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How the Self-Defeating Argument Against

Determinism Defeats Itself
Stephen M. Knaster
Dialogue / Volume 25 / Issue 02 / June 1986, pp 239 - 244
DOI: 10.1017/S0012217300048770, Published online: 13 April 2010

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Stephen M. Knaster (1986). How the Self-Defeating Argument Against
Determinism Defeats Itself. Dialogue, 25, pp 239-244 doi:10.1017/
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How the Self-Defeating Argument

Against Determinism Defeats Itself

STEPHEN M. KNASTER

University of Toledo

There is a well-known argument which is an attempt to show that all

arguments in favour of determinism are self-defeating. Proponents of the
Determinism-Is-Self-Defeating Argument (hereafter referred to as
DISDA) claim that all pro-deterministic arguments, if successful,
undermine rationality and epistemic justification. Indeed, the proponents of DISDA claim that since the truth of determinism implies that
we cannot claim to know the truth of any proposition, then it follows, of
course, that proponents of determinism cannot claim to know that
determinism is itself true. Hence, the self-defeating nature of determinism.
It is my intention to show why DISDA is an unsuccessful argument. I
will do so not by attempting to advocate compatibilism, soft determinism, or self-determinism, as other critics of DISDA have done. Rather, I
will grab the bull by the horns, one might say, and refute DISDA on its
own turf, i.e., given a hard deterministic framework. My interest, however, in providing a refutation of DISDA is not for the purpose of helping
to resurrect arguments in favour of hard determinism. Rather, my purpose is a more modest one of attempting to lay to rest a specious
argument which has, nonetheless, enjoyed wide acceptance. Clearly,
sometimes we act and believe freely, and sometimes we do not.1 But,
those of us (myself included) who endorse a view of limited human
freedom ought to advance our case in a forthright manner, and with the
best arguments we can muster in its defence.
Before we set out to refute DISDA, let us be clear about what the
argument proposes and what it does not propose. The germ for DISDA
1 Fora defence of free and rational belief acquisitions, see my "Chisholm, Deliberation,
and the Free Acquisition of Belief", Philosophical Studies 46 (1984), 307-322.
Dialogue XXV (1986), 239-244

240 Dialogue
can be found in the writings of Kant.2 In addition, numerous contemporaries have advanced DISDA in one form or another. Some advocates
of less plausible versions of DISDA have claimed that if determinism is
true, then the concept of objective truth is rendered incoherent.3 A
recent proponent has claimed that DISDA shows that if determinism is
true, then determinism is meaningless.4 Probably the clearest, most
plausible, and least idiosyncratic version of DISDA was presented by
James Jordan.5 Indeed, Jordan's version of DISDA is, I believe, a fair
2 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). Kant states: "But we cannot possibly conceive of a
reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgments; for in that
case the subject would attribute the determination of his power of judgment, not to his
reason, but to an impulsion. Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own
principles independently of alien influences. Therefore as practical reason or as the will
of a rational being, it must be regarded by itself as free." Also, "[B]ut we have been quite
unable to demonstrate freedom as something actual in ourselves and in human nature;
we saw merely that we must presuppose it if we wish to conceive a being as rational and
as endowed with consciousness of his causality in regard to actions ..." (116).
3 Charles Ripley, "Why Determinism Cannot Be True", Dialogue 11/1 (March 1972),
59-68. Ripley states: "[I]t is a logical consequence of determinism that appeals to
justifying reasons and also the very concept of objective truth must be abandoned" (58).
Also, see Warner Wick, "Truth's Debt to Freedom", Mind 73 (1964), 527-537. Wick
states: "All talk of truth would be utterly pointless if there was nothing to it but causal
influences that induced me to say or think this, while causing you to oppose that ..."
(535). Also "the autonomy of intelligence, or of 'reason' as we used to say is thus the
keystone of the whole edifice. What then does truth owe to freedom? Why everything, of
course!" (537). For a critical response to Ripley's version of DISDA see Robert Simon's
"Should Reasoning Embarrass the Determinist?", Dialogue M/4 (December 1973),
680-682.
4 Joseph A. Magno, "Beyond the Self-Referential Critique of Determinism", Thomist 48
(January 1984), 74-80.
5 James Jordan, "Determinism's Dilemma", The Review of Metaphysics 23/1, Issue
no. 89 (September 1969), 48-66. For a list of pre-1969 DISDA advocates see ibid., 48. The
following are all post-1969 DISDA advocates or critics. Nathaniel Branden, "Free Will,
Moral Responsibility, and the Law", Southern California Law Review (Winter 1969).
Branden's defence of DISDA is similar to Jordan's. William Dwyer, "The Contradiction
of 'The Contradiction of Determinism' ", The Personalist 53 (Winter 1972), 94-101. A
critical response to Branden. David Bold, "A Reply to William Dwyer's 'The Contradiction of the The Contradiction of Determinism' ", The Personalist 54 (Summer 1973),
284-289. William Dwyer, "A Reply to David Bold", The Personalist 54 (Summer 1973),
291-303. A. Aaron Snyder, "The Paradox of Determinism", American Philosophical
Quarterly 9/4 (October 1972), 353-356.- A DISDA advocate, Snyder states: "[T]he
Determinist Doctrine is inconsistent with their being proofs, conclusive arguments, or
conclusive reasons for believing anything, and hence, trying to prove that doctrine is a
self-refuting activity. This inconsistency arises out of the fact that the universal operation of physically sufficient causes would leave no room for the conceptual sufficiency of
reasons" (354). Joseph Boyle, Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, "Determinism,
Freedom, and Self-Referential Arguments", The Review ofMetaphysics 26(1972), 3-37.
Robert Young, "A Sound Self-Referential Argument", The Review of Metaphysics 27
(1973), 112-119. A critical response to Boyle, Grisez, and Tollefsen. William Hasker,
"The Transcendental Refutation of Determinism", The Southern,Journal ofPhilosophy
11/3 (Fall 1973), 175-183. Karl Popper and John C. Eccles. The Self and Its Brain (New
York: Springer International, 1977), 75-76. Also, Karl Popper, The Open' Universe
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), 81-85. Popper advances his version of
DISDA by drawing upon the work of J. B. S. Haldane. Patricia Smith Churchland, "Is
Determinism Self-Refuting?", Mind 90 (January 1981), 99-101. A critique of Popper. Karl

Determinism

241

representation of the argument which has been widely advanced by

writers in books, journals, and introductory philosophy texts which
treat the issue. I shall, therefore, use Jordan's version of DISDA as the
basis for my refutation.
Jordan claims that DISDA cannot show that arguments in favour of
determinism are self-contradictory. Thus, it is not the case that DISDA
proves determinism is false. Indeed, DISDA readily admits that deterministic arguments could be coherently formulated, and might contain a
consistent and perhaps even a true set of premises. What the argument
does claim is: any argument which attempts to prove the truth of determinism defeats itself, because if the argument were sound we could not
justifiably claim to know its truth since if determinism were true the
soundness of no argument whatsoever could be established. Why?
Consider: if we accept the truth of the deterministic thesis, i.e., the view
that all events including, of course, all mental events are the result of
necessary and sufficient causal conditions which ultimately predate our
births, then all of our beliefs as well as our criterion for evaluating the
truth of our beliefs have also been so determined. Hence, DISDA
charges that if hard determinism is true, then we cannot claim to know its
truth nor the truth of any other beliefs, because, although we might think
that we are judging statements or propositions on their worth and as a
consequence of true rational assessment, really both our beliefs and our
belief-forming processes are beyond our control, and merely the result
of necessary and sufficient causal conditions produced by our heredity
and environment. Indeed, Jordan claims that if determinism were true,
then:
Whether we believe a proposition and what considerations we undertake before making a
decision depend simply on sufficient and necessary causal conditions that logically need
not be, and quite probably are not, relevant to the issues involved in assessing propositions
for truth and arguments for validity. If our rational assessments are conditioned solely by
factors whose exhaustive statement would omit mention of the recognized accordance of
our deliberations with criteria of trustworthy evidence and correct inference, then the
recognition of the relevance of these criteria is either inefficacious or absent. Of course,
one still might occasionally believe what is true, but this would always be the outcome of
happy circumstances, never of reasoned investigation. And if this is true of our rational
assessment of any argument, it is true of our attempts to determine the strengths and
weaknesses of any argument for the proposition in question. If the latter is true, any
argument for it is self-defeating, for it entails that no argument can be known to be sound."

So if hard determinism were true, we would be like elaborate computers churning out beliefs over which we, in truth, had no ultimate control.
Some individuals might believe in the truth of determinism, and others
might not. In both cases, however, the individual involved could not
Popper, "Is Determinism Self-Refuting", Mind 92 (January 1983), 103-104. A reply
to Churchland. Darrel D. Colson, "The Transcendental Argument Against Determinism: A Challenge Yet Unmet", Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (Spring 1982). 15-24.
Finally, see Michael Stack, "Self-Referential Arguments", Melaphilosophy 14/3 and 4
(July/October 1983), 327-335.
6 Jordan, "Determinism's Dilemma", 54.

242 Dialogue
help but believe what he did believe in the matter. Rational assessment
would be mere illusion since it would be impossible for each of us to
believe otherwise than we do believe given that our beliefs would always
be wholly a function of influences beyond our control. And however one
were to formulate such influences, whether in terms of "heredity and
environment", "brain and nervous system", or "character and circumstances" is of no consequence for DISDA, since any of these views, or
even a combination of them, is compatible with the argument.
Thus, if DISDA is successful, then it shows that we must be able to
freely acquire our beliefs in order to claim that we can rationally assess
beliefs, and in order to claim to know the truth of our beliefs. Still,
DISDA admits the possibility that if determinism were true someone
might happen to believe its truth for the right reasons. But this would be
merely a case of extraordinary good luck if any individuals were so well
programmed to reach the correct conclusions for the correct reasons.
Indeed, if hard determinism were true, then even these lucky individuals
could not justifiably claim to know the truth of determinism, nor any
other conclusion for that matter, since they could not know that they had
advanced the right reasons.
Why is it so important to show that DISDA fails? Let us illustrate: if I
consider the proposition "I am now seeing a red patch", I find that I
cannot but believe that this proposition is true while I do observe the red
patch. Indeed, I feel compelled to believe the truth of this proposition
since I find (through introspection) that I cannot believe otherwise than
that it is true. Similarly, if I consider the proposition "I exist", Descartes' supposed first truth, I also find that I cannot but believe that this
is true as well. Thus, here are two propositions which I suspect that most
of us (with the exception of some Wittgensteinian philosophers and
radical sceptics) would want to claim are among those propositions we
do indeed know with certainty. But if DISDA is correct, then I cannot
claim to know either of the above propositions since DISDA implies that
freedom is a prerequisite for making knowledge claims and it is clear to
me that I do not freely adopt either of the above beliefs. Rather, I find
that I cannot believe otherwise but that each proposition is true. Of
course, I only use the above propositions as examples of a much broader
class of propositions which includes the class of basic perceptual beliefs
and the class of basic introspective beliefs.
Still, one might object that propositions of this sort are compelled only
by the rules of logic or the rules of evidence, and are not necessarily the
result of causal compulsion. Indeed, one might argue that DISDA
shows that freedom is a prerequisite for knowledge claims only in the
sense of freedom from causal compulsion. But might not an overwhelming or overpowering psychological compulsion be indicative of causal

Determinism

243

compulsion as well?7 And might not our acceptance of the rules of logic,
and the rules of evidence be the result of causal compulsion? We ought
to keep in mind that DISDA charges that both our beliefs and our rules
for belief formation are subject to causal compulsion if determinism is
true. Thus, if we regard the rules of logic and the rules of evidence as
important guides for belief formation, and if our acceptance of these
guides occurs as the result of necessary and sufficient antecedent causal
conditions (which DISDA claims is true, if determinism is true) then it is
likely that those beliefs which we acquire on the basis of these guides will
also be the result of causal compulsion.
Thus, we should not underestimate the importance of DISDA since if
the argument succeeds then we may be unable to claim to know a good
many of our most basic beliefs, and beliefs we would ordinarily claim to
know with our strongest degree of certainty.
A "common sense" philosopher, e.g., a G. E. Moore, might brush
aside DISDA merely by noting that if DISDA implies a scepticism about
propositions we would ordinarily claim to know with a very strong
degree of certainty, then this in itself serves as a reductio argument
against DISDA. I do not find a "refutation" of this sort against DISDA
convincing. Nor do I find it convincing if one points to the fact that the
process of making inferences in deductive logic is certainly a rational
process even though many of the inferences we do make seem to be a
result of psychological compulsion. This begs the question because, as I
noted earlier, DISDA implies that deductive reasoning is itself not a
truly rational process if we cannot freely adopt its principles. Nonetheless, let us now examine DISDA more closely to show exactly what is
wrong with it.
Here then is why DISDA fails. Proponents of DISDA do not purport
to pass judgment on the truth or falsity of hard determinism. They admit
that the argument does not assume or imply that determinism is false.
Thus, given the law of excluded middle, it must be the case that hard
determinism is either true or false. So let us begin by supposing that hard
determinism, (1) is true, or (2) might be true. Even if DISDA is correct,
it permits us to suppose (1) for the sake of argument, though we cannot
claim to know it. And (2) is readily admitted by DISDA. Since it is the
case that DISDA entails the conclusion that we cannot know the soundness of any argument if we suppose (1) or (2), then it follows that we
cannot claim to know that DISDA is itself true. This is so because we
would have no valid criteria for evaluating it under these suppositions
since our belief in the truth of DISDA itself (if [1]), is, or (if [2]), could be,
wholly a function of influences beyond our control and not a function of
7 I assume, of course, that in order for an agent to be free from causal compulsion it must
be true that in a given situation he could have chosen to do (or believe) otherwise. I also
assume that we can gain evidence for freedom (or the lack of it) through introspection.

244 Dialogue
true rational assessment. Thus, paradoxically, if we suppose that
DISDA is sound while supposing that hard determinism is also true or
even might be true (as DISDA admits), then it follows from the joint
truth of DISDA and (1) or (2) that we cannot justifiably claim to know the
truth of DISDA. Nonetheless, determinism might be true and DISDA
might even be sound, but even if DISDA is sound we cannot claim to
know it, i.e., it defeats itself.
So in order that we may justifiably claim to know the truth of DISDA
we must also claim to know that hard determinism is false. But DISDA,
of course, does not make this claim, and if it did without advancing any
additional arguments, it would beg one of the central questions of the
free will vs. determinism debatewhich, by the way, would render
DISDA superfluous. Thus, it is clear that DISDA cannot help us shed
any new light in the free will vs. determinism debate since we can only
claim to know that DISDA is itself true, if we can first claim to know that
hard determinism is false. This, of course, shows that DISDA is useless
since it cannot help us to resolve the debate until after the debate is
already resolved on the basis of other arguments.
Now one might object by noting that the fact that DISDA defeats itself
is nothing more than a necessary consequence of its success. Still, this
does not alter the fact that if it does succeed, we cannot claim to know
that it is successful (unless we already know first that hard determinism
is false) since DISDA charges that if hard determinism is true (or might
be true) we cannot know the soundness of any argument whatsoever. In
addition, one might argue that DISDA defeats itself only if hard determinism is true, or might be true. Indeed, if hard determinism is false then
DISDA is not self-defeating. It seems to me that this is correct. But,
since DISDA is not an argument which proves that hard determinism is
false (at best it shows only the futility of attempts to prove that it is true)
then if we begin with the assumption that hard determinism is false, it
follows that DISDA is wholly unnecessary.
Let us briefly summarize: DISDA fails because it leaves the truth or
falsity of hard determinism an open question. Indeed, if we assume that
hard determinism is true or might be true, we cannot justifiably claim to
know the truth of DISDA; it defeats itself. So in order to claim that we
know the truth of DISDA, we must also claim to know that hard determinism is false. But this is a claim which cannot be justifiably asserted on
the basis of DISDA alone. To do so is to beg the question. Thus, because
we can only justifiably advance this claim on the basis of other arguments, and to prove that hard determinism is false is already to resolve
the issue, DISDA is rendered superfluous. In short, DISDA can only fail
when it is needed, and can succeed (if it does succeed at all) only when it
is unnecessary.