The conflict over global

warming
The application of scientific
research to policy choices

Volker A. Mohnen, Walter Goldstein and WeiChyung Wang

Sophisticated
computer models have
been employed by the United Nations
Environment
Programmes
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) to assess past variations
of
world climate and to project possible
trends over the next century. Attention
has focused on the growing concentration of carbon dioxide (CO,) and other
greenhouse
gases that contribute to
global warming. Critics in scientific and
policy professions hold that simulation
models are not yet adequate to guide
policy decisions. Many western governments dissent from this judgment and
insist that a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions should be achieved within 15
years and that remedial policies must
be adopted to prevent catastrophic climate change. The proposed remedies
range from saving tropical rain forests
to forced conservation
of energy or
taxation of fossil-fuel combustion.
A
consensus is emerging in the scientific
community to endorse a no regrets
policy that involves buying various
kinds of insurance against future global warming.
The authors are with atmospheric science
and public policy programmes in the State
University of New York at Albany, 1400
Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222,
USA.

0959-3780/91/020109-15

The rise of ecological advocacy groups and green political parties in the
1980s took many western societies by surprise.
It had been widely
believed that public opinion would remain passive or confused when
complex scientific issues were debated.
To many scientists
it was a
matter of astonishment
that public opinion responded
with anxiety on
learning
that global average temperatures
had risen in the past 150
years, and that they would continue
to climb dangerously
in the next
century if remedial action were not started.
Concern about the habitability
of Earth was voiced by the popular
press, by governments
enquiry panels, and in cautious reviews appearing in scientific and technical journals. Scientific advisers warned that a
historic catastrophe
was brewing and that irreparable
damage would be
done to the biosphere early in the next century. But there was another
side to the debate.
Scientists
in several countries
insisted that the
warming panic amounted
to hysteria and scientific overkill. A worstcase scenario had been projected
of the heat-trapping
gases that were
accumulating
in the atmosphere;
and projections
of global warming had
been broadcast that were neither reasonable
nor accurate.
The debate intensified
as scientists moved from analytical pursuits to
campaigns of advocacy. An international
group of experts submitted to
the United Nations Environment
Programme
(UNEP) the results of two
years of intensive
study. Their reports were guilty either of scaremongering
or of excessively timid judgment,
depending
on which critics
were to be believed. Basically it was agreed that emissions of humanmade greenhouse
gases would continue
to warm the atmosphere,
but
opinion
differed in predicting
how far temperatures
would rise and
determining
what remedial measures should be taken. A rapid increase
in concentration
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
(and of other
greenhouse
gases too) was clearly developing.
Simulation
models and
analytic
teams still differed,
however,
in forecasting
the degree of
change that would appear in the global climate, sea levels, and weather
patterns of the next century.

1991 Buttetworth-Heinemann

Ltd

109

The corzflicf over g/oh/

wurrning

Is there a greenhouse effect?

The scientific community
accepts the proposition
that the process of
climate change and the variability
of weather trends must be more
closely studied; and that computer models of the earths climate system
must be further refined. While this work proceeds over the next few
years, three basic questions remain in contention:
0

Has the climate meusurably changed in the past 150 years, and will
continue to do so in the 21st century?
Can climate changes be attributed
with certainty
to a rise in
greenhouse
gases (especially carbon dioxide) and to the massive
burning of fossil fuels?
Is it wise at this early phase of the enquiry to legislate high-cost
measures to halt the process of global warming if the testing of
climate models and greenhouse
consequences
is still at a preliminary stage?
it

J.T Houghton,
C.J. Jenkins and J.J.
Ephraums,
eds, Climate Change: The
/PCC Scientific Assessment, Report of the
United Nations Environment Programme,
Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), Cambridge
University
Press, Cambridge and New York, 1990.

110

The first of a scholarly series of reports has been published

in recent
months by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The reports were commissioned
by the World Climate Research Programme that is funded by two agencies of the United Nations: the World
Meteorological
Organization
and UNEP. The IPCC reports rely upon
mathematical
modelling and projections
derived from the fastest computers. Working with a novel set of general circulation models (GCMs),
the IPCC effort has raised the level of sophistication
in research on
changes in global ecological systems.
The aim of the IPCC panel is to study the climate impact of increases
in the concentration
of atmospheric
greenhouse
gases (ie gases which
absorb the infrared radiation
that is emitted by Earths surface). The
research methodology
is still at a formative
stage and doubts about
climate assessment
remain high. The assumptions
plugged into the
GCMs are tentative and varied. They posit that global average temperatures will rise as emissions
of greenhouse
gases increase,
but they
disagree about the timing, the geographic extent, or the degree of global
warming that will occur in the next half century. Predictions
range from
an increase of 1.5C to a catastrophic
climb of 4.5C of global warming.
They are obviously inexact. It is hoped that a closer study will improve
the predictive capacity and the modelling techniques that are now being
developed.
No matter how strongly prediction
models conflict, it is agreed that
concentrations
of carbon dioxide (CO,) and other greenhouse
gases are
building up at an increasing
rate. The human-made
emissions of CO2
are running at the somewhat sensational
rate of 22.4 gigatonnes
(or 22.4
billion metric tonnes) per year. In addition, an accumulation
of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), methane,
and nitrous oxide could also alter the
climate (Table 1). They are all potent greenhouse
gases, but the primary
threat is posed by CO*. The volume of CO2 entering the atmosphere
has
increased
by 25% in the last century,
and the rate could speed up
dramatically
as the burning of fossil fuels and biomass accelerates.
It is accepted that a relatively small shift in global temperature
could
create major problems in large cities, on crop-growing
prairies, and in
poor countries dependent
on subsistence
agriculture.
The heat energy
trapped in the atmosphere
by radiatively
active gases of human-made
origin creates an enhanced greenhouse
effect, pushing global tempera-

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

CHANGE

March 1991

The conjicr over global warming

Table 1. The principal

Concentration:

greenhouse

gases.

co2

CH,

Pre-industrial

280

Present

ppmvC
353
ppmv

0.79
wmv
1.72
ppmv

CFC-11

CFC-12

280
PPt+?

484
PPtv

NzO
280
ppbvd
310
ppbv

Lifetime in atmosphere (years)

(50-200)

10

65

130

150

20 years
Global warming
100 years
potential
relative to COzb 1 500 years

63
21
9

4500
3500
1500

7100
7300
4500

270
290
190

55

15

24

Contribution to
total radiative
effect 198&90 (%)

(all CFCs)

a Data from IPCC Working Group 1;bThe warming effect of an emissron of 1 kg of each gas relative to CO, based on the present-day atmosphere: Parts
per million by volume; d Parts per billion by volume; e Parts per trillion by volume.
Source: Global Climate Change, Briefing Paper Series, Royal Dutch Shell, London, 1990, p 1.

tures ever higher. It appears that the history of the 21st century will turn
on the ability to hold global warming stable at 1990 levels.
The authors of the IPCC report express confidence
in their findings.
They call for a 20% reduction
in global emissions of CO;, by the year
2005 and a 50% reduction at a later date. If this is not achieved, there
could be increasing drought in the grain lands of the temperate
zones, a
significant
rise in sea levels, and severe climate changes world-wide
(Table 2).
The political and economic
cost of arresting
the process of global
warming could be astronomical.
Economic
growth might have to be
curbed
and industrial
costs would soar if emission
controls
were
rigorously enforced.
Possibly 5% of GNP would have to be appropriated to execute corrective policies in the near future. Though allocations
of this magnitude
might be economically
feasible in the USA, Western
Europe, or Japan, they would be fiercely contested.
The GNPs of the
USA and of the 12-nation bloc of the European
Community
are each
valued at $5000 billion. A diversion of 5% would roughly equal the price
that each pays for its annual oil supplies or medical care, and it would

Table 2. Estimates

for changes

by 2030.

Central North America

Warming will vary from 2 to 4C in winter and 2 to 3C in summer. Precipitation increases will range
from 0 to 15% in winter but there will be decreases of 5 to 10% in summer. Soil moisture will decrease
in summer by 15 to 20%.
Southern

Asia

Warming will vary from 1to 2C throughout the year. Precipitation will change little in winter and
generally will increase throughout the region by 5 to 15% in summer. Summer soil moisture will
increase by 5 to 10%.
Sahel
Warming will range from 1 to 3C. Area mean precipitatron will increase and area mean soil moisture
will decrease marginally in summer. However, throughout the region, there will be areas of both
increase and decrease in both parameters.
Southern

Europe

Warming will be about 2C in winter and will vary from 2 to 3C in summer. There is some Indication of
increased precipitation in winter, but summer precipitation will decrease by 5 to 15%. and summer soil
moisture by 15 to 25%.
Notes: (a) these projections are based upon the
IPCC Business-as-Usual
scenano; (b) area
averages hide large variations at the subcontinental level; (c) it is assumed that the rate of
change from the pre-industrial era to the present
will roughly double.

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

Australia
Warming will range from 1 to 2C in summer and will be about 2C in winter. Summer precrpitation will
increase by around 1O%, but the models do not produce consistent estimates of the changes in soil
morsture.

CHANGE

March 1991

111

require considerable
sacrifice. Nevertheless,
an impressive
start was
made when the German government
announced
that it would cut CO*
emissions
by 20% over 15 years if others would follow suit. Nine
countries
agreed to enact similar measures but many more disagreed,
either on principle or because they rejected the assessment of the costs
involved.
The dissidents argued that Draconian
restraints and budget
expenditures
should be delayed until better data had been gathered and
until the models simulation
runs had been validated.

The greenhouse effect and climate change

The Economist, 15 September 1990, p

85.
S.H. Schnerder, The global warming debate heats up: analysis and perspective,
Bulletin of the American Meteorologrcal
Society, Vol 71, No 9, September 1990, pp
1292-I 304.
%ee Stephen H. Schneider, The greenhouse effect: science and policy, Science,
Vol 243, No 4892, 10 February 1989, pp
771-781.
%obert M. White, The great climate debate, Scientific American, Vol 263, No 1,
July 1990, pp 3643.
T.A. Boden. P. Kanciruk. and M.P. Fallell.
Trends 90:A Compendium of Data on
Global Change, ORNUCDIAC-36,
Carbon
Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge,
TN, August 1990.

112

One-third
of the solar energy entering the atmosphere
is reflected back
into space, leaving two-thirds to be absorbed by Earth and eventually
re-emitted
as infrared radiation.
The contribution
to the greenhouse
effect over the decade 198CL90 has been carefully estimated (Table 1):
55% came from carbon dioxide (CO?) emissions;
15% from methane
(CH1); 24% from chlorofluorocarbons
(mainly CFC-11 and CFC-12):
and 6/0 from nitrous oxide (N,O).
Even though greenhouse
gases are natural components
of the atmosphere. human-made
emissions have prompted a sharp increase in their
atmospheric
concentrations.
The accumulation
of CO2 in the past
decade alone has matched the total recorded between 1850 and 1950. If
this rate does not slow down, CO2 levels could double within 25 years.
Deep ice-core samples reveal that global temperatures
were 7C lower
at the end of the last ice age (20 000 years ago) than they are today.
Another
minor ice age occurred between the 14th and 18th centuries
when glaciers rapidly advanced
and severe winters struck Western
Europe. With the onset of the industrial revolution
in the 19th century.
measurements
of surface temperature
climbed 0.5C. The historical
record suggests that small changes in global temperature
can provoke
significant
upheaval
in ecosystems.
It is in this light that scientists
consider the news that the 1980s was the warmest decade known since
temperatures
were recorded.
Most of the GCMs indicate that average global temperature
could rise
between
l.SC and 4.5C between
1850 and 2050 if atmospheric
CO?
concentrations
were to double. Though this rate of increase would be
largely attributed
to industrial
activity,
the methodology
and the
assumptions
used by model calculations
are still at a tentative
stage.
The first aim of the GCMs is to distinguish natural variations in climate
from the consequences
of fossil fuel combustion.
Unfortunately,
by the
time that convincing
proof can be assembled
it might be too late to
launch corrective measures.
But as one noted observer put it, there is
reason for hope: the IPCC simulation
runs might justify the funding of a
no regrets package of remedial
measures
so that insurance
can be
bought against future risks of disaster.
The combustion
of fossil fuels discharges approximately
6100 million
metric tonnes (6.1 gigatonnes)
of carbon each year. This converts on a
molecular
weight basis to 22.4 gigatonnes
of carbon dioxide a year.
The significance
of these data appears in the alarming rate of increase
of CO]. It mounted from 2.1% in 1986-87 to 3.7% in 1987-88. If this
pace of acceleration
holds, the crisis of global warming will come to a
head long before 2050. The burning of liquid and solid fuels - largely oil
and coal - accounted
for 80% of the discharge,
and the burning
or
flaring of natural gas for the rest. The US share of emissions declined

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

CHANGE

March 1991

The conflict over global warming

Table 3. 1988 carbon

USA
USSR
PRC
FRG
India
UK
Poland
Canada

dioxide

emission

TotaP

Solid

1310.2
1086.0
609.9
269.8
182.7
163.8
152.5
125.3
119.4

493.6
425.3
487.9
82.9
78.0

117.4
66.7
106.0
26.9

estimates

(million

tonnes

of carbon).

Percentage
of total

Liquid

Percentage
of total

Gas

Percentage
of total

Per
capitab

37.7
39.2
80
30.8
42.7
71.7
43.7
64.6
24.2

566.4
334.4
86.9
152.8
75.0
35.3
55.0
11.9
54.9

43.2
308
14.3
56.6
41.1
21.6
36.2
9.5
46.0

238.6
302.6
7.5
23.5
25.1
3.5
27.0
5.4
32.5

18.2
27.9
1.2
8.7
13.7
2.1
18.2
4.3
27.2

5.3
3.8
0.56
2.2
3.0
0.2
2.7
3.3
4.6

Source: T.A. Boden, P. Kanciruk, and M.P. Falleli, Trends 90: A Compendium of Data on Global Change, ORNUCDIAC-36,
Analysis Center, Oak Ridge Natronal Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, 1990.
aAmounts from other categories are insignificant and have been omitted, thus row totals do not add up to 100%.
Tonnes of carbon.

Carbon Dioxide Information

from 42% (after 1950) to 21% of the total as other nations raced ahead
to industrialize,
but the US volume of emissions still stands unrivalled at
1.3 gigatonnes
(Table 3). Difficult as it is to conceptualize,
carbon
emissions
now equal about one tonne a year for each person on the
planet. How much more, it must be asked, can the atmosphere
take?

The sources of greenhouse gases

Carbon dioxide
Carbon
dioxide
emissions
contribute
heavily to the absorption
of
terrestrial radiation and the increased concentration
of CO2 will lead to
a perturbation
of Earths radiation balance. This is known as radiative
forcing since it leads to a forced change of the global climate system. To
the 22 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide each year that are derived from
the burning
of fossil fuels, biomass burning
and deforestation
add
another seven billion tonnes.
CO* emissions from fossil-fuel combustion
vary greatly by region and
function. Power generation,
industrial production,
commercial
activity,
and transportation
account
for 75% or more of the carbon
from
fossil-fuel
burning.
Logically,
the heaviest discharges come from the
wealthy industrial
countries.
This prompts bitter arguments
in international policy fora on the environment.
If rich countries created so much
of the mess, the poor nations ask, why do they insist that all countries
must sacrifice resources to clean it up?
Only 4.8% of the world population
lives in the USA, but it is the
source of 21% of the CO;! derived from fossil-fuel burning (Figures 1
and 2). By contrast,
with 15.8% of the world population,
India
contributes
only 4% of global C02. Discrepancies
of this order have
been cited by countries that refuse to cooperate in environment
control.
They claim that their low per capita emissions of COZ and their low per
capita GNPs justify a position of unconcern.
Yet the need for international
action to curtail CO2 is difficult to
deny. Projections
of CO1 emissions
(Figure 3) suggest that emission
levels in the less developed countries (LDCs) will escalate more rapidly
than in the USA and Western Europe. The two most populous nations,
the PRC and India, will create the gravest difficulty. Like many of the
LDCs, they argue it is their turn to catch up with the pollution spawned
by industrialization.
They need to manufacture
millions of cars, to build
extensive power plants, and to exploit their abundant
coal resources in a
desperate bid to expand GNP. It would help, of course, if the wealthy

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

CHANGE

March

1991

113

The conflict over global warming

USA

5Canada,
;i
?
5
5

Czechoslovokla
4-

Poland
0

i
%
?

OWest

3Romonla

;
B

South

$
g

Figure 1. 1988 per capita emissions

of carbon and total emissions
bon.

of car-

q
USSR

DAustrolio

Africa

c,

aJapan

2-

z
&
a

Germany

OUK

Italy
FranceDo

Spa~nooKorea

Global

Source: T.A. Boden, P. Kanciruk, and M.P.

Fallell, Trends 90: A Compendium of Data
on Global Change, ORNUCDIAC-36,
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center,
Oak Ridge National
Laboratory,
Oak
Ridge, TN, August 1990.

Bra211

I1111111

I Illlll

100
Total

carbon

0
Chino

lndla
Y

overage.

1.2 per person

O Mexico

I-

emwlons

from

fossll

fuels

IO00
(tonnes

I IIIII
10000

x IO61

countries simply gave them efficient power sources or energy conservation technologies
without charge. But opponents
object since such
transfers breach the commerical
rules of the marketplace.
Carbon dioxide is not the only contributor
to global warming. Three
other gases are also important.
Methane (CH,) accounted for one-sixth
of the change in radiative forcing in 1980-90. It is a chemically
and
radiatively active gas with a relatively brief lifetime in the atmosphere.
Emissions
are estimated
at 525 million tonnes a year. Methane gas is
produced by ruminant
cattle, natural wetlands,
rice paddies, landfills,
and termites;
from venting releases in coal mines, gas drilling, and
transmission
facilities; and from biomass burning. There is an additional
anxiety about methane.
It is feared that a slight rise in Earths surface
temperatures
could release vast quantities
of methane
gases that are
now trapped under permafrost
at high Arctic latitudes.
Of the remaining greenhouse
gases, CFCs account for a quarter of the
change in radiative
forcing.
CFCs are widely used as retrigerants,
propellants
for aerosols and solvents, and insulating
agents. When the

q North

Amerxa

q USSR
East
0

Figure 2. Per capita energy consump-

i
s

tion by region.

Note: Global average - 53 million Btu per

person (3412 Btu = 1 kWh).

Source: World Resources 7990-91, Report of the World Resources Institute, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1990, Table 21 .l , p 316.

114

q West Europe

120

60
Latin

Europe

Amerlca/Conbbeon
0

0
0

1200

Asia/Middle
q

Chino
0

2400
Population

GLOBAL

East

Afnca
q

3600

South

Aslo

4800

(mllllon)

ENVIRONMENTAL

CHANGE

March 1991

The conflicr over global warming

USA
Other developed countrtes

Less developed countries

Figure 3. Human

origin

of global COn

emissions.
Source: K. Yeager, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1990, personal communication.

1950

1985

2020

2060

destructive
impact of CFCs on the ozone hole in the Antarctic
was
confirmed,
a Protocol was signed by all major governments,
pledging
that the production
of CFCs will cease within 10 years.
The last gas to note is nitrous oxide (N,O). It is a chemically
and
radiatively
active trace gas that is produced
by biological
sources in
soils, by the burning of biomass, and by fossil-fuel combustion.
Global
N20 emission estimates vary between 14.5 and 34.5 million tonnes per
year, contributing
to 6% of change in radiative forcing. All of these
greenhouse
gases are increasing
in concentration
and their persistence
in the atmosphere
will extend well into the next century.

How best to cope with CO2

Arguments
over the reduction of CO:! emissions may not be resolved for
many years to come, though a consensus is emerging that some form of
remedial strategy will have to start soon. Two different types of strategy
are available:
one draws on biological measures to sustain the carbon
cycle; the other requires extensive change in industrial
technology,
in
social behaviour
patterns,
and in the burning of fossil fuels. The first
relies upon the regenerative
power of Earths forests and oceans. The
second looks to a slowdown
of global warming by curtailing
energy
consumption
and the wasteful combustion
of fossil fuels - it cannot
possibly succeed until a radical switch is made to carbon-free
fuels and
renewable
sources of energy.

Biological measures
Halting deforestation and biomass burning
7World Resources 7990-97, Report of the
World Resources Institute, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1990,
Table 21 .l p 316.
%.A.
Houghton,
Emissions
of greenhouse gases, in N. Myers, ed, Deforesfation Rates in Tropical Forests and Their
Climate Implication, Friends of the Earth,
London, 1989, pp 5362; R. Monastersky,
Biomass burning ignites concern, report
on Williamsburg
conference,
Science
News, Vol 137, 1990, p 196; J. Shukla, C.
Nobre, and P.J. Sellers, Amazon deforestation and climate change, Science, Vol
247, p 1322.
Houghton, Ibid.

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

Tropical forests stretch over 13% of Earths land surface and account
for almost one-half of its forests. More importantly,
their vegetation
absorbs 40% of the worlds plant carbon.
It is imperative
that the
cutting down and burning of these forests be stopped since the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere
must be moderated
by the storing of
carbon in trees. The process of photosynthesis
can take up XL60 billion
tonnes of carbon per year.s If present
levels of human-made
CO2
emissions are eventually to be reduced by 20%) an additional
1.2 billion
tonnes of carbon a year must be stored in the long-lived tree species of
the tropical forests.
Tragically,
the world is fast losing its forests. Tropical forests have
been slashed and burned to make way for agricultural
and grazing land.
The need for firewood and for land has become critical in countries

CHANGE

March 1991

115

Table 4. Requirements

for reforestation.
Carbon fixation defined
as net annual forest growth
(tons of carbon per hectare)

Forests
Land area
(millions of hectares)
Temperate and boreal forests:
a J. Holowacz, Forests of the USSR, The Forestry Chromcle, Vol 61, No 5, October 1985, pp
366373.
b An Am/y.% of fhe Timber Situeffon in the
United States, f952-2030, Forest Resource Report No 23, US Forest Servce, Department of
Agriculture, December 1982.
V Smil, Deforestation in China, Ambio, Vol
12. 1983. DD 22&231.
* lnfensive ~u~~ip/e-Use
forest ~anagemenf in
the Tropics, FAO Forestry Paper 55, Food and
Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1985
e S. Brown, A.E. Logo, and J. Chapman,
Biomass of tropical tree plantations and its Implications for the global carbon budget, Canadian Journal of Forest Research, Voi 76, 1986,
pp 390-394.

USSR
Canada
USA
PRC
India
All Europe except USSR

2227
922
913
933
297
472

792
264
195
125
73
145

846
181
227
192
2190
945
1680

396
123
106
48
217
306
679

0.3a
0.44a
0 82-l .35b
0.39c
0 70-I

07d

Tropical forests:
Brazil
Indonesia
Zaire
Mexico
Total Africa
Total Asia and Pacific
Total Latin America

1.56-3.90e

burdened
with a rapidly growing population.
Scientists have warned
that the loss of tropical rain forests will reduce the biospheres
carbon
sink over the next century.
Brazil has pledged to halt the destruction
of
the Amazon forest, and its deforestation
has been successfully reduced
by 70% since 1987. At the height of forest destruction,
an area
comparable
to the size of (the former) West Germany was burned and
cleared each year. Then the warning was heeded that deforestation,
particularly
in Latin America and tropical Africa, could rapidly alter the
climate by lowering the regions rainfall.
Biomass burning is widespread in tropical zones and boreal forests or
savannas. The burning of agricultural
waste and fuelwood today adds to
the global threat. The total amount of carbon dioxide released to the
atmosphere
by biomass burning has been estimated at 14 billion tonnes
a year. By origin, 2.2 billion tonnes comes from tropical forests, 6 billion
tonnes from savannas (mainly Africa), 3.3 billion tonnes from agricultural wastes, and 2.3 billion tonnes from fuelwood.
Fuelwood
provides one-sixth
of world energy but one-half of the
energy needs in the poorest of the developing
countries.
This dependence on wood cannot be sustained if consumption
continues to exceed
current yields in sub-Sahnran
Africa or southern Asia. The exhausting
demand for fuelwood has already created a ring of desolation
around
crowded popLllation centres. Too little concern has been given to the
pillaging of this vital resource. If the LDCs began to use fuelwood more
efficiently and to plant more trees, global emissions of carbon dioxide
could be reduced by 4%) million tonnes.

World

Resources

institute,

World

Re-

sources 198&89, Basic Books, New York,

1988, pp 69-88; J.S. Levine, Burning
trees and bridges, Nature, Vol 346, 1990,
p 511.

J.

Soussan et al, Urban fuel wood: chal-

lenges and dilemmas, Energy Policy, Vol

18, No 6, August 1990, pp 35-43.

116

Scientists find difficulty in calculating how much land must be found for
reforestation
because of uncertainties
in the carbon uptake of forests.
Rates vary with tree species, the quality of forest management
(silviculture), soil and climate conditions. The land area now covered with
temperate
and boreal forests is roughly 1.65 billion ha (Table 4); this
compares with only 1.2 billion ha of tropical forests (a hectare is roughly
0.45 acre). Extensive
tracts of forest in temperate
zones, such as the
USA and Western Europe, are needed to absorb one ton of carbon (or
3.7 tonnes of carbon dioxide). Tropical forests grow in countries such as
Brazil,
Indonesia,
and Zaire, at a vigorous rate; and they require

GLOBAL

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The conflict

over global

warming

considerably
less area to absorb the same amount of carbon from the
atmosphere.
The area would be even smaller if reforestation
programmes in tropical regions were developed
in intensely
managed
plantations. They would then require only 0.1-0.27 ha as against 0.7-l .2 ha in
temperate
zones to take up each ton of carbon.
In the USA alone, 800 million ha of once-forested
land could be
replanted
with productive
forests if much of the land was not held for
commercial
and residential
use. At best only about 200 million ha are
available.
With proper management
and genetic engineering
to foster
growth, somewhere
between 95 and 525 million tonnes of carbon could
be removed each year. This would equal 7% to 40% of current US
emission levels. The reforesting of 13 million ha of crop land set aside in
the USA since 1986 under the Conservation
Reserve Program could
only absorb 65 million tonnes of carbon annually.
Reforestation
could be more cost-effective
in tropical than in temperate climates because forest growth flourishes in warm moist climates.
Half of the planets tropical rain forests are located in four countries Brazil, Indonesia,
Zaire, and Mexico. About 120 to 250 million ha
would be required to store 20% of current global CO2 emissions from
fossil fuels. The land to be set aside for managed forest growth would
amount
to a significant
fraction
of the existing
rain forests,
but
substantial
incentives
might have to be offered to convert present land
use to silviculture.
It has been suggested that these countries
could offer
equity in their silviculture
to offset billions of dollars of their foreign
debt. Alternatively,
they could trade forest rights for investments
in
their social and economic infrastructures.
Another
strategy proposes
to stimulate
the biological
fixation or
extraction
of CO* from the atmosphere
by nurturing
marine organisms
in the Arctic and Antarctic oceans. The Commission
on Life Science of
the US National
Academies
of Sciences and Engineering
reviewed a
proposal to spray iron pellets into the ocean.r3 The aim would be to
create giant blooms of marine algae to soak up carbon dioxide dissolved
in ocean water; the CO2 would be constantly
replenished
from the
atmosphere.
The hypothesis
suggested that populations
of tiny marine
algae (phytoplankton)
are limited in their growth by serious deficiencies
of iron. If iron were sprayed on the sea, in the form of powder or
slow-release
floating pellets, the phytoplanktonnes
growth could be
powerfully
stimulated.
The Commission
on Life Science suggested that 300 000 tonnes of
high-grade
iron should be dispersed each year into polar waters. They
could possibly remove up to two billion tonnes of carbon per year, or
well over 20% of human-made
carbon from the atmosphere.
The
estimated
cost would be less than $1 billion per year. The panel
recommended
that an international
experiment
should begin with an
allocation of $5&$150 million; if it were successful, the cost could be as
low as 50 cents per ton of carbon removed.
Critics cautioned
that
intervention
into biological
cycles has produced
mixed results in the
G. Byrne, Let 100 million trees bloom,
Science, 21 October 1988; N.R. Samson,
Releaf for global warming,
American
Forests, November/December
1988.
3A.G. Davies, Taking a cool look at iron,
Nature, Vol 345, 1990, pp 114-l 15.
J.H. Martin, M. Gordon. and SE. Fitzwater, Iron in Antarctic waters, Nature,
Vol345, 1990, pp 156-158.

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

past,

and

further,

first

be

completed

international

that

an extensive

since

the

environmental

Law

of the

impact

Sea

puts

analysis

oceans

must

under

jurisdiction.

Political and economic measures to halt global warming

Biological

CHANGE

measures

March 1991

can be harnessed

to provide

less expensive

and less

117

The conjlicr

over global

warming

painful solutions to the CO2 problem.

It will not be easy to halt the
tearing down of forests or to finance reforestation
and marine algae
programmes.
But these counter-measures
will probably
provoke less
resistance than radical proposals to tax economic growth or to proscribe
the burning of fossil fuels. The 160 countries in the global system are
locked into a race for industrial
expansion
and economic
power.
Burdened with debt and exorbitant factor costs, few are willing to make
sacrifices or retard GNP growth to protect the biosphere.
Though
scientists still argue over the technical findings of rival climate models,
they agree that the capacity of the atmosphere
to carry carbon dioxide is
approaching
exhaustion.
By now some degree of global climate change
is inevitable.
If technology
can be harnessed
to ease the adjustment
process, it may be possible to buy time or climate insurance
to cope
with a threatening
future.
If the world economy is to raise the efficiency of its energy production
and consumption
schedules, it must turn to market forces and realistic
pricing levels to promote conservation
and fuel-switching
programmes.
Price incentives will have to be supplemented
with punitive carbon taxes
or differential
fuel subsidies.
Factor costs and aggregate consumption
expenditures
will have to move sharply upward, first to deter waste, and
second to finance
alternative
energy programmes.
Rich and poor
countries
will surely protest; so too will industrial,
agricultural,
and
consumer
pressure groups. Some will claim that rising cost schedules
will stimulate inflation and hinder the pace of industrial
development.
Others
will argue that a rise in energy outlays will impair their
comparative
advantage in the world marketplace;
or that energy pricing
strategies will widen the already desperate gap between the LDCs and
the rich world economies.
The worst difficulties will be met in lowering the 22 gigatonnes a year
of CO2 emissions that threaten to impair the biosphere. The most visible
obstacles
will be found in the USA since it is a disproportionate
contributor
to global emissions of CO*. In 1988 the USA generated 5.3
tonnes of CO2 per person, for a national total of 4.8 gigatonnes
- or
21% of global carbon emissions.
Of the US emissions 36% came from
transportation,
34% from electric power generation,
16% from industrial users, and the remaining
14% from residential
and commerical
activities (Table 5). By contrast Japan, West Germany,
and a number of
industrial
countries have realized an impressive economy in fuel costs
and outlays by promoting
energy-efficiency
initiatives.
For each unit of
GNP produced
they have lowered their energy input by one-third
to
one-half, thus achieving an input-output
ratio which far exceeds the US
or Canadian
efficiency index.
The goal of cutting
US emissions
by 20% is certainly
feasible.
Energy-efficiency
standards improved by 40% in the 1970s and 19XOs,
when oil prices shot up from $2 to $40 a barrel, but they declined as
Table 5. 1988 US CO. emissions by fuel and sector (million tonnes COJyear).

Source: New York State Annual Energy Review:

Energy Consumption, Supp/y and Price Stafistics 1970-1988. New York State Energy Office,
Albany, NY, 1990, p 85. (See Ref 18 in this
article.)

118

Residenbal
Commercial
Industrial
Transportation
Electric utilities
Totals

Oil

Gas

136
84
183
1777
135
2315

274
158
347
_
155
934

Coal

W)

6
8.6
231

8.6
5.2
15.7
36.8
33.7
100.00

1341
1587

Total 1988 COP emissions: 4835 million tonnes as COP (1319 million tonnes carbon).

GLOBAL

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March 1991

The conflict

over global warming

FRG 1973

FRG 1986

Japan

Jopan

1970

1986

DomestIc

eza

Car

Rail (long

ROI

Bus

airlines

datonce)

I ( local,estimated )

Sweden
1973
Sweden

Figure 4. Passenger travel - per capita comparisons for all modes.

Source: Personal communication, Dr Lee
Schipper,
International
Energy Studies,
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley,
CA.

15J.H. Gibbons, P.D. Blair, and H.L. Gwin,

Strategies
for energy
use, Scienfific
American, Vol261, No 3, September 1989,
pp 13&143.

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

1986

USA

1970

USA

1985
0

5
Passenger-km/coplta

(x IO)

prices later fell. It will be difficult to gain further improvements

in the
1990s since many of the easiest and cheapest cuts have already been
made. Fuel efficiency for US automobiles
improved
from 11 to 27.5
miles per gallon in the 1970s and early 198Os, and the ratio of aggregate
energy inputs to GNP outputs was cut almost in half. While real GNP
climbed 52%) US oil consumption
rose only 9% in the past two decades.
Efforts to improve automobile
fleet standards to 40 miles per gallon
have been stalled in Congress in recent years and threatened
with a
Presidential
veto. Unfortunately,
too many Americans
are dependent
on cheap petrol. Compared
with other societies, they drive more cars
over more miles a year (Figure 4), clogging cities and highways, and
impairing clean air and fuel-efficiency
programmes,
alike. If car mileage
could be improved to 40 miles per gallon, 3 millon barrels of oil imports
each day could be saved, and CO2 emissions could be reduced by 500
million
tonnes
annually
- or 10% of current
US emissions.
It is
pessimistically
assumed that these savings will never materialize
until
petrol taxes and prices are raised to the German level of $3 per gallon or
the Italian level of $5 per gallon.
Electric power generation
in the USA could become more efficient if
radical innovations
were applied to coal and natural gas technologies.
Nearly one-half of the coal-fired power plants in the USA were built
before 1975, and their useful life will end early in the 21st century.
Carbon dioxide emissions could be lowered by 700 million tonnes (or
15% of 1988 emissions)
if they were replaced with efficient plants.
Coal-fired
generating
capacity world-wide
is expected to double over
the next 30 years. It is vital that innovative
clean coal technologies
should be applied in both the industrial and the developing
economies.
No other fuel is as cheap or abundant
as coal. More efficient burning
processes could be introduced
at remarkably
little incremental
cost, and
the environment
gain could be conspicuous.
Greater efficiency must also be realized in end-use technologies.
The
demand for electric energy in the USA is now 2500 billion kWh. Even if
new appliance efficiency standards are phased in, demand could reach
3200 billion kWh in 10 years. Improved demand-side
management
could
cut this increment
by about 6.5%. If the most efficient technologies
available in the industrial,
commerical,
and residential sectors were ever
brought into service, consumption
demand by the year 2000 could be cut

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1991

119

The conflict over glohul warming

16Newpush for energy efficiency, EPRI

Journal, Vol 15, No 3, April/May 1990, pp
S-17.
Excellent
forecast for wind, EPRt Journal, Vol 15, June 1990, pp 14-25.

120

appreciably,
and possibly by as much as 24-44%.
This would reduce
CO2 emissions by 600 million tonnes - or 14% of the current total.lh
The success of energy efficiency and conservation
campaigns
in the
industrialized
economies
bodes well for the future. But they will be
negated to the degree that consumption
and COZ emissions multiply in
the LDCs. Primary energy intensity is calculated as a ratio of energy
consumption
to GNP output. It improved by 25% in the rich economies
but fell 25% in the poor countries
between
1973 and 1989. Energy
demand is currently increasing at only l-2% a year in the rich countries,
which consume 70% of the worlds oil and 50% of all energy supplies,
but it is rising rapidly in the LDCs and in the centrally
planned
economies
- including China, India, the USSR, and Eastern Europe.
These countries depend to an alarming extent on the burning of coal.
Their COZ emissions could dramatically
multiply if they are not deterred
of free market
by a sharp rise in energy prices, by the phasing-in
incentives,
or by the constraints
negotiated
in the form of international
treaties.
The first requirement,
inescapably,
is to raise energy prices or energy
taxes to the point at which demand
curves fall away smartly.
The
suppression
of consumption
will improve efficiency ratios but it will also
lead to social hardship,
unemployment,
regressive
taxation,
and a
fearsome mix of inflation and recession. It is obvious that rich countries
and poor alike do not cherish the idea of rationing fuels or controlling
energy wastage with higher prices. The price mechanism
provides the
most ruthless and also the least avoidable form of energy constraint.
A second requirement
is to encourage fuel switching. If the 1991 crisis
in the Arabian
Gulf should push oil prices from $30 to $65 a barrel,
industrial boilers and electric utilities will have to stop burning oil. Oil
used to provide 54% of primary energy needs in the USA, but in the
past 20 years it fell by more than 10% - clue largely to the price elasticity
of demand. Oil use in Europe and the LDCs could fall much further if
benchmark
prices rise, or if emergency funds were allocated to promote
nuclear, hydroelectric,
solar, or other renewable
energy technplogies.
The drawback is that fuel switching is more likely to encourage
the use
of coal than natural gas or non-fossil fuels. This will certainly be seen in
the many LDCs that are burdened
with foreign debt and poorly
endowed with energy technologies.
China and the USSR command well
over one-half of the proven reserves of coal and they are responsible
for
more than one-half
of coal consumption.
Like India and the larger
LDCs, they rely on coal for their heavy industries.
railroads,
and the
rapid expansion
of electric utilities.
If they remain
committed
to
economic
growth, they will cancel any gains that might be made in
richer countries that are intent on reducing CO2 and other greenhouse
gas production.
Industrialized
countries
have made some progress
in establishing
alternative
energy technologies.
Photovoltaics
(PV) directly convert
sunlight into electricity,
and they can be used both for large-scale utility
networks or for small remote locations. If PV module costs could be cut
from $4.50 to $2.00 per peak watt, PV might eventually
dispiace
millions of megawatts of diesel power. If a more economical
design for
PV collectors could be developed,
PV could eventually
supply 15% of
global electricity
needs. In addition,
large-scale
wind farms could be
built to compete economically
with conventional
power plants.
Installed capacity for wind energy grew rapidly in the 1980s. Favourable
tax

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

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March

1991

The conflict over global warming

credits and 16 000 wind turbines added 1500 MW to Californias

grid,
and 200 MW of wind turbine capacity was installed in Western Europe.
The potential
for deploying
this low-cost
power in the LDCs is
enormous.
Unfortunately,
the funds and the technology
needed to
assure deployment
have yet to be guaranteed.
If the political will could be summoned,
a carbon tax might be
imposed on high CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, while leaving untaxed
all forms of nuclear fuel or renewable
energy sources. A carbon levy
could be presented
as an atmospheric
users charge, say at $0.40 per
million Btu. For a start, this could add $22 billion a year to the US tax
base. s A more radical proposal has been advanced in plans to auction
or to trade off carbon emission permits between the poor and the rich
economies.
Trading
in permits could be highly profitable
for poor
countries that record a low per capita ratio of GNP and CO2 emissions.
If they sold their spare carbon emission permits to the heavily industrialized and richer economies
they could earn a sizeable income in hard
currency;
and they could draw upon market incentives
to retard their
own emission totals.
The two most compelling
instances would appear in India and the
PRC. They could sell valuable per capita entitlements
to Europe or
Japan; and with the proceeds they could finance economic development
programmes
that were both cost effective and energy efficient.
This
tradeable
entitlement
strategy could be extended to the former communist
regimes and many of the LDCs. It could be -further
supplemented
with an internationally
agreed carbon tax. This resort to
global cooperation
would surely retard the doubling
of greenhouse
gases after 2000. A promising start in global policy making was seen in
the Montreal
Protocol of 1987. It required that the industrial
nations
eliminate
their own production
of the exceptionally
harmful
gases,
CFC-11 and CFC-12, and subsidize or transfer elimination
technologies
without charge to the LDCs.
Based on the following 1988 annual consumptions (in trillion Btu):
utility
15850
Coal
2 714
Natural gas
1 599
Petroleum
Transportation
14 105
Gasoline
2 620
Jet
Industrial and commercial
2 898
Coal
8810
Natural gas
3162
Petroleum
Residential
4 784
Natural gas
1 084
Petroleum
(Source: New York State Annual Energy
Review: Energy Consumption, Supply and
Price Statistics
7970-1988,
New York
State Energy Office, Albany, NY, 1990, p
85.)
19For a sceptical criticism of emission controls by a noted economist, see William D.
Nordhaus, Count before you leap, The
Economist, 7 July 1990, pp 21-24.
20For a review of recent literature on tradeable permits and other forms of international cooperation,
see Michael Grubb,
The greenhouse
effect:
negotiating
targets, international Affairs, Vol 66, No 1,
January 1990, pp 67-89.

GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

Two intractable issues

It is likely that some of these measures will be implemented
during the
1990s. A strong start was made in UNEP and in the Montreal Protocol
on CFCs. UNEP has also won considerable
support for the models and
the tentative recommendations
put forward in the reports of the IPCC.
It might become politically
feasible, too, to halt deforestation
in the
tropics or to fund marine
algae. reforestation,
and other natural
remedies during the 1990s. Moreover,
it may be possible to put in place
a novel set of financial incentives,
or alternatively
to rely on soaring
energy prices, to prompt nations into a more determined
course of
action. The development
of a profitable
trade in CO2 emission entitlements, or a transfer of valuable technologies
to the LDCs, could win
considerable
policy benefits.*
Unfortunately,
two outstanding
problems are likely to go unresolved.
The first concerns nuclear power and renewable
energy sources. The
second involves a great number of dangers, all of them associated with
the thrust towards massive population
growth.
On the first score, it is evident that the competition
for industrial
wealth has been fuelled over the past two hundred
years by the
availability
of inexpensive
and easily accessible
fuel. Coal, oil and
natural gas were relatively abundant,
cheap to recover, and inexpensive

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March 1991

121

The conflict

over global

warmrng

For
further
discussion,
see David
Everest, The Greenhouse
Effect:
Issues
for Policy-Makers,
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1988.

122

to burn. Many of the LDCs, including the PRC and India, are endowed
with these resources.
It is not their fault, they argue, that the CO2
consequences
of using fossil fuels became acute just as the leading LDCs
reached the point of economic take-off. Naturally,
they would benefit if
atmospheric
degradation
could be avoided, retarded or bought off. But
it is not fair or realistic to ask them to slow down their industrialization
so that global climate stabilization
can be achieved. Perhaps it will need
a historic act of generosity,
such as an outright gift of non-fossil-fuelled
power installations
to the LDCs, to satisfy their energy requirements
in
a manner that can safeguard the environment.2
The most remarkable
and possibly the most tainted of gifts to the
LDCs could come in the transfer of nuclear technology
and reactor
fuels. Economic
costs and CO2 consequences
could be rigorously
contained,
and the transfer of nuclear capability could wean them away
from burning oil or coal fuels in gigantic amounts.
But there are two
alarming
factors that will have to be controlled
at all times. The
non-proliferation
regime devised by the superpowers
in the 1960s has
prevented
the spread of nuclear
fuels and reactor
capabilities
for
military purposes. It is vital that the regime be preserved into the next
century.
Similarly, the storage of nuclear waste leaves an unresolved
issue. Until storage
facilities
are guaranteed
against
leakage
for
thousands of years, nuclear power will not be regarded as an acceptable
substitute
for fossil fuels. Indeed,
nuclear
energy generation
may
actually decline between 1995 and 2005, as a growing number of plants
reach the end of their operational
lives.
On the second score, it is doubtful
that any strategy to contain
greenhouse
gases can succeed if global demographic
curves continue to
climb at projected rates. The basic needs of many of the worlds 6 billion
people are not adequately provided for today, and malnutrition
is all too
widespread.
If the planet has to sustain 10 billion within two generations, and IO billion more after that, the survivability
of the biosphere
and of basic social coping mechanisms
cannot be assured.
The critical difficulty is that one-quarter
of the population
lives in the
rich countries.
It commands
three-quarters
of the worlds total GNP,
international
trade, and energy production.
Population
growth in the
poor countries
threatens
to multiply
so rapidly that food and fuel
resources
will be overwhelmed.
Starvation
in Africa is becoming
systemic and recurrent.
If its population
of 300 million people within 46
often-unstable
countries
keeps expanding
at almost 3% a year, the
continent
will race not towards economic take-off but towards ecological disaster. But how can a people facing an explosion in numbers and
expectations
be urged not to burn wood, coal, or oil? The only answers
given so far are problematic:
the rich countries
should open their
markets wide to the LDCs, they should subsidize population
control in
the LDCs, and underwrite
the costs of their environmental
constraints
too.
It is in this light that the opening argument
of this article must be
rephrased.
It is accepted that the GCMs projecting
global warming are
far from flawless. It is also agreed that the magnitude
and the timescale
of the build-up of greenhouse
gases remain fraught with supposition
if
not error. The cause-effect
relationships
that link rising global greenhouse gases to climate changes in the atmosphere
are still subject to
conjecture.
The verification
of scientific hypotheses with GCM techniques has only just begun, and the debate between
the prophets
of

GLOBAL

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March 1991

The conflict

over global warming

ecological disaster and the status quo economists

will surely continue.
Arguments
about what should be done will persist until the GCMs are
improved
and a better knowledge
of market consequences
has been
gained.
All parties
agree, however,
that it would be prudent
to move
cautiously
towards a system for managing
global warming and to buy
insurance against possible disasters. If the emissions of C02, methane,
and nitrous oxide are stabilized at 1990 or 1995 levels, the gathering
momentum
could at least be held in check. A major achievement
would
be secured if the build-up
of greenhouse
gases were contained
by
international
agreement.
Victory would come not in one swoop but in
small environmental
steps and bureaucratic
accords. The incremental
value of progressing
slowly and undramatically
might be worth more
than all the political
rhetoric and the symbolic triumphs
which are
falsely celebrated
today. It is sensible to buy a minimal coverage of
insurance
against future deterioration
by holding atmospheric
CO2
levels stable. An international
consensus
or a no regrets policy is
beginning
to emerge in the scientific community.
If the reports of the
IPCC working groups generate wider support, the political determination might be found to pay the first of the insurance premiums.

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1991

123