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BRETT KIMBERLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, et al.,
Defendants.
BERICO TECHNOLOGIES AND NICHOLAS HALLAMS MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY
AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO ALLOW DISCOVERY
Defendants Berico Technologies and Nicholas Hallam (collectively Berico), by counsel,
hereby move to stay Plaintiffs discovery to Berico pending resolution of Bericos Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 53) and oppose Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Discovery (ECF No. 75). This Motion is
necessitated by Plaintiffs issuance of discovery requests to Berico before the entry of a scheduling order
by this Court and before briefing has been completed on Bericos Motion to Dismiss. This filing is
further necessitated by Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Discovery. For the reasons set forth below, this
Court should (1) grant Bericos Motion to Stay Discovery until a scheduling order is issued after
Bericos Motion to Dismiss has been resolved and (2) deny Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Discovery.
I.
BACKGROUND
On September 4, 2015, Berico filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its Motion to Dismiss, Berico
demonstrates that (1) all of Plaintiffs claims against Berico are time-barred; (2) Plaintiff does not
establish standing as he failed to plead a cognizable injury; and (3) Plaintiff otherwise fails to state any
claim against Berico. Plaintiff filed a response to Bericos Motion to Dismiss on October 15, 2015.
On September 18, 2015, Plaintiff served Berico with broad interrogatories and document
requests. See Exs. 1-2. As of the date of this filing, this Court has not yet issued a scheduling order nor
have the parties otherwise agreed to commence discovery. On October 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Allow Discovery seeking permission to pursue his discovery requests or, in the alternative,
the issuance of a scheduling order.
II.
[u]nless otherwise ordered by the Court or agreed upon by the parties, the conference required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(f) need not take place and discovery shall not commence and disclosures need not be made
until a scheduling order is entered. L.R. 104.4 (emphasis added). This Court has not yet entered a
scheduling order so Plaintiffs discovery requests are premature and against the Local Rules.1 See Banks
v. Ramsey, Civ. A. No. RWT-14-305, 2015 WL 5157488, *2 (D. Md. Sept. 1, 2015) (finding that
defendants requests for admissions were premature and that plaintiff had no obligation to respond);
Cooper v. Rowley, Civ. A. No. JFM-08-3209, 2010 WL 761209, at *2 n.7 (D. Md. Feb. 26, 2010) (A
scheduling order was not issued in this case. Therefore, discovery is not appropriate.).
III.
cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see Wymes v. Lustbader, Civ. Case No. WDQ-10-1629, 2012 WL
1819836, *3 (D. Md. May 16, 2012) (stating that a motion to stay discovery is properly considered
under Rule 26). [I]t is not uncommon for courts to stay discovery pending resolution of dispositive
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(d)(1) holds that [a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as
required by Rule 26(f), subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. The parties have not yet held a Rule 26(f)
conference so Plaintiffs discovery requests are premature under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well.
motions. Id. at *4 (citing cases). [S]uch stays can be an eminently logical means to prevent wasting
the time and effort of all concerned, and to make the most efficient use of judicial resources. Cognate
BioServices, Inc. v. Smith, Civ. No. WDQ-13-1797, 2015 WL 5673067, *2 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2015)
(internal citation omitted). Factors favoring issuance of a stay include the potential for the dispositive
motion to terminate all the claims in the case or all the claims against particular defendants, strong
support for the dispositive motion on the merits, and irrelevancy of the discovery at issue to the
dispositive motion. Yongo v. Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am., No. 5:07-CV-94-D, 2008 WL
516744, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2008).
Even if Plaintiffs discovery requests had been timely, discovery to Berico should be stayed
because Bericos Motion to Dismiss may dispose of all of Plaintiffs claims, Plaintiffs discovery
requests are burdensome, and Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the stay.
A.
Bericos Motion to Dismiss asserts three separate bases for dismissal: Plaintiffs claims are timebarred; Plaintiff lacks standing because he failed to plead a cognizable injury; and Plaintiff fails to state
a claim. Any one of these grounds is sufficient to dispose of all of Plaintiffs claims against Berico and
thus provides good cause to stay discovery. See Briggs v. T & D Plumbing & Heating Co., Civ. No.
WDQ-10-2714, 2011 WL 2970845, at *2 (D. Md. July 19, 2011) (granting motion to stay discovery
pending resolution of Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, noting that engaging in
discovery now would cause undue burden and expense; T & D would bear the costs of investigating
issues that may be rendered moot by the decision on the motion to dismiss); Purvis v. Pitt Cty. Sch.,
No. 4:12-CV-00054, 2013 WL 3778950, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 18, 2013) (granting motion to stay
discovery where motion to dismiss asserted that the complaint was time-barred, failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be based, and failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction).
3
First, Plaintiffs claims against Berico are time-barred because the statutes of limitations have
run as to all of Plaintiffs claims. Bericos Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Mot. to
Dismiss) at 4-6 (ECF No. 53-1). Plaintiffs RICO claim has a four year statute of limitations which
began to run when Plaintiff learned of the alleged actions taken by Berico against Plaintiff. Id. at 4. As
Plaintiff acknowledged in his complaint, he learned of Bericos alleged actions in February 2011 after
Defendant HBGary Federals emails had been hacked and released. Id. Despite learning about Bericos
alleged actions in February 2011, Plaintiff did not file his complaint until March 16, 2015more than
four years later. Plaintiffs other claims are also based on information Plaintiff learned in February 2011
and these other claims have even shorter statutes of limitations. Id. at 5-6. Thus, all of Plaintiffs claims
are barred and subject to dismissal. See Knickman v. Prince George's Cty., 187 F. Supp. 2d 559, 56364
(D. Md. 2002) (dismissing plaintiffs claim as the statute of limitations had run).
Second, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims against Berico because Plaintiff has not pled a
cognizable injury that can be traced to Berico. Mot. to Dismiss at 6-9. Plaintiffs allegations do not
allege any injury traceable to Berico because Plaintiffs allegations concern proposed actions that were
never taken by Berico or its alleged co-conspirators. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiffs wild accusations, which are
unsupported by any particularized allegations, do not satisfy his burden to demonstrate standing. See
Zaycer v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 399, 408 (D. Md. 2012) (Individual standing is not
merely a pleading requirement, but an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case that must be supported
in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof) (quotations
omitted).
Third, Plaintiff has failed to state any claim against Berico. Mot. to Dismiss at 9-24. For each of
the claims against Berico, Plaintiffs complaint fails on its face to plead the required elements. Id.
Instead, Plaintiff has relied upon conclusory allegations and unsupported assertions, which are
4
insufficient to state a claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ([A] plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]) (quotations omitted).
Given the dispositive nature of Bericos Motion to Dismiss, as reflected in the arguments
detailed above, there is good cause for a stay of discovery.
B.
Although no scheduling order has been entered and discovery has not yet commenced, Plaintiffs
premature discovery requests indicate that Plaintiff intends to pursue discovery through far-reaching and
extremely broad requests. Indeed, Plaintiffs premature discovery includes demands for information
regarding all communications Berico had with any party regarding the matters at issue in this case.2 Ex.
1 at 1. Plaintiff has similarly issued broad requests for documents, including a request for [a]ll
documents concerning, reflecting or referring to any and all matters related to the matter and matters
outlined in this case. Ex. 2 at 6. Plaintiff has also requested all documents that are related in any way
to the subject matter of this case, corporate spying and espionage, and Brett Kimberlin Id.
Responding to such discovery requests will require a significant expenditure of resources. A stay of
discovery is appropriate as Bericos Motion to Dismiss may eliminate the need for discovery and the
associated burdens. See Cognate, 2015 WL 5673067, at *2 (if [defendant] is successful in obtaining
the dismissal of the claims against it, a stay of discovery will result in a substantial conservation of the
resources that the parties and of the Court in managing this case); see also Holmes v. McLaughlin, No.
5:10-CV-355 (CAR), 2010 WL 5789446, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 30, 2010) report and recommendation
adopted, 2011 WL 534197 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2011) (granting stay of discovery pending resolution of a
motion to dismiss in order to avoid any potentially unnecessary costs and burdens associated with
2
Plaintiff has indicated that Berico Technologies and Mr. Hallam should provide separate responses for each interrogatory.
further litigation); Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 09 CV 5874(RPP), 2009
WL 2777076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009) (granting stay of discovery as a stay would avoid the need
for costly and time-consuming discovery).
C.
After purportedly learning of the alleged actions by Berico, Plaintiff waited over four years to
file his complaint. A modest stay of discovery will not unduly prolong Plaintiffs attempts to recover for
his alleged injuries. Nor will a stay create any case management problems for this Court. No
scheduling order has been entered in this case nor has a trial date been set. The only motions currently
pending before this Court are various motions to dismiss and a few motions related to service or
discovery issues. Accordingly, a stay will not negatively impact Plaintiff or this Court.
Further, contrary to what Plaintiff asserts in his Motion, discovery is not needed for Plaintiff to
defend against the arguments raised in Bericos Motion to Dismiss. Discovery will not change the fact
that the statutes of limitations have run on Plaintiffs claims; discovery will not permit Plaintiff to plead
a cognizable injury; and discovery will not cure the pleading defects in Plaintiffs claims. Indeed,
Plaintiffs RICO claim is based largely on allegations of fraud but discovery cannot be used to overcome
the particularity requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).3 See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,
176 F.3d 776, 789 (4th Cir. 1999) (The clear intent of Rule 9(b) is to eliminate fraud actions in which
all the facts are learned through discovery after the complaint is filed.) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has
long had access to the over 70,000 emails that were released by hackers. Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3. A stay
of discovery will not impact Plaintiffs ability to respond to Bericos Motion to Dismiss. See Rankin v.
Plaintiff mischaracterizes Rotella v.Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) and Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041 (7th
Cir. 1998), which he cites for the proposition that discovery can take place in RICO cases to supplement the particularity
requirements. Pl.s Mot. to Allow Discovery, at 2 (ECF No. 75). Both Rotella and Corley simply confirm that there is some
flexibility in Rule 9(b) as Rule 11(b)(3) allows pleadings based on evidence reasonably anticipated after further
investigation or discovery. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 560; see also Corley, 142 F.3d at 1051.
Mattamy Homes Corp., No. 1:10CV117, 2010 WL 3394036, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug.26, 2010) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that she needed the full facts ... developed through discovery before she could
oppose the defendants' motion to dismiss) (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff would not be prejudiced
by a stay of discovery.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this Court should (1) grant this Motion and stay discovery until the Motion to
Dismiss submitted by Defendants Berico Technologies and Nicholas Hallam has been resolved, after
which a scheduling order should be issued, and (2) deny Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Discovery.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Attison L. Barnes, III
Attison L. Barnes, III (Bar No. 15198)
Jennifer S. Zucker (pro hac vice)
Mark B. Sweet (pro hac vice)
Wiley Rein LLP
1776 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 719-7000
Fax: (202) 719-7049
abarnes@wileyrein.com
Attorneys for Berico Technologies and Nicholas
Hallam
Exhibit 1
5. State whether you have had any communications with law enforcement
officials investigating any member of the Chamber of Commerce or anyone
associated with the Chamber of Commerce from 2009 through 2013. If so, provide
the dates and substance of those communications and any documents related
thereto.
6. State whether you are aware of any fund that is considered off the books
and whether any payments were made from that fund or any other fund to any
Defendant in this case or anyone associated with any Defendant between 2009 and
2013, and if so state the date, time, place and to whom.
7. State whether you billed the Chamber of Commerce or Hunton&Williams for
services between September 10, 2010 and June 1, 2011.
8. State whether you terminated any Berico employee due to any matter
surrounding the matters in the complaint. If so, who and did they receive any
severance pay.
9. State who your contact person was at the Chamber of Commerce and/or
Hunton&Williams during the time frame set forth in the Complaint.
10. State whether you had any direct contact with The Chamber of Commerce or
lawyers from the Chamber of Commerce and if so please state the substance of those
communications, the dates, and provide copies of them.
11. State whether, during the time set forth in the complaint, you communicated
with any Defendants in any way other than email and if so state how and provide
copies of those communications. Also, please provide any other emails other than
Exhibit 2
PLAINTIFFS FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS
Pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff
Brett Kimberlin hereby requests that the Berico Defendants produce for Plaintiff
each of the documents identified below within thirty (30) days from the date of
service of this Request, at the home of Brett Kimberlin, 8100 Beech Tree Rd,
Bethesda, MD 20817
INSTRUCTIONS
1.
kept in the usual course of business or shall be organized and labeled to correspond
with the categories in this request in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
3.
In the event that any documents responsive to the requests set forth
in the numbered paragraphs below were, but not longer are, within Defendants
possession, custody, or control, state the circumstances and timing of the loss of
possession, custody, or control, and the name of the persons or entities to which
possession was transferred, if any.
4.
original of the final version of such document(s), although an identical copy may be
produced when an original is not available, as well as any nonidentical drafts or
nonidentical copies of such document(s), including those that are nonidentical by
reason of notations or markings on the copies.
5.
including the destruction of backup and archival data, must be followed pending
final resolution of this case.
6.
question which shall provide, with respect to each such writing as part of such
description thereof: (a) each privilege whereby Defendant contends the contents of
such writing are protected from disclosure; (b) each and every fact upon which the
defendant relies on to support the claim of privilege; (c) the type of writing (e.g.
letter, memorandum, telegram, telefax, notes or memoranda of telephone
conversations, etc.); (d) the date of each such writing; (e) the author(s) of each such
writing; (f) the person(s) to whom each such writing was directed; (g) the person(s)
to whom copies of each such writing were supplied; and (h) the general subject
matter of each such writing.
9.
documents created and/or dated between August 2010 and the present.
DEFINITIONS
All definitions as set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) are incorporated by
reference including in particular, but without limitation, the definitions therein as to
document, communication, person, and concerning.
1.
employees who were or are involved in Team Themis and the matters set forth in
the Complaint.
(a)
(b)
(c)
or highlighting of any kind. Electronic data includes, but is not limited to, activity
listings of electronic mail recipients and/or transmittals, output resulting from the
use of any software program, including word processing documents, spreadsheets,
database files, charts, graphs and outlines, electronic mail, any and all items stored
on electronic media, including, but not limited to, computer memories, hard disks,
floppy disks, CDROMs and removable media. Electronic data also includes the file,
folder tabs and/or containers and labels appended to, or associated with, any
physical storage device associated with each original and/or copy.
3.
The term State means the State of California and its agencies.
5.
whichever makes the particular Interrogatory more inclusive, and any shall mean
each and every.
6.
The singular form of a word shall be deemed to include the plural, and
the masculine or feminine, whenever appropriate in order to bring within the scope
of these Interrogatories any information which otherwise might be considered to be
beyond their scope.
7.
DOCUMENT REQUESTS
Request No. 1.
All documents concerning, reflecting or referring to any and all matters
related to the matter and matters outlined in this case, including all communications
with the members of Team Themis and others.
Request No. 2.
All documents identified, referenced, or relied upon in Defendants Answers
to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and/or concerning the subject matter of said
Interrogatories, and all documents requested in said Interrogatories.
Request No. 3
All documents not referenced in Plaintiffs Interrogatories but related in any
way to the subject matter of this case, corporate spying and espionage, and Brett
Kimberlin that may be relevant to the claim in the complaint.
Request No. 4.
All documents related to any financial transactions related to the allegations
made in the complaint, including those on and off the books, and bills and invoices
associated with your activities during the time frame set forth in the complaint.
Request No 5.
All records related to Brett Kimberlin, Justice Through Music, Velvet
Revolution, Stop the Chamber, Kevin Zeese and Brad Friedman in any form
including data discs. This request includes communications that occurred after
February 4, 2011 related to the matters set forth in the Complaint.
Respectfully,
Brett Kimberlin
September 8, 2015
BRETT KIMBERLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, et al.,
Defendants.
PROPOSED ORDER
Upon consideration of the motion to stay discovery by defendants Berico Technologies and
Nicholas Hallam (collectively, Berico) and the briefs in support thereof and in opposition there to, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the motion shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issuance of a scheduling order is stayed until the
resolution of Bericos Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 53).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Berico is not required to respond to discovery requests from
Plaintiff and Plaintiff may re-serve discovery requests on Berico after issuance of a scheduling order in
this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Discovery (ECF No. 75) is
denied.
SO ORDERED this _____ day of ___________, 2015.
__________________________
Judge George Jerrod Hazel
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 16, 2015, I caused the foregoing to be filed via the Courts
CM/ECF system, which will automatically serve a copy on all registered participants.
I also caused a copy to be sent via first-class mail and electronic email to the following:
Brett Kimberlin
8100 Beech Tree Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20817
justicejtmp@comcast.net
Pro Se Plaintiff
William Hoge
20 Ridge Road
Westminster, Maryland 21157
himself@wjjhoge.com
Pro Se Defendant