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G.R. No.

106435, July 14, 1999, 310 SCRA 281


PAMECA Wood Treatment Plant, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
PAMECA loaned P2M from DBP and executed a promissory
note, secured by its inventory of furniture and equipment.
PAMECA defaulted thus DBP extrajudicially foreclosed on the
chattels. DBP was the only bidder so it was able to buy said
property for P322K. Subsequently for the deficiency, it filed a
complaint against PAMECA and its solidary debtors, according to
the promissory note it signed.
ISSUE:
Whether an action be instituted for deficiency of a debt
after foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
RULING:
Yes. Chattel Mortgage Law expressly entitles the mortgagor
to the balance of the proceeds, upon satisfaction of the principal
obligation and costs. Since the Chattel Mortgage Law bars the
creditor-mortgagee from retaining the excess of the sale
proceeds, there is a corollary obligation on the part of the
debtor-mortgagee to pay the deficiency in case of a reduction in
the price at public auction.

G.R. No. L-14027


Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. French & Unson
FACTS:
Petitioner is a common carrier engaged in the
transportation of passengers and merchandise in the Philippine
Coast Trade, and rendered services as such for the Government,
at the request of the purchasing agent. By reason of said
services, the Bureau became indebted to the petitioner.
Furthermore, out of the supposed twenty cans of gasoline that
were to be delivered, two of which had escaped by leakage.
Petitioner claims that since respondent Bureau is indebted to the
former, the alleged loss of gasolines during delivery should be
deducted from said debts.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent can lawfully proceed to liquidate and
set-off demand.
RULING:
No. When any person is indebted to the Government of the
Philippine Islands or Government of the United States, the
Insular Auditor may direct the proper officer to withhold the
payment of any money due him or his estate, the same to be
applied in satisfaction of such indebtedness. We conclude,
therefore, that no power to adjudicate and offset disputed
unliquidated claims for damages is conferred upon Insular
Auditor by the cited provisions of the Jones Law or by the
general grant of jurisdiction to examine and audit claims owing

to the Government contained in section 584 of the Administrative


Code. It now remains for us to determine if that authority is
conferred by section 624 of that statute.

G.R. No. 130722


Litonjua, et al. v. L &R Corporation, et al.,
FACTS:
Litonjua obtained a loan from Respondent. The loan was
secured by a mortgage which contains a stipulation that the
mortgagor shall not alienate the object mortgaged without the
consent of the mortgagee and that of right of first refusal in favor
of the latter. Subsequently, Litonjua sold to PWAS the object
mortgaged. The respondent knew such sale, thus, he moved for
the cancellation thereof invoking the stipulation in the mortgage,
and moved for the foreclosure of the same.
ISSUE:
Whether the mortgagee can move for the cancellation of the
sale.
RULING:
Yes. The mortgagee can proceed to cancel the sale.
Although the stipulation in mortgage contract which prohibits
the mortgagor from alienating the mortgaged property without
prior consent from mortgagee is void, nonetheless, since there is
also a stipulation therein with respect to the right of first refusal,

the mortgagor should respect such stipulation. Since the


mortgagor violated the tenor of the contract, the subsequent sale
made in favor of PWAS is rescissible. Hence, the sale of the
property can be cancelled.

G.R. Nos. 54224-25


Tambunting v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
FACTS:
Escuetas obtained a loan from RFC which loan was secured
by a mortgage over the land owned by the former. Subsequently,
with the consent of RFC, Escuetas created a second mortgage
over said land to secure another loan obtained from Tambunting.
Escuetas defaulted in payment to RFC, thus, RFC obtained the
property after foreclosure and sale thereof. Meanwhile,
Tambunting offered to redeem the property from RFC which the
latter agreed to with a condition of right of redemption in favor
of Escuetas. However, Escuetas assigned their rights to
Hernandez, consequently, Tambunting refused to sell the land to
Hernandez claiming that Escuetas violated the stipulation
concerning the redemption.
ISSUE:

Whether the assignment made by Escuetas in favor of


Hernandez violated the terms of the mortgage.
RULING:
No. In the first place, the matter of whether or not the
assignment was fictitious is an issue of fact and its resolution by
the Court of Appeals is, by firmly established and long observed
principle, final and conclusive on this Court. A mortgagor, by
encumbering his property, does not ordinarily lose the right to
sell the same or create another mortgage over it, although of
course obliged, when exercising said right, to preserve and
maintain the superiority of the prior mortgagee's rights. Indeed,
recognition of the propriety of subsequent encumbrances is
implicit in the grant of the right of redemption by Section 6 of
Act 3135, as amended, in cases of extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, to "any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the
property is sold," in addition to the "debtor, his successors in
interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said
debtor.

G.R. No. L-20482


Philippine Industrial Co. v. El Hogar & Vallejo
FACTS:
Vallejo executed a mortgage in favor of defendant upon
certain real estate belonging to him, registered under the
Torrens Law. Said mortgage has a stipulation that the mortgagor
cannot alienate said property mortgaged without obtaining prior
consent from mortgagee. Vallejo however went to ROD and
presented a document to register another mortgage over the

property previously mortgaged. Consequently, ROD rejected said


registration of second mortgage claiming that the property
contains an encumbrance and stipulation prohibiting subsequent
alienation thereof without consent of the mortgagee.
ISSUE:
Whether the stipulation prohibiting subsequent alienation of
the mortgaged property is void.
RULING:
No. Article 107 of the Mortgage Law has no application
because this is a case of a property registered in accordance with
the Torrens system prescribed by Act No. 496, section 124 of
which provides that the system of registration established by the
laws in force on the matter in the Philippine Islands should
continue to be applicable to properties not registered in
accordance with this law, with the modifications established
therein. Nor can said article 1880 of the Civil Code, giving effect
to the provisions of the Mortgage Law, be invoked. Therefore, the
provision of article 1255 of the Civil Code remains in force, who
gives the contracting parties absolute liberty to make such
stipulations as they may deem fit, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals and public order; and there being no law
whatsoever prohibiting the stipulation that no other mortgage
should be made, and said stipulation not being immoral, nor
contrary to public order, we are of the opinion that such a
stipulation is valid and binding between the parties.