[G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998.

]
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES URIARTE,
and FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF GREGORIO
ARNALDO, represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO SULLANO and LUPECINO ARNALDO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent brought in the Regional Trial Court an action for partition of the land left by Justa
Arnaldo-Sering who died intestate and without issue, claiming to be the sole surviving heir of decedent.
Private respondent contended that petitioners could claim only one-half of the land which the decedent
had inherited from her parents. However, the petitioners claimed that the land was originally owned by
their great granduncle, Ambrocio Arnaldo, who allegedly bequeathed the land to his nephews Domingo
Arnaldo, uncle of the decedent, and Juan Arnaldo, father of the decedent. Petitioners contended that
private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo.
The trial court sustained petitioners' contention. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that private respondent is the nephew of the decedent, being the
son of Agatonica Arreza, half-sister of the decedent, and is therefore a third degree relative of the
decedent. On the other hand, the petitioners are the sons and daughters of decedent's cousins and are
therefore fifth degree relatives of the decedent. Applying Article 962 of the Civil Code which provides that
the nearest excludes the farthest, the Court of Appeals held that the private respondent is the lawful heir
of the decedent. Hence, this petition. Petitioners are questioning private respondent's filiation contending
that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that private respondent is the son of
Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of the decedent. Petitioners also make much of the fact that
private respondent is not an Arnaldo, and is therefore not qualified to share in the estate of the decedent.
The Supreme Court found that petition to be without merit. It is well-settled that questions not taken up
during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason should such a
question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court also held
that petitioners misappreciate the relationship between the decedent and private respondent. A nephew is
considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify
him from being his aunt's heir. The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half-blood is
important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors. HETDAa
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; ISSUES NOT RAISED DURING THE TRIAL CANNOT BE RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during the trial
of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a question
be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this Court.
2.
CIVIL LAW; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; A NEPHEW IS A COLLATERAL RELATIVE WHO MAY INHERIT IF
NO DESCENDANT, ASCENDANT, OR SPOUSE SURVIVE THE DECEDENT. Petitioners misappreciate the
relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of
Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephews. A nephew is considered a collateral relative
who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; BEING A HALF-BLOOD RELATIVE, NOT A DISQUALIFICATION FROM BEING HIS AUNT'S
HEIR. That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify
him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of
whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of
the survivors." EDHCSI
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate court's resolution
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a 2.7 hectare piece of
land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on March 31, 1989.
cdasia
The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:

Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and
Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another
daughter, the decedent Justa. 2 Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her
half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of
Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother,
Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justa's
father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers. 3 Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth
degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte. cdtai
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio. 4 The children of
Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio,
all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio,
Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within
the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the
land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as
follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by
purchase. 5 Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter
died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa's
tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest. 6 He contended that Pascasio
had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had
inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. 7
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. 8 In their answer, the heirs
denied they were mere tenants of Justa 9 but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land. cdt
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, 10 their
great granduncle. It was alleged bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a
holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. 11 Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan,
one-third. 12 The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime
Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. 13
They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of
Ambrocio Arnaldo, 14 the original owner of the property.
The trial court sustained petitioner's contention. In its decision rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two nephews, Domingo and Juan
Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters to Domingo, and
one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares
because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan
Arnaldo, after the latter's death. The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax declaration in the name of
Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter however died intestate and without issue. Her nearest surviving relatives
are the children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death by
operation of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code). 15
Accordingly, the court ordered: aisadc
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and the intervenors [herein
petitioners] and against the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the defendants and the intervenors,
together with the other heirs of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land described
in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering.
No cost.
SO ORDERED. 16
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the appellate court found
that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by Justa's parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their
marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be entitled
to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its decision the appellate court ordered: cdta
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another is hereby entered
Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended complaint in the following manner:

(1)

.2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and

(2)

2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff. cdasia

For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the partition in accordance with the
procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED. 17
Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio
Arnaldo. Petitioners allege: cdtai
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK
AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF AGATONA ARREZA,
THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO SERING;
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED
AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III
THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES
IS MERITORIOUS; cdt
IV

AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 18

After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As already stated, Justa left a piece of
land consisting 2.7 hectares. Half of this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly was
conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was
acquired by Justa after the death of her parents. Accordingly, the division of Justa's property should be as
follows as private respondent contends:
A
The first hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue to
petitioners and the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.
aisadc
B
As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already stated was
consolidated with the hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula
Tubil, the same shall accrue to private respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and who is only
three degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and
Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo. 19
The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justa's estate
as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
holding that private respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo.
Petitioners are raising this issue only now. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during
the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a
question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this Court. 20

It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals, 21 petitioners admitted that private
respondent is Justa's nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justa's half-sister. Apparently they are now
questioning private respondent's filiation because, as explained by the Court of Appeals, private
respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate. cdasia
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Justa's parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her father's (Juan Arnaldo's)
share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition, Justa
inherited her mother's (Ursula Tubil's) share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which
belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land. This
2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justa's nearest surviving
relative. As the Court of Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between
paternal and maternal lines. cdtai
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil
Code. They provide:
ART. 963.
a degree.

Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms

ART. 964.

A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. aisadc

A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
ART. 965.

The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
ART. 966.
progenitor.

In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the

In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one degree removed from the
parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with
whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from
his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of
Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa's cousin. They are thus
fifth degree relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The
fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. 22
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother
being Ursula's daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case,
private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate. cdasia
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private
respondent is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is
considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the
decedent. 23 The private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not
disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination
of whether the relationship is of the full or half-blood is important only to determine the extent of the share
of the survivors." 24
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth grounds of the petition for renew
must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. 66574. June 17, 1987.]
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp.
Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,"
praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and
that she be appointed as special administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another
child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and
the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual
Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973
and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti
Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. LLphil
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
"a)
Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pablo
Santero;
"b)
Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual
Santero;
"c)
Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person,
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
"e)
Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero."
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to intervene in
the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero
and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14, 1980
adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part
or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1, 1980,
Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4
was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the
trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads
"WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law applicable, the same
is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring
the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to
interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
"Costs against the oppositors-appellees."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the same
respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the
following: LexLib
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I.
The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero
as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece,
who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II.
The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero to
represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
III.
The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the
petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV.
The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore a
collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero,
who are her direct descendants and/or grand children;
V.
The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable provisions
of law on intestate succession; and
VI.
The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are
provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here
is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero
could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father
Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of
the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil
Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970)
to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate
children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but
that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the
illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their
grandmother (Simona Pamuti)" 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: Cdpr
ART. 992.
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a).
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided
for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed
by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon.
Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:

"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate
family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art, 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing
him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so.
This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to
make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and
998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children.
(Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First
Quarter, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes
all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the
only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein
are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit
any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. cdll
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of
the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention
is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for
the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently,
Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for
reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are
already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained
by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. The
respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980
excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly
a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void."
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. L-51263. February 28, 1983.]
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES
BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC., respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS; GENERALLY NOT
DISTURBED ON REVIEW; EXCEPTIONS. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous
cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court.
The exceptions are. (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of
both appellant and appellee. None of the abuse exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence,
there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.
2.
CIVIL LAW; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN NOT ENTITLED TO INHERIT AB
INTESTATO FROM THE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF HIS FATHER OR MOTHER; CASE AT BAR.
Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13,
1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's
first marriage was still subsisting. At most , petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father like the Deceased Francisco
Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

DECISION
DE CASTRO, J p:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R,
promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor of
petitioner: LLjur
"(a)
Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA
REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;
"(b)
Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the deceased FRANCISCA
REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell;
"(c)
Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the share
of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
"(d)
Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the properties subject of
this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike;
"(e)
Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality of this
decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff
Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;
"(f)
Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell to pay jointly and severally plaintiff
Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;
"(g)

Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and

"(h)

Dismissing defendants' counterclaim." 1

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two
(2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter,
Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949
without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo,
filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled
to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria
Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned
between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from
said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have been
made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject
properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said
properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently
executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paraaque,
Inc. sometime in September 1963. cdrep
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove
ownership of the properties in suit. From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the decision of the trial court" thereby dismissing petitioner's
complaint. Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review was filed on
the following assignment of errors:
I
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
III

"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA
REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION."
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties of the
private respondents.
"There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each has its own distinct
factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which
describes it as follows:
'. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes: Por
la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba
citada por la espalda la via ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio'
"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948.
Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the
property and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the
same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking
that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same.
"The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh.
'3') which describes the property as follows:
'. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar
de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo
Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea, de una extension superficial de
1229.00 metros cuadrados.'
"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the
same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in
Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes administered the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the
property in her own name. Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the
instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share of his father.
"As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally because defendants'
evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same
as the properties sought by the plaintiff.
"Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the
identification of the lands in question.
"To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria Cailles is 'en la
calle Desposorio' in Las Pias, Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the
time, including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.').
"With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description fits the land now
being sought by the plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R.
Co.
"With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property described in the deed and
in the tax declaration is one and the same property.
"The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades have already passed
between the deed and the declaration and 'during that period, many changes of abode would likely have
occurred.'
"Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and they have paid the
realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt
that this property is the same, if not identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being sought
after by the plaintiff.
"With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that
there is no similar boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her
name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948." (Reference to
Exhibits omitted.) 2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since the
present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-established

rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally,
final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None of the above exceptions,
however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:
"Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the
daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca
Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can
consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
"In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father
is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
"Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We have
minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased
Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
"This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a
certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol.
Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo
Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and
space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a
fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question." 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of a
clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact. prLL
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo,
still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes
considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the
fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet
married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would
be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the petitioner.
[G.R. No. 5343. September 16, 1910.]
CELESTINO RODRIGUEZ, administrator, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. LUISA RAVILAN,
defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.
PARTITION; OWNERSHIP; PARTIES. In an action for the partition of property held in common, it is
assumed that the parties by whom it is prosecuted are all coowners or coproprietors of the property to be
divided, as he who claims or demands the partition of property of common ownership must necessarily
have the status of coproprietor of the undivided property.
2.
ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP NOT TO BE TRIED IN PARTITION. In such an action for partition the question
of common ownership is not to be argued, nor the fact as to whether the interested parties are or are not
the owners of the property in question, but only as t how, and in what manner, and in what proportion the
said property of common ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of the court.
3.
ID; OWNERS ONLY CAN MAINTAIN ACTION FOR PARTITION. He who has not the status of coowner,
or shall not previously have proven that he has such status, is not entitled to prosecute an action for the
partition of property.
4.
ID.; RULES OF INHERITANCE; EFFECT OF PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS. A civil partnership contract
executed between several brothers or relatives, relating to the use and enjoyment of property held in

common, can not affect the hereditary rights of the relatives of a deceased partner, nor alter the order of
inheritance prescribed by law.
DECISION
TORRES, J p:
On November 29, 1904, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son, Nicolas Mendoza,
filed a written amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Luisa Ravillan, the
guardian of their daughters Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint
recites, among other things, that many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo of
Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia,
Matea, and Pedro, surnamed Barte, and that, although five of them divided among themselves he said
property, consisting of lands situated in the said pueblo and several carabaos, the legal portions which
pertained to four of them, Espiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remained undivided, and these latter
continued to possess, in associated in business separately from their other coheirs.
The property of the said four children, which remained undivided, consists of one parcel of agricultural land
in the pueblo of Mandaue, of an area such as is usually sown with a ganta of seed corn, bounded on the
north by property of Damasa Manalili, on the south by that of Telesfora Barte, on the east by that of Maria
Mendoza, and on the west by that of Feliciana Barte; another parcel of agricultural land in the barrio of
Banilad of the same pueblo, of an area usually covered in sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded
on the north by the street that leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio Cortes, and on the
east and west by that of Dionisio Cortes and Lucio Ceniza, respectively; another parcel of land, situated in
the same barrio and of an area required for the sowing of 2 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by
the street leading to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio Cortes, on the east by an alley, and on
the west by the property of Marcelo Oano.
That the said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from these lands, other lands, to
wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of Libog and pueblo of Bogo, of an area usually sown with 14 gantas of
seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by property of Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano
Cortes, Domingo Nunez, and Feliciano Cortes, respectively; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area
sufficient for 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the property of Benito Cabajug, on the south
by the lands of Mariano Cabajug, on the east by those of Amadeo Elore, and on the west by that of Mariano
Mendoza; another parcel in the same barrio, of sufficient area for 10 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the
north, south, east, and west by the lands of Ciriaco Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano Cortes, and Mariano
Fontanosa; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn,
bounded on the north, south, east, and west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Marianoa
Cabajug, and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively; another parcel in the said barrio, bounded on the north,
south, east, and west by lands of Damiano Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another parcel of an area sown by 4
gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Mariano Cabajug, Anacleto
Lambojon, Ciriaco Dajuna, and Anacleto Lambojon, respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of
Tabayho of the aforesaid pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south,
east and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa, Vicente Odian, and Meliton Mendoza;
another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded on the north, south, east, and
west by lands of Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of Jose Arfon and Santiago Ortelano, respectively;
and another parcel in the barrio of Dughoy, Tabugon, of an area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on
the north, south, east, and west by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago Ortelano, and
Donato Mendoza; eleven plow carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four head of cattle,
acquired by the community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against Laureano Solianoa secured by a
mortgage on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the pueblo of Bogo, and three carabaos.
That the business of the said four brothers and sisters was, by common accord, administered by one of
them, Espiridion Barte, and, when he died, the three survivors remained united in their interests and the
undivided property was administered, until December, 1901, by Pedro Barte, who at his death left four
heirs, the said Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, represented by their mother, Luisa Ravilan, the
wife and widow of Pedro Barte and the defendant in this suit; that the said property, as aforestated, was
administered by Espiridon Barte, in common accord with the others, and, he having died without leaving
heirs, by force of law the pat that pertained to him passed to his brother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and
Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said brother and
sisters continued their partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator; that
during the latter's administration, Matea Barte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented
by his father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte, Jorgia Barte and Donato
Mendoza, in the name of their son Nicolas, decided upon the distribution of the property mentioned and so
stated, in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would

not agree to the partition, on the pretext that, as the administratrix of that property, she had to pay debts
of the deceased.
That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the debts having been settled, as
admitted by the defendant herself, the latter was requested to present the accounts, which she absolutely
refused to do, and that she continued in the possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the said property,
without the consent or intervention of the plaintiffs; that Jorgia Barte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of Matea
Barte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte, were then
entitled to the property in question, which should be divided among them in three equal parts, one to be
allotted to Jorgia Barte, another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.
The demand further recites that the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore pray that a
partition of the property, both real and personal, be decreed and also of the profits that may have accrued
thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct enjoyed by the defendant, in
accordance with the respective rights of the parties, and that, in case that the distribution can not be
made without detriment to such rights, the property be ordered sold and the proceeds divided among the
parties. The plaintiffs requested also that the costs of the suit be assessed against the defendant.
A demurrer to the complaint was interposed, although the record does not show how it was decided. The
defendants in their answer denied all the allegations of the amended complaint.
The case came to trial and, the testimony having been adduced by both parties, the exhibits being
attached to the record, the judge, in view of the conclusions reached therefrom and on the date of
November 4, 1907, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, by ordering the partition of the property
mentioned, in the manner and portions expressed in the judgment, and decreeing that such partition must
be made in accordance with sections 185 to 195 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with respect to the real
property, and that the five carabaos should be distributed in three equal allotments in the manner
determined for the real property. The costs were charged to the plaintiffs and assessed against the
divisible property.
Counsel for the defendant excepted to this judgment and prayed for its annulment and a new trial. The
motion was overruled, to which exception was taken, and the appellant duly presented his bill of
exceptions, which was approved and forwarded to this court.
A demand is made in the complaint for the partition of the common property held undividedly by four
brothers and sisters who formed a partnership for the use and enjoyment of the same.
In relating the origin of a part of the property of the four brothers and sisters joined in partnership, the
plaintiffs stated that their deceased parents, Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno, left at their death nine children,
above mentioned, and property consisting of carabaos, a credit, and lands situated in the pueblo of
Mandaue, and that, their property having been divided among their nine children, that portion thereof
which corresponded to the brothers and sisters Espiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro remained undivided
and its owners, associated together, continued undivided and its owners, associated together, continued to
enjoy it and manage it in common, separately from their other brothers and sisters.
Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers and sisters were
unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and are therefore their only heirs, it
should at least have been shown that a lawful partition was made among their nine children, of the
property left by both spouses at their death, and that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of
Mandaue, and said to be possessed by the said four brothers and sisters associated together, were
awarded to the same. Such a partition, were it made, should appear in an authentic document, which was
not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the civil Code provides "A division legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property which may have been awarded to him."
Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it had been shown that the
Mandaue lands had been awarded by partition to the fourth brothers and sisters aforementioned, there
would have been prima facie proof that they were and certainly are the owners thereof.
Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or holding real estate with others, in
any form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, may compel partition thereof in the manner hereinafter
prescribed."
Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for partition shall set forth the
nature and extent of the plaintiff's title and contain an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded, and name each tenant in common, coparcener, or other person interested therein,
as defendants."

So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the status of a coproprietor or
coowner of the property the partition of which is asked for; and notwithstanding the fact that Jorgia Barte
and the son of Matea Barte, through his representative, aver that they are the coowners of the said
Mandaue lands and of others situated in the municipalities of Bogo and Tabogon, they have not proved
their averment by titles which establish the common ownership alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs
is insufficient, since the defendant party, representing the four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte,
absolutely denied all the allegations of the complaint.
It is true that the defendant Luisa Ravilan stated in her sworn testimony that, as the guardian of her
children, she had an interest in the lands situated in Mandaue and that the parcels of land situated in
Tabogon did not belong to her, nor to her deceased husband, Pedro Barte; but she positively affirmed that
the seven parcels of land situated in Bogo were acquired by her said husband during his lifetime and
during his marriage with her, and she exhibited five documents, one of them the original of a possessory
information, as titles proving the ownership of her said husband.
Against the averment of the plaintiffs appears that of the defendant in the name of her four daughters, the
heirs if Pedro Barte, and while the plaintiff party exhibited no title of ownership whatever, not even of the
lands situated in the pueblo of Bogo and which the defendant affirmed were acquired by her deceased
husband, Pedro Barte, during his lifetime, it is an indisputable fact that the latter's widow, who in her own
behalf and in the name of her four daughters claims the exclusive ownership of the lands in Bogo, is at the
present time in possession thereof, and moreover showed documents which prove the acquisition of some
of them. The testimony of the defendant to the effect that she only had a share in the lands of Mandaue,
but not in those situated in Tabogon, is worthy of serious consideration, although she positively affirmed
that those situated in Tabogon, is worthy of serious consideration, although she positively affirmed that
those situated in Bogo belonged to her husband and to herself. As she is in possession of these lands, and
as the record of the trial shows no proof that they belonged to the joint association or partnership existing
between the said four brothers and sisters, there are no legal provisions that would support the issuance of
the issuance of an order for the partition of the said lands in Bogo, of which the widow of their alleged
former owner is now in possession.
In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties are all coowners or
coproprietors of the undivided property to be partitioned. The question of common ownership need not be
gone into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what manner, and in what proportion the said property of
common ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of court.
Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered that the hereditary
succession of the deceased Espiridion Barte, who it is said left no legitimate descendants at his death,
should be divided among his eight brothers and sisters who may have survived him, and in case any of
these have died, the children of his deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews and nieces per stripes,
are entitled to share in his inheritance, according to the provisions of articles 946. 947, 948 of the Civil
Code, the last cited of which prescribes: "Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the
whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita and the latter per stripes," representing their respective
fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the deceased.
The record does not show whether Jorgia Barte left any legitimate heir at her death, and if she did not, her
collateral relatives succeed her in the manner provided by law.
It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the fourth brothers and sisters can not affect
the hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of the deceased predecessor in interest nor alter the
order prescribed by law for testate or intestate successions. (Arts. 744, 763, 806, 808, 913, 946, Civil
Code.)
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, to
declare, and we do hereby declare, that the partition prayed for be denied, and to absolve, as we do
hereby absolve, the defendant Luisa Ravilan from the complaint, without special finding as to costs.
G.R. No. 155733

January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND
GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS
DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS
DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS
DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R.
DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R.
CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF
ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN
RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA
RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside
by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. 6 The
main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs
of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1)
the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his
nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa,
five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood
siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon
Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was
admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados
union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. 13 If Ramon Osorio and
Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood
brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would
be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they
assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date
or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So
did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated
that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado), 15 significantly omitting
any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father. 16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no
marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some
collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia
executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but whether a marriage in fact
took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but

were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage
existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors
referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did
not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the
death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were
known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition,
oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active
Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into
their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally
adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, 19 the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo
Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary
which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also,
her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. 20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate
estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that
her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot
claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition
for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction." 23 The petition
was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana
Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman
Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia,
Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with
the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo
Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The
opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were
barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the
only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors
(respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC
insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the
interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out
upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both
estates.27The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa
Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only
legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and
entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this
Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the
late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of
the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and
necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of
the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J.
RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all
her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The
same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal
was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest
of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of
the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters of
substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the
administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the
denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should
not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated
November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private
respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the
amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.)
Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to
partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia
and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus
revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate
estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of
the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia
Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of
the administrators qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15,
1973 isREMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of
Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to
draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of
fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable. 37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their
family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even
the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to
them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested
marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate
which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always
proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may
be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued
to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the
declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado 43 and the
titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately
support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the
truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to
support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that
eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who
baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no
hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this
jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and,
if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the
common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her
mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may
overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage,
can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors
(now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of
such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of
the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partida de
Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado). 50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her
natural children.52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural
brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different
from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood.
The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families
does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category
between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the
same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that
the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood
illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if
all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally. 53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado,
her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters,
or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested
right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial
court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the
time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: 57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other onehalf.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated
Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the
decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the
estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she
may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. 59 She,
however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death
of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no
hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted
certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. 60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with
that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) 61 by the
direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing. 63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through
authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until
the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but
a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed
upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for
purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this
case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be
his.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary
prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not.
The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his
name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice
of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted
as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia
himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original
signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in
accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar
to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence. 68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the
decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his
sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent.
Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one
to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates,72a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de
la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch
55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The
remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the
children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at
the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In
this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita)
and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares
shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now
deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as
may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
ADOPTION
[G.R. No. L-6294. June 28, 1954.]
In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTERIO RESABA. LUIS SANTOS-YIGO
and LIGIA MIGUEL DE SANTOS-YIGO, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.
ADOPTION, PURPOSE OF PERSONS DISQUALIFIED TO ADOPT. The purpose of adoption is to afford
to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one by creating, through legal fiction,
the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. This purpose rejects the idea
of adoption by persons who have children of their own, for otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences

may arise resulting from the infiltration of foreign element into a family which already counts with children
upon whom the parents can shower their paternal love and affection.
2.
ID.; ADOPTION AGREEMENT EXECUTED BEFORE THE NEW CIVIL CODE VALID ADOPTION IN THIS
JURISDICTION. While the adoption agreement was executed at a time when the law applicable to
adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court, which does not prohibit persons who have legitimate children
from adopting, such agreement can not have the effect of establishing the relation of paternity and filiation
by fiction of law without the sanction of court. The only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one made
through court, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule.
3.
COURTS; THEIR DUTY. The duty of the courts is to interpret and apply the law as they see it in
accordance with sound rules of statutory construction.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Luis Santos-Yigo and
his wife for the adoption of a minor named Marcial Eleuterio Resaba. It is alleged that the legitimate
parents of said minor have given their consent to the adoption in a document which was duly signed by
them on March 20, 1950, and that since then petitioners had reared and cared for the minor as if he were
their own. It is likewise alleged that petitioners are financially and morally able to bring up and educate the
minor.
By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the Solicitor General who, in due time, filed a
written opposition on the ground that petitioners have two legitimate children, a boy and a girl, who are
still minors, and as such they are disqualified to adopt under the provisions of the new Civil Code.
The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have two legitimate children of their own, yet
said children were born after the agreement for adoption was executed by petitioners and the parents of
the minor. The court found that said agreement was executed before the new Civil Code went into effect
and while the petition may not be granted under this new Code, it may be sanctioned under the old
because it contains no provision which prohibits adoption in the form and manner agreed upon by the
parties. From this decision, the Solicitor General took the present appeal.
The errors assigned by the Solicitor General are:
"I
"The lower court erred in granting the petition to adopt in violation of the provisions of paragraph 1, article
335, new Civil Code.
"II
"The lower court erred in giving Exhibit 'A', the agreement to adopt, a binding effect."
There is merit in the contention that the petition should not be granted in view of the prohibition contained
in article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code. This article provides that persons who have legitimate
children cannot adopt, and there is no doubt about its application because the petition was filed on June
24, 1952 and at that time petitioners had two legitimate children, one a boy born on November 12, 1950
and the other, a girl born on April 13, 1952. This case therefore comes squarely within the prohibition. This
prohibition is founded on sound moral grounds. The purpose of adoption is to afford to persons who have
no child of their own the consolation of having one by creating, through legal fiction, the relation of
paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. This purpose rejects the idea of adoption by
persons who have children of their own, for, otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences may arise
resulting from the infiltration of foreign element into a family which already counts with children upon
whom the parents can shower their paternal love and affection (2 Manresa, 6th ed., 108-109). This moral
consideration must have influenced the framers of the new Civil Code when they reiterated therein this
salutary provision.
But it is contended, this prohibition in the new Civil Code cannot have application to the present case
because, to do so, as it is now attempted, would impair the acquired right of petitioners over the adopted
child in violation of the transitory provisions of article 2252 of said Code. It is pointed out that petitioners
reared and took care of the child, since February 24, 1950, and on March 20, 1950 they and the parents of
the child executed the adoption agreement in accordance with the Rules of Court, and since these rules do
not forbid adoption to persons who have legitimate children, that agreement shall be given full effect in
the same manner as any other contract which is not contrary to law, morals and public order.

We find no merit in this contention. While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law
applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that rule does not prohibit persons who have
legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to the proposition that such agreement has the effect
of establishing the relation of paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court. The
reason is simple. Rule 100 has taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (sections 765772, inclusive), which in turn replaced the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on adoption. (Articles 173180.) As was stated in one case, said chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure "appears to be a complete
enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law
thereof. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the
matter." In re adoption of Emiliano Guzman, 73 Phil., 51.) Now, said rule expressly provides that a person
desiring to adopt a minor shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the province where he
resides (section 1). This means that the only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one made through
court, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule, which shows that the agreement under
consideration can not have the effect of adoption as now pretended by petitioners.
Some members of the Court have advanced the opinion that, notwithstanding the enactment of the Code
of Civil Procedure or the adoption of the present Rules of Court concerning adoption, those provisions of
the Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in nature cannot be considered as having been impliedly
repealed, such as the one providing that a person who has a legitimate child is prohibited to adopt (article
74). But the majority is of the opinion that the repeal is complete as declared by this Court in the case of In
re adoption of Emiliano Guzman, supra. At any rate, this matter is not now of any consequence considering
the fact that when the adoption agreement was executed the petitioners had not yet any legitimate child.
Their children were born subsequent to that agreement.
We are sympathetic to the plea of equity of counsel considering the fact that petitioners had taken custody
of the child and had reared and educated him as their own much prior to the approval of the new Civil
Code and that all this was done with the consent of the natural parents to promote the welfare and
happiness of the child, but the inexonerable mandate of the law forbids us from adopting a different course
of action. Our duty is to interpret and apply the law as we see it in accordance with sound rules of
statutory construction.
The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA
VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA,
TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely,
RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG,
petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R.
DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA
CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely,
JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO
RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; 1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor, 2 respondents. 3
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, 4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside
by the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October 24, 2002. TSacCH
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. 6 The
main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs
of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1)
the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his

nephews and nieces, 8 his illegitimate child, 9 and the de facto adopted child 10 (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents.
THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio,
all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood
siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. ITcCSA
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado's life. Before him was Ramon
Osorio 12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which
was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio's and Felisa
Delgado's union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. 13 If Ramon Osorio
and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood
brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter's intestate estate. He and his heirs would
be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado's intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they
assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date
or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So
did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento 14 stated
that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado), 15 significantly omitting
any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father. 16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no
marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some
collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia
executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but whether a marriage in
fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife
but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the
sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did
not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the
death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were
known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition,
oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1.
Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by
Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;
2.

Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3.
Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active
Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 18
4.
Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa
Delgado. aCcHEI
THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into
their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally
adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, 19 the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo
Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father's demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado's obituary
which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also,
her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. 20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate
estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that
her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot
claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code. 21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition
for the adoption 22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction." 23 The petition
was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia
vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia
Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco
Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda. 24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with
the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. 25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; 26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo
Rustia's late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The
opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were
barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the
only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors
(respondents herein), the motion was granted. EaCSHI
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC
insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the
interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out
upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de
Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.
27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa
Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only
legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and
entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this
Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the
late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of
the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and
necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of
the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J.
RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all
her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The
same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. ATcaID
SO ORDERED. 28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal
was not filed on time. 29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals. 31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties' oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors' appeal in the interest
of substantial justice. 32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that oppositors' failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of
the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision 33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court's pronouncements as to certain matters of
substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the
administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the
denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In this instance, private respondents' intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should
not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A review of the trial court's decision is needed.

xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated
November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private
respondents' Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Court's May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial court's decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration, 35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision. 36 The dispositive portion of the
amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to

partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia
and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus
revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate
estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of
the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia
Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of
the administrator's qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15,
1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of
Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
cIaCTS
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1.

whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2.

who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3.

who should be issued letters of administration.

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to
draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of
fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable. 37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;
xxx

xxx

xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their
family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even
the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to
them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested
marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate
which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman. 39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always
proof that no marriage in fact took place. 40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may
be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued

to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the
declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado 43 and the
titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately
support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. 44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the
truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners' own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to
support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that
eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate 45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who
baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, 46
such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this
jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and,
if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the
common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage. 47
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her
mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed. HcTSDa
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may
overturn them. 48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of
marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors
(now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of
such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of
the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado's and Caridad Concepcion's Partida de Casamiento 49
identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado). 50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of
marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her
natural children. 52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural
brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different
from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate
brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal
successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration.
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives.
There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if
begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should
receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the
half-blood, they shall share equally. 53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado,
her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters,
or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested
right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial
court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the
time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: 57
Art. 1001.
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated
Josefa's estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the
decedent's entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the
estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of
deeds. . . . (emphasis supplied)
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such,
she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. 59
She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
TEDAHI
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no
hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted
certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. 60 Recognition is compulsory in any of
the following cases:
(1)
in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with
that of the conception;
(2)
when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) 61
by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3)
when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father;
(4)

when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. 62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing. 63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through
authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until
the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a

mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. 64 Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent. 65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed. 66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma's right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma's second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for
purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this
case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be
his. 67 Did intervenor's report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado's obituary
prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not.
The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his
name appears there as intervenor's parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice
of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the SUNDAY TIMES on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted
as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia
himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original
signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor's claim. CSAaDE
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in
accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latter's death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar
to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in
pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of
adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence. 68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the
decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69
nieces and nephews. 70
ENTITLEMENT TO LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent.
Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a)
To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve; IDSEAH
(b)
If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c)
If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person
as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one
to be appointed. 71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates, 72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de
la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch
55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
1.

Guillermo Rustia's June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2.
the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado.
The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b)
the children of any of Josefa Delgado's full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving
at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado's grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In
this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3.
Guillermo Rustia's estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado's estate) shall be inherited
by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per
capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective
shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4.
Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such
amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. 117246. August 21, 1995.]
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL,
ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,
petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
Eufrocino L. Bermudez for petitioners.
Marcelo C. Espinoza for Modesta Baltazar.
Nolan R. Evangelista for Estanislaoa Manuel.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; ART. 992, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; "BARRIER"
BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FAMILY; CONSTRUED. Article 992 of the Civil
Code, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the
"principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine
rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and
illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line.
Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on
testamentary dispositions. This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in
intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. (Desiderio Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession,
8th ed., 1991, pp. 423-424.) His thesis: "What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art.
992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the
legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the
illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of 'brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces' as
legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters." The Court, too, has had occasions to
explain this "iron curtain," firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie (40 O.G. [First S] No. 3, p. 196 citing 7
Manresa 110) and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA
645) and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. (181 SCRA 861) In Diaz, we have said: "Article 992 of the New
Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural

tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family
and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment." The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by
the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who
were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; (Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567) that
the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; (Cacho v. Udan,
13 SCRA 693) that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandparent; (Llorente v. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Allarde v. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909) that the natural
daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural
father; (Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29) and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. (Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA
890) Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be
rendered inoperative (Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042) by, but must always be construed in relation to, any
other part as to produce a harmonious whole. (Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil 688; Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil
709)
2.
ID.; ID.; ORDER OF PREFERENCE AND CONCURRENCE IN INTESTACY; GRAPHIC PRESENTATION. We
might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy
expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz:
Order of Preference
(a)

Legitimate Children

Order of Concurrence
(a)

and Descendants

Legitimate Children
and Descendants,

Illegitimate Children
and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b)

Legitimate Parents

(b)

and Ascendants

Legitimate Parents
and Ascendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse
(c)

Illegitimate Children (c)

Illegitimate Children

and Descendants (in the

and Descendants and

absence of ICDs and LPAs,

Surviving Spouse

the illegitimate Parents)

(d)

Surviving Spouse

(d)

Surviving Spouse

and Illegitimate Parents

(e)

Brothers and Sisters/ (e)

Brothers and Sisters/

Nephews and Nieces

Nephews and Nieces

and Surviving Spouse

(f)

Other Collateral Relatives

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g)

State (g)

Alone

(f)

Alone

3.
ID.; ID.; WHEN A WARD IS NEITHER A COMPULSORY HEIR NOR A LEGAL HEIR. A ward (ampon),
without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. (Lim vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69679, 18 October 1988)
4.
ID.; DAMAGES; WHEN NOT JUSTIFIED; CASE AT BAR. An adverse result of a suit in law does not
mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the
actor. (Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488, Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 51)
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child
who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During
his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this
relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his
mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04
November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original
Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two
other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were
later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own.
Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into
their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter."
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro
(with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134.
Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza
Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT
No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication
with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles (OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in
the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No.
184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in
favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed
one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan
Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well
with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the
petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for summary
judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint holding that
petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real partiesin-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay (a)
respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary
damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the
sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That
"1.
THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT
ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.
"2.
THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS
EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN

HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE
STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.
"3.

TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG." 1

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half
would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the
Civil Code, providing thusly:
"ARTICLE 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her
surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
"If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall
inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
"ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child." (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the
"principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine
rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and
illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line.
Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on
testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a
noted civilist. 2 His thesis:
"What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or
intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier
dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue
of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks
of 'brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate
brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and
sisters." (Emphasis supplied)
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain," firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3
and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court
of Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have said:
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does
no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled
that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the
former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her
illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate
of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased
uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. 10 Indeed, the law on
succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11
by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in
intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz:

Order of Preference

Order of Concurrence

(a)

(a)

Legitimate Children
and Descendants

Legitimate Children and

Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse

(b)

Legitimate Parents

(b)

Legitimate Parents and

and Ascendants

Ascendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse

(c)

Illegitimate Children and

(c)

Illegitimate Children

Descendants (in the

and Descendants and

absence of ICDs and

Surviving Spouse

LPAs, the Illegitimate Parents)

(d)

Surviving Spouse

(d)

Surviving Spouse and

Illegitimate Parents

(e)

Brothers and

(e)

Brothers and

Sisters/Nephews and

Sisters/Nephews and

Nieces

Nieces and Surviving

Spouse

(f)

Other Collateral Relatives

(f)

Alone

(g)

Alone

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g)

State

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan
Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a
compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of
Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of
action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its
advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor. 15
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED,
except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on
costs.
[G.R. No. 72706. October 27, 1987.]
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No.
05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special
Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying
respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial
Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591-ACEB. No special pronouncement is made as to costs."
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a
petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of
letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that
Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his
sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by
Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo,
p. 31) submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained
provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo
as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
"THIRD:
All my shares that I may receive from our properties, house, lands and money which I earned
jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN, Filipino,
widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother
Segundo Acain predeceases me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in
Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given by me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, Laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose all surnamed Acain."
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be
heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB. LLphil
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents
herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the latter's widow Rosa
Diongson Vda. de Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal
capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been preterited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985
(Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court
to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of
respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June
6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents'
Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on
September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 4):
(A)
The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is
not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B)
The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to
probate;

(C)
The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The preterition
mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line,"
and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission
shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D)

DICAT TESTATOR ET ERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;

(E)
There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code that suggests that mere institution of a
universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite
distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and
should be inviolable.
(F)
As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 591-A-CEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain; and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been preterited. llcd
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 854.
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation."
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance,
for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code) However, the same thing cannot be said of the other
respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by
petitioner (Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child
and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado, mejora o donacion"
(Manresa, as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra, Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982). The only
provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should
stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra). No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the
whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.
The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be
respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by
the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa,
21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being
no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he
is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will
as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the

provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special
Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed. Cdpr
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v.
Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not
available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the course of law (D.D. Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are,
however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case
where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137
[1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591-CEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general
rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449
[1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v.
Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
(Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court said:
"We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate
or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet headon the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution."
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse
was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully
substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld
the probate court's order of dismissal. LLpr
In Cayetano v. Leonidas, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals with the
validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that
as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied
its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the
issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591CEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter
have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for
the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing
on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on
its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited
would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v.

Leonidas, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra). The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed
of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to
resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda.
de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court
harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained,
particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
supra). prcd
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985
are hereby AFFIRMED.