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The Barrington Moore Thesis and Its Critics

Author(s): Jonathan M. Wiener
Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 301-330
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/656776
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301
THE BARRINGTON MOORE THESIS AND ITS CRITICS
JONATHAN M. WIENER
At a time when most studies of modernization assume that the existing

political order is the most desirableone, BarringtonMoore arguesin Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966) that violent social
revolution has been, and is, a prerequisitefor increasingfreedom and rationality in the world. Moore rejects the view that all modernizing societies
undergo essentially the same process.Wheremost recent studieshave tried to
find characteristicswhich all modernizingsocieties share - whether "economic take-off" (Rostow), "expanded political participation"(Huntington), or
"multiple dysfunction" (ChalmersJohnson)- Moore arguesthat there have
been three different types of modernizationdistinguishedby the changes in
class structure that acconmpanydevelopment, and by the political costs and
achievements of each in their contribution to increasing freedom and
rationality.
The first type Moore calls "bourgeoisrevolution," in which a violent revolution abolishedthe dominationof the traditionallanded elite and broughtcapitalist democracy to England, France, and the United States. The second is
"revolution from above," the process in Germanyand Japan by which the
traditional landed elite defeated popular revolution and preserved its
dominant position during industrialization,a process which culminated in
fascism. The third type is "peasant revolution," which in Russia and China
saw the traditionalelite abolished,not by a revolutionarybourgeoisie,but by
a revolutionary peasantry which cleared the way for modernization. All
modernizing societies have undergonea version of one of these three types,
Moore argues, providing case studies of England,France, the United States,
Japan,China,and India.
More than 35 discussionsof the Moore thesis have appearedin Englishsince
the book was published; they include many brief journal reviews and some
longer review essays. These discussionshave been of three kinds: criticismof
University of California, Irvine
302
Moore's method, consideration of the thesis itself, and examination of
particularcase studies. I will consider the importantissues raised in each of
these areas,and conclude with a brief evaluationof the Moorethesis in light
of the criticaldiscussionof the past nine years.
1. Moore'sMethod
The most frequent criticism of Moore's method is that he is an economic
deterministwho neglects non-economic "factors"which play a causalrole in
modernization.The chargeof economic determinismwas made explicitly by
Gabriel Almond, Lee Benson, David Lowenthal, and Cyril Black, among
others.' Stanley Rothman's review article in the AmericanPolitical Science
Review was the longest and most polemical statement of this argument:
Moore, he wrote, sees "actors moved inevitably towards a predetermined
end" by their economic interests; Moore argues that ideology, politics,
society, and cultureare all "determined"by economic forces, and function as
"mechanismsused by the rulingclassesto furthertheir own interests,"Moore
considers past revolutions to have been "inevitable" results of economic
forces.2
Rothman providedevidencefor his critiqueby embarkingon a massivesearch
through Moore's footnotes, conclusively proving that Moore's own sources
did not support an economic determinist interpretation of history. They
argued the importance, at various points, of politics, social structure,
ideology, and so on. And every point at which Mooreexaminesthe relations
between these elements in a particularhistoricalsetting, Rothman stated that
he had found a point at which Moore "weakened his thesis" of economic
determinism,exhibited a "tendency to hedge," and "whimsicallyintroduced
other factors"beyond the economic.3
Rothman failed to see that behind Moore'sapparentwhimsey lay a method.
He was correct in arguingthat the sources did not put forwardan economic
determinist analysis; but neither did Moore. Rothman's critique of Moore's
method succeededin demolishingthe classicstrawman.
Those who criticized Moore for economic determinismmissed one of the
most fundamentalpurposesof his project: to distinguishbetween economic
analysis and social class analysis. Moore'sbook stands as the most thorough
and systematic demolition of economic determinism from a social class
perspective.4 The decisive element in historical development from Moore's
303
point of view is class conflict, an understandingof which presupposesa
specific historical analysis of the constituent classes. The confusion between
Marxian class analysis and economic determinismarises from the Marxian
definition of classes in terms of property in the means of production.Moore
follows Marxbe defining classesin terms of the variousmechanismsby which
elites have extracted an economic surplus from the underlyingpopulation.
This method is "economic" only in the broadest sense. It permits comparative analysis by recognizing the existence of a recurringproblem (extracting the surplus) and limited historical solutions (feudalism, agrarian
bureaucracy,commercial agriculture,etc.); but it also recognizesthe difference among particularclassesat particularplaces and times. These differences
result from unique configurations of economic interests, existing political
alternatives,semi-autonomouscultures,and particularworld views, which are
seen in relation to economic interests, but not wholly subordinateto them.
The assumption that the "economic factor" determines the behavior of a
class in any particular situation rather than, for instance, the "religious
factor" or the "political factor," is ahistorical, ignores the totality and
interrelationshipsof the various elements, and is therefore not Marxist.As
Marx himself wrote, "empirical observationsmust in each separateinstance
bring out empirically. . . the connection of the social and political structure
with production."5
Moore himself repeatedly rejects economic determinist explanations. The
conception of bourgeois revolution as the result of a "steady increasein the
economic power" of the bourgeoisieMoore describesas "a caricatureof what
took place;" he rejects as "obviously inadequate" the idea that peasant
revolts are caused by the deterioration of the peasants'economic situation
underthe impact of commerceand industry.6
A case in point is Rothman's description of Moore's chapter on the English
Civil War as an "economic interpretation."Rothman's own analysis is that
"wide agreement had been reached in the Long Parliament on purely
economic issues; it was the political and religious question, as well as
Charles' personality, which ultimately produced the conflict."7 Rothman
here confuses the explicitly economic issues debated in Parliamentwith the
changes in class structurewhich culminated in war - Moore's own concern.
But Rothman's categoriesof analysis are not exactly clear;in what sense did
the "factor"of personality"ultimatelyproduce"the conflict?
304
The most frequently recommendedalternativeto economic determinismwas
the addition of non-economic factors to the list of effective causes of social
change. Thus LawrenceStone insisted that demographybe considered,Reinhard Bendix and Gabriel Almond agreedthat internationalrelations should
not be ignored, and Lee Benson called for attention to religiousand ethnocultural influences; Cyril Black's list of factors was among the longest:
"ideology, social psychology, leadership,war, diplomacy,and indeed, chance,
must be taken into account."8
What these critics shared was an unsystematic, almost haphazardnotion of
how to explain social change. In place of a theory of change,they depended
on the existing sub-fields of academic disciplinesto form the basis of their
conception of society and history, uncritically assuming that, just as each
field "makes a contribution," so each factor "plays a role" in explainingthe
overall pattern of social change. The resultinglist of factors amountsto, not
an alternativemethod to social class analysis,but ratheran absenceof theory
and method.
The "multi-factor"approach tended in two directions - either toward an
emphasis on a particular factor, or else toward an effort to compare the
causal importance of different factors. Some of those criticisingMoore for
economic determinismargued that their own academic specialty dealt with
the most important causal factor - thus an intellectual historian arguedfor
the fundamentalcausal significanceof formal ideas in history. Other critics,
however, saw as their task not emphasizingthe importanceof one particular
factor, but rather comparing the causal role played by different factors.
Rothman, for instance, made statements such as "the changing political
culture played some role, and religiousfactors played at least as importanta
role as economic."9
In this attempt to list all potential causes,to measurethe relativeinfluence of
different factors case by case, critics like Rothman left themselves in a
theoretical void - facing each new historical case without a tested way to
begin an analysis, with no conception of what is fundamentallyimportant
and what is not, without a method for examining the structure of interrelationshipsamong the various factors, or of systematically comparingthe
cases thus studied.
Rothman describedhis alternativeto Moore's position as "Weberian."It was
Max Weber, Rothman suggested, who provided-the most thorough critique
305
and alternative theory to Marx's, and Rothman has strong words about
"Moore'sattack on Weber."'0But Moorehas emphasizedthe extent to which
Weber'swork is the basis of much of his own, arguingthat Weber'smethod
resembled Marx'sin several crucial respects, which distinguishestheir work
from contemporarysocial science.11Moore wrote that both Weberand Marx
possessed a "critical spirit," a refusal to accept the status quo as given, that
had disappearedfrom modern sociology (Moorewas writingin the mid-fifties'
"end of ideology" interlude); both were steeped in historical study and
possessed a historical perspectiveon present society which has been lost by
contemporary social scientists; and both refused to sacrifice content to
technical virtuosity, as modern social science has done. Marx and Weber,
Moore wrote, in spite of their lack of sophisticatedstatisticaltechnique,had
more to say about significantsocial questions than today's sociologists.
While Moore recommended Weber's historical work as a model of comparativesociology, he was convincedthat Weber'slater writing- particularly
Economy and Society - was characterizedby a decline of historicalperspective" which culminated in an "arid desert of definitions" - eventually
elaboratedby Talcott Parsons.12
Between Weber and Marx, Moore suggested that Marx provided the more
valuablestartingpoint. He consideredfour aspects of Marx'smethod to be of
crucial value to social science today: Marx's conception of social class "as
arising out of an historically speciflc set of economic relationships;"his
"conception of the class struggleas the basic stuff of politics;"his awareness
of the sharp divergencebetween official valuesand aspirations,and the way a
society actually works; and his sense of the absence of antagonismbetween
science and morality. For Marx,"the whole enterpriseof science makes sense
only in terms of moral convictions," Moore wrote.'3 To this list should be
added Moore's acceptance of Marx's conception of exploitation as an objective and measurableeconomic phenomenon.
Rothman indicated that the "Weberian"method he was defending against
Moore was a "culturalexplanation."14 Moore,however,in criticizingcultural
explanations, attacks not Weber, but Parsons,15He rejects the Parsonian
position that the cultural factor is the startingpoint in historical and social
analysis,andan independentcausalfactor in its own right. Mooresays that the
basic error of those who rely on cultural explanationsis "the assumptionof
social inertia," the assumption that continuity of value systems requiresno
explanation, that only change requiresexplanation. Social analysis based on
306
value systems "begs the fundamentalquestion." Moorewrites: "Whydid this
particularoutlook prevailwhen and where it did? The answerto this question
is historical:"particularvalues are maintainedand transmittedby particular
16
groups under particularconditions, "often with great pain and suffering."
But Rothman himself did not defend the Parsonianposition which Moore
attacks - that culturalvalues,ratherthan social classes,shouldbe the starting
point for historical analysis. Rothman's argumentwas much weaker;he says
only that "the cultural inheritance of a society is a significantpart of any
explanation," and urges historians to "give significant weight to cultural
factors."17 Moore never denies that culturalvalues are "significant;"he does
attempt to explain where they come from and how they function in the
context of social classes.
Parsons himself has referred to Social Origins - in his System of Modern
Societies, publishedjust before he retired.18 But, instead of respondingto
Moore'scritique of his theory, he treated Moore as a source of half a dozen
facts to be incorporated into a structural-functionalanalysis of European
history. Thus Parsons cited Moore as the authority for the statement that
English peasantswere weaker than the French, and that the French aristocracy was more dependent on the crown than the English- and fit these into
a value-orientedratherthan a class-orientedanalysis.Parson'sdecision not to
defend his own work - the single most important Americanalternativeto
Marxistsocial theory - appearsto be an implicit admissionof the strengthof
Moore's critique, a recognition of Moore'ssuccessat demonstratingthe value
of class analysisas a method.
All the criticisms of Moore's method discussed thus far have come from
non-Marxistswho regardMooreas a Marxistof some sort. Marxistcriticismof
Moore's method was radically different. Eric Hobsbawm generally praised
Moore's method, but observed that his focus on relationsbetween landlord
and peasant neglects some of the more subtle aspectsof ruralsocial structure.
Hobsbawmlisted them: ruralsociety's "marginaland mobile strata,its nuclei
of permament dissidence and withdrawal,its permanent flux of inter-communal and inter-gentryconflict and alliance, and its occasionalor permanent
recognition of wider social units." Hobsbawmsaid that Moore's chapter on
China in particulardemonstratesthat he is "awareof some of these dimensions;" Moore's problem is that the necessaryprimaryresearchhas not been
done, and "the comparativistcan only be as good as the materialavailablefor
comparison."'9
307
Eugene Genovese has written that he considers Moore's chapter on the
American Civil War "the most successful attempt at a Marxiananalysis."
Genovese confined his discussion of Mooreto the Americanchapter,without
consideringhis thesis as a whole - a procedurewhich, Genoveserecognized,
"risks some distortions." He agreed that Marxian analysis requires the
"broader context" of comparative concerns "such as the one Moore
offers."20
Within this context of agreement on the general requirementsof Marxian

class analysis, Genovese put forward some rather strong criticism of Moore's
American chapter. Genovese shared Moore's concern that class analysis be
distinguishedsharply from economic determinism, and most of Genovese's
essay on "Marxianinterpretationsof the slave south" is an attack on various
forms of vulgarMarxiandeterministwriting. But, Genovesewrote, Moore "is
so anxious to repel (a) crude economic interpretationthat he concedes far
more ground than is necessary or safe." In arguingthat the Southern class
structure was a "separate civilization," Moore "minimized the economic
aspect" of planter domination, and "obscures the class issue," while at the
same time paying "little attention" to ideology; in consequence, "despite a
framework that places social class at the center, he never analyzes the
slaveholders as a class; he merely describes certain of their features and
interestsin a tangentialway."21
Genovese said that Moore'sversionof the separatecivilizationargumentdoes
not include an analysis of the planterclass in terms of its economic interests,
ideology, and social relationswith the rest of the "plantationcommunity."
Such an analysis, Genovese wrote, would consider the "hegemonic mechanisms" of the planters'domination as a "special case of class rule" - would
considerthe role of planterideology in defendinga particularset of economic
interests.22
Initially it may appear that in calling for great attention to "the economic
aspect" and to ideology, Genovese was makingthe samekind of argumentas
the anti-Marxistswho criticise Moore for emphasizingthe wrong "factors"in
his thesis, who want to add different "variables"to the list of effective causes
in history. In fact Genovese'sargumentdoes not take this form. His argument
is that the method of class analysisrequiresa more thoroughconsiderationof
the relationshipsand the reciprocal influences among different aspects of a
social class; his purpose is not to demonstratethat the "economic factor" is
causally more importantin history that the "political factor" or the "cultural
308
factor," but to demonstrate that understandinghistory in terms of conflict
among social classes is more fruitful than understandingit in terms of
particular "variables," like political structure or cultural characteristics.
Genovese's argument against Moore is not that his list of variablesis incomplete, but that a full understandingof social class requiresmore attention
to the reciprocalinfluence of economic interestsand ideology in establishing
a system of class rule.
The question which Genovese does not raise, but which naturallyfollows, is
whether his criticism of Moore'smethod in the Americanchapter applies to
the thesis as a whole, or whether the Americanchapter is an exception to a
generally satisfactory method. In his discussion of particularagrarianruling
classes, does Moore have a sufficient consideration of their economic
interests, and of the role of ideology in establishingtheir hegemony?Moore's
focus on the levers by which agrarianelites extract an economic surplusfrom
the underlyingworking population is very much a study of particularforms
of class rule. But, on the issue of ideology and the establishment of
hegemony, Genovese's criticism of Moore's Americanchapter does seem to
apply to the book as a whole; Moore is not particularlyconcernedabout the
ideological aspect of class relations, and Gramsci'swork on hegemony which Genovese rankshigh on the list of Marxiantheoretical writing - does
not appearin Moore'sgeneralbibliography.
2. The MooreThesis
The relationshipbetween the Moorethesis and Marxismwas a leadingissue in
most discussions of Social Origins. Some saw the book as part of Marxist
scholarship,an elaborationand defense of Marx'sown ideas;some saw it as a
critique or refutation of Marx, while still others saw Moore makinguse of
Marx,among others, where helpful. ReinhartBendix consideredthe book to
be "a majorlandmarkof Marxistthought in its period of disillusionment,"23
while MichaelRogin wrote, Marxistorthodoxy turns out to be wrong at every
point.'"24 Eugene Genovese noted that although Moore's "categories are
basically Marxian,"he writes "in a mannercalculatedto divorcehimself from
Marxism."25C. Vann Woodwardobservedthat Moore "is a Marxianin some
of his interpretations, but he is not an apologist for any regime or any
ruler."26 Lawrence Stone considered Moore a "neo-Marxist,"27the T.L.S.
Reviewer said "he is fundamentallya Marxist,"28and Joseph Featherstone
described Moore as one who "does sociology in the grand... historical
mannerof Marx."29The most lengthy and also most favorableevaluationof
309
Moore's relation to Marxismwas that of J. H. Plumb, who wrote, "for too
long Americanhistorianshave been concernedwith narrative,with biography,
or with cultural and institutional history that evades economic and social
roots." Moore'swork shows that Marx "demonstratedthe type of historical
question that needs to be asked, and the way answersrequireto be framed,if
one is to understandthe process of social change." Plumb concluded that,
with Moore,"a new analytic materialismis putting down strong roots."30
Eric Hobsbawm criticized Moore's thesis from a Marxist perspective. In a
brief review, he agreed with Moore that modernizationin all forms implies
the destruction of the traditionalpeasantry;howeverhe found "exaggerated"
Moore's argumentthat peasantswere more importantthan industrialworkers
in radicalanti-capitalistmovements.31
In objectingto Moore'sargumentthat industrialworkerswere historicallyless
important than peasants in radical movements, Hobsbawm was of course
upholding the traditional Marxist view. Moore makes it clear that his
sociology of revolution is sharply at odds with Marx's. Moore sees no
revolutionarypotential whatsoeverin the industrialproletariatat any stage of
the developmentof capitalism.Successfulrevolutionarymovementsfind their
mass base of support among the declining artisansand peasants, ratherthan
among the growingfactory proletariat;for Moore, modern social revolutions
are "the dying wail of a class over which the wave of progressis about to
roll;" they are reactionaryrather than progressivein terms of the political
perspectiveof their mass of supporters.Here Moorejoins the ranks of those
who use Marxistcategoriesin an effort to "refute" Marx - Adam Ulam and
S. M. Lipset being prominentamong them.
Hobsbawm also objected, although with great tact, to the central terms of
Moore'sanalysis: "dictatorship"and "democracy"(Hobsbawmputs them in
quotation marks) - which "require... rather more preliminaryanalysis"
than Mooreprovided.
Hobsbawm suggested that Moore's conception of "freedom" was the conventional liberal one, limited to "a constitutionalframework,"and was not a
Marxist conception. Moore does not dwell on his definition of 'democracy,'
remarkingthat concern for such definitions "hasa way of leadingaway from
real issues to trivial quibbling."He defines "the developmentof democracy"
as a "long and certainly incomplete struggle"to accomplish three related
goals: first, to "check arbitraryrulers;"second, to "replace arbitraryrules
310
with just and rational ones;" third, to "obtain a share for the underlying
population in the making of rules." He cites the beheading of kings as
important steps in checking arbitraryrule, and indicates that he considers
"efforts to establish the rule of law, the power of the legislature,and later to
use the state as an engine for social welfare"as steps toward establishingjust
and rational rules and increasingpopularparticipation.32Hobsbawmsuggests
that we ask whether there is anythinghere that challengesthe assumptionsof
cold-warliberalhistoriography.
I think there is. First, Moore does not equate fascism and communism,but
distinguishesthem sharply and evaluatesthem differently. Second, he argues
that liberal historianshave tended to accept the rulingclass'sown definition
of what is "just and rational," when in fact it can be shown that they are
simply providingan ideologicaljustification for rulingclass interests.33
Third, Moore challenges cold-war liberal conceptions of democracy by his
attention to the repressiverole played by Westerndemocraciesin the Third
World.Moore points to imperialismand to America's"armedstruggleagainst
revolutionary movements in backward areas" as evidence that liberal
democracyhas "startedto turn into [an] ideology that justifies and conceals
numerousforms of repression."34Whileit can be shown that this relationship
is not one which has "started"recently, Moore'sposition is to the left of the
cold-warliberalone.
Although Moore expressesthis criticism of the activitiesof the United States
the ThirdWorld,he does not indicate much about the state of democracyand
freedom within contemporary America. He would probably agree with
Joseph Featherstone'sargumentthat "it would be a mistaketo conclude that
because this freedomwas tainted or incomplete, it was not worth having."At
the same time, Featherstone saw Moore arguing that "revolution is no
guaranteeof freedom," citing Moore's statement that "the claims of existing
socialist states to represent a higher form of freedom than Western democratic capitalismrest on promises,not performance."35
Lawrence Stone had a critique of Moore's political categories which was
similarto Hobsbawm's.Stone wrote that Moore'sconceptions of dictatorship
and democracywere based on "formalist, institutional, and legal standards."
Mooreaccepts the notion that "the institutions of Anglo-Saxonsocieties (are)
the last word in political equity and wisdom," Stone wrote,36 He stated
explicitly what Hobsbawm only implied, that Moore's conception of the
311
problem of the development of twentieth-century dictatorship and democracy has its origins in the cold-warscholarshipof the late forties and early
fifties.
Stone's own critique of these views has an ad hoc quality and lacks any firm
theoreticalbasisthat could rivalHobsbawm'simplicit Marxism.He wrote that
Moore was wrong to have a formal constitutional conception of democracy
because "we now realizethat what mattersis the state of mind which governs
the rulers." This appears to be a suggestion that psychological analysis of
rulers replace formal analysis of the rules. Stone concluded that Moore's
political conceptions should be "less legalistic and more anthropological."37
Surely the basis on which formal analysis of political institutions should be
rejected is that it does not lead to a satisfactory understandingof power which groups use it to achieve what, and by what means, formal and
informal. Neither anthropology nor psychohistory have been particularly
concerned with these questions;thus Stone's position does not seem to be a
satisfactoryone.
Stone's argumenton the cold-warform of Moore'sstatement of the problem
is more substantial, though equally problematic. To pose the problem of
"dictatorshipversus democracy" is an historical anachronismtoday, Stone
argued;it is to exaggeratethe historicalimportanceof the thirtiesand forties.
In 1945 or 1950 it seemed that the rise of Stalin and Hitlerwas the greatest
development of modern times, the culmination of centuries of historical
development; Stone believes this view to have been wrong. "Fascism and
Stalinism,"he wrote, "both now look like short-termtransitionphasesrather
than permanentand deep-seatedstructuralphenomena."38CyrilBlackagreed
with Stone's view of what can be called the "culminationproblem.""in what
sense did the conservativeroute taken by Germanyand Japan'culminate'in
fascism?"Black asked, observingthat "in neither country did fascismsurvive
for more than a dozen years."39 The criteria by which Black in particular
separates genuine 'culminations' from brief 'interludes' seems to be simply
temporalduration- dependingupon the brevity of the phase, ratherthan the
extent of social or political transformationwhich are involved.
As evidence for his view, Stone cited the apparent success of democratic
institutions in post-war Germany,Italy, and Japan, and the apparentevolution of the Soviet Union toward increasedpolitical participationand personal
freedom. He concluded that in studying the "social origins of dictatorship
and democracy," Moore is not "asking a significant question;" a better
312
question would be: "under what conditions a given society is likely to pass
through a relativelybrief authoritarianphase as it enters the modernworld."
However, he regardedeven this question as "not a terribly important one,"
since "the phase is not likely to be prolonged much beyond the period of
industrialtakeoff."40
Stone's reasoning overlooks elementary facts. In the thirties, Germanyand
the Soviet Union were at radicallydifferent stages of development;it hardly
seems necessaryto point out that Germanindustry in 1933 was far beyond
"take-off." Even if we accept all the assumptionsbehind Stone's argument,
the conclusion based on the German case would be that an "authoritarian
phase"is likely to occur in some of the most developedindustrialcountriesat
times of capitalist crises, ratherthan, as Stone sees it, that such a phasewill
come in the less developedcountriesat the time of "take-off.",4'
Stone arguedthat because there are "short-termfluctuationsin the degreeof
liberty and democracy" in different societies, Moore may not be "askinga
significant question" in seeking the social origins of democracy. Stone cited
the Greek colonel's coup of 1968 as an example of such a short-term
fluctuation; Greece was a constitutional democracy from 1948 to 1968, and
now is in a period of right-wingdictatorship;Stone asked, how then is it
possibleto discusssocial originsfor such relativelybrief political phases?
Moore'sthesis in this regardis that industrialdevelopmenttends to culminate
in fascism unless there is social revolutionwhich destroys the power of the
traditionalelite. MichaelWalzerhas appliedthis thesis to the case Stone cites
against Moore - the Greek colonel's coup. Walzer argued that American
foreign aid in the 1948-68 period promoted Greek economic development
while it repressedradical social change, with the consequence of "simultaneously reinforcingoligarchic rule and threateningit" - threatening it by
enhancing the "resentmentand capacities"of the underlyingpopulation, at
the same time providing the elite with "the material forces to meet the
threat."42 The result was the rise of fascism. Walzer concluded that the
Moore thesis provides an excellent analysis of the social basis of post-war
Greekpolitical developments.
Stone also cited the developmentof democraticpolitics in post-warGermany
and Japan as evidence that fascismwas a "short-termtransitionphase"rather
than "the culmination of deep-seated structural phenomena." N. Gordon
Levin had a more consistent and more satisfactory analysis of this develop-
313
ment. He arguedthat "the defeats and occupations of 1945 may be seen as
providingin some sense the bourgeois revolutionswhich Germanyand Japan
both missed;" if this is the case, then the post-1945 constitutional politics
Stone cited againstMoore "seem to bear out his generaltheory."43Thus, for
Moore, one way or another, the violent destructionof the traditionalagrarian
ruling class is necessary if democracy is to have a chance in a developing
society - destruction either through social revolution, or internationalwar;
either by the exploited classes, or by foreign powers. Moore believes the
choice is between Jacobinterrorand Nazi horrors.
Black's criticism focused on Moore's contention that his types constituted
successive historical stages. "In what sense have democracy, fascism, and
communismsucceeded each other?" he asked, arguingthat "the introduction
of Communism. . . preceded that of fascism."44What Moore says is that
''conservativerevolutions from above" bring about successful modernization
before peasant revolutions do, which is only to say that Germanyindustrialized before Russia and China.45Fascism does not appear in nineteenthcentury Germany,but conservativemodernization,which later culminatesin
fascism, does. It is in this sense that what Moore calls "the reactionary
experience"of industrializationprecedes"the communistmethod."
N. Gordon Levin also noted Moore's account of the relationship between
"the reactionary experience" and fascism. Levin saw Moore arguing "contrary to the traditionalMarxistview" that Germanfascismwas "not the last
stage of a dying and threatenedmonopoly capitalism,but ratherthe defensive
maneuver of a capitalism which has never really been triumphant."46Here
Levin misread Moore. It was democracy that had never been triumphantin
Germany,not capitalism;the Germaneconomy was thoroughlycapitalistby
the 1930's, but the political system was far from being thoroughly democratic. Moore emphasizesthat the reactionaryroad has been as successful as
the bourgeois democratic one at transformingagrarianinto industrial societies, as Germanyand Japanprove;it is "nonsense"to believe otherwise,he
writes.47What distinguishesthese two routes is not their success at industrialization, but ratherthe political practiceswhich accompanythat process.
Stanley Rothman, whose review article in the American Political Science
Review was the most critical, and most intemperate, summarizedwhat he
believed to be Moore's "propositions," which took twenty pages for
Rothman to disprove:"All industrializationhas ... been more or less equally
violent and repressive; all ruling classes are ... equally exploitative; and
314
fascism is . .. the necessaryoutcome of so-called 'conservativeindustrialization.' "48 It is difficult to believe that such a massive failure to understand
Moore's book could not be willful. Moore does not say all industrialization
has been "equally violent and repressive;"the whole point of identifying
distinctive types of modernizationfor Moore is to distinguishtheir different
costs. He concludes that the route of moderationand gradualismcreates at
least as much, and probably more suffering than revolutionarymodernization, and argues that the greatest violence and repressionis asoociated with
industrializationunder conservativeauspices. As Joseph Featherstonewrote,
for Moore"there is pointless sufferingand sufferingthat leads to progressand
even to freedom."49
Moore does not believe that all ruling classes are "equally exploitative." He
arguesthat exploitation has an objective characterwhich can be measuredin
terms of "rewardsand privilegescommensuratewith the socially necessary
services rendered by the upper class."50 This varies among societies and
historical periods;Moore arguesthat the less the degree of exploitation, the
greaterthe chancesfor social stability in a particularsociety.
Moore does not argue that fascismis the "necessaryoutcome" of modernization under conservativeauspices. He writes that "where the [reactionary]
coalition succeeds in establishingitself, there has followed a prolongedperiod
of conservativeand even authoritariangovernment,which, however, falls far
short of fascism;" in Germany, Italy and Japan, fascism eventually took
power (as it did in Poland, RomanianHungary,Spain and Greece), but "it
failed in other countries," even those where the same "reactionary syndrome" was present - notably Russia, India, and early nineteenth-century
England.5'Moorespends severalpagesexplainingwhy periodsof conservative
modernizationled to fascist rule in some cases but not others.
One of Moore's most radical conclusions is that revolutionaryviolence has
been a prerequisitefor liberal government - constitutional democracy has
succeeded only where a social revolution has taken place. One might think
that many would object to this conclusion, but only one reviewer did:
Lawrence Stone. Stone characterizedMoore's argument as "the Catharsis
theory of history," and said he was "in seriousdisagreement"with Mooreon
"a basic judgment about the moral and practicaljustification for the use of
violence." He arguedagainstMoore that "such violence is . . . almost always
self-defeating,"citing the FrenchRevolution as a case in which "the evil they
did came out of the violence they employed."52This is indeed exactly the
315
opposite of Moore's conclusion that without a violent attack on the French
landed aristocracy, democracy would never have had a chance. Moore's
position is precisely that the "good" the revolutionariesdid - removingthe
social obstacles to democraticmodernization- came out of the violence they
employed.53
WhereStone disagreedsharplywith Moore'sconclusionsabout the desirability of revolutionaryviolence, other critics accepted Moore'sargument.Joseph
Featherstone wrote that for the victors in social conflicts, "violence is the
worst thing that can happen,"but for the "victimsof history, the worst thing
would be the perpetuation of the present."54Michael Rogin agreed with
Moore that "the refusal to countenance apocalypic violence from below
eventually produced fascism," writing that "authoritarianviolence from
above is the price paid for failing to overthrow pre-modernauthorities,""
(Moore might reject the implication of irrationality in Rogin's adjective
"apocalyptic,"and argue that popular violence directedat exploitersoften is
characterizedby a clear rationality.) C. Vann Woodwardsimilarlyaccepted
Moore's argumentthat those who attempted the "democraticparliamentary
way" without social revolution "wound up at the mercies of the totalitarian
fascists," and Gabriel Almond agreed that Moore's conclusion "is a most
useful corrective for those of us who sometimes permit hope to carry us
away."56
Almond criticized Moore for neglecting an "exploration of policy alternatives" in relation to "contemporaryproblems of modernizationand democratization."57Moore's thesis does contain implications about alternatives
facing developing countries;indeed it is surprisingthat Almond should miss
what other reviewersmade it a point to praiseor attack. Joseph Featherstone,
for instance, arguedthat Social Originsshowed that "the picture of the world
inside the heads of men like Dean Rusk is substantiallyinacurrate."Compared to those who "think of nations as dominos and communismas cancer,"
Moore's book is "a ray of light."58 Moore arguesthat democracy,where it
exists in the world, was possible only as the result of violent social revolutions
against the traditional agrarianelite. He compares India and China, and
concludes that the cost of capitalist development has been economic stagnation and the "threatof death on a massivescale" from starvationand disease,
while, at the same time, "democracy does not yet exist in the Indian
countryside.""The only policy that seems to offer realhope," he concludes
his 100-page analysis of India, "is a system approaching the communist
model."59 Could Almond ask for a clearer"explorationof policy alternatives
316
in dealing with contemporaryproblems of modernizationand democratization?"
At the same time that he argues that only "the communist model" offers
"realhope" for developingcountrieslike India, Mooreis not enthusiasticover
the prospects of political freedom developing under such governments.
Communism,like liberalism,he writes, has "startedto turn into an ideology
that justifies and conceals numerous forms of repression."The "common
feature of both," he writes, is "repressive practice covered by talk of
freedom;" "it is dubious in the extreme" that the opressive tendencies in
either system will be overcome.60
3. The CaseStudies
The simplest kind of critique of Moore'sbook is for a reviewerto pick the
chapter on which he is a specialist, and attack Moore for ignoring recent
monographs,for exaggeratingor misunderstandingparticulardevelopments,
for coming to the materialwith categoriesthat don't necessarilyfit it - and
to conclude as the basis of one of the case studies that the book is seriously
flawed, without consideringthe author'scornparativemethod or his thesis.
However, the increasinginterest in comparativestudies of developmenthas
made such critiquesless tenable, and few in fact appearedin print. No doubt
the practice of assigningbooks for reviewto writerswith similarcomparative
interests played a role. Severalreviewersin fact explicitly rejectedthe tactic:
LawrenceStone wrote, "it is very easy, but perhapsnot very fruitful nor very
generous, for the local expert to pick holes" in particularchapters,and Eric
Hobsbawmcommented, "it would be easy but pointless for the specialiststo
criticise any one of the case studies;" Hobsbawm explained that the comparativeanalyst "does not compete with the specialists,he exploits them and
may have to question them."6' Nevertheless, the reviews sometimes contained criticism of specific interpretations in the case studies, and these
deserveconsideration.
Moore's chapter on the AmericanCivil Warevoked more discussionthan any
other single chapter,apparentlybecause more of the reviewerswere historians
of the United States than of any other country.
Most frequently discussed was Moore's argumentthat the key to American
democracy lies in the Civil War more than in the Revolution. Reinhard
317
Bendix asked, "why discuss the social origin of American democracy by
reference to the Civil Warrather than the Americanrevolution?"and David
Lowenthal similarly suggested that Moore should have focused on the
RevolutionaryWarand "the basic tenets of the Declarationof Independence
and the Constitution" if he wanted to understandAmericandemocracy.62
Perez Zagorin wrote that Moore's view of the Civil War as a bourgeois
revolution was incompatible with his argument that "southern plantation
slaverywas economically compatible with Northerncapitalism."63Lawrence
Stone asked whether, "if a reactionarycoalition was formed after the failure
of Reconstruction, the civil war was in fact not negotiable after all, if the
resultshave been as decisiveas Mooresupposes."64
Other reviewers disagreed with these objections, restating Moore's case.
Joseph FeatherstonedescribedMoore's Americanchapter as "persuasivebut
uneasy," arguingthat "Moore has some difficulty fitting America into his
scheme," and observingthat "it is characteristicof his scholarshipto lay weak
cards on the table as well as strong."65Michael Rogin'sevaluationwas more
favorable; he found Moore's "bourgeois revolution" argument to be "brilliantly relevant," arguing that "the Civil War delayed and weakened the
foundations of an alliance which, . . . in a slave-owningcountry, would have
been profoundly anti-democratic."66C. Vann Woodward similarly emphasized the importance of Moore's argument that the Civil War was crucial,
agreeing that it "broke the power of landed resistance to democratic and
capitalistadvance."67
Stanley Rothman also raised a number of objections to Moore's American
chapter. Moore arguedthat industrializationunder the auspicesof a Prussianstyled reactionary coalition of northern industrialistsand southern planters
was an alternativeto war in 1960; Rothman found this "absurd,"and went
on to argue that Reconstruction was not liquidated by such a reactionary
coalition.68 He cited Genovese and Woodwardas his authorities on these
points; however, both have sided with Moore in subsequentpublications.69
Finally Rothman questioned the analogy Mooredrawsbetween slave-owning
planters and Prussian Junkers, arguing that class divisions among white
southernerswere less sharp than in Europe.70Genoveseobjected to the same
analogy, but on radicallydifferent grounds;he saw the southernplantersas a
clearly delineated social class, but more reactionary than the Junkers, who
Genovesesuggestswere more modernthan Moore indicates.71
David Lowenthal, writing in History and Theory, put forward the only
318
objections to appearin print to Moore'sfavorableevaluationof the goals of
Radical Reconstruction after the AmericanCivilWar- the abolition of the
plantersas a class and the transformationof formerslavesinto small farmers.
Lowenthal spoke of "the immorality of destroying a white South," which
had "an explicit constitutional right" to slavery.He askedwhether American
democracy "could have survivedthe moral shock" of a successful Radical
Reconstruction: "that Moore does not even raise such questions is yet
another sign of the great harmdone to the criticalfacultiesby an imprudent,
doctrinaire,and even fanaticalradicalism,"Lowenthalwrites.72It is not clear
whether the "fanaticalradicalism"in question is that of the RadicalRepublicans, or Moore. Lowenthal's racism was an isolated phenomenon among
Moore'scritics.
Lee Benson's idiosyncraticcriticismof Moore'sAmericanchapterwas part of
his projectto discreditand eventuallyabolish"the establishedhistoriographic
system" and to "reorient and reorganize the social sciences."73 Moore's
chapter represents "the best work done to date on Civil War causation,"
Benson wrote; yet, to understandit "is to dismiss it as not worth serious
consideration."It is significantprimarilybecause the seriousnesswith which
it has been taken indicates "something must be radically wrong with the
historiographicsystem."74
Moore's basic problem in Benson's view is that the question he asked "what caused the Civil War?"- is "useless." He should have asked "who"
caused it.75 To the extent that Benson was able to "translate" Moore's
arguments into answers to this question, it appears that the answer is
"northernpoliticians."But, Benson asked,"what evidencedid he offer . . . to
support that claim? None."76 Moore, however, did not attempt to answer
Benson's question; it seems unfair to criticize him for failing to provide
evidence for an argumenthe did not make.
Aside from his American chapter, Moore's English case study was the only
one which was commented on by more than two or three reviewers.
Lawrence Stone argued that Moore's conclusions about the peasants and
revolution did not fit the English case very well. Mooreheld that democratic
modernization required the destruction of the peasantryas a social class the elimination of agricultureas the primaryactivity of a majority of the
population. And Moore described the enclosures of eighteenth-century
England as a "social upheaval" which "destroyed the whole structure of
English peasant society as embodied in the ruralvillage." Stone wrote that
319
this interpretation"flies in the face of modern scholarship,"which has found
that enclosureswere a slow, "relativelyequitable"processthat "improvedthe
ruralstandardof living by providingmore food." Stanley Rothmanalso sided
with the revisionistsagainstMooreon the enclosurequestion.77
Hobsbawm, like Stone, observed that Moore's view on enclosures "runs
counter to recent fashions in scholarship,"but Hobsbawm found Moore's
position "perfectly tenable," because Hobsbawm was not convinced that
"recent fashions in scholarship"had resolvedthe issue - as Stone apparently
was.78 The position Moore took seems to be a reasonable one, which
recognized the revisionist evidence: "though the enclosures may not have
been as brutal or as thorough as some earlierwriters have led us to think."
Moore writes, they "eliminatedthe peasantquestion from Englishpolitics" in
a way that did not occur in Germany,France,Russiaor China.79
Stone's second criticism of the English chapterwas that duringthe CivilWar
"the English peasantry remained passive and quiescent," that after 1549
England did not have "constant, desperate, ferocious peasant revolts."80
Stone stated this as a disagreementwith Moore, but in fact it is one of the
problemsMoore is investigating:he calls the peasants'role in the Englishcivil
war "trivial,"rejects many explanations of that fact, and concludes that the
most importantreasonfor it was the rise of commercialagriculturebefore the
war.8' However, Moore does conclude that "the process of modernization
begins with peasant revolutions that fail," and Stone rightly suggestedthat
this is not the way Mooreexplainsmodernizationin England.82
J. H. Plumb arguedthat Moore "exaggeratesthe extent of bourgeois revolution in 17th century England,... a great deal of land in 18th century
Englandwas still held for status rather than for profit."83And Stone agreed
that Moore "greatly exaggeratesthe degree to which English society . .. had
gone over to a competitive, individualistic,commercializedvalue system" in
the seventeenth century.84Moore's argument,however, is not that the value
system changed,but rather that the structureof social classesdid: he rejects
analysisof social changein terms of value systems.
There was little discussion or criticism of the French case study. Stone
devoted one paragraphto variouspoints of disagreement,and concluded that
Moore's analysis "seems acceptable although one could quarrel over
details."85Rothman believed Moore underestimatedthe costs of the Revolution and exaggeratedits achievements.86Zagorin chargedthat Moore "does
320
nothing to explain why the Frenchpolitical order,in contrastto the English,
was so unstable and divided against itself."87 Zagorin overlooked Moore's
explanation: that the French revolution, instead of abolishing peasant
holdings as the English Civil Wardid, consolidatedpeasantproperty,thereby
strengthening a class which "cared next to nothing about democracy as
such," at the same time that it "displayedstrong anticapitalisttendencies,"
thus the revolution, by consolidatingpeasantproperty,left a "legacy(which)
was a banefulone for a long time."88
One of the most important achievements of Moore's book was to bring
together the study of both eastern and westernhistory, apply a singletheory
to compare the development of the two "civilizations." Half of his case
studies deal with non-Westernsocieties - Japan, China, and India. These
Asian case studies, in spite of their significance,recievedvery little attention
from the critics. G. D. Ness wrote that Moore was "insufficiently impressed
with the development of Meiji agricultureand the emergenceof new peasant
capitalists" in nineteenth-century Japan; Rothman argued that Japanese
industrializationwas less repressive,and providedmore popularbenefits than
Moore indicated. He also rejected Moore's argument that Japanese big
business was one of the main supportersof fascism.89On India, Ness termed
Moore indicated. He also rejected Moore's argument that Japanese big
which he worked." Ness also had some minor criticism of Moore's use of
Indian statistics.90Rothman found that Moore's account of Indianhistorical
development neglected her political heterogeneity as well as her inadequate
natural resources and "the problems of a tropical agriculturedependent on
the monsoon." He also found Moore's discussion of the origins of caste
"unsatisfactory,"while Joseph Gusfield wrote in Social Forces that "it is too
earlyto count Indiaout."9'
The only criticism of the Chinese case study came from Rothman; he
challengedMoore's characterizationof ChiangKai Shek as a "proto-fascist,"
preferringto classify Chiangas "authoritarian,""unattractive,"and "wrong."
Rothman also arguedthat the revenueproblemsof the Chinesestate resulted
from a reliance on "Confucian precepts" rather than political opposition
from the gentry, as Mooreheld.92
Some reviewers criticized Moore's omission of smaller countries. Stein
Rokkan wrote that Moore "has made no effort to account for politics at
varying levels of size and economic strength;in fact he rejects this task as
unworthy of his intellectual efforts."93Stanley Rothmanwrote that Moore's
321
exclusion of Sweden and Norway was "problematical,"and Edith M. Link
wrote in the Journal of Economic History that "it is not clear" how the
Moorethesis would explain EasternEuropetoday.94
Moore anticipated these objections in his introduction; "smaller countries
depend economically and politically on big and powerful ones," he wrote;
thus "the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries,"
and "their political problems are not really comparableto those of larger
countries." His concern is with "innovation that has led to political power,"
not with "the spreadand reception of institutions that have been hammered
out elsewhere."95
Moore did not include chapterson Russiaand Germany,which play a central
role in his thesis, but few reviewers criticized these omissions. David
Lowenthal pointed out that Moore devotes much less time to the differences
and similaritiesof Russian and Chinese communismthan he does to German
and Japanese fascism; he rightly suggestedthat it is the Russian,more than
the Germancase, that poses potential problemsfor Moore'sthesis.96
Moore's exclusion of the Russian case certainly does not rest on his own
ignorance;he spent the earlieryears of his careerstudying Soviet politics.97
He writes in the preface to Social Originsthat he "discarded"the draft of a
Russian chapter "because first-rate accounts became available during the
course of writing to which it was impossiblefor me to add anything."98That
is, the story of class relationsin the RussianRevolution is told elsewhere.But
in his bibliography,Moore lists only two books on Russia published since
1949: Franco Venturi's Roots of Revolution, and Jerome Blum'sLord and
Peasant in Russia Neither deals with the twentieth century; neither answers
what for Mooreis the absolutely crucialquestion: what role did the industrial
proletariatplay in the Russian Revolution?If the revolutionwas based on an
anti-capitalisturban proletariat, then it does not fit Moore'sChina-oriented
type of "peasant revolution."Moore'sassertionthat the proletariathas never
played a revolutionary anti-capitalist role must be abondoned, and some
fourth type of modernization must be created to account for the Russian
case.
The problem with the Russiancase is to understandthe relationshipbetween
the revolutionary leadership, the urban proleteriat, and the peasantry.
Moore's French case study provides a key: in France, he wrote, the urban
laborers "made" the bourgeois revolution, while "the peasants determined
322
just how far it could go."99 This would seem to be a fruitful comparative
hypothesis with which to approachthe issue of the social class basis of the
Russianrevolution.
Moore'sdiscussionof "Catonism"in his epilogue on reactionaryideology was
a subject of criticism. David Lowenthal arguedthat Moore was "sparedthe
necessity of investigatingthe truth of the variouspartsof Catonism. .. by his
bias againstit;" as a result, "the problem of the relation between the moral
viruesand humanhappiness. . . is entirely ignored."He went on to arguethat
"Cato was no Catonist in Moore's sense ... he harkenedback to old Roman
ideals,"'00 Richard Frank disagreed with Lowenthal: he found Moore's
conception of "Catonism"to be "an insight of fundamentalimportancefor
understandingboth the history and literatureof the AugustanAge." Frank
found evidence for Moore'sargumentthat Catonismsharedessentialideological elements with modern reactionarymovements,citing translationsof Cato
published in Germany in 1935 as "reading matter . . . for the schools of the
NationalSocialist state."'01
Few critics rose to defend quantitativehistory againstMoore'schargethat the
use of statistics has tended to impose a conservativebias in recent historywriting.102 Only Lawrence Stone took up Moore's argument. The crux of
Stone's defense of quantitative methods was his charge that Moore's
"suspiciousattitude" was "old-fashioned"- "it would be mere obscurantism
to deny the role that statisticsmust increasinglyplay in social history," Stone
wrote, arguing that Moore's position was "grist to the mill of the neoLudditesof our time."103
In his appendix on statistical methods, Moore examines three important
quantitative studies bearing on the major concerns of his own book, and
criticizes each by refuting the author's argument with his own statistics.
Moore's critical method here consists first of all of a closer, more careful
readingof the quantitativeevidence,ratherthan a rejectionof it. Thus,where
Brunton and Pennington studied Parliamentduringthe Civil War,found no
social differencesbetween Royalists and Parliamentarians,
and concludedthat
the war was not based on any broad social cleavage,Mooredug into their own
tables to show that the developing capitalist areas had Parliamentarian
representativesand the more backward areas had Royalists. This kind of
refutation of Brunton and Pennington is not all "grist to the mill of the
neo-Luddites of our time;" but as Featherstone observes,Moore's case is a
"caution about the use (of statistics),not an argumentagainstthem.104
323
Moore does go on to argue that "there may be a point at which quantitative
evidence becomes inapplicable,where counting becomes the wrongprocedure
to use."105The key question is obviously where the point is. Moore never
says it is wrong to count members of Parliamentduring the Civil War,or to
count victims of the Terror, or the number of small farms that survived
enclosure, as long as that counting is done with an awarenessof the natureof
the evidence and the problem under investigation.His argumentis that there
are "qualitativechanges from one type of social organizationto another" such as the transition from feudalismto capitalism- in which "there may be
an upper limit to the profitableuse of statistics."'06Can Stone really believe
these cautious and qualifiedstatementsamount to "obscurantism?"
4. Conclusion
The critical response to Moore'sSocial Originsmay revealas much about the
present state of social science as it does about the book itself. While the
critics accused Moore of an excessive emphasis on economic factors, the
economists and economic historiansvirtuallyignoredthe book; while Moore's
case studies were all historical, national historians have tended to overlook
them.'07 The academicgroupwhich showed the greatestinterestwas the new
field of "comparativemodernization,"which consists mostly of sociologists
and sociologically-orientedhistorians.Critics of this school were enthusiastic
about the interdisciplinaryand comparativeaspect of the book, but tended
not to discussthe theoreticalissues presentedby Moore,except for a vigorous
defense of non-Marxistand anti-Marxistpositions. In generalthe critics did
not defend value neutrality, which Moore attacked, and were impressedby
Moore's case for progressiveviolence, but eager to move on to other topics,
instead of consideringthe implicationsof these issues. Therewere only a few
committed cold warriors;Stanley Rothman described Moore as a former
fellow traveller, and Gabriel Almond indicated that Moore was soft on
communism,but these argumentswere the exception ratherthan the rule.108
Moore has demonstratedthat an analysisof changesin the structureof social
classes is the most fruitful method by which to study comparativemodernization. The Moore thesis stands - because the critics either did not attempt
to make, or else did not succeed at making,argumentsthat would lead to its
rejection.As the T.L.S.reviewerwrote, Moore'sthesis "imposeslimitationsas
well as offering opportunities. But the limitations appear fewer, and the
opportunities greater, than in any alternative approach. . . this [is] a very
importantbook indeed;it may even be a greatone."109
324
Unfortunately, a large proportion of the critical remarks arose out of a
misunderstandingof Moore'smethod. This suggeststhat a majorweaknessof
Moore'sbook is that he did not spell out more clearlythe distinction between
his method of class analysis and the alternative positivist and empiricist
explanations in terms of "factors" and "variables."In this respect his 1959
essay "Strategy in Social Science" is essential supplementaryreading."0 As
GianfrancoPoggi wrote in the British Joumal of Sociology, "Moore is not
explicit enough ... about his theoretical assumptions and his conceptual
apparatus;"it would have been helpful had he "clarified the theoretical
significance"of this thesis."' It is unlikely that such a clarificationof his
method would have changedthe minds of his positivistand empiricistcritics,
but at least the issues would be clearer.
Given that Moore has demonstrated the superiority of class analysis of
comparativemodernization,the question which remainsis one of weaknesses
in his method and conclusions,aspects in which the comparativeclass analysis
of modernization could be strengthened. The least satisfactory case in
Moore'sbook itself is the Russianone. If the RussianRevolution does not fit
his model of peasant revolution,but is some kind of a proletarianmovement,
it may be necessary to modify the Moore thesis; thus an analysis of Russian
developments along the lines set out in Social Originswould be one of the
most important contributionsto the comparativeclass analysisof modernization.'12
The analysis of Europeandevelopmentscould be strengthenedby makinguse
of the Marxian concepts of the "feudal mode of production" and the
"transition from feudalism to capitalism."Moore covers similar ground by
analyzing how the links between lord and peasant in traditional society
change with the introduction of commercial agriculture,but he does not
begin with an explicit analysisof the feudal system of class relations."3 Such
a considerationwould offer a clearersense of the startingpoint of the process
of change in Europe; it would also provide the opportunity for considering
the relationshipbetween demographicchange and the social transformations
Mooredescribes.
The comparativeclass analysis of modernizationwould be further strengthened by a fuller and more explicit considerationof the ideological aspect of
these developments - of the manner in which classes become conscious of
their positions, and of the terms in which the conflicts are fought out (or not
fought out). Puritanismin seventeenth-centuryEngland,to make a familiar
325
case, hardly enters into Moore's analysis - because it was an urban
phenomenon, and he focuses on rural society - but it obviously plays a
crucial role in shapingthe self-conceptionsand political goals of the popular
revolutionarygroups, a role which cannot be understood simply as "reflection" or "superstructure."(Moore's appendix on "reactionaryand revolutionary imagery"providesa significant contributionto the study of ideology
in relationto the three types of modernization.)
It would be useful to analyze the histories of smaller countries from the
perspective of comparativesocial class developments. For example, Michael
Walzerhas suggested that the Moore thesis be used to compareGreek with
Yugoslav developments since World WarII - by contrastingthe "genuinely
indigenous insurrection" which established socialist Yugoslavia with the
"relativelysophisticalintervention"of the Britishand Americansin Greeceto
defeat social revolution and lead Greece down the capitalist road. The
question Walzerproposes is, "what price has Yugoslaviapaid for destroying,
and Greece for failing to destroy, the social and institutional basis of old
authoritarianismand traditionalist mythology?"'114It seems likely that a
number of comparativestudies along these lines would be possible - Southeast Asia and Latin Americabeing obvious choices.
Moore's concept of the "reactionary coalition" of a persistent traditional
landed elite with a weak modernizingbourgeoisieis one of the richest aspects
of his thesis;it deservescontinuingattention. It should be particularlyhelpful
in analyzing social and political developments in contemporary Latin
America, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Perhapsit would be possible to
distinguishvariationsin the "revolution from above" model to explain why,
in some countries, the reactionarycoalition remainsin a traditionalauthoritarianphase,while in others it moves toward a fully developedfascism.
Many would appreciateseeing Moore's argumenton the industrialproletariat
spelled out in greaterdetail. That the most industriallydeveloped countries
have not had proletarianrevolutions is a commonplaceobservation;it would
be interesting to learn of Moore's evaluation of the relative importance of
capitalist concessions and repression,of liberal hegemony, of reformismin
the labor bureaucracy,and of Communistand Soviet strategy.
Finally, there is the question of the practicalimplications of Moore's thesis,
of the relationship of the student of comparativeclass development to his
own work. The Weltanschauungwhich informs Moore's work is closer to
326
Weber's "heroic pessimism" than to Marx's optimistic attempts to unite
theory with revolutionarypractice.115Moore works as a politically isolated
individual;he is associated with no movement, intellectual or political. As
Peter Nettl wrote, Moore is "a loner,"' "a radical of great and austere
116 He sees his task not as a political one, but as a personaland
scholarship."
intellectual one - to work until he can comprehendthe whole; to find the
facts, and then "face them like a man," however unpromisingthat may be.
Whenhe has accomplishedthat, he believeshis work is done. Marx,of course,
would have thought otherwise.
NOTES
1. GabrielA. Almond, Review of Social Origins,AmericanPolitical Science Review,
61 (1967), p. 769; Lee Benson, Toward the Scientific Study of History (Philadelphia,
1972), p. 243; David Lowenthal, Review Essay on Social Origins, History and
Theory, 7 (1968), p. 296; C. E. Black, Review of Social Origins, American Historical Review, 72 (1967), p. 1338. See also Stein Rokkan, "Models and Methods in
the Comparative Study of Nation-Building," in T. J. Nossiter, et. al. (eds.). Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences (London, 1972), pp. 136-37; Lawrence
Stone, "News from Everywhere," New York Review of Books, 9 (24 August 1967),
p. 34; Lester H. Salamon, "Comparative History and the Theory of Modernization," WorldPolitics, 23 (1970), p. 100; Reinhard Bendix, Review of Social Origins,
Political Science Quarterly, 82 (1967), p. 626; Isaac Kramnik, "Reflections on
Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," History and
Theory, 11 (1972), p. 40.
2. Stanley Rothman, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An Essay
Review," American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), p. 82-162. Rothman set the
tone for his attack on Moore with an opening epigram taken from Through the
Looking Class. Alice asks Humpty Dumpty "whether you can make words mean so
many different things," to which comes the reply, "the question is, which is to be
the master - that's all." Rothman thus suggested that Moore is a kind of authoritarian Marxist Humpty Dumpty to whom he seeks to play Alice.
3. Rothman, pp. 62, 63.
4. See also Eugene D. Genovese, "Marxian Interpretations of the Slave South," in In
Red and Black: MarxianExplorations in Southern and Afro-AmericanHistory

(New York, 1972), and E. J. Hobsbawm, "Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiography," in Robin Blackburn (ed.), Ideology in Social Science (London, 1972).
5. Karl Marx, The German Ideology; see also Genovese, pp. 322-25. Gianfranco Poggi
provided a good brief summary of the conceptions that underlie Moore's method:
"an intrinsically, objectively exploitative relationship typically binds the upper and
lower strata; the maintainance of this relationship involves the systematic use of
coercion; the critical process is that whereby the productive surplus yielded by the
labor of the majority is extracted from it and allocated within the minority." Poggi,
Reviewof Social Origins,BritishJournalof Sociology, 19 (1968), p. 216.
327
6. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 428, 453-54. Reviewing J. H. Hexter's attack on
Tawney for being an economic determinist, Moore writes, "this is simply untrue ...
Tawney has written one of the best eloquent warnings against doctrinaire
determinist history that has ever come to my attention," p. 8, n. 8. Rothman's
critique of Moore simply reiteratcs the Hexter attack on Tawney.
7. Rothman, pp. 66, 67.
8. Stone, p. 34; Bendix, p. 626; Almond, p. 769; Benson, p. 243; Black, p. 1338. Dean
C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A
Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15 (1973),
pp. 199-226, criticizes others but ignores Moore.
9. Rothman, p. 66-67.
10. Rothman, p. 65.
11. Moore, "Strategy in Social Science," Political Power and Social Theory (New York,
1956).
12. Moore, "Strategy,"
13. Moore, "Strategy," p. 1 17.
14. Lester Salamon was similarly concerned with alternative 'cultural' explanations to
Moore's questions. He suggested it was not the persistence of a pre-modern elite
that contributed to the rise of German fascism but rather the absence of "political
skill" among the German bourgeoisie. If they had had a greater "capacity to
organize," Salamon wrote, they would have been better able to resist the rise of
fascism. But where does "political skill" come from? Salamon says from "cultural
values," p. 19.
15. Moore, Social Origins, p. 486 n. Moore cites Weber's historical work favorably on at
least three occasions: pp. 121, 172, 220.
16. Moore, Social Origins, p. 486. Poggi considered Moore's critique of cultural
explanations to be his "outstanding contribution." Poggi, p. 217.
17. Rothman, p. 64. At every point where Rothman offers Weber as an alternative to
Moore, he footnotes not Weber himself, but Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An
Intellectual Portrait - an introductory interpretation which many, including
Moore, reject. See for instance H. Stuart Hughes' review in American Historical
Review, 66 (1960), p. 154-55. Irving Zeitlin, in Ideology and Social Theory also
argues against Bendix for the compatibility of Weber with Marx.
18. Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., (1972).
19. E. J. Hobsbawm, Review of Social Origins, American Sociological Review,
32 (1967), p. 36.
20. Genovese, pp. 345, 348.
21. Genovese, pp. 346, 347.
22. Genovese, p. 348.
23. Bendix, p. 626.
24. Michael Rogin, Review of Social Origins, Book Week, 4 ( 1 January 1967), p. 5.
25. Genovese, p. 353 n. 58.
26. C. Vann Woodward, "Comparative Political History," Yale Review, 56 (1967),
p. 453.
27. Lawrence Stone, Causes of the English Revolution (New York, 1972), p. 148 n. 5.
28. "Lord and Peasant," Times Literary Supplement,3434 (21 December 1967),
p. 1231.
29. Joseph Featherstone, "Modern Times," New Republic, 156 (7 January 1967),
p. 347.
30. J. H. Plumb, "How It Happened," New York Times Book Review, 171 (9 October
1966), p. 11. See also James H. Meisel, "Origins: A Dialogue. Tape-Recorded,
328
Michigan Quarterly Review, 7 (1968), pp. 135-38; A. L. Stinchcombe, Review of
Social Origins,HarvardEducationalReview, 37 (1967), p. 291-92.

31. Hobsbawm, Review, p. 882.
32. Moore, Social Origins, p. 414.
33. However, Moore does not attempt to deal with the thorny issues in the Marxian
critique of the notion of "justice." See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1971); Allen W. Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice," Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 1 (1972), pp. 244-82.
34. Moore, Social Origins, p. 508; Gareth Stedman Jones and Robin Blackburn criticize
Moore for overlooking the connection between the imperialism he condemns and
the bourgeois democracy he admires. Jones, "The History of U.S. Imperialism," in
Blackburn, Ideology in Social Science, p. 219-20; 1 1.
35. Featherstone, pp. 34, 36.
36. Stone, New York Review, p. 32.
37. Stone, p. 32.
38. Stone, p. 32.
39. Black, p. 1338.
40. Stone, p. 32.
41. Furthermore, Stone does not seem to recognize that Rostow's "stages of economic
growth" notion is radically incompatible with Moore's version of Marxian class
analysis of modernization, that Moore emphatically rejects the understanding of
industrialization in terms of the one-dimensional concept of "take-off:" that is the
whole point in developing a theory of different types of modernization.
42. Michael Walzer, "The Condition of Greece," Dissent, 14 (1967), p. 429.
43. N. Gordon Levin Jr., "Paths to Industrial Modernity," Dissent, 14 (1967), p. 241.
44. Black, p. 1338.
46. Levin, p. 241.
48. Rothman.
49. Featherstone, p. 34.
51. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 437, 442. Rothman also criticized Moore for failing to
see the "irony and "genuine tragedy" in the historical developments he describes;
Rothman says Moore lacks the sense that history consists of "tragic encounters
among men equally caught up in their own limitations." (p. 81) I would agree that
Moore's book does lack this kind of ahistorical pseudo-significant thought.
52. Stone, p. 34. Stone's criticism of Moore is reviewed in Henry Bienen, Violence and
Social Change (Chicago, 1968), p. 79.
53. At the same time that Stone deplores Moores' defense of revolutionary violence by
arguing that such violence is "evil," Stone characterizes German fascism as a
"short-term transition phase." Some might see an inconsistency in Stone's evaluation of revolutionary violence in comparison to reactionary violence.
55. Rogin, p. 5.
56. Woodward, p. 453; Almond, p. 769.
57. Almond, p. 770.
58. Featherstone, p. 37; see also Werner L. Gundersheimer, "Journey to Synthesis,"
Reporter, 36 (9 March 1967), p. 59; Gilbert Shapiro, Review of Social Origins,
American Sociological Review, 32 (1967), p. 820; Black, p. 1338. On the other
329
hand, Rothman believes the Moore thesis "is not applicable... to much of the
'Third World.' " Rothman, p. 61-62.
59. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 408-10. Kramnik observes that Moore is virtually alone
among theorists of modernization in advocating this position.
61. Stone, p. 32; Hobsbawm, p. 82. A similar view was expressed by Gundersheimer,
p. 58; see also Review of Social Origins, Virginia Quarterly Review, 43 (1967), p.
cliv.
62. Bendix, p. 627; Lowenthal, p. 267. A similar view was expressed by Joseph Gusfield, Review of Social Origins, Social Forces,46 (1967), p. 114.
63. Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography," Political
Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), p. 41.
64. Stone, p. 34.
66. Rogin, p. 5:
67. Woodward, p. 451.
68. Rothman, p. 73.
69. Genovese; Woodward.
70. Rothman, p. 72.
71. Genovese's criticism of Moore's American chapter was discussed above in the
section on Moore's method.
72. Lowenthal, p. 272.
73. Benson, p. 228-29.
74. Benson, pp. 228, 247.
75. Benson. p. 234.
76. Benson, p. 242.
77. Stone, pp. 21, 33; Rothman, pp. 67-69.
78. Hobsbawm.
79. Moore. p. 426.
80. Stone, p. 33.
81. Moore, pp. 453, 477.
82. Moore, p. 453.
83. Plumb, p. 11.
84. Stone, p. 32.
85. Stone, p. 33.
86. Rothman, p. 70-71.
87. Zagorin, p. 41.
88. Moore, p. 107-08.
89. Gayl D. Ness, Review of Social Origins, American Sociological Review, 32 (1967),
p. 819; Rothman, p. 77.
90. Ness, p. 819.
91. Rothman, p. 79; Gusfield, p. 115. See also H. D. Harootunian, Review of Social
Origins;Journal of Asian Studies, 27 (1968), pp. 372-74.
92. Rothman, p. 74-75.
93. Rokkan, p. 141.
94. Edith M. Link, Review of Social Origins, Journal of Economic History, 27 (1967),
p. 261.
95. Moore, p. xiii. Walzer's success at using the Moore thesis to analyze Greek politics
should be recalled in this regard; see above.
96. Lowenthal, p. 260.
97. Moore, Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power; USSR: Terror and Progress.
330
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
Moore, p. xii.
Moore, p. 110. I am indebted to Juan Corradi for this argument.
Moore, p. 410; Lowenthal, p. 275.
Richard Frank, "Augustan Elegy and Catonism," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der
romischen Welt, vol. II, p. 2. (1974).
Gilbert Shapiro found that Moore's "minor disgressions" on statistical studies
"increase confusion" and "disorient the reader;" Gabriel Almond considered
Moore's "polemics with the statisticians" to be "often unessential and diverting,"
but unlike Shapiro he found Moore to "offer a useful corrective to the quantitative
theory of know ledge so influential today." Joseph Featherstone wrote, "Moore's
careful work is a standing rebuke to social scientists who imagine that quantitative
data, like virtue, is its own reward." Shapiro, p. 820; Almond, p. 768; Featherstone,
p. 36.
Stone, p. 34.
Featherstone, p. 36.
Moore, p. 519.
Moore, p. 519.
For instance, Colin Lucas' review essay on the social interpretation of the French
Revolution discussed dozens of obscure articles but ignored Moore's chapter on
France: "Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French Revolution," Past and
Present, 60 (1973), pp. 84-126.
Rothman, p. 81. When Moore objected in print to Rothman's characterization,
Rothman replied that his source of information on Moore's "fellow-travelling" was
"my memory of classes of his which I attended in the early 1950s, in which he
indicated what his sympathies had been earlier." (p. 182); Almond, p. 769.
109. TimesLiterarySupplement,p. 1231.

110. Moore, "Strategy." Poggi, p. 217. Along these lines, see Leopold Haimson.
111. Poggi, p. 217.
1 12. Along these lines, see Leopold Haimson.
113. I am indebted to Robert Brenner for this analysis.
114. Walzer, p,429. Walzer's own view is that "Yugoslavia is today the better society, or
at least the one for which we can entertain higher hopes."
115. Wolfgang Mommsen, "Max Weber's Political Sociology and his Philosophy of World
History," in Dennis Wrong (ed.), Max Weber (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), pp. 18394. Moore emphatically rejects the narrow liberal nationalism and limited conception of democracy that characterized Weber's political writing, particularly in the
World War I period.
116. Peter Nettl, "Return of the Intellectual," New Statesman, 73 (6 October 1967),
p. 438..
Theory and Society, 2 (1975) 301-330

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The Barrington Moore Thesis and Its Critics

THE BARRINGTON MOORE THESIS AND ITS CRITICS

At a time when most studies of modernization assume that the existing

Within this context of agreement on the general requirementsof Marxian

Red and Black: MarxianExplorations in Southern and Afro-AmericanHistory

Reviewof Social Origins,BritishJournalof Sociology, 19 (1968), p. 216.

Social Origins,HarvardEducationalReview, 37 (1967), p. 291-92.

109. TimesLiterarySupplement,p. 1231.

Theory and Society, 2 (1975) 301-330

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