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Romulo Neri v.

Senate Committee on accountability of PO&investigation, on trade


and commerce, on national defense and escu
GR No 180643; 3/25/08
Fact:
Neri appeared before the Committees and testified for about 11 hours on matters
concerning the (national broadband network)NBN Project, a project awarded by the
DOTC to ZTE (Zing xing telecommunications equipment).
Neri disclosed that then Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200M
approval of the NBN Project.
He informed PGMA of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on PGMA and his discussions relating to
the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.
Committees persisted in knowing Neris answers to
(a) w/n PGMA followed up the NBN Project
(b) w/n she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) w/n she directed him to approve it, required him to appear and testify once more
on Nov. 20 2007.
On that day, Neri did not appear upon orders of the President invoking executive
privilege.
On Nov. 22, the Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain
why he should not be cited in contempt.
NERIS REPLY: it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should
there be new matters to be taken up. He requested that he be furbished in
advance as to what else he needs to clarify.
Issue:
2. w/n there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the
3 questions are covered by executive privilege--Y

3. w/n Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the 3 questions
are critical to the exercise of their functions--N

Held:
2. Yes.
a. Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, because the Constitution
does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board. The power to
enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power and the final
decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the
President even when it has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board
because it is only a form of check and balance.
b. Committees contend that the application of the doctrine of operational
proximity for the reason that it may be misconstrued to expand the scope of the
presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are
operationally proximate to the President by who may have no direct
communications with her.
In the case at bar, the danger is absent because the official involved here is a
member of the Cabinet within the term advisor of the President; in fact,
her alter ego and a member of her official family.
c. Committees contend that the Court erred in upholding the Presidents invocation,
through Exec. Sec., of executive privilege because
i. Between Committees specific and demonstrated need and the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor
of the former
o It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely
founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated Nov. 15 of
Exec. Sec. Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to
diplomatic and economic relation with another sovereign nation as the bases for the
claim.
o The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this
jurisdiction that information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion
of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for
the sake of national interest.

3. No. Committees contend the information elicited by the 3 questions are


necessary in the discharge of their legislative function, among them,

a. To consider the 3 pending Senate BillsThere is simply a generalized assertion


that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a
broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate Bills. And it is further expressed
by the counsel of Committees that even without Neri answering the 3 questions, the
Senate can still come up with legislations.
b. To curb graft and corruptionThe potential culpability of high government
officials in a given government transaction is not a task for the Senate to perform.
The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of a
crime or wrongdoing.

PET-GRANTED
Civil liberties Union(CLU) vs Exec Sec
GR no 83896; 2/22/91
FACTS
Pres Aquino issued EO 284 members of cabinet, their undersec and assistant sec
are allowed to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations
CLU assailed EO law- unconsti
-- that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: WN EO 284 consti---- NO


HELD:
It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their
tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself
the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers)
consi as mere personal opinions wc cannot override constis manifest intent
and the peoples understanding thereof
Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO
284 is unconstitutional.
Restricting = no of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position ---to X> 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually
allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Joseph ESTRADA vs Aniano Desierto


GR no 146710-15; 3/2/01
FACTS
4/11/98 Estrada (pres); GMA (VP) singson went on air and accused pet , friends
and fam of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lord (downfall
Calls for resig of pet filled the air
11/13/00- Estrada- impeached by HOR
1/19/01- PNP and AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd
at EDSA shrine.
E called for snap presidential election to be held concurrently w congressional and
local elections on 5/14/01

--he added that HE WILL NOT RUN in this election


1/20- SC declared: seat of presidency- vacant E constructively resigned his post
Arroyo then took her oath of office in presence of the crowd at EDSA as 14 th Pres
Erap after downfall, filed pet for prohi w prayer of WPI:
to enjoin resp ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as pres ends
-Confirming Erap to be lawful and incumbent pres temporarily unable to discharge
duties of office
ISSUE:
WoN Estrada resigned as President. -Y
WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.- N
HELD
1.Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevant
issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service
of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before, during
and after January 20, 2001

** It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
2. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any

decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the

officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.

Maximo Soliven (roces, agacaoli, manzanas) vs Hon Ramon Makasiar


No L-82585; 11/14/88
FACTS
Maximo Soliven together with the other petitioners was filed with libel by Pres Cory
Aquino. Pres filed a complaint-affidavit (CA) against him and others.
MAKASIAR AVERRED: Cory cant file a CA GRD: this would defeat her immunity
from suit
**Basis: principle that a pres cant be sued-- However, if a president
would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts
jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back
++ considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to
appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: WN pres of phils under consti, may initiate criminal proceedings against
petitioners thru filing of CA
HELD:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in
which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

Hon. Ricardo Gloria (Sec)(rosas- RD)(DECS) vs CA (icasiano)


GR No 119903; 8/15/00
FACTS
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent, QC by Pres Aquino
Resp

Sec

Gloria

recommended

to

Pres

that

Icasiano

be

reassigned

as

Superintendent of the MIST (Marikina Institute Sci and Tech), to fill up vacuum
created by the retirement of its superintendent, Bannaoag Lauro
Icasiano requeted Gloria to reconsider the assignment, but latter denied
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary
implementation of his reassignment.

mandatory

injuction

enjoining

the

CA- granted the petition REASON: indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasianos


right to security of tenure.
DECS SEC ARGUED: filing of case- improper same attacks an act of the Pres--- in
vio of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit
ISSUE: WN filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit
HELD:
The doctrine of presidential immunity has no application where the petition for
prohibition is directed not against the pres himself but against his subordinates

The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave
abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

** Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of
petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". reassignment in question is violative
of the security of tenure of Icasiano

W. Cameron Forbes (Harding, trowbridge chief of police, chief of secret service


mnl) vs Chuoco Tiaco (crossfield)- judge in CFImnl)
No 6157; 7/30/10
FACTS
Forbes- Gov-Gen of phils
Tiaco- foreigner of chinese nationality and a subj of the chinese empire

Tiaco filed suit in CFi against Forbes. Harding, Throwbridge


ALLEGED: under orders of Forbes, he was deported therefrom and sent to
Amoy, China and that having been able to return he feared as it was
threatened that he should be again deported (prelim inj in case deporting him
again) + 20 for indemnity
PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED said expulsion- carried out in pub int of govt and at the
request of the proper rep of chinese govt
**Crossfield, granted petition prohibiting them from deporting Tiaco

_____plaintiffs alleged: been deprived of liberty wo due process of law


ISSUE: WN gov gen had power and authority to expel a domiciled alien- yes
(he cant be held personally lia for the damages resulting from an act performed in
pursuance of such determination, even tho he was wrong in such determination and
the act perfor in purusnace thereof was in violation of law. By virtue of He should
therefor be protected in that determination w/in limits
Philippine legislature passed an act which, reciting that the governor general had
authorized the deportation in the exercise of authority vested in him by law,
enacted that his action was approved and ratified and confirmed, and in all
respects declared legal, and not subject to question or review. So that, if ratification
by that body can dispose of the matter, no court has authority to entertain the suits.
Therefore the deportation is to be considered as having been ordered by the
governor general in pursuance of a statute of the Philippine legislature directing it,
under their combined powers, and it is unnecessary to consider whether he had
authority, by virtue of his office alone, as declared by the statute, or whether, if he
had not, he had immunity from suit for such an official act done in good faith.

It is admitted that sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and
seemingly that Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the
United States.
Deporting the plaintiffs was not depriving them of liberty without due process of
law, unless on other grounds the local government was acting beyond its powers.
But the local government has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the
Islands
The right to remain < removal as an act of state.

PEOPLE vs Francisco SALLE, Jr.


GR No 103567; 12/4/95

FACTS
Salle and Ricky Mengote found guilty beyond reasonable doubt + sentenced reclu
perpe + indemnity
were convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson before the RTC of
Quezon City.

They filed notice of appeal (Court accepted)


**Howev, Salle filed Urgent motion to withdraw appeal
They were granted a conditional pardon, acceptance of which appeallants released from confinement
*they impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence---hence, appeal
should be dismissed
Both were discharged from bilibid prison
Atty Lao informed court that mengote left for his province wo consulting her
Lao prays that court grant salles motion to withdraw his appeal + consider it
wdrawn upon his acceptance of conditional pardon
Mengote has not filed a motion to wdraw his appeal
Court granted appeal of Salle
Section 19, Article VII the President may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise
provided in the Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final judgment, the Court
required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-appellants to submit their
memoranda

on

the

issue

of

the

enforceability

of

the

conditional pardon and

(2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court
why it recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the
pendency of the appeal.

OSG AVERRED: conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote = unenforceable -because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of
his appeal.

ATTY LAO AVERRED: conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and


enforceable
although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to
have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in
the finality of his conviction.

ISSUE: WN pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a
judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable -NO
HELD:
{S19, A7
pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time
after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where
the requirement is " final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of S14,
Article 9 or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in S19,A7. In such a
case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
--pardon no effect until person wdraws appeal and allow conviction to be final and Mengote
has not filed a motion to wdraw his appeal
Counsel of mengote is given 30 days to secure wdrawal of his appeal. Conditional wdrawal
take effect only upon GRANT OF SUCH WDRAWAL }

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b)
when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is
expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court,
and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where
the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality,
as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.

"Conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal.

PEOPLE VS WALTER NACIONAL(millamina, musa,luces, mirabete, militante)


GR no 111294-95; 9/7/95
FACTS
Nacional, Millamino, Musa, Lucer, Mirabete and Militante member of NPA (new
peoples army) charged with murder and Quirino and Joel Lagaron in Daragan Albay
on 2/21/85
All except Mirabate (pleaded not guilty), were given conditional pardon as political
prisoners
Resps appealed to court (granted)
Resps mpved to wdraw their appeal
**CLAIMED: charges against them were political in natire committed while
they were members of he NPA
: as political prisoners- they applied for and recom by Frank Drilon
for CONDITIONAL PARDON BY PRES (court-granted)
Luces also wdraw his appeal for becoming moot and academic
CLAIMED: he had been granted conditional pardon by pres + been released
from prison per instruct
---OSG- opined that Luces abandoned his appeal when we accepted
pardon
Only Mirabate has remained and pursued appeal to Court
CLAIMED: only watching volley near scene of crime and denies mem as NPA and
conspiracy as he is 69
ISSUE: WN conditional pardon when granted, extinguish the civil lia arising from
crime N

HELD:
Grant of conditional pardon and the consequent dismissal of the appeals of resps
does not exempt them from payment of civil indemnity. A CP when granted does not
extinguish the civil lia arising from the crime. The indemnity of 50k imposed by TC
for each o the deaths of Quirino and Joel Lagason miust be shared solidarily by all
accused.

SALVACION MONSANTO VS FULGENCIO FACTORAN


GR No 78239; 2/9/89
FACTS
Sandiganbayan convicted Monsanto (Assistant treas of Calbayog City) and 3 others
complex crime of estafa thru falsi of pub docs + sentenced to jail
Monsanto appealed her conviction to Court affirmed
Filed a motion for recopending however, Marcos gave an absolute pardon- she
accepted it
By reason of pardon, she wrote letter to Minister of Finance (MOF) for her to be
reinstated to her former pos since it was still vacant + requestd back pays
MOF referred issue to Office of Pres + Factoran denied her request
**GROUND: Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does
not reinstate her former pos
**PRES OFFICE: the acquittal, not absolute pardon of a former PO is the only
ground for reinstatement to his former pos and entitlement to salaries during pd of
suspension
:A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from pay of civil
indemnity imposed upon him by sentence
**MONSANTO AVERRED: gen rules on pardon cant apply to her case cos
she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal
in court
There having been no final judgment of conviction- employment as assis city
treaCOULD NOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN TERMINATED

: by reason of pardon, she should no longer be compelled


to ans for the civil lia brought about by her acts

ISSUE: WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment. NO
HELD:
To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post
as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.

IBP vs Hon Ronaldo Zamora


GR no 141284; 8/15/00
FACTS
Pres Estrada, Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, in
verbal directive, due to increase in violent crimes in MM like roberries, kidnapping and carnappings
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.

The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.

ISSUE: WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.-- NO

HELD
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement.
The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is
their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.
Thus, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Prof Randolf David vs Arroyo


G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency,

President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing Pres Proc 1017


Reason for issuances = conspiracy among some military officers in a plot to unseat/
assassinate Arroyo and take over reins of govt as a clear and present danger
Pet David and Llamas were arrested wo warrant on their way to EDSA
Newspaper daily tribune was searched wo warrant
---basis of warrantless arrests and warrantless search and sei PP1017 in exer of
constitutional power to call out AFP to prevent and suppress lawless violence

--- 7 petitions challenged the constitutionality of PP1017


**GROUND - PRES ARROYO COMMITED GAD
******Respondent officials of govt in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic isntitutions are trampling upon every freedom guaranteed and
protected by
*****contend: PP1017- void bec of its overbreadth its enforcement
encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under S4,A3 and sent a
chilling effect to citizens

ISSUE: Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.


HELD:
The

Petitions

are

partly

granted. The

Court

rules

that

PP

1017

is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related
to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section


17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does
not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate
actions

and

measures

to

suppress

and

prevent

acts

of

lawless

violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and
made

punishable

by

the

Legislature,

such

portion

of

G.O.

No.

is

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search
of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

FRANCISCO GUDANI (balutan) vs GENEROSO SENGA (COS of AFP)


Gr No 170165; 8/15/06
FACTS
Senator biazon invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes in a hearing.
PGMA issued EO 464 ---enjoining officials of the executive department + the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent.

AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval.
However, the two still appeared before the Senate.

As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War
and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command.
Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly
violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry. YES

HELD:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of
the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.

TEODOSIO LANSANG (del Rosario, alcala) vs Brigadier gen Eduardo GARCIA


No. L-33964; 12/11/71
FACTS

While Liberal party was holding a public meeting in Manila for presentation of
candidates in gen elections, 2 grenades were thrown, 8 were injured.
Marcos then issued PP 889suspended the privilege of the WOHC (A7,S10)
--crimes of insurrection/ rebellion
**REASON: there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist grp
Petitions for WOHC were filed having been arrested wo warrant and then detained,
upon authority of proclamationasail its validity + their detention
Lansang were invided by PC headed by Garcia for interrogation & investigation
he questioned the validity of the suspension of writ
AVRRING: that the suspension does not meet constitutional reqs
ISSUE: WN suspension declared by pres is constitutional - Y
HELD:
Pres didnt act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889- not unconstitutional
Pursuant to the principle of sepa of pow underlying our sys of govt, executive is
supreme w/in his own sphere. Howev, it is not absolute. It goes in hand w the sys of
checks and balances under wc exec is supreme as regard the suspension of the
privy , but only if and when he acts w/in sphere allocated to him by basic law.
Dismissing petitions
There is a valid suspension as it complied w the requirements that there was
invasion, insurrection or rebellion pursuant to S10,A7 and imminent danger and
oublic safety must require suspension both conditions-present.