Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
politics
The
nature of power
power as capacity (military strength; economic development; population size; level of
literacy and skills; geographical factors, etc); structural power (ability to affect the rules of
the game, influence via organisations and international regimes);
hard and soft power (ability to reward or punish (military/economic power) vs co-optive
power;
The growing importance of soft power; rise of smart power), etc.
Classification of states great powers (features of; examples); superpowers (features
of; examples); hegemon and hegemony (features of, examples); emerging powers (features
of, examples), etc.
Debating decline of military power decline of inter-state war and rise of economic
power (impact of globalization, etc); difficulty of resolving conflict by military means
(intractable terrorist threats, insurgency or new wars, etc); military power as irreducible
core of state sovereignty;
The need to respond to new security threats, etc.
Changing nature of world order
Cold War world order Cold War bipolarity; implications of bipolarity (structural
dynamics of bipolarity; balance-of-power theory); Cold War balance of terror);
collapse of the Cold War (role of new Cold War and Reaganite anti-communism; structural
weakness of Soviet communism;
role of Gorbachev and Soviet reformers; significance for realism and liberalism).
( Note: historical questions will not be set on the rise and fall of Cold War bipolarity.)
Post-Cold War world order The new world order (the liberal moment); fate of the
new world order (rise of ethnic conflict and civil wars, etc).
US hegemony and world order nature of hegemony; rise of US hegemony (basis of US
power; neoconservative project for unipolar world);
implications of unipolarity (tendency towards unilateralism; benign hegemony (hegemonic
stability theory, Pax Americana, etc) vs oppressive or predatory hegemony (American
empire, Chomsky, etc);
implications of war on terror for world order; decline of US power? (loss of soft power;
ineffectiveness of hard power; decline of relative economic power, etc).
21st century world order rise of multipolarity; nature and structural dynamics
of multipolarity (global conflict and instability (anarchic multipolarity) vs peace
and reconciliation (multilateral multipolarity);
implications of rise of China and India and revival of Russia tendencies (China as a
superpower (the new hegemon?);
possibility of conflict between the USA and China; shift from West to East; major powers
and new Cold War (Russia vs the West?); democracy vs authoritarianism; implications of
globalization for world order; impact of global economic crisis on balance of power, etc.
Bipolarity
A concept most commonly associated with the cold war era (c.1945-1949)
Each of the two main blocs was organised according to power, ideology
and regimes
However, there were military exchanges between east and west, most
notably those which took place in Korea, Vietnam, Africa and Latin
America over most of the period of the cold war. Here the superpowers
either sought to maintain or extend their spheres of influence.
It is also the case that the concept overestimates the degree of internal
cohesion within the blocs. It should be remembered that French U.S.
relations have often been strained and that France left NATO in 1966. Also
The Soviet Union used tanks to crush popular rebellions in Hungary in
1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Past Questions:
SAQ
To what extent was the Bipolar International order more stable than the multipolar order?
When, and in what ways, was international politics best seen as bipolar?
Essay
What are the implications of Bi-polarity and multipolarity for global order?
Multipolarity
MILITARY STRENGTH
WEALTH AND ECONOMIC POWER
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE
CULTURAL INFLUENCE
Where a state or non state actor can act upon and shape the international system in all of
these areas it may be regarded possessing superpower or polar potential. Where a minimum
of three actors has this range of influence then the international order is characterised as
multipolar.
The above criteria are also indices of superpower status but again all four
are required
Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American
Century is a non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to
promote American global leadership
The end of the cold war has prompted a debate over whether we are now
entering an inherently unstable multipolar international order. The matter
is extremely complex. In economic terms the EU, Japan and the U.S. are
seen as the key poles with other actors such as the tiger economies
possessingnear pole status.
The transition from a bipolar to a multipolar era predates the end of the
cold war. There is the question of whether this in more or less stable than
the era of bipolarity
Past Questions:
SAQ
Is International politics now multipolar?
Essay
What are the implications of Bi-polarity and multipolarity for global order?
Unipolarity
The unipolar actor need not be a state. Historically they have tended to be
multinational empires.
The ending of the cold war has prompted some speculation that the U.S. is
now the only superpower and in its willingness to exert this power and
influence to shape the international order it is the centre of a unipolar
order.
At the end of the cold war Francis Fukuyama wrote that we are at the
end of history where economic liberalism and liberal democracy would
triumph and spread across the globe.
Equally however the end of history thesis could just as easily provide
the underpinnings of a multipolar order in international relations.
Bipolarity is mainly associated with the Cold War period as the international
system revolved around two superpowers, the USSR and the USA.
Other states defined their foreign policies in terms of their relationships with the
superpowers.
International systems are subject to change, and some analysts argue that the
increased permanence of alliances leading to bipolarity make major conflicts
inevitable.
for conflict.
However it is also argued that there is too much flexibility in a multipolar system and
peace depends on the willingness of states to form alliances when their national
interest may suggest neutrality or isolation is preferred.
Arguably the bipolar Cold War proved that a tense peace is preferable to the conflicts
found under multipolarity.
Governance, broadly, refers to the various ways in which social life is co-ordinated, of
which government is merely one.
At the heart of the emerging system of global governance is the UN and its various
bodies, together with the institutions of global economic governance, notably the
WTO, the World Bank and the IMF.
Rather than imposing their will on individual states, the processes provide the
framework for the development of intergovernmental relationships, reflecting a
growing acceptance of global interdependence.
Global governance does not only involve intergovernmental bodies, but also the
participation of non-governmental actors such as NGOs, national corporations,
global capital markets, citizens movements and so on.
However, the most versions of world government are based on the idea of world
federalism, in which the central authority is vested with supreme authority in
relation to certain functions, while state governments continue to have jurisdiction in
relation to other functions.
Although the League of Nations and the United Nations were often presented as
early prototypes of world government, neither has come close to realising this goal.
It is possible to have a regional hegemon or a global hegemon (as many believe the
USA has been since the end of the Cold War).
Hegemony may have one of two implications for global order. Realists and some neoliberals have argued that a hegemon is necessary to create stability and order within
a liberal market economy, thereby bringing benefit to all the states within such an
economy.
It does this by enforcing the rules of the economic game, the USA could be said to do
this through the role of the dollar as an international currency and by its influence
over the institutions of global economic governance.
In this case, hegemony may lead to conflict and disorder, possibly through shifting
patterns of alliances. Hegemonic powers remain dominant in part through their
ability to prevent anti-hegemonic alliances being formed amongst second-level
powers.
The balance of power can be defined in a variety of different ways, including the
following:
The existing distribution of power, which may be even or uneven. A policy designed
to
achieve an even or more even balance of power.
Views about the capacity of the balance of power to prevent war diverge, however:
Realists argue that the balance of power is the surest, and perhaps only, guarantee
that war can be avoided.
Its value is that an even distribution of power, whether brought about naturally or as
a consequence of statecraft, prevents the triumph of dominant powers.
Powers will be deterred from attacking others only if they have reason to believe they
will be unsuccessful.
Liberals, on the other hand, believe that the balance of power merely legitimises state
egoism and fosters the growth of military power.
In this view, the balance of power is a cause of intensifying tension and possibly war,
based upon a mind-set of competition, rivalry and distrust.
Bipolarity is the tendency for the international system to revolve around two poles
(major power blocs).
Bipolarity is often associated specifically with the Cold War and the so-called
superpower era.
Two quite different views of the implications of bipolarity for global order have been
developed:
This is because a bipolar system tends to result in a balance of power as each of the
major power blocs is concerned to consolidate control over its own sphere of
influence.
Liberal theorists on the other hand, have sometimes argued that bipolarity is
inherently unstable as it leads to intensifying rivalry between major power blocks, as
demonstrated by sustained vertical nuclear proliferation during the Cold War.
A unipolar global system is one in which there is a single pre-eminent state. Many
have argued that the end of the Cold War can be seen as the unipolar moment, the
end of an era of superpower bipolarity and the birth of the world in which the USA
stood as the sole superpower.
Some have seen this as the creation of some kind of American empire, a trend
resulting from US economic successors during the 1990s, coupled with the ongoing
difficulties of other competitors, such as Japan, Russia and the EU.
The USAs unassailable position in global affairs was evident in the unilateralist
tendency of US foreign policy, particularly following the election of George W. Bush
in 2000 and in particular by the so-called war on terror.
This has been interpreted as an attempt to preserve and reinforce the USAs
benevolent global hegemony through a kind of new imperialism that was based on
unrivalled military strength, the USAs strength in promoting democracy worldwide,
and an interventionist foreign policy that was based on the idea of regime change,
achieved by military means and possible through pre- emptive attack.
However, the unipolar moment in world politics may have passed, partly due to the
tendency of the USA to succumb to the problem of imperial over-reach.
Although the USA accounts for around 50 per cent of global defence spending, its
proportion of GDP is well below 50 per cent and declining in relative terms.
The economic fragility of the USA has been further illustrated by the global economic
crisis that started in 2008.
The rise of China, India and other new powers creates the prospect either of the
return of some form of bipolarity, in which global politics in the twenty-first century
will be characterised by Sino-US relations, or the emergence of a truly multipolar
system consisting of five or possibly more major world actors.
Chinas rapid economic progress, its growing military capacity and its greater
involvement in global affairs, Africa and elsewhere all demonstrate that the global
system can no longer be seen as unipolar.
Other rising powers include India, Brazil and Russia. Trends towards multipolarity
can also be seen in the implications of globalisation and the rise of non-state actors
ranging from transnational corporations to terrorist groups and new social
movements.
The growth of emerging powers, such as China, India and Brazil, can be seen to have
altered the nature of world order in important ways.
Such a view is underpinned by economic developments, notably the fact that the
balance of power in the world economy has shifted from the West to the East,
especially due to the combined influence of China, India and Japan.
Such trends also have a political or diplomatic character, as reflected in the growing
importance of bodies such as the G20 and the BRICs countries.
However, others argue that emerging powers have yet to fundamentally alter the
nature of world order.
In most cases, this is based upon the view that none of these powers is yet strong
enough to challenge the USA as the global hegemon.
The USA remains the worlds largest economy and has a still impressive global lead
in hitech production. Similarly, its military lead over the rest of the world is still
considerable, being the only power that can sustain major military involvements in
two or more parts of the world at the same time.
As the global hegemon, the USA also continues to exert disproportional structural
power through its influence over a variety of institutions of global governance.
era, with the USA taking the lead. The idea, floated at the time, that the
global North contained several poles of power, collaborating on a
multilateral basis was, for him, an illusion. The first Gulf War was therefore
a case of pseudo-multilateralism. The US essentially acted alone, with
the alliance offering merely the impression of multilateral action. In terms
of military power, the US towers over other nations.
It is very important to note that there is rather more to his position than
just the aim of ensuring global stability. Krauthammer, along with
Rumsfeld, Cheney, Bush (and Reagan before them) did not take on a
purely realist position because they believed in the USA as a force for
good (this is idealism a foreign policy driven by ideals, such as
freedom, democracy etc as opposed to realism, which is much more
concerned with the survival of the state, and may be very wary of foreign
adventures to promote particular values). The USA was, and is, seen by
many Americans (mainly, but not just those on the political right) as a
righteous project. Terms such as American exceptionalism, and the City
on the hill (a religious analogy employed by, amongst others, Reagan),
referred to this belief that the USA is a special place Gods chosen
country. Other people around the world look up to America as a beacon.
This has been a powerful element of the US collective imagination and
clearly affects the way they engage with the rest of the world.
The main reason we oppose the land mine treaty is that we need them in
the demilitarised zone in Korea (between north and south). We (the USA)
mans the line there. Sweden and France and Canada do not have to worry
about a North Korean invasion killing thousands of their soldiers. As the
unipolar power and thus guarantor of peace in places where Swedes do
not tread, we need weapons that others do not. Being uniquely situated in
the world we cannot afford the empty platitudes of allies not quite candid
enough to admit that they live under the umbrella of American power.
That often leaves us isolated.
how they may treat weaker states. Those suggesting that US hegemony
is benign, and acts in the interests of all (as do hegemonic stability
theorists for instance) would perhaps align themselves more with the
bandwagoning argument. See discussion below.
However, Gilpin & Keohane, the originators of the HST term, actually
thought that the USA acted as a real hegemon for only a short period of
time,
For two decades following the Second World War, the United
States, largely for political and security reasons, subordinated
many of its parochial economic interests to the economic wellbeing of its alliance partnersIn the late 1960s, however, the US
began to pursue economic policies that were more self-centred
(and) by the 1980s, the US was pursuing protectionist,
macroeconomic, and other policies that could be identified as
appropriate to.a predatory hegemon. (Gilpin)
Snidal adds that there is no longer any reason to assume that the
distribution of benefits favors smaller states (Snidal 1985). Thus, the
suggestion has been that real hegemony is essentially benign that it
accommodates the interests of those covered by its security umbrella.
Now though, so the argument goes, the US is a hegemon of a whole
different, rather unpleasant type. This raises the question of whether the
original alleged advantage of hegemony, stability, will be as attractive to
the subordinate powers in the relationship.
To take one example, from the early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank came
under the control of the Washington Consensus, in which neoliberal
[I]n spite of IMFs efforts during the past quarter century, crises
around the world have been more frequent and (with the
exception of the Great Depression) deeper. By some reckonings,
close to a hundred countries have faced crises. Worse, many of
the policies that the IMF pushed, in particular, premature capital
market liberalization, have contributed to global instability. And
once a country was in crisis, IMF funds and programs not only
failed to stabilize the situation but in many cases actually made
matters worse, especially for the poor. The IMF failed in its
original mission of promoting global stability (Stiglitz 2002, p.
15).
Is the US an empire? If it is, is this a good thing? The neo-cons say yes,
because the world is a dangerous place and the US is essentially
benevolent (hence all the stuff about American exceptionalism they
believe that the US has something special to offer the worldthe world
looks up to the USthey want to live there etc). Others (liberals such as
Nye for instance) would perhaps agree that the US could be benign, but
that blatantly pushing its own agenda as the neo-cons have done is not
the best way to sustain a hegemonic position.
Those who say, yes, the US is an empire, but no it is not a good thing (ie
Chomsky), are suspicious of American power. They feel that US
domination does not just exist, rather it is perpetuated by US behaviour. It
attempts, aggressively, to sustain its place as the predominant power. He
would suggest that the result of hegemony is domination (although you
couldnt say that he is coming at the problem from the same direction as
many realists, he arrives at the same conclusion any hegemon will tend
to attempt to impose itself on others, and understandably creates
resistance).
Bipolarity:
Third, and perhaps most telling as a criticism, is that there was one factor
present since 1945 that could have been far more significant than
whether the system was bipolar or multipolar. That factor was nuclear
weapons. It could have been the presence of this special class of military
capability rather than the bipolar situation that ensured relative stability
(it must be noted at this point that Waltz may have been unaware how
close the Soviet Union came to firing a nuclear weapon during the Cuban
missile crisis in 1962 {the details of quite how close a Soviet submarine
came to firing a nuclear missile only emerged in 2002} so if that was
stability, God help us!).
Waltz has revised his views slightly. He now considers the presence of
nuclear weapons to be of equal importance to the bipolar structure of the
international system in ensuring the longest peace yet known (again, he
seems to forget the huge number of wars, of all kinds, that have taken
place, and continue to take place possibly because they are in the global
south? Since 1998 approximately 5.4 million people have died as a result
of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo {DRC}the worlds
deadliest conflict since the 2nd World War). This relaxed view of other
kinds of conflict (basically, he ignores them) comes from his realist
perspective. The real problems of global order centre on relations
between states. From this perspective it is possible to see the world as
relatively peaceful (although even this ignores ie the Iran/Iraq war in the
1980s).
Multipolarity