(Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr., G.R. 165427, March 21, 2011, 645 SCRA, 677).

Betty B. Lacbayan vs. Bayani S. Samoy, Jr

Sometime in 1978, Letty and Sammy met each other through a common friend. At that time
Sammy was already married although not happily because his wife was a heavy gambler. Hence, that
meeting with Letty blossomed into a romantic relationship ultimately resulting in the birth of a son on
October 12, 1979.
Initially, Letty lived with her parents but in 1983, she left her parents and decided to co-habit with
Sammy in a property located in Project 4, Quezon City registered in the name of Sammy married to
Letty under TCT No. 30324. Later, Letty and their son transferred to another property also in Project 4,
Quezon City registered in the name of Sammy, married to Letty under TCT No. 335193. Finally they
again transferred and co-habited in located at Don Enrique Heights subdivision QC registered in the name
of Sammy married to Letty covered by TCT No. 90232. Sammy practically co-habited with Letty and
their son almost 24 hours although he would go home to his legal wife in the wee hours of the morning.
In 1991 however their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways. By that time, two
other properties had been acquired during their co-habitation, one located in Teachers Village, QC,
registered in the name of Sammy married to Letty under TCT No RT-38264, and another one located in
Cubao, registered in the name of the Spouses Sammy and Letty. In 1998, Sammy and Letty agreed to
divide the five properties acquired during their co-habitation with two properties, one in Project 4 and the
other in Don Enrique Heights going to Letty, while the three others will go to Sammy. They also agreed to
terminate their business partnership in a manpower services corporation where Letty had a 3.33 percent
share.
This partition however was not consummated because Letty demanded for more but Sammy
already refused. Feeling aggrieved, Letty filed a complaint for judicial partition of all the five properties
acquired during their co-habitation worth P15.5 million. She claimed that they were acquired from the
income of the manpower services company which she and Sammy established.
Sammy on the other hand denied said claim. He testified that the properties were purchased with
his personal funds, salaries, dividends and commissions. He countered that said properties were registered
in his name together with Letty only to exclude the same from the property regime with his legal wife and
to prevent their possible dissipation since his legal wife was a heavy gambler.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Lettys petition. The RTC ruled that Letty
failed to prove she was a co-owner of those properties, citing her own admission that the properties were
acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company where
she owned a measly 3.33% share.
Aggrieved by the decision of rtc, petitioner letty elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she
is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts
decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and
jurisprudence. Appellate court denied the appeal.
Hence before the Supreme Court the issue is whether or not the Torrens title over the disputed
properties can be collaterally attacked in the action for partition?
Ruling: There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but
that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
The certificate referred to is the document issued by the register of deeds known as TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by the
document.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership
thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving
as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose that possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have
acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Needless to say,
registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
In this case Letty did not present any evidence showing that the funds or a portion of the funds
used in the purchase of the subject properties came from her own earnings. On the contrary she presented
contradictory evidence when she admitted that the funds used to purchase the subject properties came
from the income of the manpower business which she managed and in which she only had 3.33% share.
Thus in the absence of a clear showing of co-ownership of said properties, Lettys action for judicial
partition has no legal basis. Sammy is really the sole owner of the disputed properties

(RP vs. Vergel de Dios, Gr. no. 170459, February 9, 2011, 642 scra 414)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CANDIDO, DEMETILA, JESUS, ANGELITO, and
TERESITA, all surnamed VERGEL DE DIOS

Danilo, Candido, Marciana, Francisco, Leonardo, Milagros, Petra, Demetila, and Clarita, all
surnamed Vergel De Dios, are the registered owners of three parcels of land (Lots 1, 2 and 3) located in
Angat, Bulacan. The entire land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-141671.
The owners duplicate of TCT No. T-141671, which was allegedly in the custody of a certain Elmer
Gonzales, was destroyed on October 17, 1978 when the Angat River overflowed and caused a big flood
which inundated their houses. On March 7, 1987, the original copy of TCT No. T-141671 was among the
documents destroyed by the fire that razed the office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
Respondent Candido, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, Demetila, Jesus,
Angelito, and Teresita, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a Petition for
Reconstitution of the Burned Original of TCT No. T-141671 and Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate
Copy in Lieu of the Destroyed One.
The RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, granted the petition for reconstitution. The Register of Deeds of
Bulacan is directed, upon payment of all legal fees, to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of Title No.
[T-]141671 on the basis of the Plan, Technical Description and Tax Declaration and thereafter to issue a
second owners copy thereof in lieu of the lost one which is declared of no force and effect and ordered
cancelled.
Petitioner appealed the case to the CA. The CA ruled that the photocopies of the subject TCT,
survey plan, technical description, tax declaration, and certification of the Register of Deeds were not
sufficient to order a reconstitution of the lost title. It noted in particular that, in Heirs of Ragua, a
photocopy of the TCT which was not certified by the Register of Deeds was held as not sufficient basis
for reconstitution of title. The CA also held as insufficient evidence the Kasulatan which was executed
only in 1996, long after the original TCT was burned and the owners duplicate title was lost.
Issue: whether or not the order for granting the reconstitution of title is valid?
Ruling: no. The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land . The purpose of

the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced
in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.

The lost or destroyed document referred to is the one that is in the custody of the Register of Deeds.
When reconstitution is ordered, this document is replaced with a new onethe reconstituted titlethat
basically reproduces the original. After the reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicate copy of
the reconstituted title.

It really does not matter if petitioner did not specifically question the order for the issuance of a new
owners duplicate title. The fact that petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition for reconstitution
meant that it was questioning the order for reconstitution and all orders corollary thereto. The trial courts
order for the Register of Deeds to issue a new duplicate certificate of title was only an offshoot of its
having granted the petition for reconstitution of title. Without the order for reconstitution, the order to
issue a new owners duplicate title had no leg to stand on.
More importantly, it would have been impossible for the Register of Deeds to comply with such order.
The Register of Deeds cannot issue a duplicate of a document that it does not have. The original copy of
the certificate of title was burned, and the Register of Deeds does not have a reconstituted title. Thus, it
does not have a certificate of title that it can reproduce as the new owners duplicate title.