Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Seminar on Housing
Brussels
11th December, 2014
Tenure by Population
2001
2007
2012
60
50 (2002)
14
27
2 (2002)
53
22
57
71
20
73
33
73
42
43
0.5
33
48
113 (2003)
43 (2004)
86
69
85
28
49
14
45
43
81
101
44
n/a
78
108
70
67
15
61
81
103
52
Sources: EMF/OECD
24
38
10
48
35
83
93
35
107
75
96
60
60
8
61
66
132 (2006)
49
140.00
120.00
100.00
60.00
20.00
2009:3
2009:1
2008:3
2008:1
2007:3
2007:1
2006:3
2006:1
2005:3
2005:1
2004:3
2004:1
2003:3
2003:1
2002:3
2002:1
2001:3
2001:1
2000:3
2000:1
1999:3
1999:1
1998:3
1998:1
1997:3
1997:1
1996:3
1996:1
1995:3
1995:1
0.00
100.00
80.00
60.00
20.00
2009:3
2009:1
2008:3
2008:1
2007:3
2007:1
2006:3
2006:1
2005:3
2005:1
2004:3
2004:1
2003:3
2003:1
2002:3
2002:1
2001:3
2001:1
2000:3
2000:1
1999:3
1999:1
1998:3
1998:1
1997:3
1997:1
1996:3
1996:1
1995:3
1995:1
0.00
2009:3
2009:1
2008:3
2008:1
2007:3
2007:1
2006:3
2006:1
2005:3
2005:1
2004:3
2004:1
2003:3
2003:1
2002:3
2002:1
2001:3
2001:1
2000:3
2000:1
1999:3
1999:1
1998:3
1998:1
1997:3
1997:1
1996:3
1996:1
1995:3
1995:1
120.00
100.00
80.00
60.00
Belgium Real House Prices
40.00
20.00
0.00
2009:3
2009:1
2008:3
2008:1
2007:3
2007:1
2006:3
2006:1
2005:3
2005:1
2004:3
2004:1
2003:3
2003:1
2002:3
2002:1
2001:3
2001:1
2000:3
2000:1
1999:3
1999:1
1998:3
1998:1
1997:3
1997:1
1996:3
1996:1
1995:3
1995:1
140.00
120.00
100.00
80.00
Germany Real House Prices
60.00
Switzerland Real House Prices
40.00
20.00
0.00
120.00
100.00
80.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
96.00
94.00
92.00
90.00
88.00
120.00
100.00
80.00
Germany Real House Prices
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
1995:1
1995:3
1996:1
1996:3
1997:1
1997:3
1998:1
1998:3
1999:1
1999:3
2000:1
2000:3
2001:1
2001:3
2002:1
2002:3
2003:1
2003:3
2004:1
2004:3
2005:1
2005:3
2006:1
2006:3
2007:1
2007:3
2008:1
2008:3
2009:1
2009:3
2010:1
2010:3
2011:1
2011:3
2012:1
2012:3
2013:1
2013:3
2014:1
2014:3
Nominal and Real House Prices (seasonally adjusted, index based in 2010)
1995-2014, Quarterly, Great Britain and Germany
140
120
100
80
Great Britain Nominal Price
60
Great Britain Real Price
40
20
The expectation among economies with high household debt and open economies was that
there would be large scale mortgage default and problems of negative equity and
possessions (as in the early 1990s);
In the main this did not happen, significantly because of lower interest rates and variable rate
mortgages but also because unemployment did not rise as expected;
Major exceptions include Iceland, Ireland, and Spain not only because of the depth of their
crises but also because of high supply elasticities, massive overhangs of new supply and the
proportion of their real economies involved in the construction sector;
The biggest finance problems were with respect to the banking sector and often on the
Treasury management side with high exposure to lending to residential development rather
than directly related to mortgage market failure;
However there have been large reductions in access to mortgage finance resulting in low
levels of transactions and the exclusion of new entrants from the owner-occupied market;
One result has been less downward adjustment in house prices in many countries than
expected or probably desirable and now considerable evidence of rising house prices even
though economies are stagnating or growing very slowly;
Particular issues of increasing differentiation within countries with house price rises
concentrated in areas of housing pressure.
While, for many European countries, the financial markets have worked better
than feared, the biggest continuing problem is that investment levels have fallen
drastically across much of Europe; construction industries have been destroyed;
debt finance for investment remain a major problem and risks are still seen to be
too high;
The recession that followed the financial crisis has been longer lasting and
government policies to stimulate investment have been replaced by greater
austerity measures;
What upturn there has been has been extremely slow many countries do not
expect to get back to normal levels of investment for many years;
Where there is expansion bottlenecks are occurring rapidly and much of any
increased demand is coming out in higher prices;
The housing situation for consumers is being worsened by mortgage market
regulatory responses which are making it more difficult for households to enter
owner-occupation in most European countries often excluding households that
could afford to buy over their lifetimes;
Increasing importance of private rental markets and increasing concerns about
high rents and calls for additional regulation but equally a desire to bring in more
equity finance for the rental market.
2007
2012
Year with
highest/lowest
output levels
Completions
per 000
population
over 18,
2007
1,571
1,502
649
2006/2012
6.7
40
46
42
2006/2010
6.8
Belgium (starts) 42
55
42
2006/2002
6.5
Czech Republic
Germany
France (starts)
UK
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
42
211
435
234
25
30
3
78
80
30
67
8
641
31
29
215
304
136
10
28
1
9
58 (2011)
19 (2011)
23
4
120
26
2007/2001
2001/2009
2007/2009
2007/2009
2006/2009
2005/2009
2007/2011
2005/2012
2009/2010
2007/2010
2002/2012
2008/2012
2007/2012
2008/2010
9.8
3.1
8.7
4.8
5.8
7.1
12.8
23.5
6.2
8.2
7.6
4.7
17.3
USA
Austria
(building
permits)
25
326
303
192
21
27
2
53
73
22
115
7
366
15
There is still massive concern at the macro level about the possibility that housing
and construction more generally will knock economies off course and undermine
stable economic growth;
There is further concern that deleveraging has not significantly increased resilience
and that rising interest rates could be difficult to manage
But at the macro level there remains relatively little understanding of how
property markets operate and how interventions may play out
Governments tend to place heavy reliance on banking capital ratios and limiting
loan to value ratios as well as on increased regulation - but do these address the
fundamentals?
An important result in many countries is that the gulf between the haves and the
have nots is increasing. Those already well housed have suffered little from either
the financial crisis or the lack of investment; those trying to enter the housing
market are finding it increasingly difficult with potential negative impacts on
labour markets;
But perhaps the most important conclusion is that there is very little evidence that
housing and finance systems are working better or that government interventions
are significantly improving efficiencies
We are nowhere near a long run stable equilibrium and unlikely to be so in the
forseeable future.