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Abstract
European firms are confronted to the paradox of a strong R&D in many areas but a low level of
innovation. Building on the dynamic capability approach, I propose an institutional approach where
innovation is linked to cultural, organizational, and regulatory factors. These include managers attitude
toward risk and uncertainty, the ability to develop capabilities and access complementary assets, and a
favorable regulatory environment. Using European microdata on how 6860 managers perceive factors
hampering innovation, this paper shows that the risk-averse attitude of European firms and their
difficulty to develop dynamic capabilities may explain the weakness of European innovation.
Institutional factors such as pervasive rigidities and distortions that hamper the functioning of markets,
may also prevent innovative responses. The use of managers perceptions seems particularly well suited
in the context of innovation where choices are taken with limited information. Conclusions drawn from
this perspective call for policies that will take into account the system in which innovation can take
place. D 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Innovation; Institutional environment; Europe
1. Introduction
One of the most outstanding features of the present era is the pursuit of an accelerated pace
toward the globalization of exchanges, which is accompanied by deregulation whose main
* Tel.: +1-805-893-7185; fax: +1-805-893-7612.
E-mail address: delmas@bren.ucsb.edu (M.A. Delmas).
1047-8310/02/$ see front matter D 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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effects are in most cases still to come (Bouin & OConnor, 1997). Given the new competitive
conditions in the global economy, innovation is a determining factor in the ability of firms
and countries both to adapt themselves to new constraints and take advantage of new
opportunities (Cervantes, 1997).
This question is crucial for Europe, which is confronted with the paradox of a strong R&D
in many respects but a low level of innovation. Although Europe has a strong scientific base
(CEC, 1994), it seems that European firms, as compared to their American and Japanese
counterparts, suffer from a difficulty to transform R&D into commercially viable innovations
and new products (Andreasen, Coriat, den Hertog, & Kaplinsky, 1995; Buigues &
Jacquemin, 1998).1
The dynamic capability approach to strategy (Teece, Pisano, & Schuen, 1997) shows
that successful innovative firms in the global market place have been demonstrating timely
responsiveness to market changes, along with the management capability to effectively
coordinate and redeploy internal and external competencies. Even though the business
firm is clearly the leading player in the development and commercialization of new
product and processes, it is important to understand the institutional environment in which
these activities take place. Innovation systems are rooted within a given set of national
and subnational institutions, and the role of supporting institutions, both private and
public, formal and informal, is of crucial importance (Lundvall, 1998; Mowery, 1998;
Nelson, 1993).
In this paper, I propose an institutional approach to explain innovation. I suggest four
dimensions of the institutional environment that facilitate or hamper innovation. The first
one is cultural and includes the attitude of managers toward risk and uncertainty. The second
one is organizational and refers to the ability of firms to acquire and develop new
knowledge. The third dimension refers to the availability of complementary assets such as
access to sources of finance or cooperation with other firms. The fourth one is the regulatory
environment such as property right regimes and taxes.
Using European microdata on how 6860 managers perceive factors hampering innovation,
this paper shows that the risk-averse attitude of European managers and the perceived
difficulty of European firms to develop dynamic capabilities and acquire new knowledge
explain the weakness of European innovation. Institutional factors, such as pervasive
rigidities and distortions that hamper the functioning of markets, may also play a role in
preventing innovative responses.
Most of the studies on the lack of innovation in Europe focus on the cost of R&D and the
difficulty to finance it (Green Paper on Innovation, 1995). However, successful innovation
requires more than basic research and R&D expenditure. Conclusions drawn from an
1
European companies apparently obtain lower returns than US companies on R&D investment, as measured
in terms of ability to leverage R&D into patents and to leverage patents into products for the global market. The
international diffusion rate of patents generated in Europe is only two-thirds that of the US. Between 1984 and
1993, the European Union lost patent share in all sectors apart from aerospace and transport equipment
(Competitiveness Report, 1996).
21
institutional perspective on innovation call for policies that will take into account the system
in which innovation can take place. New technologies will not be fully reflected in
productivity growth until societal constraints are removed allowing companies to undergo
thorough reorganization (Pavitt, 1998).
In Section 2 of this paper, I develop an institutional approach to innovation. Section 3
exposes the data and empirical methods. The measures of factors hampering innovation are
discussed and the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is described. Sections 4 and 5 of the
paper present the empirical results and a concluding discussion of their implication.
22
established routines and by overcoming a wide range of social and cultural barriers
(Hargadon, 1998; Tushman & Reilly, 1996).
These elements not only require an entrepreneurial attitude as portrayed by Schumpeter
(1936) with energy of action and will, but also adaptive organizations, which challenge their
current paradigms. The swift-moving environment in which they function makes it critical
that the old fit be consciously disturbed (Chakravarthy, 1982). Organizations can close
themselves to changes in the market and business environment and to new sources of
technology. Individuals in organizations can fall into the trap of adopting a citadel mentality.
Closed systems may be able to hone existing routines but will lose the capacity to engage in
new routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982).
There is also a value in responding rapidity to new demands. In an era of shortened product
life cycles, a competitive advantage is directly linked to how quickly new products can be
developed (Malueg & Tsutsui, 1997). Certain innovative responses are required when timeto-marker is critical, when the rate of technological change is rapid, and when the nature of
future competition and markets is difficult to determine.
In conclusion, firms must be able to process by trial and errors, to challenge their way of
working, and to respond rapidly to changes in the environment. This requires firms to adopt a
dynamic and entrepreneurial attitude. On the contrary, closed systems with a culture averse to
risk taking will not lead to innovation. The predicted effect of a risk-averse attitude of the firm
can be formalized as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The more the risk-averse attitude toward change, the less the innovation output.
2.2. Ability to acquire new knowledge
Innovation is linked to organizational learning, that is the way firms generate, absorb, and
transmit knowledge (David, 1997; Freeman, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Pisano, 1994;
Rosenberg, 1976; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). Knowledge constitutes input into the learning
process, that is, knowledge transfer in many cases is a means to generate new learning and
among others an agents existing knowledge stock (Foray & Lundvall, 1996).
Cohen and Levinthal have argued that the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new
external information, to assimilate it, and to apply it to commercial ends is critical to the
firms innovative capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This capability, called a firms
absorptive capacity, is largely a function of the firms level of prior related knowledge. The
absorptive capacity is based on employees skills as well as firm organizational design,
which influences the quantity and quality of information exchanged, the level at which
decisions are made, and how organization members monitor the external environment. This
level of knowledge can be embedded in the employees. Alternatively managers can recruit
scientists and engineers to keep a firm adequately up-to-date with scientific knowledge.
Knowledgeable employees will be able to survey what knowledge is available in the world,
detect new developments, and judge what is worthwhile acquiring and learning. Therefore,
if there is a lack of knowledgeable employees within the firm or in the environment of the
23
firm such as in universities, the firm will lack absorptive capacity and will have more difficulties to innovate.
The ability to acquire knowledge is not only linked to the firms absorptive capacity but
also to the existing flow of knowledge surrounding firms. For example, external information
on technological innovations or market opportunities difficult to reach maybe even for
knowledgeable employees because of deficient information technologies. The relationship
between the ability to acquire knowledge and innovation can be formalized as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The less the ability to acquire knowledge, the less the innovation output.
2.3. Access to complementary assets
Innovative activity is often the result of dynamic relations between participants rather than
the simple transfer of information or technology (Mastenbroek, 1996). The systemic
characteristics of new technologies have significant implications for the organization of
firms. The more systemic a technology, the closer the cooperation between firms needed to
share and transfer it. Feedback loops between the different players are very important in the
innovation process (Teece, 1996).
Furthermore, linkages to other technologies, to complementary assets and to users must be
established if innovation is to be successful. As firms might lack competence in a number of
technological fields, cooperation with other enterprises creates the necessary complementary
technology unit, enabling these companies to capitalize on economies of scope through joint
efforts (Delmas, 1999; Hagedoorn, 1993; Kogut, 1988; Powell, 1990).
To be successful, innovation requires access to complementary assets such as for example
financing or distribution (Teece, 1986). Collaborative arrangements between firms may be
utilized to access complementary assets supplied by the respective parents. Moreover,
innovation also depends on links between firms and other type of agents such as research
laboratories, industry unions, or public agencies (Ham and Mowery, 1998).
In conclusion, innovation requires that firms develop, adapt, integrate, and reconfigure
internal as well as external organizational skills and resources to match the requirement of a
changing environment. An environment, which hampers the creation of linkages and obstructs
access to complementary assets, should therefore impede the innovation process. The
predicted effect of the difficulty to access complementary competencies on innovation can
be formalized as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The more difficult the access to complementary assets, the less the
innovation output.
2.4. A favorable regulatory environment for innovation
The institutional environmentcomprising the rules of the gamecan influence in
several ways the propensity of firms to innovate (North, 1990). It can be a source not only
of uncertainty but also of rigidities hampering organizational change.
24
25
3. Methods
Over the past two decades, there has been an increasing research effort, which has
significantly advanced both conceptual and empirical understanding of how enterprises,
26
economies, and societies innovate and the economic and social effects of such innovation.
However, statistical measures have not kept pace with modern conceptual approaches to
innovation. A dramatic proliferation of innovation surveys has occurred (Archibugi &
Pianta, 1996; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1996; Hollenstein, 1996). Industrial associations,
universities, public and private research centers, and statistical offices have produced their
own innovation surveys. However, reviews of the literature show that there has been very
little statistical material at the European level on the resources, which are required for
innovation in different enterprises and industries, on how enterprises access and develop
technology, and on the roles played by innovation in the development of enterprises and in
the evolution of industries.
Recognition of the role of innovation on economic change should therefore be coupled
with an awareness of sharp limitations in the available information. This is especially the case
for information collected in a systematic way at the enterprise level.
3.1. The Community Innovation Survey (CIS)
The CIS is an action of the European Commission (EC) and its Member States. It is the
first time that innovation surveys are carried out at a large scale in a harmonized way in the
12 Member States of the EU (at that time) and Norway, and Iceland. It is also the first time
that microdata of different innovation surveys have been stored in one common database.
The EC harmonized questionnaire was developed on the basis of the Oslo Manual by
Eurostat and the OECD secretariat in cooperation with a team of external experts (OECD &
Eurostat, 1997).
There are essentially two ways of collecting innovation data: the so-called subject
approach and the object approach. In the latter, a single innovation and its sources and
results are studied. In the subject approach, each single firm is studied, including any
innovative project it might have. The last approach is chosen for CIS as recommended
in the Oslo Manual. The method allows aggregation of activity across industries and
countries and allows international comparison if sampling is done properly. Another
advantage is that all innovative activity is included, successes as well as failures. Finally, firms without innovative activity are included, allowing for comparisons between
those active and those inactive in innovationa matter of great importance for policy making.
There is a general problem of accuracy and reliability when collecting data through survey
questionnaires, in particular when the questions do not match readily available data in the
firms. This is the case with the innovation survey, as most firms do not keep a record of
either innovation inputs or outputs. In effect, the answers cannot be treated as accurate
measures but rather as well-informed estimates by the people responsible in the firms (i.e., as
indicators of the activity going on). In addition, there are several questions asking for
opinions or more qualitative information about the firm and its activities. Such information is
highly dependent upon who the respondent is and what function he or she has in the
organization. On the other hand, many issues relating to innovation are not available as
hard data. Surveying or interviewing may therefore be the best source for collecting more
27
or less qualitative information. As the same technique has been applied in a series of
countries and most results seem to be relatively consistent across both countries and
industries, I believe them to be a reasonable picture of reality.2
There is no legal basis for the collection of innovation data. Hence, the EC was unable
to impose any demands on Member States and could only compile a list of implementation and sampling issues, which were presented to Member States as recommendations.
The EC was therefore highly dependent on Member States cooperation. The data transferred from the Member States to the EC went through a logical consistency check to
verify whether the data were transferred into the appropriate format and position according
to the guidelines.3
3.2. Measurements
Surveys on the hindrances to innovation are quite common, and an attempt to replicate
them would be tedious and of little advantage in the present context. Vickery and
Northcott (1995) give a number of examples of the genre and illustrate the difficulties of
attempting to survey the field. The CIS however is superior to all previous studies in its
breadth and coverage. The questionnaire is developed around eight separate chapters: general information, sources of information for innovation, objectives of innovation, acquisitions/transfer of technology, R&D activity, factors hampering innovation, cost of
innovation, and impact of innovation activities. This paper is concerned with two chapters of the survey: innovation activity (within general information) and factors hampering innovation.
3.2.1. Innovative and noninnovative firms
The dependent variable is innovation. The questionnaire is concerned with technological
innovation. A technology is interpreted broadly as the whole complex of knowledge, skills,
routines, competence, equipment, and engineering practice, which are necessary to produce a
product. A new product rests on a change in this underlying technology. More generally,
innovation occurs when a new or changed product is introduced to the market or when a new
or changed process is used in commercial production.
In the CIS questionnaire, two types of innovations are distinguished: significant and
incremental innovations. A significant innovation is a newly marketed product whose
intended use, performance characteristics, technical construction, design or use of materials,
and components are new or substantially changed. Such innovations can involve radically
new technologies or can be based on combining existing technologies in new use. An
incremental innovation is an existing product whose technical characteristics have been
For an evaluation of the CIS approach, see Archibugi, Kristensen, and Shaffer (1995).
Guidelines EC document Doc.Eurostat/D3/REDIS/005 (3rd EC EFTA joint working party on R&D and
innovation statistics, March 1993).
3
28
enhanced or upgraded. This can take two basic forms. A simple product may be improved, in
terms of better performance or lower cost, through use of new components or materials. A
complex product, consisting of a number of integrated technical subsystems, may be
improved by partial changes to one or more of the subsystems.
The dependent variable is derived from the question 1 of the CIS called general
information about innovation activities. Two questions were used to assess the innovativeness of the company. The first one asked whether the company had developed or
introduced any technologically changed products (goods or services) during 19901992.
The second one asked whether the company had developed or introduced any technologically changed processes during 19901992. An innovative firm would be a firm that
answers yes to one of these questions. The dependent variable is coded 1 for innovators and
0 for noninnovators.
3.2.2. Factors hampering innovation
The data for the independent variables are derived from the response to question 12 of
the CIS, concerning factors hampering innovation. Question 12 asked: what have been
the most important difficulties hindering the realization of innovation in your enterprise
Table 1
Variables definition and descriptive statistics
n
Mean S.D.
Min Max
6860
6860
6860
6860
6860
0.354
0.405
0.316
0.107
0.155
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
Knowledge acquisition
SKILL, Lack of skilled personnel
TECHINFO, Lack of information on technologies
MKTINFO, Lack of information on markets
1
1
6860
6860
6860
6860
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
Institutional rigidities
COPY, Innovation too easy to copy
6860 0.336 0.472 0
REGUL, Legislation, norms, regulations, standards, and taxation
6860 0.311 0.462 0
MKTACCES, Lack of customer responsiveness to new products and processes 6860 0.230 0.421 0
1
1
1
0.408
0.470
0.207
0.190
0.478
0.491
0.464
0.309
0.362
0.491
0.499
0.405
0.393
29
The original survey included 18 variables but several countries did not answer to three of these variables
(12.5 enterprise innovation potential too small, 12.13 lack of technological opportunities, and 12.14 need not
innovate due to earlier innovation). I removed them from the analysis.
30
4. Results
The empirical results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. They provide support for
most of my hypotheses and some results challenge the received wisdom on European
innovation. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the independent variables and Table 2
reports the percentage of innovating companies within each country using the estimated
population. The countries included in the analysis are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain,
Ireland, Luxembourg, and Norway. There are 6860 companies in the sample, which represent a population of 80,760 companies. Eurostat uses a weighted procedure to estimate
the total population based on industry and size distributions. In each country, the
coefficient of variation between the estimated total population and the sample was less
than 10% (see Appendix A for more details on the methodology). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the number of innovators and noninnovators in the sample. Overall,
there are 4453 firms declared being innovative and 2407 noninnovative. When using the
estimated population, there are 47,765 innovative firms and 32,995 noninnovative firms.
The percentage of innovators is higher in Ireland (72%) and Germany (67%) than in the
other European countries that are analyzed in this paper. The percentage is particularly
low for Spain (37%). Table 3 reports the coefficients of the binomial logit. Firms
(n=6860) replied to question 12 on factors hampering innovation out of 42,000, the total
European sample.
Table 2
Percentage of innovators in the estimated population
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Ireland
Luxembourg
Norway
Total
a
Sample size
61
56
67
37
72
37
53
59
600
638
1994
2236
762
130
500
6860
5959
2944
49,860
18,567
2179
171
1081
80,761
Eurostat uses a weighted procedure to calculate the estimated population within each country (see Appendix A).
31
Table 3
Analysis of maximum likelihood estimates
Dependent variable
Intercept
RISK, Excessive perceived risk
FINANC, Lack of appropriate
sources of finance
COST, Innovation costs too high
PAYTIME, Pay-off period of
innovation too long
SKILL, Lack of skilled personnel
TECHINFO, Lack of information
on technologies
MKTINFO, Lack of information
on markets
COSCONTR, Innovation costs
hard to control
RESCHANGE, Resistance to
change in the enterprise
EXTSERV, Deficiencies in the
availability of external
technical services
COOPOP, Lack of opportunities for
cooperation with other firms and
technological institutions
COPY, Innovation too easy to copy
REGUL, Legislation, norms,
regulations, standards, and taxation
MKTACCES, Lack of customer
responsiveness to new products
and processes
UTIME, Uncertainty in timing
of innovation
Parameter Standard
df estimate error
Wald c2
Standardized
Odds ratio
Pr > c2 estimate
1
1
1
0.8329
0.0766
0.0626
0.0196
0.00768
0.00655
1800.4938 0.0001
99.5379 0.0001
91.3428 0.0001
0.208703
0.185935
1.080
1.065
1
1
0.0759
0.0475
0.00860
0.00859
77.7829 0.0001
30.5642 0.0001
0.224181
0.134257
0.927
1.049
1
1
0.0345
0.1208
0.00707
0.00966
23.7965 0.0001
156.4799 0.0001
0.096034
0.280575
1.035
0.886
0.1020
0.00892
130.6848 0.0001
0.257224
1.107
0.1801
0.00801
504.9682 0.0001
0.468013
1.197
0.1712
0.00814
441.9872 0.0001
0.385296
0.843
0.2308
0.0102
510.1094 0.0001
0.573837
1260
0.2112
0.00902
548.8192 0.0001
0.536622
0.810
1
1
0.0368
0.2356
0.00653
0.00625
31.7862 0.0001
1422.2995 0.0001
0.105925
0.671095
1.037
1.266
0.0528
0.00734
51.6797 0.0001
0.134938
0.949
0.1217
0.00814
223.5447 0.0001
0.279839
1.129
32
33
The number of choices is 15, so a difference of five ranks means 1/3 of the total ranking scale.
34
ranked 8 as compared to an average ranking of 13. This means that German managers
perceive regulation has a more important factor hampering innovation than do other
European managers. In Spain, the variable COSTCONTR is ranked 11 as compared to an
average of 6. This means that in Spain, innovation costs are not perceived as hard to control
as compared to other European countries. The variable EXTSERV is ranked 7 as compared to
an average of 12. Deficiencies in the availability of external services seem to be a more
important factor hampering innovation in Spain than in other European countries.
In Ireland, COPY is ranked 13 as compared to an average ranking of 8. In Luxembourg, RESCHANGE is ranked 10 as compared to an average ranking of 15, REGUL is
ranked 7 compared to an average ranking of 13, and UTIME is ranked 8 as compared to an
average ranking of 14. In Norway, UTIME is ranked 9 as compared to an average ranking
of 14.
Concerning potential differences in the rankings of factors hampering innovation by the
size of the company, there are also few differences (see Table 4.). Using the same method, I
observe that firms of more than 500 employees rank the variable TECHINF 15 as compared
to an average of 9. Larger firms may indeed have a better access to technological information than smaller companies. On the contrary, REGUL is ranked 6 compared to a total
ranking of 13. Regulation seems to affect more large firms than smaller firms. UTIME also
ranked 9 as compared to a total ranking of 14, which suggests that uncertainty in timing of
innovation is more important for large firms than small firms. These differences highlight
some variations in perceptions due to the country or the size of the company. However,
there is consistency within the rankings for most of the variables with little variance around
the mean.
Table 4
Ranking of factors hampering innovation by country and size
RISK
FINANC
COST
PAYTIME
SKILL
TECHINFO
MKTINFO
Country
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Spain
Ireland
Luxembourg
Norway
3
3
2
5
4
2
3
5
4
3
2
3
3
5
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
5
3
2
4
4
6
5
7
4
6
5
2
9
8
14
8
7
13
8
7
6
11
9
5
11
7
Size
20 99
100 249
250 499
500+
Total sample
4
3
2
3
4
2
4
4
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
3
2
3
5
5
5
5
5
9
12
12
15
9
8
8
7
8
7
35
COSCONTR
RESCHANGE
EXTSERV
COOPOP
COPY
REGUL
MKTACCES
UTIME
4
9
6
11
8
9
6
14
13
15
13
14
10
11
15
15
10
7
12
15
14
12
14
12
7
9
14
13
8
11
4
10
13
12
12
13
10
8
14
11
7
15
10
7
9
12
10
6
10
11
12
13
15
15
8
9
6
6
6
7
6
15
15
15
12
15
13
10
14
10
12
11
14
13
14
11
7
7
9
11
8
12
13
10
6
13
10
9
8
13
10
14
14
11
9
14
36
37
Validating skills, irrespective of how and in which country they were acquired, would also
contribute towards an open EU skills area and support mobility. Many Member States are
reluctant to recognize qualifications gained in other Member States, arguing that the
standards are different and not equivalent.
The opportunity to validate skills acquired in another Member State would enable Member
States to maintain standards but also provide an access route to those trained elsewhere.
It should also be noted that although training arrangements are not harmonized, the
setting of common standards in other areas, such as health and safety and product or
service standards, introduces common elements into the education and training of a wide
range of occupations. These changes are gradually bringing content and standards closer
together. However, it is also increasingly important that employers are able to understand
more readily and easily the content of different qualifications. Systems to improve the
transparency of qualifications should also be examined to contribute to greater mobility
and flexibility. In an environment where technology can quickly change the skills in
demand, systems for rapidly providing adequate new skills to workers are essential (Quinn
et al., 1996).
5.4. Difficulty to access financing
Access to external finance for innovation projects and new technology-based firms appears
to be a major bottleneck for many European entrepreneurs although, recently, special
financial instruments have been developed that aim to channel savings from those who want
to invest in high-risk, high-return projects. Such projects remain underdeveloped as compared
to main European competitors (Boekholt, 1996). For example, in the US, venture capital
plays a significant role in financing innovation. In Europe, it does not. The explanation lies in
part in the different structure of their financial systems. However, it is also due to
administrative and regulatory barriers that have hindered the growth of the European venture
capital industry.
The European venture capital industry has pointed out that it faces important legislative
gaps. In the US, venture capitalists can pool capital in special fund structures. They are
available to investors throughout the US, regardless of their state of residence. In Europe, the
equivalent fund structures do not exist even at the level of the Member States. Many Member
States do not have fund structures that suit local and foreign investors. A pan-European fund
structure is not available.
5.5. A complex regulatory environment
A suitable legal and regulatory environment would nurture innovation. The rules designed
to protect and disseminate innovation (intellectual and industrial property rights and
standards) need to be fully utilized. Cumbersome administrative formalities curb enterprise
formation. Current legal forms do not really facilitate enterprise cooperation and development at the European level. Patents play a central role among the different instruments
available for protecting innovation. It is a fact that the patent system has become com-
38
plicated in Europe, with national patents existing alongside European patents and Community patents (although the Community patent system has yet to actually come into
operation; Hagedoorn, 1995).
6. Conclusion
Using a logit regression, I find strong support that innovation is linked to the perceptions
of the institutional environment and the organization of competencies internally and between
firms. Research on innovation along with research on organizational change and dynamic
capabilities has been hampered by the lack of measures of managers perceptions. This paper
analyzes innovation output by linking it to the perceptions of managers. The CIS questionnaire is particularly interesting because it measures how managers perceive factors
hampering innovation. This approach seems particularly well suited in the context of innovation where choices are taken with limited information. It shows that managers will direct
their strategies toward innovation in an environment that provides them with access to
complementary assets.
My research confirms and expands the dynamic capability approach to strategy.
Innovation requires, first and foremost, a state of mind combining creativity, entrepreneurship, and a willingness to take calculated risks. Innovation requires an attitude open to
change, which is facilitated by organizational flexibility. Building on this approach, I have
proposed that there are four dimensions of the institutional environment that facilitate or
hamper innovation. The first one is the attitude of managers toward risk and uncertainty.
The second one is the ability of firms to acquire new knowledge. It refers to the availability
of skilled personnel and the ease to access information and learn. The third one is the
ability to build interorganizational links and access to complementary assets such as sources
of finance. The fourth one is the regulatory environment, which can favor innovation by,
for example, providing adequate property right regimes and not obstructing the timing of
innovation. The results of this study support these propositions. Firms that (1) perceive
resistance to change within their organizations, (2) feel they lack technological knowledge,
(3) have difficulties to access complementary assets and (4) sense that customers will not
respond positively to the introduction of new products are less likely to innovate.
Innovators may be aware of the risk associated with innovation and emphasize the
institutional factors that hamper the success of innovation such as the difficulty to predict the
timing of innovation, the difficulty to find access to market, and the burden of regulations.
The CIS questionnaire has not been tailored for this specific research. Therefore, some
questions could be adapted to fit the model better. For example, variables concerning
regulation could be more specific. The next CIS, which will provide us with new results in
2001, takes some of these criticisms into account. However, the present CIS data set opens the
way to further analysis. It would be possible to undertake an analysis by country and industry
using NACE code. It would also be possible to test how factors hampering innovation impact
governance structure choices such as alliances as well as to do a comparative analysis
between countries.
39
Conclusions drawn from this perspective call for policies, which will take into account the system in which innovation can take place instead of looking at the innovation
output like R&D subsidies. New technologies will not be fully reflected in productivity growth until societal constraints are removed, allowing companies to undergo thorough reorganization.
Traditionally, technology policy has been aimed at the innovation end of the process,
concerning itself almost exclusively with incentives for R&D investments through subsidies
and tax credits or through strong property rights and standards. Research has shown that
R&D policies might not be sufficient to enhance technological innovation and transform
skills into competitive strength (Papadakis, 1995).
This approach has slowly been complemented by a parallel concern for an economic
environment conducive to the diffusion of innovations. A number of countries have put into
place policy measures aimed at encouraging firms to adopt new technologies efficiently,
either by removing regulatory and other obstacles, by using the tax system and fiscal measure
to encourage investment in next machinery, or in assimilation of knowledge developed
elsewhere. Recently, a few public policy measures have been implemented in EU countries to
support new technology-based firms and foster innovation. However, these programs are still
marginal and not included enough into an interdependent system of technological policies
(Storey & Tether, 1998).
Several classes of factors that are important for innovation can be identified: availability of
a labor force with the requisite training and technical skills; decentralized economic
structures that recognize private property and permit considerable autonomy, entrepreneurship, and wealth creation; economic systems that permit and encourage a variety of
approaches to technological and market opportunities; access to venture capital, either
from a firms existing cash flow or from an external venture capital community; good
relationship between the scientific community (especially the universities), the technological
community, users and developers of technology, protection of intellectual property, the
availability of contractual arrangements to enable innovating firms to capture a return from
their investment, and the ability to quickly build or contractually access cospecialized assets
inside or outside the industry. I hope to have made a contribution in showing their
importance as part of the European innovation system.
Acknowledgments
I thank the team of Eurostat for their help on the statistical analysis of this research.
40
Let Nx,j be the number of enterprises in size class x and NACE class j in this particular country.
Let nx,j be the number of enterprises who have answered to the survey in that country.
The weighting factor is (Nx,j)/(nx,j).
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