Deception and Media Misinformation in Wartime - The Cases of Private Lynch and Corporal Tillman

Deception and Media
Misinformation in Wartime
The Cases of Corporal Tillman and Private
Lynch
University of Manchester POLI30300

Dissertation 2015
Student Number: 8354397; Degree Programme:
Politics and Modern History; Supervisor: Cristina
Masters; 14,930 words
8354397
PAGE 1 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Abstract
Using the evidence from the 2008 Report by the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, together with other sources, this
dissertation argues that the U.S. government utilised the stories of Private
Lynch and Corporal Tillman engaged in tactics of deceptive organised
political persuasion, or propaganda, in order to retain support for their
Global War on Terror.
This dissertation outlines the historical usage of propaganda during

wartime, drawing parallels with these contemporary examples of
campaigns of propaganda, and concludes that the use of deception has
led to an endemic failure of democratic accountability concerning our
politicians and leaders.
8354397
PAGE 2 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Contents
1) Introduction...4
i) Research Questions....8
2) A History of Propaganda in Wartime..10
3) The Case of Private Lynch...20
i) Background....20
ii) Saving Private Lynch
22
iii) Deception.....26
4) The Case of Corporal Tillman.....32
i) Background.....33
ii) The cover-up..37
iii) Deception......46
5) Conclusions....56
6) Bibliography of Sources.....59
8354397
PAGE 3 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Introduction
Corporal Patrick Tillman and Private Jessica Lynch are two of
the most famous soldiers from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 1, and
their stories are among the most seminal wartime news media
events of the 21st century. Private Lynchs capture and subsequent
rescue in April 2003 and Corporal Tillmans death in April 2004
provided the media in the United States with compelling human
interest stories, and provided, for the United States military and
government, a welcome distraction from difficult events in Iraq and
Afghanistan. However, it later emerged that parts of both stories had
been fabricated or manipulated, fuelled by the propagation of
misleading information. A 2008 Report by the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform determined that the actions of
the US government and military were, in large part, the reason for
the dissemination of this misinformation.2
1 U.S. House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Misleading

Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes Together with
Additional Views (110 H. Rpt. 858), p.1.
2 U.S. House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Misleading

Information from the Battlefield, p.48.
8354397
PAGE 4 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Using the findings of the Committee, together with evidence from

other sources, this dissertation will argue that the propagation of
misinformation was a deliberate act on the part of the United States
government and military in order to propagandise the stories of
Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch. These two soldiers, who
sacrificed everything in fighting for their country, became tools in a
campaign of wartime propaganda, designed to retain support for a
Global War on Terror that lacked a reasonable justification.
The central argument of this dissertation concerns the issue of

propaganda, and particularly its deployment during wartime.
Governments throughout history have utilised tactics of propaganda
during times of conflict for, broadly speaking, similar reasons: in
order to keep a population on side, and in support of a war effort; as
soon as a government loses domestic support for its foreign policy, it
becomes very difficult to recover. Campaigns of propaganda are
important tools in preventing this occurrence. This dissertation
argues that, although its deployment has become more covert, the
very same tactics of propaganda are still being used today, and for
precisely the same reasons. Focusing on the case-studies of Corporal
Tillman and Private Lynch specifically, I argue that the U.S.
government carried out a concerted campaign of misinformation, of
propaganda, during the Global War on Terror, in an effort to retain
8354397
PAGE 5 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
credibility and support domestically for controversial foreign policy

decisions. That its deployment has become more covert is
particularly important, because it has led to a failure of
accountability and this is an issue that urgently needs addressing.
Eric Herring and Piers Robinsons recent work, including their

articles Report X Marks the Spot: The British Governments
Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD3, and Deception and Britains
Road to War in Iraq4 has provided a framework from which to
develop this argument. They abandon the term propaganda, in
favour of organised political persuasion, a tactic that has utility
given the negative connotations the former term has attracted.
Furthermore, their framework attempts to distinguish between
deceptive and non-deceptive organised political persuasion.
Propaganda, or organised political persuasion, is a commonly used
tool of all governments; Herring and Robinson conceive of organised
political persuasion as, broadly speaking, a deliberate and
systematic attempt to shape perceptions in order to gain support for
3 Robinson and Herring, Report X Marks the Spot: The British Governments
Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD.
4 Piers Robinson and Eric Herring, Deception and Britains Road to War in Iraq,
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 8 (2014), pp 213-232.
8354397
PAGE 6 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
a policy.5 Governments use organised political persuasion in

attempt to influence public opinion regarding a policy, or set of
policies. According to Herring and Robinson, it is not always a bad
thing, with sinister or nefarious motivations. There is, what they
refer to as, non-deceptive organised political persuasion, which is
conducted honestly and without involving an effort to deceive. 6 By
contrast, deceptive organised political persuasion involves
persuasion of the public in ways that are misleading, and is done in
three main ways: deception through lying (making a knowingly false
statement), deception through omission (knowingly withholding
important information) and deception through distortion (framing
statements in a knowingly misleading way).7 Governments use
deceptive organised political persuasion in attempt to manipulate
public opinion when honest, or non-deceptive, tactics of persuasion
would be ineffective.
Thus, the use of organised political persuasion is not of any
particular interest in and of itself. Whether it is referred to as spin,
propaganda or perception management, all governments use it to
some degree, and not always necessarily in a manipulative or
5 Robinson and Herring, Deception and Britains Road to War in Iraq, p.217.
6 Robinson and Herring, Deception, p.217.
7 Robinson and Herring, Deception, pp. 217-218.
8354397
PAGE 7 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
duplicitous manner. However, in the cases of Tillman and Lynch, this

dissertation argues that organised political persuasion was used in
a deceptive manner, in an attempt to mislead the public. This is why
these two case-studies are of particular importance: it is not that the
U.S. government simply tried to persuade the public of the virtues of
its foreign policy decisions in an honest manner; instead, they
misled, and misinformed. They deceived the public into supporting
their foreign policy aims, and the cases of Corporal Tillman and
Private Lynch were used as part of these tactics of deception but,
because of the increased covertness of these tactics of organised
political persuasion, it has become increasingly difficult to hold
anyone accountable for this deception.
Herring and Robinsons framework is particularly useful

because it distinguishes between these two types of organised
political persuasion. It recognises that the use of organised political
persuasion is not of any particular interest in and of itself, but that
the key issue of importance is the use of deception, because this,
in effect, articulates how governments deliberately lie to and
mislead their citizens on a large scale. By applying Herring and
Robinsons conceptual framework of organised political persuasion
to the cases of Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch, this dissertation
argues exactly that: the U.S. government utilised deception in its
8354397
PAGE 8 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
campaign of propaganda during the Global War on Terror, and lied

to its citizens in an effort to retain credibility and support
domestically for controversial foreign policy decisions.
Research Questions
Using the conceptual framework developed by Herring and
Robinson, I will address the following two questions:
1) In the cases of both Lynch and Tillman, was misinformation
propagated, on the part of the U.S. government and military, in
an attempt to influence public opinion? Can their actions be
classified as organised political persuasion? (RQ1)
2) To what extent was there an attempt to intentionally deceive the
public? Can their actions be classified as deceptive organised
political persuasion? (RQ2)
The first research question concerns whether the U.S.

government and military attempted, on any level, to appropriate the
Tillman and Lynch stories for their own ends, i.e. as part of a
propaganda (or organised political persuasion) campaign. If they
were engaging in a practice of spreading misinformation regarding
the two stories, was this part of a wider attempt to influence public
opinion in relation to the Global War on Terror? Both stories
occurred at times of acute political pressure for the Bush
8354397
PAGE 9 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
administration, at times when there may have been a perception

that the war in Iraq was unpopular, or unwinnable. Doubtless, the
Tillman and Lynch stories, at least initially, represented something of
a coup for the government, in terms of perception management. The
first research question aims to answer whether such a coup was
merely fortunate timing, or whether it was deliberately engineered
in an attempt to influence public opinion.
The second research question follows on from this. If the
handling of the Tillman and Lynch stories amounted to an attempt to
influence public opinion (if it amounted to organised political
persuasion), can these attempts be understood within the context of
an intention to deceive? In other words, was this deceptive
organised political persuasion? Were these stories propagandised in
a more obviously cynical or nefarious way than might otherwise
have been the case? Furthermore, if an intention to deceive was
present, by what means was the deception employed? With respect
to Herring and Robinsons conceptual framework, can the deception
be understood as: deception through lying (making a knowingly
false statement), deception through omission (knowingly
withholding important information) or deception through distortion
(framing statements in a knowingly misleading way)?
8354397
PAGE 10 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
This dissertation is divided into four sections: the first entails a

brief history of the use of propaganda in wartime. This functions as a
literature review, outlining the current academic standpoints on the
issue, and drawing historical parallels with the contemporary use of
propaganda. The second and third sections apply Herring and
Robinsons conceptual framework to the cases of Private Lynch and
Corporal Tillman in turn, in an attempt to answer the above research
questions, whilst the final section considers the significance of the
two case-studies, asks questions about the endemic lack of
accountability in contemporary propaganda campaigns, and
concludes the paper.
A History of Propaganda in
Wartime
Propaganda has, over time, become an unavoidably loaded
term. Perhaps its most common association now is with Nazi
Germany and Joseph Goebbels, who perfected the art of wartime
propaganda. One tends to think of propaganda as inherently
dishonest and manipulative. Indeed, Goebbels himself lamented the
words negative reputation: Propaganda is a much maligned and
often misunderstood word. The layman uses it to mean something
inferior or even despicable. The word propaganda always has a
8354397
PAGE 11 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
bitter aftertaste.8 It is perhaps ironic then that his actions, more

than anyone elses, perpetuated the pejorative and sinister
application of the term. However, in its broadest sense, propaganda
does not necessarily have to be a nefarious, or cynically
manipulative practice. Randal Marlin describes propaganda as
simply the attempt to shape the thoughts and feelings of others in
ways confirming to the aims of the communicator. 9 Similarly, David
Welch: propaganda is the dissemination of ideas intended to
convince people to think and act in a particular way and for a
particular persuasive purpose.10 Governments engaging in
propaganda (and all governments do) are not always doing so for
entirely sinister reasons: there is propaganda aimed at getting
people to give up smoking, for example. No-one would argue the
merits of engaging in that kind of propaganda however, when one
considers the employment of propaganda in times of war, the terms
more sinister and manipulative tendencies often come to the fore.
8 David Welch, Propaganda: Power and Persuasion (London, 2013), p.2.
9 Randal Marlin, Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion (Peterborough ON,

2013 (2nd ed.)), p.35.
10 Welch, Propaganda: Power and Persuasion, p.2.
8354397
PAGE 12 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
The idea of propaganda can be traced back to Ancient Greece, and

is closely associated with rhetoric, the ancient worlds equivalent of
contemporary propaganda. The orator Pericles speech during the
Peloponnesian War in 431 BC is one of the first recorded examples of
wartime propaganda, where he paid tribute to the Athenians who
had been killed in battle, and persuaded the survivors to continue
fighting by appealing to the inherent virtues of Athenians and
Athenian society. His techniques have influenced political leaders
throughout history.11 Aristotle was one of the most prolific writers on
the principles of rhetoric which, he argued, was based on three
things: ethos (personal character of the speaker), pathos (emotional
receptivity) and logos (the argument itself).12 In his depiction of
rhetoric, one can identify similarities with modern day propaganda:
the use of a speaker that the audience will trust, of vivid examples
to illustrate points, and the importance of the receptivity of the
audience, amongst other things.
From Pericles onwards, propaganda has often been deployed by

leaders and governments in times of war and conflict. Marlin
describes how atrocity propaganda played an important part in
11 Marlin, Propaganda, p.37.
12 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (London, 1991).
8354397
PAGE 13 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
fuelling the wars of the Crusades, starting in the twelfth century. As

described by Robert the Monk, Pope Urban II in particular made use
of vivid imagery depicting gross acts of cruelty by the Turks to
motivate Christians to take up the sword against them. 13 Likewise,
it was an important tool in the French Revolution and was used
effectively by Napoleon to consolidate his dominance over France,
and much of Europe.14 One can see, throughout history, how
propaganda was used in times of war and conflict in order to keep a
population on side, in support of a war effort and inspired to
continue fighting. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that
many wars only lasted as long as they did as a result of propaganda.
This is possibly why the term has attracted so many negative

connotations over the years, particularly when considered in relation
to war. But it wasnt until the 20th century that, as a result of
developments in print and media, propaganda came into its own.
The technological advancements in media enabled, for the first time,
propagandists to reach out to a mass audience, through daily
newspapers, radio broadcasts and film. The First World War brought
a seminal transformation in propaganda. It also gave rise to many of
8354397
PAGE 14 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
the negative connotations we still associate with the term to this

day, as Welch states: it wasbetween 1914 and 1918 that the
wholesale employment of propaganda as an organised weapon of
modern warfare served to transform the popular understanding of its
meaning into something more sinister.15 The governments of those
countries engaged in conflict saw the importance of engaging in a
sustained propaganda campaign in order to keep morale high in the
home countries, sap the enemys will and even persuade other, nonbelligerent countries, to their cause. Like Pope Urban in the twelfth
century, both the British and the German governments recognised
the necessity of atrocity propaganda. Thus, the British pointed to the
sinking of the passenger vessel, the Lusitania, in 1915 as a blatant
example of German barbarism, as Taylor states: it served to
reinforce precisely the stereotype of the Hun that British propaganda
had been trying to create.16 Likewise, Germany pointed to the
barbaric actions of the Russians on the Eastern Front, as proof that
the Germans were fighting to defend civility and humanity against
barbarism.17 Most scholars agree that the First World War marked
15 Welch, Propaganda, p.15.
16 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the

Ancient World to the Present Day (Manchester, 2003), p.178.
17 Troy Paddock, Word War I and Propaganda (Leiden, 2014), p.2.
8354397
PAGE 15 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
the emergence of the properly organised, heavily funded,

government propaganda machines, aimed at a mass audience. In
other words, the First World War was the first real propaganda war,
in the contemporary sense. The Second World War built upon and
developed these propaganda machines still further. Propaganda
effectively became an essential part of warfare, almost as important
as the physical act of fighting itself. Nazi propaganda was arguably
the culmination of the multi-layered, multi-faceted complex
propaganda machine, that manipulated and deceived on an
immeasurably large scale.18 The Second World War was, according to
Taylor, the greatest propaganda battle in the history of warfare. 19
Nevertheless, propaganda has continued to play a crucial role in
international conflict post-WWII. Framed as a monumental battle
between two contesting ideologies, both sides in the Cold War relied
heavily on domestic propaganda campaigns, predicated on fear and
paranoia, in order to retain support for their actions and the mass
media, now a powerful and pervasive influence in citizens everyday
lives, played a willing role in fuelling the paranoia, as Taylor explains
with reference to the propaganda campaign in the USA:
19 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p.208.
8354397
PAGE 16 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Culminating in the sordid McCarthyite witch-hunts of the early

1950s, this campaign
created a climate of fear in which
sympathy for the Enemy was equated with sympathy for
the
Devil. The conversion of a former wartime ally into a peacetime

enemy was fuelled by
media representation of post-war
events in a specifically hostile light. The Red Menace was
not just
a threat to Europe and Asia: it threatened the very existence of the

American way of
life itself. Books, magazines, films and even
the new medium of television were scrutinized by
self-
appointed watchdog groups of red-hunters, often sponsored by the

FBI to create an
atmosphere in which no view of the Russians
other than as demons could be tolerated.20
Three things are important to note about Cold War propaganda:

firstly, it was almost uniformly manipulative: it shaped citizens fear
and paranoia in line with government will. By any reasonable
standard, most of it was deceptive. Secondly, thanks to the
emergence of mass media as a hegemonic force in society, it
became more effective. During the second half of the twentieth
century, the mass medias importance in society grew and, with it,
their ability to influence public opinion. Furthermore, the perception
20 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p.259.
8354397
PAGE 17 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
that the media was independent of government helped to legitimise

the propaganda. Thirdly, for those who wanted to see it, it was quite
open and obvious; it was not difficult to identify the propaganda
campaigns that both the American and Soviet governments were
engaged in throughout the Cold War.
In the post-Cold War era, propaganda, whilst still manipulative and

reliant on a compliant media, has become more covert. Whilst most
scholars still recognise the role it has played in 21st century
conflicts, the general publics perception of propaganda appears less
acute. One of the reasons for this is possibly the near total
abandonment of the term propaganda when referring to
contemporary persuasion tactics. Because of the negative
connotations the word has picked up throughout its long, often
ignominious, history, modern-day governments tend to refer to their
propaganda campaigns as spin, perception management, public
diplomacy, or in other such euphemistic terms. No political or
military leader would admit to utilising propaganda, but all
governments still use the very same techniques in one form or
another. Indeed, most scholars agree that propaganda has been a
vital tool in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and, more broadly, the
War on Terror. For David Miller, the propaganda machine has never
been more powerful:
8354397
PAGE 18 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Since 11 September 2001, both the US and UK governments

have comprehensively
overhauled their
internal and
external propaganda apparatus. These have been globally coordinated as never before to justify the war on terror
including the attacks on Afghanistan
and Iraq and the assault on
civil liberties at home. To win the war on Iraq the US and UK

governments evidently believed that they could not rely on the
media to report consistently in
conformity with the official line.
Consequently there has been serious investment in an

extensive machinery of propaganda.21
Welch emphasises the psychological operations (psyops) that

American and British forces engaged in during the 2003 Iraq War as
a major example of the propaganda war of the 21st century:
US and British coalition forces intensified the use of psychological

operations. The United
States employed its long tradition of
radio psyops, which could be traced back to Vietnam.

Broadcasts were used in Afghanistan after 9/11 to persuade
21 David Miller, Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on
Iraq (London, 2004), p.80.
8354397
PAGE 19 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
citizens to reveal Taliban and al- Qaeda factions. In the Iraq War, the
United States engaged in a comprehensive airwaves
campaign to soften its enemy and soothe its population at
home.22
Scholars such as Deepa Kumar and John Pilger argue that

propaganda played an important role in justifying the wars in
Afghanistan and, particularly, Iraq. Kumar argues the Bush
administration resorted to propaganda in order to justify its war on
Iraq and the news media simply presented as fact information they
should have carefully scrutinised.23 Likewise, John Pilger refers to
the media channeling what turned out to be crude propaganda
had journalists done their job, had they questioned and investigated
the propaganda instead of amplifying it, hundreds of thousands of
men, women and children might be alive today. 24 It is interesting
that both emphasise the failings of the media and criticise them for
blithely and unquestioningly amplifying the propaganda of the
22 Welch, Propaganda, pp.191-192.
23 Deepa Kumar, Media, War and Propaganda: Strategies of Information

Management During the 2003 Iraq War Communication and Critical Cultural
Studies 3 (2006), pp. 48-69 (p.48).
24 John Pilger, War by Media and the Triumph of Propaganda, 5 December 2014,
retrieved from http://johnpilger.com/articles/war-by-media-and-the-triumph-ofpropaganda.
8354397
PAGE 20 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
government. The scholarly consensus is that the contemporary

Western media, most notably in the USA, tend to conform to an
elite-driven model of media-state relations; that is to say, in the
context of war, the media is broadly supportive of the government
and its aims.25 Herman and Chomsky advocate a Propaganda Model
which lists five filters through which media coverage is shaped by
elites: ownership, funding, sourcing, flak and anti-communism/fear
ideology. Similarly, Gadi Wolfsfeld summaries the medias role in
wartime as akin to that of a faithful servant dutifully providing
services to their Allied master26, Lance Bennetts Indexing
Hypotheses highlights how journalists tend to privilege elite
sources, and index news coverage to elite debate27 and Robert
Entmans model of Cascading Activation demonstrates how
interpretative frames activate and spread from the top level of a
stratified system (the White House) to the network of non
25 Piers Robinson, Peter Goddard, Katy Parry, Craig Murray and Philip M. Taylor,
Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion
of Iraq (Manchester, 2010), p.34.
26Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East
(Cambridge, 1997), p.197.
27 Lance Bennett, Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United

States, Journal of Communication 2 (1990), pp. 103-127.
8354397
PAGE 21 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
administration elites, and on to news organisations, their texts, and

the public.28
There is little serious academic disagreement on the fact that the

media conform to an elite-driven model of media-state relations.
What this effectively means is that, in the elite-driven model, the
media has become an important and faithful tool of government led
propaganda. Whilst academics are generally agreed upon this theory
of media-state relations, and most tend to recognise the important
role propaganda has played in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
debate has, for some time, lacked a clear conceptual framework to
guide discussion. The notion of propaganda has been thrown
around frequently when discussing the American and British
governments actions in their War on Terror but it seems to have
lacked clarity: there has not been a clear understanding of what
propaganda is, what this unavoidably loaded term refers to, and how
it has been employed with relation to Afghanistan and Iraq. Herring
and Robinsons conceptual framework of organised political
persuasion rectifies these problems, and provides a clear insight
into what contemporary propaganda entails and how it has been
utilised. It does this by distinguishing clearly between deceptive
28 Robert M. Entman, Cascading Activation: Contesting the White Houses
Frame After 9/11, Political Communication 20 (2003), pp. 415-432 (p.415).
8354397
PAGE 22 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
and non-deceptive organised political persuasion, and detailing the

specific ways in which governments deceive, i.e. through lying,
omission and distortion.
In summary, though contemporary propaganda has become

more covert, there are clear historical constants from which to draw
when assessing its modern day usage. Throughout history,
propaganda has been deployed in wartime in order to retain
domestic support, to convince the public of the virtues of the war
that is being fought, and to remind them that their fellow citizens
are not dying in vain. As I will now discuss further, these are
precisely the reasons why the U.S. government utilised the stories of
Private Lynch and Corporal Tillman in their campaign of organised
political persuasion during the Global War on Terror.
8354397
PAGE 23 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
The Case of Private Lynch

The case of Private Lynch was one of the most significant
media stories during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. John

Kampfner describes it as one of the most stunning pieces of news
management yet conceived29, whilst Robinson et al. refer to it as a
pseudo-event.a stage-managed affair designed to achieve
maximum publicity.30 Scholars have explored the storys
implications for our understanding of the complex relationship
29 John Kampfner (15 May, 2003), The Truth about Jessica, The Guardian,
retrieved from guardian.com.
8354397
PAGE 24 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
between gender and war31, amongst other things but there has been
little sustained engagement with the case from a standpoint of
deception. This chapter will examine the utility of the case of Private
Lynch as a tool of organised political persuasion and the role
deception played in crafting Jessica Lynchs story into the perfect
piece of political propaganda.
Background
The beginnings of this good news story originate at a time of acute
political pressure for the Bush administration. Occurring early on in
the Iraq War, around a month after President Bushs infamous
mission accomplished speech32, the Lynch story broke immediately
after what is now referred to as the week of wobble in which, as
Robinson et al. explain, coverage of the war had become largely
negotiated as the coalition encountered higher levels of resistance
than expected and journalists developed a more questioning line
30 Piers Robinson, Peter Goddard, Katy Parry, Craig Murray and Philip M. Taylor.
Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War and Theory in the 2003 Invasion
of Iraq (Manchester, 2010), p.132.
31 Veronique Pin-Fat and Maria Stern, The Scripting of Private Jessica Lynch:
Biopolitics, Gender and the 'Feminization' of the US Military Alternatives: Global,
Local, Political 30 (2005), pp. 25-53.
32 Scott Lindlaw (2003, 2 May), Bush: Allied Forces Prevailed in Iraq, Associated
Press News Service.
8354397
PAGE 25 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
towards the progress of the war.33 Now was an ideal time for a
good news story to emerge, a story that was favourable to the US
government and diverted attention away from the difficulties that
were beginning to characterise the coalitions progress in Iraq. The
capture and subsequent rescue of Private Jessica Lynch was the
ideal good news story for the government, seemingly a triumph of
good timing and coincidence: the Lynch story contributed to a
turnaround in early April when supportive coverage returned to
dominate media representation of the war.34 In other words, the
Lynch story did its job of managing perceptions and rebuilding media
and public support for the war effort. Private Lynchs personal
narrative provided a human interest angle to the war, an angle
which, in my view, serves to sanitise the violence and death of a
conflict by drawing attention away from the deaths of civilians and
military personnel and focusing instead on the brave actions of
certain specific individuals. By embodying an entire conflict in a few
individuals personal narratives, the broader, more unpalatable
aspects of that conflict are inevitably lost or forgotten about.
33 Robinson et al., Pockets of Resistance, p.135.
8354397
PAGE 26 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Jessica Lynchs story, however, is somewhat more complicated than

simply a triumph of good timing and coincidence: as one digs
deeper, a sense begins to emerge that the whole event was
deliberately engineered in an attempt to influence public opinion. It
begins to look like propaganda, or organised political persuasion.
Kumar argues that Jessica Lynch, rather than being a symbol of
progress for her gender, was just another tool in the US
governments tactics of propaganda:
This is not a step forward for women. Instead, the Lynch

rescue narrative, I argue,
served to forward the aims of war
propaganda. The story of the dramatic rescue of a young,

vulnerable woman, at a time when the war was not going well
for the US, acted as the means
by which a controversial war could
be talked about in emotional rather than rational terms
In short,
the Lynch story, far from putting forward an image of womens

strength and
autonomy, reveals yet another mechanism by
which they are strategically used to win support for war.35
Saving Private Lynch
35 Deepa Kumar, War Propaganda and the (ab)uses of Women: Media

Constructions of the Jessica Lynch Story, Feminist Media Studies 4, pp. 297-313
(p.297).
8354397
PAGE 27 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Private First Class Jessica Lynch, a member of the US Armys 507th

Maintenance Company, was captured by Iraqi forces on March 23,
2003, after her convoy had taken a wrong turn and headed into
territory controlled by Iraqi forces.36 Severely injured when her
vehicle crashed into another convoy vehicle, Lynch was taken by her
captors to a military hospital, and later to the Saddam Hussein
General Hospital in An Nasiriyah. According to the House Report:
For the next seven days, Iraqi hospital staff treated Private
Lynchs life-threatening
wounds, which included numerous
shattered bones. During that time, Marines
conducting
operations in the area learned that Private Lynch was being held at
the hospital
Late on the night of April 1, 2003, a US special
forces unit rescued Private Lynch [from the hospital].37
These established facts have never been in dispute, however, as

news of the story began to break across US news media, the
narrative of Private Lynch began to diverge from these facts and the
story became embellished with misinformation. This occurred in two
main ways: firstly, a narrative emerged that Lynch had bravely
36 U.S. House. Misleading Information from the Battlefield, p.41.
8354397
PAGE 28 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
resisted her capture, and had shot at the Iraqi forces. She, in turn,
had purportedly been shot. The origin of this narrative was an April
3rd Washington Post story, entitled She Was Fighting to the
Death.38 Citing government officials, this article was the first source
to suggest Private Lynch was firing her weapon until she ran out of
ammunition, and that she sustained multiple gunshot wounds. 39
From here on in, this idea was widely reported by US news media as
fact.40 The narrative, however, was false, as Lynch herself later
explained: tales of great heroism were being told.the story of the
little girl Rambo from the hills who went down fighting. It was not
true.41 Furthermore, the Iraqi doctor who treated her, told John
Kampfner that Private Lynch did not sustain any bullet wounds:
there was no shooting, no bullet inside her body, no stab wound only RTA, road traffic accident.42
38 Susan Schmidt and Vernon Loeb (April 3, 2003), She Was Fighting to the
Death; Details Emerging of W. Va. Soldiers Capture and Rescue, Washington
Post.
39 Schmidt and Loeb, She was Fighting to the Death.
42 John Kampfner, The Truth about Jessica.
8354397
PAGE 29 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
The second narrative construction concerned Lynchs rescue by US

special forces. The impression that government and military officials
gave to the media was that this was a daring and supremely
dangerous night-time rescue, and that, in the words of General
Vincent Brooks who announced details of the rescue operation to
journalists, there had been fire fights outside of the building,
getting in and out.43 This impression was further bolstered by the
release of a four-minute video of the operation, which showed US
forces arriving by helicopter and bringing Private Lynch out on a
stretcher. Thus, the narrative of a daring rescue mission carried out
under fire from Iraqi forces was created entirely by the US militarys
statements and release of video footage. The US news media quickly
jumped on the story and blew it further out of proportion, but the
original propagation of misinformation came from the military
spokespeople. It was misinformation because Iraqi forces had
already left the hospital and Lynch was actually being looked after
by Iraqi medical staff who had already attempted to return her to US
forces.44 As the Committees investigation found out, Private Lynch
was rescued without significant resistance.45
8354397
PAGE 30 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Ultimately it was revealed large parts of Private Lynchs story had

been entirely fabricated. The circumstances were, in actual fact,
relatively mundane and would have been of minimal interest to the
government as a good news story or, indeed, to the media as a
good news story. With regards to RQ1, it appears that a new version
of the story was created, with highly embellished facts, and used as
a tool of organised political persuasion. As noted above, the
narrative that emerged proved favourable for the government,
returning media coverage to favourability after the week of
wobble. A Washington Post story from 3rd April 2003 explained how
useful the Lynch story was for the Bush administration:
After nearly two weeks of discouraging news from Iraq, the

White House viewed
yesterday as an excellent message
day. There were new details on the rescue of prisoner of war

Jessica Lynch by US Special Operations forces. 46
Thus, the Lynch story was particularly useful in diverting attention

away from the bad news stories that the Bush administration had
been suffering from during the so-called week of wobble.
46 White House is Revising its War Message; Setbacks Providing Lessons,

Washington Post (April 3, 2003).
8354397
PAGE 31 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Furthermore, it also provided an opportunity to reinforce the kinds of

patriotic and nationalist discourses that underpinned the war
effort.47 Robinson et al. note the use of proud, patriotic language 48
at the press briefing, and the words of Jim Wilkinson, a CENTCOM
spokesman, that America doesnt leave its heroes behindNever
has. Never will.49 demonstrate how the Lynch myth was imbued
with discourses of heroism and nationalism, much like Corporal
Tillmans story would be one year later, how it became an
opportunity to re-emphasise the bravery and exemplary attitude of
the United States military and, indeed, the country in general. It was
also a successful application of the technique of othering, a
constant feature of wartime propaganda throughout history. In much
the same way as the British used the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915
to reinforce the stereotype of the Germans that British propaganda
had been trying to create as somehow evil and brutal, with a callous
disregard for human life, or the way the ideological battle of the Cold
War was almost uniformly framed in the terms of an overly simplistic
them vs. us narrative, the story of Jessica Lynchs capture and
47 For further discussion of this, see, for example: Kumar, Media, War and
Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War.
49 American Troops Rescue Iraq POW Lynch, Associated Press (April 1, 203).
8354397
PAGE 32 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
rescue seemed to reinforce a negative portrayal of Americas

enemies in its Global War on Terror as, once again, somehow evil,
brutal and with a callous disregard for human life. That 12,125
civilians had been killed in Iraq during the year 2003 as a direct
result of U.S. involvement in the country50, hardly seemed to matter
much at all.
The myth of Private Lynchs capture and subsequent rescue was an

attempt to influence public opinion in certain ways. Further, this
attempt to influence public opinion was made possible by the spread
of misinformation concerning the facts of the case. As noted above,
the misinformation originated with government and military sources.
Thus, when answering the first research question - was
misinformation propagated, on the part of the U.S. government and
military, in an attempt to influence public opinion? - in the case of
Private Lynch, the answer is yes. The story of Private Lynch, as
propagated by the U.S. government and military, was not only an
attempt to persuade the public that this was a successful rescue
mission against all the odds, it was also utilised as a symbolic story
of the inherent bravery and virtue of the American people. It
perhaps even alluded to the inherent bravery and virtue of U.S.
50 Iraq Body Count, accessible at www.iraqbodycount.org/database.
8354397
PAGE 33 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
foreign policy: that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were justified.
Moreover, it furthered the creation of a dangerous and disingenuous
us vs. them narrative that, at one stroke, condemned Americas
enemies for the very same crimes it had already absolved itself of.
In this way, the actions of the US government and military can be
classified as organised political persuasion.
Deception
Having established that the handling of the Lynch story
constituted an attempt at organised political persuasion, it is now
necessary to examine what role deception played in supporting and
strengthening these tactics of persuasion. Returning to the
Washington Post story from April 3rd:
After nearly two weeks of discouraging news from Iraq, the

White House viewed
yesterday as an excellent message
day. There were new details on the rescue of prisoner of
war
Jessica Lynch by US Special Operations forces. 51
51 White House is Revising its War Message; Setbacks Providing Lessons,

Washington Post (April 3, 2003).
8354397
PAGE 34 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
As the Committees Report noted, those new details, however,

included an entirely fictional account of her capture. 52 Selfevidently, this points to the use of deception: the Lynch story that
had become the tool of organised political persuasion was not what
happened to Jessica Lynch; as the Report stated, it was pure fiction.
If the story was false, then that suggests that deception would have
had to play a role somewhere. Furthermore, this was not simply a
case of ignorance of information: the initial reports of Private Lynchs
capture and rescue were entirely factually accurate, it was only after
the storys potential utility as a propaganda tool was identified, that
the false information began to spread. The Committees Report
concurs:
It is not uncommon for initial battlefield reports to have factual

inaccuracies, since they are
often written in difficult
circumstances and under intense time pressures. Subsequent

reports
then correct the record. The opposite was true, though,
in Private Lynchs case. The initial
reporting was accurate. It was
the subsequent stories that invented new facts. This unusual
8354397
PAGE 35 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
situation raised concerns that the misinformation might be

part of a deliberate propaganda strategy.53
My examination of the case identified deception occurring in

two major ways: there were certain specific examples of deception
through lying but, more broadly, deception through distortion was
practiced. Deception through lying occurred with the multiple
knowingly false statements that were made by government and
military spokespeople: General Brooks line that there was fire
fights outside of the building, getting in and out was
unsubstantiated and contributed to painting a false picture of
Lynchs rescue. Also, Navy Captain Frank Thorp, a CENTCOM public
affairs officer, made similarly false statements to the Military Times
concerning Lynchs capture: [Lynch] waged quite a battle prior to
her captureshe fired her [M-16 rifle] until she had no more
ammunition.54 Along with the Washington Post story, this article
formed the basis of the misinformation that soon began to circulate
in the media. Again, this claim was knowingly false and
unsubstantiated. Original reports of Lynchs capture were accurate
and did not describe her waging quite a battle. If there even was
54 Remains Found at Iraqi Hospital to be Flown to U.S., Military Times (April 3,

2003).
8354397
PAGE 36 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
one, the source of this false information is unknown. However, the

government and military made no attempts to correct the false
information: it wasnt until newspaper stories emerged in The
Guardian and the Washington Post, in May and June 2003
respectively55 that the public learnt the more accurate version of
Private Lynchs story. If there had been no deliberate attempt to
deceive, one would expect the misinformation to have been
corrected, by the government and military themselves, much
sooner.
In summary then, the organised political persuasion in part relied on

specific examples of deception through lying in order to directly
spread misinformation and build a media narrative favourable to the
government and military. However, I found that the construction of
such a narrative relied more heavily on the broader tactics of
deception through distortion. This did not involve outright lying,
rather it involved more subtle techniques of framing statements and
events in such a way so as to shape the media narrative in a
favourable manner. Robinson et al. explain:
55 Kampfner (15 May, 2003), The Truth about Jessica; A Broken Body, a Broken
Story, Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch - Still in Hospital After 67
Days - Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington
Post (June 17, 2003). The Committees Report noted that, although the military
conducted two separate investigations into the Lynch case, neither investigation
addressed the misinformation aspects of the story.
8354397
PAGE 37 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
What made it [the story] so successful was the conjunction of

coalition aims to
promote a good news story and
news media imperatives for an exciting story that would appeal
to
readers and viewers. In this sense, media management involved

channelling the right kind of information - not only good news for
the coalition, but also good copy for journalists -
towards an
attentive and hungry media. In practice, coalition briefers only had

to suggest the
possibility of a dramatic and daring rescue
Directed in this way, journalists could then be
relied upon to fill
in the gaps and present, ultimately, a dramatically distorted account

to the
public which, in turn, benefitted the coalition.56
The focus was on nudging the media in the right direction and
allowing them to fill in the gaps. Although I have demonstrated
certain examples of deception through lying, this tactic was by no
means widespread. By leaving the details somewhat ambiguous and
simply giving suggestions of some of the more incredible parts of
the story (i.e. the daring rescue mission), government and military
officials knew they were essentially letting the story write itself, and
write itself in the most favourable manner possible for them.
8354397
PAGE 38 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
In line with Herring and Robinsons conceptual framework, I am

describing this tactic as deception through distortion. The fourminute video of the rescue mission, which was released by
CENTCOM during the initial press briefing, is not false in the sense
that the events being portrayed did not occur. The video contains
actual footage of the rescue operation, shot using green-tinted night
vision cameras that give it an almost video-game like feel. The
deceptive aspect of the video occurred with the way the operation
was carried out and, later, edited. It was entirely stage-managed, in
order to construct the perfect conclusion to the Lynch capture and
rescue story. An Iraqi doctor present on the ground described the
rescue like a Hollywood film. They cried, Go, go, go, with guns and
blanks and the sound of explosions. They made a show - an action
movie like Sylvester Stallone or Jackie Chan, with jumping and
shouting, breaking down doors.57 The reality of the rescue operation
was so thoroughly distorted by careful stage management and
editing that the journalists who were at the press briefing and
watched the video had only one conclusion to draw. This distortion,
combined with the few instances of outright deception through lying
noted earlier, was enough for the military and governments
57 Kampfner (15 May, 2003), The Truth about Jessica.
8354397
PAGE 39 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
preferred narrative (the narrative that maximised the organised

political persuasion potential of the story) to become, effectively,
established fact in the media. This largely followed Entmans model
of Cascading Activation, in which interpretative frames activate
and spread from the top level of a stratified system (the White
House) to the network of non administration elites, and on to news
organisations, their texts, and the public.58 The government relied
upon the media to accept the deceptive organised political
persuasion they had carefully designed who, in turn, passed it on to
their consumers, i.e. the general public. In this way, the media
played a key role in magnifying the tactics of deception the US
government and military employed in the Jessica Lynch case.
The Case of Corporal

Tillman
Like Private Lynchs story, the case of the death of Corporal Pat
Tillman has become one of the most controversial and widely
discussed media stories of the War on Terror.59 There have been
58 Entman, Cascading Activation: Contesting the White Houses Frame After
9/11, p.415.
59 U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Misleading

8354397
PAGE 40 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
numerous discussions and interpretations of the events surrounding

his death, with contextual framings ranging from the failings of the
U.S. government and military60, to what Tillmans life and death tells
us about what it means to be American, or what it means to be a
hero.61 Whilst there has been sustained engagement with the
misinformation and perception management implications of the
case, few scholars have focused specifically on the role deception
played in the government and militarys handling of events. In this
chapter, I will examine more closely the response of the U.S.
government and military to Corporal Tillmans death, and answer
the above research questions with specific reference to this case
study. Ultimately, together with the case study of Private Lynch, this
should provide a focused and compelling exploration of the broader
issue of deception in political propaganda.
Background
2004 was something of a difficult year for the U.S. government in
terms of foreign policy. On 1st May 2003, President Bush stood
60 The Tillman Story, Dir. Amir Bar-Lev, Passion Pictures (2010), Film.
61 Arthur W. Herbig, Discursive Characterization as Embodiment and Critique:

The Divergent Rhetorical Trajectories of Pat Tillman as an American Hero, in
Jason Edwards and David Weiss (eds.), The Rhetoric of American Exceptionalism:
Critical Essays (Jefferson, 2011).
8354397
PAGE 41 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln and declared to the nation that it
was mission accomplished in Iraq.62 However, operations did not
cease there and, contrary to Bushs declaration, the conflict actually
intensified. 310 American soldiers were killed in 2003 in the months
following Bushs speech, and 849 more were killed in 2004.63 The
rise in military deaths contributed to falling support for the war
effort in Iraq amongst the American public by the beginning of 2004,
as it was becoming increasingly clear that the war was not going to
be won quickly (despite the Presidents assertions that it already had
been won). Though 2005 is generally considered to be the year in
which public opinion turned radically against the government with
regards to Iraq64, the tide began to turn in 2004: in March 2003, 22%
of the American public felt the decision to use military force in Iraq
was wrong; by March 2004, the number had risen to 39%. 65
Similarly, just 7% of people felt the Iraq War was going either not
too well or not at all well in March 2003 (by comparison, 88%
62 Lindlaw, Bush: Allied Forces Prevailed in Iraq.
63 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, accessible at icasualties.org.
64 Sean Aday, Chasing the Bad News: An Analysis of 2005 Iraq and Afghanistan
War Coverage on NBC and Fox News Channel, Journal of Communication 60
(2010), pp. 144-164 (p.144).
65 Pew Research Centre, Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008,
(2008, March 19), retrieved from pewresearch.org.
8354397
PAGE 42 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
thought it was going fairly or very well); by March 2004, 37% felt
it was not going well.66 These figures would only increase as time
went on, however it is clear that there was some cause for concern
for the Bush administration at the beginning of 2004. To compound
this, 2004 also happened to be an election year. Iraq and
Afghanistan would play a major role in determining the outcome of
the election and, as such, the Bush administration would wish to
minimise the negative coverage emanating from there. In line with
Bennett and Entman, most U.S. news media organisations indexed
their coverage tightly to elite sources, thus ensuring, at this point,
coverage of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan remained broadly
supportive of the government, rather than oppositional.67
Nevertheless, a good news story from Iraq, a definitive public
relations coup for the Bush administration would ensure the
retention of broad media and public support for their war. The death
of Corporal Pat Tillman presented one such opportunity.
In many ways, Corporal Tillman was already the perfect public

relations coup: his storybook narrative of turning down a
multimillion-dollar National Football League (NFL) contract to instead
66 Pew Research Centre, Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq.
67 Entman, Cascading Activation: Contesting the White Houses Frame After

9/11, Political Communication, p.415.
8354397
PAGE 43 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
enlist, alongside his brother, in the Army following 9/11 68 already

constituted a major propaganda victory for the military and the
government: he was an all-American patriot and hero who, more
than anyone, embodied the bravery and courage of those who serve
in the U.S. military.69 Stories such as Tillmans drew attention away
from issues such as military and civilian casualties in Iraq and
Afghanistan or the motivations behind the U.S. invasions of those
countries; like Jessica Lynchs story one year earlier, the story of
Corporal Tillman provided a compelling human interest narrative to
the war, which, in my view, served to sanitise its more violent and
unpalatable aspects. Tillmans decision to enlist in May 2002 was
the subject of prominent news coverage at the time.70 Already
famous in the world of American football, he became a household
name. The then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, took a
personal interest in Tillmans story, and sent him a personal note
just after he enlisted, in which he commended him for his proud
68 Josh White (2005, 4 May), Army Withheld Details About Tillmans Death, The
Washington Post, retrieved from washingtonpost.com.
69 Arthur W. Herbig, Discursive Characterization as Embodiment and Critique:

The Divergent Rhetorical Trajectories of Pat Tillman as an American Hero.
70 See, for example: Mike Freeman (2002, 1 June), Tillman Leaves N.F.L to Join
Army, New York Times, p.D7; Sam Farmer (2002, 31 May), N.F.L Player Passes
up Bucks to Take Field for Uncle Sam, The Seattle Times, p.A6.
8354397
PAGE 44 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
and patriotic decision.71 Even before his death, he became a useful

tool of organised political persuasion for the government and
military: John McCain highlighted his use as a recruiting tool,
recalling days not long ago when it was seen as uncool to join or
support the army: perhaps [those] last vestiges of the Vietnam War
have disappeared in the rubble of the World Trade Center. I dont
think there will be any doubts about his capabilities as a solider, but
also as a recruiting tool. Hell motivate other young Americans to
serve as well.72
In many ways, Pat Tillman was the most famous and recognisable
solider in the U.S. military. Naturally therefore, news of his death
nearly two years later had the potential to deal an enormous blow
to the image of the Army and the government. 73 This would have
been further exacerbated by the manner of Tillmans death: not in
the line of devastating enemy fire74 as the storybook narrative
71 U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Misleading
72 Sam Farmer (2002, 31 May), N.F.L Player Passes up Bucks to Take Field for
Uncle Sam.
73 Josh White (2005, 4 May), Army Withheld Details About Tillmans Death.
74 Silver Star Award Citation for Corporal Patrick D. Tillman, United States Army
(undated).
8354397
PAGE 45 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
might go, but killed by members of his own battalion in a friendly

fire situation.
It is perhaps curious then, that when the news of Tillmans death

emerged, the reaction of the media and public was not one of
hostility towards the military and the government; there were few
who criticised the fact that yet another young American had died on
foreign soil fighting an unjust war on behalf of the U.S. government.
There were few who lamented the series of wholly preventable
mistakes that led to Tillman being shot by one of his own. Rather,
the story of Pat Tillmans death united the nation in worship of the
all-American patriot and hero, in celebration of how this young man
saw the images of September the 11th, and seeing that evil, felt
called to defend America.75 Those are the words of President Bush
himself, commenting on Tillmans death in his speech at the White
House Correspondents Dinner in early May 2004. It typifies the
manner in which Tillmans life and untimely death came to embody
expressions of patriotism and heroism. Tillmans motivations for
enlisting are unclear: he never revealed them, thus the notion that
he felt compelled to defend America after seeing images of 9/11 is
75 President George W. Bush, Remarks at White House Correspondents Dinner

(May 1, 2004).
8354397
PAGE 46 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
unsubstantiated.76 This is one example of how the legacy of Pat

Tillman was appropriated by others and laden with overtly
nationalistic discourse, to suit their own ends. Nonetheless, why was
the initial reaction to his death in the media and amongst the
general public so uniformly uniting and positive? How did this
become a good news story for the government? The answer lies in
the fact that the truth about how Corporal Tillman died was kept
secret by the United States military and government for over a
month.
The cover-up
On 22nd April 2004, on a dirt road near the village of Sperah in
eastern Afghanistan, Corporal Tillman was shot and killed. Initially,
the U.S. Army claimed that the former professional football player
had died in the line of enemy fire, a claim which, subsequently, was
widely reported as fact across U.S. and international news media. 77
However, it soon became evident to the Army that the
circumstances of Tillmans death were rather more problematic: a

Additional Views (110 H. Rpt. 858), pp. 24-26.
77 See, for example: Bill Pennington (2004, 24 April), Ex-N.F.L Player is Killed in
Combat, New York Times, pp. D1, D7; Roland Watson (2004, 24 April), Death of
the all-American Boy, The Times, pp. 18-19.
8354397
PAGE 47 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
15-6 investigation conducted in the days following Corporal

Tillmans death reportedly concluded that[it]was a likely
fratricide78, a term used by the U.S. Army to refer to a death by
friendly fire. Members of Tillmans battalion knew what had
happened, saying they were immediately sure Tillman was killed by
a barrage of American bullets.79 Though a subsequent review of the
investigation found it to be tainted by the failure to preserve
evidence, a lack of thoroughness, and the failure to pursue
investigative leads80, the investigations main conclusion, i.e. that
Tillman was killed by friendly fire, self-evidently held true. In other
words, the U.S. Army knew almost immediately that Tillman was not
killed in the line of enemy fire, as was being reported, but that his
death was the result of fratricide. That the story being reported in
the mainstream media differed markedly from the Armys
ascertainment of the true circumstances of Tillmans death was no
mere coincidence, rather it was a result of the release of
misinformation by the Defense Department: on 23rd April, a
79 Josh White (2005, 4 May), Army Withheld Details About Tillmans Death.
80 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters

Related to the Death of Corporal Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2007)
(IPO2007E001), originally cited in U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Misleading Information from the Battlefield.
8354397
PAGE 48 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
spokesman in Afghanistan indicated that a U.S. solider (who would

be identified as Tillman later that same day) had died after a
firefight with anti-coalition militia forces about 25 miles southwest of
a U.S. base at Khost, which has been the scene of frequent
attacks.81 None of the information released by Army or government
sources in the days immediately following Tillmans death made any
mention of, or even allusion to, the possibility of fratricide being the
ultimate cause of death. Instead, statements such as the one quoted
above were framed in such a way that made it appear as if Tillman
had been killed by enemy fire, without explicitly stating it in those
terms: indicating that he had died after a firefight with anticoalition militia forces leads to only one conclusion about cause of
death, a conclusion that was seized upon and widely reported by the
U.S. and international news media. No initial attempts were made by
Army or government sources to correct the spread of misinformation
(misinformation that was caused by the very same sources subtly
oblique framing): the 2007 investigation by the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform into Tillmans death found that,
while military officials at highest levels knew within a matter of
days that Corporal Tillmans death was a likely fratricide, they did

8354397
PAGE 49 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
not share this information with the Tillman family or the public for
another month.82
With regards to RQ1, this is evidence of the propagation of

misinformation on the part of the U.S. military. Furthermore, that it
took another month to correct the misinformation suggests an
attempt to influence public opinion. The story of Corporal Tillmans
death had, bizarrely, turned into something of a good news story
for the government and the Army, and provided welcome relief from
the torrent of bad news that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had
become. In order to ensure that Tillmans death remained a good
news story, military sources made no discernible effort to correct the
misinformation that was circulating in the national and international
news media. Thus, in the case of Corporal Tillman, an initial answer
to RQ1 is that yes, misinformation was propagated, on the part of
the U.S. government and military and, yes, this did amount to an
attempt to influence public opinion. Thus, their actions might
justifiably be classified as organised political persuasion.
In order to build upon this initial answer, one needs to account

for the reasons behind the discrepancy between what government
8354397
PAGE 50 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
and military officials knew and what the media and public knew, in
more detail. Why were the media allowed, even enabled, to continue
spreading misinformation regarding Corporal Tillmans death for a
full month, even when government and military officials were
obviously in possession of the full facts of the case? Kevin Tillman,
Corporal Tillmans younger brother who served with him in
Afghanistan, alluded to one possible answer in his testimony to the
congressional hearing: To our family and friends, it was a
devastating loss [Corporal Tillmans death]. To the nation, it was a
moment of disorientationBut to others within the government, it
appears to have been an opportunity.83 Similarly, Jon Krakauer
suggests that when Tillman was killed, White House perception
managers saw an opportunity not unlike the one provided by the
Jessica Lynch debacle thirteen months earlier.84 The suggestion
implicit in both of these quotes is that the military and governments
handling of the news of Corporal Tillmans death was part of a wider
attempt to influence public opinion regarding a policy, or set of
policies, namely the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, more broadly,
the Global War on Terror; Krakauer notes that the White House
83 Kevin Tillman (2007, 24 April), Deliberate Acts of Deceit, The Guardian.

Retrieved from www.theguardian.com.
84 Jon Krakauer, Where Men Win Glory: The Odyssey of Pat Tillman (New York,
2009), ch.33.
8354397
PAGE 51 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
was frantic to come up with something to divert attention away from

the deadly quagmire that Iraq had become.85 For Krakauer, this was
a classic case of perception management on the part of the White
House. It was pure propaganda. With respect to Herring and
Robinsons conceptual framework, one might term it organised
political persuasion.
It is now necessary to ascertain when White House officials became

aware of, at the very least, the suspicion that Corporal Tillmans
death was a result of fratricide. If the government was not intending
to utilise the death as part of a strategy of organised political
persuasion, and there was even the slightest suspicion that Tillman
was killed by fratricide, their handling of the story should have been
very different, and the actions taken in the weeks following vastly
altered. Determining precisely when White House officials became
aware proves difficult, as the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform found out, because of the seemingly collective
inability of these officials to recall any specific details: none of the
White House officials interviewed by Committee staff had any
recollection of how they learned of the fratricide or what they did in
85 Krakauer, Where Men Win Glory, ch.33.
8354397
PAGE 52 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
response.86 Based solely on the information given by officials to the

Committee, it appears that no-one in the White House, including the
Secretary of Defense and the President himself, was aware that
Tillman was killed by fratricide until, perhaps, a few days before the
information was made public, on 29th May 2004. The first problem
with this official version of events is the fact that White House staff
showed intense interest in the Tillman story almost as soon as the
news broke: email records released to the House Committee show
that, in total, the White House staff sent or received nearly 200
emails relating to Corporal Tillmans death on April 23, 2004 87, the
day after he died. Many of the emails disclosed discussed the
possibility of the President releasing a statement regarding Tillmans
death, and what language and tone should be adopted in this
statement. Yet, none of the emails released made any mention of
the suspicion that Tillman may have been killed by friendly fire,
despite military officials already being aware of the suspicion at this
point. Based on the documents released by the White House in cooperation with the investigation, it seems that this information was
not immediately passed onto them by the military, nor did White
House staffers themselves seek to determine the circumstances of
8354397
PAGE 53 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Tillmans death before they began drafting their statements and

press releases. Moreover, the Report found that no one in the White
House confirmed with the military whether Corporal Tillman had
actually died. The White House also did not confirm with the military
that it could talk publicly about Corporal Tillman.88 Thus, the
assumption the Committee and, indeed, the general public is
presumably supposed to make is that there was a breakdown in the
channels of communication between government and military
officials, and the militarys knowledge of the fratricide did not reach
the White House for some weeks: this is supposed to explain why
the government acted as it did, making Tillman into a posthumous
poster boy for its failing war, the theory perhaps being that
ignorance of information is not as serious as withholding, or
manipulating information.
However, evidence uncovered by the Committees investigation

strongly suggests that information regarding Corporal Tillmans
fratricide reached the White House and probably the President
himself around a week after his death. President Bush made specific
mention of Corporal Tillman in his speech at the annual White House
Correspondents Dinner on 1st May 2004, saying:
8354397
PAGE 54 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last week in Afghanistan

brought home the
sorrow that comes with every loss and
reminds us of the character of the men and women who
serve
on our behalf. Friends say that this young man saw the images of
September the 11th, and seeing that evil, he felt called to defend
America89
At no point during his remarks about Corporal Tillman does he refer,
or even allude to possible cause of death. There is no suggestion
that he was killed in the line of enemy fire and, of course, there is no
suggestion that he was killed by fratricide. It seems odd that the
President would make no mention of this in his remarks about a
recently fallen soldier; this conspicuous absence of detail may be
explained by a P4 message, sent by General Stanley McChrystal,
Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), on
29th April 2004. Sent to the commanding general at United States
Central Command (CENTCOM), as well as the commanders of
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Army Special Operations
Command (USASOC), the message cited unconfirmed but
suspected reports that POTUS [the President of the United States]
and the Secretary of the Army might include comments about

(May 1, 2004).
8354397
PAGE 55 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Corporal Tillmans heroism and his approved Silver Star medal in

speeches [sic] currently being prepared, stressing it essential to
inform our countrys leaders about the fratricide, to preclude any
unknowing statements by[them]which might cause public
embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillmans death
became public.90 Two days after this message was sent, President
Bush gave his speech and, as had been advised, made no mention
of how Corporal Tillman died. Despite this, none of the former White
House officials interviewed as part of the Committees investigation
had any recollection of when they learned that Corporal Tillmans
death was a possible fratricide, what they did in response and
whether or not they discussed the case with the President. Chief
speechwriter Michael Gerson told the Committee that he did not
know when he learned about the friendly fire, and could not recall
whether he was aware of it while preparing the Presidents
Correspondents Dinner speech.91 Likewise, Scott McClellan, White
House Press Secretary in 2004: he did not remember when he or the
President learned about the fratricide, only that he maybe could
90 Personal For message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General

John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, and Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr.
29, 2004), originally cited in U.S. House. Misleading Information from the
Battlefield, p.28.
91 U.S. House. Misleading Information from the Battlefield, pp. 28-29.
8354397
PAGE 56 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
have found out just before it was made public on 29th May. 92 The
President himself was asked directly by a journalist in 2007 when he
learned of the fratricide; not even he could recall when he found out:
I cant give you the precise moment. But obviously the minute I
heard that the facts that people believed were true were not true,
that I expect there to be a full investigation and get to the bottom of
it.93 Ultimately, it is difficult to believe that the commanders of
JSOC, CENTCOM, SOCOM and USASOC, who all definitively knew of
the fratricide allegations by 29th April 2004, had no contact at all
with the White House and the President himself in the following
weeks, or that they did not deem it necessary to seek out the
President directly and inform him of what they had learned from
Major General McChrystals message. Herein lies the major problem
with the White Houses official line (i.e. that they did not know of the
suspected fratricide until soon before it was made public): it is
predicated on a wholly unbelievable scenario, where almost all of
the countrys most important leaders were aware of the actual
circumstances of Corporal Tillmans death, except for the President
himself and all other officials in the White House. It suggests a major
breakdown in the channels of communication between the
93 White House, President Bush Discusses American Competitiveness Initiative

During Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2007).
8354397
PAGE 57 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
government and military on an unprecedented scale. It relies on the

President, the Secretary of Defence and their staff not meeting or
speaking with the commanders of JSOC, CENTCOM, SOCOM and
USASOC for nearly a month, between Tillmans death and the public
announcement of his fratricide or, if they did, it relies on these
commanders not thinking to correct the misinformation that was
being reported regarding the nations foremost news story. It seems
to require a significant suspension of disbelief to accept that the
White House was as much in the dark about Corporal Tillmans
death as the rest of the general public.
The reality is that both military and government officials likely knew
of the circumstances regarding Corporal Tillmans death within a
matter of days, yet did not share this information with the media,
the public nor, indeed, the deceaseds family, for another month.
The manner in which Corporal Tillman was spoken of posthumously,
by the media, by politicians, by the President himself (he reminds
us of the character of the men and women who serve on our
behalf94) demonstrates just how favourable this news story, in its
current guise, had become for the American government and

(May 1, 2004).
8354397
PAGE 58 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
military. Tillmans death in the line of devastating enemy fire95 was

the culmination of his storybook narrative, from millionaire football
player to valiant soldier who gave up his life in service and
protection of his country. It was a storybook narrative that was an
ideal tool of organised political persuasion, in that it both diverted
attention away from the deadly quagmire96 of Iraq, and reaffirmed
the kind of nationalistic values upon which domestic support for a
war is invariably built. It was undoubtedly a public relations coup for
the Bush administration, however it was deliberately engineered like
that because the storybook narrative was not true: Tillman had not
been killed in the line of enemy fire, he had been killed by one of his
own and, as I have demonstrated, the military and the government
were aware of that fact. Furthermore, they propagated
misinformation in an attempt to conceal that very same fact. With
regards to RQ1, the story of Pat Tillmans life and death was being
used as part of a campaign of organised political persuasion. With
regards to RQ2, that there was an attempt to conceal the truth
about Tillmans death suggests the presence of deception in the
tactics of organised political persuasion. With that in mind, it is now
necessary to examine the issue of deception in greater detail.
(undated).
8354397
PAGE 59 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Deception
Major General McChrystals wrote in his P4 message that it was
essential to inform our countrys leaders about the fratricide, to
preclude any unknowing statements by[them]which might cause
public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillmans
death became public.97 Here, the shortest word is perhaps the most
meaningful: if. Gen. McChrystal writes that the President should
not speak of how Tillman died valiantly in the line of enemy fire,
because if the truth were to come out and the public were to find out
he was actually killed by fratricide, then that would be incredibly
embarrassing for the government. That he uses if, rather than
when suggests that there were those, possibly himself included,
who thought that the truth could be covered up. Corporal Tillman's
fratricide would not necessarily have to be revealed; perhaps the
current misinformation circulating in the media would eventually
become established truth and Tillman would remain as the Army and
the war efforts poster-boy. It is a small linguistic slip but it has
serious implications: it suggests that the highest-ranking officials in
the US Army were at least prepared to consider the use of deception
to ensure the media narrative remained favourable to them; if they
97 Personal For message from Major General Stanley McChrystal.
8354397
PAGE 60 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
were committed to releasing the truth about Corporal Tillmans

death, if it was just a matter of timing (i.e. when they would make it
public), then it seems unlikely, highly improbable even, that Gen.
McChrystal would choose to phrase his message in the way he did.
Though it is but one small word, Gen. McChrystals use of if
betrays a broader pattern of deception at work within the
government and the Army concerning the Tillman affair.
As Herring and Robinsons framework outlines, deception within

organised political persuasion can be carried out in three main ways:
deception through lying (making a knowingly false statement),
deception through omission (knowingly withholding important
information) and deception through distortion (framing statements
in a knowingly misleading way).98 This section will examine the
extent to which deception was used in the organised political
persuasion tactics employed following Corporal Tillmans death, and
identify whether such deceptions can be classified as: lying,
omission or distortion. For example, Gen. McChrystals choice of
language suggests a willingness, or intention to deceive through
omission. He was implying it was not absolutely necessary for the
full facts of Tillmans death to be released to the public, aware of the
98 Piers Robinson and Eric Herring, Deception and Britains Road to War in Iraq,
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 8 (2014), pp 213-232 (p.217).
8354397
PAGE 61 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
implications such revelations might have upon the prevailing

narrative. In other words, in order to ensure the organised political
persuasion tactics were not compromised, Gen. McChrystal was
prepared to omit key details regarding the case from statements
made by officials to the public and the media. This would constitute
an intention to carry out deception; indeed, key details regarding the
case were omitted for over a month, meaning the deception was
carried out.
One can identify other examples of deception in some of the

statements quoted above. The initial statement from the DoD
concerning Corporal Tillmans death, which became the basis for the
narrative of misinformation that developed in the ensuing weeks,
was deceptive in its wording: it indicated that Tillman had died after
a firefight with anti-coalition militia forces about 25 miles southwest
of a U.S. base at Khost, which has been the scene of frequent
attacks.99 It has already been established that the military knew,
almost immediately, that Tillman died as a result of fratricide, and
though this statement does not directly contravene that truth
(though it does not constitute deception through lying), it is framed
in a knowingly misleading manner, making it deception through

8354397
PAGE 62 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
distortion. Stating that Tillman died after a firefight with anticoalition militia forces strongly implies a cause of death that was
contrary to the truth, i.e. it implies he died in the line of enemy fire,
rather than through fratricide. Moreover, no attempts were made by
either the military or the government to correct the distortion: if the
distortion had been accidental, one expects it would have been
corrected much sooner than it actually was.
President Bushs speech at the White House Correspondents Dinner

contains two discernible examples of deception:
The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last week in Afghanistan

brought home the
sorrow that comes with every loss and
reminds us of the character of the men and women who
serve
on our behalf. Friends say that this young man saw the images of
September the 11th, and seeing that evil, he felt called to defend
America100
As noted above, the Presidents speech contains no reference or

allusion to Corporal Tillmans cause of death, instead choosing to
frame his death within broader themes of American heroism and

(May 1, 2004).
8354397
PAGE 63 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
patriotism (itself an example of organised political persuasion)

however, as was also established, the reason for the omission does
not simply appear to be ignorance: by all reasonable measures, this
was a deliberate omission following the advice of Gen. McChrystals
P4 message. To argue that the Bush administration were not in
possession of the full facts at this point is untenable and, ultimately,
not credible, making this deception through omission: there was a
deliberate intention to withhold important information (as evidenced
by Gen. McChrystals message). Indeed, one could go further and
argue that every statement made by the military and government
concerning Corporal Tillman between the time of his death and 29th
May 2004 (when the fratricide was made public) constitutes
deception through omission. As the Committee investigation stated,
while military officials at highest levels knew within a matter of
days that Corporal Tillmans death was a likely fratricide, they did
not share this information with the Tillman family or the public for
another month.101 Thus, they were knowingly withholding important
information.
Furthermore, the statement in President Bushs speech: friends say

that this young man saw the images of September the 11th, and
8354397
PAGE 64 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
seeing that evil, he felt called to defend America is a clear example

of deception through lying. The claim that Tillman was motivated to
enlist after seeing the images of September the 11th is wholly
unsubstantiated - Tillman never disclosed his reasons for enlisting and White House fact checkers were well aware of this102, yet the
claim was never removed from the speech, instead it was simply
accredited to unknown friends. The notion of Tillman being
motivated to enlist as a result of the terrorist attacks on September
the 11th 2001 was an integral part of the construction of his
storybook narrative: foregoing millions of dollars in order to fight for
the safety of the American people in President Bushs Global War on
Terror not only lent the war a kind of perverse legitimacy, it was
also a reaffirmation that he did not give his life in vain, that none of
the hundreds of American servicemen and women who lost their
lives in the War on Terror did so in vain. Constantly reaffirming that
fact was essential for retaining public support for the war: the media
and, in turn, the general public only tend to turn against wars when
there is a sense that it is unwinnable, and that their fellow citizens
are dying for no good cause, as was the case with the Vietnam
War.103 This was why Tillmans personal 9/11 narrative was important
in terms of its utility as part of organised political persuasion.
102 U.S. House. Misleading Information from the Battlefield, pp. 24-26.
8354397
PAGE 65 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
However, the narrative was untrue and President Bush and his
advisors were aware of that when they chose to include the above
statement in the speech. President Bush made a knowingly false
statement, and this constituted deception through lying.
The most egregious example of deception occurred with the

posthumous award of the Silver Star to Corporal Tillman, a medal
given to soldiers who have demonstrated gallantry in action against
an enemy of the United States.104 The military awarded Tillman this
honour on 29th April 2004, the same day Gen. McChrystal sent his
P4 message. Gen. McChrystal himself was in charge of administering
the medal recommendation process and, despite him being aware of
the fratricide at this point, he still felt it appropriate to award the
medal: in his own words, he satisfied himself that, in fact, his
[Tillmans] actions warranted [the Silver Star], even though there
was a potential that the actual circumstances of death had been
friendly fire.105 As Krakauer notes, the latter clause is deliberately
obfuscatory, intended to suggest doubts still existed about the
103 Sean Aday, Steven Livingston and Maeve Hebert, Embedding the Truth: A
Cross-Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War
The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 10 (2005), pp. 3-21 (p.5).
104 Army Regulation 600-8-22, 3-10(b) (2006).
8354397
PAGE 66 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
actual cause of death, when he knew with near certainty that it

was fratricide.106 Moreover, the final citation asserted that Tillman
had put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire. 107 The
decision to award the Silver Star had two possible motivations:
firstly, it neatly completed Corporal Tillmans narrative of heroism,
bravery and self-sacrifice and, secondly, it implied to the public that
the circumstances surrounding his death were not suspicious and
that he had, in fact, been killed by the enemy. Indeed, the inclusion
of the phrase put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire
does more than simply imply he was killed by the enemy, it more-orless states it explicitly. This was deception through lying: the military
were aware of how Tillman was killed, yet when citing him for his
award they stated he had been killed by the enemy. Furthermore,
the Committee investigation uncovered that both of the eyewitness
statements submitted with the Silver Star paperwork were altered
by somebody within the 75th Regiments chain of command. 108 The
statements were attributed to Private ONeal and Sergeant Mel
Ward. In their testimonies, ONeal said he typed out a statement but
(undated).
8354397
PAGE 67 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
after he wrote it, his words were embellished so egregiously that he

never signed it109, whilst Sergeant Ward had no recollection of even
writing such a statement. This is perhaps the most brazen example
of deception through lying that I found throughout the whole Tillman
affair: the eyewitness statements of two serving U.S. soldiers were
either entirely fabricated or embellished to the point were they were
completely inaccurate. The two soldiers were aware of the fratricide
allegations, yet their altered statements made no mention of it
whatsoever. Krakauer sums up the state of affairs accurately: all
the recommendation material that McChrystal approved and
submittedwas painstakingly written to create the impression that
Tillman was killed by enemy fire. By any objective measure, the
recommendation was fraudulent.110 The fraudulent
recommendation only served to fuel the misinformation that was
being reported, emboldening the organised political persuasion in a
manner that can only be construed as deception through lying.
One day later, on 30th April 2004, United States Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC) issued a press release announcing
Corporal Tillmans award. This was also the same day USASOC
8354397
PAGE 68 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
received Gen McChrystals P4 message that confirmed the fratricide.

The press release stated that Tillman was being given the award:
for his selfless actions after his Ranger element was ambushed
by anti-coalition
insurgents during a ground assault
convoy through southeastern Afghanistan
[Tillman] was
shot and killed while focusing his efforts on the elimination of the
enemy forces and the protection of his team members. 111
It constitutes deception through distortion because, although not

explicitly stating how Corporal Tillman died, the inference is clearly
that he was killed by enemy fire. USASOC knew that Tillman was
almost certainly killed in a fratricide incident, yet their press release
strongly implied otherwise. USASOCs deputy commander at the
time, Brigadier General Howard Yellen, concurs: for the civilian on
the street the interpretation would be that he was killed by enemy
fire.112 Similarly, General Kensinger: a member of the public
reading this probably would have concluded or assumed that
Corporal Tillman had been killed by the enemy.113 USASOC
commanders were aware of their oblique framing: they framed their
111 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Awards Silver Star to Fallen
Ranger (April 30, 2004).
8354397
PAGE 69 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
press release in a knowingly misleading way, so as not to disrupt the

ongoing narrative that Corporal Tillman had been killed by enemy
fire.
In summary, in attempting to answer RQ2 - to what extent was

there an attempt to intentionally deceive the public? Can the U.S.
government and militarys actions be classified as deceptive
organised political persuasion? - with regards to the case of Corporal
Tillman, my research has identified numerous examples of decisions,
actions and statements that can all be classified as deceptive.
Furthermore, there are clear examples of every kind of deception
noted by Herring and Robinson: through lying, omission and
distortion. There is no question that the deception was deliberate
and intentional, and I have put forward some suggestions as to the
motivations behind this deception. One needs to take into account
the political situation: a time of acute political pressure for the Bush
administration, with falling support for the War on Terror and an
election around the corner, now was the time, more than ever, for
some good news. Likewise, the U.S. military were keen to avoid
further damage to their reputation, and a case of preventable death
involving the nations most famous soldier was potentially
8354397
PAGE 70 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
significantly damaging. The deception was motivated by a desire to

avoid such damage, and by a desire not to disrupt Corporal Tillmans
storybook personal narrative that had been, and still was, used as a
tool of organised political persuasion by the political elite, in attempt
to retain support for increasingly unpopular foreign invasions of
sovereign states. The case for going to war, particularly in Iraq, had
always been rather shaky and, as such, these tactics of organised
political persuasion were required.114 What my research suggests is
that the political and military elite in the US were certainly not
averse to involving deception in these tactics. This was not simply
organised political persuasion of the kind which involves the
dissemination of information in an attempt to persuade. This was the
dissemination of misinformation, in an attempt to mislead.
114 For further discussion, see, for example: Kumar, Media, War and
Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War.
8354397
PAGE 71 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Conclusions
This dissertation has examined the case studies of Private Lynch and
Corporal Tillman in an effort to develop understanding of the
techniques of, and motivations behind, contemporary wartime
propaganda, or organised political persuasion. With regards to
organised political persuasion, the findings of this dissertation are
broadly in line with the findings of Robinson and Herrings Report X
Marks the Spot, in that these two case-studies have also
highlighted how such activities [i.e. the activities of organised
political persuasion], designed to persuade or promote policy, can
lead to inaccuracy and deception in government communication. 115
These findings not only raise similar questions regarding
democratic accountability, they also raise important and essential
questions regarding the use of deception as a tool of politicians and
115 Robinson and Herring, Report X Marks the Spot, p.582.
8354397
PAGE 72 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
governments. This dissertation has drawn numerous historical

parallels with past examples of wartime propaganda, and has found
broad similarities in terms of both motivation, and execution:
certainly with regards to the Lynch and Tillman case-studies, the
U.S. governments campaign of organised political persuasion during
the Global War on Terror relied heavily on the dissemination of
misinformation, assisted by an almost uniformly compliant media, in
order to mislead its citizens in a manner designed to retain
credibility and support domestically for controversial foreign policy
decisions. Most importantly, this dissertation has concluded that
they deceived the public into supporting their foreign policy aims,
and the cases of Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch were used as
part of these tactics of deception.
These two case-studies have a certain degree of broader
significance. The way they were handled by the United States
government and military certainly suggests that there was, and is,
no particular aversion amongst the elite in that country to using
tactics of deceptive organised political persuasion in order to
influence public opinion in a knowingly misleading manner. The
case-studies perhaps suggest that the use of deception is
widespread amongst political elites, though further, more extensive,
research would need to be conducted.
8354397
PAGE 73 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
What is particularly worrying, and what makes these

conclusions so important and further research so vital, is that, unlike
historical examples of wartime propaganda, these contemporary
campaigns of organised political persuasion have become infinitely
more covert in their execution, a fact not helped by the deliberately
obfuscatory euphemistic guise that such campaigns tend to go by in
the 21st century. Whether it is referred to as perception
management, spin or in any other meaningless combination of
terms, the fundamental, unaltered fact is that the propagandisation
of the stories of Lynch and Tillman, like the countless other
examples of wartime propaganda throughout history, relied heavily
on the use of deception. However, its inherent covertness has led
to an endemic failure of accountability, an inability to conclusively
point to certain politicians and leaders, and hold them to account for
deceiving their own citizens. Though this dissertation has been able
to lay the blame at the door of the United States government and
military for the deception involved in the Tillman and Lynch cases,
like the House Committees investigation, it was unable to
determine precisely which individuals were behind campaign of
deception. No-one within the United States government or military
has ever been held to account for their role in the Lynch and Tillman
cases, nor faced any significant consequences. Nonetheless, as the
contemporary propaganda machine becomes more well-funded and
8354397
PAGE 74 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
well-hidden, now, more than ever, it is important to research,

identify, and communicate examples of the dissemination of
misinformation, even if our leaders are becoming increasingly less
accountable.
Bibliography of Sources
8354397
PAGE 75 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Aday, Sean. Chasing the Bad News: An Analysis of 2005 Iraq and
Afghanistan War Coverage on NBC and Fox News Channel,
Journal of Communication 60 (2010), pp. 144-164.
Aday, Sean, Steven Livingston and Maeve Hebert. Embedding the
Truth: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television
Coverage of the Iraq War, The Harvard International Journal
of Press/Politics 10 (2005), pp. 3-21.
Aristotle. The Art of Rhetoric (London, 1991).
Associated Press (2003, 1 April). American Troops Rescue Iraq POW
Lynch.
Bennett, Lance. Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the
United States, Journal of Communication 2 (1990), pp. 103127.
Bush, George W (2004, 1 May). Remarks at White House
Correspondents Dinner
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Tillman, U.S.
Army, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
Entman, Robert M. Cascading Activation: Contesting the White
Houses Frame After 9/11, Political Communication 20
(2003), pp. 415-432 (p.415).
8354397
PAGE 76 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Farmer, Mike (2002, 31 May). N.F.L Player Passes up Bucks to Take

Field for Uncle Sam, The Seattle Times, p.A6.
Freeman, Mike (2002, 1 June). Tillman Leaves N.F.L to Join Army,
New York Times, p.D7.
Herbig, Arthur W. Discursive Characterization as Embodiment and
Critique: The Divergent Rhetorical Trajectories of Pat Tillman
as an American Hero, in Jason Edwards and David Weiss
(eds.), The Rhetoric of American Exceptionalism: Critical
Essays (Jefferson, 2011).
Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, accessible at icasualties.org. First
Accessed 20th March, 2015.
Iraq Body Count, accessible at www.iraqbodycount.org/database.
First Accessed 20th March, 2015.
Kampfner, John (2003, 15 May). The Truth about Jessica, The

Guardian, retrieved from guardian.com.
Krakauer, Jon. Where Men Win Glory: The Odyssey of Pat Tillman
(New York, 2009).
Kumar, Deepa. Media, War and Propaganda: Strategies of
Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War
Communication and Critical Cultural Studies 3 (2006), pp.
48-69.
8354397
PAGE 77 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Kumar, Deepa. War Propaganda and the (ab)uses of Women: Media

Constructions of the Jessica Lynch Story, Feminist Media
Studies 4 (2004), pp. 297-313.
Lindlaw, Scott (2003, 2 May). Bush: Allied Forces Prevailed in Iraq,
Associated Press News Service.
Marlin, Randal. Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion
(Peterborough ON, 2013 (2nd ed.)).
Military Times, (2003, 3 April). Remains Found at Iraqi Hospital to be
Flown to U.S.
Miller, David. Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the
Attack on Iraq (London, 2004).
Paddock, Troy. Word War I and Propaganda (Leiden, 2014)
Pennington, Bill (2004, 24 April). Ex-N.F.L Player is Killed in Combat,
New York Times.
Personal For message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to
General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, and Lieutenant
General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
Pew Research Centre. Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 20032008, (2008, 19 March), retrieved from pewresearch.org.
Pilger, John (2014, 5 December). War by Media and the Triumph of
Propaganda. Retrieved from
8354397
PAGE 78 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
http://johnpilger.com/articles/war-by-media-and-thetriumph-of-propaganda.
Pin-Fat, Veronique and Maria Stern. The Scripting of Private Jessica
Lynch: Biopolitics, Gender and the 'Feminization' of the US
Military Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 30 (2005), pp.
25-53.
Robinson, Piers and Eric Herring. Deception and Britains Road to
War in Iraq, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi
Studies 8 (2014), pp 213-232.
Robinson, Piers and Eric Herring. Report X Marks the Spot: The
British Governments Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD,
Political Science Quarterly 4 (2014) pp. 551-583.
Robinson, Piers, Peter Goddard, Katy Parry, Craig Murray and Philip
M. Taylor. Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, War
and Theory in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq (Manchester, 2010).
Schmidt, Susan and Vernon Loeb. (2003, 3 April). She Was Fighting
to the Death; Details Emerging of W. Va. Soldiers Capture
and Rescue, Washington Post.
Silver Star Award Citation for Corporal Patrick D. Tillman, United
States Army (undated).
Snow, Nancy. Propaganda and American Democracy (Baton Rouge,
2014).
8354397
PAGE 79 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from

the Ancient World to the Present Day (Manchester, 2003).
The Tillman Story. Dir. Amir Bar-Lev, Passion Pictures (2010). Film.
Tillman Kevin (2007, 24 April). Deliberate Acts of Deceit, The
Guardian. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com.
U.S. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman
and Lynch Episodes Together with Additional Views (110 H.
Rpt. 858).
Washington Post, (2003, 3 April). White House is Revising its War
Message; Setbacks Providing Lessons.
Washington Post, (2003, 17 June). A Broken Body, a Broken Story,
Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch - Still in
Hospital After 67 Days - Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in
Crash During Ambush.
Watson, Roland (2004, 24 April). Death of the all-American Boy,
The Times.
Welch, David. Propaganda: Power and Persuasion (London, 2013).
Welch, David and Jo Fox. Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the
Modern Age (London, 2012).
8354397
PAGE 80 OF 81
14,930 WORDS
White House (2007, 9 August). President Bush Discusses American

Competitiveness Initiative During Press Conference.
White, Josh (2005, 4 May). Army Withheld Details About Tillmans
Death, The Washington Post, retrieved from
washingtonpost.com.
Wolfsfeld, Gadi. Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle
East (Cambridge, 1997).
8354397
PAGE 81 OF 81
14,930 WORDS

Deception and Media Misinformation in Wartime - The Cases of Private Lynch and Corporal Tillman

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Deception and Media Misinformation in Wartime - The Cases of Private Lynch and Corporal Tillman

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Deception and Media

University of Manchester POLI30300

This dissertation outlines the historical usage of propaganda during

1 U.S. House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Misleading

2 U.S. House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Misleading

Using the findings of the Committee, together with evidence from

The central argument of this dissertation concerns the issue of

credibility and support domestically for controversial foreign policy

Eric Herring and Piers Robinsons recent work, including their

a policy.5 Governments use organised political persuasion in

6 Robinson and Herring, Deception, p.217.

7 Robinson and Herring, Deception, pp. 217-218.

duplicitous manner. However, in the cases of Tillman and Lynch, this

Herring and Robinsons framework is particularly useful

campaign of propaganda during the Global War on Terror, and lied

The first research question concerns whether the U.S.

administration, at times when there may have been a perception

This dissertation is divided into four sections: the first entails a

bitter aftertaste.8 It is perhaps ironic then that his actions, more

8 David Welch, Propaganda: Power and Persuasion (London, 2013), p.2.

9 Randal Marlin, Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion (Peterborough ON,

10 Welch, Propaganda: Power and Persuasion, p.2.

The idea of propaganda can be traced back to Ancient Greece, and

From Pericles onwards, propaganda has often been deployed by

12 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (London, 1991).

fuelling the wars of the Crusades, starting in the twelfth century. As

This is possibly why the term has attracted so many negative

14 Marlin, Propaganda, p.51.

the negative connotations we still associate with the term to this

15 Welch, Propaganda, p.15.

16 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the

17 Troy Paddock, Word War I and Propaganda (Leiden, 2014), p.2.

the emergence of the properly organised, heavily funded,

18 Marlin, Propaganda, p.75.

19 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p.208.

Culminating in the sordid McCarthyite witch-hunts of the early

created a climate of fear in which

sympathy for the Enemy was equated with sympathy for

Devil. The conversion of a former wartime ally into a peacetime

media representation of post-war

events in a specifically hostile light. The Red Menace was

a threat to Europe and Asia: it threatened the very existence of the

life itself. Books, magazines, films and even

the new medium of television were scrutinized by

appointed watchdog groups of red-hunters, often sponsored by the

atmosphere in which no view of the Russians

other than as demons could be tolerated.20

Three things are important to note about Cold War propaganda:

20 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p.259.

that the media was independent of government helped to legitimise

In the post-Cold War era, propaganda, whilst still manipulative and

Since 11 September 2001, both the US and UK governments

and Iraq and the assault on

civil liberties at home. To win the war on Iraq the US and UK

conformity with the official line.

Consequently there has been serious investment in an

Welch emphasises the psychological operations (psyops) that

US and British coalition forces intensified the use of psychological

States employed its long tradition of

radio psyops, which could be traced back to Vietnam.

Scholars such as Deepa Kumar and John Pilger argue that

22 Welch, Propaganda, pp.191-192.

23 Deepa Kumar, Media, War and Propaganda: Strategies of Information

government. The scholarly consensus is that the contemporary