Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
We shall now consider the merits of the basic petition and the
petitions for contempt.
I
The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the
executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his
trust, his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of
administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his
fees, the liability for payment resting primarily on the executor or
administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be
entitled to reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be
followed by counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the
administrator to make payment, and should the latter fail to pay,
either to (a) file an action against him in his personal capacity,
and not as administrator, 1 or (b) file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the
heirs and interested parties, to direct the payment of his fees as
expenses of administration. 2 Whichever course is adopted, the
heirs and other persons interested in the estate will have the
right to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on
the necessity of his employment. In the case at bar, petitioner
filed his petition directly with the probate court.
There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of
the estate, and as such trustee it should jealously guard the
estate under administration and see to it that it is wisely and
economically administered and not dissipated. 3 This rule,
however, does not authorize the court, in the discharge of its
function as trustee of the estate, to act in a whimsical and
capricious manner or to fix the amount of fees which a lawyer is
entitled to without according to the latter opportunity to prove
the legitimate value of his services. Opportunity of a party to be
heard is admittedly the essence of procedural due process.
What petitioners filed with the lower court was a motion
for partial payment of attorney's fees in the amount of
P30,000.00 as lawyers for the executrix for the period February,
1963, up to the date of filing of the motion on or about November
18, 1965. Five of the seven heirs had manifested conformity to
petitioners' motion, while the remaining two merely requested
deferment of the resolution of the motion "until the total amount
for Executrix's fees and attorney's fees of her counsel is agreed
upon by all the heirs." The court, however, in spite of such
conformity, and without affording petitioners the opportunity to
establish how much attorney's fees they are entitled to for their
entire legal services to the executrix, issued an order fixing at
P20,000.00 the entire attorney's fees of petitioners.
In his Order
explained: cdta
of
January
12,
1967,
respondent
Judge
discredit
petitioner
Samuel
C. Occea and
his
wife,
the
executrix, intervenor stated in his
Intervenor's Opposition to Petition
that less than a month after the loan
of P100,000.00 had been granted to
the
transportation
company,
petitioner Samuel C. Occea was
elected president by directors of his
own choosing in the Bohol Land
Transportation
Company,
Inc.,
insinuating that in effect the
executrix loaned to her husband the
said sum of money. The certification
of the corporate secretary of the
Bohol Land Transportation Company,
Inc. (Annex D-Contempt) states that
petitioner Samuel C. Occea was not
the president of the company at the
time, nor did he act as president or
treasurer thereof, and that the
president was Atty. Vicente de la
THE
EUSTACIO DE LUNA,
appellees.
ET
AL., defendants-
"Manila,
Philippines,
January
28,
f. possess
the
required
qualifications; and
educational
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers
only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably
failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by
respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the
averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy
of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui.
For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal
bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is
difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case
at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated,
it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information
contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when
she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that
point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality. LexLib
WHEREFORE,
the
complaint
for
disbarment
against
respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to
her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an
altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that
a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Acting
JJ., concur.
C.J.),
Mendoza,
||| (Ui v. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, [June 8, 2000], 388 PHIL 691708)
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 944 . July 25, 1974.]
FLORA NARIDO, complainant, vs. ATTORN
EY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J p:
The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in
bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, although it is
understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the
defense of one's client may be carried to the point of undue
skepticism and doubt as to the motives of opposing counsel.
Some such reflection is induced by these two administrative
cases wherein respondents Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B.
Risma, who represented adverse parties in a workmen's
compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other.
The charge against respondent Linsangan filed by a certain
Flora Narido is that he violated the attorney's oath by submitting
a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he
deny the complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma
accountable for having instigated his client, the complainant,
Flora Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in
what respondent Linsangan called "embarrassment, humiliation
and defamation" of a brother in a profession.
On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above
administrative cases to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation
was submitted on May 31 of this year.
1. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime
S. Linsangan is concerned, the report contains the following: "In
support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court,
complainant Narido heavily
relies
on
the
refusal
of
respondentLinsangan to withdraw despite warning the
affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios . . ., which
affidavit Narido claims to be perjured. . . Mrs. Narido and Atty.
Risma threatened Atty. Linsangan with disbarment should he
insist
in
offering
the
affidavit
of
Mrs.
Vergel
de
Dios." 1 Nonetheless, such affidavit was filed. It was found as a
fact that there was nothing improper in presenting such affidavit,
its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were otherwise, still
there was no showing of respondent having violated his
attorney's oath for submitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the
10
FORTUNATO
PATALINGHUG, respondents.
R.
||| (Laput v. Remotigue, A.C. No. 219, [September 29, 1962], 116
PHIL 371-375)
11