Mind, Matter and Language weeks 6-7: From Dualism to Functionalism

Reading List
To understand the material were covering in this fortnight, working through the core
readings should be enough. If youd like to write an essay or exam answer on one of
these topics, or just to investigate it in more detail for your own interest, the additional
readings suggest some places to start. If you find anything that you think would be a
particularly great addition to the readings, email Dave.Ward@ed.ac.uk to let me know
about it!
Lectures 1 & 2: Introduction to the course, Dualism
After a quick rundown of the themes well be covering on this course, well aim to
articulate and understand substance dualism about the mind: the thesis that mind and
matter are essentially distinct substances.
Core reading:
Kim, J (2010) Philosophy of Mind (3rd Edition), Westview
Chapter 2: Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes Dualism [BD418.3 Kim]
Optional Additional readings:
A nice clear defense of dualism is provided by Brie Gertlers In Defense of MindBody Dualism, in Feinberg and Schafer-Landau (eds) Reason and Responsibility.
(Loads of copies in the library: B29. Rea])
The paper by Kim Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism, in Timothy
OConnor (ed.) Philosophy of Mind, Contemporary Readings (available online
through the university library website), goes in to more detail about the problem
of interaction for dualism.
For some enjoyable summarizing/bashing of the dualist conception of minds and bodies
that will tee us up nicely for the next lecture, you could take a look at the first section of
Gilbert Ryles The Concept of Mind, Chapter 1 (entitled The official doctrine).
Available in many editions and anthologies [BF 161 Ryl.]
Lecture 3: Behaviourism & The Identity Theory
In this lecture well consider a couple of alternatives to dualism. Firstly behaviourism:
the thesis that theres nothing more to having a mind than behaving and having
dispositions to behave. Secondly the identity theory: the thesis that what happens in
our mind is identical to what happens in our brain.
Core reading:
Kim, Philosophy of Mind Chapter 3: Mind as Behaviour: Behaviourism, and
Chapter 4: Mind as Brain: The Psychoneural Identical Theory
Optional additional readings:
Hilary Putnams Brains and Behaviour is the origin of the Super-Spartans
example well be talking about, and a great paper. Its reprinted in a lot of places (E.g.
Block (ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology [BF 38 Rea.] and Rosenthal (ed.)
The Nature of Mind [BD418.3 Nat])

Mind, Matter and Language weeks 6-7: From Dualism to Functionalism

The rest of Chapter 1 of Ryles Concept of Mind (see above) contains the argument
about category mistakes well be considering in the lecture, and is (as philosophical
classics go) a fun read.
J.J.C. Smarts Sensations and Brain Processes is the classic statement of identity
theory. Its reprinted in OConnors Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings
(available online through the university library website).
For the canonical statement of the multiple realizability argument against identity
theory, see Putnams The Nature of Mental States, reprinted in (e.g.) Lycan and
Prinz (eds.) Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2008)
And theres plenty of food for thought (and not just about identity theory) in Arnold
Zuboffs The Story of a Brain, also available in OConnors anthology. For some
brief discussion of the story, see the postscript in Hofstader and Dennetts The Minds I:
Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul. [B29 Hof.]
Lectures 5 & 6: Functionalism
Lastly, well consider the prospects of functionalism: the theory that mental states are
functions that mediate between particular kinds of inputs and outputs.
Core reading:
Kim, Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 6: Mind as a Causal System: Causal-theoretical
Functionalism
Optional additional readings:
Ned Blocks (1978) Troubles with Functionalism provides an excellent
characterization of functionalism (in slightly more detail than you find in Kim), as well
as some classic problems for the view. You can find this paper in OConnors anthology
(Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings), available through the library website, as
well as on Learn.
John Searles (1980) Minds, Brains and Programs is the source of the famous
Chinese Room objection to functionalism well consider in the lectures. Again, you can
find this paper in OConnors anthology (Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings),
available through the library website, as well as on Learn.
A more advanced paper is David Lewiss (1986) Mad Pain and Martian Pain,
where he argues that his particular combination of functionalism and identity theory is
the most satisfactory of the positions weve considered this fortnight. You can find it
here: http://goo.gl/KHmBw5
Finally, the first appendix to Andy Clarks Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Cognitive Science (2001, Oxford University Press) [BF 311 Cla.] provides a lucid bitesized summary of all the positions weve looked at in these weeks. It might be useful for
jogging your memory when revising, or getting a quick overview of a position before
investigating it in more detail.
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