HEIRS OF DOLLETON V. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC.

FACTS: Petitioners Heirs filed for quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and p
ossession with preliminary injunction/restraining order and damages against resp
ondents Fil-Estate Management Inc. They claimed that they have been in open, exc
lusive, and notorious possession of parcels of land for more than 90 years until FilEstate forcibly ousted them. Fil-Estate contended that that have in their p ossession
numerous certificates covering the parcels of land and can only be att acked
collaterally pursuant to PD 1529. The respondents also filed a motion to d ismiss on
the grounds that the petitioners do not have a cause of action the RTC dismissed
the complaint filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient cause of action.
HELD: The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry
is into the suffic iency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations
in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not
be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant. T
his Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficie ntly
stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the o wners of
the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the
right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived
thereof, they may recover the same. The petitioners are in open, co ntinuous and
notorious possession of the disputed parcels of land for more than 90 years. The
rule of civil procedure provides the elements of a cause of action ; 1) a right in favor
of a plaintiff. 2) An obligation on the part of the defend ant to violate such right. 3)
an act or omission on the part of defendant of the right of the plaintiff which
constitutes such right.

MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., vs. MIGUEL V. CAMPOS,G.R. No. 138814 , April 16, 2009
FACTS:Respondent Miguel V. Campos filed a petition with the Securities, Investigation and
Clearing Department(SICD) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the
petitioners Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE)The petition sought: (1) to nullify the
Resolution dated 3 June 1993 of the MKSE Board of Directors, whichallegedly deprived
him of his right to participate equally in the allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO)
of corporations registered with MKSE; (2) the delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly
deprived of, for which hewould pay IPO prices;.SICD granted the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from implementing orenforcing the resolution of
the MKSE. they also issued a writ of preliminary injunction for the implementation
orenforcement of the MKSE Board Resolution in question.On March 11,1994, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Petition becamemoot due to the
cancellation of the license of the MKSE (2) The SICD had no jurisdiction over the petition and (3)the
petition failed to state a cause of action. However, the SICD denied petitioner s motion
to dismiss.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petition failed to state a cause of action.

HELD:The petition filed by respondent Miguel Campos should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.It contains three essential elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff 2) the
correlative obligation of thedefendant and 3) the act or omission of the defendant
in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent,the complaint will be dismissed
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Furthermore, the petition filedby
respondent failed to lay down the source or basis of respondents right
and/or petitioners obligation.Article 1157 of the Civil Code, provides that Obligations
arise from: law, Contracts, Quasi Contracts, Actsor omissions punished by law and quasi
delicts. Therefore an obligation imposed on a person and thecorresponding right granted
to another, must be rooted in at least one of these five sources.The mere assertion of a
right and claim of an obligation in an initiatory pleading, whether a Complaint orPetition,
without identifying the basis or source thereof, is merely a conclusion of fact and law. A
pleading shouldstate the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense
asserted, as distinguished from mereconclusions of fact or conclusions of law.The
Respondent merely quoted in his Petition the MKSE Board Resolution, passed sometime in
1989,granting him the position of Chairman Emeritus of MKSE for life. However, there is
nothing in the said Petitionfrom which the Court can deduce that respondent, by virtue of
his position as Chairman Emeritus of MKSE, wasgranted by law, contract, or any other legal
source, the right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in thestock market at
their offering prices.

Contracts
INTERNATIONAL FREEPORT TRADERS, INC., v.ABAD, and MENDOZA,
JJ. DANZAS INTERCONTINENTAL,G.R. No. 181833 January 26, 2011FACTS:
In March 1997 petitioner International Freeport Traders, Inc. (IFTI) ordereda shipment of
Toblerone chocolates and assorted confectioneries from Jacobs SuchardTobler Ltd. of
Switzerland (Jacobs) through its Philippine agent, Colombo MerchantsP
hils., Inc., under the delivery term F.O.B. Ex
Works.
To ship the goods, Jacobs dealt with Danmar Lines of Switzerland (Danmar)which issued to
Jacobs negotiable house bills of lading[1] signed by its
agent,respondent Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. (Danzas). The bills of lading stated that the
terms were F.O.B. and freight payable at destination, with Jacobs as the shipper,
China Banking Corporation as the consignee, and IFTI as the party to be notified of
theshipment. The shipment was to be delivered at the Clark Special Economic Zone withManila
as the port of discharge. The goods were also covered by Letters of Credit MK-97/0467 and
MK97/0468 under a freight collect arrangement.

Since Danmar did not have its own vessel, it contracted Orient OverseasContainer Line
(OOCL) to ship the goods from Switzerland. OOCL issued a non-negotiable master bill of lading,
[2] stating that the freight was prepaid with Danmar asthe shipper and Danzas as the consignee
and party to be notified. The shipment was tobe delivered at Angeles City in
Pampanga. Danmar paid OOCL an arbitrary fee ofUS$425.00 to process the release of the
goods from the port and ship the same to

Contracts
Clark in Angeles City. The fee was to cover brokerage, trucking, wharfage, arrastre,and
processing expenses.The goods were loaded on board the OOCL vessel on April 20, 1997 and
arrivedat the port of Manila on May 14, 1997. Upon learning from Danmar that the goods
hadbeen shipped, Danzas immediately informed IFTI of its arrival. IFTI prepared the
importpermit needed for the clearing and release of the goods from the Bureau of Customsand
advised Danzas on May 20, 1997 to pick up the document. Danzas got the importpermit on May
26, 1997. At the same time, it asked IFTI to 1) surrender the original billsof lading to secure the
release of the goods, and 2) submit a bank guarantee inasmuchas the shipment was consigned
to China Banking Corporation to assure Danzas that itwill be compensated for freight and other
charges.But IFTI did not provide Danzas a bank guarantee, claiming that letters of creditalready
covered the shipment. IFTI insisted that Danzas should already endorse theimport permit and
bills of lading to OOCL since the latter had been paid an arbitrary fee.But Danzas did not do
this. Because IFTI did not provide Danzas with the original billsof lading and the bank
guarantee, the latter withheld the processing of the release of thegoods. Danzas reiterated
to IFTI that it could secure the release of the goods only ifIFTI submitted a bank
guarantee. Ultimately, IFTI yielded to the request and applied fora bank guarantee which was
approved on May 23, 1997. It claimed to have advisedDanzas on even date of its availability for
pick up but Danzas secured it only on June 6,1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a contract of lease of service exists between IFTI and Danzas.
HELD:
What is clear to the Court is that, by acceding to all the documentaryrequirements that Danzas
imposed on it, IFTI voluntarily accepted its services. Thebank guarantee IFTI
gave Danzas assured the latter that it would eventually be paid allfreight and other charges
arising from the release and delivery of the goods to it. Another indication that IFTI recognized
its contract with Danzas is when IFTI requestedDanzas to have the goods released pending
payment of whatever expenses the latterwould incur in obtaining the release and delivery of the
goods at Clark. It also admitted
that it initially settled with Danzas General Manager and OOCLs Maba
zza the issueregarding the charges on the goods after Danzas agreed to bill IFTI for the
electriccharges and storage fees totaling P56,000.00. Certainly, this concession indicated
thattheir earlier agreement did not push through.

Contracts
Every contract has the elements of (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2)object certain which
is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligationwhich is established. A
contract is perfected by mere consent, which is manifested bythe meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are toconstitute the contract.Generally,
contracts undergo three distinct stages: (1) preparation or negotiation;(2) perfection; and

(3) consummation. Negotiation begins from the time the prospectivecontracting parties manifest
their interest in the contract and ends at the moment ofagreement of the parties. The perfection
or birth of the contract takes place when theparties agree upon the essential elements of
the contract. The last stage is theconsummation of the contract where the parties fulfill or
perform the terms they agreedon, culminating in its extinguishment. Here, there is no other
conclusion than that theparties entered into a contract of lease of service for the clearing and
delivery of theimported goods.

BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. vs. JOHN TANSIPEK

Posted on March 28, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard
[G.R. No. 181235. July 22, 2009.]
FACTS: The Complaint alleges that J. O. Construction, Inc (JOCI) entered into a contract with Duty Free Philippines,
Inc. as actual construction went on, progress billings were made. Payments were received by JOCI directly or through
herein respondent John Tansipek, its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek were initially
remitted to JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI
but instead, Tansipek deposited the same to his account in PCIB. PCIB allowed the said deposit, despite the fact that
the check was crossed for the deposit to payees account only, and despite the alleged lack of authority of Tansipek to
endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of the check despite demands made by the latter.
PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The RTC denied PCIBs Motion to Dismiss.
PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was granted time to
file his Answer to the Third-Party Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for failure to do so. The Motion to
Reconsider the Default Order was denied. Upon being declared in default, respondent Tansipek filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, which was dismissed for failure to attach the assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipeks Motion for
Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals was denied for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the correct remedy
HELD: NO. Respondent Tansipeks remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very beginning.
Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration
pursuant to Section 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified;
and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of
(1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.
It is important to note that a party declared in default respondent Tansipek in this case is not barred from
appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of
Default, and regardless of the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on
the Decisions being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default
order

St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City
G.R. No. 174290
January 20, 2009
FACTS:
The private respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Assignment, Deed of Sales and Cancellation of TCTS registered in the name of Oro
Development Corporation (ODC) and SMWSI. In his Complaint, private respondent alleged
that Tomas Soriano and Josefina Soriano, parents of the private respondent, executed a
Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC involving the subject properties to pay for Tomas Q.
Sorianos subscription of stocks in the said corporation. Tomas Q. Soriano then
diedintestate.By virtue of the said Deed of Assignment, the ownership and title over the
subject properties were transferred to ODC. Thereafter, ODC executed in favor of petitioner
SMWSI a Deed of Saleover one of the subject property. Private respondent claimed that
several years after his father Tomas Sorianos death, he discovered that the latters
signature in the Deed of Assignment in favor of ODC was a forgery.A Notice of LisPendens
was annotated on TCTs of the property owned by ODC and SMWSI.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss.RTC issued an Order dismissing the private
respondents Complaint. Aggrieved by the RTC Order, private respondent moved for its
reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same.Petitioners, et al., filed with the RTC a Motion
to Cancel Notice of LisPendensannotated on the titles, which Motion was opposed by the
private respondent. Private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal stating his intention to
elevate the RTC Orders to the Court of Appeals. RTC issued its Ordergranting the Motion to
Cancel Notice of LisPendens. The private respondent, on the other hand, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Order.RTC denied for lack of merit private respondents Motion
for Reconsideration.
Private respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate
Notice of LisPendens on the TCTs of the subject properties given that there was yet no final
judgment of dismissal of his Complaint, as its dismissal had been duly appealed. Petitioners
opposed the aforesaid Motion of private respondent.Petitionersfiled a Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal on the ground that the issues in the appeal are and can only be questions of law,
the appellate jurisdiction over which belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court, thus the
dismissal of private respondents appeal is mandatory pursuant to Supreme Court Circular
No. 2-90 and Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure.The Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution granting private respondents Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of
LisPendens. The Court of Appeals also issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss Appeal of private respondent. According to the appellate court, private respondent
raised both questions of fact and law in his appeal.
The petitioners instituted two special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition before the
Supreme Court. In G.R. No. 174290, the petitioner, seek to annul and set aside on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which granted herein private respondent Hilario P.
Sorianos Motion to Reinstate/Re-annotate the Notice of LisPendens over TCT.
In G.R. No. 176116, the petitioner also seek to annul and set aside, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the three Resolutions
similarly rendered by the Court of Appeals to wit: (1) Resolutiodenying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss Appeal of herein private respondent Hilario P. Soriano; (2) Resolutiondenying for lack
of merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and (3) Resolution requiring the Register of
Deeds of Makati City to submit to the appellate court the original copies of the documents

involvedso that they can be presented to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
comparative analysis of the signatures of Tomas Q. Soriano.
G.R. No. 174290
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may file the instant Petition without filing a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed resolution.
RULING:
No. A Motion for Reconsideration of the order or resolution is a condition precedent for the
filing of a Petition for Certiorari challenging the issuance of the same.The general rule that
the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to
afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any factual or fancied error attributed
to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. This rule,
however, is subject to certain recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the order or a
resolution, is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (2) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (3) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (4) where, under the circumstances, a Motion for
Reconsideration would be useless; (5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (7) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (8) where the
proceedings were ex parte or were such that the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Petitioners averment of sense of urgency in that private respondent was already taking
steps and other measures to have the Notice of LisPendens re-annotated by presenting the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City
deserves scant consideration. Petitioners never described with particularity, much less,
presented proof of the steps purportedly taken by the private respondent that would justify
their immediate resort to this Court on certiorari without seeking reconsideration of the
Resolution in question from the Court of Appeals. Petitioners simply made a sweeping
allegation that absolutely has no basis. The records themselves are bare of any proof that
would convince this Court that the private respondent indeed, took steps to have the
challenged Resolution implemented. In fact, petitioners themselves, in their letterdated 8
September 2006 addressed to the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, pointed out
that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals did not yet order the said Office to reannotate the Notice of LisPendens. More importantly, petitioners explicitly revealed in their
letter that they intended to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, as its
Resolution dated 18 August 2006 had not yet acquired finality. Why then did petitioners not
proceed with filing their motion for reconsideration, and opted to immediately file the
present Petition for Certiorari?Similarly baseless is petitioners bare assertion, without even
an attempt at explaining, that the issues subject of the Petition at bar involve public interest
sufficient to excuse them from filing a Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 176116
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves purely
questions of law, in which case, the proper mode of appeal would be a Petition for Review on
Certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure;

or questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, in which case, the proper mode
would be by ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41?
RULING:
Rule 41. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or
questions both of law and of fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts as to the
correctness of such conclusions will be resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals.
Among the grounds raised by petitioners in seeking the dismissal by the RTC of private
respondents Complaint are: (1) the Complaint stated no cause of action;(2) the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished; and (3) a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
In a Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any
question of fact or doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts, simply because
there are no findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply
the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It
follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions of law or doubt or
controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts."
It must be remembered, however, that the basis of the RTC Order dismissing private
respondents Complaint was not only its failure to state a cause of action, but also the fact
that the claim or demand set forth therein had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished, and that the condition precedent for filing a claim had not been complied with.
According to the RTC, the Complaint was dismissible on the ground that the claim or demand
set forth therein had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. Private
respondent, in accepting a certain parcel of land as his share in the estate of his late father
Tomas Q. Soriano, was now deemed to have been paid or compensated because his share in
the estate of the deceased had been delivered to him. In arriving at such a finding, the RTC
necessarily made a preliminary determination of the facts in order to verify that, indeed,
private respondents claim or demand had been paid. When the private respondent
assigned as error in his appeal such finding of the RTC, he raised not only a question of law,
but also a question of fact.
It must be stressed that in its 17 January 2005 Order, the trial court expressed a finding that
in the beholder of untrained eyes, the signatures in the Deed of Assignment and in the
Second Amendment of Credit Agreement are the same. Considering that the trial court
made a finding of fact as regards the issue of forgery and such issue was properly raised in
the private respondents appeal with the appellate court, it certainly behooves the appellate
court to review the said findings. Accordingly, as the Court of Appeals has the power to
inquire into the allegations of forgery made in the private respondents Complaint, it can
validly require the submission of the original copies of the documents involved to enable the
NBI to perform a comparative analysis of Tomas Q. Sorianos signatures therein.

GENARO SANTIAGO III v. JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR.

579 SCRA 1 (2009)
Under the principle of judicial immunity, judges cannot be held criminally, civilly or
administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.

The complainant Genaro Santiago III filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/
Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona
Santiago and Blas Fajardo. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the
petition. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed to the Supreme Court asking for its reversal.
The case was raffled to Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, Justice Vicente Veloso and
herein respondent Justice Juan Enriquez. Justice Gonzales-Sison was the one who made
the Report as the basis for the Divisions consultation and deliberation which upholds
the decision made by the RTC of Quezon City. Justice Veloso concurred in the Report
made. On the other hand, Justice Enriquez dissented to the Report and made his own
Dissenting Opinion. Justice Enriquez requested for another two (2) Justices to form a
Special Division, Justice Edgardo Cruz and Justice Lucas Bersamin were then included.
After the deliberations, the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Enriquez became the majority
opinion. The decision of the RTC of Quezon City was reversed by the decision made by
the Special Division.
Complainant Santiago then filed an administrative complaint against Justice Enriquez
on the ground of gross ignorance of the law, and gross incompetence in connection with
his rendering of alleged unjust judgment in the case of Santiago. Justice Enriquez
contends that it was a mere nuisance and that it was filed prematurely.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid ground for the filing of an administrative case against
Justice Enriquez
HELD:
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of the
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased
and partial. Thus, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent
to do an injustice, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of
his duties renders him liable.
The principle of judicial immunity insulates judges, and even Justices of superior
courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an

erroneous decision rendered in good faith. To hold otherwise would render judicial
office untenable. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice could be infallible in his judgment.
It bears particular stress in the present case that the filing of charges against a single
member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not
rendered by respondent in his individual capacity. It was a product of the consultations
and deliberations by the Special Division of five.