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Purity and Democracy: Beauty


Ideals and Pollution Reduction
in Democratic Reform
ARTICLE in ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY & PRAXIS JULY 2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1881648

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Frank Hendriks
Tilburg University
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Purity and Democracy


Beauty Ideals and Pollution
Reduction in Democratic Reform
Frank Hendriks
Tilburg University

ABSTRACT
In debates on democratic reform, the logic of Spring cleaning
resurfaces over and over again. Different democratic beauty ideals inspire different types of cleaning in the home of democracy.
Where one particular vision of democracy is polished up, rival
visions are rubbed out, usually at the same time. Informed by
Douglass take on cleaning ritual and pollution reduction, this
article distinguishes four such beauty idealspendulum democracy, consensus democracy, participatory democracy, and voter
democracyas well the tensions among them, which can made
productive as well as destructive, as the real world of democracy
illustrates. This article argues that viable democracies cannot
afford too much cleaning of one particular type, unchecked by
rival visions of democracy. The advice to democratic theorists and
reformers alike is to keep mixofobiathe fear of mixing related
to the quest for purityin check as much as possible.
Notions of purity are often invoked in discussions about democratic form and
reform, even though we cannot expect democracy to be pure on a permanent
basis. Democracy, like lavatory cleaning, is an uphill task: no sooner have we
got it all clean and tidy than someone comes in and pisses all over it, Michael
Thompson once wrote (Thompson, Grendstad, & Selle, 1999, p. 18). He may
be putting it a little graphically, but Thompson has a point, an essential one:
Just as you can keep cleaning a toilet because it keeps losing its sterile properties, you can keep polishing democracy; it is like a beauty ideal that requires
ceaseless maintenance because reality never quite lives up to it.
With his cleansing metaphor, Michael Thompson proves himself a dedi-

Administrative Theory & Praxis / March 2011, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 4562.
2011 Public Administration Theory Network.
1084-1806 / 2011 $9.50 + 0.00.
DOI 10.2753/ATP1084-1806330102

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cated follower of Mary Douglas, whose view of cleaning ritual and pollution
reduction is condensed into six words: Dirt is matter out of place (Douglas,
xxxx, p. xxx).1 <<AU: Provide year and page number for direct quote.>>
Unclean is what does not square with the cherished order. Cleaning means
to restore this cherished order, to make distinctions, to polish and shine the
one (the proper) and to rub out and distance the other (the deviant). Douglas
interpreted the underlying pattern as ritualized cleansing behavior or pollution reductiona combination of polishing up the acquainted (the proper)
and rubbing out the alien (the deviant). Whitewashing and removing foreign
stains are two sides of the same coin.
In debates on democratic reform, most notably, the logic of Spring cleaning resurfaces over and over again (Cain, Dalton, & Scarrow, 2003; March &
Olsen, 1983; see also Hendriks, 2009) with reformers referring to cleansing,
clearing, purging, putting the house in order, orpitching it a little stronger
making a clean sweep. Where one particular conception of democracy is
polished up, rival visions of democracy are rubbed out, usually at the
same time. To understand cleaning rituals in real and everyday life, Douglas
teaches us, we should first get a grip on the notions of order that inspire pollution reduction. This means that to understand cleaning rituals in the home
of democracy, we should first bring into sharp focus the relevant notions of
democratic order: the democratic beauty ideals that inspire attempts at
pollution reduction.
Inspired by Douglas, I distinguish and discuss four such beauty ideals:
pendulum democracy, consensus democracy, participatory democracy, and
voter democracy. I go into the inherent tensions among them, which can be
made more or less productive, as the real world of democracy illustrates.
Different democratic beauty ideals inspire different forms of democratic
cleansing, but none of them can bring cleanliness on a permanent basis. The
importance of thisthe value of hybrid democracyis discussed further
in this paper. First, however, we need to take a closer look at Mary Douglass
cultural analysis of purity and pollution reduction.
DIRT IS MATTER OUT OF PLACE
Mary Douglas has been recognized as one of the 1,000 Makers of the Twentieth Century, and her book Purity and Danger (1966) has been classed among
the 100 most influential works of nonfiction since World War II (Fardon,
1999). In Purity and Danger, Douglas analyzed what she saw as the essence
of culture: purification, keeping things in order, some particular, cherished
order. What corresponds with this cherished orderdefined as pure, proper,
wholesome or even holywill be maintained and polished up as much as
possible. What deviates from it will be perceived as out of order, impure,
improper, or, generally, as misfitting and will be distanced and rubbed out

HENDRIKS

47

as much as possible. In this sense, every culture, in one way or another, is


engaged in pollution reduction and anomaly management. It can be traced in
non-Western communities studied by traditional anthropology, but it can just
as well be traced in Western societies, even in a heightened way according
to some (Labrie, 2002). Pollution reduction can take the terrifying shape of
ethnic cleansing or totalitarian purification (cf. Arendt, 1951; Scurr, 2006) but
also the rather prosaic shape of desk clearing or gardening.
In the Netherlands, there is a public agency called Fauna Protection. For
years, it fought (even taking the matter to court) against the proliferation of a
variant of the black grouse that was new to the Dutch provinces. Their argument was that this new variant would endanger the purity of other types of
grouse: crossbreeding would pollute the guarded classification, the cherished
order of grouse. Fauna Protection rested its case only when such crossbreeding turned out to be virtually impossible. It calls to mind Douglass (1966)
famous cultural analysis of the rules of avoidance stipulated in the book
of Leviticus, the third book of the Hebrew scriptures, which is sacred to
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Many people know and obey dietary rules
inspired by Leviticus, rules stipulating what is halal and what is haram, what
is kosher and what is not. The rules of avoidance in Leviticus, however, go
way beyond that. Cloths must be either wool or linen, not both wool and linen;
that would be impure. Cattle must be held like with like, not criss-cross; this
is not how it should be. Edible cattle chew the cud and are cloven-footed;
an animal that does not meet both criteria must be avoided; an animal that
meets one criterion but not the other (like the pig, which is cloven-footed but
does not chew the cud) must be avoided by all means. A borderline case like
this symbolizes the slippery slope between good and evil and is, therefore, a
highly instructive analogy. The explicit rule, according to Douglas (1966), is
less important here than its implicit message: there must be order, order of the
strictly separated and strongly stratified type. The instrumental effect of a rule
such as do not mix wool and linen is less important than its metaphorical
value. As a pars pro toto, it exemplifies on a small scale how things should
be on a large scale.
In a lecture prepared close to her death in 2007, Mary Douglas reflected
on the design and purpose of Purity and Danger. She recalled how, back in
the 1960s, social anthropology still felt it was necessary to vindicate the
intelligence of colonial people, then known as natives or primitives, and
how she attempted to reverse the direction of inquiry:
Not concerned to show that the typical institutions of modern society
can be traced in the most exotic societies, I set out to show that the
famously primitive concepts of pollution and taboo were with Us as
much as with Them. Ritual defilement should be brought under the
same rubric as the rituals of spring cleaning and other domiciliary standards of hygiene. I postulated a universal cognitive block against matter

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out of place. Unclassifiables, I said, provoke cognitive discomfort and


reactions of disgust, hence negative attitudes to slime, insects, and dirt
in general. It was a Durkheimian thesis: classification underwrites all
attempts to co-ordinate activities, any thing that challenges the habitual
classifications is rejected. (Douglas, 2006, p. 1)
In a necessary sequel, as she called it, to Purity and danger (1966), Mary
Douglas began to think and write in terms of natural symbols, which is also
the title of this sequel, published in 1970. In Douglass conceptualization,
natural symbols, derived from the natural or material order, are analogies
that express essential notions of this symbolic or cultural order. In thinking
about the state, for example, people often invoke metaphors referring to the
human body: the overall body politic, the vital organs of the state, the
parliament as the heart, the police as the strong arm, and so on. Concepts
such as these suggest and highlight a material order but, more important, also
a symbolic order.
POLLUTION REDUCTION IN THE HOME OF DEMOCRACY
Inspired by Mary Douglas, Simon Schama (1987) pointed to another powerful metaphor: the home or the house where people live, which needs to
be maintained and fitted out for proper consociation. Writing about cultural
manifestations in the seventeenth-century Dutch republic, Schama elaborated
on the (in)famous cleanliness and spotlessness of the typical Dutch home.
The almost ceaseless Spring-cleaning activities going on in the Dutch house
and its adjacent streets, reported on by many astounded foreign visitors, could
hardly be explained by material circumstances. They could be explained better
from a cultural than from a functional perspective, Schama suggested, closely
following Douglas. In the Dutch republic, recently (re)formed, divorced from
Catholicism and centralized Habsburg rule, fanatical house cleaning mainly
satisfied cultural needs. In a very practical way, it exemplified the importance
of distinction, crucial for a brand new republic like the Dutch one, which
very much needed to reinvent and refurbish the intrinsic, while distancing the
extrinsic as much as possible. The clean home was both a fundamental building block and a powerful metaphor for the Dutch town, the Dutch province,
and the Dutch republic: In this particular sequence, as the cherished order
was decentralized and (re)designed from the bottom up, in opposition to the
centralized and topdown Roman Catholic and Hapsburg order.
Inspired by Douglas and Schama, I take a cultural perspective to explain
more recent discourse on the reform of Dutch democracy, which has regularly
and quite typically been presented as necessary Spring cleaning of the House
of Thorbecke. This metaphor refers to Thorbecke, the Dutch liberal statesman,
who, in the mid-nineteenth century, formulated the constitutional principles
that continue to underpin the Dutch polity up to the present day. Thorbeckes

HENDRIKS

49

constitution has been adapted to changing circumstances in a more or less organic way, but individuals and parties have quite regularly stood up to demand
more radical makeovers. In understanding the craving for democratic reform
in the Netherlands, what is crucial is not so much the supposedly sorry state of
the House of Thorbecke but rather the reformist cultural orientation of many
of its inhabitants. As I present this thesis elsewhere (Hendriks, 2009), I will
not repeat it in detail here. In this paper, I explore the notion of democratic
order, which inspires democratic reform not only in the Netherlands but also
in other established democracies.
In the following discussion, I distinguish four democratic beauty ideals,
which imply different notions of proper versus improper democracy and which
inspire different attempts at polishing up or rubbing out particular democratic
institutions. In Table 1, I juxtapose two distinctions that are often used in
democratic theory but rarely in combination. The first distinction, between
aggregative and integrative democracy, concerns the question how democratic
decisions are to be taken: in a counting heads process of aggregation, in
which a simple majority vote is decisive, or in an integrative, talkative
process of conferring, seeking for the widest possible consensus and voting
down minorities as little as possible. In essence, the aggregative/integrative
distinction that I propose runs parallel to Lijpharts well-known majoritarian/
nonmajoritarian distinction, but, other than Lijphart (1999), whose analysis
focuses on national and formal models of representative democracy, I suggest that this distinction can also be applied to local and informal democratic
institutions, both in representative (indirect) democracy and non-representative
(direct) democracy. This leads to the second distinction, between direct and
indirect democracy, which concerns the question who are to make the decisions in democracy: the citizens themselves, through self-determination (direct democracy), or caretakers, delegates or trustees, through representation
(indirect democracy).
If we combine these two distinctionsindirect versus direct and aggregative versus integrativewe can distinguish four ideal types: pendulum
democracy, consensus democracy, voter democracy, and participatory democracy (see Table 1). The four types inspire different types of democratic
reform or cleansing.
Pendulum democracy is, in its general logic, akin to Lijpharts (1999)
majoritarian or Westminster democracy, although, through my analytical
lens, I propose to look beyond the British sphere of influence and also beyond Westminster as a metaphor and center of the nation state. Hence the
alternative metaphor of the pendulum, referring to the democratic logic that
makes political power alternate between two competing political protagonists
or parties. Power follows the movements of the pendulum, and the pendulum
follows the movements of elections or polls. Pendulum democracy is fundamentally indirect and representative in nature: Citizens periodically cast their

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Table 1. Models of Democracy

Indirect
(representation)
Direct
(self-determination)

Aggregative (majoritarian)

Integrative (non-majoritarian)

Pendulum democracy

Consensus democracy

Voter democracy

Participatory democracy

Source: Hendriks, 2010, p. 27.

votes and hand over decision-making powers to their elected representatives.


Decision making is largely majoritarian and aggregative. In constituencies,
owing to the first-past-the-post electoral system, the winner takes all, and the
majority party forms the government, even if their majority is minimal.
Ideal-typically, democratic reformers inspired by pendulum democracy will
try to get as many elements of indirect and aggregative democracy as possible
in, while keeping as many traces of direct or integrative democracy as possible
out. The former is in order, the latter is matter out of place, in Douglass
(1966) terms. As Table 2 shows, darlings of democratic reform include winnertake-all voting, strong (quasi-) presidentialism, and nonappointed, popularly
elected mayors and other political figureheads. Democratic reformers in the
Netherlands often look to the district-based, competitive, win-or-lose electoral
processes in the United States and the United Kingdom for guidance and inspiration (Hendriks, 2009; Michels, 2008). Table 2 lists some other reforms
favoured by proponents of pendulum democracy. A crucial feature here is the
preference for lean and mean democratic institutions, transferring clear voter
signals, vigorously felt in political representation and government formation.
A party losing elections should not get executive power; this is not done in
the pendulum system, unlike in consensus-based systems.
Consensus democracy, in its general logic, is similar to Lijpharts (1999)
nonmajoritarian democracy, as the quest for consensus, through accommodation and pacification, is crucial in this model of indirect and integrative
democracy. Its influence is strongly felt in todays European Rhineland, but
it is not confined to this period or region. Representatives of groups and sections of society are the prime decision makers in consensus democracy. They
go about their business in an integrative, consensus-seeking way, usually in
conference room or round table types of settings. The majority preferably
does not overrule substantial minorities by simply counting heads: this is not
done and should be avoided. Policies are preferably built on a broad-based
platform of support, both socially and politically.
Consensus democracy inspires democratic reform that is moving toward
indirect-integrative democracy and away from its antithesis. Parts of the
U.K. Labour Party as well as the Liberal Democrats, for example, shored up

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Table 2. Darlings of Democratic Form and Reform


Pendulum democracy

Consensus democracy

In order
Indirect (representative), aggregative
(majoritarian) democracy

In order
Indirect (representative), integrative
(non-majoritarian) democracy

Out of place
Direct (self-determining), integrative
(non-majoritarian) democracy

Out of place
Direct (self-determining), aggregative
(majoritarian) democracy

Darlings of democratic reform


Strong, undivided centres of executive
power, backed by clear, unequivocal
electoral mandates
Popularly elected, not appointed, mayors, regional governors, prime-minister
selected by voters, not by coalition
parties; strong presidentialism or quasipresidentialism
Winner-take-all, first-past-the post,
plurality voting, competitive, districtbased elections, may the best party or
person win
Unification, amalgamation, simplification, streamlining of democratic
institutions
Democratic accountability, clarification, transparency
Voter democracy

Darlings of democratic reform


Broad-based, multi-party coalitions,
furthering social partnerships
Consensus-building consultations,
representative summits, round-tables,
expert meetings
Proportional voting, lowering electoral
thresholds, may all relevant voices be
represented
Federalization, decentralization, deconcentration, devolution of power
Intensive multi-level, intergovernmental cooperation, connecting umbrella
organizations
Constitutional review, independent
central bank, checks and balances

In order
direct (self-determining), aggregative
(majoritarian) democracy

In order
direct (self-determining), integrative
(non-majoritarian) democracy

Out of place
indirect (representative), integrative
(non-majoritarian) democracy

Out of place
indirect (representative), aggregative
(majoritarian) democracy

Darlings of democratic reform


Large-scale initiatives, referendums,
not only consultative and local, but
also decisive and national
Small-community voting, citizen assemblies, directly-aggregative plebiscites,
by show of hands, Swiss-style voter
assemblies, New England-style town
hall meetings
E-petitions, agenda-setting citizens
initiatives, counting signatures for or
against
Permanent voter and market research,
Internet panels, public opinion polls,
aggregating (digital) choice signals

Darlings of democratic reform


Deliberative/communicative/strong/
deep democracy, mini publics, open
and inclusive forums
Do-it-yourself democracy, communal
self-governance supporting hands-on
everyday makers
Co-steering citizen committees,
neighbourhood budgets, participatory
budgeting, empowered participation
and other types of civic coproduction
Common future forums, citizens-consensus conferences, civic round-tables,
planning cells

Participatory democracy

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devolution and regionalization as antidotes to excessive centralization and


concentration of power and flirted with cogovernment, co-production, political
coalitions, and social partnerships with the third sector, notions associated
with consensus democracy and its conceptual relatives: consociationalism and
(neo)corporatism (cf. Flinders, 2008). Table 2 mentions some other items that
supporters of consensus democracy will regard as in order and not to be
avoided: electoral reform towards proportional representation, decentralization, federalization, constitutional review, or, in general, dispersal, sharing
and balancing of power.
In voter democracy, public decision making is propelled by self-governing
communities of individuals who make choices between binary options in
referendums, raise hands on matters in town meetings, tick preference boxes
in user questionnaires, opinion polls, and so on. Voter democracy combines
direct, unmediated citizen governance with aggregative, majoritarian decision
making. In a straightforward decision-making referendum, for example, a
common majority of 50%+1 (or more) can swing decisions for either Option
A or Option B. A smaller-scale example is the Swiss-style or New England
style town meeting, in which citizens make majority decisions by a show of
hands and a count of ayes and nays.
Democratic reformers inspired by voter democracy want to wipe away what
they consider paternalistic tendencies in representative democracy and viscous
elements in integrative democracy. They want to shore up citizens nondependence on others for having their voices heard, loudly and clearly, and without
too much hassle. A critical mass of preference indicators should be enough to
compel attention and force decisive action. In this vein, the progressive movement in the United States has supported reforms bringing in the initiative, the
referendum, and the recall procedure (Cronin, 1989). Such formal plebiscites
are increasingly surrounded by informal plebiscites in the shape of opinion
polls, consumer surveys, and the like, which lend themselves to easy numerical
aggregation. In the Californian experience, it is interesting to see how all this
is admired as the apex of democratic innovation by some, whereas it serves as
the prime example of what to avoid to others (Zakaria, 2003).
Participatory democracy, finally, combines direct self-governance with
integrativepreferably deliberative and highly interactiveways of dealing
with public issues; communication and communion are important values here
(cf. Habermas, 1981; Pateman, 1970). Widespread participation of individual
citizens and civic associations is considered crucial in its own right. Including
minority and fringe voices in a bottomup process of decision making should
lead to better and more legitimate decisions. In participatory democracy, the
Other must be included, not excluded: this is not done. A minority should
not be overruled by a simple numerical majority; counting heads, if done at
all, should only take place in the final stages of decision-making, to confirm
a shared view rather than to forge one.

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53

Democratic reform inspired by the logic of participatory democracy entails


more action-oriented variants (do-it-yourself democracy, communal selfgovernment, etc.) as well as more deliberation-oriented variants (mini-publics,
common future forums, planning cells, citizen conferences, and similar, more
or less cerebral meetings of minds) mentioned in Table 2. Polling, which is
fully in order in the context of voter democracy, is accepted only as an
innovation in the shape of deliberative polling (Fishkin, 1991). Consensusseeking is fine, but delegation to political trustees and selective experts, as in
consensus democracy, should be avoided. Empowered participation, participatory budgeting, and the like will be shored up as democratic reform, as long
as they involve individual citizens in a bottomup way.
CULTURAL BIASES AND ELECTIVE AFFINITIES
In Purity and Danger (1966), Douglas focused on cultures that she would
later describe as strongly positional or hierarchical. However, not all cultures
are like that, Douglas readily conceded. After publication, she was grateful to
Basil Bernstein (1971) who criticized the universalism in Purity and Danger
and who stimulated Douglas to make additional distinctions, as she recalled
in the final stage of her life:
Bernstein teased me to go on to the work that he had begun. The obvious next stage would be to differentiate between weak and strong
classification systems. Classification, like symbolising, is the creation
of culture, or equally one could say that culture is the creation of
classifying processes. Therefore the next task ahead was to attempt
a typology of cultures based on a peoples need for classification. It
would have to emphasise the division of labour and the organisation
of work. With this object I produced a crude typology intended to account for the distribution of values within a population. The account
would show the connection between kinds of social organisation and
the values that uphold them. It started modestly in 1970 as a simple
model of the distribution of values. I plotted the main varieties of social
organisation borrowing Bernsteins two-dimensional scheme of family
organisations, and then derived logically compatible values for each
variety. (Douglas, 2006, p. 2)
In this way, Douglas set out to develop a more refined typology of cultures,
the so-called grid-group typology, distinguishing four basic types of partaking
in social life: hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism, and atomism.2 The four
types of culture are ideal types. They relate to empirical cultural manifestations as primary colors do to real-world color varieties (or as primary flavors
do to real-life taste sensations). In the reality of culture, hybridity is the rule;
all really existing cultures are mixtures. Nevertheless, in certain cultural

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mixtures or hybrids, one particular type of culture may be more pronounced


than another (individualism, for instance, may be the dominant flavor in the
cultural cocktail of a particular community).
The four cultures result from the juxtaposition of two dimensions of sociality. The group dimension refers to the degree to which peoples thoughts and
actions are driven by their engagement in a social group. In the ideal-typical
low-group culture or me-culture, the individual operates as an autonomous
being in its own right. In the ideal-typical high-group culture or we-culture,
people are defined by the group with which they share strong feelings of
solidarity and commitment. The grid dimension refers to the degree to which
peoples thoughts and actions are regulated by position-related roles; that is,
role prescriptions specifying how people are supposed to act in particular
positions. The ideal-typical low-grid culture is one of roles achieved: People
themselves decide about the script they play out and are free and equal in doing
so. The ideal-typical high-grid culture is one of roles ascribed: Roles are
allocated from the outside and are strongly specifying and guiding for people
in particular social positions. Put the two dimensions together and you get, in
the words of Mary Douglas: four opposed and incompatible types of social
control, and plenty of scope for mixing, modifying or shifting in between the
extremes (2006, p. 3).
The types of culture distinguished in Table 3 display elective affinities,
or Wahlverwandtschaften in Webers terms (1922/1968), with the models of
democracy presented earlier. Removing all intervening factors, one might
expect, logically and theoretically, that a magnet and a horseshoe will be attracted; likewise, socio-logically and cultural-theoretically, one might expect
that participatory institutions and egalitarianism will be attracted in the field
of democracy. The attraction is mutual: The former is a favorable sociotope
for the latter and vice versa. This does not mean that an empiricalcausal
connection between the two is inevitable. To what degree and in which way
elective affinity arises in real life is codetermined by intervening factors;
there are always laws, practical drawbacks, and other factors that operate on
cultural-sociological Wahlverwandtschaften.
Egalitarianism
On the issue of democratic order, there is elective affinity between participatory
democracy and egalitarianism. Egalitarianism holds that human beings thrive
in an inclusive community (high-group rather than low-group), that decision
making in such a community must be widely shared (consensus rather than
contest), and that minority interests should be integrated as much as possible
(integrative rather than aggregative procedures). In addition, egalitarianism
is based on the principle that positions and roles should be distinctive and
discriminatory as little as possible (low-grid rather than high-grid), that ev-

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HENDRIKS

Table 3. Types of culture

High-grid
(Roles ascribed)
Low-grid
(Roles achieved)

Low group (Me-culture)

High group (We-culture)

Atomism
(Isolate culture)
Individualism
(Market culture)

Hierarchy
(Positional culture)
Egalitarianism
(Enclave culture)

eryone should be able to take part in everything, irrespective of age, status, or


expertise (power equality rather than power distance), and that all should be
able to speak for themselves (direct rather than representative democracy).
Individualism
Individualism has in common with egalitarianism that it favors a social structure that leaves people free; the major difference is that egalitarianism speaks
the language of us and individualism the language of me. 3 Regarding the
proper form of democracy, there is elective affinity between individualism and
voter democracy. Individualism centralizes the idea that the individual always
takes priority over the community (low-group rather than high-group), that the
individual should be able to choose between substantially different alternatives
that compete for support (contest rather than convergence), and that public
choice should be sensitive to citizen demand (aggregative mechanisms rather
than integrative systems). In addition, individualism cherishes the principle
that people may do as they please (low-grid rather than high-grid), that citizens
can make their own choices independent of officials (power equality rather
than power distance), and that self-determination is always better than being
patronized (direct rather than representative democracy).
Hierarchy
When it comes to democracy, there is elective affinity between hierarchy and
consensus democracy. Contrary to what some believe, hierarchy need not be
the onset of despotism; democracy and hierarchy may well go together.4 Hierarchy cherishes the idea that each member of the community is embedded
in comprehensive umbrella units (high-group rather than low-group), that the
collective is kept together by communality and willingness to accommodate
(convergence rather than contest), and that, in decision-making, the parts
should be incorporated into the whole as much as possible (integrative rather
than aggregative procedures). In addition, hierarchy holds that different roles
go with different positions (high-grid rather than low-grid), that everyone,
each according to merit and expertise, has their own responsibilities within

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the wider group (each to their niche rather than all count equally), and that
the systems division of labor decides who is to represent and who is to be
represented (indirect rather than direct democracy).
Atomism
In the realm of democracy, there is mutual attraction between atomism and
pendulum democracy.5 Atomism is founded on the idea that individuals are
singular units in fields of other discrete individuals (low-group rather than
high-group), that each individual must fend for himself and not appeal to others (win-or-lose competition rather than melting together), that, in decision
making, it must be the biggest who carries away the spoils (the winner takes
all), the others drawing the short straw until they themselves gain enough
mass to win the game (aggregative rather than integrative democracy). In addition, atomism is based on the principle that responsibilities differ according
to position and ability (high-grid rather than low-grid), that not everyone can
take part or be involved in everything (each to their niche rather than all count
equally), and that some have the role and the position to govern while others
do not (indirect rather than direct democracy). This is considered normal in
this context, just as hierarchical, individualistic, or egalitarian rules are considered appropriate in other cultural settings.
DYNAMICS AND VIRTUES OF COMPETING MODELS
From the 1980s onward, Douglass gridgroup analysis has been picked up by
scholars in the fields of policy analysis, politics, and administration, renaming it cultural theory. Douglas was not really fond of the new name,6 but
she did like the innovations that particularly Michael Thompson and Aaron
Wildavsky brought to her cultural analysis:
They showed that any community has several cultures, and that each
culture defines itself by contrast with the others. Those persons who
share a culture maintain enthusiasm for it by charging the other cultures
with moral failure. . . . The brilliant stroke was to introduce the idea of
competition between cultures. They compete for members, compete for
prestige, compete for resources. What had started as a static mapping
of cultures upon organisations was thereby transformed into a dynamic
theoretical system. (Douglas, 2006, pp. 78)
More recently, Perri 6, Michael Thompson, and others using gridgroup
analysis have started to reformulate the dynamic interplay between the different cultural biases (or relational solidarities) in terms of positive and negative
feedback mechanisms, terms inspired by complex systems theory (Perri 6,
2003; Thompson, 2002, 2008). In contemporary cultural analysis, developed

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57

in the wake of Douglas, the positive feedback mechanism is described as the


institutionalized tendency to affirm and reinforce what is considered appropriate or in place; the negative feedback mechanism refers to the institutionalized
tendency to disorder and emasculate what is alien or out of place.
Putting this in terms of the four models of democracy discussed above in
this paper, one might say that each model has the institutionalized tendency
to provide negative feedback to democratic institutions that are held to be out
of place and positive feedback to democratic institutions that are held to be
in order, that is, in line with the cherished world view. To repeat Douglass
famous dictum: Dirt is matter out of place. Where one particular model of
democracy is rubbed up, rival models of democracy are rubbed out, usually at the same time. Proponents of participatory democracy, for example,
tend to condemn traces of indirect or aggregative democracy, which, in their
view, amount to ugly smudges that are out of place in a democracy. Proper
democracy, in their view, is both direct and integrative, and anything tending
that way may bank on their support. Similar feedback loopsnegative and
positive onescan be connected theoretically to the other models of democracy. What differs is what the different models hold as in order and out of
place (see Table 2 for an overview).
Pendulum democracy, the theoretical opposite of participatory democracy,
for instance, can be expected to feedback positively to democratic institutions
that are indirectly-aggregative, and negatively to those that are not. The British version of pendulum democracyWestminster democracyis a case in
point. Until recently, it strongly and effectively resisted the advent of direct
or integrative democracy in the United Kingdom. However, the experiment
with coalition government after the general elections of 2010 shows that pendulum democracy is not alone in exerting an influence. Consensus democracy
is modestly but steadily on the rise, not only in Westminster but also in the
subnational realm, where power sharing and power spreading have become
somewhat more established (Flinders, 2008).
Figure 1 displays the various feedback mechanisms, positive and negative,
emanating from all four models of democracy. All four inspire attempts at pollution reduction, but none of them can be kept clean and tidy on a permanent
basis. Constitutional legislators might design a pure blueprint of consensus
democracy, for instance, but it would inevitably become tainted by everyday
use. Afficionados of consensus democracy would be inclined to rub off and
keep out these impurities as much as possible, while polishing up and keeping in what they consider clean and tidy. Others, with competing ideas of
proper and improper democracy, would challenge their approach, which is
basically a good thing.
Take, for instance, consensus democracy in the Netherlands, which has
gained a prominent position over a long period of time. It has virtues but
also vices, which have triggered fierce criticism and persistent attempts at

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Figure 1. Positive and negative feedback in democracy


Aggregative

Indirect

Direct

Pendulum democracy

Voter democracy

= positive feedback

Integrative

Consensus democracy

Participatory democracy

= negative feedback

democratic reform (Hendriks & Toonen, 2001; Michels, 2008). Incrementally, some elements of direct democracy have been added, as well as some
more aggregative elements: experiments with competitive, one-on-one mayoral elections, local referendums, citizen assemblies, neighborhood budgets
and so on. Weaknesses of indirectly integrative consensus democracy, such
as its tendency to expertocratic and paternalistic rule and its penchant for
complexity and stickiness, may be corrected in this fashion. However, all is
not well, as Dutch consensus democracy has proved to be rather resistant to
such changes.
In principle, a model of democracy that is geared to keeping both itself
and its rivals on their toes is a blessing for democracy. Unbridled kinds of
positive and negative feedback, however, can both be destructive. A model of
democracy that produces an excess of positive feedback may lead to institutional lock in, to a vicious circle of self-affirmation, to a model on its way
to skidding and veering off course. The models fundamental pitfall and its
inherent weaknesses would not be kept in check anymore. An abundance of
negative feedbacktoo much sweeping away of the Other, of what is assumed
to be out of placemay lead to democracy resembling still water. The inside
gets bogged down; the outside does not get the chance to shake up all-too
familiar with out-of-the-box ingredients.
In other words, positive and negative feedback mechanisms are vital,
but they need to be multilateral, connected to various, competing ways of
approaching democracy, and not unilateral. Though one culture may be
dominant, it must avoid excluding the other three from the public forum. A

HENDRIKS

59

dominant culture should not drive the others underground or reduce any of
them to silence (Douglas, 2006, p. 9). This is what Douglas wrote about
cultural biases in general, but it goes for democratic models, reflecting cultural
biases, just as well, or even more so, if we take the view that the organization
of pluriformity and interaction is at the very heart of democracy. What Douglas
referred to as the normative principle (it is better to have pluriformity and
interaction) could inspire democratic theorists to see democratic hybridityand
hence impurityin a more positive light, and to keep mixophobia and all too
exclusionary foundationalism (cf. Catlaw, 2007; Labrie, 2002) in check.
Democratic hybridity involves a mutually contraining constellation of
forces that impact and correct each other and that keep one another on their
toes, a system of checks and balances, which serves the vitality of democracy. Philosophers of democratic reform operating at levels far removed from
democratic praxis do not need to worry about the dangers of unbridled positive
or negative feedback. They can afford to lose themselves in high ideals and
abstract ideas on clean and pure democracy. In the real world, viable democracies inevitably encompass a certain impurity, a certain dilution, a certain
blend of models. Viable democracies cannot afford to indulge in intellectual
or ideological purity. Purity means vulnerability in the real world of democracy; hybridity means vitality (Hendriks, 2010). This conclusion can be drawn
when we take Douglass cultural analysis to the realm of democratic theory.
Some times and places seem to be more tolerant and supportive to democratic hybridity than others. Swiss democracy appears to display more hybridity than, for instance, Bulgarian democracy; British democracy seems more
hybrid nowadays than 20 years ago. It is beyond the scope of this article to
report on and account for empirical contrasts like these, however important
for tackling in future research. This article focuses on outlining a cultural way
of understanding democratic reform, strongly influenced by Mary Douglass
analysis of purity and pollution.
POSTSCRIPT: BEYOND THE NOT-IN-MY-TRIBE SYNDROME
In the end, the strength of Douglas is that she kept developing throughout
her long intellectual life and that she refused to make do with fragmented
explanations and isolated case studies. Contrary to many other anthropologists, she was never afflicted by the Not-in-My-Tribe syndrome (You may
say so about your tribe, but my tribe is truly unique, and we have none of
that here, you know) but had the courage to look, compare, abstract, and
generalize beyond the single case. Armed with a good share of British empiricism, unarguably influenced by her master Evens-Prichard, she branched
out to French structuralism (Durkheim, Lvi-Strauss, Foucault, Bourdieu;
see Fardon, 1999) and produced a frame of analysis that was uniquely her
own and that managed to be highly productive while using a relatively small

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set of concepts. This is probably why Mary Douglass cultural method has
met with a considerable group of users among political and administrative
scholars (Hood, 1998; Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky, 1993;
Thompson, Grendstad, & Selle, 1999; Verweij & Thompson, 2006).
NOTES
1. The central text here is Mary Douglass 1966 text Purity and Danger.
Douglass approach to culturally inspired cleansing has, however, been developed further in a series of publications, which I use for this article also: Natural
Symbols (1970); Cultural Bias (1978); How Institutions Think (1986); Risk and
Blame (1992); Thought Styles (1996); Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture
(1982); and Douglas and Ney, Missing Persons (1998).
2. The following are also used as shorthand: outlooks on life, ways of life,
world views, cultural biases, and solidarities (see Hood, 1998; Thompson, Ellis,
& Wildavsky, 1990; Thompson, Grendstad & Selle, 1999; Verweij & Thompson,
2006; Wildavsky, 1993).
3. An author like (1984/2004) believes that we should have more of the one
(the language of we) and less of the other (the language of me).
4. The link between hierarchy and consensus democracy is also made by
Wildavsky, (1993, p. 82). To be able to see this link properly, we need to let go of
common negative bias in the approach to hierarchy (see Douglas, 2003).
5. To undo the concept from unwanted connotations as much as possible,
atomism is preferred to fatalism here. In essence, the concept does not imply
anything beyond a culture of both weak group integration and strong personoriented regulation.
6. Douglas explained how she appreciated the content but not the new name:
I never liked Cultural Theory, CT, because it sounds very grand and pretentious. But I am grateful to have a word that conveys the same thing to everyone
who has read Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavskys book of that name
(on culturaltheory@yahoogroups.com, methodological reflections on CT, 16
February 2003).

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Frank Hendriks is a professor of comparative governance at the Tilburg


School of Politics and Public Administration, Tilburg University; e-mail:
f.hendriks@uvt.nl.

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