxes, charges or fees imposed by the
government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
CHAPTER XI
PENALTIES
Section 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. - Any
person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such
as, but not limited to, authorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any

Section 75. Transition Period. - The ONCC/OSCC shall have a period

of six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act within which to wind up
its affairs and to conduct audit of its finances.
Section 76. Transfer of Assets/Properties. - All real and personal
properties which are vested in, or belonging to, the merged offices as
aforestated shall be transferred to the NCIP without further need of
conveyance, transfer or assignment and shall be held for the same
purpose as they were held by the former offices: Provided, That all
contracts, records and documents shall be transferred to the NCIP. All
agreements and contracts entered into by the merged offices shall
remain in full force and effect unless otherwise terminated, modified or
amended by the NCIP.

Section 77. Placement Committee. - Subject to rules on government

reorganization, a Placement Committee shall be created by the NCIP, in
coordination with the Civil Service Commission, which shall assist in the
judicious selection and placement of personnel in order that the best
qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in the
reorganized agency. The placement Committee shall be composed of
seven (7) commissioners and an ICCs/IPs representative from each of the
first and second level employees association in the Offices for Northern
and Southern Cultural Communities (ONCC/OSCC), nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) who have served the community for at least five
(5) years and peoples organizations (POs) with at least five (5) years of
existence. They shall be guided by the criteria of retention and
appointment to be prepared by the consultative body and by the
pertinent provisions of the civil service law.
CHAPTER XIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 78. Special Provision. - The City of Baguio shall remain to be
governed by its Chapter and all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite
reservation shall remain as such until otherwise reclassified by
appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles
recognized and/or required through any judicial, administrative or other
processes before the effectivity of this Act shall remain valid: Provided,
further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which
becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act.
Section 79. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to finance the
initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current
year's appropriation of the ONCC and the OSCC. Thereafter, such sums
as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 80. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within sixty

(60) days immediately after appointment, the NCIP shall issue the
necessary rules and regulations, in consultation with the Committees on
National Cultural Communities of the House of Representatives and the
Senate, for the effective implementation of this Act.
Section 81. Saving Clause. - This Act will not in any manner adversely
affect the rights and benefits of the ICCs/IPs under other conventions,
recommendations, international treaties, national laws, awards, customs
and agreements.
Section 82. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act or
any portion thereof is declared unconstitutional by a competent court,
other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Section 83. Repealing Clause. - Presidential Decree NO. 410,
Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C, and all other laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 84. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days (15)
days upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.