CRIM PRO OUTLINE

4th Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against UNREASONABLE SEARCHES and SEIZURES, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon PROBABLE CAUSE, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized.

UNIT ONE
Katz Threshold Doctrine
What Constitutes a SEARCH?
Government Action is a SEARCH when it invades a reasonable expectation of privacy
which occurs when:
1. A person exhibits an actual expectation of privacy AND
2. Society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.
Factors that Suggest that Society is NOT Prepared to Recognize an Expectation
of Privacy as Reasonable
1. Voluntary disclosure to a 3rd party who conveys information to Government
(Assumption of Risk)
1. White - was convicted by use of information that was communicated to an informant
through a radio transmission. Evidence that is received by a radio transmission from an
informant is admissible because it is not a search.
2. Smith - Installation and use of a pen register is not a search within the meaning of the
4A because there is no expectation of privacy when one dials phone numbers and
transmits that information to a phone company.
2. Knowing exposure to the public
1. Ciraolo - There is no reasonable expectation of privacy from an aerial view of plants in
ones yard that are guarded from view by a 12 foot fence, therefore there is no search.
2. Knotts - Police put a tracking device on a container that was with a person in order to
find out where he was. It did not matter that police had a tracking device because the
information could have been obtained by visual surveillance from public places.
3. No societal interest in protecting privacy of matters/information
1. Oliver - There is no societal interest in protecting the activities that happen in open fields
and they are usually open to the public anyway.
1. The four variable pertinent to determine whether area is curtilage:

1. Areas proximity to the home

2. Existence of enclosure
3. Nature of the use of the area
4. Precautions taken to exclude others
4. Nothing legitimate could be learned by the government
1. Jacobsen - Court found that the 4A did not protect from a government agents
reopening of a package that had been opened by a FedEx employee who was a private
party, nor did it find a violation in a chemical field test that identified the substance in a
package as cocaine.
2. Place Jones-Jardine Alternative Threshold Doctrine
What Constitutes a SEARCH?
A Search Occurs When:
1. Government physically intrudes into a constitutionally protected area (i.e., home, curtilage)
2. In order to obtain information AND
3. Does obtain information
If a SEARCH does occur and the search is UNREASONABLE then it is in violation of the
4th AMENDMENT. Thus, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
UNIT TWO
Unreasonableness and Probable Cause
RULE:
Probable Cause is the substantive showing that the 4th Amendment ordinarily requires for a
warrant and for a warrantless search or seizure to be reasonable.
LEVEL OF PROBABILITY:
Probable Cause = FAIR PROBABILITY (standard of probability) (Gates)
PC TO ARREST:
SHOWING of fair probability person to be arrested committed/is committing offense
PC TO SEARCH:

SHOWING of fair probability item properly subject to seizure by government is in the place to be
search (or will be there at time of the search).

Note: Item can be contraband, stolen foods, evidence or instrumentalities of crime

STALENESS and PC:

PC to SEARCH can go stale - i.e., information that once established a fair probability that
an item was in a place can be insufficiently current to establish the required fair probability at
the relevant time.
PC Based on Informants can furnish the basis for a PC finding

Assessment of hearsay-based PC showings:

A. Totality of the Circumstances governs hearsay based PC showings

A. Gates Abandoned strict Aguilar-Spinelli two prong test for totality of
circumstances including:

i.
ii.
iii.

How the informant obtained their information (underlying

circumstances)
Why the informant is reliable (credibility prong)
And any other indicia of reliability like corroboration of testified
fact.

B. Assessment of reliability of canine sniff alert - whether it provides PC - is

governed by same Totality approach

A. Harris PRETEXTS
PC is determined objectively officers actual/subjective motivations/intentions do not matter as
long as known facts provide PC for search or seizure performed (Whren)
UNIT THREE
Unreasonableness and Warrants
[A] Warrant Requirement For Searches
1. FUNDAMENTAL 4A RULE:
1. Searches without warrants are unreasonable, subject to exceptions
1. Johnson

2. Katz
2. REASONS for Search Warrant RULE:
1. to prevent unjustified searches
2. to limit the scope of justified searches
3. to prevent after-the-fact justification of unreasonable searches due to hindsight
1. Johnson
2. Katz
[B] Warrant Requirement For Seizures of Persons (Arrests)
1. Arrests in public places for felonies based on PC are reasonable without warrants
1. Watson
2. Arrests for even very minor criminal offenses committed in officers presence is reasonable
under the 4th Amend.
1. Atwater
3. A person arrested without warrants is entitled to a prompt judicial determination of
probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty. (Gerstein) 48
hours is presumptively sufficiently prompt. (McLaughlin)
4. When person is arrested and detained for any criminal offense and assigned or admitted
into the general jail population, a strip search and body cavity inspection is generally
reasonable without any specific showing. (Florence)
5. When a person is arrested for a serious criminal offense and detained in custody (for any
period), taking and analyzing a cheek swab of his/her DNA for the purpose of identifying
the arrestee is reasonable under the 4A. (King)

[C] Issuance, Content, and Execution of Warrants

(See Lecture Outline)
1. Issuance
1. No warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause known as the Warrant Clause of 4th
Amendment.
2. Anticipatory Warrants are permissible; special definition of PC for requires two showings
(Grubbs)
1. A triggering condition before warrant is issued (Fair probability)
2. The occurrence of said triggering condition for warrant to be executed (Fair
probability)
3. Warrants based on false information may be invalid

4. Magistrate must be neutral and detached

2. Content
1. Search Warrants
1. Particular description of places to be searched,
2. Persons or things to be seized is required by 4A text
2. Arrest Warrant
1. Must specify the name of the defendant or otherwise describe the defendant with
reasonable certainty
3. Purposes of particularity requirements
1. Limit the privacy intrusion
2.
3. Execution
1. Knock-and-Announce Requirement (Wilson)
1. Audibly knock or otherwise make law enforcement presence known
2. Announce the identity of the executing officers (Its the Police!)
3. Announce the purpose of the executing officers (We have a warrant!)
4. Delay for a sufficient period of time (30 sec)to allow occupant to open the door.
In Banks, 15 seconds was sufficient.
1. Exception: When there is reasonable suspicion that knock and announce
would be dangerous, futile or inhibit effective law enforcement. (Richards)
2. SCOPE: search can be excessive in place, time, or due to presence of third-party not in
aid of execution
4. Seizures Pursuant to a Warrant
1. What-Items specified and particularly described in the search warrants maybe see as
well as non-described items that they see in plain-view
2. Where- Anywhere on premises that the item particularly described in the warrant may
be hidden.
3. Intensity- Dictated and limited by the nature of the items being sought under the warrant
4. Damages- Police may damage or destroy property as much as reasonably necessary to
effectuate search.
5. Duration- As long as reasonably necessary
UNIT Four
Exception To The Warrant Rule
[A] Plain View Exception
1. Scope:

a. Lawful access to object

b. Immediately Apparent Incriminating (PC to seize)
c.
2. Scope: Allows Seizure of object (and any incidental search that occurs)
3. Justification
a. Inconvenient and possibly dangerous to obtain warrant to seize
4. Cases:
a. Horton: Got rid of inadvertence requirement. The warrant authorized him to search
only for the rings. Although he didnt find the rings, the officer did find weapons in plain
view. He admitted that he was interested in finding things other than the rings, so his
finding the weapon was not inadvertent. Even though inadvertence is a characteristic
of most plain view seizures, it is not a necessary condition.
b. Hicks- Although the police were probably entered an apartment to search for evidence
relating to a shooting the observed expensive stereo components which they moved to
observe the serial numbers. The Court invalidated the search holding that serial
numbers were not immediately apparent before the police moved the components to
observance the serial number. Moving to observe was a search for which the police did
not have PC.

[B1] Search Incident to Legal Arrest

1. Showing: A lawful arrest
2. Scope:
a. Location:
i. Arrestees person and
ii. Area w/in arrestees immediate control (at the time of arrest)
b. Time:
i. Not remote in time/ must be contemporaneous w/arrest
3. Justifications:
a. Remove weapons (prevent escape/ resistance, threat to officer safety.
b. Seize evidence (prevent destruction/ concealment of)

4. Cases:
a. Chimel- Defendant arrested when he got home. Police arrested him there and
searched entire house and drawers. Court held that police may have only searched
the room in which he was arrested in. But may not search drawers or containers in
the room which he was arrested in.

b. Robinson- D Arrested for driving w/o license. Police conducted a search incident to
arrest and found on the person a cigarette pack that contained heroin.

[B2] Search Incident to Legal Arrest (Car)

Whats an Arrest?
i.
When police take a suspect in custody in order to bring charges.
1. Showing:
i.
A lawful arrest
ii.
Of recent occupant of vehicle
iii.
Reasonable to believe evidence relevant to offense of arrest might be found in vehicle.

1. Scope

a. Location
i. Passenger compartment of vehicle (including containers)
b. Time:
i. Not remote from; contemporaneous w/arrest.

2. Justifications
i.
ii.

Remove weapons (prevent escape, resistance, threat to officers)

Seize evidence (prevent destruction/ concealment)

4. Cases:
Gant- Search of jacket in car was unreasonable because he was arrested for driving
w/suspended license and search of car could not have produced evidence of the crime
of driving w/out license.
Belton- Pulled over speeding car, smelled marijuana and arrested occupants. Police
searched the car and found a jacket which contained that cocaine. Court held that car
was w/in immediate control (Chimel) and could be searched.

[B3] Monitoring Arrestee Entries

1)

2)
3)

Showing:
a.
Lawful Arrest
b.
Request by arrestee to enter place
Scope:
a. Where arrestee goes/ may stay at elbow of
Justification:
a. Safety of officers
b. Integrity of arrest- to prevent escape

4)

Cases
Chrisman- Student request to enter dorm room. Court held it was constitutional.

[B4] Home Entries to Arrest Felons

1) Showing:
a. Valid Arrest Warrant for felon
b. Reason to Believe arrest is in home (split if this more or less than probable cause)
2) Scope:
a. Interest- Home privacy interest of subject of arrest warrant
b. Location: Wherever reasonable to believe arrestee could be home.
3) Justification:
a. Uncertain
i. Possible exigency of mobility plus the fact that the privacy interest of a
suspected felon is less worthy of protection.
4) Cases:
Payton- Police broke into Ds home and found a gun in plain view. Court held search
was unreasonable because they did not have a warrant.

[C] Exigent Circumstances

Types of Potential Exigencies
A. Hot pursuit- To apprehend/ capture/ prevent escape of suspected criminal
a. Hayden- Police received reporting armed robbery and that suspect was in a
particular house. Police entered the house w/consent and found fruits and
instrumentality of crime
b. Santana- D was standing in the doorway to the house when the police
attempted to arrest her (PC in public- Watson), she retreated into her home
which created the exigency of hot pursuit.
B. Prevent danger/ harm to life/ safety from suspected criminals
a. See also Hayden
C. Prevent evidence loss/ destruction of evidence
a. Welsh- B/C Wisconsin had categorized first time DUI as non-criminal civil
forfeiture, court concluded that an exigency based on the destruction of
evidence (BAC) could not justify warrantless entry into home.
b. Vale- Police were doing surveillance on Ds home. Cops witnessed a drug
deal between D and other person. Cops arrested D outside of his home and
told him they were going to search his home to prevent co-conspirators from
destroying evidence. Found narcotics. Court held that an arrest on the street

does not provide its own exigent circumstances to justify warrantless search of
arrestees home.
c. King- Police followed a suspected drug dealer into apartment and smelled
marijuana outside the door. Police knocked and heard flushing sounds
whereupon they entered the unit and found drugs. Court held search was
reasonable under exigency because they did not create the exigency by
violating or threatening to violate 4th Amend.
d. McNeely- The fact that blood-alcohol levels dissipate after drinking ceases, is
not a per se exigency to justify an officer to order a blood test without obtaining
a warrant from a neutral judge.
D. Emergency Aid- Either to prevent serious injury to occupant or to render aid to
seriously injured occupant.
a. Brigham City- upheld a warrantless entry into a home after police witnessed
a fight that involved four adults and a juvenile. One exigency obviating the
requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously
injured or threatened with such injury.
b.
1) Showing:
a. Probable Cause to search
b. Exigency (Sufficient need to act to prevent harm)
c. Officers DID NOT CREATE EXIGENCY BY VIOLATING or THREATENING TO
VIOLATE 4th Amendment
d. Not too minor offense/interest. (At least for homes)
2) Scope:
a. Location
i. Wherever PC and Exigency justify
b. Time
i. As long as PC and Exigency justify
3) Justification:
a. To avoid harm to govt/Society interests that could occur if officers delay search in
order to obtain warrant.
4) Cases

[D] Booking Searches

1. Showing:
a. Lawful arrest
b. Arrestee to be incarcerated/jailed
c. Inventory conducted according to Standard Police Procedures

2. Scope:
a. Person of Arrestee
b. Personal Belongings on Arrestee
3. Justifications:
a. Prevent personal items from being stolen while the arrestee is in the jail
population
b. Help protect police against false claims of theft
c. To prevent the arrestee from introducing contraband into the jail
d. To better ascertain a suspects identity
4. Cases:
a. Lafayette- Officer arrested D for disturbance of the peace. He took the D to the
station and found drugs. It is not unreasonable for police, as a part of a routine
procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person to search any container or
article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures
5. Justifications:
a. Prevent personal items from being stolen while the arrestee is in the jail
population
b. Help protect police against false claims of theft
c. To prevent the arrestee from introducing contraband into the jail
d. To better ascertain a suspects identity

[E] Automobile Exception

1. Showing:
a. Probable Cause to search
b. A Vehicle
c. That is readily mobile
d. And being used for transportation (possibly not if used sufficiently as a
residence)
e. If stopped in transit, parked on public property, or parked on private property of
another (Possibly not if parked on private property or curtilage if individual
objecting to search of vehicle)
2. Scope:
a. Location of vehicle: On site or at police station
b. Location IN vehicle: Wherever in vehicle probably cause extends, including ALL
containers in vehicle to which probable cause extends
c. Time/Duration of Authority: Seach may be conducted immediately or lateras
long as delay not indefinite and does not adversely affect privacy or
possessory interests
3. Justifications:
a. Exigency created by mobility &

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b. Diminished privacy expectations in vehicles due to pervasive government

regulation
4. Cases
a. Chambers- D was riding in an car at the time of his arrest, the vehicle was
searched at the police station rather than at the scene. The court upheld the
search even though the car was immobilized and it would have been relatively
easy to obtain a warrant. Given the existence of probable cause to search, police
may choose to search later at the police station or elsewhere.
b. Chadwick- D were suspected drug traffickers. Had a suitcase with drugs in the
trunk of a car. Court held the footlocker search was not justified under the
"automobile exception," since a person's expectations of privacy in personal
luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile. The footlocker's mobility
did not justify dispensing with a search warrant, because there was not the
slightest danger that it or its contents could have been removed before a valid
search warrant could be obtained.
c. Carney- Search of mobile home did not violate 4A when vehicle is being used on
the highways or is capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not
regularly used for residential purposes, the two justifications for the vehicle
exception come into play. First, the vehicle is readily mobile, and, second, there is
a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from the pervasive regulation of
vehicles capable of traveling on highways.
d. Acevedo- ASK!!!!!!!!!!!!

[E] Inventory Exception

1. Showing:
a. Lawful impoundment of vehicle
b. Impoundment decision based on Standardized Criteria
c. Inventory conducted according to Standard Police Procedures
2. Scope:
a. Areas of vehicle
b. Containers inside vehicle (if authorized by standard procedures)
3. Justifications
a. Justified by the need to protect an owners property while it is in the custody of
the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property, and to
guard the police from danger. (Opperman)
4. Cases
a. Opperman- Ds car impounded for multiple parking violations. Police conducted
inventory of the vehicle which revealed marijuana in the glove box. Court held
reasonable under 4A

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b. Wells- The court concluded that an inventory search of a locked suitcase in the
trunk of an impounded car violated the 4th Amendment because the highway
patrol had no policy governing the opening of closed containers in inventory
searches
c. Bertine- D arrested for DUI. Car was inventoried before it was impounded and
police searched a backpack that contained drugs. Court held the search was
reasonable because it was made in a good-faith effort to inventory according to
departmental procedures.
ehicle must have been lawfully impounded
5. Cannot be done for the sole purpose of criminal investigation
6. Courts prefer inventory searches conducted consistently according to police department
guidelines. (Wells)

[F] Consent
1. Showing
a. Consent given
b. Voluntarily
c. By person with Authority to consent
2. Scope:
a. Wherever consented to: objective reasonableness standard when not explicit
b. To determine whether the consent was voluntary, courts apply a totality of
circumstances test. Factors include
i. Vulnerability of defendant.
ii. Police demand to search, drawing of weapons.
iii. Knowledge by D that they can refuse, although police not required to
explain so.
3. Justifications
a. Unclear: People may choose not to exercise Fourth Amendment rights
4. Cases:
a. Bustamonte- Police performed a consent search of a car that had been stopped
by for traffic violations. Passengers consented to and assisted with search. The
Court held that consent searches are valid but that the state bears the burden of
showing that the consent was in fact freely and voluntarily given. Consent does
not exist when the suspect is coerced. In
i. To determine consent, court looks at totality of the circumstances
including suspects peculiarities and police coduct (guns drawn).
b. Jimeno- Consent extends to containers in cars unless otherwise explicitly limited
in scope. The officer had informed respondents that he believed they were
carrying narcotics and that he would be looking for narcotics in the car. The court

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held that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general
consent to search respondents' car included consent to search containers which
might bear drugs.
c. Randolph- Held that wifes consent to search did not validate the search in the
face of the husbands objections

[F2] Authority to Consent

1. Showing:
a. Voluntary Consent
b. Reasonable to believe person has authority to consent
2. Scope:
a. Same as consent searches
3. Justifications:
a. 4A demands only responsible judgments ie. that officers be reasonable
4. Cases:
a. Matlock- Police went to Ds house after he was arrested and asked wife for
consent to search. She agreed. Court held for 3rd parties to be able to consent,
they must have common authority
i. Which includes mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes so that it is reasonable for
the cohabitant to be able to consent in his own right and that the others
have assumed the risk that one of their members might permit the
common area to be searched.
ii. When finding common authority, police must make a reasonable
judgment regarding the facts before them.
1. Police conduct is reasonable when they enter a dwelling based
on a reasonable but erroneous belief that the person who has
consented to their entry is a resident of the premises.
2. Objective standard: Would the facts available to the officer at the
moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
consenting party had authority over the premises? (Rodriguez)
b. Rodriguez- Girlfriend who claimed she had common authority over property b/c
she lived there for months, had a key, claimed to have property in apt. In fact she
had moved out a month prior, stolen the key, was not on the lease and did not
pay rent.

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i. Objective standard: Would the facts available to the officer at the moment
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting
party had authority over the premises?

UNIT Five:
The Balancing Approach To The Fourth Amend Reasonableness
[A2] Seizure of Person Standard
A seizure of a person occurs when an officer EITHER:
1. Applies ANY PHYSICAL FORCE to the person, even touching slightly, for the purpose of
controlling/detaining the person (Hodari D.)
OR
2. (a) Makes a sufficient SHOW OF AUTHORITY that is, a reasonable person would not
have felt free to leave or a reasonable person would not have felt free to decline the
officers request or otherwise terminate the encounter
a. Cases:
i. Mendenhall- When in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave. Circumstances include: Presence of multiple officers, officer
use/show of weapons, physical touching.
ii. Bostick- Bus passengers not necessarily seized because they choose
not to disembark from bus. His belief that he was not free to leave was not
due to the conduct of the officers.
AND

(b) The person SUBMITS/YIELDS to that show of authority (Hodari)

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3. Cases:
a. Hodari- Suspect throws crack rock as he fled from police. Court held he was not
seized when he abandoned the coke because although police made sufficient
show of authority, Hodari had not yielded to that showing of authority when he
threw the rock.

[A3] The Showing Needed for Stops, Frisks

1. Investigative stop/detention complies with 4A when an officer has a Reasonable
Suspicion that the person stopped/detained is engaged/engaging in criminal activity.
a. Cases
i. Wardlow- D was in high drug-crime area and fled when he saw the
police. Police caught him found a .38 caliber gun on him. Court held that
officers were justified in suspecting that defendant was involved in
criminal activity based on his presence in an area of heavy narcotics
trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Frisk justified
due to officers experience that narcotics involve weapons.
ii. White- An anonymous tip led police to do a Terry Stop of D. A tipster said
she would be leaving in a certain kind of car at a certain time to a specific
location. Some but not all of her future behavior was confirmed by police.
A Terry stop based on an anonymous tip which is sufficiently
corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was
engaged in criminal activity is not violative of the 4th Amendment.
iii.
2. A frisk/weapons pat down requires a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed
and dangerous.
a. Wardlow frisk justified due to officers experience that narcotics involve weapons.
b. Terry- Police may stop a person if they have a reasonable suspicion that the
person has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may frisk the suspect
for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and
dangerous, without violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures. Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.
3. The RS standard is less demanding than probable cause (which is fair prob) and
requires considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence, but does require a
minimal level of objective justification more than an inchoate or unparticularized
suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.
a. Wardlow- RS found because suspect was in an area known for drug trafficking
and made headlong flight when he saw officers.

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b. White- See above

4. The information that supports a RS can be lesser in quantity or content or in
quality/reliability than the information required to demonstrate PC.
a. Arvizu- Under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion supported
a border patrol agent's decision to stop a motorist traveling on an isolated road in
a forested area of southern Arizona near the Mexican border, even if each of the
reasons the officer gave for the stop, viewed in isolation, had an innocent
explanation.
5. To determine RS, the totality of the circumstances must be evaluated, and those
circumstances must be viewed together, not judged in isolation from each other.
a. Arvizu- Under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion supported
a border patrol agent's decision to stop a motorist traveling on an isolated road in
a forested area of southern Arizona near the Mexican border, even if each of the
reasons the officer gave for the stop, viewed in isolation, had an innocent
explanation.
6. A RS can exist even though no one fact describes ongoing criminal activity i.e. a
number of innocent fact in combination can support a RS.
a. Sokolow- (1)Court found that a reasonable suspicion did arise from s conduct
when the (1) paid $2100 for two plane tix from a roll of $20 bills; (2) traveled
under a false name; (3) went to Miami known to be a drug source city; (4) stayed
in Miami for 2 days although round trip flight takes 20 hours; (5) appeared
nervous during flight; and (6) checked none of his luggage.
7. To support a RS of criminal activity, a tip/hearsay must have sufficient/moderate indicia
of reliability.
a. J.L.- Anonymous phone call said man at bus stop wearing plaid shirt had gun.
One of the guys fit the description. That alone was not enough for reasonable
susp because the tip concerning J.L. did not provide any predictive information
and therefore left the police w/o means to test the informants knowledge or
credibility.
8. Although factors in a drug courier profile can support a RS, a judge must make an
independent evaluation of whether they do and must not simply defer to officers
judgment or reliance on factors in a profile.
9. An investigative stop/detention for a COMPLETED felony is permissible based on a RS,
it is undecided whether such a stop is permissible for less serious past crimes.
a. Hensley- Police made a stop of man based on a wanted flyer issued by a
neighboring police department. Court held that Terry stops to investigate past

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FELONIES was justified by strong govt interest in solving crimes and bringing
offenders to justice.
[A4] The SCOPE of Stops, Frisks and Sweeps
A. Stops/Detentions/Seizures
1. Movement of Suspect:
a. May not take suspect into police station (but might be allowed if judicial order)
b. Movement to other places uncertain
c. Cases:
i. Hayes- Cops suspected in a rape case but did not have PC. They went
to his home and asked him to come to the station. He didnt want to
go. Police said they would arrest him if notso he went. Court held
Police can not take someone to the police station with only
reasonable suspicion (even briefly). It is an arrestnot a Terry stop.
2. Time:
a. No bright line brevity limit question is whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly,
during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. Must consider
following factors- Length and intrusiveness of the stop & the law enforcement
purpose served by the stop and the time needed to reasonable effectuate that
purpose.
i. Sharpe- Police saw two vehicles weighed down and suspected drug
smuggling. Police each pulled the car over and held one car until the
other officer arrived- approx. 15 min. Court held that the detention was
reasonable.
3. Identification Methods:
a. Fingerprinting: may take fingerprints if reasonable basis (dictum in Hayes);
probably other means of identifying e.g. voice, handwriting samples
i. Dictum in Hayes - A brief detention in the field for the purpose of
fingerprinting, where there is only a reasonable suspicion not amounting
to PC, is permissible under the 4A.
b. Name: Generally may require suspect to disclose name- apparently not if not
reasonably related to justification for stop.
i. Hiibel- A under investigation for a suspected assault, refused to
respond to an officers request for ID, the officer arrested him. Court held
that it was not unreasonable for officers to require a suspect who is being
lawfully detained to identify himself.
4. Vehicle Occupants:
a. Automatic removal of drivers and passengers allowed/reasonable
5. Independent Seizures of Effects

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a. Limited seizure of effects allowed if RS of narcotics (Place); uncertain whether

can be justified if RS of evidence of other crimes, but indication must be
special operational necessities for seizure on less than PC (Hicks)
i. Place- NY DEA agents were informed by MIA DEA that suspect was
traveling there and suspected of carrying narcotics. He was stopped in
NY. DEA waited for 90 mins until a drug dog came and sniffed positive
then they held the bag over the weekend to obtain warrant. Court held
that the 90-min detention of Places luggage was too long especially given
that the agents have advanced notice of his arrival and could have
prepared for the additional investigation.
ii. Hicks---WHY IS IT HERE????
6. OVERALL QUESTION (for stops/detentions of persons)
a. Whether seizure was a properly limited investigative detention or a de facto
arrest which depended on the quantitative and qualitative intrusions upon a
suspects freedom of movement.
i. Sharpe- Police saw two vehicles weighed down and suspected drug
smuggling. Police each pulled the car over and held one car until the
other officer arrived- approx. 15 min. Court held that the detention was
reasonable.
ii. Hayes- Police asked D to go with them to HQ to be fingerprinted. Court
held that the seizure amounted to an arrest and not just a terry stop.
b. STANDARD: Whether a reasonable person would feel that he/she was subjected
to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest (no 4A case;
supported by seizure standard and standards for custody under Miranda)
SCOPE OF:
B. FRISKS/WEAPONS PATDOWNS/SEARCHES (and SWEEPS)
1. PERSON: May conduct pat down of OUTER CLOTHING of suspect for weapons (guns,
knives, clubs); may remove weapons felt (Terry)
a. May not search more extensively than needed to detect weapons; more intrusive
exploration of outer clothing is unreasonable (Dickerson)
b. Cases
i. Terry- Officer patted down the outer clothing of s. He did not place his
hands in their pockets until he felt weapons, and then he merely reached
for and removed the weapons. The officer confined his search strictly to
what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and
to disarm them once discovered.
ii. Dickerson2. VEHICLES: May conduct AREA SEACH OF PASSENGER COMPARTMENT, including
containers that could contain such weapons

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a. Cases
i. Long- swerved off the road and cops saw him. did not respond to
request for DL and registration. Cop saw a hunting knife in car and
flashed a light into the car to search for other weapons but found Bud.
Arrested for possession and opened his unlocked trunk and found 75lbs
of Bud. Court held that the search of the passenger compartment of an
automobile is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable
belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably may gain immediate
control of weapons.
3. QUESTION: May effects/containers carried on a person ever be patted down or opened?
4. HOMES: Limited protective sweeps of homes for dangerous persons permitted (Buie)
(Not Terry Frisk)
a. Cases
i. Buie- Police were executing warrant for D at his home when he emerged
from the basement. Police arrested him and went into the basement to
make sure nobody else was in there that could launch an attack. Held that
it was reasonable to make a cursory inspection of the area as search
incident to arrest. i.e. can not look into coat pocket in a closet.

UNIT Five:
Due Process- Coerced Confession Doctrine
1.The DP Clause includes a right against conviction based upon a coerced or involuntary
confession.
2.Under the DP Clause, a confession may not be introduced at trial if it is the product of an
overborne will.
3.To determine whether a confession is coerced or involuntary, the totality of the
[relevant] circumstances must be considered - including facts that put pressure upon
the individual to confess and facts about the strength/weakness of the particular
individuals will.
4. Official coercive . . . activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is
not voluntary under the Due Process Clause. The individuals mental condition or
state of mind alone cannot render a confession involuntary for DP purposes.
5. Cases:

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a. Ashcraft- Court held that the confession was not made voluntarily. Ashcraft had
been held incommunicado for thirty-six hours, during which time without sleep or
rest, he had been interrogated by relays of officers and investigators -- showed a
situation inherently coercive
b. Spano- D confessed to a friend who was also a police officer. The friend told
his superiors. D was brought in and refused to answer questions without his
lawyer. His requests to see his lawyer were denied. Ds friend tried to get him to
confess by lying and saying his job was on the line. D eventually confessed
without his lawyer. A confession where D was denied access to attorney and
persuaded by a childhood officer friend to confess after D was already
indicted is not voluntary, is not admissible.
c. Connolly- D approached officer on the street to confess to a crime. The next
day, he seemed disoriented and was found incompetent to assist in his own D.
Later he was competent again. At trial, an expert testified that he confessed due
to his mental psychosis. D argued that the confession was not voluntary.
Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment. Here, the taking of respondents statement
and their admission, is not a violation.

UNIT Seven:
Miranda Summary
A. The Miranda Decision & Its Constitutional Basis
1. Miranda is based on 5th Amendment Privilege against Compulsory Self-Incrimination.
2. Extended 5th Amendment privilege beyond formal court proceedings, applying it to
informal compulsion by police.
3. Held that custodial interrogation gives rise to inherent compulsion and that as a result
statements are barred by 5Ai.e. admission would violate 5A rightunless steps are
taken to dispel/combat compulsion.
4. Warnings and waiver are required to dispel/combat/overcome compulsion and render
statements produced by custodial interrogation admissible.

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5. Also, 5A requires right to consult with counsel before and have counsel present during
custodial interrogations.
6. If suspect indicates they wish to remain silent, questioning must cease; if states he wants
counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is present.
7. Later decisions explain Miranda as prophylactic- as based on a likelihood of
compulsory /unacceptable great risks of compulsion, which gives rise to PRESUMED
compulsion, not actual compulsion. Miranda provides enlarged protection of 5A rights
(more than the 5A right mandates) in order to guard against or prevent 5A violations.
8. Although Miranda is a constitutional decision, is constitutionally based provides
protections that are constitutionally required (in the absence of a fully effective
equivalent), the admission of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda does not
violate the 5A right of a suspect.
9. Cases:
a. Dickerson- Court held Miranda was a constitutional decision
B. The Public Safety Exception (Quarles)
1. There is a public safety exception to the requirement of warnings and waiver as
prerequisites to admissibility of statements resulting from custodial interrogation.
2. Applies to questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.
3. Questions about how likely threat to public safety must be, what kinds of harm are
threats to public safety, whether threat must be immediate, whether exception applies
to other Miranda requirements for admissibility.
4. Based on understanding of Miranda a based on presumed, not actual compulsion, on
Miranda as prophylactic i.e. designed to prevent potential 5A violations by providing
enlarged protection for the privilege. No possible exception if statements actually
compelled/coerced because admission would violate 5A right, which has no exceptions.
5. Cases
a. Quarles- D, who was known to have a gun, ran when he saw police and
disappeared from site for a short period. Police seized him and frisked him and
found an empty gun holster. The officer asked D where the gun was before
reading him his rights. D answered and was then read his rights. There is a
public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be
given before a suspects answers may be admitted into evidence, which
does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officer involved.
b. Dickerson v US- Court held Miranda was a constitutional decision which could
not be in effect overruled by an act of Congress; Miranda and Miranda's progeny
in the Supreme Court thus governed the admissibility of statements made during
custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.

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C. Custody
1. Requirement: Miranda applies only when a suspect is in custody
2. Definition: Custody exists when a suspect is subjected to formal arrest or its
functional equivalent
a. Functional Equivalent or Formal Arrest: When reasonable person in
suspects position would have understood/believed his/her freedom of action
has been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest or that hes
has been subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a
formal arrest.
b. Cases
i. McCarty- D was pulled over for suspicion of DUI. Officer asked if he
was under the influence. He said he had had alcohol and some pot
and stated that he was barely under the influence. D wanted to have
his statements suppressed because he was not read his rights.
Motion to suppress denied because he was not in custody (but
was interrogated.)
1.

The standard: Would a reasonable person in Ds position feel that they

were restrained to the degree of a formal arrest? Look at where and
why they were stopped.

ii. JDB- 13 yr old D was pulled out of class into a conference room to be
questioned about break ins. The was not given any Miranda
Warnings although he was questioned for 30-45 minutes. Court held
that age is an objective factor that affects how a reasonable
person would perceive his or her freedom to leave.
iii. McCarty3. Functional Equivalent or Formal Arrest: When reasonable person in suspects
position would have understood/believed his/her freedom of action has been
curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest or that hes has been
subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.
a. Cases
i. McCarty4. Intent: Officers actual intent/state of mind is irrelevant unless expressed/conveyed to
suspect.
5. Attributes of Suspect: Objective reasonable person standard for custody must take
into account AGE of minor; prior history with law enforcement is not relevant.
a. Cases
i. JDB- See above Age is a factor that affects whether a reasonable
person would feel free to leave.

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ii. Yarborough- Court held that prior history with law enforcement was
not relevant in determining if felt free to leave b/c officers do not
always know a suspects prior criminal history.
6. Prison: Inmates NOT in custody simply because in prison and is not per se in
custody because isolated from general population/questioned in private and/or
questioned about crime outside prison. Apparently, in custody if additional restraints
on freedom create an environment with the same inherent coercive pressure as
the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.
a. Cases
i. Howes- Being in prison itself was not enough to constitute Miranda
custody. Factors that leaned toward finding the inmate's questioning
was custodial were offset by others: he was told at the outset, that he
could go back to his cell whenever he wanted, was not physically
restrained or threatened and was not uncomfortable, was offered food
and water, and the door to the conference room was sometimes left
open. Objectively reasonable person would have felt free to leave
ii. Shatzer- While D was incarcerated in 2003, he was questioned in
2003 about a crime that happened before he was in jail. Invoked right
to counsel. In 2006, a different detective reopened the case and D
made inculpatory statements. Court held suppression of evidence not
needed as it was more than 2 weeks between Miranda custody. 2
weeks?
D. Interrogation
1. Requirement: Miranda Applies only when a suspect is subjected to interrogation.
2. Definition: Interrogation is Express Questioning or Functional Equivalent of Express
questioning by a person known to be a state agent.
a. Cases
i. Innis- See below
ii. Perkins- Fellow inmate of D gave police information that D was involved
in a specific unsolved murder. Police put an informant and an agent in the
cell block with D and collected incriminating evidence used to charge D.
An undercover law enforcement officer is not required to give
Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking him
questions that may elicit an incriminating response.
1. Only government agents that are known to be government agents need
to read Miranda, there is no basis for feeling of pressure when they dont
even know the person works for the state.

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3. Functional Equivalent of Express Questioning: Words or action on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
a. Cases
i. Innis- Several officers, at several different times, read D his Miranda
warning and D requested to see an attorney. While D was in custody,
being transported to the police station, one officer commented to another
what a shame it would be if a child found a weapon and killed herself. D
interrupted and offered to tell police where the gun was. He was again
read his rights and decided to show the place of the weapon anyway.
Interrogation under Miranda refers not just to questioning, but
actions or words on the part of the police that elicit statements that
they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. D was not interrogated within the
meaning of Miranda.
4. Officers Intent/Suspects Attributes: Officers intent to obtain statements/responses is not
required or determinative; suspects vulnerabilities known to officer are relevant.
a. See Innis above
E. Warnings
1. Requirement: Miranda Warnings are a absolute prerequisite
2. Variation of Wording- Warnings need not be given in the exact language prescribed in
Miranda. Are sufficient if the warnings reasonably convey the rights in the original
warnings.
F. Waiver
1. Requirement: Officer must obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights
a. Berghuis- A suspect's silence during interrogation does not invoke his right to
remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona. The invocation of that right must be
unambiguous, and silence is not enough to invoke it. Voluntarily and knowingly
responding to police interrogation after remaining silent constitutes a waiver of
the right to remain silent, provided that a Miranda warning was given and the
suspect understood it.
b. Butler-ASK TOMKO
2. Express Waiver: A waiver need not be expressly made orally or in writing, but can be
inferred from the circumstances. Where a warning is given, and understood by a
suspect, the suspects uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver.
a. Adad
3. Voluntary: Waiver must not be coerced by the government in totality of circumstances--including pressures on and vulnerabilities of suspect.

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a. Connely- See pg 18- Schizophrenic man walked up to officer and confessed to

murder. It was admissible because the govt did not coercive force the
compulsion was a product of Ds own psychosis.
4. Knowing: Must be aware of rights states in warnings; do not need to knows any
additional information such as fact lawyer is trying to contact him.
a. Burbine- Respondent confessed to and was convicted of the murder of a young
woman. D appealed, claiming his confessions should have been suppressed
because the police deceived him by failing to inform him that a public defender
had called to speak with him while he was in custody. The Court found that
respondent at no time requested an attorney, and events occurring outside the
presence of respondent and entirely unknown to him had no bearing on his
capacity to comprehend and knowingly waive his rights. The Court held that once
a person knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, the waiver was valid as a
matter of law.
G. Invocation of Right To Remain Silent
1. Requirement: If suspect invokes right to remain silent, interrogation may be resumed
only if officers Scrupulously honor the right to cut off questioning. Waiver cannot be
valid unless this additional safeguard is satisfied.
2. Clear Invocation: Suspect must clearly, unambiguously invoke right to remain silent.
a. Thompkins- See up- silence alone is not enough to invoke right to remain silent
3. Scrupulously Honor Standard:
a. Time: More than momentary cessation of a momentary respite is required. How
long is sufficient is uncertain.
b. Other Factors: Question is weather officers have respected assertion of right to
remain silent or undercut suspects decision to remain silent. Factors relevant
include: amount of time (over minimum) whether fresh Miranda warnings given
whether same or different crime, place, or officers. Any other factor that show
respect for versus undercutting of decision.
c. Initiation by suspect or 14-day break in custody: Probably sufficient (see
invocation of counsel)
d. Mosley- Defendant was arrested in connection with the investigation of
robberies. After being advised of his rights, defendant stated that he did not want
to talk about the robberies. Defendant was thereafter questioned at another
police station about a homicide and confessed to the murder. The Court
concluded that when the questioning was for different crimes, by a different police
officer, in a different room, after an extended period without questioning, the
request to remain silent had been scrupulously honored.
H. Invocation of Right to Counsel
1. Requirement: If suspect invoked right to counsel, officers may not interrogate unless

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a. Counsel is made available (i.e. present during interrogation)

b. Suspect initiates further communications, exchanges, conversations OR
c. There is at least a 14-day break in custody.
i. See Shatzer on pg 20.
d. Cases:
i. Edwards- After he was arrested and read his Miranda rights, petitioner
requested an attorney. Questioning ceased, but detectives from the same
police department returned the next day and again interrogated petitioner.
Petitioner confessed to the crimes during the second interrogation. Court
held the confession inadmissible because police initiated that
conversation, counsel was not present at the second interrogation, and D
had not validly waived his right to counsel.
Waiver cannot be valid unless one of these additional safeguards is satisfied

2. Clear invocation: Suspect must clearly, unambiguously invoke right to counsel. Must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable police officer would understand it to be a request for
an atty.
a. Davis- During questioning, D said maybe he should talk to a lawyer. The
Interrogator said he could have a lawyer if that is what he was asking for. D said
he wasnt asking for a lawyer. Later, D asked for a lawyer and questioning
stopped.
3. Initiation: Routine statements/inquiries are not initiation. Suspect must evince a
willingness and a desire for generalize discussion of the investigation.
a. Alternative: Suspects words/acts must represent a desire to open up a more
generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.
i. Bradshaw- D told police he wanted to speak to an attorney, then asked
the officer whats going to happen to me. The officer reminded him he
requested an attorney and reminded him that if he talks, anything he says
will be used against him. General conversation followed and D agreed to
a lie detector test. The Rehnquist plurality concluded that after initiating
further communication, D validly waived his right under Miranda.
4. Insufficient Safeguards: Fact that are different officers and/or that interrogation is about
different crime and/or that officers are unaware suspect invoked right to counsel and/or
suspect has consulted with a lawyer after invocation are not bases for permitting officers
to obtain a waive and interrogate the suspect.
a. Minnick- D escaped from prison and arrested at a home were residents were
killed. asked for lawyer when questioned. spoke to attorney. FBI agents and
local police then persistently tried to persuade to waive his rights. resisted,
but eventually submitted to interviews w/o attorney present. Prisoner was

26

convicted. Court held that his statements were taken in violation of his right to
counsel under the 5A. The requirement that counsel be "made available" to the
accused refers not to the opportunity to consult with an attorney outside the
interrogation room, but to the right to have the attorney present during custodial
interrogation
b. Roberson- was arrested for burglary at the scene of the crime. was read
rights and requested attorney before answering questions. Three days after
arrest, a different officer sought to interrogate him about a different burglary and
obtained an incriminating statement. Court held a who invokes a right to
counsel may not be questioned by a different officer about a separate offense
unless the suspect initiates further communications and even if the 2nd officer is
unaware of suspects invocation of right to counsel.

UNIT 10:
Massiah Right to Counsel Summary
A. Basic Doctrine
1. The Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense.
2. Massiah recognized 6th Amendment right to counsel in pretrial situations in which, after
indictment government agent deliberately elicited incriminating statements in absence of
counsel.
3. Held that right was violated when statements were used against him at trial.
B. Attachment of the right to counsel
1. The Right to Counsel attaches ONLY after the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings. In other words, it does not attachan individual has no entitlement to the
assistance of counseluntil after the initiation of formal charges.
2. An arrest or arrest warrant is not sufficient, but a formal charge, preliminary hearing ,
indictment, information, or arraignment constitutes the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings.
3. When a person makes a first appearance before a judge, is informed of the charges
against him/her, and his liberty is subject to restraint, the right attaches.
a. Rothgery- was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm. had an
initial appearance before a magistrate who concluded theta there was PC that he
was a felon. County did not appoint counsel to until 6 months after. alleged
that his right to counsel attached upon his first appearance and that the County
violated his 6A right. Supreme Court agreed.
4. The initiation of adversary judicial proceedings does not depend on whether a
prosecutor is involved in starting the process.

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a. See Rothgery Above. District Court ruled that s right to counsel had not
attached at his initial appearance b/c prosecutors were not aware of or involved
in his case. Supreme Court disagreed.
5. The right to counsel is OFFENSE SPECIFIC. It attaches only for those offense that have
been the subject of formal chargesincluding any offense that is the same as the
formally charged offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause test (one offense must
include all elements of the other offense).
a. Texas v. Cobb- D was arrest and indicted for burglary. He had an appointed atty
and was released on bond for that crime. Later he was arrested for the murder of
the home he burglarized and confessed after waiving his Miranda rights. D
Motioned to suppress b/c he was entitled to counsel pursuant to his burglary
charge. Court held that the right to counsel is offense specific and burglary
murder even though factually related.
C. Massiahs Critical Stage
1. Massiah held that the govt deliberate elicitation of statements from an accused is a
critical stage of the prosecution giving rise to a 6th Amendment right to counsel.
2. The Govts interaction with the accused:
a. Deliberate elicitation by either a known government agent or an undercover agent
can violate the 6A.
i. Brewer- was being transported and did not initiate discussion. An
agent and engaged in small talk regarding religion and appealed to his
religion. took police to the places he left the blanket, shoes, and then
lead them to the body. Here the police officer's "Christian burial speech"
was tantamount to interrogation respondent was entitled to the assistance
of counsel at the time he made the incriminating statements.
ii. Messiah- D was arrest for narcotics, was on bail when a codefendant and
govt informant had D make incriminating statements while in Co-Ds car.
Court held that use of informant was deliberate elicitation by govt and D
was entitled to counsel
iii. Fellers- After D was indicted by a grand jury, went to his home to arrest
and then had a discussion with Fellers about the charges against him.
During the convo Fellers made statements that were then used against
him in his trial. Court held that statements should be suppressed because
the indictment constituted the beginning of proceedings against him and
he was entitled to the presence of counsel from that moment on.
iv. Henry- was indicted for armed robbery. He was put in a cell with a
government informant who was told not to question him, but to report
information. The fellow prisoner gave the feds info on and testified in
Court. Court held that by intentionally creating a situation likely to

28

induce to make incriminating statements without the assistance of

counsel, the Government violated s 6A right to counsel.
b. Interrogation is NOT required, only deliberate elicitation. Mere conversation
suffices, but passive listening is NOT sufficient.
i. Henry- See above
ii.
3. The Govts Responsibility For the Informant:
a. For elicitation by an undercover informant instead of a regular Governmnet
employee (e.g. police, FBI) there muse be a basis for holding the informants
conduct attributable to the Govt.
i. Henryb. This requires that the Govt either intentionally create a situation likely to induce
the accused to make an incriminating statement without counsel or knowingly
exploit an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel; it is sufficient
that the govt must have known that its agent was likely to obtain incriminating
statements (alternative: that the informant was likely to take affirmative steps to
secure incriminating information)
i. Moulton- and co- were released. told the co- about a plan to kill
one of s witnesses. co- told police and wore a wire. Court held that
even though co- initiated contact with State, the police knowingly
circumvented s 6A since they knew he would make incriminating
statements. Motion suppress wire-tap evidence granted
ii. Henry- See aboveD. Waiver of the Massiah Right to Counsel
1. An accused may WAIVE the 6A right to counsel. State must prove an intentional
relinquishment of a known right or privilege. A valid waiver must be knowing and
voluntary.
a. Brewer- See above- No intentional relinquishment by showing where the body
was when both of his attorneys told police not to interrogate him and he told
police in the car ride that he would tell his story after he arrived and was with his
lawyer.
2. Court has never held that a waiver of the 6A right to counsel must be express;
consequently, it can be inferred from circumstances.
3. Knowing: Accused must know information in Miranda warnings; must know of attorneys
effort to contact; may have to know he has been charged with crime.
a. Patterson4. VOLUNTARY: No reason to believe that voluntary means something different than in
confession and Miranda waiver situations i.e. not coerved by govt in totality.
5. INVOCATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL- Request for assistance in court does not
invoke right to pretrial assistance granted by Massiah and even if Massiah right is

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invoked, a waiver is still possible even though the accused has not initiated
communication.
a. Montejo- was charged with first-degree murder. was also appointed courtordered counsel, which he neither expressly requested nor denied. While in
prison, police read his Miranda rights, and agreed to go along on a trip to
locate the murder weapon. While in the police car, wrote an inculpatory letter of
apology to the victim's widow. Only upon return did first finally meet his
attorney. At trial, the letter of apology was admitted over s objection. The jury
convicted of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death.

UNIT 13:
The Exclusionary Rule:
1. The 4th Amendment Exclusionary Rule requires exclusion of evidence acquired by
means of unreasonable searches or seizures from trials.
2. It was originally adopted for federal courts in Weeks v. United States; then was applied to
the states through the 14th amendment in Mapp v. Ohioh
3. Rationales/ Justifications for 4A ER:
a. Original rational unclear in Weeks, which said that without ER the 4A would be of
no value and might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The Court did
appear to recognize a right to exclusion.
b. MAPP recognized that it was an essential part of the right to privacy. Mapp also
said that its purpose was to deter- to compel respect for the 4A in the future in
the only effectively available way and described the ER as a clear, specific, and
constitutionally requiredeven if judicially implies deterrent safeguard needed
to prevent the 4A from being reduced to a form of words. The Court also relied
on judicial integrity.
c. Later

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