Cambaliza vs. Cristal-Tenorio [A.C. 6290.

July 14, 2004]

FACTS:
[C]omplainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B.
Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct,
and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. Case on deceit and grossly
immoral conduct did not pursue lacking clear and convincing evidence. On malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the
Philippine Bar and two other allegations. The respondent averred that this disbarment
complaint was filed by the complainant just to get even with her. The complainant later
filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint as she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP and the case was pursued. The IBP
found the respondent guilty of assisting in unauthorized practice of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Cristal-Tenorio violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

RATIO:

A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and
to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.

Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character.

Lijuaco v Atty. Terrado, AC No. 6317, Aug.31, 2006

FACTS: On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint 1

was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijaucoagainst respondent Atty. Rogelio P.
Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of anofficer of the
court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment
representing
attorneys fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in
January 2001 for P70,000.00 toassist in recovering her deposit with Planters
Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the
release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property
identified asLot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said
bank is the subject of a petition for theissuance of a writ of possession then pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketedas LRC Case No.
B-2610.In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the
Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely andsolely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00
savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events sayotherwise, to wit:1.)
The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too
high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to effectuate
the compromise agreement.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Terrado was administratively liable for charging excessive fees
.HELD: Yes.

Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants
savingsdeposit from Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show
that he acted as complainants counsel

in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to
LRC Case No. B-2610.Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the
agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in
therecovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonablefees.
11
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02,
18.02 and 20.01 of theCode of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for
six (6) months
effective fromnotice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely. He is further orderedto RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice,
the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco andto submit to this Court
proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL
CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided
by the following factors in determining his fees(a) The time spent and the extent of the
service rendered or required;(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;(c)
The importance of the subject matter;(d) The skill demanded;(e) The probability of
losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;(f) The
customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to
which he belongs;(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the service;(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;(i) The
character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and(j) The
professional standing of the lawyer.Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with
the consent of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the work
performed and responsibility assumed.Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full
knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs,commission,
interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to
his professionalemployment from anyone other than the client.Rule 20.04 - A lawyer
shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicialaction only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

l\epuhlic of tbe l)bilippines

RODRIGO E. TAPA Y and
ANTHON~ J. RlJSTIA,
Complainants,
A.C. No. 9604
-versusPresent:
CARPIO, J, Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and Promulgated:
ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER,
Respondents. MAR 1 0 20!3 \ik\m~clhn2Qct9 X------------------------------------------------ {(rE'j<.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
."
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E.
Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Ban colo (Atty. Bancolo)
and Atty. Janus T. larder (A tty larder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics
and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty,
and Harassment.
, ... ' ._'> Decision 2 A.C. No. 9604

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated

14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them
to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority,
falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against
them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the
Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1
dated 31 August 2004
was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other,
the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia
showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus,
Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On
9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed
signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using
Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia
filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of
his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsels
signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaints validity. Also, the
Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of
Public Document2

and Dishonesty3
be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia
and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August
2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty.
Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August
2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia asked that the
Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public
document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and
1 Docketed as OMB-V-C-04-0445-I and OMB-V-A-04-0429-I. 2 Docketed as OMB-V-C05-0207-E. 3 Docketed as OMB-V-A-05-0219-E.Decision 3 A.C. No. 9604

to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document
(OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by
Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other
offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was
also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated
19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5
to disbar Atty. Bancolo and
Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants alleged that
they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants
stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not
the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report6
dated 1 July
2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined
three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients,
allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the
questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard
signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person.
Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the
Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a
certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office,
forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,
respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by
Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman
4 IBP Records (Vol. I), p. 14. 5 Docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1612. 6 Sub-Office
Report No. 0008-2005.Decision 4 A.C. No. 9604

were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned
to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the

assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the
necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses,
Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in
his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that
complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since
the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and
strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents
also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law
office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006.
Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to
attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference
was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present
but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September
2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were
submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to
the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed
to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP
received complainants position paper dated 18 October 2006 and
respondents position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted
her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years

from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to
exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
opined:
x x x. In his answer[,] respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed against
complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings
that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his Decision 5
A.C. No. 9604

office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent

clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer
who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the
aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as
an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a
member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme
Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned
finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of
respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine[s] Commission on Bar
Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the
law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise
certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a
senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of command
responsibility. x x x.

xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner,
having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He
holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo
and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert
ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure
that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner[,] it is his responsibility to provide
efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the
name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the
unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board
of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos
violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
7 IBP Records (Vol. III), pp. 4-6.Decision 6 A.C. No. 9604

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder,

the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to
AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case
for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty.
Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007.
Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to
Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of
Governors denied both complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution
No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds
to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary
of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a

member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. CristalTenorio,
9
where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in,
the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
8 Id. at 1. 9 478 Phil. 378, 389 (2004).Decision 7 A.C. No. 9604

individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The

permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible
the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary
action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,
10 we held that the
preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the
practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the

Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has

read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11
Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has
the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty.
Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of
manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his
former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any
steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying
his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed
with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006.
Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint
Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he
did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare
the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without
seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of
some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay
and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading.
10 529 Phil. 876 (2006). 11 RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Section 3.Decision 8 A.C. No.
9604
This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary
action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was

directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful

practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign
pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that
Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice
of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the
case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T.
larder for lack of merit. ...
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable
for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 3593

March 23, 1907

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,

vs.
C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants.

Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.

C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not
entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after
the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was
not qualified for admission to the bar (In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an order was
entered accordingly.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney,
to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that
they had established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the
Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work
relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law Office Ney & Bosque. Juan G.
Bosque, jurisconsulto espaol C.W. Ney, abogado americano."
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and
with one exception, occuring through an inadvertance, papers from the office were
signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys,
but with the words "Ney & Bosque C.W. Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this
court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the
practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to
the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this
proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within
the law.

Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be
subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a
subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore
a signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a
compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the
addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was
aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named was a person residing in these
Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in
question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a
practice any signature of names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action
other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by
non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency. (In re
Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a
suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to practice.

It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or
removal of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not
being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably
for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.

Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?

Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:

1.
Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;

2.
Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in
his official transactions.

Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment for
acts so defined. (Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.)

As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has
been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant
Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This order,

however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its
review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its
violation. Even had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any
license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made on his own
petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature
to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a
substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the
establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands,
amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the
addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish
law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the
Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in
regard to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The
fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer
of his professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a
foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law. One of the most
eminent American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in
the court of New York State. (In re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.)
Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an
order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.

Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable,
inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this
subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in
holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper
signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to
say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man
who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while
the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming
on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of members of the
bar.

The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200
pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costs
de oficio. So ordered.