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1 AUTHOR:
Frank Hendriks
Tilburg University
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ABSTRACT
In debates on democratic reform, the logic of Spring cleaning
resurfaces over and over again. Different democratic beauty ideals inspire different types of cleaning in the home of democracy.
Where one particular vision of democracy is polished up, rival
visions are rubbed out, usually at the same time. Informed by
Douglass take on cleaning ritual and pollution reduction, this
article distinguishes four such beauty idealspendulum democracy, consensus democracy, participatory democracy, and voter
democracyas well the tensions among them, which can made
productive as well as destructive, as the real world of democracy
illustrates. This article argues that viable democracies cannot
afford too much cleaning of one particular type, unchecked by
rival visions of democracy. The advice to democratic theorists and
reformers alike is to keep mixofobiathe fear of mixing related
to the quest for purityin check as much as possible.
Notions of purity are often invoked in discussions about democratic form and
reform, even though we cannot expect democracy to be pure on a permanent
basis. Democracy, like lavatory cleaning, is an uphill task: no sooner have we
got it all clean and tidy than someone comes in and pisses all over it, Michael
Thompson once wrote (Thompson, Grendstad, & Selle, 1999, p. 18). He may
be putting it a little graphically, but Thompson has a point, an essential one:
Just as you can keep cleaning a toilet because it keeps losing its sterile properties, you can keep polishing democracy; it is like a beauty ideal that requires
ceaseless maintenance because reality never quite lives up to it.
With his cleansing metaphor, Michael Thompson proves himself a dedi-
Administrative Theory & Praxis / March 2011, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 4562.
2011 Public Administration Theory Network.
1084-1806 / 2011 $9.50 + 0.00.
DOI 10.2753/ATP1084-1806330102
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cated follower of Mary Douglas, whose view of cleaning ritual and pollution
reduction is condensed into six words: Dirt is matter out of place (Douglas,
xxxx, p. xxx).1 <<AU: Provide year and page number for direct quote.>>
Unclean is what does not square with the cherished order. Cleaning means
to restore this cherished order, to make distinctions, to polish and shine the
one (the proper) and to rub out and distance the other (the deviant). Douglas
interpreted the underlying pattern as ritualized cleansing behavior or pollution reductiona combination of polishing up the acquainted (the proper)
and rubbing out the alien (the deviant). Whitewashing and removing foreign
stains are two sides of the same coin.
In debates on democratic reform, most notably, the logic of Spring cleaning resurfaces over and over again (Cain, Dalton, & Scarrow, 2003; March &
Olsen, 1983; see also Hendriks, 2009) with reformers referring to cleansing,
clearing, purging, putting the house in order, orpitching it a little stronger
making a clean sweep. Where one particular conception of democracy is
polished up, rival visions of democracy are rubbed out, usually at the
same time. To understand cleaning rituals in real and everyday life, Douglas
teaches us, we should first get a grip on the notions of order that inspire pollution reduction. This means that to understand cleaning rituals in the home
of democracy, we should first bring into sharp focus the relevant notions of
democratic order: the democratic beauty ideals that inspire attempts at
pollution reduction.
Inspired by Douglas, I distinguish and discuss four such beauty ideals:
pendulum democracy, consensus democracy, participatory democracy, and
voter democracy. I go into the inherent tensions among them, which can be
made more or less productive, as the real world of democracy illustrates.
Different democratic beauty ideals inspire different forms of democratic
cleansing, but none of them can bring cleanliness on a permanent basis. The
importance of thisthe value of hybrid democracyis discussed further
in this paper. First, however, we need to take a closer look at Mary Douglass
cultural analysis of purity and pollution reduction.
DIRT IS MATTER OUT OF PLACE
Mary Douglas has been recognized as one of the 1,000 Makers of the Twentieth Century, and her book Purity and Danger (1966) has been classed among
the 100 most influential works of nonfiction since World War II (Fardon,
1999). In Purity and Danger, Douglas analyzed what she saw as the essence
of culture: purification, keeping things in order, some particular, cherished
order. What corresponds with this cherished orderdefined as pure, proper,
wholesome or even holywill be maintained and polished up as much as
possible. What deviates from it will be perceived as out of order, impure,
improper, or, generally, as misfitting and will be distanced and rubbed out
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constitution has been adapted to changing circumstances in a more or less organic way, but individuals and parties have quite regularly stood up to demand
more radical makeovers. In understanding the craving for democratic reform
in the Netherlands, what is crucial is not so much the supposedly sorry state of
the House of Thorbecke but rather the reformist cultural orientation of many
of its inhabitants. As I present this thesis elsewhere (Hendriks, 2009), I will
not repeat it in detail here. In this paper, I explore the notion of democratic
order, which inspires democratic reform not only in the Netherlands but also
in other established democracies.
In the following discussion, I distinguish four democratic beauty ideals,
which imply different notions of proper versus improper democracy and which
inspire different attempts at polishing up or rubbing out particular democratic
institutions. In Table 1, I juxtapose two distinctions that are often used in
democratic theory but rarely in combination. The first distinction, between
aggregative and integrative democracy, concerns the question how democratic
decisions are to be taken: in a counting heads process of aggregation, in
which a simple majority vote is decisive, or in an integrative, talkative
process of conferring, seeking for the widest possible consensus and voting
down minorities as little as possible. In essence, the aggregative/integrative
distinction that I propose runs parallel to Lijpharts well-known majoritarian/
nonmajoritarian distinction, but, other than Lijphart (1999), whose analysis
focuses on national and formal models of representative democracy, I suggest that this distinction can also be applied to local and informal democratic
institutions, both in representative (indirect) democracy and non-representative
(direct) democracy. This leads to the second distinction, between direct and
indirect democracy, which concerns the question who are to make the decisions in democracy: the citizens themselves, through self-determination (direct democracy), or caretakers, delegates or trustees, through representation
(indirect democracy).
If we combine these two distinctionsindirect versus direct and aggregative versus integrativewe can distinguish four ideal types: pendulum
democracy, consensus democracy, voter democracy, and participatory democracy (see Table 1). The four types inspire different types of democratic
reform or cleansing.
Pendulum democracy is, in its general logic, akin to Lijpharts (1999)
majoritarian or Westminster democracy, although, through my analytical
lens, I propose to look beyond the British sphere of influence and also beyond Westminster as a metaphor and center of the nation state. Hence the
alternative metaphor of the pendulum, referring to the democratic logic that
makes political power alternate between two competing political protagonists
or parties. Power follows the movements of the pendulum, and the pendulum
follows the movements of elections or polls. Pendulum democracy is fundamentally indirect and representative in nature: Citizens periodically cast their
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Indirect
(representation)
Direct
(self-determination)
Aggregative (majoritarian)
Integrative (non-majoritarian)
Pendulum democracy
Consensus democracy
Voter democracy
Participatory democracy
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HENDRIKS
Consensus democracy
In order
Indirect (representative), aggregative
(majoritarian) democracy
In order
Indirect (representative), integrative
(non-majoritarian) democracy
Out of place
Direct (self-determining), integrative
(non-majoritarian) democracy
Out of place
Direct (self-determining), aggregative
(majoritarian) democracy
In order
direct (self-determining), aggregative
(majoritarian) democracy
In order
direct (self-determining), integrative
(non-majoritarian) democracy
Out of place
indirect (representative), integrative
(non-majoritarian) democracy
Out of place
indirect (representative), aggregative
(majoritarian) democracy
Participatory democracy
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HENDRIKS
High-grid
(Roles ascribed)
Low-grid
(Roles achieved)
Atomism
(Isolate culture)
Individualism
(Market culture)
Hierarchy
(Positional culture)
Egalitarianism
(Enclave culture)
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the wider group (each to their niche rather than all count equally), and that
the systems division of labor decides who is to represent and who is to be
represented (indirect rather than direct democracy).
Atomism
In the realm of democracy, there is mutual attraction between atomism and
pendulum democracy.5 Atomism is founded on the idea that individuals are
singular units in fields of other discrete individuals (low-group rather than
high-group), that each individual must fend for himself and not appeal to others (win-or-lose competition rather than melting together), that, in decision
making, it must be the biggest who carries away the spoils (the winner takes
all), the others drawing the short straw until they themselves gain enough
mass to win the game (aggregative rather than integrative democracy). In addition, atomism is based on the principle that responsibilities differ according
to position and ability (high-grid rather than low-grid), that not everyone can
take part or be involved in everything (each to their niche rather than all count
equally), and that some have the role and the position to govern while others
do not (indirect rather than direct democracy). This is considered normal in
this context, just as hierarchical, individualistic, or egalitarian rules are considered appropriate in other cultural settings.
DYNAMICS AND VIRTUES OF COMPETING MODELS
From the 1980s onward, Douglass gridgroup analysis has been picked up by
scholars in the fields of policy analysis, politics, and administration, renaming it cultural theory. Douglas was not really fond of the new name,6 but
she did like the innovations that particularly Michael Thompson and Aaron
Wildavsky brought to her cultural analysis:
They showed that any community has several cultures, and that each
culture defines itself by contrast with the others. Those persons who
share a culture maintain enthusiasm for it by charging the other cultures
with moral failure. . . . The brilliant stroke was to introduce the idea of
competition between cultures. They compete for members, compete for
prestige, compete for resources. What had started as a static mapping
of cultures upon organisations was thereby transformed into a dynamic
theoretical system. (Douglas, 2006, pp. 78)
More recently, Perri 6, Michael Thompson, and others using gridgroup
analysis have started to reformulate the dynamic interplay between the different cultural biases (or relational solidarities) in terms of positive and negative
feedback mechanisms, terms inspired by complex systems theory (Perri 6,
2003; Thompson, 2002, 2008). In contemporary cultural analysis, developed
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Indirect
Direct
Pendulum democracy
Voter democracy
= positive feedback
Integrative
Consensus democracy
Participatory democracy
= negative feedback
democratic reform (Hendriks & Toonen, 2001; Michels, 2008). Incrementally, some elements of direct democracy have been added, as well as some
more aggregative elements: experiments with competitive, one-on-one mayoral elections, local referendums, citizen assemblies, neighborhood budgets
and so on. Weaknesses of indirectly integrative consensus democracy, such
as its tendency to expertocratic and paternalistic rule and its penchant for
complexity and stickiness, may be corrected in this fashion. However, all is
not well, as Dutch consensus democracy has proved to be rather resistant to
such changes.
In principle, a model of democracy that is geared to keeping both itself
and its rivals on their toes is a blessing for democracy. Unbridled kinds of
positive and negative feedback, however, can both be destructive. A model of
democracy that produces an excess of positive feedback may lead to institutional lock in, to a vicious circle of self-affirmation, to a model on its way
to skidding and veering off course. The models fundamental pitfall and its
inherent weaknesses would not be kept in check anymore. An abundance of
negative feedbacktoo much sweeping away of the Other, of what is assumed
to be out of placemay lead to democracy resembling still water. The inside
gets bogged down; the outside does not get the chance to shake up all-too
familiar with out-of-the-box ingredients.
In other words, positive and negative feedback mechanisms are vital,
but they need to be multilateral, connected to various, competing ways of
approaching democracy, and not unilateral. Though one culture may be
dominant, it must avoid excluding the other three from the public forum. A
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dominant culture should not drive the others underground or reduce any of
them to silence (Douglas, 2006, p. 9). This is what Douglas wrote about
cultural biases in general, but it goes for democratic models, reflecting cultural
biases, just as well, or even more so, if we take the view that the organization
of pluriformity and interaction is at the very heart of democracy. What Douglas
referred to as the normative principle (it is better to have pluriformity and
interaction) could inspire democratic theorists to see democratic hybridityand
hence impurityin a more positive light, and to keep mixophobia and all too
exclusionary foundationalism (cf. Catlaw, 2007; Labrie, 2002) in check.
Democratic hybridity involves a mutually contraining constellation of
forces that impact and correct each other and that keep one another on their
toes, a system of checks and balances, which serves the vitality of democracy. Philosophers of democratic reform operating at levels far removed from
democratic praxis do not need to worry about the dangers of unbridled positive
or negative feedback. They can afford to lose themselves in high ideals and
abstract ideas on clean and pure democracy. In the real world, viable democracies inevitably encompass a certain impurity, a certain dilution, a certain
blend of models. Viable democracies cannot afford to indulge in intellectual
or ideological purity. Purity means vulnerability in the real world of democracy; hybridity means vitality (Hendriks, 2010). This conclusion can be drawn
when we take Douglass cultural analysis to the realm of democratic theory.
Some times and places seem to be more tolerant and supportive to democratic hybridity than others. Swiss democracy appears to display more hybridity than, for instance, Bulgarian democracy; British democracy seems more
hybrid nowadays than 20 years ago. It is beyond the scope of this article to
report on and account for empirical contrasts like these, however important
for tackling in future research. This article focuses on outlining a cultural way
of understanding democratic reform, strongly influenced by Mary Douglass
analysis of purity and pollution.
POSTSCRIPT: BEYOND THE NOT-IN-MY-TRIBE SYNDROME
In the end, the strength of Douglas is that she kept developing throughout
her long intellectual life and that she refused to make do with fragmented
explanations and isolated case studies. Contrary to many other anthropologists, she was never afflicted by the Not-in-My-Tribe syndrome (You may
say so about your tribe, but my tribe is truly unique, and we have none of
that here, you know) but had the courage to look, compare, abstract, and
generalize beyond the single case. Armed with a good share of British empiricism, unarguably influenced by her master Evens-Prichard, she branched
out to French structuralism (Durkheim, Lvi-Strauss, Foucault, Bourdieu;
see Fardon, 1999) and produced a frame of analysis that was uniquely her
own and that managed to be highly productive while using a relatively small
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set of concepts. This is probably why Mary Douglass cultural method has
met with a considerable group of users among political and administrative
scholars (Hood, 1998; Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1993;
Thompson, Grendstad, & Selle, 1999; Verweij & Thompson, 2006).
NOTES
1. The central text here is Mary Douglass 1966 text Purity and Danger.
Douglass approach to culturally inspired cleansing has, however, been developed further in a series of publications, which I use for this article also: Natural
Symbols (1970); Cultural Bias (1978); How Institutions Think (1986); Risk and
Blame (1992); Thought Styles (1996); Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture
(1982); and Douglas and Ney, Missing Persons (1998).
2. The following are also used as shorthand: outlooks on life, ways of life,
world views, cultural biases, and solidarities (see Hood, 1998; Thompson, Ellis,
& Wildavsky, 1990; Thompson, Grendstad & Selle, 1999; Verweij & Thompson,
2006; Wildavsky, 1993).
3. An author like (1984/2004) believes that we should have more of the one
(the language of we) and less of the other (the language of me).
4. The link between hierarchy and consensus democracy is also made by
Wildavsky, (1993, p. 82). To be able to see this link properly, we need to let go of
common negative bias in the approach to hierarchy (see Douglas, 2003).
5. To undo the concept from unwanted connotations as much as possible,
atomism is preferred to fatalism here. In essence, the concept does not imply
anything beyond a culture of both weak group integration and strong personoriented regulation.
6. Douglas explained how she appreciated the content but not the new name:
I never liked Cultural Theory, CT, because it sounds very grand and pretentious. But I am grateful to have a word that conveys the same thing to everyone
who has read Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavskys book of that name
(on culturaltheory@yahoogroups.com, methodological reflections on CT, 16
February 2003).
REFERENCES
Arendt, H. (1951). The origins of totalitarianism. Berlin: Schocken Books.
Barber, B.R. (2004). Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age.
Berkeley: University of California Press. (Original work published 1984)
Berstein, B. (1971). Class, codes and control: Theoretical studies towards a
sociology of language. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Cain, B.E., Dalton, R.J., & Scarrow, S.E. (2003). Democracy transformed:
Expanding political opportunities in advanced industrial democracies.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Catlaw, T. (2007). Fabricating the people: Politics and administration in the
biopolitical state. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
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