Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
the trial court confirming petitioners title over the subject property for not b
eing allegedly supported by substantial evidence as required by law.
YES. The Court found out that petitioners offered in evidence a certification20
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Regio
n dated 29 October 2001, to prove that the subject property was alienable and di
sposable land of the public domain. Said certification is sufficient to establis
h the true nature or character of the subject property. The certification enjoys
a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.
Issue2: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subje
ct property as pubic land and ignoring petitioners evidence of over 50 year posse
ssion in the concept of an owner and completely unmolested by any adverse claim.
YES. Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced on
ly after 12 June 1945, application for registration of the said property is stil
l possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which
speaks of prescription. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree N
o. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose
possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 year
s or more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite the f
act that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
In the present case, while petitioners possession over the subject property can b
e reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date when according to evidence, the subj
ect property became alienable and disposable, they can still have the subject pr
operty registered in their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Regi
stration Decree.
WHEREFORE, the court granted petitioners application for registration of the subj
ect property and directing the issuance of a decree of registration in petitione
rs favor.
REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF CARLE, 105 PHIL.
FACTS:
The homestead application filed by respondent Ciriaco Carle over a parcel of lan
d located in Pola, Oriental Mindoro (H. A. No. 154223-E 72825) was approved on A
ugust 30, 1930 and the applicant, having died in 1942, the Homestead Patent No.
71852 corresponding to said application was issued to his heirs on April 26, 194
4, which was then transmitted to and recorded by the Register of Deeds of said p
rovince.
On May 11, 1946, the certificate of title (O.C.T. No. 4648) was duly issued in f
avor of Ciriaco Carle s heirs.
Seven years later, upon the opposition of a certain Meynardo Ilagan to the issua
nce of Patent No. 71582 to the heirs of Carle, the Director of Lands declared th
e said patent inoperative as it converse a certain portion that is covered by th
e homestead application of the oppositor and adjudged the same in the latter s fav
our simply because the inclusion of the aforementioned area in the former s patent
was erroneous.
On appeal by the heirs, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affir
med the order of the Director of Lands; and on December 2, 1955, the Director of
Lands filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Mindoro praying that
Homestead Patent No. 71852 be declared null and void and prayed further that th
e respondents be ordered to surrender the patent and the certificate of title is
sued to the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Mindoro, respectively
, for cancellation.
Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, claiming that as more than one year fr
om the issuance of the certificate of title had already elapsed, petitioner's ca
use of action was already barred by prescription; and considering the aforesaid
motion and the opposition thereto filed by the petitioner, the Court a quo in it
s order of March 2, 1957, dismissed the petition on the ground that said action
was filed beyond the period of limitation provided for by law.
The Director of Lands thereupon instituted an appeal.
ISSUES:
1.
WON the action filed to declare Homestead Patent No. 71852 as null and v
oid was already barred by prescription.
2.
WON the appellant, as the official who exercises the power to dispose pu
blic lands, necessarily has the power to review the patent that pertains to him,
as in the case at bar.
RULING:
The appellant claims that a homestead patent differs from a decree of registrati
on, obtained in an ordinary registration proceeding, in many fundamental ways; t
hus, depriving the former of that indefeasible nature ordinarily characteristic
of the latter. This contention of the appellant is flawed because the appellant
compares a homestead patent from a decree of registration when what is involved
in the instant case is the indefeasibility of the certificate of title issued af
ter the homestead patent has been duly registered pursuant to Section 122 of the
Land Registration Act which clearly stipulates that "After due registration and
issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be registered l
and for all purpose under this act."
Consequently, where a land was granted by the Government to a private individual
as a homesteader under the provisions of Act No. 962, and the corresponding pat
ent was registered and the certificate of title issued to the grantee, said land
is considered registered within the meaning of the Land Registration Act. The t
itle to the land thus granted and registered may no longer be the subject of any
inquiry, decision, or judgment in a cadastral proceeding. Further, a homestead
patent when registered in the corresponding register of deeds is a veritable tor
rens title and thus, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. For while it is
true that neither the Public Land Act nor the Land Registration Act provides fo
r the period within which the certificate of title to a public land grant may be
questioned, this does not essentially sustains the appellant s contention that su
ch action may be brought within ten years for the reason that a certificate of t
itle issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes the nature of a certificate
issued as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, hence, as long as the land dis
posed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, the same be
comes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the
date of the issuance thereof.
On the appellant s contention that as the official who exercises the power to disp
ose public lands, it too, bestows him the right to review a patent pertains to h
im was ruled correct by the court in so far as the land remains a part of the pu
blic domain and still continues to be under his exclusive and executive control.
However, once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of tit
le is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes privat
e property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction
, as in the herein case.
The parties, however, are not without any remedy in law for if a patent has alre
ady been issued, allegedly through fraud or mistake and had been registered ther
eafter; the remedy of the injured party is an action for reconveyance.
The order appealed from was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
INGARAN VS RAMELO, 107 PHIL. 498 (1960);
FACTS:
This is an appeal for the dismissal of the plaintiff s complaint for the cancellat
ion of a homestead patent as per the order of the Court of First Instance of Isa
bela.
The complaint alleges that in 1936 Prudencio Bumanglag, plaintiffs predecessor in
interest, filed a homestead application for a tract of land in Echague, Isabela
, which was given due course by the defendant Director of Lands; and that after
having intended to submit the final proof to a patent, the war broke out and the
reafter Bumanglag s death, his heirs, herein plaintiffs, continued possession of t
he land applied for and finally, on October 26, 1945, plaintiff Inocencia Ingara
n filed a new homestead application for the same tract of land.
Also, as alleged, in 1946 defendant Ramelo entered the land through force and de
ceit and refused to vacate the land despite the letter sent by the Local Distric
t Land Officer advising him to desist from his occupation of the land because Ho
nt having been filed more than 3 years after the issuance of the homestead paten
t to defendant Ramelo apparently renders the lower court to be of no more jurisd
iction on the matter.
Finally, the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent, as prayed for by
plaintiffs, and the consequent reversion of the property to the state, are matte
rs between the state and the grantee or his heirs, and until the government has
taken steps to annul the grant and assert title to the homestead, the rights of
the homesteader stand and must be recognized in the court of law.
LOPEZ VS. PADILLA, G.R. 27559, MAY 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44
FACTS:
The late Juan Padilla, the predecessor in interest of defendants Emilio Padilla
and Alberto Padilla, was the applicant of a public land under Homestead Applicat
ion No. V-6992 filed with the Bureau of Lands on February 28, 1939 wherein his h
eirs were subsequently issued Original Certificate of Title No. 183 which was tr
anscribed in the Registration Book of the Province of Cebu pursuant to the provi
sions of Section 41 of Act 496 on January 7, 1966.
In the year 1958, the plaintiffs began reclaiming the area covered by the water
across the shores of Mambaling, Cebu City, constructed dwellings thereon as soon
as the same became tenantable, and consequently filed with the Bureau of Lands
an application to lease the areas they have reclaimed, to which, they have relig
iously paid the yearly rentals due from then on.
The allegations in the complaint stated that said Juan Padilla and later on his
heirs, defendants Padillas, obtained the approval of the Director of Lands of th
eir homestead application without excluding therefrom the foreshore and marshy l
ands as well as the areas reclaimed and occupied by the plaintiffs and covered b
y plaintiffs' applications of lease; and that the Director of Lands approval of t
he homestead application which later on led to the issuance of the homestead pat
ent in favour of the defendants were done thru fraud and misrepresentation of th
e defendants Padillas, without the knowledge of herein plaintiffs and without co
nsulting the records of the District Land Office in the province and city of Ceb
u.
It has been further alleged that the late Juan Padilla and later his heirs, the
defendants Padillas, pretended to the Bureau of Lands, Manila, that their Homest
ead Application No. V-6992 entirely covered an area of land which they alone occ
upied and cultivated, the truth of the matter being that more than half of the a
rea applied by them for homestead was foreshore, marshy, and covered by the sea,
and a portion of which was reclaimed and occupied by herein plaintiffs long bef
ore the issuance of the patent and title in defendants' favour and hat subsequen
t to the issuance of the aforesaid patent and title through fraud, deceit and mi
srepresentation, defendants Padillas sold the land to defendant Edgar Woolbright
in open violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Com
monwealth Act No. 456, as admitted by Edgar Woolbright himself in his letter dat
ed May 20, 1966 to the District Land Officer, Land District No. VI-I Bureau of L
ands, Cebu City.
Ultimately, notwithstanding the clear and lawful rights of plaintiffs over their
respective lots as assigned and allocated to them by the Bureau of Lands throug
h its regional office in Cebu City, Philippines, defendants conspiring and worki
ng together threatened to occupy the premises in question and forcibly oust plai
ntiffs from their humble homes.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the case at bar falls within the scope of the provisions
of Section 38 of Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act.
2.
Whether or not the plaintiffs are the proper parties to bring the action
.
3.
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cebu has jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the action as well as the power to cancel the patent and
title issued to the defendants on the ground of fraud.
RULING:
On the appellants' first issue, the lower court correctly held that "in ordinary
registration proceedings involving private lands, courts may re-open proceeding
s already closed by final decision or decree, only when application for review i
s filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree o
f registration. The decree of registration then should correspond to the promulg
ation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent and n
eed not address the actual issue of the patent.
The facts in record, including the Supreme Court's decision of the case in City
of Cebu vs. Padilla, show that the order for the issuance of the patent for the
53,000 square meter homestead lot in question in favor of the Padillas was issue
d by the Director of Lands on December 16, 1952, which was upheld by the Court e
ven as against the adverse claim and opposition of the City of Cebu in said case
. The sale to defendant Woolbright was made on June 2, 1966, and the present act
ion was filed on June 10, 1966, therefore, the lower court correctly held that "
the period within which to file the action for review of the title and to annul
the sale to Woolbright has already expired," and "that the patent is deemed issu
ed upon promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance ther
eof."
Moving on to the appellants' second issue, the lower court likewise correctly ru
led that plaintiffs could not properly institute the action for cancellation of
defendants' homestead patent No. 112148 and original certificate of title No. 18
3 issued since the land clearly had ceased to be a public land and private owner
ship thereof had therefore been vested in favor of defendants Padillas and their
transferee Woolbright. Granting arguendo plaintiffs' allegations of fraud and d
eceit against defendants and their alleged preferential right under Republic Act
whic
730 to purchase the portions of the homestead lot occupied by them in 1958
h they insist should be deemed conceded for purposes of the motion to dismiss fi
led by defendants-appellees section 101 of the Public Land Act vests only in the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the authority to institute
the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of defendants' title and
for reversion of the homestead to the Government. The Supreme Court has long bef
ore recognized exceptional cases wherein plaintiff-claimant has sought direct re
conveyance from defendant of public land which was titled thru unlawful acts and
in breach of trust, on the principle of enforcing constructive trust, but such
principle is in no way applicable or invoked in the herein case.
Finally, insisting that the lower court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and authority to cancel defendants' homestead patent and torrens title must nec
essarily fail. As succinctly held by the lower court, the torrens title issued t
o defendants in pursuance of the homestead patent is no longer susceptible to co
llateral attack through the present action filed by plaintiffs, who as mere appl
icants of revocable lease permits or miscellaneous applications of what is now c
oncededly titled property of private ownership, have no personality or legal int
erest to institute the action to begin with, more so to question the sale of the
homestead, allegedly within the five-year prohibitory period of section 118 of
the Public Land Act. In view of the fact that there is no showing that plaintiff
s applications have been approved by the Director of Lands, taking into account t
hat the property has long ceased to be part of the public domain, the lower cour
t, thus, correctly ruled itself to be bereft of authority to grant the relief so
ught by plaintiffs-appellants on the basis of their lack of a valid cause of act
ion.
Certification dated
Resources Office, D
which stated that t
or Disposable land pe
No. 20-A and approv
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. The Republi
c interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, stating that Malabanan had faile
d to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of th
e public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in posse
ssion of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law f
or confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC
and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court noted that sin
ce the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alie
nable and disposable only on March 15 1982, the Velazcos possession pri
or to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of posses
sion.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners can apply for Land Registration pursuant to:
a.
PD 1529 Sec. 14(1) in relation with the Public Land Act Se. 48 (B)
b.
PD 1529 in relation with Art. 1137 of the Civil Code
RULING:
According to PD 1529 Sec. 14, the following persons may file in the proper
of Title No. 0-12665 and titles derived therefrom as null and void, to direct t
he register of deeds to annul said certificates of title, and to confirm the sub
ject land as part of the public domain.
The Republic claimed that at the time of filing of the land registration case an
d of rendition of the decision on June 15, 1967, the subject land was classified
as timberland under LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, as shown in BF
Map No. LC-1180; hence inalienable and not subject to registration. Moreover, pe
titioners title thereto can not be confirmed for lack of showing of possession an
d occupation of the land in the manner and for the length of time required by Se
ction 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Neither did petitioners have
any fee simple title which may be registered under Act No. 496, as amended. Cons
equently, the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction over the res
and any proceedings had therein were null and void.
Petitioners claim that their title to the land became incontrovertible and indef
easible one (1) year after issuance of the decree of registration. Hence, the Re
public s cause of action was barred by prescription and res judicata, proceedings
having been initiated only after about 18 years from the time the decree of regi
stration was made. Contrary to the appellate court s findings, the land is agricul
tural and the inclusion and classification thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in
1955 as timberland can not impair the vested rights acquired by petitioners prede
cessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, adverse and public posses
sion of the land in question since time immemorial and for more than thirty (30)
years prior to the filing of the application for registration in 1960.
ISSUE: W/O CA committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside ent
ry of judgment in the land registration case contending that at the time of fili
ng of the land registration case and of rendition of the decision on June 15, 19
67, the subject land was classified as timberland, hence inalienable and not sub
ject to registration
RULING: The CA committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside en
try of judgment in the land registration case.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupatio
n thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownersh
ip and be registered as a title.
Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the application f
or land registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed
land in the name of petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the
public domain, as per certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development o
n April 1, 1985.
This fact was even admitted by petitioners during the proceedings before the cou
rt a quo on March 10, 1986, when they confirmed that the land has been classifie
d as forming part of forest land, albeit only on August 25, 1955.23 Since no imp
erfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or ali
enable, the title issued to herein petitioners is considered void ab initio.24
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and char
ged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that
all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are pr
esumed to belong to the State.25 To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable.26
In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land has been reclass
ified as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the f
orest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on
the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land clas
sified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
27 Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government.
28 It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived.29 It c
Gazette (O.G.), Volume 93, No. 39, 29 September 199715 as Exhibits "D-1" to "D3"; (5) Affidavit of Publication16 issued by the We Forum newspaper17 as Exhibit
s "E", "E-1" and "E-1-A"; (6) Registry Receipts sent to the government agencies
concerned as well as to the adjoining owners as Exhibits "F," "F-1" to "F-16," i
nclusive; and (7) Certificate of Posting18 as Exhibit "G."
Since the Public Prosecutor did not interpose any objection, the court a quo adm
itted the aforementioned Exhibits.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, on behalf of the Republic, f
iled an Opposition to the aforesaid Application for Registration of Title. It fi
led a Notice of Appearance, but in a letter dated 18 November 1997, deputized th
e Provincial Prosecutor of Silang, Cavite, to represent its interest therein.
During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title, respondent pres
ented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando Ramos as witnesses to strengthen he
r claim that her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous, open,
notorious and adverse possession of the subject property.
Rustico Diloy testified that the first time he came to know of the subject prope
rty was in 1952 when he was twenty years old, because he used to work on the sai
d property. When he married Pacencia Leaban, the owner of the subject property w
as Eusebio Leaban, the father of Pacencia Leaban. Said property was inherited by
his wife from her father. It then came to the possession of the respondent by v
irtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed between her and her mother, Pacencia L
eaban. According to him, from the time he came to know of the subject property u
p to the present, it was continuously declared for taxation purposes. He also af
firmed that the subject property has an area of 22,249 square meters, and it is
located in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite. He came to know of said information
because he was the one who had it surveyed. The survey of the land was made and
approved by the Director of Lands and reapproved by the Bureau of Lands. The su
bject property was fenced with barbed wire and shrubs.23
To corroborate the testimony of Rustico Diloy, Armando Ramos, 81 years old and p
resently residing in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite, stated that he was the ow
ner of the land adjoining the subject property, and that he knew the previous ow
ners of the same. He disclosed that he knew the subject property even before the
Japanese Occupation because he became the husband of one of the heirs of the ow
ner thereof. Prior to the Japanese Occupation, he said the owner of the subject
property was his father-in-law, Narciso Leaban. Then, in 1948, Crispin Leaban ca
me into the possession of said land. From Crispin Leaban, he confirmed that the
subject property was inherited by Eusebio Leaban, the son of Crispin Leaban. Eus
ebio Leaban, in turn, transferred the same to his daughter, Pacencia Leaban. The
n, in 1979, Pacencia Leaban conveyed the subject property to her daughter, the r
espondent, who is the present owner of the subject property where she plants cof
fee.
The Republic persistently argues that the respondent's Application for Registrat
ion of Title should have been denied because the latter failed to comply with th
e period of possession required by law, i.e., Section 14 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529. The Republic reveals that the subject property was only declared alien
able and disposable on 15 March 1982 per Forestry Administration Office (FAO) No
. 4-1650. From 1982 when the property was declared alienable and disposable to 1
997, the respondent had only been in adverse possession of the subject property
for a period of 15 years. Thus, there was no compliance with Section 14, Preside
ntial Decree No. 1529 because the subject property was not yet alienable and dis
posable on 12 June 1945, and respondent's possession lacked the required number
of years (30 years) for her to acquire the same through prescription. Hence, res
pondent did not acquire an imperfect title, which may be confirmed through a jud
icial proceeding.
The MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, thereby granting her ap
plication for registration over the subject property.
Republic then filed a Motion for Reconsideration the said Motion for Reconsidera
tion was denied.
As a result thereof, the Republic appealed the Decision of the MCTC to the Court
of Appeals.
Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the Republic and affirmed the Decision of
the MCTC granting the application for registration of the subject property.
Aggrieved, the Republic filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid
Decision which was likewise denied in a Resolution dated 30 August 2006.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent has acquired a registrable title
No, respondent has acquired a registrable title.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may apply for regis
tration of land. The said provisions of law refer to an original registration th
rough ordinary registration proceedings.31 It specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of tit
le to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of aliena
ble and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownersh
ip since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied.)
The three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title
under the first category are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.32 In effect, the pe
riod of possession - open, continuous, exclusive and notorious - must at least b
e 30 years computed from 12 June 1945 to the effectivity of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 on 11 June 1978.
Section 14(1) of the aforesaid law requires that the property sought to be regis
tered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for regist
ration of title is filed.
In the case at bar, it is beyond question that the subject property was already
an alienable and disposable land at the time the Application for Registration of
Title over the same was filed by the respondent. The Application for Registrati
on of Title over the subject property was filed by the respondent in the year 19
97. The Report,34 dated 27 July 1998, submitted by the Director of Lands and the
Certification,35 dated 4 May 1998, issued by the CENRO, clearly established tha
t the subject property was already within the alienable and disposable zone as c
lassified under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 3013 as early as 15 March 1982 per F
orestry Administration Order No. 4-1650.36Even the parties to this case, particu
larly the OSG, did not refute the fact that at the time the Application for Regi
stration of Title was filed, the subject property had already been classified as
alienable and disposable land.
Both lower courts upheld that the respondent was able to prove that her possessi
on of the subject property was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious for mor
e than 30 years
While this Court agrees with the lower courts that, indeed, respondent's possess
ion of the subject property was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, howev
er, we hold that respondent failed to prove that she or her predecessors-in-inte
rest were already in possession of the subject property under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, which is the reckoning period specif
ically provided in Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
From 1982 up to 1997, the year the respondent filed an Application for Registrat
ion of Title over the subject property, the respondent was in possession of the
same for only 15 years, which was short of another 15 years from the 30-year-per
iod possession requirement. Thus, this Court is constrained to abide by the Lati
n maxim "Dura lex sed lex."42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Deci
sion and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 2006 and 30 August
2006, respectively affirming the Decision of the MCTC dated 5 May 1999, which gr
anted the respondent's Application for Registration of Title over the subject pr
operty, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent's Application for Regi
e the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property
for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still r
eserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its owne
rship in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in g
ood faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the pa
rt of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. (Emphas
is ours)
Here, when respondents filed their application in 1994, the lots were already de
clared alienable and disposable by the DENR 49 years ago, or in 1945.
II.
No, they were able to show that they have been in open, exclusive, cont
inuous and notorious possession of the lots in the concept of owners.
As to the second requisite, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that respondents were able to prove, through testimonial and documentary evidenc
e, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, co
ntinuous and notorious possession of the lots for the period required by law.
In the present case, applicants-appellees predecessors-in-interest have been in o
pen, continuous, exclusive possession of the disputed land as early as 1955, thu
s, they only stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by vir
tue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what would other
wise be deemed as an imperfect title.
Although respondents possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest was mo
re than 39 years when they filed their application for registration in 1994, tha
t period of possession will not suffice for purposes of registration of title. W
hat is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respo
ndents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.10 Much as we want to conform to the State s polic
y of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spu
r economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are
tied by the law s stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated Feb
ruary 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54874 affirming in toto the Decision dated Sept
ember 17, 1996 of the RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte in Land Registration
Case No. N-775 (LRA Record No. N-61762) is REVERSED. Respondents application for
registration of title is DENIED.
Director of Lands v. CA (106 SCRA 426)
These are separate appeals of the parties via certiorari seeking to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals granting the application for confirmation and r
egistration of title of Natividad Alio, substituted by her heirs, to five (5) par
cels of land, with an area of 377,216 square meters, situated at Mamburao, Occid
ental Mindoro.
FACTS:
"On December 16, 1976, Maria Natividad Alio filed L. R. C. No. N-72 seeking the r
egistration of five parcels of land containing an aggregate area of 37,7216 hect
ares under the Land Registration Act and/or Section 48(b), Chapter VIII of Act 1
41 as amended in lieu of a previous application docketed as L.R.C. Case No. N-67
which was ordered amended by the Court.
"In her application Maria Natividad Alio claims that she is the owner in fee simp
le of the parcels of land situated at Sitio Tagun, Barrio of Taguan, Municipalit
y of Mamburao, Province of Occidental Mindoro.
"She further asserts that the aforesaid parcels of land are covered by Tax Decla
ration No. 262; that, applicant being the only surviving daughter of Patricio Al
io obtained her title over the said parcels of land by way of inheritance from he
r father; that, applicant has exclusive possession of said parcels of land and,
together with her predecessor-in-interest, her possession is peaceful, continuou
s, public and adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner since ti
me immemorial, i.e. even prior to 1890; that they have used the said parcels of
land for residential and agricultural purposes up to the present time.
"Maria Natividad Alio s application was opposed by Attorney Amando Y. Azul, Honofre
Cobarrubias, Estanislao Temenia, Benigno Olleres, the Bureau of Forest Developm
ent and the Republic of the Philippines.
"Oppositor Amando Y. Azul, claims that he is the actual occupant of a parcel of
land containing an area of eight (8) hectares more or less which is included in
the application for title under LRC No. N-72; that, he acquired the said parcel
of land from a certain Estanislao Temenia, who was the previous occupant for mor
e than thirty (30) years; that, he has caused the survey of the land which was r
ecorded as Psu-230336, which is pending approval before the Bureau of Lands; tha
t, he has commenced occupying the said land since 1963, continuously up to the p
resent without having been molested, disturbed or questioned by anyone, includin
g registration applicant; and, that applicant Maria Natividad Alio has never set
foot in the area covered by his opposition nor introduced a single improvement t
herein. Attorney Amando Y. Azul, therefore, prays that the application for regis
tration be denied so far as it includes the eight (8) hectares he has actually o
ccupied and improved.
"Oppositor Honofre Cobarrubias, for his part avers that the application for regi
stration includes a parcel of land with an area of six (6) hectares more or less
situated at sitio Ligang, barrio of San Luis, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, whi
ch parcel of land he has actually occupied and improved without having been mole
sted, disturbed or questioned by anyone, including the registration applicant, s
ince 1958 when he purchased said land from Mr. Estanislao Temenia; that, at the
time of the sale in his favor the said land has been fully cultivated to upland
riceland by the vendor whose occupation has been open, peaceful, adverse and in
the concept of an owner since the last thirty years; and, that applicant Maria N
atividad Alio has never set foot in the area covered by his opposition nor introd
uced a single improvement therein. Honofre Cobarrubias, therefore, prays that th
e registration application be dismissed in so far as it affects the area of six
(6) hectares which he owns.
"Oppositor Benigno Olleres contends that he is the actual physical possessor of
a parcel of agricultural land situated in Sitio Taguan, Barrio San Luis, Mambura
o, Occidental Mindoro embraced under the plans submitted by the applicant, with
an area of more or less 17,7759 hectares declared for taxation purposes under Ta
x Declaration No. 1547 in his name; that, he has possessed the said property ope
nly, publicly, continuously and adversely against the whole world and under a bo
na fide claim of acquisition of ownership by himself and his predecessor-in-inte
rest for more than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the ins
tant application without having been disturbed by anybody much less the applican
t, except only sometime June of 1977 when a certain Conrado Alvarez, alleged car
etaker of the applicant tried to gain a foothold on his property, resulting in h
is filing of a Forcible Entry case against said Conrado Alvarez, which case is s
till pending trial in the lower court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that, whe
n he first entered the land it was forested and cogonal and thereafter, he has u
prooted the trees thereon, planted fruit trees and has converted a portion of th
e same to an irrigated field; that, he has been religiously paying the taxes due
the government for the land subject of his opposition. Benigno Olleres, thus, p
rays that the application be dismissed and the land subject of his opposition be
decreed in his favor. (pp. 83-84, Records)
"Oppositor Estanislao Temenia, alleges that he is the actual and physical posses
sor of a parcel of agricultural land situated at Sitio Taguan, Barrio San Luis,
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 154,460 square meter; that, he inh
erited the said parcel of land from his parents and that he and his predecessors
-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession a
nd occupation thereof since the time immemorial under a bonafide claim of acquis
ition of ownership without being disturbed by anybody; that, he has declared the
said parcel of land for taxation purposes lunder Tax Declaration No. 2411; that
, the said land was still a primeval virgin land when he and his predecessors-in
-interest first set foot on it, which thereafter they converted into a rich agri
cultural land; that, the aforesaid parcel of land is included in the land sought
to be registered by herein applicant under plans Psu-04-005173, Psu-4A-000231,
Psu-4A-000232, Psu-04-000233; that, Maria Natividad Alio has never taken possessi
on of the land which are objects of her application whether actual or constructi
ve and therefore, not entitled to a registerable right over the same. Estanislao
Temenia therefore prays that the application for registration with regard to th
e parcels of land subject of his opposition be denied and that he be declared th
e lawful possessor thereof.
"As for the Bureau of Forestry, psray that the application for registration with
regard to the lands subject of their opposition be denied and that the same be
declared part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
"Finally, for its part the Republic of the Philippines, opposes Maria Natividad
Alios application on the following grounds:
"1. That neither the applicant/s nor his/her/their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 (b), C.A. 141
, as amended by P. D. 1073);
"2. That the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payment/s
receipt/s of applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/e
s not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the lands applied for, or of his/her/their open, continuous, exclusive and noto
rious possession and occupation thereof, in the concept of owner, since June 12,
1945, or prior thereto. Said muniment/s of title do/es not appear to be genuine
and the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended po
ssession of applicant/s to be of recent vintage;
"3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish Title or g
rant can no longer be availed of by the applicant/s who have failed to file an a
ppropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from
February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records,
it appears that the instant application was filed on December 16, 1976.
"5. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation."
Meantime, the original applicant, Natividad Garcia Alio, died on May 26, 1985, an
d was substituted by her heirs Nieves, Elisa, Bienvenido, Antonio, Renato and Le
onardo, all surnamed Alio-Buhay.2
"After trial, on September 17, 1990, the court a quo rendered the assailed decis
ion, which in part states:
"Documentary evidence presented consists of the application requisites from stag
e to stage, until the application was filed, on December 16, 1976, Survey Plans,
Technical Descriptions, Tax Receipts, and Certificates of Ownership of Large Ca
ttle.
"The individual oppositors likewise submitted Tax Declarations and Tax Receipts
and copies of deed of sale.
"The pleadings, the evidence on file as above outlined and all the papers of rec
ord now render it justifiable to maintain oppositor-parties in possession of the
areas claimed by them. An additional ground for this exists with regard to thos
e cases where some papers have been filed with the Bureau of Lands. (Atty. Arman
do Azul and Honofre Cobarrubias)
ISUUE: Whether respondent heirs of Natividad Alio have registerable title as owne
rs of the five (5) parcels of land applied for with an area of 377,216 square me
ters, situated at sitio Tagum, Barrio Taguan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
RULING:
No the respondent heirs of Natividad Alio have registerable title as owners of th
e five (5) parcels of land applied for with an area of 377,216 square meters, si
tuated at sitio Tagum, Barrio Taguan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
An applicant seeking to establish ownership of land must conclusively show that
he is the owner in fee simple,7 for the standing presumption is that all lands
belong to the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or b
y grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time i
mmemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had n
ever been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even be
the previous owners up to the present; and that its possession and occupation a
s owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful,
continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner.
Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of Inco
rporation, the tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print copies of said plan, t
echnical descriptions of the lots, Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax De
clarations for the three lots and Tax Clearances.
On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial C
ourt for the applicant s failure to comply with the requirements called for in the
Report dated February 22, 1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority
.
On June 2, 1994, the applicant filed a motion to revive the application and to s
et the case for initial hearing. The motion was granted by the Regional Trial Co
urt on June 7, 1994 and initial hearing was set on September 1994.
On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision on March 31, 1995 granting the application for registration. In due tim
e, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the ap
pealed decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over thre
e (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.
RULING:
The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable ti
tle over three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied f
or.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled
to registration of title over the three (3) parcels of land applied for. The rul
ing is erroneous.
An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show tha
t he is the owner thereof in fee simple, for the standing presumption is that al
l lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Gover
nment either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and
his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the pr
esumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all. It
s claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the
parcels of land applied for were declared public land by decision of the Cadastr
al Court. Such being the case, the application for voluntary registration under
P. D. No. 1529 is barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court. The land
having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and dec
lared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary appl
ication under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by
res-judicata. As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or o
wnership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System
of registration.
Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and
that of its predecessors in interest. The applicant must present specific acts
of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements
which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Actual po
ssession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of su
ch a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open,
adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is
hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this natu
re. In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by co
mpetent evidence.
the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES the application
for registration of title filed by applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and declares
the subject parcels of land to be public land belonging to the public domain.