FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES
BONIFACIO
JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ,

R.

VALDEZ,

Petitioners,

G.R. No. 132424

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL
FABELLAand FRANCISCA FABELLA,
Respondents.
May 2, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners
spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22
April 1997 decision[1] and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the
decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No.
2547.
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners
Bonifacio
and Venida Valdez
against
private
respondents
Gabriel
and
Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges
these material facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot
denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy.
Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty,
Inc.Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of
which is hereto attached marked as Annex A and the xerox copy of the Torrens
Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex B;

3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d]

the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein
plaintiffs rightful possession thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants
to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly
refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay,
defendants still refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot
peacefully;
6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to
settle the case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the
necessary Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order
that the necessary cause of action be taken before the proper
court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex C;
7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of
the defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein
plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional services of counsel thus
incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
representing acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was
likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex D;
8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to
vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious
anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x[2]
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that
petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors of the
former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the
ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more
than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply
with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering
private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the
same plus attorneys fees.
Private respondents appealed the MTCs decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC,
in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they
failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises
or that they had tolerated private respondents possession of the same, which is a
requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners complaint
lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior material
possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:
An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that
will support an action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular,
an allegation of prior material possession is mandatory in forcible
entry, xxx andthe complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand,
neither does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private
respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the right to
occupy the premises, which right has now [been] extinguished.
xxx

In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial
Court before which the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over
the case. Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The
decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal
for lack of jurisdiction.[3]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30
January 1998.[4]
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration[5]:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY

MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE

COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for
unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the
possession of the property in question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for
unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy available to the owner if another occupies the land at the formers tolerance or
permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by an implied
promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
The petition is not meritorious.
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover
possession
of
real
property:
(a) accion interdictal;
(b) accion publiciana;
and
(c) accion reivindicatoria.[6]
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).[7] In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. [8] The
two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de
facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. [9]
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. [10] Both actions must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of
last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. [11] The issue in said cases is the right to physical
possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one

year.[12] It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title.[13] In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more
than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or
illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an
action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.[14]
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is
later sought to be recovered.[15]Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an
action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. [16] As explained in Sarona v.
Villegas[17]:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the
owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at
tolerance, we do
premises and sue
one year from the

the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs

not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the
before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within
date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word
tolerance confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the possessor.Violation of that right authorizes the
speedy redress in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from
the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy
ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to
seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior
court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well
be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long
such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription
to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one
year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
[18]
(Underlining supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause
of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal,
then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the
case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. [19] The complaint must show enough on its face the
court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.[20]
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it
does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy
should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court.[21] Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[22] petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case
against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through

intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as

well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners case for
unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled[23]:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property
registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof
by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death,
by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on
December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the
property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes
a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It
is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiffs supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners
cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made
the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death,
by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at
the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint,
considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a
house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before
them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained
in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA 216
(1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to
be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not
of forcible entry x x x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, [24] petitioners
complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated
by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for
unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must
have been present at the beginning of the possession. x x x
xxxx
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any
averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent
Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the
premises was by mere tolerance.
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory
that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments
advance the view that respondents occupation of the property was unlawful at
its inception.Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful
detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must
be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
recovered.[25]
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of
fact that would substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property by respondents.The complaint contains only bare allegations that
respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building
their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof. Nothing

has been said on how respondents entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of
petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.
[26]
Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. [27] It is in this
light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of
jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-26848 August 17, 1981
CARIDAD O. DE GALLEGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
LAND AUTHORITY (Formerly Land Tenure Administration), oppositor-appellee.

GUERRERO, J.:
The petitioner herein, who is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of
Paraaque , Rizal and covered by TCT No. 46402 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, seeks the
cancellation of the following 'CONDITIONS' appearing in the Memorandum of, Encumbrances of the
aforementioned Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46402, to wit:

1. That the parcel of land described in this certificate of title, shall not be sold, assigned,
encumbered, mortgaged or transferred, within the period of five (5) years from the date
hereof without first obtaining the written consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources;
2. That except by hereditary succession, it shall not be conveyed, transferred to,
assigned in favor of any person who is not landless and disqualified to acquire or own
land in the Philippines;
3. That violation of either of the next two preceding paragraph shall be sufficient ground
for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources or his duly authorized
representative to take such action as may be necessary for the reversion of the land to
the government. (Doc. No. 1858, page 57, Book XXVI, S. of 1954 of Notary Public of
Manila, Andres Urrutia) Date of instrument - June 28, 1954. Date of the inscription - June
30, 1954 - 10:10 a.m.
In her Petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 7, in
LRC Case No. 458, it is alleged that the said conditions were entered on June 30, 1954 and a period of
five (5) years have since then elapsed so that Condition No. 1 has long become academic; that the
aforestated parcel of land formerly formed part of a tract of land which the Government acquired for
subdivision into residential lots with the principal objective of distributing the same to the landless and
thereby allow more people to have their own homes for which reason, Conditions Nos. 2 and 3 above
were entered as encumbrances on the said certificate of title; that the area wherein the above-mentioned
parcel of land is comprised has since become commercial community, fronting, as it does, the Manila Bay,
and not only said parcel of land but the immediate vicinity thereof now contain improvements devoted
purely to commercial purposes that by reason of the foregoing, the objective of the Government in
imposing Conditions Nos. (2) and (3) above has lost its meaning inasmuch as the value of said property
has become prohibitive to any landless who desire to establish his home therein; that to allow the said
Conditions to remain and to affect said parcel of land will only be a deterrent to the economic
development and progress of the country; and that in line with the country's program of economic
development, therefore, said Conditions should be eliminated.
Respondent opposed the Petition for Cancellation insofar as Conditions Nos. (2) and (3) are concerned
on the ground that Condition No. 2 carries with it no prescriptive period at all and the same is considered
perpetual in character and any subsequent transactions or dealings involving the land in question must
necessarily be with the written consent and permission of the Land Authority, and that Condition No. 3 is
likewise perpetual in character. Respondent, however, agrees that Condition No. 1 may be cancelled
since it carries the five-year prescriptive period.
In his Order dated July 19, 1966, Presiding Judge Francisco dela Rosa, finding the grounds relied upon in
the Opposition to be well- taken, denied the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner thru Counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging among others, that subsequent to the
filing of the Opposition, counsel made representations with the respondent for a withdrawal of the
Opposition in line with the position taken by the same office in connection with G.L.R.O. Record No. 7672
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch X entitled, "Sotera Duavit Vda. de Bautista, et al.,
petitioners," wherein no opposition was filed by the Land Authority to a similar petition for the reason that
the property involved was already commercial so that the Land Authority cannot maintain inconsistent
position, otherwise it may be guilty of discrimination, arbitrariness, or grave abuse of its official discretion.
Petitioner further pointed out that as to the fact that the land in question is a commercial property and is
situated in a commercial territory, namely, fronting the Roxas Boulevard, Paraaque , Rizal, three has
been no controversy and the court can take judicial notice thereof as a matter of common knowledge, as
in fact the property is presently occupied by the night-club "E L MUNDO" and is classified for real estate
taxation as commercial.
It is likewise insisted by petitioner that the primary intention of the restriction against transfers or
conveyances of the property except to the landless and except by hereditary succession in order to insure
that more people shall own residential homes, has been lost by the transformation of the property from
residential to commercial since the landless who may want to establish their residential homes can no
longer afford to pay the commercial price of this commercial property and following the principle that
"when the reason for the law ceases," the said restriction should be eliminated to allow the
aforementioned property to contribute to the economic development of the country.

The attention of the court a quo was also called to the fact that the petitioner who is the wife of former
Ambassador Manuel Gallego, is not a landless individual, nor was she landless at the time when the said
property was acquired by her, the fact being that the restriction refers only to voluntary conveyances and
did not comprehend sales by public auction, as in the particular case, where the petitioner came to own
the property as the highest bidder in a foreclosure sale by reason of a mortgage thereon. Petitioner
concludes that accordingly, the restriction cannot be intrinsically intended to limit the ownership of this
type of property to only the landless where it may be acquired by a landed owner thru an involuntary sale.
The court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Order of September 8, 1966, hence the present
appeal to this Court.
Petitioner submits a lone assignment of error, and that is, that the trial court erred in denying the petition
for cancellation and in denying the motion for reconsideration.
In Petitioner's Brief, it is pointed out that the Order dated July 19, 1966 denying the Petition for
Cancellation, as well as the Order of September 8, 1966 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, did not
express the reasons in support of said Order. Petitioner argues that Condition No. (1) in the Memorandum
of Encumbrances of TCT No. 46402 had long become academic because five years have already
elapsed from the date the said annotation was made on June 30, 1954, inasmuch as the Petition for
Cancellation was filed on February 11, 1966, almost twelve years after the entry of such condition.
Oppositor Land Authority does not oppose the cancellation of Condition No. (1), hence, finding the said
cancellation to be in order, the said condition is hereby ordered cancelled.
Petitioner further contends that Conditions No. (2) and (3) have lost any sound basis in that while the
subject parcel of land was originally a residential lot, the classification of the property had been changed
to that of commercial, as evidenced by the present tax declaration thereof (Exhibit "B"). According to
petitioner, the original intention of the controverted condition to restrict ownership of subject property by
people who could utilize the same as their residence has lost its meaning for the said property has gone
beyond the reach of any individual to acquire for purely residential purposes.
It is likewise claimed that the inhibition in Condition No. (2) is not entirely absolute because a person who
is not landless may still properly acquire the said property in a foreclosure of a mortgage thereon, as in
the instant case where petitioner, who is the wife of former Ambassador Manuel V. Gallego, is not
landless and had acquired the subject property, not by voluntary conveyance in her favor but as the
highest bidder in the public auction sale thereof in relation to a foreclosure of a mortgage involving the
said property, which argument assumes that Condition No. (2) limits the restriction only to a conventional
or voluntary sale, transfer or assignment of the property, excluding mortgage or encumbrance whereas
Condition No. (1) inhibits not only the sale but also the encumbrance or mortgage of the subject land.
Petitioner's contentions are without merit and We reject the same.
Conditions No. (2) and (3) are found or provided in Section 17 and 18 of Land Registration Order No. R-3
under the subject "Rules and Regulations Governing the Acquisition and Disposition of Landed Estate,"
approved November 15, 1951 by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. These sections
provide as follows:
16. Prohibition to Alienate.-The applicant shall not sell, assign, encumber, mortgage or
transfer, his rights under the agreement to sell or in the property subject thereof without
first obtaining the written consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and this condition shall subsist until the lapse of five (5) years from the date of the
execution of the final deed of sale in his favor and shall be annotated as an encumbrance
on the certificate of title of the property that may be issued in his favor.
17. Conveyance of Lands, Covered by Final Deeds of Sale.- Except by hereditary
succession, no lands acquired hereunder shall be transferred or assigned to any
individual unless he be landless and not otherwise disqualified from acquiring and owning
lands in the Philippines. This prohibition shall be made a condition in all deeds of sale
and shall be annotated as encumbrance in the certificate of title.
18. Violation of the two preceding paragraphs: its effect.-Any sale, assignment,
encumbrance, mortgage, or transfer made in violation of the provisions of the next two
preceding paragraphs hereof is null and void, and shall be sufficient ground for the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to cancel the deed of sale and to order

the reversion of the land to the government and the forfeiture of whatever payments
made on account thereof. In case, however, a deed of sale has already been issued, the
violation of the said provisions shall be sufficient ground for the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to take appropriate action in court with a view to obtaining the
reversion of the land involved to the government. All lands reverted to the government
shall be disposed of as vacant lot.
It is pertinent to state here that pursuant to the provisions of Section 4, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
of the Philippines which mandated that Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of land to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals, Commonwealth
Act 539 enacted May 26, 1940, authorized the President of the Philippines to acquire private lands or any
interest therein, thru purchase or expropriation and to subdivided the same into home lots or small farms
for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bonafide tenants or
occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire
and own lands in the Philippines (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 539). And under Section 2 of the same
Act, the President may designate any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National
Government, or he may organize a new agency to carry out the objectives of the Act, and for tills purpose,
the agency so created or designated shall be considered a public corporation. Commonwealth Act 539
amended Commonwealth Act No. 20, as amended by Commonwealth Act 260, and Commonwealth Act
No. 378, as amended by Commonwealth Act 420.
As indicated earlier, Sections 16, 17 and 18 of Lands Administrative Order No. R-3 dated October 19,
1951 are the sources which gave rise to the annotation of Conditions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on the title of
subject property. The said Order was published in the Official Gazette of December, 1951, pp. 6075 to
6078, Volume 47, No. 12, and has the force and effect of law. (Javillonar vs. Land Tenure Administration,
G. R. No. 10303, Aug. 22,1958,104 Phil. 323)
As the Administrative Order itself provides, the rules and regulations governing the acquisition and
disposition of private estates were promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned
"(p)ursuant to the provisions of section 4, article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, section 79 (B)
of the Revised Administrative Code, and Executive Order No. 376, dated November 28, 1950."
Conditions Nos. 2 and 3, having been imposed pursuant to an Administrative Order which has the force
and effect of the law, are therefore binding upon any person who acquires title to the same, it appearing
that said Conditions are annotated as encumbrances on the back of the Certificate of Title of the land.
Moreover, the said Conditions are not contrary to law, morals, customs, or public policy. In fact, these
Conditions had been imposed in order to implement more effectively the main purpose of the
constitutional provision which is to break up landed estates into reasonably small portions and to
discourage the concentration of excessive landed wealth in an entity or a few individuals, (Republic vs.
Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461) Incidentally, the New Constitution of 1973 provided a modification of the original
provision in the 1935 Constitution, thus: "The National Assembly may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost
to deserving citizens.
These two encumbrances or Conditions annotated on the back of TCT 46402 imposed by and pursuant to
the Administrative Order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may not, therefore, be
cancelled for under Section 39 of the Land Registration Act,
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and
every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in
good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said
certificate, and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statutes of the Philippine Islands
cannot require to appear of record in the registry:
Second. Taxes within two years after same become due and payable;
Third. An public highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been
determined.

But if there are easements or other rights. appurtenant to a parcel of registered land
which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain
so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until
cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner.
(As amended by Act No. 2011, and Sec. 4, Act No. 3621.)
Presidential Decree No. 1529, amending and codifying the laws relative to registration of property and for
other purposes, promulgated June 11, 1978, substantially contains the same provision under Section 44
thereof, which provides:
Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title
for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted on said certificate and any of the following encumberances which may be
subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the
Philippines which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in
order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record;
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately
preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value,
without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone;
Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any
government irrigation canal or lateral thereof. if the certificate of title does not state that
the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been
determined;
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or
pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian
reform.
Until and unless the law, or the Administrative Order which has the force and effect of law, is repealed,
amended, or otherwise, altered or modified, the said encumbrances must remain, notwithstanding the
contention of petitioner that a previous governor of the Land Authority had not opposed a similar petition
for cancellation in Sotera Duavit Vda. de Bautista and Jaime Bautista, G.L.R.O. Record No. 7672 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, for a wrong act cannot be cured by the commission of another
wrong. laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary. (Article 7, New Civil Code)
Neither can petitioner's arguments that the lot in question contains improvements, a nightclub devoted to
a purely commercial purpose, that the value of the land has become prohibitive to any landless who
desires to establish his house thereon, that to allow the said Conditions to remain and to affect said parcel
of land will only be a deterrent to the economic development and progress of the country and that in line
with the country's program of economic development, said Conditions should be eliminated, be sustained.
The courts are not concerned with the wisdom, necessity or propriety of the law, for these are the
particular province of the legislative. As this Court said in Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22
SCRA 424, 450, speaking thru Justice (now Chief Justice) Fernando citing Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139, "It is well to remember, that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.' "
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Orders appealed from dated July 19, 1966 and
September 8, 1966 are hereby MODIFIED in the sense that Condition No. (1) inscribed as an
encumbrance in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 46402 (Rizal Registry) covering Lot 4, Block 4, Psd10988 Baclaran, Estate, Baclaran, Paraaque , Rizal, under the name of petitioner Caridad O. de
Gallego, is hereby ordered cancelled, the five-year period stated therein having already expired, and that
Conditions No. (2) and (3) shall remain as they are.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez and Melencio-Herrera. JJ., concur.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., concur in the result.