Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Troadio Tecson [G.R. No. 89483.

August 30, 1990]

Ponente: CORTES, J.
FACTS:
The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio
Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended,
and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The
Board opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. According to
petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent because he is a subordinate of former President Marcos.
Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in
Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him,
that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the
Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a
crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so.
Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent acted as a subordinate under E.O. No.1 and
related executive orders.
HELD:
NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.
RATIO:
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is
[w]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned. The term subordinate as used in
E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with
former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member,
relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate,
dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.
The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of
private respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the
appropriate prosecution agency.

People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of

Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private
prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI,
RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.
Ponente: AQUINO
FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen
persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No.
772. Before the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu
proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled)
on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through
stealth and strategy, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected with
the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the
decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of
dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply
to agricultural lands.
HELD:
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial courts dismissal was affirmed.
RATIO:
[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by
well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural
areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court
does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is
intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.

The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is

resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
Vera v. Cuevas
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1979/may1979/gr_l_33693_1979.html
Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of
filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent,
Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold
whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the
brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the
brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk
Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose
of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk
industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk
products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to
penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in skimmed milk
wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the
fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines
shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the
language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the
respondents to print on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the
Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents related
to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.
Issue:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax
Code.
Held:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific
and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed
milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause
"all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in
part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed

milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms
are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the
former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise
removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then
be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and
filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both
to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk
products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious,
wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to
the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any
defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due
process of law.

SYNTHESIS
In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Troadio Tecson
wherein the issue raised is whether or not private respondent acted as a
subordinate under E.O. No.1 and related executive orders. Applying the rule in
statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is [w]here general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are
to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned. The term subordinate as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would
refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos
and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in E.O. No. 2.
The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of
private respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the
appropriate prosecution agency.

In the case of The People of the Philippines vs Hon. Vicente B. Echavez wherein the
issue raised was whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar
acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands. The supreme court held that [T]he lower
court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court
does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is
intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.
The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is
resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
In the case of Misael P. Vera vs Hon. Serafin R. Cuevas wherein the issue raised was
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax
Code. It was held by the Supreme Court that Section 169 of the Tax Code is not
applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in
the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would
restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the
fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is
restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem
generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the
particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the
former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise
removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then
be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and
filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both
to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk
products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious,
wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to
the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any
defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
In sum, In applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis,
that is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words
of a particular, and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extend, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned and is resorte to when the
legislative intent is uncertain.