Executive Politics: The

Politics of a Dual Executive

Alvin A. Camba; Class 6-7 of Eurofor, First Semester of 2013-2014
alvin.a.camba@gmail.com

Key Question:
What is the relationship of the Council
and the Commission?

Outline
Argument
Executive Politics Principal Agent Approach
Member States: Executive Politics, delegation,
and discretion
Government by the Commission
Conclusion

Argument
Executive responsibilities are shared between the Council and
the Commission
Institutionalized separation of powers, or dual executive, can
sometimes lead to deadlock.
Consensus and stability exist through a division of labour; the
Council is more powerful in big bang decisions (long term)
that could change the EU, while the Commission is more
powerful in everyday politics (short term)

I. Principal-Agent Approach
Classic constitutional government: legislature
decides, executive enacts, and judiciary
adjudicates

Government systems are highly complex

Principal-Agent Approach: Two issues
agents may be targeted by lobby groups;
agents may want to increase their influence
over the policy process
Principles: screening process (but it only
works at a period of time)
Council (states) do not have the power all
the time to police the commission shift of
preference pertains to agential drift

I. Principal-Agent Approach
Classic constitutional government: legislature
decides, executive enacts, and judiciary
adjudicates

Government systems are highly complex

Principal-Agent Approach: Two issues
agents may be targeted by lobby groups;
agents may want to increase their influence
over the policy process
Principles: screening process (but it only
works at a period of time)
Council (states) do not have the power all
the time to police the commission shift of
preference pertains to agential drift

 Principals may limit

the drift:

fire alarm (other

agents of the
Council, or interest
groups); specifying
delegated task and
powers

 Agents may have

information however
that limit the
principals power
and allow the agent
to implement the
policy in another
way

Franchinos thesis: EU
legislators can rely on two
agents to implement EU
legislation: Commission and
national bureaucracies
Decision of Council depends
on the complexity of the
policy issue, as well as the
divergence in the policy
preference of the government

More complexity and unanimit

= National bureaucracies
Qualified majority (many rules
in the market) = Commission

In sum
Degree of autonomy that executive
agents are given by their principals
depends on the nature of the tasks in
question, the institutional rules under
which they operate, the degree of
policy disagreements between the
principals, as well as the amount of
information the principals have on the
likely actions of the agents

This is the relationship of the Council and

the Commission

II. Member States

IGC agrees on a least common
denominator and adds power to the
Commission. The task at hand is to know
which tasks to delegate to a common
agent and to strike a balance between
the need to ensure a common policy is
implemented across the EU.
Member states cannot delegate too
much and cannot delegate too little
Can be seen in the history of the EU

Treaty of Paris
Signed in 1951 which
established the ECSC
Common production and
distribution could have been
government through
intergovernmental meeting,
but the would be too high
because of procrastination,
indecision interest groups.

Monnet Method
intergovernmental
delegating to supranational

Treaty of Rome
Signed in 1957 which
established the European
Economic Community and
EURATOM
Central issue: German
common market and French
interest in CAP
Legislative procedure makes
it easier for the Council to
accept a proposal than to
overturn it
Created Agenda setting
powers of the Commission

Single European
Act (SEA)
1986 SEA pushed through

because of the failure to create a

functioning market, Japans rise,
perceived weakness of Europe vis-vis the US and Japan
Commission prepared treaty
reforms and policy leadership
Commission powers were
upgraded: initiate legislation,
propose laws (environmental,
economic, health, etc.), draft a plan
for the EMU, QMV in the Council
SEA introduced intergovernmental
cooperation in Foreign Policy
(European Political Cooperation)

Treaty of the
European Union
1991 institutionalized the
Commission-brokered plan
for EMU

More funds were

promised for cohesion
policies, social policy,
health, education, etc;
introduced co-decision
procedure
Delegated to
Commission legislation and
managing these policies
Council refused to
delegate powers in two
pillars: CFSP (former EPC)
and JHA

Amsterdam treaty
1997
Came to force in 1999,
transferred free movement
of persons to the EC,
member states accepted
the JHA provisions because
governments could not
agree
Delegated policy
initiation rights in this area
to the commission
Council delegated
monitoring of CFSP issues
into a new task force
located in the Council
Secretariat

Nice in 2001
Came to force in 2003,
aimed to reform the EU
institutions in preparation
for accession
Defense was made an
EU competence for the first
time, creation of the
European Security Defense
Policy

Policy initiation, agendasetting, decision-making,

implementation of defense
were kept away from the
Commission

Lisbon 2007
Came to force in 2010,
formalized policy
competences between
member states and the EU
in a catalogue of
competences
Decision-making rules
within and between
governments and the
Commission, weighing of
votes in the council and
the two leadership offices
(permanent president of
the European Council and
High Representative for
Foreign and Security Policy

Member states evaluate trade-off

Member states experienced the day-to-day
implications of the SEA in the construction of the single
market
Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, governments were
more reluctant to hand over agenda-setting powers in
new and highly sensitive policy areas

Story of Selective
Delegation of
Power
Treaty reforms are a blunt
policy instruments
States cannot predict
precise implications of treaty
provisions and new decisionmaking rules
Powers may create
unintended consequences;
they are hard to reform once
theyre given

Outcome of IGC
Assume that all
member states are
equal
Only strong member
states matter
Expected difficulties
in the national
ratification process in
some states than others

Spatial models of
negotiations

B. Political Leadership and

Delegation
European Council (heads of
governments) sets the guidelines and
objectives for the Commission and
implement the guidelines
European Council executes the CFSP,
macroeconomic policies, agrees the
multi-annual budget framework, and
can adopt new policy frameworks of the
EU
They also provide guidelines for the work
of the Council of Ministers, invites
Commission to develop policy initiatives
in particular areas, and monitors the
domestic policies of member states

B. Political Leadership and

Delegation
Lisbon treaty: created a separation between
the Presidency of the Council (rotates on a
six-month basis and has a legislative role,
mainly) and the President of the European
Union (elects through a two-and-a-half-year
term)
Not clear if the president is meant to be the
chief executive of the EU, or a silent
consensus broker
President of the EC (European Council) may
be more political focusing on resolving highprofile political disputes

President of the Council of Ministers will both

have a political and administrative role.

C. Transposition of EU
legislation
Question again of delegation to national
bureaucracies leads to classic coordination problem,
where no member state implements the legislation.
Balancing process with delegating to the Commission

Commission may take EU countries to the ECJ for noncompliance

The capacity of national administrators is the key
factor in explaining the varying transposition rates
among member states

Weaker states of Central and East Europe have

incorporated EU Law into national legislation
Deadlines often impact national administrations

C. Transposition of EU legislation
Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied find that policy conflict within
the Council may speed up the transposition process and
more freedom to set domestic policy rules
Konig and Luetgert find that conflict in the Council
increases the chances of infringement notification against a
member states; meanwhile, divergent policy preferences in
a coalition government in member states delays
transposition
Jensen oversight procedures that concentrate in the
hands of the national bureaucracy strengthen the ability of
member states to circumvent infringement cases, the same
thing happens to those who reduce their reliance on
interest groups

In Sum
When deciding how and when to
implement a directive, the member
governments weight the costs associated
with correct implementation against the
costs associated with failure or delays in
the implementation process.

III. Government by Commission

When deciding how and when to
implement a directive, the member
governments weight the costs associated
with correct implementation against the
costs associated with failure or delays in
the implementation process.

A Cabinet: Core EU Executive

One Commissioner each for member
states (treaty of Nice)
President of Commission chairs the
meetings
Consensus decision making in
practice, but majority voting when
pressed to vote (absences and abstain
are negative)

Bound by the principle of Collective

Responsibility (toe to the party line)
Allocation of each portfolio to the
Commissioner Commission Vice
Presidents and then to those who were
previous Commissioners

A Cabinet: Core EU Executive

Commission President is first among
equals
Decides which Commissioner gets the
portfolio (after consulting with the states),
chairs meeting of the college, sets the
agenda, in charge of the Secretariat
General
In practice, member states hold
agenda-setting powers since they
nominate their Commissioners
Commission can exert pressure on
member governments to nominate their
most high profile and competent figures
President can ask resignation from other
commissioners

A Cabinet: Core EU Executive

Cabinets filter interest group demands;
serve as a political antennae; advisers in the
directorates-general; mechanism for intercommission coordination; supervisor of the
work of directorates-general responsible to
the Commission
Cabinet meets together every week to
prepare the agenda for the Commissioner

Deals with the most important items in the

agenda to leave the most important ones to
the Commissioner
They were handpicked fellow nationals of
the Commissioners before, but the cabinets
are no longer the same nationality as their
commissioners

A Cabinet: Core EU Executive

Commission is a political body,
occupied by actors with background
in national politics
Interest: Gap between the
preferences of the Commission and
governments, and the competence of
the Commission

Much of the literature assumes

preference-divergence between
states and Commission
Puzzling that member states would
select a Commission with outlying
preferences

A Cabinet: Core EU Executive

Commissioners have previously held political
positions in parties that are in government at
that time of their appointment to the
commission
Suggest a high-level preference similarity
between the government and the commission

Political competence of the official also matter

in the nomination (since Com powers have
increased, there is greater blowback)

Comitologies: Interface of the EU and

dual executive
Comitologies (officials of states) scrutinize the
Commissions implementation
Established in June 1999 and July 2006.
Advisory, management, regulatory, and regulatory
committee with scrutiny

Membership on committees depends on their roles:

composed of national civil servants, monitor the
implementation of legislation, temporary
committees composed of representatives of private
interests groups consider matters for which the
Commission feels wider consultation is necessary;
and scientist and experts give advice on
technicalities

Comitologies: Procedures
If the Comitology disagrees with the Commissions
opinion, the decision is referred to the Council and,
for further information, to the European Parliament
Within 3 months, the Council may agree or amend

Regulatory procedures with scrutiny: Council and EP

can carry out a check prior to the adoption of a
measure and if there is a problem, the Commission
cannot adopt the measure
Adopted in animal, plant, food safety, environment
and transport
After Lisbon Council and EP acting under the
ordinary legislative procedure, need adopt a new
set of rules to simply procedures

Comitologies: After Lisbon

Can we expect more conflict given that there are
different degrees of Commission power over policy
areas?
Only 29 percent of all Commission proposals between
1987 and 1995 were under procedures where the
Commission was weak. Council still accepted 40% of
proposals

Commission is deeply implicated in the pattern of

Council comitology preferment between the
Commission and the committees in the operation of
comitology,
the figures might reflect the fact that the Commission is
strategic in its choice of comitology procedures, and
hence only proposes the advisory procedure in cases
where it thinks it has a reasonable chance of getting
past the council

Comitologies: Parliaments Role

European Parliament has been critical of comitology
After the establishment of the system, the European
Parliament argued that the system lacked transparency, due
to the secretive nature of committee procedures
Comitology does undermine the principle of the separation
of powers between the legislative authority of the EU
(Council and Commission) and the executive
implementation authority (Commission)
Parliament has been critical that procedures only allows for
issues to be referred back to the Council, rather than both
Council and EP.
New procedure in 2006 was designed to address this concern
Committees are more transparent with all documents public
available in the register

Comitologies: In Sum
Comitology system enables the Commission and
national experts to solve policy issues in a nonhierarchical and deliberative policy style.
Involvement of scientific experts and private interest in
the process of implementation and regulation is a
common feature of public administrative system.
High-profile policy issues create conflict between
Commission and National Experts, and between experts
from different member states

European Parliament: Scrutiny and

transparency
Commission presents annual program to
European Parliament
Regularly give evidence to EP Committees,
and certain committees have question time
for the Commissioner of a policy area

President-in-office of the Council presents the

Councils six-monthly work programme to the
parliament
Government ministers from the member state
that holds Council Presidency often appear
before the EP Committees, and President of
the ECP, and heads of the EU Agencies
appear before EP
President of European Council is not
accountable to the EP, but he does appear

European Parliament: Commissions

Culture
No formal rules governing the behavior of
Commissioners
Individual C are often blamed for
inconsistencies in the DG in their charge, or the
lack of action in the policy area they cover

Still no procedure for forcing Cs to resign

Commission has not developed a culture in
which a C would resign out of a sense of
obligation, and the EP does not have the right
to censure individual Commissioners.
In 1999, EP announced it would hold separate
votes of no confidence on two Cs: Edit Cresson
and Manuel Marin, who were charged with
corruption and nepotism
Media and government pressure were used

European Parliament: Commission

promoting transparency
1994 Package allows the European Parliament
and the Council time to debate the draft
before the final adoption of the full legislative
programme in January

Initiation of legislation of the Commission now

makes more use of green and white papers,
public hearings, information seminars, and
consultation exercises
Commissions new code of conduct commits it
to make internal documents public, with the
exception of its minutes, briefing notes, and
personal opinion
Commission submits draft legislation to national
parliaments so that their committees on EU
affairs can scrutinize the legislation before their
government minister address it

European Parliament: Council Supports

Openness in EU decision-making
Commission and EP accused Council of
hypocrisy:
Majority of member states have opposed
Coms efforts to allow public access to EU
documents
Council has proved reluctant to expose itself
to public scrutiny (EU Treaty, Article 207)

Article 207 has protected Council, but it

changed partially due to Lisbon (limits
Councils legislative powers under procedures
and requires Council to be more open)

European Parliament: Council

Supports Openness in EU
decision-making
Council has been scrutinized by and in national
parliaments - EU Special Affairs Committee of
national parliaments)
Depends on the preference divergence of
executive and legislative branches of a state

Single majority governments tend to be less involved

in EU affairs than states with mixed coalitions
Recent delegation of more powers to EU Institutions
have led the decline of the ability of the parliament
to scrutinize the executive branch
Lisbon requires six weeks to offer a reasoned opinion
on the Commission's proposal, whether it violates
subsidiarity and proportionality if its a vote of 1/3
against, then the Commission has to review. During
the review, Commission can withdraw, amend, or
not do anything about the proposal

Selection and Censure of the

Commission
Questions the legitimacy of the Commission

Commission President regarded as a secretariat of

an IO rather than choosing a first among equals
Maastricht Treaty Innovation term of the
Commission the same as the European Parliament
EP now considers nomination of member
governments, and can vote on it as well.
Procedure called Commissioner hearings, where
the nominees needs to give evidence to the EP
committee covering portfolios (modeled on the US
Senate hearings of the nominees of the US President)
After hearing, a second vote takes place.
Amsterdam treaty institutionalizes the EPs power
on vetoing nominees.

Right to Censure
QMV in the Council for the nomination of the C
President and the C as a whole. Lisbon requires the
European Council to take into account EP election
results when nominating a Commission President

Parliament has used investiture procedure to exact

concessions from governments (October 2004, EP
refused to back Barroso because of Rocco
Buttiglione, which was replaced by Franco Frattini;
Bulgarias Rumia Jelava in 2009)
EPs right to censure absolute majority of MEPs
and two-thirds of the votes cast. They have this
power, but it has never been used before. EP fears
throwing Commission under the bus would endanger
the institution
Aside from that, nothing would stop the states from
appointing the same Commissioners
It requires a large majority, almost impossible to
fulfill

Right to Censure
Since 1998, the EP has been more confident
failure to handle the BSE crisis in 1999, EP demanded
that Commission looked at mismanagement and
nepotism
At the eve of censure vote, C President Santer
promised to act on the matters by creating new
policies. censure vote was narrowly defeated (232
MPEs in favour and 293 against)
In 1999, EP put C on probation until the committee
set up by EP reported on the allegations. Pauline
Green informed Santer that they would be voting for
censure
At the eve of the censure, Santer called for an
emergency meeting of the Commissioners, who
agreed they should resign en masse.
Incoming Prodi Commission was much more
sensitive to the EPs concerns; Prodi even promised
he would sack individual Commissioners.

Hybridity
Procedures for selecting and deselecting
Commission have become a hybrid mix of
parliamentary and presidency models.
The requirements of EPs majority support and ECs
QMV are similar to a parliamentary governments
bicameralism

However, in selecting Commission President, the

member states are like individual electoral college,
over which the EP can only exercise a veto.
The EP cannot nominate, and once invested, the
Commission does not really required the working
majority of the EP
Right to censure a safety valve in extreme
situations of the Commissions failure.
Alternative modes lf classic parliament and
presidential models were proposed, but not
acceptable to the member states

Conclusion
Executive responsibilities are shared between the
Council and the Commission
Institutionalized separation of powers, or dual
executive, can sometimes lead to deadlock.
Consensus and stability exist through a division of
labour; the Council is more powerful in big bang
decisions (long term) that could change the EU,
while the Commission is more powerful in
everyday politics (short term)