Daniel Schwartz

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Magill,Kevin."MoralResponsibility."FreedomandExperience:Selfdeterminationwithout
Illusions.NewYork:St.Martin's,1997.N.pag.Print.
WebeganonPhilpapersandfromtherewereledtoKevinMagillsessayBlaming,
UnderstandingandJustification.Thisessaywasadaptedfromachapterwhichfirstappearedin
MagillsbookFreedomandExperience.ThechapterisanextendedassessmentofStrawsons
positionandalsodefendsStrawsonagainstseveralofhisdetractors.Wewerebothveryfondof
StrawsonsessayandsosettledonthischapterinordertobetterunderstandStrawsonaswellas
someoftheobjectionshispositionhasfaced.
ForPeterStrawson,bothhumaninteraction,andtheattitudespeopledevelopinresponse
togoodandbadbehavior,arefoundationalforourconceptionofmorality.Forinstance,Iresenta
burglarforthecrimeofstealingonlybecauseIpresumehiscrimetobeexpressinganimproper
indifferencetomyinterests.Iftheburglarwereadequatelysensitivetomyneedsandwants,just
asIamtohis,hewouldnothavestolenfromme.Itisthenwrongheaded,onStrawsonsview,for
anincompatibilisttoregardmoralresponsibility(MR)asuntenableonmetaphysicalgrounds.
For,evenifweallacceptedthethesisofdeterminism,itwouldstillbeabsurdtothinkthata
theoreticalconvictionmightsochangeourworldthat,init,therewerenolongeranysuchthings
asinterpersonalrelationshipsconventionallyunderstood,orthemoralattitudesthataretheir
result(Strawson192).Evengrantingthatourburglarwasdeterminedtosteal,myresulting
attitudetowardhimandhisactionswould,onStrawsonsview,notberadicallydifferent.
Inhisbook,FreedomandExperience,KevinMagillentertainsthefollowingobjectionto
Strawsonsview.Attimesweencounter,orbelievewehaveencountered,apersonbehaving
badlybecauseofanunbalancedorimmoralcharacter.Ifweexcusethispersonbecauseheis
constrainedbyaconstitutionhecannothelpbuthave,howmaywedeterminewhenandtowhat
degreehimandotherslikehimdeservepunishment?Indeed,wemay(slippingfurtherdownthe
slope)wanttoexcuseeveryoneinthattheytransgressonlybecauseoftheircharacter.
LibertariansbelievetheirownaccountofMR,asopposedtoStrawsons,avoidsthis
difficultybymaintainingthatapersononlydeservespunishmentincaseswherehepossessesa
categoricalabilitytodootherwise.Ourburglarisguiltyofstealingonlyifhecouldhave
refrainedfromhavingstolen.Magillrejectsthisstrategy,however,claimingthatanagents
categoricalabilitytodootherwisedoesnottakenonitsown,logicallyimplyorinanyway
entailthat[aperson]deservestobepunishedorblamedforwhathedid(43).Moreover,even
iflibertariansarerightinthinkingthereissomethingunfairaboutblameandpunishment,a
categoricalabilitytodootherwisewouldnotrenderblameandpunishmentanymorefair.
TojustifyboththeseclaimsMagillarguesthattheetiologyof,say,ourburglarsbehavior
isirrelevanttotheconvictionthatpunishmentisjustdesertforhiscrime.Thisisbecause,for
Magill,Theconvictionthatpunishmentisfairrewardforbadbehaviorisfoundationaltoour
moralthoughtsandpractices(44).Andinsofarastheideaofrelinquishingourmoralthoughts
andpracticesis,fromaStrawsonianperspective,untenable,wecannotandoughtnotabandona
grounduponwhichthesethoughtsandpracticesisthoughttorest,namely,thegroundofjust
deserts.Therefore,onlyprinciplesinternaltoourmoralattitudesandpracticescanactually
impactthesesameattitudesandpractices.Asabove,somethinglikeacontrovertingmetaphysical
considerationwould,forStrawsonandMagill,havenorealeffectonourmoralattitudesor
conduct.Onlycompetingmoralprinciplescaninfluencesomethinglikethemetingoutof
retributivepunishment.
Wellbeingi.e.thegoodnessofpleasureandhappinessmaybesuchacompetingmoral
principle.Libertarians,forMagill,believethistobetheonlyprinciplethatmatters,maintaining

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thatthereisnosuchthingasjustpunishment.Aswehaveseen,however,Magillrejectsthis
view,believingthat,whileincertaincasesourconcernforwellbeingshouldmotivateusto
abstainfrompunishment,inothercases,punishmentcanbereadilyjustified.Moreover,asbefore,
onlyvaluespropertomoralitycancompetewithothermoralvalues.Inthisway,values
internaltomoralpracticesareimpervioustoexternalconcerns.Thereforethelibertarian
emphasisonacategoricalabilitytodootherwiseisirrelevanttothepraiseworthinessor
blameworthinessofanaction.
Wehavereasontothinkhowever,thatMagillsdefenseofStrawsonisnotwithoutits
flaws.EvenifweacceptMagillsaccountofMRtheremaystillbegoodreasontowonderabout
theproprietyofourreactiveattitudeswithrespecttocertainagents.Magillemphasizestheway
ourmoralpracticesofrewardandpunishmentareconstitutedandsustained,butisperhapsnot
sensitiveenoughtohowthosepracticesmaybeimproved.SlaveryintheantebellumSouthwas
thoughttobeapermanentandnaturalfixtureofsocial,economic,andpoliticalintercourse.
Slaverygovernedthecontentandtenorofpeoplesreactiveattitudestooneanother,especially
whenitcametotheinteractionbetweenslaveandfreepersons.If,likeMagill,wetakethese
reactiveattitudestobefoundational,andhence,notinneedofjustification,weriskpresumingthe
resultingracialhierarchytobefoundationalinthesameway.Becausejustificatoryquestions
concerningthereactiveattitudesthatsurroundslaverycant,inprinciple,ariseforMagill,we
believetheremaybeanimportantdefectinhisview.
Todefusethisobjection,Magillmightappealtoanotionofproperreactiveattitudesand
doingso,mayindeedbesufficientforavoidingourcritique.However,eventhisstrategymay
leadtoproblemsofitsown.What,forMagill,couldqualifyasanarbiterofpropriety?Whatare
thestandardsaccordingtowhichweoughttodeemareactiveattitudeproperorimproper?Itis
notclearthatMagillhasanaccountforsomethinglikethenecessaryandsufficientconditionsfor
justifiedindignationinresponsetothetheftofourburglar.AnditseemslikelythatifMagillwere
todeviseanaccountofthiskindhewouldbeleadinevitablytoproposingatheoryofMR.Butif
atheoryofMRisunavoidableinthecourseofdeterminingtheproprietyofareactiveattitude
thenMagillsfocusonwhatistrueofmoralattitudesandactionsinpracticemayberenderedless
integraltoourunderstandingofpraiseandblame.