Property Cases:

1.

Ramos vs. Director of Lands (GR L-13298 Nov. 19, 1918)

2.

Ramirez vs. Director of Lands (GR 117247 April 12, 1996)

3.

Republic vs. Hon. Vera (GR L-35778 Jan 27, 1983)

4.

Republic vs. IAC (GR 71176 May 21, 1990)

5.

People vs. Torres (GR 170837 Sept. 12, 2006)

6.

People vs. Tira (GR 139615 May 28, 2004)

7.

Abuan vs. People (GR 168773 Oct. 27 2006)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35778 January 27, 1983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO MARTINEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, l983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA,
respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:

The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions dated October 9,
1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan, Branch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in
LRC No. N-206, respectively, involve a common issue. For convenience, they are hereby
decided jointly.
G.R. No. L-35778:
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for
registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of
Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less.
On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic
of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan.
On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to
the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation.
On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading:
Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B.
Rodriguez during the hearing of August 8, 1972 that this land, subject
matter of this application, was a subject of cadastral proceeding and that
this land was assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn, August 3, 1972, page 41),
this case is ordered re-opened and the Land Registration Commissioner
is directed to submit his report and/or comment as to whether this lot is
covered by the Mariveles Cadastre within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.

Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez,
62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited the same
from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land
in 1938; that about 8 hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango
trees; that kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for taxation
purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that possession
was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the concept of owner.
Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito
Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or less; that since 1938, applicant
has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son
Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia are the ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared
alike between applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the other;
that eighteen (18) hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.
While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked on the land of
the applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or less; that said Luisito Martinez
inherited the land from his parents; that he plants palay only on four (4) hectares; that there
are 42 mango trees on the land,
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under
Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case No.
N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya,
municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters,
more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and more particularly
described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC)
SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431, respectively.

xxx xxx xxx

On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to
the lower court a report stating.
That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case
is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles,
Province of Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097.
xxx xxx xxx

On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report within ten
(10) days if the land subject of the application has been issued patents or is the subject of
any pending application for the issuance of patents. Likewise, the lower court directed the
Commissioner of Land Registration to submit within the same period his report if the land
applied for has been issued a title or is the subject of a pending decree.

On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in
the lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied for registration "do not appear to have
been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the
Revised Administrative Code." Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land
Registration Commission filed in the lower court another report or manifestation stating "that
Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No. N-41884, when
plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the Commission does not appear to overlap with
any previously titled property under Act 496; that the plan and records of said Land
Registration application will be subjected to further examination as soon as the decision to be
rendered by this Honorable Court is received in this Commission to determine whether or not
a patent or title has in the meantime been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping
of titles."
At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the lower court issued
an Order of General Default against all persons, with the exception of the Director of Lands
and the Director of Forestry, represented by the Office of the provincial fiscal, and the
oppositor Eliseo Martinez represented by Atty. Angelino Banzon, who were directed to file
their respective oppositions,
On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands
and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.
Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein), testified
in her behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, and
Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, as well as her documentary evidence in support of her
application for registration. On the other hand,. Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the
government, and submitted documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by the
provincial fiscal's office in this case.
At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old,
testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept
of owner since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who
allegedly possessed this land" in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid
for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.

that 16 hectares of these lands were planted to palay while others were devoted to pasture
land and planting vegetables.
Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood, he had known
Elisa Llamas to be the owner of the land applied for; that she was the one managing the
planting and improving of the land; that he used to see Leopoldo de Guzman and another
one also named Agapito del Rosario worked on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa
Llamas informed him that in 1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega.
At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the
government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of Leonides B. Rodriguez, District
Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio
Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan containing an approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES
more or less, as shown and described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two sheets,
as surveyed for Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and Disposable
Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by the Director of Forestry as such on
February 16, 1972."
The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to testify
on the alleged possession of the land. The applicant also failed to present Guillermo
Ramirez, who was hired by her as overseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was
presented as witness to prove that the applicant had possessed the land as owners.
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October
9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated
them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.
In the instant petitions for review the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of
the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court is
without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application for voluntary registration under
Act 496. Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to
registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory
registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order.

Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were the ones
working on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his parents, on their request to
owner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when the same was sold to applicant;

It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land
subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral
Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097";

that some portions of Lot No. 626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that
"portion declared Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of
the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return
day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by
law, such as: (1) Age of the claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block
and lot numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality, township or
settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If
claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no express grant of the land by the
Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the length of
time property was held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of
time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant
is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest claimed
by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for
taxation, their last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the
names of adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful claimants, the
property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the
aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they
were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims
would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in
question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.

years to constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit
convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owners of the
entire area in question during the period required by law.
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not approved by the
Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission. The Land Registration
Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans in this particular case. Section
34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy
relation which are expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-ownerbeneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character
and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands,
the same are not of much value. 4
WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16, 1972 of the Court of
First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are hereby reversed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result.

Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land,
under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole
world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already
determined by final judgment. 2
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over
the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail. It is to be noted
that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only
portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of
the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that
sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13298

agricultural in nature is the fact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of
age.

November 19, 1918

CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.
Basilio Aromin for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine
laid down by the United States Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish
grantes within the United States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to say that the
possessory information, apparently having taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should
not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs.
United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice that
the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act
No. 1908, reads as follows:

MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit
A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the
Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land
located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title
to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of
the possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio
Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered
by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was
forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from
registration. So much for the facts.
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions of the
Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as
the Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come under the
protective gis of the Maura Law, it must have been shown that the land was cultivated for
six years previously, and that it was not land which pertained to the "zonas forestales." As
proof that the land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July,
nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first
relates to the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of what,
for present purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public land, under a bona fide claim
of ownership.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Relative to actuality of
possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about one fourth of the entire
tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government, following:

fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of
agricultural public land.
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land."
The law affirms that the phrase is denied by the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as
the Philippine bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to 18 thereof that three
classes of land are mentioned. The first is variously denominated "public land" or "public
domain," the second "mineral land," and the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of
Congress comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the determination of whether
the land is more valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous
occasions, what was said in the case of Jones vs. Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122),
is still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to
them a construction that will be entirely free from objection." In the case which gave most
serious consideration to the subject (Mapa vs. Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it
was found that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural
public lands." It was said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926
means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands."

The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the
instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?lawphil.net
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the
possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
(Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs.
Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one
particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually
in possession of the claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the general rule.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and
notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the
world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest

The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in
nature and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is
not very helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For
the purposes of this chapter, 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated,
all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of
whatever character." This definition of "public forest," it will be noted, is merely "for the
purposes of this chapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests,
not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands
are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department
Head to be agricultural lands." With reference to the last section, there is no certification of
the Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether this land is better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of
trees and underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that he word "forest" has a
significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly
woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of considerable extent. (Higgins vs.
Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y. Supp., 262; People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N.
Y. Supp., 512.)

The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H. BadenPowell, in his work on Forest Law of India, states as follows:
Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found
either to exclude some cases to which the law ought to apply, or on the other hand,
to include some with which the law ought not to interfere. It may be necessary, for
example, to take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land which at present has
neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it, but which in the course f time it is hoped
will be "reboise;" but any definition wide enough to take in all such lands, would
also take in much that was not wanted. On the other hand, the definition, if framed
with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed would be almost sure to) include a
garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with.
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:
A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no
means a mere collection of trees, but an organic whole in which all parts, although
apparently heterogeneous, jumbled together by accident as it were and apparently
unrelated, bear a close relation to each other and are as interdependent as any
other beings and conditions in nature.
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:
During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question
of forest and agricultural lands was beginning to receive some attention and it is
clearly shown in section 18 of the above mentioned Act; it leaves to the Bureau of
Forestry the certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest uses.
Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau has in its administration since the
passage of this act construed this term to mean forest lands in the sense of what
was necessary to protect, for the public good; waste lands without a tree have
been declared more suitable for forestry in many instances in the past. The term
'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the past has been applied to
wood suitable for construction purposes but with the increase in civilization and the
application of new methods every plant producing wood has some useful purpose
and the term timber lands is generally though of as synonymous with forest lands
or lands producing wood, or able to produce wood, if agricultural crops on the
same land will not bring the financial return that timber will or if the same land is
needed for protection purposes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly
appointed boards and leave it in the hands of these boards to decide what lands
are more valuable for forestry purposes or for agricultural purposes.
In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable
under the law. In many cases, in the opinion of the Bureau of Forestry, lands
without a single tree on them are considered as true forest land. For instance,
mountain sides which are too steep for cultivation under ordinary practice and
which, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the big natural resource
of the soil, by washing, is considered by this bureau as forest land and in time
would be reforested. Of course, examples exist in the Mountain Province where
steep hillsides have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but even then
the mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative
cover which they from experience have found protect their water supply. Certain
chiefs have lodged protests with the Government against other tribes on the
opposite side of the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribes
from cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of water for irrigation.
Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if
mankind could not devise and enforce ways dealing with the earth, which will
preserve this source of like "we must look forward to the time, remote it may be, yet
equally discernible, when out kin having wasted its great inheritance will fade from
the earth because of the ruin it has accomplished."
The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in
order to determine whether they are more adapted for agricultural or forest
purposes by a technical and duly trained personnel on the different phases of the
conservation of natural resources, is based upon a previously prepared set of
questions in which the different characters of the land under inspection are
discussed, namely:
Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.
Exposure: North; South; East; West.
Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.
Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber
mixed, dense forest.

If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under
cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.)
For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?
State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and
estimate of stand in cubic meters per hectare, diameter and percentage of each
species.
If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for
agriculture in vicinity, which is not covered with timber.
Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons
in full.)
Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or
communal forest? Description and ownership of improvements.
If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his
place of residence, and state briefly (if necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds
upon which he bases his claim.
When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for,
the corresponding certificate is forwarded to the Director of Lands; if it is made on a
privately claimed parcel for which the issuance of a title is requested from the Court
of Land Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be more adapted for
forest purposes, then the Director of Forestry requests the Attorney-General to file
an opposition, sending him all data collected during the inspection and offering him
the forest officer as a witness.
It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time
intervening between the notice for the trial on an expediente of land and the day of
the trial, and the difficulties in communications as well as the distance of the land in
question greatly hinder the handling of this work.
In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means
of his delegate the examining officer, submits before the court all evidence referring
to the present forest condition of the land, so that the court may compare them with
the alleged right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a title

issued by the proper authority or evidence of his right to the land showing that he
complied with the requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not affect him
in the least as such land should not be considered as a part of the public domain;
but when the alleged right is merely that of possession, then the public or private
character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character should be
established not simply on the alleged right of the claimant but on the sylvical
condition and soil characteristics of the land, and by comparison between this area,
or different previously occupied areas, and those areas which still preserve their
primitive character.
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be
conservation of the natural resources of the Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift
who squanders his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be restrained for
the less spectacular but surer policy which protects Nature's wealth for future generations.
Such is the wise stand of our Government as represented by the Director of Forestry who,
with the Forester for the Government of the United States, believes in "the control of nature's
powers by man for his own good." On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of
contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the
good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under private ownership.
Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the
Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be
established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the
Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the
court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the
courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters.
But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which
he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as
amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894, and his possessory information.
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the
entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs.
So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.

that their possession of the land, tacked to that of their predecessors Apolonio Diaz, et al.,
(allegedly from 1943 onwards), was sufficient to vest title in them by acquisitive prescription.
On the other hand, in LRC Case No. B-526, petitioner claimed that the duration of
possession by his parents (commencing allegedly in 1958), combined with his own
possession (counted from 1988 when he purchased the accretion from his parents) gave him
sufficient title thereto by acquisitive prescription. In other words, because of the different
relevant periods of possession being referred to, the basis of the application in Case No. B46 is actually different from that in Case No. 526. Stated in another way, the right to relief in
one case rests upon a set of facts different from that upon which the other case depended.
Hence, there was no res judicata to bar the proceedings in LRC Case No. B-526.
DAVIDE, JR., J., separate opinion:
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT THE PROPER LEGAL
REMEDY IN CASE AT BAR. - A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is not the proper remedy, especially in this case where the private respondent was not
even an oppositor, and even if he were his remedy would have been an ordinary appeal,
which cannot be substituted by a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Manuel I. Ramirez for and in his own behalf.
Renato B. Damasing for private respondent.
DECISION

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117247. April 12, 1996]
MANUEL I. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ESMERALDO PONCE,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA; ELEMENT OF
IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. - It is evident that
one of the elements of res judicata is lacking in the case at bar. Respondent Court declared
that identity of causes of action between Case No. B-46 and Case No. B-526 exist since they
both sought registration of the land formed by alluvial deposits, but failed to recognize that
the basis for claiming such registration was different in each case. In Case No. B-46,
applicants-spouses Arcadio Ramirez and Marta Ygonia (herein petitioners parents) claimed

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Does the judgment in a land registration case denying the application filed in court in 1957 by
the parents of the herein petitioner for the registration of land allegedly formed by alluvial
deposits, which judgment was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1968 and
became final, constitute res judicata as to bar a subsequent application by the herein
petitioner to register the same property?
This is the question tackled by this Court in the instant petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Decision[1] dated September 6, 1994 of the respondent Court[2] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 33735, and the subsequent Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
By a Resolution dated October 23, 1995, the First Division of this Court transferred the
instant case to the Third. After careful deliberation on the submissions of the parties, this
case was assigned to the undersigned ponente, who assumed his position as a member of
the Court on October 10, 1995, for the writing of the herein Decision.
Antecedent Facts

In August, 1929, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Government of the Phil. Islands
vs. Colegio de San Jose,[4] declaring that two parcels of land bordering on Laguna de Bay
and identified as Lots 1 and 2 form an integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan
belonging to the Colegio de San Jose. Ten years later, the Colegio de San Jose sold the said
two lots, together with an adjoining unregistered land, to the Government. The three parcels
of land acquired by the Government became known as the Tunasan Homesite. The Rural
Progress Administration (RPA), which was charged with the administration and disposition of
the homesite, caused the subdivision thereof into small lots for the purpose of selling them to
bona fide occupants.
In December, 1940, Lot 17, Block 78 of the Tunasan Homesite, which was part of Lot 2, and
containing an area of 5,158 square meters, was sold by the RPA to Apolonio Diaz. In May,
1948, Lot 19 of the same homesite, which was also a part of Lot 2, with an area of 1,170
square meters, was acquired by Apolonio Diaz, although his son Pastor Diaz was made to
appear as the vendee. In January, 1955, the heirs of Apolonio Diaz transferred their rights to
both Lots 17 and 19 to Marta Ygonia, wife of Arcadio Ramirez (said spouses being the
parents of herein petitioner), who paid the balance of the purchase price for the lots. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved the deeds of transfer of rights
executed by the heirs of Apolonio Diaz, and in July, 1958, the Land Tenure Administration
executed a deed of sale in favor of Marta Ygonia over Lots 17 and 19.
An original application for registration was filed by spouses Marta Ygonia and Arcadio
Ramirez (docketed as LRC Case No. B-46) with the then Court of First Instance of Laguna in
May, 1957. It had for its subject matter a parcel of land on the eastern side of Lot 17, with an
area of 11,055 square meters (later increased to 11,311 sq. meters), which was claimed by
the applicants as an accretion to their land gradually formed by alluvial deposits.
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the grounds that the applicants did not
possess sufficient title to the land sought to be registered, and that the land in question is a
part of the public domain. Canuto Ponce (herein private respondents predecessor) also filed
an opposition claiming that the land applied for is foreshore land covered by a revocable
permit granted to him in June 1956 by the Bureau of Lands. The Land Tenure Administration
likewise opposed the application on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, on the ground
that, inasmuch as the Government was the previous owner of Lots 17 and 19, and
considering that only the two lots -excluding the accretion - were sold to the predecessors of
the applicant-spouses, the latter cannot claim ownership of the accretion and the same
should be declared as part of the Governments patrimonial property.
The principal question raised, both in the lower court and on appeal before the Court of
Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 2893 8-R) was simply whether the accretion came into existence
only in 1943, as the applicant-spouses claimed, or as far back as 1918, as maintained by the
oppositors. As the appellate Court noted, resolution of said question rested on the credibility
of witnesses presented. In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court a quo found for the
oppositors, and denied the application for registration, holding that the accretion, based on
preponderance of evidence, must have been gradual and dated back even before the
acquisition of the Tunasan Homesite by the Government in 1939.

The appellate court upheld the findings of the lower court since the applicants-spouses failed
to show any fact or circumstance of weight which was overlooked or misinterpreted by the
trial court, and since the testimonies of the witnesses for the applicants-spouses were either
not credible or else tended to support the oppositors position instead. The appellate court
further stated:
Considering that the Colegio de San Jose was the owner of Lot 2 (of which lots 17 and 19
are part) to which the accretion in question is contiguous, it follows that the Colegio de San
Jose also became the owner of said accretion at the time of its formation. Neither the
applicants nor their predecessors can lay a claim of ownership over the land because it is
clear from the documents that the property sold by the Government to Apolonio Diaz which
was in turn conveyed to the applicants (herein petitioners parents) was just a little more than
one-half hectare. True it is that the applicants tried to prove that the heirs of Apolonio Diaz
verbally agreed with them to include the accretion in the transfer deeds, but such oral
evidence cannot prevail over the solemn recitals of the documents. Besides, the heirs of
Apolonio Diaz cannot pretend to convey what did not belong to them.
As a final attempt to have the land in dispute decreed in their names, the applicants claim
that their possession of the land, tacked to that of their predecessors, is sufficient to vest title
in them by acquisitive prescription. However, the evidence clearly demonstrates that from
1918 to 1940 it was Juan Ponce who was in possession of the land, and the possession of
Canuto Ponce commenced from 1940 and extends up to the time this case was being tried.
There is therefore no basis for the applicants claim of acquisitive prescription.[5]
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the above case, promulgated on July 6, 1968,
became final and executory for failure of the applicants-spouses (parents of herein petitioner)
to appeal therefrom.
However, that was not to be the end of the story. Herein petitioner, as the buyer of Lots 17
and 19 from his parents, filed on May 17, 1989, in LRC Case No. B-526, before the Regional
Trial Court of Laguna, Branch XXV, Bian, Laguna,[6] an application for registration of the
same land formed by accretion. After due publication, mailing and posting of notices, the
petition was called for hearing.
Among petitioners witnesses was Mario Lantican, chief of the Forest Engineering and
Infrastructure Unit at Los Baos, Laguna, who testified that the function of said office is to
know whether the property involved is alienable and disposable. He testified that he
conducted an inspection to determine the status of the subject property and prepared a
report to the effect that the land is indeed disposable.
The trial court also noted the following findings in its Order of May 13, 1991:
The REPORT of the Community Environment and Natural Resources states that the parcel
of land, after it has been inspected/investigated, was verified to be within the alienable and
disposable land under the Land Certification Project No. 10-A of San Pedro, Laguna certified

and declared as such on September 28, 1981 pursuant to the Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1627 per BFIC Map No. 3004 (Exh. T). Likewise, (sic) the Director of the Land
Management Bureau in its COMPLIANCE WITH REPORT, dated December 12, 1990, states
that the land applied for registration is not covered by any kind of public land application filed
by third persons, nor by any patent issued by said office (Exh. U).[7]

Similarly, there is identity of subject matter from a mere perusal of Case No. B-46 (p. 13,
Rollo) and Case No. B-526 (p. 48, Rollo) which refer to the same property consisting of
11,311 sq. m. Lastly, there is no dispute that identity of causes of action between Case No. B46 and Case No. B-526 exist since they both sought registration of the land formed by
alluvial deposits. (CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 36.)

Thereafter, the court a quo, considering the testimonial and documentary evidence on record,
ruled that applicant (herein petitioner) possessed an imperfect title to the accretion, which
could already be confirmed and registered, and ordered[8] registration and confirmation of
title over the claimed accretion in favor of herein petitioner, and issuance of a decree of
registration. Pursuant to said order a decree of registration was eventually issued, followed
by an original certificate of title.

Thus, the respondent Court ruled as follows:

It was only a matter of time before herein private respondent - son of the late Canuto Ponce became aware of the situation. He filed a special civil action for certiorari on February 14,
1994 (which this Court referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action) seeking to
annul the land decree issued in favor of petitioner and the judicial proceedings had in LRC
Case No. B-526.

The Issues

In its assailed Decision of September 6, 1994, the respondent Court upheld herein private
respondents contention that the judgment in LRC Case No. B-526 approving the application
over the accretion was improper since the earlier application in Case No. B-46 had been
denied, which denial, as previously affirmed by the respondent Court in CA-G.R. No. 28938R, constituted res judicata. The respondent Court ratiocinated:
There is merit in petitioners principal submission that res judicata had set in when private
respondent applied for registration in 1989 over the same lot because of the previous
rejection of the application of private respondents parents in 1960.
All of the requisites of res judicata x x x
xxx xxx xxx
are present which prevent private respondent from relitigating the same issue of registration
of the identical lot. There is no question that the judgment in Case No. B-46 (p. 27, Rollo)
became final after it was affirmed in CA-G.R. No. 28938-R on July 6, 1968 (p. 39, Rollo)
which was not appealed. There is equally no doubt that Case No. B-46 was rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the same subject matter and parties. Moreover, there was,
between Case No. B-46 and LRC Case No. B-526, identity of parties, of subject matter and
parties (should be cause of action). The fact that private respondent was not a party in the
first registration case (p. 88, Rollo) is of no moment because private respondent is a
successor-in-interest of his parents who acquired the disputed lot by title in 1988 subsequent
to the commencement of the first registration case in 1960 (Section 49[b], Rule 39, Revised
Rules of Court). In fact, only substantial identity of parties is required (San Diego vs.
Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; 2 Martin, Rules of Court, 1982 Ed., p. 425).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given DUE COURSE. The Order in LRC Case No. B526 dated May 13, 1991 and Decree No. N-198605 issued by the LRA pursuant thereto are
hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the application (in) LRC Case No. B-526 is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.

The instant petition for review on certiorari raises two issues:

I. Respondent Hon. Court of Appeals committed grave error in the interpretation and
application of the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly on the issue of public domain and
II. Respondent Hon. Court of Appeals committed grave error when it violated the provisions
of Section 38 of Act No. 496, as amended (The Land Registration Act) relative to the doctrine
of non-collateral attack of a decree or title.
However, as we shall soon see, the resolution of this case hinges on the first issue, and there
is really no need to delve into the second.
The Main Issue: Res Judicata
Petitioner argues that res judicata did not apply in the instant case because of the ruling of
this Court in the Case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,[9] which quoted from the
decision in an earlier but similarly titled case, Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,[10] as
follows:
But granting for a moment, that the defenses (sic) of res judicata was properly raised by the
petitioner herein, We still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of.
The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of
respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot
public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land
Registration Act.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same
applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land,
provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, and as long as said public lands remains alienable and disposable (now
Sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073). (italics supplied)[11]

After careful deliberation and consultation, we find ourselves in agreement with petitioners
contention. Seen from the perspective offered by the aforequoted ruling, it is evident that one
of the elements of res judicata is lacking in the case at bar. Respondent Court declared that
identity of causes of action between Case No. B-46 and Case No. B-526 exist since they
both sought registration of the land formed by alluvial deposits, but failed to recognize that
the basis for claiming such registration was different in each case. In Case No. B-46,
applicants-spouses Arcadio Ramirez and Marta Ygonia (herein petitioners parents) claimed
that their possession of the land, tacked to that of their predecessors Apolonio Diaz, et al.
(allegedly from 1943 onwards), was sufficient to vest title in them by acquisitive prescription.
[12] On the other hand, in LRC Case No. B-526, petitioner claimed that the duration of
possession by his parents (commencing allegedly in 1958), combined with his own
possession (counted from 1988 when he purchased the accretion from his parents) gave him
sufficient title thereto by acquisitive prescription.[13]
In other words, because of the different relevant periods of possession being referred to, the
basis of the application in Case No. B-46 is actually different from that in Case No. B-526.
Stated in another way, the right to relief in one case rests upon a set of facts different from
that upon which the other case depended. Hence, there was no res judicata to bar the
proceedings in LRC Case No. B-526.
Incidentally, the Solicitor General reached essentially the same conclusion in his Comment
filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 33735 before the respondent Court.[14]
As to the parties pleas[15] before the respondent Court for the issuance of an order to cause
the taking of a verification survey to determine whether they are referring to the same parcel
of land or to two different properties, suffice it to say that the disposition of this case is not a
bar to such a survey.[16]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and the Order dated May 13, 1991
issued by the RTC of Laguna, Br. XXV granting registration and confirmation of title in favor
of petitioner is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170837

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DEXTER TORRES y DELA CRUZ, appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., see separate opinion.

September 12, 2006

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Dexter Torres was charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425, as amended, for unlawful possession of 831.91 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug; as well as Section 16, Article III of the same law for illegal possession of 0.26
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as shabu.
The indictment in Criminal Case No. 08-1334 for violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No.
6425 reads:

That on or about August 13, 2001, in the Municipality of Gonzaga, province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his control and custody one (1) brick of Marijuana fruiting
tops weighing 831.91 grams wrapped in a newspaper which gave POSITIVE
results for the tests of marijuana, a prohibited drug, the said accused knowing fully
well and aware that it is prohibited for any person to, unless authorized by law, to
possess or use any prohibited drug.

master's bedroom and found the following stashed inside the second deck of a wooden
cabinet: 1) a brick of dried suspected marijuana wrapped inside newsprint; 2) two plastic
sachets of suspected shabu; 3) three pieces of aluminum foil; 4) a colored green plastic
lighter; and 5) a small transparent plastic bag. The raiders then prepared an inventory 4 of the
articles seized, a copy of which was handed to Henny. After photos of the confiscated articles
were taken, they were placed in a plastic bag and turned over to SPO4 Lasam, who
submitted the same to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office 2, Camp Alimanao, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, for forensic examination.5

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

That same afternoon, Kagawads Edward and Ernesto both signed a certification 6 as to the
conduct of the search, certifying, among others, that it was conducted in an orderly and
peaceful manner; no unnecessary force was employed; nobody was hurt; and nothing was
taken without proper receipt. Henny, however, refused to sign the certification.

Upon the other hand, the accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-1344
for violation of Section 16, Article III of the same law reads:
That on or about August 13, 2001, in the Municipality of Gonzaga, province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his control and custody two (2) small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances with a total
weight of 0.26 gm. which substances gave POSITIVE results to the tests for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug, commonly known as Shabu,
the said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited for any person to
possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The two (2) criminal cases were jointly tried at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 8. Dexter pleaded not guilty to both charges. 3
The case for the prosecution is as follows:
In the early afternoon of August 13, 2001, operatives of the Second Regional Narcotics Office
led by PSI Teodolfo M. Tannagan, SPO4 Abelardo M. Lasam, SPO1 Jessie O. Liwag and
PO2 Tirso T. Pascual, as members, and a back-up team from the Gonzaga Police Station,
armed with a search warrant issued by Executive Judge Jimmy Henry F. Lucson, Jr. of the
RTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, raided the house of Dexter Torres located at Salvanera
St., Barangay Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan. The team was joined by the two barangay
councilmen, Edward Sagnep and Ernesto Vivit.
Just before searching Dexter's house, SPO4 Lasam presented the search warrant and
introduced the raiding team to Henny Gatchalian, Dexter's sister, and Dexter's children.
When asked where the owners of the house were, Henny responded that her brother and his
wife had just left. In their presence and that of the two kagawads, the team searched the

PSI Forensic Chemist Maria Leonora C. Camarao examined the substance seized from
Dexter's house which tested positive for marijuana and shabu. On the witness stand, Maria
confirmed her Physical Science Reports, hereunder reproduced as follows:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh "A" one (1) brick of suspected Marijuana fruiting tops with weight of
831.91 grams wrapped with newspaper print and masking tape with
markings and further placed in one (1) brown long envelope with
description. xxx
Exh "B-B1" Two (2) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
wrapped with masking tape with markings, containing white crystalline
substances with total weight of 0.26 gm and further placed in one (1)
cellophane with description. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drugs. xxx
F I N D I N G S:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave
the following results:
Exh "A" gave POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited
drug. xxx

Exh "B-B1" gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methamphetamine

Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx
C O N C L U S I O N:
Exh "A" contains Marijuana, a prohibited drug. xxx
Exh "B-B1" contains Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated
drug. xxx7
On December 5, 2002, the prosecution formally offered its exhibits, which included the brick
of marijuana leaves and fruiting tops weighing 831.91 grams (Exhibit "A"); and the shabu
which weighed 0.26 grams (Exhibits "B" and "B-1"). Thereafter, the prosecution rested its
case.8
Dexter, through counsel, objected to the offer of evidence on the ground that the same were
"confiscated not from [his] possession as he was then staying in Laoag City." 9
The defense consists of the testimonies of Dexter himself, his sister Henny Gatchalian, and
his relative, Kagawad Ernesto, are predicated on denial and frame-up.
The defense version is as follows:
Thirty-eight-year old Dexter eked out a living as a carpenter. He averred that weeks before
his house was searched, he was already in Gabu, Laoag City, working in a house
construction project of his sister-in-law Rema Pentigrado. He left for Gabu, Laoag City on
July 28, 2001 with his wife. After entrusting his children to the care of his father, and his sister
Henny, he padlocked his place and gave the key to his sister. He declared that he only came
to know of the incident from Henny when he and his wife arrived home from Gabu, Laoag
City.10
Kagawad Ernesto, aged 65 years, Dexter's kin, narrated that on August 13, 2001 he was at
his house. A policeman from the Gonzaga Police Station arrived and asked him to be a
witness in a raid that lawmen would conduct in Dexter's residence. He acceded. However,
upon reaching the premises, he found out that the search had already been conducted. He
was informed that a brick of marijuana had been found inside the house, but he did not see it.
Later, upon the prodding of the police, he signed a confiscation receipt without reading its
contents.11
Henny, aged 35 years, recounted that at about 1:00 p.m. of August 13, 2001, she was at her
father's house when a number of policemen arrived. They asked her to open the door, and as
she was forced to do so, she accompanied the police to the neighboring house and unlocked
the place. Inside, she was placed in one of the rooms and was ordered not to move a
muscle. Thereafter, the policemen ransacked the cabinets, chests and drawers. Meanwhile,

she remained confined in the room, without a clue as to what was taking place. After the
search, the policemen brought her out of the house and showed to her the shabu and
marijuana which the police claimed to have found inside the house. She denied signing
anything save the search warrant. Henny, however, told the court that it was Dexter's
mistress, not his wife, that her brother brought to Gabu, Laoag City. 12
On November 14, 2003, the RTC rendered a joint decision convicting Dexter of the offenses
charged. The fallo reads
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Dexter Torres y De La Cruz "GUILTY"
beyond reasonable doubt in both cases and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
Pesos in Criminal Case No. 08-1334 and, the indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years, one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) Pesos in Criminal Case No. 08-1344.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.13
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi cum frame-up of the accused and upheld in favor
of the prosecution the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
Dexter appealed his conviction to this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 162542-43, praying for
the reversal of the judgment. He claimed that the search warrant had been unlawfully
implemented and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
assigned the following errors purportedly committed by the trial court:
I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the search warrant issued against
herein appellant was validly and lawfully implemented.
II
The court a quo erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime
charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.14
The appeal was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition per Resolution15
of this Court dated April 6, 2005, in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo.16

On July 28, 2005, the judgment of conviction was affirmed, but was modified as to the
penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 08-1344. In disposing the appeal, the CA gave short
shrift to Dexter's claim that the two-witness rule under Sec. 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court was violated. Emphatically pointing out that at the time of the search, Henny was
living in Dexter's house, and therefore a lawful occupant, it held that the two-witness rule
applies only in the absence of a lawful occupant of the searched premises. Citing People v.
Simon,17 and considering that only 0.26 grams of shabu was involved, the appellate court
reduced Dexter's sentence to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional. The petitory portion of the CA
decision reads
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the joint decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 08 of Aparri, Cagayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 08-1334 and 08-1344
is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Dexter Torres y
Dela Cruz is hereby found GUILTY of violating Sections 8 and 16 of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer:
(1) the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) in Criminal Case No. 08-1334; and
(2) an indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2
months of prison correccional in Criminal Case 08-1344.
SO ORDERED.

since she was prevented by the police from actually witnessing the search as it was being
conducted. He points out that her sister was confined by the police in one of the rooms of the
house while the simultaneous search was going on in the other portion thereof. Moreover,
though the raiding party had summoned two barangay kagawads as witnesses, the police
were already through searching the house when Kagawad Ernesto arrived. In other words,
the latter, too, had failed to witness the search. 21
The appeal is not meritorious.
Contrary to appellant's claim, Henny and Barangay Kagawad Ernesto were present when the
lawmen searched his house. The illicit drugs and paraphernalia were found in the master's
bedroom stashed inside the second deck of a wooden cabinet. This is clear from the positive
and categorical testimony of PO2 Tirso Pascual, a member of the raiding team:
FISCAL :
Q What did you do when you arrived at the house of the accused at Salvanera St.
Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan?
A SPO4 Lasam, the officer on the case who was handling the Search Warrant,
informed the persons present at that house of the purpose of the members, Sir.
Q By the way, was the accused present?

18

Dexter sought reconsideration, which the CA denied.19

Unfazed, Dexter, now the appellant, appealed anew to this Court, adopting by way of
manifestation the same arguments before the CA. 20
Appellant insists that the items seized from his house are inadmissible as evidence, being
the fruits of an illegal search. He maintains that the manner of search conducted in his
residence had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section
7), Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.
Appellant argues that Henny is not a "lawful occupant" of the house as contemplated in the
above section. And even if she is one, her presence did not cure the illegality of the search

A Dexter Torres was not present, Sir.

Q Who were in their house at that time?
A His sister, Henny Gatchalian and some of his children, Sir.
xxx
Q And after informing the sister of the accused of your purpose, that is to serve the
search warrant against her brother, what did you do?
A In the presence of the barangay kagawad and the sister of the accused, we
began to search the house, Sir.
Q And were you able to discover anything inside the house of the accused?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What were you able to find out inside the house?

A During the conduct of the search, we were able to recover one brick form of dried
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper, placed inside a wooden cabinet particularly at
the second deck of the wooden cabinet, Sir.
Q Aside from that, what did you see inside the house?
A While conducting the search, we recovered two transparent
plastic sachet containing, which we believe to be shabu and
some other materials such as lighter, aluminum foils, Sir.

The RTC and the CA correctly rejected the testimonies of defense witnesses Henny and
Kagawad Ernesto for being biased and riddled with inconsistencies. We are in full accord
with the following encompassing disquisition of the appellate court:
We note, however, that her credibility is adversely affected by the inconsistencies
in her statements. She could not even exactly say where she was staying before
the police arrived to conduct the search. Thus, the transcript of her testimony
provides as follows:
FISCAL NELJOE CORTES: You do not own a house in Gonzaga?

22

xxx

Witness GATCHALIAN: We only stay in the house of my parents-in-law, Sir.

COURT:

Q: You stated while ago that you were then in your house when they conducted the
search?

Q Where was Henny Gatchalian at the time of the search?

A: Yes, Sir.

A Always beside us, Your Honor.

Q: And you likewise stated that your house is situated beside the house of Dexter
Torres

Q You mean Henny Gatchalian was also inside the house?

A Yes, Your Honor.
FISCAL:
Q So there were five of you inside the house?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: The house of your father is situated about 200 meters away from the house of
Dexter Torres, is it not?
A: Yes, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.

Q: And according to you at that time, you were staying in the house of your fatherin-law?

Q You, Liwag, councilmen Sagnep and Vivit and Gatchalian?

A: I was not staying in the house of my father, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.23

Q: Because you were then staying in the house of Dexter Torres?

PO2 Pascual's above testimony was corroborated by SPO1 Jessie Liwag, likewise a member
of the raiding team that searched the house of the appellant. 24 Besides, Henny and Kagawad
Ernesto, were not the only witnesses to the search; Kagawad Edward Sagnep was also
present during the entire search. This is evinced by the testimonies of PO2 Pascual and the
certification signed by the two Kagawads.

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And as a matter of fact, you were in the house of Dexter Torres when the police
arrived, is it not?
A: I was in the house of my father, Sir.

Q: So you now agree with me that in August 2001, you were staying in the house of
your brother Dexter Torres?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Did you not state a while ago that you are staying in your brother's house?
A: Yes, Sir, but when the police conducted the search, I was in the house of my
father.

The presence of barangay council members Edward Sagnep and Ernesto Vivit during the
search was also sufficiently established. These barangay officials even affixed their
signatures on the confiscation receipt issued by PO3 Jessie Liwag that contains a statement
that the seized properties were found in the presence of Brgy. Kag. Edward R. Sagnep and
Brgy. Kag. Ernesto Q. Vivit.
Barangay kagawad Ernesto Vivit's retraction and assertion that he was not really present
when the policemen searched the house of the accused-appellant fail to persuade. During
cross-examination, Vivit, a relative of the accused-appellant, even testified in court:

Q: Again, you seem not to be telling the truth?

FISCAL NELJOE CORTES: You were required to sign a confiscation receipt?

A: Why not, Sir.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: A while ago also you stated that you are staying in the house of your father-inlaw, which is about 200 meters away?

Q: You were told that the document that you were asked to sign is a Confiscation
Receipt, meaning, the items you enumerated therein were actually taken as a
result of the search?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So at that time you were staying in three houses, in the house of your brother, in
the house of your father-in-law and in the house of your (father)?
A: I am not staying in the house my father-in-law, Sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you signed that document because you know for a fact that the items were
actually recovered inside the house of the accused?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: So your statement earlier that you are staying in your father-in- law's house is
not correct?

Q: And that is the truth?

A: No, Sir.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So the house that you are referring to in your direct examination is actually the
house of your father or the house of Dexter?
A: (I) was only told by Dexter that I will just clean the house if he leaves the place,
Sir.
Consistent with the trial court's own findings as between the testimony of Gatchalian and the
testimonies of the police officers, this Court finds the testimonies of the police officers more
credible. Aside from the principle that testimonies of police officers deserve full faith and
credit given the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly, we note that the
prosecution witnesses gave consistent and straightforward narrations of what transpired on
August 13, 2001. The police officers have consistently testified that Gatchalian was then in
the house of the accused-appellant when they arrived thereat, and that she was with them
when they conducted the search inside the house.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court:

The afore statements of this defense witness clearly established the fact that, there
was nothing irregular in the execution of the search warrant. It also establishes the
material fact that, what was claimed to have been recovered, seized and
confiscated from the cabinet located in one of the rooms of Dexter's house, to wit:
dried marijuana, two (2) plastic sachets of shabu, lighter, match box, and aluminum
foils are true. True, because Ernesto Vivit, a witness to the search and a barangay
councilman signed the confiscation receipt voluntarily because he knew for a fact
that said items were actually recovered from the house of the accused."
Even defense witness Henny Gatchalian mentioned in her testimony that Ernesto
Vivit was with the policemen when they conducted the search. 25

More importantly, it is now too late in the day for appellant to object to the admissibility of the
evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. Though he seasonably objected after the
prosecution formally offered its evidence, his objection was not based on constitutional
grounds, but rather on the ground that he was not in actual possession of the premises at the
time the search was conducted.26
In the case of Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,27 we held:
At any rate, objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility
of the evidence obtained thereby were deemed waived when no objection to the
legality of the search warrant was raised during the trial of the case nor to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained through said warrant.

Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of
"planting" any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article
II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or in the
immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the
same penalty as therein provided.
The incantation of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and standard line of defense in
most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. While such defense cannot and
should not always be considered as contrived, nonetheless, it is generally rejected for it can
easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. Police officers are, after all, presumed to have
acted regularly in the performance of their official functions, in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary, or that they are motivated by ill-will. 29

Indeed, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right,
can be waived and the waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. 28

Appellant next submits that his absence during the search coupled with the fact that he was
not caught in possession of the illicit drugs and paraphernalia are circumstances sufficient
enough to exonerate him.30

Hard to believe is appellant's insinuation that the evidence for the prosecution were planted.
His very conduct following his arrest would belie this allegation:

We are not persuaded.

First. He failed to complain about this matter when he was apprehended nor bestirred himself
to bring it up during his preliminary investigation. He could not even identify the person, the
policeman or policemen who allegedly planted the evidence. In fact, it was only during this
appeal that appellant accentuated this alleged frame-up.

The essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs are the following:
(a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized
by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said
drug is a regulated drug.31

Second. The appellant failed to inform his counsel of the alleged planting of evidence by the
policemen; if he had done so, for sure, the said counsel would have prepared his affidavit
and filed the appropriate motion in court for the suppression of the things/articles seized by
the policemen.

The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely or consciously possessed the
prohibited drug.32

Third. We find it incredible that the policemen planted said evidence in full view of Kagawad
Edward, whose presence during the search was undisputed. This is so because the
policemen could be prosecuted for planting evidence and, if convicted, sentenced to death
under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7659:

The fact that appellant was not in his residence when it was searched nor caught in flagrante
delicto possessing the illicit drugs and paraphernalia does not dent the case of the
prosecution. As a matter of law, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or
other building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that
such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the
same is sufficient to convict. Otherwise stated, the finding of the illicit drugs and
paraphernalia in the house owned by the appellant raised the presumption of knowledge and,
standing alone, was sufficient to convict.33

SECTION 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Officials and Employees and Officers and
Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence. The
maximum penalties provided for [in] Sections 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if
those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials, employees
or officers, including members of police agencies and the armed forces.

This Court, in People v. Tira,34 ruminated on the juridical concept of "possession" under
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and the evidence necessary to prove
the said crime. The same principle applies to prohibited drugs.
x x x This crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to

possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists
when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused.
On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and
dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a
showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact
of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place
under his control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by
the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the place where he
exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from
the fact that the dangerous drugs is in the house or place over which the accused
has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation.
In the instant case, appellant failed to present any evidence to rebut the existence of animus
possidendi over the illicit drugs and paraphernalia found in his residence. His claim that he
was not aware that such illegal items were in his house is insufficient. We have time and
again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. Mere
denial, just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 35 Moreover, his defense of frameup, as we said, is a common and standard line of defense which is invariably viewed with
disfavor, it being capable of easy concoction and difficult to prove. 36 Considering that no clear
and convincing evidence was presented to prove such allegation, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty,37 as well as the principle that findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great
respect and are accorded the highest consideration, 38 must prevail over the appellant's
imputation of ill-motive on the part of the policemen who conducted the search.
The RTC and the CA, in Criminal Case No. 08-1334, correctly meted against appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and the P500,000.00 fine. The crime of violation of Section 8,
Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, for illegal possession of 831.91 grams of marijuana,
a prohibited drug, is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that there are no
qualifying circumstances, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court, however, will modify the penalty the CA imposed upon the appellant in Criminal
Case No. 08-1344.
Under Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of less than 200 grams of regulated drug, in this case shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY

IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams

prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams

prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams

reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams

reclusion perpetua

Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellant is only 0.26
grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellant should have been sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period, as minimum,
to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum, for violation of
Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
In view of the quantity of shabu confiscated in this case, the CA correctly deleted the penalty
of fine imposed on appellant, as the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides only for the penalty of imprisonment.
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, increased the penalty for illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu to
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years and a fine ranging from

three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).

However, since this law is not favorable to appellant, it cannot be given retroactive
application in the instant case. This is the mandate of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
which reads:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
The same law also changed the penalty for illegal possession of 500 grams or more of
marijuana to life imprisonment to death, and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00. Obviously, the amendment of the penalty from reclusion perpetua to life
imprisonment to death in R.A. No. 9165 cannot, likewise, be applied retroactively to the
present case since it would also be unfavorable to appellant.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 08-1334, the appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby
SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ORDERED to pay a fine
of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 08-1344, the appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and is
SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty from Four (4) months and One (1) day of
arresto mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to Three (3) years of prision correccional, in
its medium period, as maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 71176 May 21, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Ministry of Education and Culture), petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AMEREX ELECTRONICS, PHILS.
CORPORATION, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The government, in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, expropriated property
owned by Amerex Electronics, Phils. Corporation. The amount of just compensation for such
property is now the subject of this petition for review on certiorari.
The property involved consists of four (4) parcels of land with a total area of 9,650 square
meters located at No. 2090 Dr. Manuel L. Carreon Street, Manila, a short walking distance
from Herran (now Pedro Gil) Street. Its previous owner, Avegon Inc., offered it for sale to the
City School Board of Manila on July 21, 1973 at P2,300,000. The school board was willing to
buy at P1,800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila intervened and volunteered to negotiate with
Avegon Inc. for a better price.
Inasmuch as the alleged negotiation did not materialize, on June 3, 1974, Avegon Inc. sold
the property and its improvements to Amerex Electronics, Phils. Corporation (Amerex for
brevity) for P1,800,000. Thereafter, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 115571, 115572,
115573 and 115574 were issued in favor of Amerex.
On August 29, 1975, the Solicitor General filed for the Department of Education and Culture
(DEC) a complaint against Amerex for the expropriation of said property before the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 99190). The complaint stated that the property was
needed by the government as a permanent site for the Manuel de la Fuente High School
(later renamed Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High School); that the fair market value of the
property had been declared by Amerex as P2,435,000, and that the assessor had

determined its market value as P2,432,042 and assessed it for taxation purposes in the
amount of P1,303,470. 1
In a motion praying that the plaintiff be authorized to take immediate possession of the
property, the then Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., invoking Presidential
Decree No. 42, informed the court that said assessed value of the property for taxation
purposes had been deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Escolta, Manila on
September 30, 1975.
Consequently, on October 9, 1975, the court issued an order directing the sheriff to place the
plaintiff in possession of the property. The plaintiff took actual possession thereof on October
13, 1975.
Amerex filed a motion to dismiss the complaint stating that while it was not contesting the
merits of the complaint, the same failed to categorically state the amount of just
compensation for the property. It therefore prayed that in consonance with P.D. No. 794, the
just compensation be fixed at P2,432,042, the market value of the property determined by
the assessor which was lower than Amerex's own declaration.
The motion to dismiss was opposed by the plaintiff reasoning that while indeed the market
value as determined by the assessor was lower than that declared by Amerex, the plaintiff
intended to present evidence of a much lower market value.
Alleging that its motion to dismiss merely sought a clarification on the just compensation for
the property, Amerex filed a motion to withdraw the plaintiffs deposit of P1,303,470 with the
PNB without prejudice to its entitlement to the amount of P1,128,572, the balance of the just
compensation of P2,432,042 insisted upon. The plaintiff interposed no objection to the
motion provided that an order of condemnation be issued by the court and that the plaintiff be
allowed to present its evidence on the matter of just compensation.

On March 12, 1976, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave of court to amend its complaint
stating that after it had filed the same, P.D. No. 464 2 was amended by P.D. No. 794; that
Section 92 of said Code, as amended, provided that when private property is acquired for
public use, its just compensation "shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower"; and that the amended complaint would
state that the fair market value of the property could not be in excess of P1,800,000, the
amount for which defendant's predecessor-in-interest had offered to sell said properties to
the Division of Public Schools of Manila and which amount was also the purchase price paid
by Amerex to Avegon Inc. In due course, plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
Amerex, however, opposed the motion for leave to amend the complaint contending that the
plaintiff was insisting on a valuation given by neither the owner nor the assessor as
mandated by P.D. No. 794 but by another person in August 1973 when the peso value was
much higher.
The lower court denied the motion to amend the complaint; but after the plaintiff had filed a
motion for reconsideration, the lower court admitted the amended complaint on April 27,
1976. In the meantime, Amerex submitted to the court "audited financial statements'
consisting of an account stating that the cost of its land and buildings was P2,107,479.48,
and another account stating that it incurred total expenses of P150,539 for their
maintenance. 3 These statements yielded the amount of P2,258,018.48 as the total value of
the property.

On December 3, 1975, the lower court issued an order vesting the plaintiff with the lawful
light to take the property upon payment of just compensation as provided by law. On
December 19, 1975, after the parties had submitted the names of their respective
recommendees to the appraisal committee, the lower court appointed Atty. Narciso Pea,
Aurelio V. Aquino and Atty. Higinio Sunico as commissioners.

The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection and hearing on the value of the property.
On October 18, 1976, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking the disqualification of Engineer
Aurelio B. Aquino as commissioner on the ground that he could not be expected to be
unbiased inasmuch as in the three appraisal reports submitted by Amerex, Aquino had
indicated as fair market value of the property amounts much more than the plaintiffs fair
market value determination of P1,800,000. Said appraisal reports were made by Ampil Realty
and Appraisal Co., Inc. with Aquino signing thereon as real estate appraiser. One report,
dated February 15, 1974 and submitted to Commonwealth Insurance Company indicated
P2,100,000 as the fair market value of the property. 4 Two other reports were made at the
behest of Amerex with one, dated November 15, 1974, fixing the fair market value at
P2,300,000 5, and the other, dated June 5, 1975, with P2,400,000 as the fair market value. 6

Thereafter, the lower court ordered Amerex to submit an audited financial statement on the
acquisition cost of the property including expenses for its improvement. Amerex was also
allowed by the court, after it had filed a second motion therefor, to withdraw the P1,303,470
deposit with the PNB.

Amerex opposed the motion to disqualify Aquino as commissioner, and the court, in its order
of November 5, 1976, denied it. Hence, on January 24, 1977, the commissioners submitted
their appraisal report finding that the fair market value of the property was P2,763,400. The
commissioners, however added:

Under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 464, as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 794, abovequoted, we could have safely
adopted the valuation of the City Assessor in the sum of P2,432,042.00,
this being lower than that declared by the owner in the sum of
P2,435,000.00, although by actual appraisal of the undersigned
Commissioners the property could command a fair market value of
P2,763,400.00 as of the date of our ocular inspection.
Considering, however, that according to the audited statement submitted
by defendant, the acquisition costs and other legal expenses incurred on
the subject property by AMEREX, the grand total of P2,258,018.57, are
(sic) lower than the findings of the undersigned Commissioners, the
explanation being the fact that the price of the sale was a real bargain
possibly due to dire necessities of the seller Avegon, it is respectfully
submitted that the said sum of P2,258,018.57 be adopted for purposes of
determining just compensation payable to defendant AMEREX, which
sum does not exceed, but is even lower than, the fair market value was
determined by the City Assessor and as declared by said defendant. 7
Both parties objected to the report of the commissioners. The plaintiff contended that the
commissioners' conclusion that the fair market value of the property was P2,763,400 was
unsupported by evidence and that their recommended just compensation of P2,258,018.57
was excessive. It reiterated its stand that the just compensation should only be P1,800,000 it
being the price had the sale between the city school board and Avegon Inc. materialized and
also the actual price of the sale between Avegon Inc. and Amerex. On the other hand,
Amerex averred that the recommended just compensation was unjustified in view of the
commissioners' finding that the fair market value of the property was P2,763,400.
On March 15, 1977, the lower court 8 rendered a decision based on the following findings:
The court believes that the findings of the commissioners are supported
by the evidence adduced during the hearings and that their
recommendation is reasonable. The property was originaly owned by
Avegon Inc. and was assessed at P1,079,370.00 by the City of Manila for
the year 1974 (Exh. A-4). Avegon Inc. offered to sell it to the City School
Board on July 21, 1973 at P2,300,000.00 but it accepted the counteroffer of P1,800,000. The negotiations, however, fell through when the city
failed to act (Exhs. C, C-1, C-2, C-3 and C-4). The property was
appraised on February 15, 1974 at P2,100,000.00 at the Instance of
Commonwealth Insurance Company, an affiliate of Warner, Barnes &

Co., Inc. (Exh. G). The defendant company introduced improvements on

the property in the middle part of 1974 worth P260,690.50 (Exhs. 4, 4-A
to 4-J; 11, 13, 14 to 19). After the renovation, the property was again
appraised at the instance of the defendant at P2,300,000.00 on
November 15, 1974 (Exh. 2). Due to the world-wide recession, there
followed a slump in the demand for electronic products. On June 4, 1975,
the Traders Commodities Corporation offered to buy the property at
P2,750,000.00 with a deposit of P50,000.00 as earnest money. The offer
was formally made by the law firm Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Africano and
Associates (Exch. 6). The offer was accepted on June 9, 1975 (Exhs. 7
and 8). The sale was not consummated, however, when the government
notified the defendant in a conference held in Malacanang on June 15,
1975 that it wanted to buy the property for the use of the Manuel de la
Fuente High School (Exh. 9). Because of the failure of the parties to
agree on the price and other conditions of the purchase, the government
filed this action on August 2, 1975.
It is apparent that the commissioners were influenced by the fact that the
city assessors fixed the market value of the property at P2,432,042.00 for
the year 1975 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 464 and that there
was a perfected contract to buy it at P2,750,000.00. No evidence was
presented nor even an allegation made, to show that the government
valuation is fraudulent or erroneous. It must therefore be regular (Rule
131, sec. m) and in view of the reliance of the Presidential Decree upon it
as a standard to be followed by the courts in arriving at the just
compensation of the property when it is acquired by the government, it
has great evidentiary weight. The offer to buy at P2,750,000.00 was
made by one of the most reputable law firms in the country. It is not likely
that it would have lent itself to any fraudulent device or scheme to inflate
the value of the property. Commissioner Pea is a renowned authority on
land registration, and has been a realtor for many years. Atty. Higinio
Sunico is the chief of the Land Management Division, Bureau of Lands,
who was recommended by the plaintiff. Both are well-known for their
probability Although it appears that Mr. Aquino, the commissioner
recommended by the defendant, had occasion in the past to participate
in transactions involving the same property, the court believes that the
concurrence of the other commissioners is a safe guaranty of the
correctness of their appraisal and recommendation.
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered funding the amount of

P2,258.018.57 as just compensation for the property of the defendant
and declaring the plaintiff entitled to possess and approximate it to the
public use alleged in the complaint and to retain it upon payment of the
said amount, after deducting the amount of P1,303,470.00, with legal
interest from October 13, 1975 when the plaintiff was placed in
possession of the real property, and upon payment to each of the
commissioners of the sum of P35.00 for their attendance during the
hearings held on January 23, February 16, May 11, July 23, September
17, October 12 and December 10, 1976, plus P500.00 each for the
preparation of the report, and the costs.
The plaintiff elevated the case to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) for review. On
October 29, 1984, it affirmed the appealed decision with the modification that the plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines be exempted from the payment of the commissioners' fees, the
P500.00 granted each of them for the preparation of the report and the costs.
Its motion for the reconsideration of said decision having been denied, petitioner filed the
instant petition submitting the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not respondent Court erred in not
disqualifying Commissioner Aurelio B. Aquino from
membership in the Committee of Appraisal.
2. Whether or not respondent Court erred in not
totally disregarding the audited statement by the
defendant, which is hearsay in nature and was not
formally offered in evidence.
3. Whether or not respondent Court erred in totally
disregarding petitioner's evidence showing that the
award of just compensation should be only
P1,800,000.00 and not P2,258.018.57 as awarded by
said respondent Court.
The issue of the disqualification of Aquino as commissioner deserves scant attention. Under
Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the court may take the following actions on the
report submitted by commissioners: it may "accept the report and render judgment in
accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners
for further report of facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it

may accept the report in part and reject it in part; . . . ." In other words, the report of the
commissioners is merely advisory and recommendatory in character as far as the court is
concerned. 9
Hence, it hardly matters that one of the three commissioners had a preconceived and biased
valuation of the condemned property. The veracity or exactitude of the estimate arrived at by
the commissioners may not be adversely affected thereby. In fact, the report of only two
commissioners may suffice if the third commissioner dissents from the former's valuation. 10
Indeed, the participation of an allegedly biased commissioner may not result in the total
disregard of an appraisal report in the absence of proof that the two other commissioners
were unduly influenced by their allegedly partial colleague.
The determination of just compensation for a condemned property is basically a judicial
function. As the court is not bound by the commissioners' report, it may make such order or
render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of
its right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property
expropriated. For that matter, this Court may even substitute its own estimate of the value as
gathered from the record. 11 Hence, although the determination of just compensation appears
to be a factual matter which is ordinarily outside the ambit of its jurisdiction, this Court may
disturb the lower court's factual finding on appeal when there is clear error or grave abuse of
discretion. 12
We hold that the courts below made an erroneous determination of just compensation in this
case.
In the first place, the just compensation prescribed herein is based on the commissioners'
recommendation which in turn is founded on the "audited" statements of Amerex that the
property is worth P2,258,018.57. As earlier pointed out, while the court may accept the
commissioners' report and render judgment in accordance therewith, it may not do so without
considering whether the report is supported by evidence. The court is also duty-bound to
determine whether the commissioners had discharged the trust reposed in them according to
well-established rules and formed their judgment upon correct legal principles for they are not
supposed to act ad libitum . 13
Amerex's "audited" statement on the acquisition cost, cost of painting and major repairs,
taxes, and insurance premiums which totals P2,107,479.48, contains the following
certification:
We have checked the details of the transactions indicated in the
foregoing schedule of Land and Building Account as at January 31, 1976

with the books and records of Amerex Electronics (Philippines)

Corporation which were presented to us for examination and have found
the details to be in accordance therewith. We have not made an audit of
the books of accounts of Amerex Electronics (Philippines) Corporation.
Sycip, Gorres Velayo & Co.
PTR No. 4709791
January 23, 1976
Makati, Rizal
(Emphasis supplied). 14
Amerex's other "audited" statement on the maintenance expenses of the property wherein it
allegedly incurred the amount of P150,539.09 contains a similar certification by the same
accounting firm specifically stating that the auditor did not make an audit of the books of
accounts of Amerex. 15
It is clear from these certifications that the accounting firm which issued them merely
compared the figures in the schedules or "audited" statements with those of the records and
books of accounts of Amerex. As no investigation was made as to the veracity of the figures
in the account, there was no audit in the real sense of the term. To audit is to examine an
account, compare it with the vouchers, adjust the same, and to state the balance, by persons
legally authorized for the purpose. 16 While the word "audit" is sometimes restricted to a mere
mathematical process, it generally includes investigation, the weighing of evidence, and
deciding whether items should or should not be included in the account . 17 Audit involves the
exercise of discretion; it is a quasi-judicial function. 18 The accuracy of the "audited"
statements herein is therefore suspect.
Besides the fact that the petitioner was not furnished a copy of the audited statements which
were also not introduced in evidence, Enrique P. Esteban, vice-president and treasurer of
Amerex, and even a representative of the accounting firm, were likewise not presented
during the trial thereby depriving petitioner herein of the opportunity to cross-examine them. It
would therefore be unfair to the petitioner to hold it bound by the "audited" statements of
Amerex which may have been premised on false or mistaken data. 19

This Court having declared as unconstitutional the mode of fixing just compensation under
P.D. No. 794 20 just compensation should be determined either at the time of the actual taking
of the government or at the time of the judgment of the court, whichever comes first. 21
In this case, the issuance of the condemnation order and the actual taking of the property
both occurred in October, 1975. Accordingly, the appraisal made by Ampil Realty and
Appraisal Co., Inc. on June 5, 1975, which date is nearest to that of the actual taking of the
property, should be the basis for the determination of just compensation the record being
bereft of any indications of anomaly appertaining thereto. It should be added that Wenceslao
Ampil, the president of said appraisal firm, testified at the trial and therefore petitioner had the
opportunity to confront him and to question his report. The reasonableness of the June
5,1975 appraisal fixing at P2,400,000 the fair market value of the property, is bolstered by the
fact that on June 4, 1975, Traders Commodities Corporation, through its lawyer, Sedfrey A.
Ordoez offered to buy the property at P2,750,000. 22 It must be emphasized, however, that
legal interest on the balance of the just compensation of P2,400,000 after deducting the
amount of P1,303,470 which had been delivered to Amerex, should be paid by petitioner
from the time the government actually took over the propert y. 23
Much as we realize the need of the government, under these trying times, to get the best
possible price for the expropriated property considering the ceaseless and continuing
necessity for schools, we cannot agree with the petitioner that the just compensation for the
property should be the price it commanded when it was first offered for sale to the City
School Board of Manila. Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that the property is worth
the lower amount of P1,800,000. In contrast, Amerex submitted evidence consisting of the
aforesaid June 5, 1975 appraisal report which fixed the fair market value of the property at
P2,400,000.
WHEREFORE, the just compensation of the property expropriated for the use of the Manuel
de la Fuente High School Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High School) is hereby fixed at Two
Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00). After deducting the amount of
P1,303,470.00 therefrom, the petitioner shall pay the balance with legal interest from October
13, 1975.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., took no part

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. AMADEO TIRA and CONNIE TIRA,
appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 46,
finding appellants Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 16, in relation to Section 20, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, sentencing each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering each of them to pay a fine of
P1,000.000.[2]
The Indictment
The appellants Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira were charged in an Information which reads:
That on or about March 9, 1998, in the Municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,
control and custody the following:
- Three (3) (sic) sachets of shabu
- Six (6) pieces opened sachets of shabu residue
- One (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves
weighing 721 grams
- Six disposable lighter
- One (1) roll Aluminum Foil
- Several empty plastics (tea bag)
- Cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139615. May 28, 2004]

different denominations believed to be proceeds

of the contraband.
without first securing the necessary permit/license to possess the same.
CONTRARY to SEC. 8 in relation to Sec. 20 of RA 6425, as amended.[3]

The Case for the Prosecution[4]

In the evening of February 24, 1998, SPO3 Asidelio Manibog received a verbal instruction
from the Chief of Police Superintendent Wilson R. Victorio to conduct surveillance operations
on the house of Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira at Perez Extension Street because of reported
rampant drug activities in the said area. Manibog formed a team composed of SPO1 Renato
Cresencia, PO3 Reynaldo Javonilla, Jr. and PO3 Efren Abad de Vera to conduct the ordered
surveillance.
At around 8:00 p.m., the group, clad in civilian clothes, arrived at Perez Extension Street. As
they stationed themselves in the periphery of a store, they observed that more than twenty
persons had gone in and out of the Tira residence. They confronted one of them, and asked
what was going on inside the house. The person revealed that Amadeo Tira sold shabu, and
that he was a regular customer. The group went closer to the house and started planning
their next move. They wanted to pose as buyers, but hesitated, for fear of being identified as
PNP members. Instead, they stayed there up to 12:00 midnight and continued observing the
place. Convinced that illegal activities were going on in the house, the policemen returned to
the station and reported to P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio. After hearing their report, P/Supt.
Victorio instructed his men to make an affidavit of surveillance preliminary to an application
for a search warrant.[5]

search warrant.[10] They responded and brought Barangay Kagawad Mario Conwi to witness
the search.[11] At 2:35 p.m. on March 9, 1998, the team proceeded to the Tira residence.
The men found Ernesto Tira, the father of Amadeo, at the porch of the house. They
introduced themselves and told Ernesto that they had a warrant authorizing them to search
the premises. Ernesto led them inside. The policemen found the newly awakened Amadeo
inside the first room[12] of the house.[13] With Barangay Kagawad Conwi and Amadeo Tira,
the policemen proceeded to search the first room to the right (an inner room) and found the
following under the bed where Amadeo slept:[14]
1. 9 pcs. suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride placed in heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets
2. roll aluminum foil
3. several empty plastic transparent
4. used and unused aluminum foil[15]
5. disposable lighters
6. 1 sachet of shabu confiscated from Nelson Tira[16]

On March 6, 1998, SPO3 Asidelio Manibog, PO3 Efren Abad de Vera, SPO1 Renato
Cresencia and PO2 Reynaldo Soliven Javonilla, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Surveillance,
alleging, inter alia, that they were members of the Drug Enforcement Unit of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and that in the evening of February 24, 1998, they confirmed reports of illegal
drug-related activities in the house of the spouses Amadeo and Connie Tira.[6] On March 6,
1998[7] Police Chief Inspector Danilo Bumatay Datu filed an Application for a Search Warrant
in the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, attaching thereto the affidavit of
surveillance executed by his men and a sketch of the place to be searched.[8]

They also found cash money amounting to P12,536 inside a shoulder bag placed on top of
the television, in the following denominations:

Satisfied with the testimonies of SPO3 Manibog, PO3 de Vera, SPO1 Cresencia and PO2
Javonilla, Jr., Judge Aurora A. Gayapa issued a search warrant commanding the applicants
to make an immediate search of the Tira residence at anytime of the day or night, particularly
the first room on the right side, and the two rooms located at Perez south, and forthwith seize
and take possession of the following items:

36 pcs. - 50.00 bill

1. Poor Mans Cocaine known as Shabu;

1 pc. - 5.00 bill

2. Drug-Usage Paraphernalia; and

1 pc. - 1.00 coin[17]

3. Weighing scale.[9]

The policemen listed the foregoing items they found in the house. Amadeos picture was
taken while he was signing the said certification.[18] Ernesto (Amadeos father), also
witnessed the certification.

P/Sr. Inspector Ludivico Bravo, and as head of the team, with SPO3 Cariaga, PO3
Concepcion, Cario, Galima, Villaroya, Andaya, SPO1 Mario Tajon, SPO1 Asterio Dismaya,
SPO1 Renato Cresencia, and PO3 Reynaldo Javonillo were directed to implement the

1 pc. -P1,000.00 bill

4 pcs. - 500.00 bill
52 pcs. - 100.00 bill

100 pcs. - 20.00 bill

53 pcs. - 10.00 bill

A joint affidavit of arrest was, thereafter, executed by SPO3 Asidelio Manibog, SPO1 Mario C.
Tajon, SPO1 Asterio T. Dismaya, SPO1 Renato M. Cresencia and PO3 Reynaldo S.
Javonilla, Jr. for the apprehension of Amadeo Tira and Nelson Tira who were brought to the
police station for custodial investigation. The articles seized were turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Urdaneta Sub-Office, for examination.[19] In turn, a laboratory
examination request was made to the Chief of the Philippine National Police Service-1, SubOffice, Urdaneta, Pangasinan for the following:
a. Three (3) sachets of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride approximately 0.5 grams;

The Case for Accused Amadeo Tira[29]

Amadeo Tira denied the charge. He testified that he was a furniture delivery boy[30] who
owned a one-storey bungalow house with two bedrooms and one masters bedroom. There
was also another room which was divided into an outer and inner room; the latter room had
no windows or ventilation. The house stood twenty meters away from Perez Extension Street
in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and could be reached only by foot.[31] He leased the room located
at the western portion to his nephew Chris Tira[32] and the latters live-in-partner Gemma Lim
for four hundred pesos a month.[33] Chris and Gemma were engaged in the buying and
selling of bananas. He denied that there were young men coming in and out of his house.[34]

b. Six (6) opened sachets of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride (SHABU) residue;

c. Twenty-four (4) pieces of dried marijuana leaves sachet; and
d. One (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride
confiscated from the possession of Nelson Tira.[20]
On March 10, 1998, P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio executed a Compliance/Return of Search
Warrant.[21]
On March 17, 1998, the PNP Crime Laboratory Group in Physical Science Report No. DT057-98 reported that the test conducted by Police Superintendent/Chemist Theresa Ann
Bugayong-Cid,[22] yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
marijuana. The report contained the following findings:
A1 to A3, B1 to B6, E POSITIVE to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug.
C and D1 to D4 POSITIVE to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A1 to A3, B1 to B6 and E contain methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu) and
specimens C and D1 to D24 contain marijuana.[23]
A criminal complaint was filed by P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio against Amadeo Tira and Connie
Tira on March 10, 1998 for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.[24] After finding
probable cause, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rufino A. Moreno filed an Information
against the Tira Spouses for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana, in violation of
Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 6425.[25] A warrant of arrest was issued
against Connie Tira on May 13, 1998. However, when the policemen tried to serve the said
warrant, she could not be found in the given address.[26] She was arrested only on October
6, 1998.[27]
During the trial, the court conducted an ocular inspection of the Tira residence.[28]

In the afternoon of March 6, 1998, he was in his house sleeping when the policemen barged
into his house. He heard a commotion and went out of the room to see what it was all about,
and saw police officers Cresencia, Javonilla and Bergonia, searching the room of his
nephew, Chris Tira. He told them to stop searching so that he could contact his father,
Ernesto, who in turn, would call the barangay captain. The policemen continued with their
search. He was then pulled inside the room and the policemen showed him the items they
allegedly found.[35]
Barangay Kagawad Mario Conwi testified that on March 9, 1998, while he was at Calle
Perez, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Capt. Ludivico Bravo asked to be accompanied to the Tira
residence. Capt. Bravo was with at least ten other policemen. As they parked the car at Calle
Perez, the policemen saw a man running towards the direction of the ricefields. Kagawad
Conwi and some of the policemen chased the man, who turned out to be Nelson Tira. One of
the policemen pointed to a sachet of shabu which fell to the ground near Nelson. The
policemen arrested him and proceeded to the house of Amadeo Tira to serve the warrant.[36]
When they reached the house, the other policemen were waiting. He saw Amadeo and
Connie Tira sitting by the door of the house in the sala. Thereafter, he and the policemen
started the search.[37] They searched the first room located at the right side (if facing south),
[38] and found marijuana, shabu, money and some paraphernalia.[39] An inventory of the
items seized was made afterwards, which was signed by Capt. Bravo and Ernesto Tira.[40]
Alfonso Gallardo, Amadeos neighbor, testified that he was the one who constructed the Tira
residence and that the house initially had two rooms. The first room was rented out, while the
second room was occupied by the Spouses Amadeo and Connie Tira.[41] Subsequently, a
divider was placed inside the first room.[42] He also testified that his house was only three
(3) meters away from that of the Tiras, and that only a toilet separated their houses.[43] He
denied that there were many people going in and out of the Tira residence.[44]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court rendered judgment on September 24, 1998, finding Amadeo Tira guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 807.3 grams of marijuana and 1.001 gram of
shabu. The decretal portion of its decision is herein quoted:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable doubt

accused AMADEO TIRA for Illegal Possession of Marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and
shabu weighing 1.001 gram penalized under Article III, Sections 16 and 20, of Republic Act
6425, known as [the] Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act 7659. The
Court sentences Amadeo Tira to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of
P1,000,000.00.
The amount of P12,536.00 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government which forms part of
the fine; the marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and shabu weighing 1.001 gram are hereby
forfeited in favor of the government; the disposable lighter and the aluminum foil are likewise
forfeited in favor of the government.

Connie testified that she was engaged in the business of buying and selling of fruits, while
her husband was employed at the Glasshouse Trading. One of the rooms in their house was
occupied by their three boarders, two male persons and one female.
In the afternoon of March 9, 1998, she and her husband Amadeo were in their house, while
their boarders were in their respective rooms. At 2:30 p.m., she was in the kitchen taking care
of her one-year-old child. She had other three children, aged eight, four, and three,
respectively, who were watching television. Her husband Amadeo was sleeping in one of the
rooms. Suddenly, five policemen barged into their house and searched all the rooms. The
policemen found and seized articles in the room occupied by one of their boarders. They
arrested Amadeo, and her brother-in-law, Nelson Tira, and brought them to the police station.
The boarders, however, were not arrested.

The Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus.
The Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) is hereby ordered to transmit
the person of Amadeo Tira to the National Bilibid Prison with proper escort within fifteen (15)
days upon receipt of this Order.[45]
The trial court upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 3 issued by Judge Aurora Gayapa. It
found Amadeos defense, that the room where the items were seized was rented out to the
couple Cris Tira and Gemma Lim, unsubstantiated. It held that Amadeo, as owner of the
house, had control over the room as well as the things found therein and that the inner room
was a secret and practical place to keep marijuana, shabu and related paraphernalia.[46]

Joy Fernandez, a neighbor of the Tiras, lived approximately ten meters away from the latter.
Since they had no television, she frequently went to her neighbors house to watch certain
programs. In the afternoon of March 9, 1998, she was at the Tira residence watching Mirasol,
while Connie was in the kitchen nursing her baby. Suddenly, about five or ten persons ran
inside the house and handcuffed Amadeo Tira.[52]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found Connie Tira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
807.3 grams of marijuana and 1.001 gram of shabu. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

Amadeo appealed the decision.[47]

The Case Against Connie Tira
After her arrest, Connie filed a motion to quash search warrant,[48] alleging that the police
officers who applied for the said warrant did not have any personal knowledge of the reported
illegal activities. She contended that the same was issued in violation of Section 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, as the judge issued the search warrant without conducting searching
questions and answers, and without attaching the records of the proceedings. Moreover, the
search warrant issued was in the nature of a general warrant, to justify the fishing expedition
conducted on the premises.
On October 26, 1998, the presiding judge ordered Judge Aurora A. Gayapa to forward the
stenographic notes of the applicant and the witnesses.[49] Connie was arraigned on
November 9, 1998, pending the resolution of the motion. She pleaded not guilty to the charge
of illegal possession of shabu and marijuana.[50] The trial court thereafter issued an Order
on November 11, 1998, denying the motion to quash.[51] It did not give credence to the
allegations of Connie Tira, and found that Judge Gayapa issued the search warrant after
conducting searching questions, and in consideration of the affidavit of witness Enrique
Milad.

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable doubt

accused CONNIE TIRA for Illegal Possession of Marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and shabu
weighing 1.001 gram penalized under Article III, Section 16 and 20, of Republic Act 6425,
known as [the] Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act 7659, the Court
sentences Connie Tira to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of
P1,000,000.00.
The amount of P12,536.00 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government which forms part of
the fine; the marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and shabu weighing 1.001 gram are hereby
forfeited in favor of the government; the disposable lighter and the aluminum foil are,
likewise, forfeited in favor of the government.
The Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) is hereby ordered to transmit
the person of Connie Tira to the National Bilibid Prisons with proper escort within fifteen (15)
days upon receipt of his Order.[53]
The trial court did not believe that Connie Tira had no knowledge, control and possession of
the shabu and marijuana found in the first or inner room of their house. It stressed that
Connie and Amadeo Tira jointly controlled and possessed the shabu and marijuana that the
policemen found therein. It ratiocinated that it was unusual for a wife not to know the
existence of prohibited drugs in the conjugal abode. Thus, as husband and wife, the accused

conspired and confederated with each other in keeping custody of the said prohibited
articles.[54] The court also held that Connie Tiras flight from their house after the search was
an indication of her guilt. Connie, likewise, appealed the decision.[55]

The appellant Connie Tira avers that she never fled from their house after the policemen had
conducted the search. Neither was she arrested by the policemen when they arrested her
husband.

The Present Appeal

The appeals have no merit.
In their brief, the appellants Amadeo and Connie Tira assigned the following errors
committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE
FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

Contrary to the appellants claim, appellant Amadeo Tira was present when the policemen
searched the inner room of the house. The articles and substances were found under the
bed on which the appellant Amadeo Tira slept. The policemen did not find the said articles
and substances in any other room in the house:
Q So when you reached the house of Amadeo Tira at the Tiras compound, you saw the
father and you told him you are implementing the Search Warrant and your group was
allowed to enter and you are allowed to search in the presence of Amadeo Tira?

II
A Yes, Sir.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH WAS ILLEGALLY
MADE.

PROS. DUMLAO

III

Q In the course of your search, what did you find?

ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT AMADEO TIRA IS GUILTY AS CHARGED, THE

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HIM
AND HIS WIFE CONNIE TIRA.[56]

WITNESS:

The Court shall resolve the assigned errors simultaneously as they are interrelated.

Q Where, in what particular place did you find?

The appellants contend that the search conducted by the policemen in the room occupied by
Chris and Gemma Lim, where the articles and substances were found by the policemen, was
made in their absence. Thus, the search was made in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

A Under the bed inside the room of Amadeo Tira, Sir

A We found out suspected marijuana leaves, Sir.

Q What else did you find aside from marijuana leaves?

A We also find suspected sachet of shabu, Sir.

SEC. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two witnesses. No

search of house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
The appellants posit that the articles and substances found by the policemen in their house
are inadmissible in evidence, being the fruits of a poisonous tree. Hence, they contend, they
should have been acquitted of the crime charged. The appellants further assert that the
prosecution failed to prove that they owned the prohibited drugs, and that the same were in
their possession and control when found by the policemen. They insist that it cannot be
presumed that they were in control and possession of the said substances/articles simply
because they owned the house where the same were found, considering that the room was
occupied by Chris Tira and his live-in partner, Gemma Lim.

Q What else?
A Lighter, Sir.
COURT:
Q If that shabu will be shown to you, could you identify the same?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.

Q About the marijuana leaves, if shown to you could you identify the same?

Q What mark did you place?

A Yes, Sir.

A My signature, Sir.[57]

PROS. DUMLAO:

PROS. TOMBOC:

Q What else did you find out aside from the marijuana leaves, shabu and lighter?

Q And when you were allowed to enter the house, did you notice who was present?

A I have here the list, Sir.

A I noticed the presence of Connie Tira, Sir.

One (1) brick of marijuana

Q When you said Connie Tira, is she the same Connie Tira the accused in this case?

24 pcs. tea bag of marijuana

A Yes, Sir, she was taking care of the baby.

9 pcs. sachets of suspected shabu

Q Who else?

6 disposable lighters

A We also noticed the presence of Amadeo Tira, Sir.

1 roll of aluminum foil

Q What was he doing there?

several empty plastic; several used

A He was newly awake, Sir.

and unused aluminum foil

Q Upon entering the house, what did you do?

one (1) sachet of shabu confiscated from Nelson Tira; and

A We entered and searched the first room, Sir.

P12,536.00 cash in different denominations proceeds of the contrand (sic).

Q What did you find out?

COURT:

A Shabu and Marijuana and paraphernalia, Sir.

Q Where did you find the money?

Q Are you one of those who entered the house?

A Near the marijuana at the bag, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.

Q About the money, could you still identify if shown to you?

Q Can you mention to the Honorable Court those items that you searched in the house of
Connie Tira and Amadeo Tira?

A Yes, Sir.
Q When you found shabu, lighter, marijuana, and money, what did you do?
A We marked them, Sir.
Q All of the items?
A Only the marijuana, Sir.

A As per in (sic) our records, we found three (3) sachets containing suspected
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride Shabu residue; one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana
leaves weighing more or less 750 grams; twenty-four (24) tea bags containing dried
marijuana leaves; six (6) disposable lighter; one (1) roll aluminum foil; several empty plastics
(tea bag); several used and unused aluminum foil; and cash money amounting to P12,536.00
in different denominations believe[d] to be proceeds of the contraband, Sir.
Q You said you recovered one (1) brick of marijuana leaves, showing to you a (sic) one (1)
brick suspected to be marijuana leaves, is this the one you are referring to?

A Yes, Sir, this is the one.[58]

Appellant Amadeo Tira was not the only witness to the search; Kagawad Mario Conwi and
Ernesto Tira, Amadeos father, were also present. Ernesto Tira even led the policemen inside
the house. This is evidenced not only by the testimony of Kagawad Conwi, but also by the
certification signed by the appellant himself, along with Kagawad Conwi and Ernesto Tira.[59]

Q And it is in that room where your husband was sleeping and where those articles were
taken?
A No, Sir.
Q Where are (sic) those things came (sic) from?

The trial court rejected the testimony of appellant Amadeo Tira that the inner room searched
by the policemen was occupied by Chris Tira and his girlfriend Gemma Lim with the following
encompassing disquisition:

A At the room where my boarders occupied, Sir.

The defense contention that a couple from Baguio City first occupied the first room, the Court
is not persuaded because they did not present said businessmen from Baguio City who were
engaged in vegetable business. Secondly, the same room was rented by Chris Tira and
Gemma Lim. Chris Tira and Gemma Lim, engaged in banana business, were not presented
in Court. If it were true that Chris Tira and Gemma Lim were the supposed lessees of the
room, they should have been apprehended by the searching party on March 9, 1998, at
about 2:30 p.m. There was no proof showing that Chris Tira and Gemma Lim ever occupied
the room, like personal belongings of Chris Tira and Gemma Lim. The defense did not even
show proof showing that Chris Tira reside in the first room, like clothings, toothbrush, soap,
shoes and other accessories which make them the residents or occupants of the room.
There were no kitchen plates, spoons, powder, or soap evidencing that the said room was
occupied by Chris Tira and Gemma Lim. Amadeo Tira contended that Chris Tira and Gemma
Lim are engaged in banana business. There are no banana stored in the room at the time of
the search and both of them were out of the room at the time of the search. And why did not
Amadeo Tira supply the police officers of the personal identities and address where they
could find Chris Tira and Gemma Lim at the time of the search. If they were banana dealers,
they must be selling their banana in the market and they could have pointed them in the
market.[60]

A They were inside their room, Sir.

We are in full accord with the trial court. It bears stressing that the trial court conducted an
ocular inspection of the house of the appellants, and thus, had first hand knowledge of the
layout of the house. Besides, the testimony of the appellant Amadeo Tira, that the inner room
was occupied by Chris Tira and Gemma Lim who were not there when the search was
conducted, is belied by the testimony of the appellant Connie Tira that the room was
occupied by two male and one female boarders who were in the room when the policemen
searched it. Thus:

Q So, at that time where were those boarders?

Q How many of them?

A Two (2) male persons and one woman, Sir.
Q And do you know their whereabout[s], Madam Witness?
A No more, Sir.
Q When did they leave, Madam Witness?
A At that time, they left the house, Sir.
Q They were not investigated by the police?
A No, Sir.[61]
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the only occupants of the house when the
policemen conducted their search were the appellants and their young children, and that the
appellants had no boarders therein.
Before the accused may be convicted of violating Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the essential elements of the crime, viz: (1) the actual possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and,
(3) the accused freely or consciously possessed the said drug.[62]

Q You said that while taking care of your baby, several policemen barged [sic] your house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And they proceeded to your room where your husband was sleeping at that time?
A Yes, Sir.

The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following: (a)
the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by
law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug
is a regulated drug. This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to
possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual

possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
the immediate physical possession or control of the accused.[63] On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found.[64] Exclusive possession or control is not necessary.[65] The accused cannot avoid
conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is
located, is shared with another.[66]

guilty of two separate crimes: (a) possession of regulated drugs under Section 16, in relation
to Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for their possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of the
law, for their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug. Although only one Information was
filed against the appellants, nevertheless, they could be tried and convicted for the crimes
alleged therein and proved by the prosecution. In this case, the appellants were charged for
violation of possession of marijuana and shabu in one Information which reads:

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of nonexclusive possession would not exonerate the accused.[67] Such fact of possession may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the
drug.[68] Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the
place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be
presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the
accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation.[69]

That on or about March 9, 1998, in the Municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,
control and custody the following:

In this case, the prohibited and regulated drugs were found under the bed in the inner room
of the house of the appellants where they also resided. The appellants had actual and
exclusive possession and control and dominion over the house, including the room where the
drugs were found by the policemen. The appellant Connie Tira cannot escape criminal
liability for the crime charged simply and merely on her barefaced testimony that she was a
plain housewife, had no involvement in the criminal actuations of her husband, and had no
knowledge of the existence of the drugs in the inner room of the house. She had full access
to the room, including the space under the bed. She failed to adduce any credible evidence
that she was prohibited by her husband, the appellant Amadeo Tira, from entering the room,
cleaning it, or even sleeping on the bed. We agree with the findings and disquisition of the
trial court, viz:

- Twenty-four (24) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves weighing 86.3 grams

- Three (3) pieces (sic) sachets of shabu

- Six (6) pieces opened sachets of shabu residue
- One (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves weighing 721 grams

- Six [6] disposable lighter

- One (1) roll Aluminum foil
- Several empty plastics (tea bag)
- Cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in different denominations believed to be proceeds
of the contraband.
without first securing the necessary permit/license to posses[s] the same.

The Court is not persuaded that Connie Tira has no knowledge, control and possession of
the shabu and marijuana (Exhibits M, N, O and P) found in their room. Connie Tira and
Amadeo Tira jointly control and possess the shabu (Exhibits M and N) and marijuana
(Exhibits O and P) found in the room of their house. It is unusual for a wife not to know the
existence in their conjugal abode, the questioned shabu and marijuana. The husband and
wife (Amadeo and Connie) conspired and confederated with each other the keeping and
custody of said prohibited articles. Both of them are deemed in possession of said articles in
violation of R.A. 6425, Section 8, in relation to Section 20.
The Crimes Committed by the Appellants
The trial court convicted the appellants of violating Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of
Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the
appellants should be convicted of violating Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. We
do not agree with the trial court and the OSG. We find and so hold that the appellants are

CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, in relation to Sec. 20 of R.A. 6425, as amended.[70]

The Information is defective because it charges two crimes. The appellants should have filed
a motion to quash the Information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
before their arraignment. They failed to do so. Hence, under Rule 120, Section 3 of the said
rule, the appellants may be convicted of the crimes charged. The said Rule provides:
SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty
for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.
The Proper Penalties On the Appellants

The crime of violation of Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for illegal
possession of 807.3 grams of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Considering that there are no qualifying circumstances, the appellants are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code and are ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

Puno, J., on official leave.

Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellants is only 1.001
grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum, to three (3)
years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum, for violation of Section 16 of
Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, appellants Amadeo and Connie Tira are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended,
and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ORDERED to pay
a fine of P1,000,000.00. The said appellants are, likewise, found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and are
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of
arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum, to Three (3) years of prision correccional, in
its medium period, as maximum.
No costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 168773

Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.

ELIZA ABUAN, Petitioner,

October 27, 2006

- versus
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

During the arraignment on November 12, 1998, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge.[7] During the pre-trial on November 19, 1998, Abuan rejected the
prosecutions proposal for her to admit the validity of Search Warrant No. 98-62, and that, in
the enforcement thereof, 57 sachets of shabu were found in her house and later confiscated
by the policemen.[8] She maintained that the warrant was invalid and that any material
allegedly confiscated from her house was inadmissible in evidence.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726 and Resolution[2] denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof. The CA affirmed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 41, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D, convicting Eliza T. Abuan of
violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Antecedents
A criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan
charging Abuan with violating R.A. No. 6425, as amended. On May 8, 1998, she filed a
motion to quash the criminal complaint, praying that pending the resolution of her motion, she
be allowed to post bail without waiving her right to question her arrest and assail Search
Warrant No. 98-62.[4] The public prosecutor conformed to the motion. Thus, the motion was
granted and bail was fixed at P60,000.00.[5]
The MTC found probable cause against Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, and recommended the filing of an Information against her. It ordered
the elevation of the records to the RTC for further proceedings.
On November 12, 1998, an Amended Information was filed in the RTC of Dagupan City,
charging Abuan with violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The
inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about 8:45 oclock in the morning of May 6, 1998 at Brgy, Lasip, [M]unicipality of
Calasiao, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has
in her possession, custody and control of the following to wit:
Fifty seven (57) small heat-sealed plastic sachets of met[h]aphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
weighing 5.67 grams.
one (1) roll aluminum foil and assorted plastic (luminous) sachets.
without authority to possess the same.
CONTRARY to Art. III, Section 16 of R.A. 6425, as amended.[6]

The court set the initial presentation of evidence by the prosecution on December 3, 1998.
However, on said date, accused filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, alleging that there was
no probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62; the applicant, Cesar
Ramos, had no personal knowledge of his claim that she had in her possession
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and other drug paraphernalia; Marissa Gorospe
was a fictitious person, and her testimony was fabricated to convince the Executive Judge to
make a finding of probable cause required for the issuance of a search warrant; and the
Executive Judge failed to ask searching questions and elicit from Gorospe the particularity of
the alleged paraphernalia in Abuans possession. Abuan asserted that since the search
warrant is void, whatever evidence was discovered as a result of the search conducted
based on the warrant was inadmissible in evidence.[9]
Instead of allowing the accused to present her evidence in support of her motion, the court
declared that any such evidence may be adduced at the trial.[10]
The Case for the Prosecution
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 5, 1998, SPO2 Marcelino Gamboa and SPO2 Beliguer de Vera
of the Calasiao Police Station received information from a confidential informant that Abuan
was conducting illegal drug activities in her house at Barangay Lasip, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Acting on the said information, Gamboa and de Vera conducted surveillance-monitoring
operations on her residence, three times for more than an hour. They saw more or less 20
people who were coming in and out of Abuans house. According to the informant, these
people were drug addicts,[11]and Abuan was a known drug pusher.[12] On the same day, the
officers, through SPO3 Cesar Ramos, applied for a warrant[13] with Executive Judge
Eugenio G. Ramos of the RTC in Lingayen, Pangasinan, to search the house of Abuan for
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), weighing scale, aluminum foil, and burner.
The application was docketed as Search Warrant No. 98-62. To establish probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant, Ramos presented their informant, Marissa Gorospe, who
was subjected to searching questions by the Executive Judge.[14]
Gorospe testified that she was a resident of Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan. She
knew Abuan because they were employed as dealers of Avon Cosmetics. Abuan was a
prominent personality in Barangay Lasip.[15] Her unnumbered house is a green bungalowtype, cemented and decorated with ornamental plants up front. She visited Abuan in her
house at least three to four times a week.[16] She first came upon the drugs in Abuans house
when the latter invited her to a jamming and drinking session. She refused because she had

to go home to Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan, a place of considerable distance

from Calasiao.[17] Abuan then suggested that they use the shabu that she kept
inside her bedroom instead. Abuan kept a substantial amount of shabu in her house and sold
it.[18] The informant further narrated that several people, including teenagers, arrived in the
house of Abuan and bought the substance.[19] During her visits, she observed that Abuan
placed shabu inside plastic bags. She also saw weighing scales and paraphernalias used in
sniffing shabu. Being a mother herself, she did not want teenagers and her children to
become drug addicts.[20] Gorospe identified and affirmed the truth of the contents of her
deposition.[21]
The Executive Judge found probable cause and issued Search Warrant No. 98-62 which
reads:
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath thru searching
questions on the applicant, SPO3 Cesar A. Ramos, PNP, and his witnesses that there is
probable cause to believe that the respondent is in possession without any authority to do so
in violation of R.A. 6425 of the following:
Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)
Tooter
Weighing Scale
Aluminum Foil
Burner

Upon arriving at the premises, Officers De Vera, Gamboa and Garcia and Mangaliag entered
the house; the rest of the policemen remained outside. Mangaliag introduced the police
officers to Abuan who presented Search Warrant No. 98-62 to her. Abuan read the warrant
and permitted the officers to conduct the search.[23]
De Vera, Mangaliag, Gamboa and Garcia entered the bedroom and found 57 sachets of
suspected shabu, one roll of aluminum foil and assorted luminous plastic sachets in the
drawer just beside Abuans bed.[24] The police officers confiscated all these and brought
them, along with Abuan, to the police station where an inventory of the items was made.
Mangaliag and Garcia affixed their signatures on the inventory/receipt,[25] but Abuan refused
to sign it.[26]
The police officers prepared a certification of orderly search which Garcia and Mangaliag
also signed. Abuan likewise refused to sign the certification.[27] The police officers requested
the PNP Crime Laboratory Unit of Lingayen, Pangasinan to conduct a laboratory examination
on the confiscated substance.[28] According to the laboratory examination conducted by
P/Supt. Theresa Ann Bugayong CID, Regional Chief Chemist, the 57 sachets of the
suspected shabu weighing 5.67 grams gave positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.[29]
After presenting its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence Search Warrant No. 9862, the Receipt of the Property Seized, the Physical Science Report and the articles
confiscated from Abuans house.[30] However, Abuan objected to the admission of the search
warrant and the articles confiscated based thereon on the ground that the warrant was
issued without probable cause.[31] The court admitted the documentary evidence of the
prosecution subject to the comment or objection interposed by accused and the eventual
determination of their probative weight.[32]
The Case for the Accused

which she keeps and conceals in her house premises at Brgy. Lasip, Calasiao, Pangasinan,
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to make an immediate search at any time of the day or
night and take possession of the above-described properties and bring them to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
This Search Warrant shall be valid only for ten (10) days from its issuance, thereafter, the
same shall be void.[22]
On May 6, 1998, police operatives composed of Col. Fidel Posadas, Major Froilan Perez,
SPO2 Gamboa, SPO2 Madrid, SPO2 de Vera, PO2 Tomelden, PO2 Rosario, PO3 Ubando,
PO1 Moyano and PO3 Vallo went to Barangay Lasip to enforce the search warrant. However,
before proceeding to Abuans residence, the policemen invited Barangay Captain Bernardo
Mangaliag and Kagawad Miguel Garcia of Barangay Lasip to witness the search.

Abuan testified that she was jobless in 1998. Her parents and her sister Corazon Bernadette
sent her money from Canada once or twice a month to support her and her daughters. It was
her father who spent for the education of her daughters.[33] She was married to Crispin
Abuan, a policeman, but they separated in 1997.[34] She did not know any person by the
name of Marissa Gorospe. She did not work for Avon Cosmetics nor used any of its products.
[35]
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 6, 1998, she was with her two daughters, 21-year old Ediliza Go
and 9-year old Mae Liza Abuan.[36] They were still in bed inside their room. Suddenly, four
armed men barged into their house and declared a raid.[37] About eight to ten others were
outside her house. She inquired if they had a search warrant but she was not shown any.[38]
The men searched her house for about 10 to 15 minutes and turned up with nothing.[39]
Some of the men went out of the house and boarded a jeepney. The men outside again went
into the bedroom and came out with powder placed in a plastic.[40] At this instance,
Barangay Captain Bernardo Mangaliag was brought to the scene and was shown the powder
substance recovered from her bedroom. She refused to sign the inventory and receipt of the

property seized and the certification of orderly search. However, Mangaliag signed the same.
[41]
She declared that the sachets/substances which the policemen claimed to have found in her
house were merely planted to implicate her. The raid as well as the charge against her were
instigated by her brother Arsenio Tana, who was enraged when she refused his demand to
entrust the properties of the family to the care of his son. It appears that Tana carried out his
threat to have her house raided since the policemen did come to her house on May 6, 1998.
[42] Her brother was by the gate of her house at the time of the raid.
Abuan also testified that, during the raid, she saw Tana talking to the police officers who
arrested her. Abuan also declared that the money kept inside a box in her room amounting to
P25,000.00 (US$1,100.00) given by her sister Corazon Bernardino had gone missing after
the raid.[43] She did not file any charge for the loss of her money because she was scared.
She did not know who took it.
Barangay Captain Robert Calachan of Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan and
Mercedes Carvajal, an employee of Avon Cosmetics in Dagupan holding the position of team
leader, testified for accused.
Calachan declared that he was born in Barangay Sapang and never left the place. He was
familiar with the residents of the small barangay.[44] He issued a certification[45] stating that
as per record of this barangay, a certain Marissa Gorospe is not a resident of this barangay.
Before he signed the certification, he inquired from the barangay members if they knew a
Marissa Gorospe, and he was told that no one by that name was a transient.[46]
Carvajal, for her part, testified that, based on the certification dated November 12, 1998 of
Dagupan City Avon Branch Manager Gigi dela Rosa, Marissa Gorospe is not a registered
dealer of Avon Dagupan Branch based on our records. She did not know any Avon
Cosmetics employee or dealer named Marissa Gorospe in Pangasinan. She further testified
that she had been a team leader/dealer of Avon Cosmetics for 21 years already, and that
Abuan was not such a dealer/employee. On cross-examination, she declared that she was a
team leader of Avon Cosmetics (Dagupan Branch), and thus had no participation in the
preparation of the certification of Gigi dela Rosa and was not in a position to know if the
certification was correct.
On March 28, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused guilty of the charge.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 15
(sic), Article 6425, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of
PRISION CORRECTIONAL.

The prohibited drug and paraphernalia seized from the accused are hereby confiscated in
favor of the government and should be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for
disposition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[47]
The trial court declared that the testimonies of police officers Gamboa and de Vera should be
accorded great weight and credence as they testified positively regarding what transpired
during the raid. In contrast, the testimony of accused was self-serving, negative and feeble.
She failed to prove that it was her brother who manipulated the unfortunate events. Neither
was she able to prove ill motive on the part of the police officers who conducted a search in
her house; hence, the presumption is that they regularly performed their duties. The failure of
the accused to present her two daughters as witnesses amounted to suppression of
evidence, giving rise to the presumption that if they had been presented, their testimonies
would be adverse to her.
On the issue of the validity of the search warrant, the court ruled that there was probable
cause for its issuance. The proceedings conducted by the Execute Judge relative to the
application of the police for a search warrant, its issuance and implementation were valid,
regular, and in accordance with the requirements of the law and Constitution.[48] The trial
court declared that Gorospe may have lied about her address and being a dealer of Avon
Cosmetics; however, it does not necessarily mean that she was a fictitious person. It
explained that Gorospe may have lied a little in order to conceal herself for her protection, but
the rest of her testimony constituted sufficient evidence of probable cause.
Abuan filed her motion for reconsideration dated April 16, 2001, which the court denied in an
Order[49] dated May 10, 2001. She appealed the decision to the CA, where she averred that:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE ALLEGED SHABU
AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
THEREBY DISREGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHOBITION AGAINST FRUITS
OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE GLARING DISCREPANCIES IN
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE SUPPOSED EYEWITNESSES.
Abuan insisted that the applicant failed to show probable cause for the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 98-62. Marissa Gorospe is a fictitious person whose alleged testimony is
fabricated and was used by the police officers to convince the Executive Judge that there
was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant when, in fact, there was none.
The Executive Judge failed to ask Gorospe searching questions. Consequently, Search
Warrant No. 98-62 is void and the substances and paraphernalia confiscated by the
policemen are inadmissible in evidence. She further claimed that the testimonies of De Vera

and Gamboa were pockmarked with inconsistencies and as such, the trial court should not
have given them probative weight.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that the trial court merely
confirmed Executive Judge Ramos finding of probable cause. Besides, appellant failed to file
a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 98-62, hence, was estopped from assailing it and the
search and seizure conducted thereafter. The OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Demaisip
v. Court of Appeals.[50] It likewise claimed that the inconsistencies adverted to by appellant
pertained merely to collateral matters and were not determinative of her guilt or innocence.
As gleaned from the evidence of the prosecution, her defenses could not prevail over the
evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC decision. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
March 28, 1001 in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Dagupan City convicting Eliza T. Abuan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[51]
The appellate court ruled that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of
Abuans guilt for the crime charged. The alleged discrepancies in the testimonies of Gamboa
and de Vera were peripheral matters. Moreover, Abuans failure to assail the legality of the
search and seizure conducted by the policemen before her arraignment was equivalent to a
waiver of her right to assail the search warrant. The CA cited the ruling of this Court in
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals.[52]
Abuan filed a motion for reconsideration,[53] reiterating her argument that the search warrant
is not valid. She also argued that she did not waive her right to assail the validity of the
search warrant at her arraignment and during the trial. She maintained that the CA should not
rely on the evaluation by the RTC of the witnesses credibility, and that the inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were on material relevant details.
The appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution[54] dated May 26, 2005 on its finding
that no new and substantial matter was presented to warrant reconsideration thereof.[55]
In the instant petition, Abuan, now petitioner, asserts that
I
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID DESPITE
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
II
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS DEEMED WAIVED AFTER ARRAIGNMENT.

III
THE CA ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE SHABU AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA
ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM THE PETITIONER AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
IV
THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER.[56]
Petitioner avers that the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge was void because the
circumstances leading to its issuance were not based on probable cause but on mere
fabrications. She points out that according to Gorospe, she became acquainted with
petitioner and visited her in her house because of their employment with Avon Cosmetics.
However, considering that she and Gorospe were never employed by Avon Cosmetics and
were not even acquainted, such testimony is false. Thus, the search warrant should be
declared invalid as it is based on the testimony of a fictitious person, a planted witness with a
fabricated testimony and, consequently, any evidence discovered on the basis thereof should
be suppressed and excluded in accordance with Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.
Petitioner points out that with the inadmissibility of the shabu and other paraphernalia, the
appellate court should have acquitted her of the charges by reason of the prosecutions
failure to prove the commission of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner insists that, based on the records, she sought to suppress the search warrant
throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. She rejected the prosecutions offer to
admit the validity of the search warrant and even filed a motion to suppress the search. She
was thus not proscribed from filing her motion to suppress the search warrant even after the
arraignment.
In its Comment,[57] the OSG maintains that the search warrant is valid. It insists that the CA
correctly ruled that the requisites of a valid search warrant were present, noting that the
Executive Judge conducted searching questions and answers on the person of Marissa
Gorospe. It asserts that, in applying for a search warrant, a police officer need not possess
personal knowledge regarding an illegal activity; it is the witness who should possess such
personal knowledge, and upon whose testimony under oath probable cause may be
established. In this case, it was Gorospe who narrated, under oath and before the judge, her
personal knowledge of (petitioners) criminal activities.[58]
The OSG maintains that petitioner in effect waived whatever objections she had regarding
the validity of the search warrant. It points out that she never questioned the warrant before
the court which issued the same, never questioned nor moved for the quashal of the warrant
before her arraignment. And while petitioner was allowed to present evidence on the alleged
invalidity of the search warrant, this did not cure her omission or inaction in raising the issue
at the proper time.
In her Reply,[59] petitioner declares that a close scrutiny of the judges investigation of
Gorospe would reveal that her personal circumstances are pivotal in her acquisition of
personal knowledge regarding the alleged possession of shabu by petitioner. If these
personal circumstances are fabricated, then such personal knowledge regarding the
possession bears no credit.

Petitioner likewise maintains that contrary to the allegations of the OSG, she did not waive
her right to question the validity of the warrant. She could not have done any better under the
circumstances at that time because all the evidence against Gorospe was made known and
available to her only after her arraignment.
The Court is tasked to resolve the following threshold issues: (a) whether petitioner waived
her right to question Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the admissibility of the substances and
paraphernalia and other articles confiscated from her house based on said warrant; and (b)
whether the prosecution adduced evidence to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioner Did not Waive
Her Right to File a Motion
To Quash Search Warrant
No. 98-62 and for the
Suppression of the Evidence
Seized by the Police Officers

In the present case, petitioner reserved her right to question Search Warrant No. 98-62 when
she filed her motion for bail in the RTC. The public prosecutor conformed to the motion.
During pre-trial in the RTC, petitioner rejected the prosecutions proposal for her to admit the
validity of Search Warrant No. 98-62, insisting that it was void. In her motion to suppress,
petitioner averred that the search warrant is void for the following reasons: lack of probable
cause; failure of the Executive Judge to ask searching questions on Gorospe; and the
evidence seized by the police officers on the basis of the search warrant are inadmissible in
evidence. She likewise prayed that the search warrant be nullified, and that the evidence
seized by the policemen on the basis of said warrant be suppressed.[62]
Petitioner was ready to adduce evidence in support of her motion, but the court declared that
this should be done during the trial. Petitioner thus no longer assailed the ruling of the trial
court and opted to adduce her evidence at the trial. She likewise objected to the admission of
the search warrant and the evidence confiscated by the police officers after the search was
conducted. It bears stressing that the trial court admitted the same and she objected thereto.
It cannot, therefore, be said that petitioner waived her right to assail the search warrant and
object to the admissibility of the regulated drugs found in her house.
On the second issue, the trial courts ruling (which the appellate court affirmed) that the
prosecution adduced evidence to prove petitioners guilt of crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt is correct.

Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 reads:
Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to
quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and
acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has
been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search
warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
The Court ruled in the Malaloan case that the motion to quash the search warrant which the
accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress the resolution of the court not
on the motion to quash the search warrant and to suppress evidence shall be subject to any
proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.[60] A motion to quash a search warrant may
be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the
property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.[61] Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court provides that the court may hear the motion, as follows:
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on
affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
The elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused was in possession of the regulated drugs; (b) the accused was fully and consciously
aware of being in possession of the regulated drug; and (c) the accused had no legal
authority to possess the regulated drug.[63] Possession may be actual or constructive. In
order to establish constructive possession, the People must prove that petitioner had
dominion or control on either the substance or the premises where found.[64] The State must
prove adequate nexus between the accused and the prohibited substance.[65] Possession of
dangerous drugs constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or aminus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of any satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence is
shifted to petitioner to explain the absence of aminus possidendi.[66]
We agree with the trial courts finding that, indeed, petitioner had in her possession and
control 57 small, heat-sealed sachets of shabu weighing 5.67 gm when Search Warrant No.
98-62 was served on her. As testified to by the witnesses of the prosecution, the police
officers, in the presence of Garcia and Mangaliag, found the said substances in a drawer in

her bedroom. Petitioner likewise failed to present any legal authority to justify her possession
of the regulated drug found in her bedroom.
The mere denial by petitioner of the crime charged and her bare claim of being the victim of a
frame-up by de Vera and Gamboa cannot prevail over the positive and steadfast testimonies
of the police officers. Their testimonies were corroborated by the inventory/receipt of
property, stating that, indeed, 57 small heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 5.67 grams were found in a drawer in
petitioners bedroom. The police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in good
faith, in accordance with law. Absent any clear and convincing evidence that such officers
had ill or improper motive or were not performing their duties, their testimonies with respect
to the surveillance operation, the implementation of search warrant, and the seizure of the
regulated drug in the house of petitioner must be accorded full faith and credence.[67] Like
alibi, the defense of denial and frame-up had been invariably viewed by the courts with
disfavor. Denial is a negative of self-serving defense, while frame-up is as easily concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of R.A. No.
6425, as amended.[68] For the defense of frame-up to prosper, the evidence must be clear
and convincing.[69]
It bears stressing that the policemen saw to it that the search of petitioners house was
conducted with the assistance and in the presence of Barangay Captain Mangaliag and
Kagawad Garcia. They testified that the regulated drugs confiscated by the policemen were
found in the searched premises. Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that the policemen and the barangay officials had any improper motive to frame her and
falsely ascribe to her the crime of violating R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Except for her bare testimony, petitioner failed to prove that her brother Arsenio Tana
instigated the policemen to secure Search Warrant No. 98-62, conducted a search in her
house, planted the drugs in her bedroom and stole money from her. Petitioner failed to make
such a claim when she was arrested and brought to the MTC for preliminary investigation.
She also failed to file any criminal complaint against the policemen and her brother Arsenio
Tana for filing the fabricated charge against her and for planting evidence in her house. It was
only when she testified in her defense in the trial court that she alleged, for the first time, that
the charge against her was instigated by her brother, in cahoots with the policemen. We
quote with approval the disquisitions of the OSG on this matter:

According to her, the intrusion into her house by the police was witnessed by her two
daughter (sic). However, she did not present them as witnesses.
In the case of her daughter Ediliza, she was already twenty years old at the time so that she
was already mature for all legal intents and purposes. In the case of her daughter Mae Liza,
who was nine years old, there was no reason why she could not articulate what she
personally saw and experienced, if what she would be made to state was true.
The inability of the said accused, therefore, to present her two daughters is tantamount to a
suppression of evidence, thus raising the presumption that if they were presented, their
testimonies would have been adverse to her.
Furthermore, it has been [the] consistent ruling of the Supreme Court that a plain denial or
negative testimony, if unsubstantiated by a clear and convincing testimony, cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 155).
FOURTH: The other defense of accused is that it was unlikely for her to have engaged in
pushing or peddling drugs for a living because she had to set a good example of decent
living for the sake of her two beautiful daughters and good neighbors. Furthermore, she did
not have financial problems which could have pushed her into the drug business because her
sister Corazon Bernardino had been regularly sending her money.
The aforecited unlikelihood perceived by accused could not prevail over the affirmative
testimonies of policemen Gamboa and de Vera who positively declared that they found 57
sachets of shabu in her room.[70]
Search Warrant No. 98-62 Is Valid; the Articles, Paraphernalia and Regulated
Drugs Found in Petitioners Bedroom and Confiscated by the Police Officers are
Admissible in Evidence
We agree with the ruling of the CA affirming, on appeal, the findings of the trial court that
based on the deposition and testimony of Gorospe, there was probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62 for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SECOND: The police officers who testified had not proven bad or ill motive to testify against
accused.
The suspicion of accused that it was her brother who manipulated the events in her life is
unsubstantiated and too far-fetched to happen and is, therefore, unbelievable.
The presumption, therefore, is that said police officers performed their official duties regularly
(People v. Cuachon, 238 SCRA 540).
THIRD: The testimony of accused is too self-serving. It is uncorroborated.

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.[71]

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerate the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, thus:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant, record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.[72]
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a
particular affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent establishes probable
cause. However, great deference is to be accorded to the Judges determination.[73] The
affidavit/deposition supporting an application for a search warrant is presumed to be valid.
[74]
Affidavits/depositions for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by Judges in a
common-sense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst
and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requisites of elaborate specificity have no
place in this area.[75] The Judge in determining probable cause is to consider the totality of
the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,[76] and must
employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.[77] Probable cause exists if a
practical, common-sense evaluation of the facts and circumstances show a fair possibility
that dangerous drugs will be found in the asserted location.[78] There must be a factual
showing sufficient to comprise probable cause of particular facts and circumstances so as to
allow the Judge to make an independent evaluation of the matter. It is sufficient if the
information put forth in the affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent are
believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant/deponent as true.[79] Sufficient information
must be presented to allow a Judge to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a
mere ratification of the bare/unsubstantiated contention of others.

The general rule is that the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo
determination of probable cause but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence
in the records supporting the Judges decision to issue the search warrant.[80] The reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the Judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed,[81] and once ascertained that the Judge had substantial basis for concluding
that a search would unearth evidence of a wrongdoing, the determination of probable cause
must be upheld. In the absence of any showing that the Judge was recreant of his duties in
connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants/deponent before
him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and
impressions.[82]
However, the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set aside and the search
warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed; the evidence seized by the
police officers based on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused presents
clear and convincing evidence that the police officers and/or a government informant made a
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in said affidavit/deposition or
testimony which is essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. Such evidence
must focus on the state of mind of the affiants/deponents that he was conscious of the falsity
of his assertion or representation.[83] The requirement that a search warrant not issue but
upon probable cause would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer and his informant are
able to use deliberately falsehood allegations to demonstrate probable cause and, having
misled the Judge, was able to remain confident that the ploy succeeded.[84] However,
innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of a police officer or government
informant will not invalidate a search warrant. And even if the police officer or government
informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in his or
her affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof are sufficient to establish probable
cause, the search warrant will not be quashed for lack of probable cause.[85]
The evidence presented by petitioner that Gorospe was not a resident or transient of
Barangay Sapang, even if true and credible, is not at all material or necessary to the
determination of probable cause. Whether petitioner and Gorospe were dealers of Avon
Cosmetics as of May 5, 1998 may be relevant to the issue of whether there was factual basis
for the finding of probable cause by the Executive Judge against petitioner; however,
petitioners evidence to prove his claim is tenuous and does not warrant the quashal of
Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the suppression of the evidence seized after the enforcement
of the search warrant.
The evidence petitioner presented to disprove the testimony of Gorospe that they were
dealers of Avon Cosmetics are her (petitioners) testimony and that of Carvajal. The
certification purportedly signed by dela Rosa, the Branch Manager of Avon Cosmetics
Dagupan Branch, is hearsay because she did not testify. Carvajal admitted that she was not
in a position to confirm the veracity of the contents of the certification:
PROSECUTOR JAIME DOJILLO ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
q What is your position at Dagupan Avon Cosmetics?

a Team Leader, Sir.

q Do you have any participation in the preparation of this certification?
a None, Sir.

Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

q So, you had not in position to know the truth of this certification, hence, you were not the
one who prepared the same?
a Yes, Sir.[86]

QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Carvajal was merely one of many team leaders of Avon Cosmetics in Dagupan City. She did
not testify nor did petitioner adduce evidence that Gorospe was not such a dealer in places
other than Dagupan City or Pangasinan for that matter. In fine, petitioner failed to adduce
competent and credible evidence that Gorospe was not a dealer of Avon products in the
branches of Avon Cosmetics other than Pangasinan. Other than the denial of
petitioner and the testimony of Carvajal, petitioner failed to present evidence that she was not
a dealer of Avon Cosmetics. On the other hand, the testimony of Gorospe before the
Executive Judge was corroborated by the testimonies of police officers Gamboa and de Vera.
In the present case, the Executive Judge found probable cause after conducting the requisite
searching questions on Gorospe for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. The trial court reviewed the testimony of Gorospe before the Executive Judge[87]
and confirmed that, indeed, there was probable cause against petitioner for violation of said
crime. The finding of the Executive Judge was corroborated by the testimony of police
officers de Vera and Gamboa, who, in their surveillance operation, partially confirmed
Gorospes claim that, indeed, people had been going to the house of petitioner to buy shabu.
The findings of the trial court were, in turn, affirmed by the CA.
The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court
are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing
evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of
substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the
outcome of the case. In this case, petitioner failed to establish any such circumstance.
The trial and appellate courts ruled that petitioner possessed 5.67 gm of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. The
penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is incorrect. As the Court ruled in
People v. Tira:[88]

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellants is only 1.001
grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum, to three (3)
years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum, for violation of Section 16 of
Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.[89]
The penalty imposed in the Tira case is the correct penalty, which should likewise be
imposed against petitioner herein.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to penalty.
Petitioner is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to three (3) years of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: PANGANIBAN, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice