Você está na página 1de 8

27. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.

Margarina-Verkausfs-Union, 93 SCRA 257


Facts:
Respondent corporation, a West German corporation not engaged in business in the
Philippines, was the consignee of 500 long tons of Philippine copra in bulk with a total value
of US$ 108,750.00 shipped from Cebu City on board petitioner's (a Philippine corporation)
vessel, the SS "EASTERN PLANET" for discharge at Hamburg, Germany. Petitioner's bill of
lading for the cargo provided as follows: Except as otherwise stated herein and in - the
Charter Party, this contract shag be governed by the laws of the Flag of the Ship carrying the
goods. In case of average, same shall be adjusted according to York-Antwerp Rules of 1950.
While the vessel was off Gibraltar, a fire broke out aboard and caused water damage
to the copra shipment in the amount of US$ 591.38. Petitioner corporation rejected
respondent's claim for payment of the and respondent filed on June 18, 1966 in the Manila
court of first instance its complaint against petitioner as defendant for recovery of the same
and US$ 250.00 - attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to claim damages
Ruling:
The Court finds no error and upholds the lower court's ruling sustaining respondent's
damage claim although the amount thereof did not exceed 5% of respondent's interest in
the cargo and would have been barred by the cited article of the Commerce Code. We hold
that the lower court correctly ruled the cited codal article to be "not applicable in this
particular case for the reason that the bill of lading (Exhibit "F") contains "an agreement to
the contrary" for it is expressly provided in the last sentence of the first paragraph (Exhibit
"1-A") that "In case of average, same shall be adjusted according to York-Antwerp Rules of
1950." The insertion of said condition is expressly authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 65
which has adopted in toto the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Now, it has not been shown
that said rules limit the recovery of damage to cases within a certain percentage or
proportion that said damage may bear to claimant's interest either in the vessel or cargo as
provided in Article 848 of the Code of Commerce On the contrary, Rule 3 of said YorkAntwerp Rules expressly states that "Damage done to a ship and cargo, or either of them, by
water or otherwise, including damage by breaching or scuttling a burning ship, in
extinguishing a fire on board the ship, shall be made good as general average."
Insofar as the present case is concerned, the lower court made no finding that it falls
within any of the exceptions that would justify the award for attorney's fees, such as gross
and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy a plainly valid, just and demandable claim. Even
under the broad eleventh exception of the cited article which allows the imposition of
attorney's fees "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered," the Court stressed in Buan,
supra, that "the conclusion must be borne out by findings of facts and law. What is just and
equitable in a given case is not a mere matter of feeling but of demonstration. Hence, the
exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the
Civil Code demands a factual, legal or equitable justification upon the basis of which the
court exercises its discretion. Without such a justification, the award is a conclusion without
a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture." The summary
award of counsel's fees made in the appealed judgment must therefore be set aside.
28. American Insurance Co. vs. CompaniaMaritima, 21 SCRA 998
Facts:
In 1962, certain cargo insured with plaintiff corporation was shipped in New York, U.S.
aboard "M/S TOREADOR", of which the general agent in the Philippines is appellee

Macondray& Co., Inc. The cargo, with an invoice value of $3,539.61 CIF Cebu, was consigned
to the order of the importer Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation.
Inasmuch as the final port of call of the "M/S TOREADOR" was Manila, the carrier, in
accepting the cargo at the point of shipment, agreed to transship the same, after its
discharge in Manila, aboard an inter-island vessel to its destination in Cebu. On September
18, 1962, the "M/S TOREADOR" arrived at the port of Manila and on the same date
discharged the cargo in question. Pursuant to the arrangement the cargo was subsequently
loaded aboard the "SS SIQUIJOR", an inter-island vessel. The shipment was finally discharged
in Cebu on September 24, 1962.
When the consignee took delivery of the shipment it was found to be short of two (2)
pieces of tractor parts worth $2,834.88, or P11,063.12 at the exchange rate of P3.9025.
Plaintiff paid the insured value of the lost merchandise to the consignee. To recover the said
sum of P11,063.12 plaintiff, as subrogee of the consignee rights, filed on September 24,
1963 a complaint against the CompaiaMaritima and the Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. as
alternative defendants. The former was sued as operator and owner of "SS SIQUIJOR" and
the latter as operator of the arrastre service at the port of Cebu charged with the care and
custody of all cargo discharged there.In view of Maritima's allegation in its answer that the
lost merchandise had not actually been delivered to it, plaintiff filed on November 6, 1964 a
motion to admit its amended complaint impleading Macondray and Luzon Brokerage
Corporation as additional defendants and eliminating the Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc.

Issue:

Whether or not the cargo in question was a transshipment cargo wherein the
discharge thereof in Manila terminated the obligation of Macondray as carrier
Ruling:
No. According to paragraph 4 of the amended complaint the cargo was loaded on
board the "M/S TOREADOR" in New York, "freight prepaid to Cebu City . . . pursuant to the bill
of lading No. 13." In other words, the action is based on the contract of carriage up to the
final port of destination, which was Cebu City, for which the corresponding freight had been
prepaid. The following provisions of the bill of lading are the ones directly in point:
1. This bill of lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act of the United States of America, approved April 16, 1936, which
shall be deemed to be incorporated herein and nothing herein contained shall be
deemed a surrender by the Carrier of any of its rights or immunities or an increase of
any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said Act. The provisions stated in said Act
(except as may be otherwise specifically provided herein) shall govern before the
goods are loaded on and after they are discharged from the ship and throughout the
entire time the goods are in the custody of the Carrier. . . .
19. In any event the Carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in
respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the
goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. . . .
The transshipment of the cargo from Manila to Cebu was not a separate transaction
from that originally entered into by Macondray, as general agent for the "M/S TOREADOR". It

was part of Macondray's obligation under the contract of carriage and the fact that the
transshipment was made via an inter-island vessel did not operate to remove the transaction
from the operation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
29. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 387
Facts:
AnacletoViana was a passenger of M/V Antonia bound for Manila which was owned by
defendant Aboitiz. After the said vessel has landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corp., as the
arrastre operator, took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on it. One hour after
the passengers had disembarked, Pioneer Stevedoring started operation by unloading the
cargoes using its crane. Viana who had already disembarked remembered that some of his
cargoes were still inside the vessel. While pointing to the crew of the vessel the place where
his cargoes were, the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the
crane which resulted to his death. Vianas wife filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz
for breach of contract f carriage. Aboitiz, however filed a third party complaint against
Pioneer since it had control completely over the vessel during the incident. Furthermore,
petitioner contends that one hour has already elapsed from the time Viana disembarked,
thus he has already ceased to be a passenger.
Issue:
Whether or not Aboitiz is liable for the death of Viana
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary
diligence for the safety of its passengers makes Aboitiz liable. It has been recognized as a
rule that the relation of the carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger
alights from the carriers vehicle, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises. A reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. The primary
factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of
the victim on or near the petitioners vessel. In the case at bar, such justifiable cause exists
because he had to come back for his cargo. Aboitiz has failed to safeguard its passenger
with extraordinary diligence in requiring or seeing to it that precautionary measures were
strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into a forbidden
area.
30. Alitalia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 192 SCRA 9
Facts:

Dr. Felipa Pablo, a professor from UP was invited to attend a meeting by the United
Nations in Ispra, Italy. She was to read a paper regarding foreign substances in food and the
agriculture environment which she had specialized knowledge of. She booked a flight to Italy
with Alitalia airlines, petitioner herein. She had arrived in Milan the day before the meeting
however her luggage did not arrive with her. The airline informed her that her luggage was
delayed because it was placed in one of the succeeding flights to Italy. She never got her
luggage.
When she got back to Manila she demanded that Alitalia compensate her for the
damages that she suffered. Petitioner herein offered free airline tickets in order to
compensate for the alleged damages, however she rejected this offer and instead filed a
case. Subsequently it was found out that the luggages of Dr. Pablo were not placed in the
succeeding flights. She received her luggage 11 months after and after she had already
instituted a case against Alitalia.

The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Dr. Pablo and ordered plaintiff to pay
damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and even increased the
amount of damages to be awarded to Dr. Pablo. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Alitalia is liable for damages incurred by Dr. Pablo
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that Alitalia is liable to pay Dr. Pablo for nominal damages. The
Warsaw Convention provides that an air carrier is made liable for damages when: (1) the
death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if the accident causing it took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of its operations of embarking or disembarking; (2) the
destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered luggage or goods, if the occurrence
causing it took place during the carriage by air"; and (3) delay in the transportation by air of
passengers, luggage or goods. However, the claim for damages may be brought subject to
limitations provided in the said convention.
In this case, Dr. Pablo did not suffer any other injury other than not being able to read
her paper in Italy. This was due to the fact that Alitalia misplaced her luggage. There was no
bad faith or malice on the part of Alitalia in the said delay in the arrival of her luggage. Dr.
Pablo received all her things which were returned to her in good condition although 11
months late. Therefore she shall receive nominal damages for the special injury caused.
31. Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. CA, March 15, 1996
Facts:
Private respondent MA. PAULA SAN AGUSTIN was a passenger on board Flight SN 284
of defendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to
Manila. She checked in her luggage which contained her valuables all amounting to
$4,265.00, for which she was issued Tag No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and
her luggage was left on board Flight SN 284. Upon Arrival in Manila, she learned that her
luggage was missing and was advised to accomplish and submit a property Irregularity
Report which she submitted and filed on the same day.
Upon follow up, it remained missing; thus, she filed her formal complaint with the
office of Ferge Massed, petitioners Local Manager, demanding immediate attention.Two
weeks later she was notified that her luggage was found. But unfortunately plaintiff was
informed that the luggage was lost for the second time. She demanded payment but the
airline refused to settle the claim. The trial court ruled in favor of Ma. Paula San Agustin. The
appellate court affirmed in toto the trial courts judgment.
Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of private
respondent should be considered the primary cause for the loss of her luggage, avers that,
despite her awareness that the flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and
Brussels, and that her flight from Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not
retrieve the luggage upon arrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent,
being a seasoned international traveler, must have likewise been familiar with the standard
provisions contained in her flight ticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried
by the passenger and that the liability of the airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage
would be limited, in any event, to only US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in
advance and corresponding additional charges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca
International Airport, private respondent, in checking in her luggage, evidently did not
declare its contents or value. Petitioner cites Section 5(c), Article IX, of the General
Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw, Poland, on 02 October 1929, as amended by the
Hague Protocol of 1955, generally observed by International carriers, stating, among other
things, that:

Passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may refuse to carry as
checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money, jewelry, precious metals, negotiable
papers, securities or other valuables.
Issue:
Whether or not the airline is negligent
Whether or not respondents negligence is the sole and proximate cause of the loss
Ruling:
Yes.Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is demanded
by the nature of an obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the
time, and of the place. When the source of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere
breach or non-fulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part
of the obligor. This rule is not different in the case of common carriers in the carriage of
goods which, indeed, are bound to observe not just the due diligence of a good father of a
family but that of extraordinary care in the vigilance over the goods. The appellate court
has aptly observed:
x xx Art. 1733 of the [Civil] Code provides that from the very nature of their business and
by reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods transported by them. This extraordinary responsibility,
according to Art. 1736, lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of and received by the carrier until they are delivered actually or constructively
to the consignee or person who has the right to receive them. Art. 1737 states that the
common carriers duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily
unloaded or stored in transit. And Art. 1735 establishes the presumption that if the goods
are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they had observed extraordinary diligence
as required in Article 1733.
The above rules remain basically unchanged even when the contract is breached by
tort although non-contradictory principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as also
forming part of the governing law. Petitioner is not thus entirely off track when it has likewise
raised in its defense the tort doctrine of proximate cause. Unfortunately for petitioner,
however, the doctrine cannot, in this particular instance, support its case. Proximate cause is
that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
The above findings, which certainly cannot be said to be without basis, foreclose
whatever rights petitioner might have had to the possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by
international air carriers under the Warsaw Convention.
The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment of the provisions
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by
such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct, or if the damage is (similarly) caused x xx
by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.The Convention does
not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airlines liability, or as
an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. (Loss of baggage twice shows gross
negligence)
32. Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Judge Jose Alejandro, 145
SCRA 42
Facts:

In 1976, ChoaTiekSeng contracted FrotaOceanicaBrasiliera for the latter to deliver


goods. ChoaTiekSeng insured the goods with Filipino Merchants Insurnace Company. The

goods left the port of Manila on December 13, 1976 and reached its point of destination on
December 17, 1976. The goods were however damaged.
ChoaTiekSeng then filed an insurance claim. Filipino Merchants refused to pay so in
August 1977, it was sued by ChoaTiekSeng. In January 1978, Filipino Merchants filed a third
party complaint against the carrier FrotaOceanicaBrasiliera as it alleged that it is the carrier
who is liable to pay damages to ChoaTiekSeng. Judge Jose Alejandro of the trial court ruled
against Filipino Merchants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the judge. The lower
courts ruled that Filipino Merchants is already barred from filing a claim because under the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the suit against the carrier must be filed within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered or one year
from December 17, 1976. The insurance company is already barred for it filed its third party
complaint only in January 1978.
Issue:

Whether or not Filipino Merchants is precluded by the said time-bar rule

Ruling:
Yes. The pertinent provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act does not only apply
to the shipper but also applies to the insurer. The coverage of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act includes the insurer of the goods. Otherwise, what the Act intends to prohibit after the
lapse of the one year prescriptive period can be done indirectly by the shipper or owner of
the goods by simply filing a claim against the insurer even after the lapse of one year. This
would be the result if the insurer can, at any time, proceed against the carrier and the ship
since it is not bound by the time-bar provision. In this situation, the one year limitation will
be practically useless. This could not have been the intention of the law which has also for
its purpose the protection of the carrier and the ship from fraudulent claims by having
matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a time as possible
and by avoiding incidents which would unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays
in the settlement of questions affecting the transportation.
33. Ang vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., 19 SCRA 123
Facts:
YauYue Commercial Bank Ltd. of Hongkong, sell 140 packages of galvanized steel
durzinc sheets to one Herminio G. Teves, shipped by Tokyo Boeki Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan with
American Steamship Agencies, Inc. as the agent in the Philippines, under a shipping
agreement. The bill of lading was indorsed to the order of and delivered to YauYue by the
shipper. Upon receipt thereof, YauYue drew a demand draft together with the bill of lading
against Herminio G. Teves, through the Hongkong&Shanghai Bank. Upon arrival, Hongkong&
Shanghai Bank notified Teves, the notify party under the bill of lading, of the arrival of the
goods and requested payment of the demand draft representing the purchase price of the
articles. Teves, however, did not pay the demand draft, prompting the bank to make the
corresponding protest. The bank likewise returned the bill of lading and demand draft to
YauYue which indorsed the said bill of lading to Domingo Ang. Despite non-payment Teves
was able to secure a Permit To Deliver Imported Articles which he presented to the Bureau
of Customs which in turn released to him the articles covered by the bill of lading.
Subsequently, Domingo Ang claimed for the articles from American Steamship Agencies,
Inc., by presenting the indorsed bill of lading, but he was informed by the latter that it had
delivered the articles to Teves. A complaint was filed by Ang against American Steamship for
having allegedly wrongfully delivered and/or converted the goods covered by the bill of
lading. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that plaintiffs cause of action
has prescribed under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.Lower court dismissed the case on
the ground of prescription. Hence, an appeal was filed to SC.
Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants cause of action prescribed under Section 3(6),
paragraph 4 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
Ruling:
From the allegations of the complaint, therefore, the goods cannot be deemed lost.
They were delivered to Herminio G. Teves, so that there can only be either delivery, if Teves
really was entitled to receive them, or misdelivery, if he was not so entitled. It is not for Us
now to resolve whether or not delivery of the goods to Teves was proper, that is, whether or
not there was rightful delivery or misdelivery.
The point that matters here is that the situation is either delivery or misdelivery, but
not nondelivery. Thus, the goods were either rightly delivered or misdelivered, but they were
not lost. There being no loss or damage to the goods, the aforequoted provision of the
Carriage of Good by Sea Act stating that In any event, the carrier and the ship shall be
discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one
year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered,
does not apply. The reason is not difficult to see. Said one-year period of limitation is
designed to meet the exigencies of maritime hazards. In a case where the goods shipped
were neither last nor damaged in transit but were, on the contrary, delivered in port to
someone who claimed to be entitled thereto, the situation is different, and the special need
for the short period of limitation in cases of loss or damage caused by maritime perils does
not obtain.Wherefore, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside
and this case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
34. Ang vs. CompaniaMaritima, 133 SCRA 600
Facts:
Ang on September 26, 1963, as the assignee of a bill of lading held by YauYue
Commercial Bank, Ltd. of Hongkong, sued CompaniaMaritima, Maritime Company of the
Philippines and C.L. Diokno. He prayed that the defendants be ordered to pay him solidarily
the sum of US$130,539.68 with interest from February 9, 1963 plus attorney's fees and
damages.
Ang alleged that YauYue Commercial Bank agreed to sell to Herminio G. Teves under
certain conditions 559 packages of galvanized steel, Durzinc sheets. The merchandise was
loaded on May 25, 1961 at Yawata, Japan in the M/S Luzon a vessel owned and operated by
the defendants, to be transported to Manila and consigned "to order" of the shipper, Tokyo
Boeki, Ltd., which indorsed the bill of lading issued by CompaniaMaritima to the order of
YauYue Commercial Bank. Ang further alleged that the defendants, by means of a permit to
deliver imported articles, authorized the delivery of the cargo to Teves who obtained delivery
from the Bureau of Customs without the surrender of the bill of lading and in violation of the
terms thereof. Teves dishonored the draft drawn by YauYue against him.
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation made the corresponding protest for
the draft's dishonor and returned the bill of lading to YauYue. The bill of lading was indorsed
to Ang. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Ang's complaint on the ground of lack of
cause of action. Ang opposed the motion. As already stated, the trial court on May 22, 1964
dismissed the complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription since the
action was filed beyond the one-year period provided in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.

Issue:

Whether or not the present case is already barred by prescription

Ruling:
No.In the American Steamship Agencies cases, it was held that the action of Ang is
based on misdelivery of the cargo which should be distinguished from loss thereof. The oneyear period provided for in section 3 (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act refers to loss of
the cargo. What is applicable is the four-year period of prescription for quasi-delicts
prescribed in article 1146 (2) of the Civil Code or ten years for violation of a written contract
as provided for in article 1144 (1) of the same Code.
As Ang filed the action less than three years from the date of the alleged misdelivery
of the cargo, it has not yet prescribed. Ang, as indorsee of the bill of lading, is a real party in
interest with a cause of action for damages.

Você também pode gostar