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001 of pp9-16 Social Justice Society (SJS) vs.

Dangerous
Drugs Board (DDB) and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA)
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008
TOPIC: No other substantive requirement may be prescribed for
elective positions.
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.

AUTHOR: Amor
NOTES:
Consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other
personalities.

FACTS:
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner SJS, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the DDB and the
PDEA from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally
infirm for the following reasons:
1. The provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
2. The provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable.
3. A persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
Consolidated with:
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR. vs. DDB and PDEA, G.R. No. 158633
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination,
and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications [citizenship, voter
registration, literacy, age, and residency] for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says
that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among
other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must
first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC
to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.

HELD:
Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL
Sec. 36(f) and (g) UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Resolution 6486 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power.
To impose mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right
to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos.
157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f)
and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
RATIO:
SJS Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Constitutional - Sec. 36[c] and [d] ; Unconstitutional - Sec. 36[f] and [g]
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from US jurisprudence and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than
an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from
their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
Pimentel Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
Unconstitutional - Sec. 36[g]
It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and
has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield
obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. Thus, legislative power
remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly
found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of
candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules
and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not
be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Constitutional - Sec. 36[c] and [d] ; Unconstitutional - Sec. 36[f] and [g]
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to
the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt
to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in
this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
There is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements
of candidates for senator. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power.
PERTINENT PROVISIONS:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of
the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of
drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo
drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules
and regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations, x x x
for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of
not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to
the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

002 of pp9-16 REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs.


COMELEC and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
TOPIC: A member of the Congress must be a natural-born
citizen.
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.

AUTHOR: Amor
NOTES:
Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated 27
March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by COMELEC
ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy
of petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque.

FACTS:
Respondent Tan
On 31 October 2012, respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before
the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner
on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically:
(1) That she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;
(2) That she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the
residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa,
Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;
(3) That her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July
1960;
(4) That she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the
United States of America; and
(5) That she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.

Submitted newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, establishing the fact that
respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012.

Petitioner Reyes
(1) While she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas),
there is no valid and binding marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with
Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements
prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio.
(2) Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas, then his
residence cannot be attributed to her.
(3) As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3
July 1964.
(4) Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of
America is not supported by evidence.
COMELEC First Division
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling petitioners COC finding that, contrary to
the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
namely:
(1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and
(2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of
Marinduque.
Petitioner Reyes on MR
She is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American
passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an
American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage
only resulted into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still,
petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September

2012. As to her alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution, she averred that, as she
never became a naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.
COMELEC En Banc
On 14 May 2013, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioners MR for lack of merit.
On 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner and took her oath of office.
On 5 June 2013, issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final
and executory.
ISSUE(S):
WoN respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.
RATIO:
Proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born status, the SC quoted with approval the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:
Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the Philippines.
There being no proof that [petitioner] had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the one-year residency requirement of
the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is
not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her domicile in
Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality
can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural- born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the partylist representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
DISSENTING OPINION:
BRION, J.: To begin with, the evidence submitted by Tan, even assuming that it is admissible, arguably does not prove that Reyes was a naturalized
American citizen. At best, the submitted evidence could only show that Reyes was the holder of a US passport. In Aznar v. Comelec, the Court ruled
that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and
that an application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. In the present case, the fact that
Reyes is a holder of a US passport does not portend that she is no longer a natural born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine
citizenship. In addition, how the Comelec arrived at a conclusion that Reyes is naturalized American citizen can be seen as baffling as it did not appear
to have provided any factual basis for this conclusion.

003 of pp9-16 Bai Sandra S. A. Sema vs. COMELEC


and Didagen P. Dilangalen
G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008
TOPIC: Membership
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.

AUTHOR: Amor
NOTES:
Consolidated petitions seeking to annul Resolution No.
7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the COMELEC treating
Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
G.R. No. 177597 for the writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus
G.R. No. 178628 for declaratory relief and for the writs of
prohibition and mandamus.

FACTS:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan,
bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting
its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the
Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City requested the COMELEC to clarify the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
COMELEC
Issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
In preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No.
7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the
enactment of MMA Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution
No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
(formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
G.R. No. 177597
Petitioner Sema
Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,
prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in
Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, Sema
asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained
the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845
designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district. Sema further
claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative
districts.
Respondent Dilangalen
Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29
March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City.
Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a
legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed
Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion

Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion
legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum
population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a
city.
Consolidated with:
G.R. No. 178628
Perfecto F. Marquez vs. COMELEC
The petition echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the
voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives.
COMELEC
Maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of
the appropriate law.
ISSUE(S):
(1) WoN Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) If in the affirmative, WoN a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such province.
HELD:
(1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces and cities; and
(2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void.
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous
regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants
to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus,
we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently,
we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
RATIO:
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable

membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The
power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local
legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, we held
that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is
vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through
the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not
divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM
Organic Act, as amended. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly
or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can
be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.
PERTINENT PROVISION:
SECTION 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
SECTION 20, Article X of the Constitution
Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region.

004 CASE Aquino and Robredo vs COMELEC


G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010
TOPIC: a congressional district must meet the 250,000
inhabitant- threshold
PONENTE: Perez, J.

AUTHOR: Arthur Archie Tiu


NOTES:
Art. VI, Sec. 5(3)
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

FACTS:
1. petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment."

2. RA 9716 was signed into law by GMA on oct. 12, 2009 and took effect oct. 31. The law created an
additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur (rconfigured 1st and 2nd legislative
districts of the province)
3. Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate.
His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district
from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district.
4. etitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by RA
9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first
district will end up with a population of only 176,383 (Article VI, Sec 5(3))
5. Respondents, through OSG, seeks dismissal of the petition
6. respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population
condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same
has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000
minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
ISSUE(S): Whether or Not RA 9716 violates the constitution because it has not reached the 250,000 population
requirement?
HELD: Yes
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
RATIO:
1. View that the assailed Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and
precise standards prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative
districts.The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and precise
standards prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4)
of Article VI mandates that Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards fixed in
Section 5. These constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2)
minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the
population base increases; and (4) uniformity in apportionment of legislative districts in provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area. The assailed RA 9716 grossly violates these constitutional standards.

2. While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000
to be entitled to an additional district.-

3. The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities
only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not
have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no
reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should
not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither
should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
4. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The
second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

005 ALDABA vs COMELEC


GR 188078 January 25, 2010
TOPIC: ): population should not be based on

AUTHOR: Arthur Archie Tiu


NOTES:

projection and certification must be issued by head of


the Philippine Statistics Authority, formerly, National
Statistics Office (NSO)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
1. The province of Bulacan was represented through 4 legislative districts (prior to May 2009)
2. It was composed of Malolos, Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong.
3. RA 9591 lapsed to law on May 1, 2009. It amended the Malolos chapter by creating a separate legislative

district for the city.


4. The population of Malolos on May 1 is a contested fact, HB 3693 ( aka RA9591) relied on an undated
certification issued by a regional director of the NSO that the projected population of the municipality of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010
5. This is in conflict over the certification stating that Malolos will only have 241,550 by 2010 based on the
growth rate of 3.78%
ISSUE(S): WON the creation of the legislative district of Malolos, Bulacan violates the minimum population requirement
of 250,000?
HELD: Yes
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
RATIO:

1. Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing
respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its
Comment, thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000. This
projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive
Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which
states:
xxx
(d)
Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range
within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the
official low and high population projections.
xxx
(f)
Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be
issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers.
Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
2. Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000,

actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the
supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a
legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
3. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos
has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a
legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591
creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
4. The constitutional check against gerrymandering, which means the creation of representative
districts out of separate points of territory in order to favor a candidate, is found in Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution. It states that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. It should be noted, however, that this rule is
qualified by the phrase as far as practicable. Hence, the fact that the creation of a legislative district
for Malolos would separate the town of Bulacan from the rest of the towns comprising the first
district, would not militate against the constitutionality of R.A. 9716. This is so because there is no
showing that Congress enacted R.A. 9591 to favor the interest of any candidate. A city can aspire to
have one representative who will represent its interest in Congress.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

006 Lokin vs COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 179431-32


June 22,
2010 TOPIC: . Party list system: allocation of seats
and sectoral representation
Purpose why marginalized sector needs to be
represented

AUTHOR: Arthur Archie Tiu


NOTES:

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
6. The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections.
Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should
CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names
appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva;
(2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil
L. Galang. The nominees certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed
by CIBAC.
CIBAC, through Villanueva, Filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of
nominees and the petitions of more than 91% of the COBAC members, Comelec failed to act on the
matter
COMELEC issued a reso where it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the withdrawLokin, Tugna,
and Galang and the substitution for Borje.
COMELEC en banc, proclaimed Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's
Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party,
Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural
Concerns and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and
coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.
Later, COMELEC issued another reso proclaiming CIBAC an additional seat
de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and
requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office.
Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC
Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
07-054 aprroved the withdrawal of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang and substitution of Cruz- Gonzales

13.
14.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act
HELD: It is unconstitutional
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.

We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it
authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has
submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving
Citizens Battle Against Corruptions withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr.,

Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees,
respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second
nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a
Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as
a Party-List Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House
of Representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
RATIO:
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his
nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his
acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being when the
"nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory grounds for
substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration
of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, 40 has neither the authority nor the license to expand,
extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose
should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic
that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. 41
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the laws general
provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.42
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941, because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provisions phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new
form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it
established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list
organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of

R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of
the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the
House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from
falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to
spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and guaranteeing a
full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only be ensured by avoiding any
arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system, and by
guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their
party-list representatives.
The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that administrative authorities
should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.

1.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

07 Ladlad v. COMELEC

AUTHOR:
NOTES:

[G.R. No. 190582. April 8, 2010]


TOPIC: Party list system: System of accreditation;
procedural aspect; criteria to be considered
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
1. This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act.
2. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender) community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its
national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
3. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual
immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for
not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be
exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought
reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld the First Assailed Resolution.
4. On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct
the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma.
Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
RATIO:
1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality
in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. The Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the
legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some

justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. The government must act for secular purposes
and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the Office
of the Solicitor General agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have
committed or are committing immoral acts. Respondent have failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not
only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. This is in accord
with the countrys international obligations to protect and promote human rights. The principle of non-discrimination as it
relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR should be recognized. The
Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to
withstand vigorous debate due to conflicting opinions.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the partylist system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all
persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

08 BANAT v. COMELEC

AUTHOR:
NOTES:

[G.R. No. 179271and G.R. No. 179295]


TOPIC: Party list system: Basic parameters of
representation: Each party list organization can only have a
maximum of three seats.
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
1. In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of
the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
2. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to
3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation
Party vs COMELEC.

In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for
the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

3. The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is
void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in
the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
4. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the
lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
5. On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of
RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUE(S):
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

RATIO:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one
seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from
party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May
2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the
2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not
qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been

allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats
given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists
were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of
the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product,
which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule
shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,
etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA
7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and
that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people
defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution
and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

09 Paglaum v. COMELEC

AUTHOR:
NOTES:

[G.R. Nos . 203766, 203818-19, 203922, 203936, 203958,


203960, 203976, 203981, 204002, 204094, 204100,
204122, 204125, 204126, 204139, 204141, 204153,
204158, 204174, 204216, 204220, 204236, 204238,
204239, 204240, 204263, 204318, 204321, 204323,
204341, 204356, 204358, 204359, 204364, 204367,
204370, 204374, 204379, 204394, 204402, 204408,
204410, 204421, 204425, 204426, 204428, 204435,
204436, 204455, 204484, 204485, 204486, 204490. April
2, 2013 ]
TOPIC: Sectoral Representation
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
1. Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors.
2. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.

RATIO:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban

poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack welldefined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies,
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3
above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack welldefined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting
the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT
case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the
people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties.
It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The
common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties,
to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system
like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other causeoriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that
by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes,
among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:


Sectoral representation need not be limited to the poor or marginalized group; extent of national membership;
performance in party list election process

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Sereno, J.
First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of "marginalized and underrepresented"
under Section 2 must be deemed to qualify national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. To argue otherwise is to
divorce national and regional parties or organizations from the primary objective of attaining social justice, which
objective surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
Second, Second 2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of
Representatives" On its face, it is apparent that "marginalized and underrepresented" qualifies "sectors", "organizations"
and "parties".
Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in terms of statutory construction, the import of "social justice" that has
developed in various decisions is that when the law can be interpreted in more ways than one, an interpretation that favors
the underprivileged must be favored.12
Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is a countervailing means for the
weaker segments of our society to overcome the preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well-established
political parties.

010 ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION


ON ELECTIONS
GR No. 190582
April 8, 2010
TOPIC: System of accreditation; procedural
aspect; criteria to be considered
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES:

FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Ang Ladlad applied for registration with the COMELEC.
First application (2006) Comelec denied, organization had no substantial membership base.
Second application (2009) Comelec denied again, on moral grounds.
PETITIONER ANG LADLAD:
1. LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity;
2. LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence;
Because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation;
3. Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections);
4. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined its platform of governance;
5. The denial of accreditation on religious ground violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion.
RESPONDENT COMELEC:
1. Petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs as can be quoted in the Bible and in Koran;
2. Ang Ladlad advocates sexual immorality (Men Having Sex with Men or MSM);
3. Ang Ladlad, which supports older practicing homosexuals, is a threat to the youth;
4. It cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain
just that.
5. COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation.
6. As stated in Ang Bagong Bayani, only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system.
7. Ang Ladlad made untruthful statement in its application when it said it said it had nation wide exiatence
through its members and affiliates. However, in fact, save for a few isolated places in the country,
petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.
OSG:
1. Comelec erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs
allegations of immorality.
2. LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the
COMELEC as a separate classification.
Commission on Human Rights (Intervenor):
1. Denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).
ISSUE: Whether Ang Ladlads application for party list accreditation be granted.
HELD: YES.

RATIO:
1. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
2. [On compliance with Requirement] Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at
least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members
in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization
with affiliates around the Philippines.
3. [On religion as Basis] It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. The non-establishment clause calls for
"government neutrality in religious matters." But here, "governmental (Comelecs) reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."
4. [On Public Morals] The Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm
of law.
5. As quoted from OSG: A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different
gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great
divide between thought and action.
6. [On Freedom of Expression] We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the
other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships
between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are
entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes
using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.
7. [On Equal Protection] The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad
cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate
state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group. From the standpoint of the
political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the
party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is
equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
7. [On principle of Non Discrimination] The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to
stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any
restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and
reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by
unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of
political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that
person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any
group or category of persons from elective office.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation. SO
ORDERED.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
EXCERPT FROM DISSENTING OPINION OF CORONA, J:
But who are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors for whom the party-list system was designed?
The Texts of the Constitution And of RA 7941
The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the fundamental law be consulted.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution directs the course of our present inquiry. It provides:
SEC. 5. x x x
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of Representatives

including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as "marginalized" to
the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was
enacted in 1995. The law provides:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date
it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
***
FROM SEPARATE OPINION OF ABAD, J:
In sum, to qualify for accreditation:
One, the applying party must show that it represents the "marginalized and underrepresented," exemplified
by the working class, the service class, the economically deprived, the social outcasts, the vulnerable, the
work impaired, or some such similar class of persons.
Two, the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic
human rights as these apply to the sector it represents.
Three, the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly defined as shown above. If such
party is a sub-group within that sector, it must compete with other sub-groups for the seat allocated to
their sector.
Four, the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent regional or national presence.
And five, except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party applying for accreditation
must prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence.

011
PHILIPPINE
GUARDIANS
BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 190529
April 29,
2010
TOPIC: PARTYLIST
PONENTE: BRION, J.

RELEVANT LAW: Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA


7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.

FACTS:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No.
8679 deleting several (26) party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was
delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. PGBI filed a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
PETITIONER PGBI:
1. Sec. 4 of RA 7941 allows any party organization already registered with Comelec to no longer register
anew, the party is just required to file with Comelec a manifestation of its desire to participate in the partylist system not later than 90 days before the election;
2. Last 2007 election, it made manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation for the election; for
2010 election, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election
under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed
2. MINERO vs Comelec does not apply in this case. MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity
to be heard. The facts are different in this case.
3. The Court, in BANAT vs Comelec relaxed the requirement of Sec. 6(8)
4. The implementation of Resolution No. 8679 should be suspended/aborted to prevent miscarriage of
justice. Comelec failed to notify the parties as required
in Sec. 8 of RA 7941.
5. PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate in
one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the required
percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.
RESPONDENT COMELEC:
1. Sec. 4 of RA 7941 was misunderstood by PGBI. The provision simply means that without the required
manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not
arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for
requalification;
2. A request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.
3. The MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not
participate at all in the 2004 elections.
4. PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave
the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.
ISSUE: Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI
HELD: NONE. Sec. 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply.

RATIO:
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs
delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system.

The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; OR (b) fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of
a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What
Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily
gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law,
given the laws clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios
differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting
is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the
contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an
erroneous application of the law an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions
alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling
case law.
We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior
election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not
covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as
such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which full
discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of
separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the
legislatures notice.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL
COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP).
PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING OPINION:
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Abad:
Election Year

Party-List X

Party-List Y

PGBI Party

May 2004

Deficient votes

Did not run

Deficient votes

May 2007

Deficient votes

Did not run

Did not run

May 2010

Cancelled

Cancelled

Not cancelled

The Court must not abandon Minero. I vote to deny PGBIs motion for reconsideration.

012 MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190793
June 19, 2012
TOPIC: Party List
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.

vs.

AUTHOR:
NOTES:

FACTS:
July 2009 - Petitioner Magdalo filed its Petition for Registration/Accreditation with Comelec as regional
political party base in NCR for participation in May 2010 election. It was represented Senator Trillanes IV
and Acedillio. Magdalo caused the publication of its Petition and the Order of the Comlec in three daily
newspapers.
A hearing was conducted, witnesses were presented, evidences were offered.
October 2009 Comelec Second Division denied the petition on the ground that some members
participated in the takeover of the Oakwood Premiere Apartments wherein some civilians were held
hostages.
PETITIONER MAGDALO:
1. Magdalos membership includes former members of the AFP, anti-corruption advocates, and reformminded citizens;
2. The resolution of Comelec denying the petition was not based on the record or evidence presented; The
denial was based on pure speculation;
3. The resolution pre-empted the decision of the RTC trying the criminal case about the siege of the
Oakwood Premiere Apartments; The resolution unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of
Magdalo committed mutiny.
4. Magdalo expressly renounced the use of force, violence and other forms of unlawful means to achieve
its goals.
5. The Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo
and their basic right of to due process of law.
RESPONDENT COMELEC:
1. Comelec possess the power to ascertain the eligibility of Magdalo to for registration and accreditation as
a political party.
2. It is common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and
some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati
City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage.
3. The fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of
organized societies.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration
filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful
means.
HELD: This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALOs filing anew of a Petition for
Registration.
RATIO:
(1) The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and
organizations to participate in electoral contests.
RELEVANT LAWS:
ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
C. The Commission on Elections
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitionsThose which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitutionshall likewise be refused registration.

Omnibus Election Code (BP 881):


Sec. 60. Political party. "Political party" or "party," when used in this Act, means an organized group of
persons pursuing the same ideology, political ideals or platforms of government and includes its branches
and divisions. To acquire juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation, and to
entitle it to the rights and privileges herein granted to political parties, a political party shall
first be duly registered with the Commission. xxx
Sec. 61. Registration. Any organized group of persons seeking registration as a national or regional
political party may file with the Commission a verified petitionThe Commission shall after due notice and
hearing, resolve the petition within ten days no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.
Party-List System Act (RA 7941):
Section 3. To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation
Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on
the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered
partiesAccreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition;
(2) Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood incident.
Rules of Court say that, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of "public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration." The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of
judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to
make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known as to make it indisputable among reasonable
men."
(3) The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or
unlawful means to achieve its goals.
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence,
outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is
employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced
by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the
administration of former President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the
supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet
members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to
seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant
explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its
members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.
(4) The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not
operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
The proceedings in and the consequent findings of the Commission (Second Division) in the subject
resolution did not pre-empt the trial and decision of the court hearing the cases of the Magdalo members.
These are two different processes. The proceedings in the Commission is a petition for registration of
Magdalo as a political party and the Commission is empowered to ascertain facts and circumstances
relative to this case. It is not criminal in nature unlike the court case of the Magdalo founders.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a
Petition for Registration by MAGDALO. SO ORDERED.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

013 PHICONSA v. Mathay


G.R. No. L-25554
October 4, 1966

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

TOPIC: Salaries (Art. VI, Sec. 10 and Art. XVIII, Sec. 17)
PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of
the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased
salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives
set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The
reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would
have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of
said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: the implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended
in 1940, that provides as follows:
SEC. 14.
The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the
House of Representatives, and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the
Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
pesos.
RESPONDENTS:
Respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners to institute the action, for lack of showing of injury;
and that the Speaker and Members of the House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the answer alleges that
the protested action is in conformity with the Constitutional provisions, insofar as present members of the Lower House
are concerned, for they were elected in 1965, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand, in short, is that
the expiration of the term of the members of the House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices to make the
higher compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.

ISSUE(S):

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the
House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective?
WON petitioners have personality to sue? YES
Nonjoinder of the members of congress in the suit; fatal to the case? NO
RATIO: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes
fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by
the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the
measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for
the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House, underscores that in the application of
Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature
that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December
30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to
increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that
has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is
clearly felt
2nd issue:
As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law
3rd issue:
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to say that
since the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the
Representatives' increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, only respondent auditors were indispensable
or proper parties defendant to this action.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISPOSITIVE: In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted,

and the items of the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No.
4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December 30,
1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of
the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing
in audit any disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by Republic Act No.
4134 for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, before December 30,
1969. No costs.

014 BENJAMIN LIGOT vs ISMAEL MATHAY


GR L-34676, April 30, 1974
TOPIC: Legislative Privileges and
Disqualifications/Inhibitions; Salaries
PONENTE: TEEHANKEE, J

AUTHOR: Aiyu
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:

Benjamin Ligot congressmen for 3 consecutive 4-year terms, from December 30, 1957
December 30, 1969
During Ligots 2nd term of office, RA 4134 was enacted into law, July 1, 1964.
o RA 4134 increased the salary of congressmen from 7,200 to 32, 000 per annum
o With limitation: that it shall take effect in accordance with the Constitution.
Ligot was re-elected; he was now in his 3 rd term of office; however, RA4134 cannot apply to
him because of the unanimous decision of SC in the case of Philconsa vs. Mathay, which
held:
o "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative
until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House
that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional
mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase."
In 1969, Ligot LOST in his attempt to have his 4th term of office; his 3rd term of office
expired on December 30, 1969
Ligot filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended
by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years
of which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees based on the
highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by
law." 2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of
P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he never received during his
incumbency and which under this Court's above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay
could become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the full terms of
all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary.
Congress Auditor Jose Velasco DID NOT SIGN said warrant; there was also a similar pending
case with ex-congressman Singson.
Auditor Velasco requested Ligot to return the warrant and its supporting papers for a
recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing therewith copy of the Auditor General's
adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson's claim for retirement gratuity as computed
on the basis of the salary increase of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress
under Republic Act No. 4134.
Ligots MR denied
Hence, SC

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress
"as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT, represented by OSG: "(T)o allow petitioner a retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his

compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain
directly."
ISSUE(S): WON Ligot is entitled to the increased salary of 32,000?
HELD: NO
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
RATIO:
Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under
Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members
of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress (House and Senate) that
approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional
mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of
pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as
petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as
provided by law" and the Constitution during their term of office.
To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December
30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would
be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that
which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As
stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's colleague,
ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what can not be done directly."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Philconsa v. Mathay
o that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected
to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969
Philconsa v. Jimenez
o In striking down Republic Act No. 3836 as null and void insofar as it referred to the
retirement of members of Congress and the elected officials thereof for being
violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident that retirement benefit
is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for
services of one possessing any office" and that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for
an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution."
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

015_A.C. No. 7399

August 25, 2009

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,


vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, R
TOPIC: Speech and Debate Clause (Art. VI, Sec.11)
PONENTE: Velasco Jr. J:
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts

attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
2. To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief

Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator.
3. In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through

counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained
that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of
Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out
in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial
legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act
of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform
applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that
non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of
Chief Justice.
4. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof

ISSUE(S): WON disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions can be taken against the lady senator.

HELD: No, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment

or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against

Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the


Constitution, DISMISSED
RATIO:

This legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of
Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official
parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as
a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates,
nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary
immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament
or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people
and the institution that represents them.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in
the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms.
Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. 3 The disciplinary
authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or
correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any

other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof."
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

#16 EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO,
RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners, vs. HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate
Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO,
MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-51122
March 25, 1982
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
May 14, 1979 an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was
held. Those in charge ruled that the following were elected as Directors:
PUYAT GROUP
ACERO GROUP
Eugenio J. Puyat
Eustaquio Acero
Erwin Chiongbian
R.G. Vildzius
Edgardo Reyes
Enrique Belo
Antonio Puya
Servillano Dolina
Jaime Blanco
Juanito Mercado
Rafael Recto
*Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
May 25, 1979: The Acero Group instituted at the SEC a quo warranto proceeding questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero
Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted. - Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero. Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds
Sec 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased from Morales 10 shares of stock of IPI for P200 upon request of respondent Acero to
qualify him to run for election as a Director.
The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on said date.
Day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
He then filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation granted by the SEC!
September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a TRO enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the
participation as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case. SolGen
supports the stand of the SEC Commissioner allowing intervention.
ISSUE: Whether in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before
an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision (Sec 11, Article VIII).
HELD: The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC proceeding falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
RATIO:
There has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition.
The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the
avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the
SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to
influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the
proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent.

017 AVELINO vs. CUENCO


[G.R. No. L-2821; March 4, 1949 ]
TOPIC: Quorum & Attendance
PONENTE:

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:
On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tanada filed with the Senate Secretary charges against Senate President Avelino. Sen.
Tanada requested to give a privilege speech during the session. Sen. Tanadas motions were continuously denied of the
common courtesy and ruling Sen. Sanidad and Tanada out of order!. Senator Avelino along with other Senators, walkedout of the session hall. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz issued Resolution No. 67 and 68 declaring the vacancy of the
position of Senate President and installing Hon. Cuenco as Acting Senate President. These resolutions were voted and
unanimously approved.
Thus, Avelino filed a petition before the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court with a vote of 6 out of the
10 Justices present, decided to deny the petition stating that the Court has no jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. The SC with a majority vote of seven, granted the motion and took cognizance over the case.
ISSUE(S): WON the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting President of the Senate constituted a quorum?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority of 23 Senators. Resolution Nos. 67
and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President. PETITION DISMISSED.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the
majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and
Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at
least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the
country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p.
239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an
absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for
the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they
could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt
Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco,
one against and one abstained.
NOTE:
Quorum has been defined as that number of person of the body, which legally assembled in their proper places, will
enable the body to transact its lawful business, or, in other words, that number that makes the lawful body and gives it
power to pass a valid act. Unless otherwise validly provided, it ordinarily refers to one-half plus one of the entire
membership of the body. (Agpalo, 2005.)
Although the Supreme Courts initial findings that there was no quorum originally constituted, the Supreme Court finds
light in the dissenting opinions of the Justices that even if a new quorum were to be established, Sen. Cuenco would still be
elected Senate President because of the 12 Senators supporting him and only 11 Senators supporting Sen. Avelino.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Physical presence during session is required. The attendance of the session showed that
majority of the members were present thereby constituting quorum. The walk out done did not affect such quorum.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

018 ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners, v.


JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-1123
March 5, 1947
PONENTE: TUASON, J.:

From the syllabus:


Under the enrolled bill theory, law passed upon by the legislative
branch is conclusive to the court. The law is question pertains to
the amendment of the Constitution. The Court said the
amendment process is "political" in its entirely, from submission
until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not
subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.

This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of
both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance
thereto."

The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are eight senators, seventeen
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. The
validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
FACTS:
1. 3 of the plaintiff senators and 8 of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
COMELEC as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946.
2. The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following
the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election.
3. The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the
election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended.
4. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not
been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.
5. As a consequence these 3 senators and 8 representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned
resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary 3/4 vote which is required
in proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
a. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners ContendEnforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto" must be stopped as they were
unable to participate in its passage.
The enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of United States vs. Pons.
(RATIO 25)
Respondents ContendDeny that Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE(S): WON the Court can prohibit the enforcement of the congressional resolution. NO. Court dismissed the
case, SC said that the enrolled bill theory finds application in this jurisdiction.
RATIO:
ON JURISDICTION:
1. There is some merit in the petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive
law, with conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice. This objection,
however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in
practice and in their operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that
both are founded on the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of
the Government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a
duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
2. It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the
courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation
of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in
determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government.
3. But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court.
a.
b.

4.

The case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not
justiciable.
The Court further held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether
an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state legislature, is not
subject to review by the court.

If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of
(only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification."
a.

There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend
the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and

b.

5.

Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful
opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
a.

b.

c.

6.

committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by
the Chief Executive.
If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less
reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court
has once said:
i. There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed, or
that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital force
from the action of the people at the ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established
form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law. The means provided for
the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a construction as not to
trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right
of free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is the
free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed
by the instrument.

The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final
determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon the courts."
In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, whether submission,
intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call
for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And
decision of a "political question" by the "political department" to which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively
binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under authority of
Congress that an amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has
taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of
the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in
the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority
of Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed between
submission and final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed
limitation of a "reasonable time" within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly authorized State
officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once
taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all consistent only with an intimate control over the
amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to judicial
interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial construction, in
others as subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at in
Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must die unless ratified
within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power to make such a
pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has constitutional power to determine if there is any such
implication in Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion declares that Congress has the
exclusive power to decide the "political questions" of whether as State whose legislature has once acted upon a
proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a case as this,
an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division between the political and judicial
branches of the government is made by Article 5 which grants power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress
alone. Undivided control of that process has been given by the Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The
process itself is "political" in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is
not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at the
same conclusion. Though his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court a point which not having been
raised by the parties herein we will not decide his reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature
of the legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case assailed. From a different angle he
sees the matter as political, saying:
a.

b.

The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, of a voter's right to protect his
franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon. That was an
action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff to vote at a primary election
in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of action because the subject matter of the suit was
political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of course the petition concerns political action, but it alleges and
seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered
for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby vs. White , and has been recognized
by this Court." "Private damage" is the clue to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its scope as
well as that of cases in this Court of which it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated with the
conception that a voter's franchise is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is
peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, , and for which there is no remedy outside
the law courts. "Although this matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is an injury precedaneous to the
parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some. The parliament cannot judge of this injury, nor
give damage to the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a recompense."
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intra-parliamentary controversies to
parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies who are
members, how and when they should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for different phases of legislative
activity, what votes were cast and how they were counted surely are matters that not merely concern political action
but are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has any connotation at all. In no sense are they matters of
"private damage." They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative
process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

engendered by procedures for voting in legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the private
rights of a voting citizen has not been doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally significant that for over two
hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to be put to purposes like the present. In seeking redress here these
Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the functions of this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court
should therefore be dismissed.

We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and
represent liberal and advanced thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in
the fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the
United States institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the opinions
which should operate to adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary,
at the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case.
Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our
labor in this phase of the controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one
members of the Senate, including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor
Amendment, and by three members of the House of Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to
erase in indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Senate and to indorse thereon
the words "as not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives from
signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by Congress
in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the
resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was
introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were forty senators, twenty of
whom voted for and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his
vote in favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of the
proposed amendment and alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had
been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five states, and
that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time, the proposed amendment
had lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits.
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the
following manner:
a. First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the
judgment of the state court reversed; second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in
case of a tie, as he did, it being the contention of the petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties
of the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the
Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article
5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the
proposed amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third, the effect of the previous rejection
of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of the Lieutenant
Governor to vote, the court avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a
question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally
divided and therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third question, the Court reached the
conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise
of its control and of the promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress, in its
control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution
has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated in the
United States Supreme Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition and that all the
questions raised are political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that all the questions were
justiciable; that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been granted and
the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had died of old
age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and nonjusticiable, passed by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding vote, on the
ground that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be
reached, these two groups were divided. The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas,
on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other, was on the result and on that part
of the decision which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show interestingly divergent but
confusing positions of the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455,
amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly

17.
18.

19.

20.
21.

22.

queries" whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to reverse the judgment below
and direct dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices
"leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested with the four justices
who concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the question of the right
of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points out that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided"
court would seem under any circumstances to bean equal division of an odd number of justices, and asks "What
really did happen? Did a justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his
mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the conference and have him walk away whole?" But
speaking in a more serious vein, the commentator says that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds
of irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would
have required reversal of the judgment below regardless of the disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the rule of
the case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of
numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have
changed from their original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are
not clear, and one or two have not yet made their decisions." It is important to bear in mind, in this connection, that
the United States Supreme Court is on the side of those which favor the rule.
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow the
rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents
may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may
be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof,
or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their
order;Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an
existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with evident vehemence.
Arguments for and against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to
pretend to add more, even if we could, to what has already been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our
judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection and borrowing of materials and arguments
under the criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion, almost
decisive. Some of these reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:
a.

SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is
required by the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and it would be an inquisition
into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to
endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience, because courts could not rely on
the published session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any
printed bills and amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on
the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be
ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had never become a law. In this respect, it has been
declared that these is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no one may be certain that an
act of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision might not be
regarded as conclusive in an action between the parties.

23. From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, we extract these passages:
a.

b.

I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be more mischievous
than the introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should look at the journals of the
Legislature to ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the Secretary of State conforms in its
contents with the statements of such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal value whatever, that, in the
event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of
veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be applied not only to the statutes now before the Court,
but to all statutes; not only to laws which have been recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing
can be more certain than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the
State. We have before us some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if
the laws of the State are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability
of all written law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of
such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much
to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these
journals. . . .
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of each House may
be the aid of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution. It
must be admitted that the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and political power must of necessity
be confided to officers, who being human may violate the trusts reposed in them. This perhaps cannot be avoided
absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond
all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of
our government have not constituted it with faculties to supervise coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses
of their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal.

24. Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a noted
jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth-

century law in form to be used in a new era of growth" unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in
the soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of Constitutional necessity, i.e.,
the impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on legislative action,
says:
a.

b.

c.

d.
e.

(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are bound to
enforce the constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an act must be
declared no law which in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is a duty to determine
according to the actual facts of the readings and the votes. Now the journals may not represent the actual facts. That
duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein
represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact was constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty to
repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will be going as far wrong in repudiating an act based on
proper votes falsified in the journal as it will be in upholding an act based on improper votes falsified in the enrollment.
This supposed duty, in short, is to see that the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the journals.
Yet, singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an examination into facts as provable by the testimony of
members present is not allowable. If to support that it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and
impracticable, then it is answered that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for
if the duty to get at the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is merely
a duty that is limited by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes into the second one above,
namely, how far it is feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and practical convenience; and from this point of
view there can be but one answer.
(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus inconsistently and pushed only up
to a certain point suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is exposed only by
carrying it to its logical consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests on the fallacious motion that every
constitutional provision is "per se" capable of being enforced through the Judiciary and must be safeguarded by the
Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet there is certainly a large field of constitutional provision which does not
come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is
not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions as a clause requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or
the Legislature to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of
Governor or Legislature to act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer
illustration may be had by imagining the Constitution to require the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the
militia whenever to the best of his belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he
has no such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief? Or suppose the
Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions
exist; can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the Legislature, or its majority, did not
have such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a
soothsayer, and in a given case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be done?
These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying and enforcing the Constitution
ceases to operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the motives and judgment of a
particular independent department of government, Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Such duties are simply
beyond enforcement by any other department if the one charged fails to perform them. The Constitution may provide
that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be treated as void because the majority had been bribed. So far
as the Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading up to and motivating the action of a department,
injunctions must be left to the conscience of that department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a
whole is for this purpose of the same nature as the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each
legislator not to vote until he has carefully thought over the matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the
whole Legislature not to act finally until it has three times heard the proposition read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone,
in the latter case as well as in the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function of the Judiciary
in the one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and
higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by
asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves
with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit
upon the name of popular government.

25. The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of
United States vs. Pons. It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or not the
contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.
26. It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that,
roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings:
a.
b.

(1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by
their order; and
(2) in case of acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

27. The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents
offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed
before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the copy
conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly stated that it
"passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its
passage.
28. Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due

enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended.
29. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of
the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine
the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with
each other.
30. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as
give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."
DISPOSITION: In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the
senators and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members
of Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.

019 Arroyo v. De Venecia


AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997
Internal rules must be observed in floor deliberations.
TOPIC: Journal and Record (Art. VI, Sec.16 (4)); The (amendment of the NIRC on sin taxes on cigars, cigarettes,
Enrolled Bill Theory
wine and other alcoholic drinks
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:
NATURE: Petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale
of beer and cigarettes.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker
of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
2. The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12,
1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill.
3. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a
recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech,
after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll
call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair,
but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
4. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until
the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on
November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6,
1996.
5. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners contentions:
6. Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyos interpellation:
(1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at
3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system;
(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00
p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on
three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word approved, which appears on line 13 in the three other versions,
cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the
other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a
quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum, which appears in the other versions.
7. Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners
have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the
transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word approved appears in
the transcripts.
8. Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false
and spurious.
9. Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by
Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking
for a reconsideration. Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law
had been properly passed, considering the Courts power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by
the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, which
affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
10. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill

doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption
by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they
implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At
all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as
parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed. In his
supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends
that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House
of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no
objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198. This Journal was approved on
December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the Court can inquire into the internal rules of the Congress to determine whether there was grave abuse of
discretion.
HELD: No.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
RATIO:
1. The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This
case is therefore dismissed.
2. First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are
merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI,
26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules
of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
3. Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the
principle on its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative
branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of
invoking judicial review.
4. But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations
that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate,
courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
5. We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power
of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote: Rules are hardly permanent in character. The
prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
6. In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House
than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
7. Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not
invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our
system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged
violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
8. Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission,
contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review. Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those
which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not altogether done away
with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1,
this Courts function is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the

constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
9. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a
branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of
our Art. VIII, 1 power.
10. Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was railroaded. They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still
making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.
11. No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving
approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On
the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198
was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee
report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills
amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
12. Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are
conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by
Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case we went behind an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
13. But, whereas here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both
Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
14. This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had
been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee. It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made
upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment shall be allowed.
15. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad.
The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a
solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution.
16. Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November
21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on
that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4).
17. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect.
18. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative
action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The
Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do
so.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Transcript of interpellation of Arroyo:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked
the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair
called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)

020. US v. PONS
G.R. No. L-11530. August 12, 1916
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Trent, J.

AUTHOR: Jade
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:
Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the crime of illegal importation
of opium. The facts from the lower court:
The facts found by the trial court were
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain on the 5 th or 6th of April 1915 bringing 25
barrels manifested as wine and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte.
Gabino Beliso had been engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office and
warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton, Manila.
The shipper's invoice and bill of lading for the 25 barrels were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a
customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino
Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte."
Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the release of the merchandise from the
customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the warehouse of
Beliso. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery.
The custom authorities, having noticed that shipments of merchandise manifested as "wine" had
been arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not listed as
merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature of the consigned merchandise, instituted an
investigation using the customs registry number of the shipment, the entry number, and the
serial number of each barrel.
It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse
about 11:00 AM of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, Juan Pons, went to
Beliso's warehouse and they engaged in conversation in Belisos office.
Pons then left and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's
bodega. He called one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a
bull cart. This Sese did and returned with the vehicle.
Beliso then carefully selected 5 barrels out of the shipment of 25 and told Sese to load the 5 on
the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano.
This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the place designated.
Pursuing their investigation, the customs secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that
date before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the
bodega and placed under arrest.
The agents then proceeded to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored
in the warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers. Only 20 of
the 25 barrels could be found on Beliso's premises.
Upon being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed the customs agents that the five missing
barrels had been delivered by him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso.
The agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here found the 5
missing barrels, which were identified by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial
numbers.
The 5 barrels were empty, the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five
empty tins, each corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels, were found on the floor
nearby.
The customs officers noticed several baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house
and on further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets. There was no one in
the house when this search was made, but some clothing was discovered which bore the initials
"J. P."
It then became important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house
No. 144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner was found,
upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was learned that the
house was rented by one F. C. Garcia.

o
o

o
o
o

o
o

o
o
o
o

When the lease of the house was produced by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the
same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons."
After discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso and selected 3 of the 20
barrels and ordered them returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each
was found to contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and
securely nailed. Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins
taken out of the three barrels with the empty ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says
the trial court, "that they were in every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April
10, Pons, apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed
under arrest, and taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service.
According to Hawkins, Pons voluntarily confessed his participation in the smuggling of the opium.
He maintained, however, that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano
represented the entire importation.
Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the 3 barrels were opened and the
customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the opium,
Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel,
which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood, contained the opium.
Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment to a Chinaman
at 7:30 AM of April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso.
Pons further stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions; that the
house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for
the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a
previous importation of opium.
Sese testified that he had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The
customs agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several large tin
receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144 Calle General Solano and those taken
from the barrels at the customhouse.
At first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the
Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and admitted that
Garcia was a fictitious person. But d
During the trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant
and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a house for
him (Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia.
According to Pons this letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of
"wine," but that he had destroyed it because he feared that it would compromise him.
On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a
part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C.
Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a
man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately; Jacinto Lasarte has not yet been arrested.
They were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly
o Beliso to be confined in Bilibid Prison for 2 years and fine of P1,000; subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency
o Pons same penalty but was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000
Beliso and Pons appealed but Beliso later withdrew his appeal.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Act No. 2381 is null and void
Whether or not the legal evidence of record establishes the guilt of Juan Pons, beyond reasonable
doubt
HELD:
The Court ascertained the date of the adjournment of the proceedings of the legislature but did
not beyond the recitals of the said journal. According to the Court, the records of the Legislature
are as important as those of the judiciary, and inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into

existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to


interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Pons was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged (through the facts/evidence
found by the lower court).
RATIO:
Pons counsel offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature for 1914 was 28 th of February and that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be
punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28 th of February but on the 1st of
March of that year.
Under Act No. 1679, the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties as the Recorder
of the Commission.
Rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides that the
proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal, and that
it shall be the duty of the Secretary to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the
Commission.
The Act of Congress approved 1 July 1902 provides that the Philippine Assembly shall keep
and publish the journal of its proceedings.
Accordingly, the Assemblys proceedings for the sessions of 1914 were duly published, It
appeared therein that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12:00am on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of
the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine
Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the
court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it
necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents,
or evidence." And s
Section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also provides that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . . (2) The proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or of
Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes
or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order:
Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature
when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment
thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the
courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States
that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a
particular bill became a law or not.
From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal
science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence.
It is maintained that the Legislature did not adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but on
March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous evidence;
On the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are conclusive
evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to understand these opposing positions, it is
necessary to consider the nature and character of the evidence thus involved.
Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or to
influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact,
as in the instance of conclusive presumptions."
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon
the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the
Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the
Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would

be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature.
But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped
on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all
pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the
Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's
proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902.
If the clock was, in fact, stopped, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and
so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory.
Centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving
verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one
purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest
upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts
between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters."
The (US) court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this question;
and, out of a multitude of citations, not one is found in which any court has assumed to go
beyond the proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals required to be kept in
each of its branches, on the question whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for the
limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been stated, in doubtless
arises from the fact that they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy require that
the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character.
They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the
various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and there was no
single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the
legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is
modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states, there must be no
hesitation to follow the courts in that country.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.
The facts stated were those found by the trial court and established the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt, despite his attempt to show that the opium as shipped to him from
Spain by a childhood friend named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in this huge
smuggling transaction and profited thereby.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

021 MORALES v. SUBIDO


AUTHOR:
G.R. No. L-29658
November 29, 1968
NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC: Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
PONENTE: Castro, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant
colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. It is to be noted, however that he does not
possess a bachelors degree. Upon the resignation of the brigadier general that time, the petitioner was designated acting chief of police
of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila.
2. Rrespondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment
for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position."
3. The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and qualified
applicants from which the mayor might appoint one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as captain for
more than three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment. The demand was contained in a letter. The
mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified persons."
4. Respondent Subido was invoking Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of
any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer
in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

According to him, nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city can
be qualified for said office.
5. Petitioner Morales, however, was arguing that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the
following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or
its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has
served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
He was contending that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the
conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill
being deliberated upon.
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judicial branch can supply an omission in a law at the time of its enactment and resolve a case in accordance
therewith
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure. It
is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.
Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at least three years.
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to make the
provision read:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city or who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or
higher.6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase, "who has served the police department of a
city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate
(both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the
legislative process the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and painstakingly read
and examined the enrolled bill in the possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the President and found that the text of
section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of the Act bears on page 15 thereof the signatures of
President of the Senate Arturo M. Tolentino and Speaker of the House of Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16 thereof
those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and of President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito this text of the Act must be deemed as
importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Marshall Field & Co. v.

Clark:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the
two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in the form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bill which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a
bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the house of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on
its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent
department requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether
the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when the two chambers of the legislature met in conference committee, the
phrase "has served as chief of police with exemplary record" was added, thereby accounting for its presence in section 10 of the Act.
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police department
of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher" a high school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a
city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served as captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years
irrespective of the branch of service where he served can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree,
completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding the successive ranks of Captain,
Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to mention the fact that he was awarded three Presidential Awards, and was given the Congressional
Commendation the highest award ever conferred in the history of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede its soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in the
law because it is not there. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of Congress and
unless such enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put the matter
with lucidity:
An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later
wisdom may recomment the inclusion.
The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a decided break with the past, and merely carrying out a
formulated policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to
which interpreting law is inescapably making law.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of
police of the city of Manila. Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty and therefore may not be compelled
by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

022 Astorga v. Villegas


GR No. L-23475, Apr. 30, 1974
Topic: Enrolled Bill Theory vs. Journal Entry Rule
Ponente: Makalintal
FACTS:
1. House Bill 9266 was filed in the HOR, it passed the 3rd reading on Apr. 21, 1964.
2. Upon reaching the senate for concurrence..
2.1 The bill was favorably recommended by the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities (headed by Sen. Gerry Roxas) but with the slight amendment that when the Vice Mayor is
incapable to succeed the mayor in case of the latters incapacity, it should be President Protempore of
the Municipal Board rather than the City Engineer that should succeed.
2.2 When the Bill was being discussed in the Senate, Sen. Arturo Tolentino made amendments which
were approved in toto.
2.3 In sum, the amendment made by Sen Tolentino was approved, while the amendment made by Sen
Roxas was not.
3. After the discussion the Senate sent a letter to the HOR informing the latter that the Bill was approved
with certain amendments.
3.1 The amendments were that made by Sen Roxas. (note that Sen Roxas amendments were not
approved)
4. The bill eventually became RA 4065.
5. Sen. Tolentino immediately issued a press statement stating that the amendments he made were not
embodied in the new law, thus he withdrew his signature for the reason that the bill passed was incorrect.
6. The President subsequently withdrew his signature.
7. Mayor Villegas of Manila immediately circulated notices that the law is void.
8. The Vice-Mayor of Manila reacting to the action of Mayor Villegas filed a petition with the SC for
Mandamus, Injunction and/ or prohibition to compel the Mayor, the Executive Secretary, the CSC, the
Chief of Police of Manila, etc. to comply with RA 4065.
Petitioner contends:
The attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is
said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government.
Respondent contends that:
1. RA 4065 never became a law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate.
2. The entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the Enrolled Bill Theory or the Journal Entry Rule is applicable? (If Enrolled Bill Theory,
petitioner wins, If Journal Entry Rule, respondent wins)
Held:
Journal Entry Rule. (Respondent wins) (in this case)
RATIO:
1. Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government,
is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he
had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.

2. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
3. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose.
4. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
5. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew
their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the
President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction
and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
A little something about the Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session,
of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And
when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority
to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it
was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and
the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of
Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10
although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
officers is present.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

023 Gutierrez v. HOR


G.R. No. 193459, , Feb. 15, 2011
TOPIC: consideration of two
complaints as basis
PONENTE: Carpio-Morales, J.
*very long case

Author: Pat
Petitioner Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez
Public Resp. House of Representatives Committee on Justice
Private Resp.#1 - Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao
(Baraquel group)
Private Resp. #2 - Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia,
Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group)

FACTS:
1. Petitioner challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the public
respondent.
2. Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15,
Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents#1 filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon
the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
3. July 27, 2010: Atty. Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the HOR, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker
Belmonte, Jr., who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
4. August 3, 2010: private respondents#2 filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement
by Party-List Representatives Neri Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio
5. On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th
Congress. Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9,
2010, also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
6. August 10, 2010: House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed Atty. Adasa,
Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to
include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the
following day, August 11, 2010.
7. August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to
public respondent.
8. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints
it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
9. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
10. September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent.
11. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her
to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public
respondent.
12. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance
of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether
valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to
file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.
13. Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition with application for injunctive reliefs.
14. September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order and to require respondents to
comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the (OSG) to file in
10 days its Comment on the petition
15. The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent
(through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
16. Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of October
5, 2010.
17. Under an Advisory issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing
of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: THE ONE YEAR BAR RULE
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT #1:
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or
four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
PUBLIC RESPONDENTSARGUMENT #1:
To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least onethird (1/3) of all the members of the House.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT#2s ARGUMENT #1:

that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following
Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report
and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT#1s ARGUMENT #1


that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
ISSUE(S):
whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed
Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year
bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution. NO!
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of Sept1, 2010 and Sept7, 2010 of public respondent,
the HOR Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued on Sept14, 2010 is LIFTED.
THE ONE YEAR BAR RULE
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action
taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no second verified impeachment may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment
complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act
of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to
the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that
the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the
complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the
candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the
matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring
the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints
filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE
CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle
the candle.

The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body
that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas disquisition in Francisco,
a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in the House precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In
fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the House of
Representatives. Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately
decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This
chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The
Constitution states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the first impeachment
complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in
Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15 th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period
started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the
complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period.

The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of
the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman
offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment
proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate
the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on
to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in
the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow
the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission.

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of
complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be
precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding
so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation
means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.

As pointed out during the oral arguments by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of
protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification
of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before
bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.

024 ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,


NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG
MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO,
INC.,
ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED
BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO,
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-inintervention.
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
TOPIC: Votes in impeachment proceedings: initiation of a
complaint for impeachment
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:
1.
2.

On November 28, 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved by the
11th Congress.
The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

BAR
AGAINST
INITIATION
OF
IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. Impeachment shall be


initiated only by a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House.

Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In


cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement
against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against
such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case
may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment
is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of
the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings.


Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof,
no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment proceedings shall be


initiated against the same official more than once within the period of
one (1) year.

3.

July 22, 2002: the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements

and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
June 2, 2003: former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (First impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution-> DISMISSED on Oct. 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
5. October 23, 2003 (Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003,
a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it): Second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
6. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
ISSUE(S): Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution?
HELD: YES. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
4.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred
under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
RATIO:
Argument of Respondents:
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;"
Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment;
initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives;
or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated
as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House
of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
1.
2.

3.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
Initiate -> to file, as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial
action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law -> MR. MAAMBONG:
The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And
what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the
one approved by the body. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution.
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae

brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase " to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once
and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of
one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado and Father Bernas: the word "initiate" as used in Article XI,
Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the
complaint moving.
Father Bernas: initiate refers to two objects -> "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Impeachment Case
An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided
by the Senate.
The House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case
to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power"
to initiate all cases of impeachment. However, before a decision is
made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed
to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate,
which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin.

Impeachment Proceeding
Proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an
end.
It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps:
(1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the
House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of
the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee
which may either reject the complaint or uphold it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and
(4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all
the members.
- If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
- The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House
proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial.
Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint
is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by
at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:


DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

025 Chief Justice Corona vs Senate of the


Philippines
[G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012]
Topic: Votes in impeachment proceedings
Ponente: Villarama Jr., J
FACTS: (chronological order)

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO)
and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case
initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the
Philippines.
1.

On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint for
impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the
same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required
by the Constitution.

2.

On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court the following
day, December 14, 2011.

3.

On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption.

4.

On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the blitzkrieg fashion by which the impeachment complaint
was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the Senate. Petitioner argued at length that the acts,
misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the
outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment
Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.

5.

On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings
against the petitioner

6.

On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution5 which states:. To allow the Prosecution to introduce
evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2(petitioners alleged failure to disclose to the public his SALN as required by the
Constitution) and 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment; 2. To disallow
the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank
accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in Taguig).

7.

In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecutions request for subpoena
directed to the officers of two private banks(PSBank and BPI) where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar
currencies.

8.

On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the
Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized
representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the opening documents for petitioners alleged
foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank statements showing
the year-end balances for the said accounts.

9.

On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed
by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2)
did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a hodge-podge of multiple
charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay;
(3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates
petitioners right to due process.

10. On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is being violated in the
ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the cold neutrality of impartial judges by acting

as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the
Impeachment Court, to no avail.
11. CONTENTION RESPONDENT:, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in
character which may be decided or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being
filed by the respondents without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and without conceding the
constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of the Senate to try and decide all
cases of impeachment.
Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of
impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully
disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of
this case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated
and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and
ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly
resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis

ISSUE(S): whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents arising
from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of
the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
HELD: Yes. Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is
a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the
structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper
subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
RATIO:
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in
Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers
of the US Constitution
Our own Constitutions provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner was
impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was
accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the
behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or
allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senates sole power to
try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional
limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges
during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court,
SenatorJudges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the
trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges.
But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within
this Courts power of expanded judicial review.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the

power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous
referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the
due process clause and of the oneyear bar provision.
Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own
acts. The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required
majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated
his office.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

026 Reyes v. COMELEC and Tan


G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
TOPIC: A member of Congress must be a natural-born
Filipino
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.:

AUTHOR: Kelsey
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS: (chronological order)


Respondent: On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically:
(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;
(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is
the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon
City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;
(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3
July 1960;
(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant4 of
the United States of America; and
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.
Petitioner: while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman
Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with
Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed
by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio.Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with
Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her. As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth
issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that
she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by evidence.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen
of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of
Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of
promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution.
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives.
HELD: No.

Ror Reyes to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have
accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the ConsulGeneral of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
There is no showing that Reyes complied with the aforesaid requirements.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELECEn Banc
affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
Early on in the proceeding, Reyes hammered on Tans lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it
is Tans burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or
naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioners submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation, establishing the fact that Reyes is a
holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012, Tan was able to substantiate his
allegations. The burden now shifts to Reyes to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, Reyes utterly failed
to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be
an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioners COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing
that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof
shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the
same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did
she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a
US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do
not apply to her. 33 Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24
September 2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the
people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity.3We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioners explanation
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she
took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed
to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never
raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known
as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioners oath of
office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioners citizenship. Petitioner, however,
failed to clear such doubt
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

027 HENRY "JUN" DUEAS, JR., Petitioner,


vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES,
Respondents
G.R. No. 185401
July 21, 2009
TOPIC: HRET
PONENTE: CORONA, J

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

Just read the Held/Ratio Number 1. Sinama kom lang


yung isa pang issue since di naman nagni-nit pick ng
issues si Maam during discussion

FACTS: (chronological order)

Petitioner Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito Jett P. Reyes were rival candidates for the
position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national
and local elections. After the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564
votes as opposed to private respondents 27,107 votes. Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed an
election protest, praying for a revision/recount, alleging that he was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts
through insidious and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the systematic
reduction of his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioners votes.
In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of
the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules. Instead of
complying with the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counterprotested precincts on October 27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET, reiterating its order directing the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and recalling its order
requiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its own funds for the
revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled
jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with
the revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. This was
with the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It was the HRETs position that the mere
filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised precincts did not automatically divest the HRET of its
jurisdiction over the same. Moreover, it ruled that its task of determining the true will of the electorate was not
confined to the examination of contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it could motu propio review the
validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counter-protest and the same could not be frustrated by the mere
expedient of filing a motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested precincts. Convinced that it
could not determine the true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City on the basis alone
of the initial revision of the 100% protested precincts and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other
recourse but to continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
ISSUE(S): (1) Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
issuing the Resolution, to continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
(2) Whether or not HRETs assumption of the burden of the costs of the continued revision amounted to an illegal and
unconstitutional disbursement of public funds nder Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal AFFIRMED.
HELD/RATIO:

The petition has no merit.


So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . the power granted to
the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any

wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Guided by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume
a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.
(1) HRETs Power to Deny the Motion to Withdraw / Abandon Counter-protest
First, there are 732 precincts in the 2nd Legislative District of Taguig City, where respondent protested the
election results in 170 precincts and petitioner counter-protested 560 precincts. All in all, therefore, 730 precincts
were the subject of the revision proceedings. While 100% of the protested precincts were already revised, only
25% or 140 of the counter-protested precincts (or a total of 310 precincts) were actually done. Yet, with 420
more precincts to go had the HRET only been allowed to continue its proceedings, petitioner claims that
respondents were only speculating that a sufficient number of fake/spurious ballots would be discovered in the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and that these fake/spurious ballots would overturn the result of the
election.
Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent constitutional body require that
any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on
shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established by
a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. But the Court finds no evidence of such grave abuse of
discretion by the HRET.
Second, the Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of its members. By employing the word sole, the Constitution is emphatic that the
jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive and
exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its own full, complete and unimpaired.
Protective of its jurisdiction and assertive of its constitutional mandate, the Tribunal adopted Rule 7 of the HRET
Rules: The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own
functions and operation.
In this connection and in the matter of the revision of ballots, the HRET reserved for itself the discretion to
continue or discontinue the process. The meaning of Rule 88 is plain. The HRET could continue or discontinue
the revision proceedings ex propio motu, that is, of its own accord. Thus, even if we were to adopt petitioners
view that he ought to have been allowed by HRET to withdraw his counter-protest, there was nothing to prevent
the HRET from continuing the revision of its own accord by authority of Rule 88.
The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its prerogative under Rule 88 was its own determination
that the evidence thus far presented could affect the officially proclaimed results. Much like the appreciation of
contested ballots and election documents, the determination of whether the evidence could influence the
officially proclaimed results was a highly technical undertaking, a function best left to the specialized expertise
of the HRET.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election
contests involving its members, the Court cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on
the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed
results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of
the electorate. TheCourt should merely test whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a different view. If the Court will dictate to
the HRET on how to proceed with these election protest proceedings, the Tribunal will no longer have
exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation. It will
constitute an intrusion into the HRETs domain and a curtailment of the HRETs power to act of its own accord
on its own evaluation of the evidentiary weight and effect of the result of the initial revision.

Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Thus, in Robles v. HRET, the Court ruled: The mere filing of the motion to
withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal,
does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon
the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority
to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold
otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are
orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This
rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time and
again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus:
The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as `intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm
as full, clear and complete [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the
amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968,
25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987
Constitution. Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus)
possible only in the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that
the tribunals decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal
of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated
ERROR, manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for
such abuse. (emphasis supplied)
(2) HRETs Discretion to Use Its Own Funds in Revision Proceedings
When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a court or tribunal, that court or tribunal, unless otherwise
provided by law, is deemed to have the authority to employ all writs, processes and other means to make its
power effective. Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Since the HRET possessed the authority to
motu propio continue a revision of ballots, it also had the wherewithal to carry it out. It thus ordered the
disbursement of its own funds for the revision of the ballots in the remaining counter-protested precincts. We
hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides that the HRET has exclusive control, direction and
supervision of its functions. The HRETs order was but one aspect of its power.
Moreover, Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides that the Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are
vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and such other powers as are necessary or incidental to the
accomplishment of its purposes and functions as set forth in the Constitution or as may be provided by law.
(emphasis supplied)
Certainly, the HRETs order that its own funds be used for the revision of the ballots from the 75% counterprotested precincts was an exercise of a power necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its primary
function as sole judge of election protest cases involving its members.

First, if petitioner hypothetically admits that the HRET has the power to order the continuation of the revision of
the 75% remaining counter-protested precincts, then he should also necessarily concede that there is nothing to
prevent the HRET from using its own funds to carry out such objective. Otherwise, the existence of such power
on the part of the HRET becomes useless and meaningless.
Second, Section 1, Chapter 1 of RA 9498 provides that the HRET has an allotted budget for the Adjudication
of Electoral Contests Involving Members of the House of Representatives. The provision is general and
encompassing enough to authorize the use of the HRETs funds for the revision of ballots, whether in a protest
or counter-protest. Being allowed by law, the use of HRET funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counterprotested precincts was not illegal, much less violative of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. To reiterate,
the law (particularly RA 9498) itself has appropriated funds for adjudicating election contests in the HRET. As
an independent constitutional body, and having received the proper appropriation for that purpose, the HRET
had wide discretion in the disbursement and allocation of such funds.
Third, HRET ha[s] the inherent power to suspend its own rules and disburse its funds for any lawful purpose it
deemed best. This is specially significant in election contests such as this where what is at stake is the vital
public interest in determining the true will of the electorate. In any event, nothing prevented the HRET from
ordering any of the parties to make the additional required deposit(s) to cover costs, as respondent in fact
manifested in the HRET. Such disbursement could not be deemed a giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference to a party since the benefit would actually redound to the electorate whose true will must be
determined. Suffrage is a matter of public, not private, interest. The Court declared in Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals that [o]ver and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the
true choice of the people. Thus, in an election protest, any benefit to a party would simply be incidental.
All told, it should be borne in mind that the present petition is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. It alleges that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it promulgated Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008. But what is grave abuse of
discretion? It is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of
caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a
contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Using the foregoing as yardstick, the Court
finds that petitioner miserably failed to discharge the onus probandi imposed on him.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

028 VINSONS-CHATO v. HRET and PANOTES


LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
ELMER E. PANOTES, Respondents. (G.R. No. 199149;
January 22, 2013)
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 201350
ELMER E. PANOTES, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
LIWAYWAYVINZONS-CHATO, Respondents.

AUTHOR: Rikki Dela Paz


NOTES: Discussion - digital images are functional equivalent of
the paper ballots.

This case involved the use of picture images of ballots as


the equivalent of the original paper ballots for purposes of
determining the true will of the electorate in the Second
Legislative District of Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2010 elections.

TOPIC: HRET
PONENTE: J. Perlas-Bernabe (En Banc)
FACTS:

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010 elections as representative of the Second Legislative
District of Camarines Norte, composed of the seven (7) Municipalities of Daet, Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente,
and San Lorenzo, with a total of 205 clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was proclaimed the
winner on May 12, 2010 having garnered a total of 51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes, or a plurality of 3,885 votes.

On May 24, 2010, Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) assailing the
results in all the 160 clustered precincts in four (4) municipalities, namely: Daet, Vinzons, Basud and Mercedes. No counterprotest was interposed by Panotes.

Pursuant to Rule 37 of the 2011 Rules of the HRET, Chato designated forty (40) pilot clustered precincts, equivalent to 25% of
the total number of protested clustered precincts, in which revision of ballots shall be conducted. The initial revision of ballots,
conducted on March 21 - 24, 2011, showed a substantial discrepancy between the votes of the parties per physical count vis-avis their votes per election returns in the following precincts of the Municipalities of Basud and Daet.

On March 24, 2011, Panotes lost no time in moving for the suspension of the proceedings in the case, and praying that a
preliminary hearing be set in order to determine first the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the elections.

Chato then filed an Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images in the Instant
Case reiterating the lack of legal basis for the decryption and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no preliminary hearing had
been conducted showing that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes was not preserved.

On June 8, 2011, the HRET issued the assailed Resolution No. 11-321 denying Chato's Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by
Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images in the Instant Case on the ground that she failed to show proof that the
CF cards used in the twenty (20) precincts in the Municipalities of Basud and Daet with substantial variances were not
preserved or were violated.

Petitioners contentions:

She maintains that, since the automated election system (AES) used during the May 10, 2010 elections was paper-based, the
"official ballot" is only the paper ballot that was printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
pursuant to Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369. She cites the law, as follows:
Sec.15. Official Ballot. x x x
xxxx
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contact the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it
cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizen's arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in
the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
xxxx
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where AES is utilized as the "paper ballot, whether printed or generated by the
technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form."

Respondent HRETs contentions:

HRET declared that, although the actual ballots used in the May 10, 2010 elections are the best evidence of the will of the
voters, the picture images of the ballots are regarded as the equivalent of the original, citing Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic

Evidence, which reads:


Sec. 1. Original of an electronic document. An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Sec. 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic rerecording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates
shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the picture images of the ballots may be considered as the "official ballots" or the equivalent of the original
paper ballots which the voters filled out.
HELD: YES.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:

An automated election system, or AES, is a system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting,
counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral process.There are two types of
AES identified under R.A. No. 9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2) direct recording electronic election system.
o A paper-based election system, such as the one adopted during the May 10, 2010 elections, is the type of AES that
"use paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the
results of the vote count."
o On the other hand, direct recording electronic election system "uses electronic ballots, records, votes by means of a
ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical component that can be activated by the voter, processes data
by means of computer programs, record voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically."

The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by shading the
oval opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As
established during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when
decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast.
THE SUPREME COURT AGREES WITH THE POSITIONS OF HRET and Panotes that the picture images of the ballots,
as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that faithfully captures in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an
electoral protest.

The digital images of the ballots captured by the PCOS machine are stored in an encrypted format in the CF cards. "Encryption
is the process of encoding messages (or information) in such a way that eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that
authorized parties can. In an encryption scheme, the message or information (referred to as plaintext) is encrypted using an
encryption algorithm, turning it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is usually done with the use of an encryption key, which
specifies how the message is to be encoded. Any adversary that can see the ciphertext, should not be able to determine
anything about the original message. An authorized party, however, is able to decode the ciphertext using a decryption
algorithm, that usually requires a secret decryption key,that adversaries do not have access to."

Despite this security feature, however, the possibility of tampering or substitution of the CF cards did not escape the HRET,
which provided in its Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots that:
o Sec. 11. Printing of the picture images of the ballots in lieu of photocopying. Unless it has been shown, in a
preliminary hearing set by the parties or motu propio, that the integrity of any of the Compact Flash (CF) Cards used in
the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved or the same was violated, as when there is proof of tampering or
substitution, the Tribunal, in lieu of photocopying of ballots upon any motion of any of the parties, shall direct the
printing of the picture image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the same
precinct. The Tribunal shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication
process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute.

Accordingly, the HRET set the instant case for preliminary hearing on May 27, 2011, and directed Chato, the protestant, to
present testimonial and/or documentary evidence to show proof that the integrity of the CF cards used in the May 10, 2010
elections was not preserved or was violated.

However, in the assailed Resolution No. 11-321, the HRET found Chato's evidence insufficient. The testimonies of the
witnesses she presented were declared irrelevant and immaterial as they did not refer to the CF cards used in the 20 precincts
in the Municipalities of Basud and Daet with substantial variances.

To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless constitute an intrusion into its domain and
a curtailment of its power to act of its own accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies presented
before it.

Moreover, after having participated and presented her evidence at the May 27, 2011 preliminary hearing, Chato cannot now be
heard to complain that the proceedings therein did not amount to a full blown trial on the merits required in the case of Tolentino
v. COMELEC for weighing the integrity of ballots.
Her allegation with respect to the pendency of the COMELEC investigation on the main CF card for Clustered Precinct 44 of the
Municipality of Daet, which was previously ordered by the HRET itself when the election officer submitted only the back-up CF
card that did not, however, contain picture images of the ballots, could not in the least bit affect the resolution of this case. As
correctly pointed out by the HRET, the same concerns only one (1) precinct out of the 20 precincts with substantial variances.45
At any rate, the following explanation46 proferred by the HRET should put the issue to rest, viz:
o

Thus, for failure of Chato to discharge her burden of proving that the integrity of the questioned CF cards had not been preserved, no
further protestations to the use of the picture images of the ballots as stored in the CF cards should be entertained.

x x x On November 2, 2011, John Rex C. Laudiangco of the COMELEC Law Department, filed Comelec's Compliance with
Manifestation and Motion to Admit the Attached Fact-Finding Investigation Report explaining the delay in the conduct of the
investigation which was duly conducted on October 7, 2011, and submitting therewith a comprehensive Fact-Finding Investigation
Report on the said investigation which was docketed in the Law Department as Case No. FF.INV. (LD) 11-46 entitled "In the Matter of
Investigation on What Happened to the Main CF (Compact Flash) card for Clustered Precinct No. 44 for the Municipality of Daet,
Camarines Norte."

In sum, the investigation revealed that the main CF Card for CP No. 44 of the Municipality of Daet could possibly be located
inside the ballot box of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Daet, Camarines Norte (serial no. CE-07-166991), after
having been allegedly submitted in an improvised envelope, by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of said CP 44 to the
MBOC. It was, therefore, recommended that said ballot box be opened to retrieve the said CF card.
Accordingly, in her January 6, 2012 letter to public respondent, Atty. Anne A. Romero-Cortez submitted certain documents
relative to the opening of the ballot box of the MBOC of Daet, Camarines Norte (serial no. CE-07-166991) so the main CF Card
for CP 44 of Daet may be retrieved and its custody turned over to the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD),
COMELEC.
Likewise, in her January 6, 2012 letter to public respondent, ERSD Director Ester L. Villaflor-Roxas requested that a
representative from public respondent be present on the day to witness the verification and backing-up of the contents of the
main CF card for CP No. 44 of Daet, Camarines Norte. Verily, the case of the alleged missing CF Card for Clustered Precinct
No. 44 is no mystery at all.

029CELESTINOA.MARTINEZIIIvs.HRETand
BENHURSALIMBANGON
G.R.No.189034,January11,2010
TOPIC: Nuisance candidates; mockery of election
process
PONENTE:VILLARAMA,Jr.,J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the
candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C.
Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position.
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. However, the
Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance
candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections.
On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth Legislative
District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred
seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three
(67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.
Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with only
MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors
did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez)
who had the same surname. In its decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the
ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C.
Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that
five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line
for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of
the voter. The HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him
to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin
of 453 votes. Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated
July 30, 2009. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET
dismissing the election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth
Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof.

ISSUE(S):
(1) Whetherornottheeffectofdeclaringacandidateanuisancecandidatetakeseffecton
electionday,evenifmadeafterelections
(2)WhetherornottheMARTINEZ votesaretobecreditedtopetitioner.
HELD:
(1) YES
(2) YES
DISPOSITIVE:WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheDecisiondatedMay28,2009andResolution
dated July 30, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 07035 are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Celestino A. Martinez III is hereby declared the duly elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu in the May 14, 2007 elections. This decision is

immediatelyexecutory.

RATIO:
(1) Ensconcedinourjurisprudenceisthewellfoundedrulethatlawsandstatutesgoverningelectioncontests
especiallyappreciationofballotsmustbeliberallyconstruedtotheendthatthewilloftheelectorateinthe
choiceofpublicofficialsmaynotbedefeatedbytechnicalinfirmities.Anelectionprotestisimbuedwith
publicinterestsomuchsothattheneedtodispeluncertaintieswhichbecloudtherealchoiceofthepeopleis
imperative.Theprohibitionagainstnuisancecandidatesisaimedpreciselyatpreventinguncertaintyand
confusioninascertainingthetruewilloftheelectorate.Thus,incertainsituationsasinthecaseatbar,final
judgmentsdeclaringanuisancecandidateshouldeffectivelycancelthecertificateofcandidacyfiledbysuch
candidateas ofelectionday.Otherwise,potentialnuisancecandidates willcontinuetoputtheelectoral
processintomockerybyfilingcertificatesofcandidacyatthelastminuteanddelayingresolutionofany
petitiontodeclarethemasnuisancecandidatesuntilelectionsareheldandthevotescountedandcanvassed.
(2) RespondentHRETgravelyabuseditsdiscretioninaffirmingtheproclamationofrespondentSalimbangonas
theduly electedRepresentativeofthe FourthLegislativeDistrict ofCebudespitethe final outcome of
revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative,voteswhichshouldhavebeenproperlycountedinfavorofpetitionerandnotnullifiedas
strayvotes,afterconsideringallrelevantcircumstancesclearlyestablishingthatsuchvotescouldnothave
beenintendedfor"EdilitoC.Martinez"whowasdeclaredanuisancecandidateinafinaljudgment.Ballots
indicatingonlythesimilarsurnameoftwo(2)candidatesforthesamepositionmay,inappropriatecases,be
countedinfavorofthebonafidecandidateandnotconsideredstray,eveniftheothercandidatewasdeclared
anuisancecandidatebyfinaljudgmentaftertheelections.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

PIMENTEL vs. COMELEC


GR No. 178413 | March 13, 2008 | Chico-Nazario
FACTS:
The case is about the 2007 Senatorial elections where Aquilino Pimentel III ran for Senate
Two months after the election, the 11 candidates with the highest number of votes were
proclaimed and had taken their oaths of office as senators. The 12 th post remains in
question between Pimentel and Juan Miguel Zubiri
Pimentel questioned the provincial and municipal certificates of canvass (PCOC and MCOC,
respectively) and alleged that the canvass proceedings headed by Lintang Bedol were
tainted with fraud and statistical improbabilities.
Task Force Mindanao headed by COMELEC Chairman Abalos was created to retrieve and
collect the MCOC from municipalities of Maguindanao for re-canvassing. The re-canvassing
will be conducted by the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPCOCMaguindanao).
During the re-canvass proceedings, Bedol and chairpersons of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers were there. However, the Pimentels legal counsels were not allowed to ask
them questions regarding the due execution and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs.
Pimentel manifested a continuing objection and argued among others that - MCOCs were palpably manufactured and the serial numbers are not clearly stamped
- Results were statistically improbable
- No available copies for comparison purposes were presented, hence the question of
authenticity
- Most MCOCs have no signature of the watcher
Arguing that there is a violation of his constitutional rights, Pimentel filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with urgent Prayer for temporary Restraining Order
and/or Status Quo Ante Order before the Supreme Court
- TRO against COMELEC en banc sitting as National Board of Canvassers (NBC) from
proclaiming the 12th winner for the senatorial post
- Status Quo Ante Order, which requires the parties to observe the status quo to
preserve and maintain the situation of the parties
- Compel or Order COMELEC en banc sitting as NBC to determine the due execution and
authenticity of the MCOCs
During the oral arguments for the issuance of TRO, the SC voted 7-7, which was deemed
denied by the Court for failure to reach majority votes.
In the meantime and while there is no grant of TRO and/or Status Quo Ante order, canvass
proceedings continued and Zubiri was proclaimed as the 12 th duly elected senator.
Thereafter, Zubiri filed a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss, arguing that controversies
involving his election and qualification as senator is within the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET)s exclusive jurisdiction.
Thereafter, Pimentel filed an election protest before the SET, praying for the annulment of
Zubiris proclamation as the 12th senator
Zubiris argument: there are two cases involving the same parties with practically the
same issues and similar remedies filed before the SC and SET, hence the Motion to
Dismiss.
Pimentels argument: he is not challenging Zubiris proclamation, but rather the conduct of
the proceedings before the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao
ISSUE: Who has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear electoral protests questioning the validity of
the proclamation of a winning candidate?
HELD: It is within the Electoral Tribunal, whether House of Representatives or Senate as the case
may be

RULING:
Take note that the canvass proceedings before the boards of canvassers remain summary
and administrative in nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining the
elected official with as little delay as possible and in time for the commencement of the
new term of office.
As ruled in Pangilinan vs. COMELEC
- The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective
Electoral Tribunals which are the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, thereby
divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution
over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of
the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of
jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies against members of the
House of Representatives as well as of the Senate
- The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections we ruled that, upon proclamation of the winning
candidate and despite its alleged invalidity, the COMELEC is divested of its jurisdiction to
hear the protest
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition
for certiorari and mandamus on matters which may be threshed out in an election
contest. It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel
involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the
Senate.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who
has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is
best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids
duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional
bodies, with due regard to the peoples mandate.
Pimentel filed the present Petition prior to Zubiris proclamation is insignificant. Since
Pimentels prayer for a TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order had been denied, Zubiriwas
proclaimed the twelfth winning Senator in the 2007 Senatorial Elections
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

031 Union Bank v. People


G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987
TOPIC: Appointment of Bureau of Customs Commissioner
does not need confirmation of the COA
PONENTE: Padilla, J.

AUTHOR:
NOTES:

Nature: Petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's
salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
- Respondent, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

FACTS:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the appointment of Salvador Mison as part of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
This is the first major case under the 1987 Constitution. Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget. Their appointment was done without the
concurrence of the CoA. Ulpiano, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law
questioned the appointment of the two sans confirmation by the COA
Petitioner Contention : Guillermo Carague, Secretary of the Department of Budget, cannot effect disbursements in
the payment of the salaries of Mison, with the latter being appointed without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments, hence unconstitutional.
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries.
4 groups a President may appoint
1. Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers.
2. All other officers of the government, the appointments of whom are not specifically provided for by the law.
3. Those whom the President may be authorized to appoint.
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone

1st Group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th Groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
o
o
o

Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments?
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction.
We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more
accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.

As to COAs role:
1935 Constitution
- Almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments
- The power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horsetrading" and similar malpractices.

1973 Constitution
- consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the
legislature.

Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not
difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle
ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those
in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the appointment is valid


HELD: Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of
the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby
DISMISSED. Without costs.
RATIO:
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; 3rd those whom the President
may be authorized by the law to appoint; 4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of
such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987
Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide
that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in
rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments
to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to
use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that
Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law
to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in
the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of
fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand,
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise
known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in
harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, SC ruled that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority

and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: President is entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all
the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
CRUZ, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion says that the second sentence is the exception to the first sentence and holds that the two sets of officers specified
therein may be appointed by the President without the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation is pregnant with
mischievous if not also ridiculous results that presumably were not envisioned by the framers.

In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments are (1)
the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman and his deputies, who are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the VicePresident when he is appointed to the Cabinet; and (3) "other officers lower in rank," but only when their appointment is vested by law in
the President alone. It is clear that this enumeration does not include the respondent Commissioner of Customs who, while not covered by
the first sentence of Section 16, comes under the second sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so is also subject to confirmation.

I vote to grant the petition.


GUTIERREZ JR, J., dissenting:

I agree with the intervenor that all provisions of the Constitution on appointments must be read together. In providing for the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Section 9, Article VIII), the Ombudsman and his deputies (Section 9, Article
XI), the Vice President as a member of cabinet (Section 3, Article VII) and, of course, those who by law the President alone may appoint,
the Constitution clearly provides no need for confirmation. This can only mean that all other appointments need confirmation. Where there
is no need for confirmation or where there is an alternative process to confirmation, the Constitution expressly so declares. Without such a
declaration, there must be confirmation.

The 1973 Constitution dispensed with confirmation by a Commission on Appointments because the government it set up was supposed to be
a parliamentary one. The Prime Minister, as head of government, was constantly accountable to the legislature. In our presidential system,
the interpretation which Justice Cruz and myself espouse, is more democratic and more in keeping with the system of government organized
under the Constitution.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

The Court has deemed it necessary and proper, in consonance with its constitutional duty, to adjudicate promptly the issue at bar and to rule
that the direct appointment of respondent Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (without need of submitting a prior
nomination to the Commission on Appointments and securing its confirmation) is valid and in accordance with the President's constitutional
authority to so appoint officers of the Government as defined in Article VII, section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The paramount public
interest and the exigencies of the public service demand that any doubts over the validity of such appointments be resolved expeditiously in
the test case at bar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Thus, the intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude the appointees mentioned in the second sentence from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is, to my mind, quite clear. So also is the fact that the term "appoint" used in said sentence was not meant to
include the three distinct acts in the appointing process, namely, nomination, appointment, and commission. For if that were the intent, the
same terminologies in the first sentence could have been easily employed.

The interpretation given by the majority may, indeed, lead to some incongruous situations as stressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Cruz. The remedy therefor addresses itself to the future. The task of constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and thereafter to assure its realization (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18,
1970, 31 SCRA 413). And the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent is the language of the Constitution itself.

032 Tatad vs Commission on Appointments


G.R. No. 183171
August 14, 2008
TOPIC:
PONENTE:

AUTHOR: Mr. Z
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:
1. On May 4, 2005, respondent Commission on Appointments (Commission) issued a Certification of Consent and
confirmed the appointment of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to the Peoples Republic of China with concurrent jurisdiction over the Democratic Peoples Republic of
Korea and Mongolia.
2. Petitioner Tatad challenged the consent before the RTC in Quezon City via a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity. He
contended that the appointment of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona as Ambassador had violated the law and
public policy because Teofisto was already beyond the age of 70.
3. After respondent Commission filed its Answer,4 petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.5 Respondent
opposed the motion and contended that the complaint should be dismissed considering that the issue had been mooted after
Ambassador Guingona tendered his resignation from the position
4. On August 30, 2006, the RTC issued its Order dismissing the complaint. The RTC declared the case moot because of the
resignation of Vice President Teofisto Guingona in the position.
5. The petitioner had elevated the case on the Court of Appeal and he argued, in his appeal, that Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7157, otherwise known as the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991, prohibits appointments of those beyond seventy
(70) years old to ambassadorial posts; that Ambassador Guingonas resignation did not render the case moot because there
must be a continuing determination of those responsible for the illegal act.
On March 17, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE(S): Whether the resignation of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona in the position had rendered the case
moot?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
The Supreme Court agrees with both the trial and appellate courts. The resignation of former Vice President Guingona as
Ambassador rendered the issues raised in this petition moot. It has become a non-issue such that a resolution either way
would be of no practical effect. In essence, there is no more illegal appointment to speak of because the appointee ceased
to occupy the subject position.
An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy. In such a case, there is no actual
substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. We
have consistently held that courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief will be granted.

Petitioner insists that despite the resignation of former Vice President Guingona from the position, a resolution
of the issues presented is imperative so that the public may know whether respondent Commission violated the
law and public policy.
Petitioner is mistaken. Because the present case lacks an actual controversy, any resolution of the issues
presented would not result in an adjudication of the rights of the parties, but would take the nature merely of an
advisory opinion. As this Court held in Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc. courts are called upon to resolve actual
cases and controversies, not to render advisory opinions.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Courts are called upon to resolve actual cases and controversies, not to render advisory
opinions.

AUTHOR:
033 GUDANI vs. SENGA
G.R. No. 170165

August 15, 2006

TOPIC: FREEDOM OF ABODE, FREEDOM TO


CHANGE ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL
2. LIMITATIONS
PONENTE: TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enjoining them and other military
officers from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a
pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the
military justice system in connection with petitioners violation of the aforementioned directive.
The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners, Brigadier General
Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine
Marines.
On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a
public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28
September 2005.
The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye,
particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone
conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.
At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint
Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the maintenance of peace
and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga) were among the
several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 September 2005 hearing.
On 26 September 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to the Superintendent
of the PMA Gen. Cristolito P. Baloing (Gen. Baloing). It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen.
Senga.5 Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing on 28
September 2005, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. 6 Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.
Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent
from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows:
PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE
ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN
FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator that "no approval has
been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear" before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both

Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004
elections.
On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464
(E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. "enjoined officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval." This Court subsequently ruled on the
constitutionality of the said executive order in Senate v. Ermita. The relevance of E.O. 464 and Senate to the present
petition shall be discussed forthwith.
In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG recommended that petitioners be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the
good order and military discipline.
Petitioners characterize the directive from President Arroyo requiring her prior approval before any AFP personnel appear
before Congress as a "gag order," which violates the principle of separation of powers in government as it interferes with
the investigation of the Senate Committee conducted in aid of legislation. They also equate the "gag order" with culpable
violation of the Constitution, particularly in relation to the publics constitutional right to information and transparency in
matters of public concern. Plaintively, petitioners claim that "the Filipino people have every right to hear the [petitioners]
testimonies," and even if the "gag order" were unconstitutional, it still was tantamount to "the crime of obstruction of
justice." Petitioners further argue that there was no law prohibiting them from testifying before the Senate, and in fact, they
were appearing in obeisance to the authority of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Finally, it is stressed in the petition that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military jurisdiction on account of his
compulsory retirement on 4 October 2005. It is pointed out that Article 2, Title I of the Articles of War defines persons
subject to military law as "all officers and soldiers in the active service" of the AFP.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the order issued by the President in preventing military personnel to attend a legislative hearing
is in violation of the constitution?
HELD: NO, The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which
begins with the simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines x x x"37 Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the
commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions
of the members of the armed forces.
RATIO:
The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic
way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government.
The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a
member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed
upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands
the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless
searches and seizures.
Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the military, the Constitution has allocated specific roles to the
legislative and executive branches of government in relation to military affairs. Military appropriations, as with all other
appropriations, are determined by Congress, as is the power to declare the existence of a state of war. Congress is also
empowered to revoke a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The approval of the
Commission on Appointments is also required before the President can promote military officers from the rank of colonel
or naval captain. Otherwise, on the particulars of civilian dominance and administration over the military, the Constitution
is silent, except for the commander-in-chief clause which is fertile in meaning and implication as to whatever inherent
martial authority the President may possess.
The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the
simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x" 37
Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause
vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the

armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military
officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa38 is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under "house arrest"
by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest,
that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court
unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:
[T]he Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that
certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules
of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the
military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its
ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with,
irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on
petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered. 39
Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military way of life circumscribes several of the
cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part and parcel of the military package. Those who cannot abide by these
limitations normally do not pursue a military career and instead find satisfaction in other fields; and in fact many of those
discharged from the service are inspired in their later careers precisely by their rebellion against the regimentation of
military life. Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is not a stain on character, for the military mode is a
highly idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally conscripted into, but volunteer themselves to be part of. But for
those who do make the choice to be a soldier, significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected. After all, if need
be, the men and women of the armed forces may be commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal
inclinations.
It may be so that military culture is a remnant of a less democratic era, yet it has been fully integrated into the democratic
system of governance. The constitutional role of the armed forces is as protector of the people and of the State. 40 Towards
this end, the military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life. 41 The laws and
traditions governing that discipline have a long history; but they are founded on unique military exigencies as powerful
now as in the past.42 In the end, it must be borne in mind that the armed forces has a distinct subculture with unique needs,
a specialized society separate from civilian society. 43 In the elegant prose of the eminent British military historian, John
Keegan:
Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain of command. Willful disobedience of a superior officer is
punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of the Articles of War.45 "An individual soldier is not free to ignore the lawful
orders or duties assigned by his immediate superiors. For there would be an end of all discipline if the seaman and marines
on board a ship of war [or soldiers deployed in the field], on a distant service, were permitted to act upon their own opinion
of their rights [or their opinion of the Presidents intent], and to throw off the authority of the commander whenever they
supposed it to be unlawfully exercised."
Further traditional restrictions on members of the armed forces are those imposed on free speech and mobility.
Kapunan is ample precedent in justifying that a soldier may be restrained by a superior officer from speaking out
on certain matters. As a general rule, the discretion of a military officer to restrain the speech of a soldier under his/her
command will be accorded deference, with minimal regard if at all to the reason for such restraint. It is integral to military
discipline that the soldiers speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander.
The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak
freely on political matters. The Constitution requires that "[t]he armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics," and
that [n]o member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote."
Certainly, no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a personal political
opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of
discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as
protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that
promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are

constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. This fundamental principle averts the country
from going the way of banana republics.
Of possibly less gravitas, but of equal importance, is the principle that mobility of travel is another necessary
restriction on members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post without the consent of the commanding
officer. The reasons are self-evident. The commanding officer has to be aware at all times of the location of the troops
under command, so as to be able to appropriately respond to any exigencies. For the same reason, commanding officers
have to be able to restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment, their presence at place of call of
duty is necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful consequences, such as a soldier being denied
permission to witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend the funeral of a parent. Yet again, military life calls for
considerable personal sacrifices during the period of conscription, wherein the higher duty is not to self but to country.
Still, it would be highly myopic on our part to resolve the issue solely on generalities surrounding military discipline. After
all, petitioners seek to impress on us that their acts are justified as they were responding to an invitation from the
Philippine Senate, a component of the legislative branch of government. At the same time, the order for them not to testify
ultimately came from the President, the head of the executive branch of government and the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.
Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commanderin-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same
time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President
may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force
of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive
officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds.
However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same
limitations as in executive privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the
President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed
forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the
Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution
prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be
compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the
Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
As evidenced by Arnault v. Nazareno54 and Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,55 among others, the Court has not
shirked from reviewing the exercise by Congress of its power of legislative inquiry. 56 Arnault recognized that the
legislative power of inquiry and the process to enforce it, "is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function."57 On the other hand, Bengzon acknowledged that the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is not "absolute or unlimited", and its exercise is circumscribed by Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution.58 From these premises, the Court enjoined the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners

in Bengzon from testifying and producing evidence before the committee, holding that the inquiry in question did not
involve any intended legislation.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
034Demetriav.Alba
AUTHOR:
NOTES:(ifapplicable)
G.R.No.71977February27,1987
TOPIC: Limitation on legislative powers; Procedural
limitations
PONENTE:Fernan,J.:
Nature:Petitionforprohibitionwithprayerforawritofpreliminaryinjunction
FACTS:
1. Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National
Assembly/BatasanPambansarepresentingtheirmillionsofconstituents,aspartieswithgeneralinterestcommonto
allthepeopleofthePhilippines,andastaxpayerswhosevitalinterestsmaybeaffectedbytheoutcomeofthe
reliefsprayedfor"listedthegroundsrelieduponinthispetitionasfollows:
2. SECTION44OFTHE'BUDGETREFORMDECREEOF1977'INFRINGESUPONTHEFUNDAMENTAL
LAWBYAUTHORIZINGTHEILLEGALTRANSFEROFPUBLICMONEYS.
3. SECTION44OFPRESIDENTIALDECREENO.1177ISREPUGNANTTOTHECONSTITUTIONASIT
FAILSTOSPECIFYTHEOBJECTIVESANDPURPOSESFORWHICHTHEPROPOSEDTRANSFEROF
FUNDSARETOBEMADE.
4. SECTION44OFPRESIDENTIALDECREENO.1177ALLOWSTHEPRESIDENTTOOVERRIDETHE
SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS.
5. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERSTOTHEEXECUTIVE.
6. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINESAREWITHOUTORINEXCESSOFTHEIRAUTHORITYANDJURISDICTION.
7. TheSolicitorGeneral,forthepublicrespondents,questionedthelegalstandingofpetitioners,whowereallegedly
merelybegginganadvisoryopinionfromtheCourt,therebeingnojusticiablecontroversyfitforresolutionor
determination.HefurthercontendedthattheprovisionunderconsiderationwasenactedpursuanttoSection16[5],
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the
governmenttoacoordinatebranchtoenjointheperformanceofdutieswithinthelatter'ssphereofresponsibility.
8. TheCourtrequiredthepetitionerstofileaReplytotheComment.This,theydid,stating,amongothers,thatasa
resultofthechangeintheadministration,thereisaneedtoholdtheresolutionofthepresentcaseinabeyance
"untildevelopmentsarisetoenablethepartiestoconcretizetheirrespectivestands."
9. TheSupremeCourtthenrequiredthepublicrespondentstofilearejoinder.TheSolicitorGeneralfiledarejoinder
withamotiontodismiss,settingforthasgroundstherefortheabrogationofSection16[5],ArticleVIIIofthe1973
ConstitutionbytheFreedomConstitutionofMarch25,1986,whichhasallegedlyrenderedtheinstantpetition
mootandacademic.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the executive department can interfere with the legislative branch in transferring and
appropriatingoffunds
HELD:NO.
RATIO:
1. Itisinthedischargeofourroleinsociety,asabovequoted,aswellastoavoidgreatdisservicetonationalinterest
thattheCourttakescognizanceofthispetitionandthusdenypublicrespondents'motiontodismiss.Likewise
noteworthyisthefactthatthenewConstitution,ratifiedbytheFilipinopeopleintheplebisciteheldonFebruary
2,1987,carriesverbatimsection16[5],ArticleVIIIofthe1973ConstitutionunderSection24[5],ArticleVI.And
whileCongresshasnotofficiallyreconvened,Weseenocogentreasonforfurtherdelayingtheresolutionofthe

caseatbar.
2. Theconflictbetweenparagraph1ofSection44ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1177andSection16[5],ArticleVIIIof
the1973Constitutionisreadilyperceivablefromamerecursoryreadingthereof.Saidparagraph1ofSection44
provides:ThePresidentshallhavetheauthoritytotransferanyfund,appropriatedforthedifferentdepartments,
bureaus,officesandagenciesoftheExecutiveDepartment,whichareincludedintheGeneralAppropriationsAct,
toanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydepartment,bureau,orofficeincludedintheGeneralAppropriationsAct
orapprovedafteritsenactment.
3. Ontheotherhand,theconstitutionalprovisionunderconsiderationreadsasfollows:Sec.16[5].Nolawshallbe
passedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations,however,thePresident,thePrimeMinister,theSpeaker,the
ChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,andtheheadsofconstitutionalcommissionsmaybylawbeauthorizedto
augmentanyiteminthegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheir
respectiveappropriations.
4. Theprohibitiontotransferanappropriationforoneitemtoanotherwasexplicitandcategoricalunderthe1973
Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the
constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution
allowedtheenactmentofalawauthorizingthetransferoffundsforthepurposeofaugmentinganitemfrom
savingsinanotheritemintheappropriationofthegovernmentbranchorconstitutionalbodyconcerned.The
leewaygrantedwasthuslimited.Thepurposeandconditionsforwhichfundsmaybetransferredwerespecified,
i.e.transfermaybeallowedforthepurposeofaugmentinganitemandsuchtransfermaybemadeonlyifthereare
savingsfromanotheritemintheappropriationofthegovernmentbranchorconstitutionalbody.
5. Paragraph1ofSection44ofP.D.No.1177undulyoverextendstheprivilegegrantedundersaidSection16[5].It
empowersthePresidenttoindiscriminatelytransferfundsfromonedepartment,bureau,officeoragencyofthe
ExecutiveDepartmenttoanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydepartment,bureauorofficeincludedinthe
GeneralAppropriationsActorapprovedafteritsenactment,withoutregardastowhetherornotthefundstobe
transferredareactuallysavingsintheitemfromwhichthesamearetobetaken,orwhetherornotthetransferis
forthepurposeofaugmentingtheitemtowhichsaidtransferistobemade.
6. Itdoesnotonlycompletelydisregardthestandardssetinthefundamentallaw,therebyamountingtoanundue
delegationoflegislativepowers,butlikewisegoesbeyondthetenorthereof.Indeed,suchconstitutionalinfirmities
rendertheprovisioninquestionnullandvoid.
7. "Fortheloveofmoneyistherootofallevil:..."andmoneybelongingtonooneinparticular,i.e.publicfunds,
provideanevengreatertemptationformisappropriationandembezzlement.This,evidently,wasforemostinthe
mindsoftheframersoftheconstitutioninmeticulouslyprescribingtherulesregardingtheappropriationand
dispositionofpublicfundsasembodiedinSections16and18ofArticleVIIIofthe1973Constitution.Hence,the
conditionsonthereleaseofmoneyfromthetreasury[Sec.18(1)];therestrictionsontheuseofpublicfundsfor
publicpurpose[Sec.18(2)];theprohibitiontotransferanappropriationforanitemtoanother[See.16(5)andthe
requirementofspecifications[Sec.16(2)],amongothers,wereallsafeguardsdesignedtoforestallabusesinthe
expenditureofpublicfunds.
8. Paragraph1ofSection44putsallthesesafeguardstonaught.For,ascorrectlyobservedbypetitioners,inviewof
theunlimitedauthoritybestoweduponthePresident,"...Pres.DecreeNo.1177opensthefloodgatesforthe
enactmentofunfundedappropriations,resultsinuncontrolledexecutiveexpenditures,diffusesaccountabilityfor
budgetaryperformanceandentrenchestheporkbarrelsystemastherulingpartymaywellexpand[sic]public
moneynotonthebasisofdevelopmentprioritiesbutonpoliticalandpersonalexpediency."Thecontentionof
publicrespondentsthatparagraph1ofSection44ofP.D.1177wasenactedpursuanttoSection16(5)ofArticle
VIIIofthe1973Constitutionmustperforcefallflatonitsface.
9. Indeed,wherethelegislatureortheexecutivebranchisactingwithinthelimitsofitsauthority,thejudiciary
cannotandoughtnottointerferewiththeformer.Butwherethelegislatureortheexecutiveactsbeyondthescope
of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
governmenthadassumedtodoasvoid.ThisistheessenceofjudicialpowerconferredbytheConstitution"inone
SupremeCourtandinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw"
CASELAW/DOCTRINE: nocrossbordertransferoffunds; allappropriationsbillmustemanatefromtheHouseof
Representativesandtheexecutivebranchhasnopowertotransfer onebudgetfor anotherpurposefor whichitwas
originallyintended.

DISPOSITIVEPORTION:
WHEREFORE, theinstantpetitionis granted. Paragraph1of Section44ofPresidential Decree No.1177is hereby
declarednullandvoidforbeingunconstitutional.

035 BELGICA VS OCHOA

AUTHOR:

G.R. No. 208566

NOTES: (if applicable)

November 19, 2013

TOPIC: Delegation
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (Congressional Pork Barrel). However, it has also come to refer to
certain funds to the Executive. The Congressional Pork Barrel can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922),
the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas
Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the
Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal
Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
The Presidential Pork Barrel questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund.
The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by thenPresident Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was
created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides
direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
Over the years, pork funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as former
Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as
kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations Act
for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) began its probe into allegations that the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years
by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
projects. The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation
JLN standing for Janet Lim Napoles had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using no
fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA)
released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during
the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.
As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers alleged that [a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of
the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].

* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of
Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the pork barrel system under the
principles of res judicata and stare decisis

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel


WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that
they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on
1.) separation of powers
2.) non-delegability of legislative power
3.) checks and balances
4.) accountability
5.) political dynasties
6.) local autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
WON the phrases:
(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and
(b) to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as
they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

RATIO:

* HELD AND RATIO:


A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public
funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by
the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since
said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject

matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already abolished the
PDAF render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional
authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that the moot and academic principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise
moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, nondelegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also apparent
from the nature of the interests involved the constitutionality of the very system within which significant
amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at
a time when the systems flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA
Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the governments own recognition that reforms are
needed to address the reported abuses of the PDAF demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note
is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of
the government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public: This is applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems
constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but
more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance
with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the preparation and
passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of
issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are
capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of
the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present
Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their
respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they dutifully contribute to the coffers of the
National Treasury. As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing Pork
Barrel System under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from
the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised
may be classified as matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest. The CoA Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy
involves not [merely] a systems failure but a complete breakdown of controls amplifies the seriousness of the issues
involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound

inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.


4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article
respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel System. Also,
the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the
merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where the same questions relating to
the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring postenactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the
entire Pork Barrel System as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of
fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be,
therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from
hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling
in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the
guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible
of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the
second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas
of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1
and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational aspects of
budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the regulation and release of
funds, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory
in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that
respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared
that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The power of

appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by
law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from
such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two
acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lumpsum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget which subverts
the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally
flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for
multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining
relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds. Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per
implementing agency.
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very
same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that: [A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing legislators
to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their
own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based
on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive
department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely
borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such,
it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase as
may be defined by law. In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be
no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this
issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of making
equal the unequal (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a
district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the VicePresident who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of
the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction. Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
Petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine
for what purpose the funds will be used." 243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of
ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rulemaking authority to the Executive 245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known
as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent
rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are
indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called
the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative
policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to
the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to
use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class
as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as
a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second,
the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; 250 and,
third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other

purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken
down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This
notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds
"to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance
that the Malampaya Funds would be used as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and
intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been
amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on the same. 252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory
provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its
constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to
first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines."
The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however,
gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority".
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President
without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition
as follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools,
bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential development." 253 In
fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional
since similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines.
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only
for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte
blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority.
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure
is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8
of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable,
all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:


DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

036 YMCA vs C.I.R.


GR L-7988, January 19, 1916
TOPIC: Procedural Limitations
PONENTE:MORELAND, J

AUTHOR: Aiyu
NOTES:
taxpayer has burden of proof to claim tax
exemption

FACTS:
YMCA non-stock, no-profit corp that came in the PH in 1898
YMCAs building and grounds was assessed and levied for taxation, by the City of Manila
YMCA paid under protest and filed this complaint before the CIR
CIR dismissed the complaint; held that the property of YMCA is not exclusively used for
educational, religious, and charitable purposes
Hence, SC
Description of the place
o 3 parts
main building, includes the following
apartments can accommodate 64 men; living rooms; parlor; social
hall; game rooms; lecture room; library; reading room
left wing Concepcion kitchen and servants quarters
right wing athletic bldg
billiard room; restaurant; tennis courts; swimming pool; bowling alley;
gymnasium; auditorium
CONTENTION OF YMCA - claims exemption from taxation on the ground that it is a religious,
charitable and educational institution combined.
CONTENTION OF CIR - It is claimed, however, that the institution is run as a business in that
it keeps a lodging and boarding house. It may be admitted that there are 64 persons
occupying rooms in the main building as lodgers or roomers and that they take their meals
at the restaurant below.
ISSUE(S): WON the building and grounds of the Young Men's Christian Association of Manila are
subject to taxation, under section 48 of the charter of the city of Manila
HELD: NO
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded with
instructions to enter a judgment against the city of Manila and in favor of the Young Men's
Christian Association of Manila in the sum of P6,221.35. Without costs in this instance. So
ordered.
RATIO:
YMCA was able to prove its entitlement to tax exemption, it cited the purposes of the
association, as set forth in its charter and constitution.
From SC decision:
o As we have seen in the description already given of the association building and
grounds, no part is occupied for any but institutional purposes. From end to end the
building and grounds are devoted exclusively to the purposes stated in the
constitution of the association. The library and reading rooms, the game and
lounging halls, the lecture rooms, the auditorium, the baths, pools, devices for
physical development, and the grounds, are all dedicated exclusively to the objects
and purpose of the association the building of Christian character and the creation
of moral sentiment and fiber in men. It is the belief of the Young Men's Christian
Association that a Christian man, a man of moral sentiment and firm moral fiber, is
yet a better man for being also all-round man one who is sound not only
according to Christian principles and the highest moral conceptions, but physically
and mentally; whose body and mind act in harmony and within the limits which the
rights of others set; who are gentleman in physical and mental struggles, as well as
in religious service; who have self-respect and self-restraint; who can hit hard and
still kindly; who can lose without envy; who can congratulate his conqueror with

sincerity; who can vie without temper, contend without malice, concede without
regret; who can win and still be generous, in short, one who fights hard but
square. To the production of such men the association lends all its efforts, husbands
all its resources.
o We are aware that there are many decisions holding that institutions of this
character are not exempt from taxation; but, on investigation, we find that the
majority of them are based on statutes much narrower than the one under consider
and that in all probability the decisions would have been otherwise if the court had
been passing on a statute similar to ours. On the other hand, there are many
decisions of the courts in the United States founded on statutes like the Philippine
statute which hold that associations of this class are exempt from taxation. We have
examined all of the decisions, both for and against, with care and deliberation, and
we are convinced that the weight of authority sustains the positions we take in this
case.
o There is no doubt about the correctness of the contention that an institution must
devote itself exclusively to one or the other of the purpose mentioned in the statute
before it can be exempt from taxation; but the statute does not say that it must be
devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes therein mentioned. It may be a
combination of two or three or more of those purposes and still be entitled to
exempt. The Young Men's Christian Association of Manila cannot be said to be an
institution used exclusively for religious purposes, or an institution used exclusively
for charitable purposes, or an institution devoted exclusively to educational
purposes; but we believe it can be truthfully said that it is an institution used
exclusively for all three purposes, and that, as such, it is entitled to be exempted
from taxation.
DISSENTING OPINION: CARSON, J
Statutory exemptions from taxation should be strictly constructed
o This cardinal rule of American jurisprudence is based on the strongest reasons of
public policy and is supported by abundant authority. As stated Mr. Justice Johnson in
his dissenting opinion in Roman Catholic Church vs. Hastings and City of Manila ( 5
Phil. Rep., 701, 708). "It is the theory of the Government that all property within the
State held by individuals or corporations should contribute equally, in portions to its
value to the support of the Government, in return for the protection which such
property receives at the hands of the Government. This being the policy of the
Government, a law which relieves any property from this burden should be strictly
construed, to the end that no individual or corporation shall be relieved from bearing
his or its full share of the burdens of taxation unless the law expressly so provides.
This exemption should not be allowed by any strained or unnatural interpretation of
law."

037 G.R. No. 166408

October 6, 2008

QUEZON CITY and THE CITY TREASURER OF


QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,
respondent.

AUTHOR:
NOTES:

. Franchise Tax. - Notwithstanding any


exemption granted by any law or other
special law, the province may impose a tax
on businesses enjoying a franchise

TOPIC:
PONENTE: Reyes R.T. J:

FACTS: (chronological order)


1. Petitioner City Government of Quezon City is a local government unit duly organized and existing by virtue
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 537, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of Quezon City. Petitioner City
Treasurer of Quezon City is primarily responsible for the imposition and collection of taxes within the territorial
jurisdiction of Quezon City.
Under Section 31, Article 13 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993, 3 a franchise tax was imposed on
businesses operating within its jurisdiction. The provision states:
Section 31. Imposition of Tax. - Any provision of special laws or grant of tax exemption to the contrary
notwithstanding, any person, corporation, partnership or association enjoying a franchise whether issued
by the national government or local government and, doing business in Quezon City, shall pay a
franchise tax at the rate of ten percent (10%) of one percent (1%) for 1993-1994, twenty percent (20%)
of one percent (1%) for 1995, and thirty percent (30%) of one percent (1%) for 1996 and the succeeding
years thereafter, of gross receipts and sales derived from the operation of the business in Quezon City
during the preceding calendar year.
2. On May 3, 1995, ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install and operate radio and television broadcasting
stations in the Philippines under R.A. No. 7966. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 provides the tax liabilities of ABSCBN which reads:
Section 8. Tax Provisions. - The grantee, its successors or assigns, shall be liable to pay the same taxes on
their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or
corporations are now hereafter may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee, its
successors or assigns, shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts
of the radio/television business transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or
assigns, and the said percentage tax shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings
thereof; Provided that the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for income taxes
under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code pursuant to Section 2 of Executive No. 72 unless the
latter enactment is amended or repealed, in which case the amendment or repeal shall be applicable
thereto.
3. ABS-CBN had been paying local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. However, in view of the above
provision in R.A. No. 9766 that it "shall pay a franchise tax x x x in lieu of all taxes," the corporation developed
the opinion that it is not liable to pay the local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. Consequently, ABS-CBN
paid under protest the local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City
4. On June 25, 1997, for failure to obtain any response from the Quezon City Treasurer, ABS-CBN filed a

complaint before the RTC in Quezon City seeking the declaration of nullity of the imposition of local franchise
tax by the City Government of Quezon City for being unconstitutional.
5. Quezon City argued that the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in R.A. No. 9766 could not have been intended to
prevail over a constitutional mandate which ensures the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units.
Further, that taxes collectible by and payable to the local government were distinct from taxes collectible by and
payable to the national government, considering that the Constitution specifically declared that the taxes
imposed by local government units "shall accrue exclusively to the local governments." Lastly, the City
contended that the exemption claimed by ABS-CBN under R.A. No. 7966 was withdrawn by Congress when the
Local Government Code (LGC) was passed.8 Section 193 of the LGC provides:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. - Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code
6. On January 20, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment declaring as invalid the imposition on and collection from
ABS-CBN of local franchise tax paid pursuant to Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, after the enactment
of R.A. No. 7966, and ordered the refund of all payments made. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the imposition on and collection from plaintiff
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION of local franchise taxes pursuant to Quezon City
Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93 after the enactment of Republic Act No. 7966 to be invalid, and, accordingly,
the Court hereby orders the defendants to refund all its payments made after the effectivity of its
legislative franchise on May 3, 1995.
7. In its decision, the RTC ruled that the "in lieu of all taxes" provision contained in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966
absolutely excused ABS-CBN from the payment of local franchise tax imposed under Quezon City Ordinance
No. SP-91, S-93. The intent of the legislature to excuse ABS-CBN from payment of local franchise tax could be
discerned from the usage of the "in lieu of all taxes" provision and from the absence of any qualification except
income taxes. Had Congress intended to exclude taxes imposed from the exemption, it would have expressly
mentioned so in a fashion similar to the proviso on income taxes.
8. The RTC noted that the legislative franchise of ABS-CBN was granted years after the effectivity of the LGC.
Thus, it was unavoidable to conclude that Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 was an exception since the legislature
ought to be presumed to have enacted it with the knowledge and awareness of the existence and prior enactment
of Section 137 of the LGC
9. Thus, appeal was made to the CA. On September 1, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition
of Quezon City and its Treasurer. According to the appellate court, the issues raised were
purely legal questions cognizable only by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the phrase "in lieu of all taxes" indicated in the franchise of the respondent appellee
(Section 8 of RA 7966) serves to exempt it from the payment of the local franchise tax imposed by the
petitioners-appellants.
HELD: No, The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in its franchise does not exempt ABS-CBN from payment
of local franchise tax.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petition in the trial court for refund of local franchise tax is DISMISSED.
RATIO: The power of the local government of Quezon City to impose franchise tax is based on Section 151 in
relation to Section 137 of the LGC, to wit:
Section 137. Franchise Tax. - Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law,
the province may impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at the rate not exceeding fifty percent
(50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the
incoming receipt, or realized within its territorial jurisdiction. x x x
Section 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city may levy the
taxes, fees and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the
taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and component cities shall accrue to
them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or
municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.
Such taxing power by the local government, however, is limited in the sense that Congress can enact legislation
granting exemptions.
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 imposes on ABS-CBN a franchise tax equivalent to three (3) percent of all gross
receipts of the radio/television business transacted under the franchise and the franchise tax shall be "in lieu of
all taxes" on the franchise or earnings thereof.
The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in the franchise of ABS-CBN does not expressly provide what kind of taxes
ABS-CBN is exempted from. It is not clear whether the exemption would include both local, whether municipal,
city or provincial, and national tax. What is clear is that ABS-CBN shall be liable to pay three (3) percent
franchise tax and income taxes under Title II of the NIRC. But whether the "in lieu of all taxes provision" would
include exemption from local tax is not unequivocal.
As adverted to earlier, the right to exemption from local franchise tax must be clearly established and cannot be
made out of inference or implications but must be laid beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, the uncertainty in the "in
lieu of all taxes" provision should be construed against ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN has the burden to prove that it is
in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. ABS-CBN miserably failed in this regard.
Subsequently, R.A. No. 8241 took effect on January 1, 1997 containing more amendments to the NIRC. Radio
and/or television companies whose annual gross receipts do not exceed P10,000,000.00 were granted the option
to choose between paying 3% national franchise tax or 10% VAT. Section 9 of R.A. No. 8241 provides:
SECTION 9. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7716 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 12. Section 117 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 117. Tax on franchise. - Any provision of general or special law to the contrary,
notwithstanding, there shall be levied, assessed and collected in respect to all franchises on radio
and/or television broadcasting companies whose annual gross receipts of the preceding year does
not exceed Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), subject to Section 107(d) of this Code, a tax of

three percent (3%) and on electric, gas and water utilities, a tax of two percent (2%) on the gross
receipts derived from the business covered by the law granting the franchise: Provided, however,
That radio and television broadcasting companies referred to in this section, shall have an option
to be registered as a value-added tax payer and pay the tax due thereon: Provided, further, That
once the option is exercised, it shall not be revoked. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, radio and/or television companies with yearly gross receipts exceeding P10,000,000.00 were
subject to 10% VAT, pursuant to Section 102 of the NIRC.
On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424 was passed confirming the 10% VAT liability of radio and/or television
companies with yearly gross receipts exceeding P10,000,000.00.
R.A. No. 9337 was subsequently enacted and became effective on July 1, 2005. The said law further amended
the NIRC by increasing the rate of VAT to 12%. The effectivity of the imposition of the 12% VAT was later
moved from January 1, 2006 to February 1, 2006.
In consonance with the above survey of pertinent laws on the matter, ABS-CBN is subject to the payment of
VAT. It does not have the option to choose between the payment of franchise tax or VAT since it is a
broadcasting company with yearly gross receipts exceeding Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
VAT is a percentage tax imposed on any person whether or not a franchise grantee, who in the course of trade or
business, sells, barters, exchanges, leases, goods or properties, renders services. It is also levied on every
importation of goods whether or not in the course of trade or business. The tax base of the VAT is limited only to
the value added to such goods, properties, or services by the seller, transferor or lessor. Further, the VAT is an
indirect tax and can be passed on to the buyer.
The franchise tax, on the other hand, is a percentage tax imposed only on franchise holders. It is imposed under
Section 119 of the Tax Code and is a direct liability of the franchise grantee.
The clause "in lieu of all taxes" does not pertain to VAT or any other tax. It cannot apply when what is paid is a
tax other than a franchise tax. Since the franchise tax on the broadcasting companies with yearly gross receipts
exceeding ten million pesos has been abolished, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause has now become functus officio,
rendered inoperative.
In sum, ABS-CBN's claims for exemption must fail on twin grounds. First, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in its
franchise failed to specify the taxes the company is sought to be exempted from. Neither did it particularize the
jurisdiction from which the taxing power is withheld. Second, the clause has become functus officio because as
the law now stands, ABS-CBN is no longer subject to a franchise tax. It is now liable for VAT.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

#38 DEL MAR v PAGCOR


G.R. No. 138298
August 24, 2001
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
November 29, 2000 SC granted petitions filed by Raoul B. Del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval and Michael T. Defensor to enjoin the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), Belle Jai-Alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming
Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) from operating, maintaining or managing jai-alai games and from enforcing the
June 17, 1999 Agreement entered into among said respondents for that purpose.
Justice Reynato S. Puno (concurred in by CJ Davide, and Justices Melo, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
Ynares-Santiago PAGCOR was bereft of any franchise to operate, maintain or manage jai-alai games whether by itself alone or in
conjunction with its co-respondents.
Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. dissented (with Judge Bellosillo Kapunan and Quisumbing) PAGCOR had a valid franchise to
conduct jai-alai games and had likewise the authority under that franchise to maintain, operate or manage jai-alai games through and
in association with its co-respondents BELLE and FILGAME pursuant to their agreement.
Justice Jose c. Vitug has a separate opinion (with Justice Mendoza) the franchise accorded to PAGCOR was broad enough to
authorize it to operate sports and gaming pools, inclusive of jai-alai, that authority, however, did not allow it to contract any part of
that franchise to its co-respondents BELLE and FILGAME.
PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME filed a MoR seeking to reverse the November 29, 2000 Decision. only 7 Justices voted to grant
the motions. For lack of required number of votes, the said motions for reconsideration are denied.
Respondents have sought from the Court a clarification of the foregoing resolution.
ISSUES and HELD: Whether PAGCOR itself has a valid franchise to conduct jai-alai games? (5 Justices NO; 10 Justices YES)
Whether PAGCOR can operate, maintain or manage jai-alai games in association with Belle and Filgame according to their assailed
agreement? (7 Justices YES; 8 Justices NO; 5 Justices NO on the thesis that PAGCOR has no franchise to operate, maintain, or
manage jai-alai; 3 Justices NO only PAGCOR by itself, not with any other person or entity, can operate, maintain, or manage jai-alai
games
DSIPOSITIVE PORTION:
(a) to partially GRANT the motions for clarification insofar as it is prayed that Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) has a valid franchise to, but only by itself (i.e., not in association with any other person or entity), operate, maintain and/or
manage the game of jai-alai, and
(b) to DENY the motions insofar as respondents would also seek a reconsideration of the Court's decision of 29 November 2000 that
has, since then,
(i) enjoined the continued operation, maintenance, and/or management of jai-alai games by PAGCOR in association with its
co-respondents Belle Jai-Alai Corporation and/or Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation and
(ii) held to be without force and effect the agreement of 17 June 1999 among said respondents.

039 TANADA vs. TUVERA


GR No. L-63915, April 24, 1985
TOPIC: Effectivity of Laws; Publication Requirement
PONENTE: Escolin, J.

AUTHOR: Nikki A
NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Petitioners Contentions:
- The subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
Respondents Contentions:
- This case should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the
instant petition.
- Petitioners have not shown that they are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question.
- The publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the laws where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the O.G. is not indispensable for their
effectivity. Reasoning grounded on Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE(S):
WON the requirement of publication is a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of the laws enacted.
Side issue: WON petitioners have legal standing to file instant petition.
HELD: YES,
Side issue: YES.
RATIO:

LEGAL STANDING
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only
in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the

Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT
Art. 2 of the Civil Code is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the O.G., even if the law provides for
the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs.
COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The publication of presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. Such decrees impose a burden upon the people. However, Other presidential issuances which apply only
to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative orders need not be published.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

040 Lopez v. Senate


AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004
I dont have a copy of the full text, so this is a temporary digest. I cant say
TOPIC:
that the digest is any good, as I just put together anything I could find on this
PONENTE:
case.
NATURE: petition for prohibition and mandamus
FACTS:
6. Rep. Lopez assails the constitutionality of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes
Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections.
7. Petitioner asks the Court to issue a temporary restraining order to the Senate to cease and desist from
implementing, executing, and enforcing the Canvassing Rules.
8. Petitioner contentions a. The canvassing rules deprived petitioner and other members of Congress of their congressional
prerogatives.
b. the Creation of a Joint Bicameral Committee is a delegation of legislative power, which is not allowed under
the doctrine of potestas delegata non delegari potest.
9. Respondent
a. (probably, they would say something like this) Separation of powers, please!
ISSUE(S): WON the SC can interfere and issue a TRO against the implementation of the Canvassing Rules
NO. The Canvassing Rules are constitutional.
RATIO:
Delegation of Power to Joint Bicameral Committee
31. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived
petitioner and other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very rules
under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint
session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.
32. In the inclusion in the 1987 Constitution of the duty of the Congress to be the National Board of Canvassers for
the election of the President and Vice-President meant that Congress was to have expanded powers.
33. These expanded powers did not necessarily mean that the nature of the powers did not necessarily mean that the
nature of the power changed from a ministerial to a discretionary one.
Congress as Canvassing Board
34. Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
35. Congress remains as the body that exercises its duties, and delegating preliminary determinations to expedite
proceedings.
36. Where the rules of Congress have been passed within the limits of constitutional and legal boundaries, everything
else remains internal and procedural, to which petitioner is bound.
37. The Canvassing rules do not delegate nor abdicate determination to the Joint Committee, nor for that matter any of
the other duties of Congress prescribed under Sec. 4, Art. VII.
DISPOSITION: PETITION DISMISSED.
DOCTRINE:

In Arroyo v. de Venecia - the Court ruled that it had no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless
there is a clear violation of the Constitution.

Likewise the Court held in Santiago v. Guingona, -under the doctrine of separation of powers
-has no authority to interfere in the exclusive realm of a co-equal branch, absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion.

The Court has no authority to restrict or limit the exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the
Constitution.

041 Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress


G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004
TOPIC: D. Doctrine of Separation of Powers
PONENTE:

AUTHOR:
The Congress is a continuing body and must fulfill its
constitutional mandate to conduct the presidential canvass
of votes even it if is in recess. The Senate shall convene in
joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not
later than thirty days after the day of the elections in
accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

FACTS:
1. By the present Petition for Prohibition, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null
and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of
Congress sine die on June 11, 2004.
2. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and
desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.
3. Petitioners Contention - with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last
regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term
2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings
terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he relies on "legislative procedure, precedent
or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress."
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) can continue to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and VicePresidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die
HELD: YES. Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and
expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised and to put to rest all questions regarding the regularity,
validity or constitutionality of the canvassing of votes fro President and Vice-President in the recently concluded
national elections, this Court assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to its power and duty "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
and its original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under Section 5 of the same Article.
2. After a considered and judicious examination of the arguments raised by petitioner as well as those presented in
the Comments filed by the Solicitor General and respondent Joint Committee, this Court finds that the petition has
absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed.
3. Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out]
by the rules of both Houses of Congress" is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted
by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in
joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
4. Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint Committee and that of the
Office of the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the
move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate
President Jovito Salonga.
5. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992. On
June 16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on
June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on
even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President, respectively.
6. Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May
25, 1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on May 27,
1998. The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of
Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and

Vice-President, respectively.
7. As for petitioner's argument that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the Joint Committee of Congress
[a]re [i]nvalid, [i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional [f]ollowing the [a]djournment [s]ine [d]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of
Congress [o]f [t]heir [r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004," he cites in support thereof Section 15, Article VI
of the Constitution which reads:

8.
9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until
thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire
upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its
regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session
(subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be
six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary,
until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have
"passed out of legal existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its
regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the
National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express
directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected
President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine dieuntil it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its
membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. ( Pelayo v.
Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385 [1968], citing Bautista v. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389 [1934]
and Aquino v. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29 1968)
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the
duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the
Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of
canvass, has not become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee
completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both
Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.

042
GUTIERREZ
v.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
G.R. No. 193459. February 15, 2011
TOPIC: POWER OF IMPEACHMENT
PONENTE: Carpio-Morales, J.

AUTHOR: Jade
NOTES: (if applicable)
Petitioner: Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez

FACTS:
Before the 15th Congress opened its 1st session on 26 July 2010 or on 22 July 2010 - private respondents
Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an
impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene
Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
A day after the opening of the 15 th Congress or on 27 July 2010 - Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.
2 August 2010 - HS Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
3 August 2010 - private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre
Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint
against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier
Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de
Jesus.
3 August 2010 - the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress; the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups
complaint to Speaker Belmonte
9 August 2010 Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
10 August 2010 House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,
instructed to include the 2 complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their
inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, 11 August 2010.
11 August 2010 at 4:47pm the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to
public respondent.
1 September 2010 public respondent found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it
considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
2 September 2010 - the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was
published.
6 September 2010 petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the Sept 1 Resolution
Public respondent refused to accept the motion for prematurity. It advised petitioner to await the notice
for her to file an answer to the complaints.
7 September 2010 - public respondent found the 2 complaints, which both allege culpable violation of
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance, hinged on the issue of whether
valid judgment to impeach could be rendered.
7 September 2010 - a notice was sent to the petitioner, directing her to file an answer to the complaints
within 10 days.
13 September 2010 petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the present petition with application for
injunctive reliefs.
14 September 2010 - the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order and
to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days.
21 September 2010 the Court directed the OSG to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition
The Baraquel group, the Reyes group, and public respondent through the OSG and private counsel filed
their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
4 October 2010 Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene which the Court granted by
Resolution of October 5, 2010.
Oral arguments were then conducted, followed by petitioners filing of a Consolidated Reply.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are proper
Whether or not the HOR Committee on Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions
HELD:

Yes, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are proper. Simultaneous referral of 2 impeachment
complaints to the House of Representatives is a controversy which must be resolved.
The HOR Committee on Justice did not commit GAD in issuing its 2 assailed resolutions.
RATIO:

Procedural Issue

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. Public respondent was not
exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the 2 impeachment complaints
as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a
preliminary investigation.

These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives but the argument that
impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked The major difference between
the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of
judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to
the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but
also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

Another glaring distinction between the US Constitution and the Philippine Constitution is that while the US
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations are:
o The manner of filing,
o The required vote to impeach
o The one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead
to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. The Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislativelyBUT note that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to
it by the Constitution.

In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether
public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its
functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective
measures from the Court.

Respondents do not contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that
the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent when petitioner filed the present
petition, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the 2 complaints.

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of ripeness. The question of ripeness is
especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent 2 impeachment complaints presents a novel
situation to invoke judicial power. Gutierrez cannot be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the
cue from the constitutional limitation that only 1 impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year.

Substantive Issue

Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and
of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the
subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had
been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father

influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness
played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against
her. Bereft of merit. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.

The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself.

In the present case, Rep. Tupas did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it
decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints. Even petitioners counsel conceded
during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.

Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public respondent in finding the two
complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only
took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat. An abbreviated pace in the conduct of
proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however.
o

Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice : Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-

judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions.


For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice
remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the
circumstances peculiar to each case.
o

The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of
work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This,
petitioners failed to discharge.

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and
substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact,
conceded by petitioners counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an
answer.

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the
Committee-level, particularly Section 5 which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the
impeachment proceedings the opportunity to file an Answer starts after the Committee on Justice
finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioners
motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is
apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of


the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which
committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the
exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and
substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the
compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there
must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee."

Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her
submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. cannot be done by the Court
o

Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the

Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature.

In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more
accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. Citing Tanada v. Tuvera, petitioner
contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on
September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints.
Recall: On August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th
Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly
substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation. Public
respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium
of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."

While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their
usage.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of
the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the
publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned,
however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication."

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former should
be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to
determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court
for filing and publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The
Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress
to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the
legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.

Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as
categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than
"promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an
issuance without need of it being published. Petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of
legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where
there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure.

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint
against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She
posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and
referred to public respondent.

Respondents/public respondent/respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of
the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but
venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the

Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

The Francisco case states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on
it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set
the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the
referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified
impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action" which
contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and
Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the
act of taking initial action on the complaint.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and
Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the
Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any
clearer in pointing out the material dates.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that
referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to that had already been
done," apparently citing Bernas discussion. Following her line of reasoning, the verification of the
complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already
initiate the impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is


impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint" to denote the
limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word
covers its enlarged and plural sense.

The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been
initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial.
According to Bernas in Francisco, a proceeding which "takes place not in the Senate but in the House"
precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. Conscious of the legal import of each
step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an
impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution.
This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to
its processes.

The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the lips of the House Secretary General
who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint.

Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which
explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of
Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special
operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second
impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided
without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.

One limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The
Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter."

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly "belated"
referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint
was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on
July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run.
When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to
include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period.

The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent
reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment
proceeding against the then Chief Justice. doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere - "adherence
to precedents;" mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House deliberates
on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been
done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act of referral allows the
unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of
disposition from referral.

The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a
year. Petitioner cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.
Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent undue or too
frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation."

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time,
and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one
impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and
duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little
time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means
filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.

Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of
multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days
between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral.

As pointed out during the oral arguments by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of
privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of
a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a

finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before bothering a respondent to
answer already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.

The number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and
for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint
will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad
publicity are enough oppression. Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time,
energy and other resources runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non
sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous effort to
defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on
the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers,
the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail
genuine and grave issues.

The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to
undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called
upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year.
This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which
provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable,
apply to impeachment proceedings before the House."

By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint or information
must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various
offenses."

To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each
charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes
that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules; That heaping two
or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave
dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of
certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the House; and prevent
public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.

Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment
complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the
application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with
the same precision required in defining crimes.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in
carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on
Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint
rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House which has yet to pass upon the
question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does
not lie.

Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with
each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one

impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation,
petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within
one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson
Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[;
c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and
substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate." Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the
consolidation as merely "contemplated."

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the
Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or
anticipatory.

Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were
deemed consolidated, her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory obviously
springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7,
2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:


DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

043 CHIEF JUSTICE CORONA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012
Topic: Power of Impeachment
Ponente: Villarama Jr., J.
FACTS:

AUTHOR:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO)
and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case
initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the
Philippines.
1.

On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint for
impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the
same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required
by the Constitution.

2.

On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court the following
day, December 14, 2011.

3.

On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption.

4.

On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the blitzkrieg fashion by which the impeachment complaint
was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the Senate. Petitioner argued at length that the acts,
misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the
outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court
enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.

5.

On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings
against the petitioner

6.

On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution5 which states:. To allow the Prosecution to introduce
evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2(petitioners alleged failure to disclose to the public his SALN as required by the
Constitution) and 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment; 2. To disallow
the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank
accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in Taguig).

7.

In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecutions request for subpoena
directed to the officers of two private banks(PSBank and BPI) where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar
currencies.

8.

On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the
Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized
representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the opening documents for petitioners alleged
foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank statements showing
the year-end balances for the said accounts.

9.

On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent
Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the
charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a hodge-podge of multiple charges, do not constitute
allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; (3) allowed the presentation of
evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioners right to due process.

10. On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is being violated in the
ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the cold neutrality of impartial judges by acting
as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the
Impeachment Court, to no avail.

11. CONTENTION RESPONDENT:, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in
character which may be decided or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being
filed by the respondents without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and without conceding the
constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of the Senate to try and decide all
cases of impeachment.
Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of
impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully
disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of
this case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated
and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and
ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly
resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis
ISSUE(S):
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings,
and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as
Impeachment Court
HELD: Yes. The power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings. Nonetheless, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
RATIO:
Impeachment and Judicial Review
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen as creating divisions,
partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more by the
comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly political character,
the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the
separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects
of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the
Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United
States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitutions provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through the
mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint
which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said
complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the
hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain SenatorJudges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive
constitutional limitations on the Senates sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear
transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of
Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, SenatorJudges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to
prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not,
is a political question that is not within this Courts power of expanded judicial review.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives:
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. we ruled that the power of judicial review in this
jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment

complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a violation of the Constitution
or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction,
which would require corrective measures from the Court.
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote
of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and
Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint
a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof
would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

044 De Castro v. JBC


GR No. 191002, mar. 17, 2010
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
1. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election.
1.1 Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy.
1.2 Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
2. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling
up the position of Chief Justice.
3. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
3.1 However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January
25, 2010, respectively.
4. The OSG contends:
4.1 The incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.
4.2 It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was
not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and
4.3 That the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents
power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political
vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint
a Supreme Court Justice.
5. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process,
there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
5.1 Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to
appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE(S):
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement?
Held: No.
RATIO:
1. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

2. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.


2.1 The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
2.2 The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.
3. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
3.1 They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII.
3.2 That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
4. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power
of the President to appoint.
4.1 The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
4.2 This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to
the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

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