[G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992.

]
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY and
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY SUPERVISORY UNIT FOR SECURITY AND
INVESTIGATION AGENCIES (PC-SUSIA), Respondents.
Franciso A. Lava, Jr. and Andresito X. Fornier for Petitioner.

not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.

4. ID.; ID.; REASONS BEHIND. The state immunity doctrine rests upon
reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which would
flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that public service would be
hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be
subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and, consequently,
controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper
administration of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129,
as cited in 78 SCRA 477).

SYLLABUS
DECISION
1. POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
CHIEF AND THE PC-SUSIA MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
STATE. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI,
Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and
PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government
exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization
and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies,
said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without
the Governments consent, especially in this case because VMPSIs
complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a
certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory
damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same
amount, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees from said public respondents.
Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be
enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary
funds for that purpose.
2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE SUED IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY IF HE
ACTS, AMONG OTHERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY; CASE AT
BAR. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or
private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority
or jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts
for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this
case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without
malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against
them in their private capacities.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSENT TO BE SUED MUST EMANATE FROM A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
Waiver of the States immunity from suit, being a derogation of
sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi
juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be
sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act,
not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 11,
1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15990, entitled "The Chief
of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Philippine Constabulary Supervisor Unit
for Security and Investigation Agencies (PC-SUSIA) v. Hon. Omar U. Amin
and Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI)," lifting the
writ of preliminary injunction which the Regional Trial Court had issued
to the PC-SUSIA enjoining them from committing acts that would result
in the cancellation or non-renewal of the license of VMPSI to operate as
a security agency.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On March 28, 1988, VMPSI filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court at
Makati, Metro Manila, praying the court to:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order to preserve the status
quo, enjoining the defendants, or any one acting in their place or stead,
to refrain from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or
non-renewal of VMPSIs license;
"B. In due time, issue a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect;
"C. Render decision and judgment declaring null and void the amendment
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 5487, by PD No. 11 exempting organizations like
PADPAO from the prohibition that no person shall organize or have an
interest in more than one agency, declaring PADPAO as an illegal
organization existing in violation of said prohibition, without the illegal
exemption provided in PD No. 11; declaring null and void Section 17 of R.A.
No. 5487 which provides for the issuance of rules and regulations in
consultation with PADPAO, declaring null and void the February 1, 1982

directive of Col. Sabas V. Edadas, in the name of the then PC Chief,

requiring all private security agencies/security forces such as VMPSI to
join PADPAO as a prerequisite to secure/renew their licenses, declaring
that VMPSI did not engage in cut-throat competition in its contract with
MWSS, ordering defendants PC Chief and PC-SUSIA to renew the license
of VMPSI; ordering the defendants to refrain from further harassing
VMPSI and from threatening VMPSI with cancellations or non-renewal of
license, without legal and justifiable cause; ordering the defendants to pay
to VMPSI the sum of P1,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation; and granting such further or other reliefs to
VMPSI as may be deemed lawful, equitable and just." (pp. 55-56, Rollo.)

agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO

Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located .
. ." (pp. 5-6, Complaint in Civil Case No. 88-471). As such membership
requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates
legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair
competition and combinations in restraint of trade.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library

The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487

(otherwise known as the "Private Security Agency Law"), as amended,
is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library

On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with
PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its
contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower
than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

"SECTION 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. Any

Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership, or association, with a
minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is
owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or
watchman agency: Provided, That no person shall organize or have an
interest in, more than one such agency except those which are already
existing at the promulgation of this Decree: . . ." (As amended by P.D. Nos.
11 and 100.)
"SECTION 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary.
The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with the
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc.
and subject to the provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue
the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this
Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair
competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor
and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective
Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an
interest in more than one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3,
subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to
Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the
Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos,
through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that "all private security

On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO

and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per
guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within
Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila (Annex B, Petition).

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO

Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from
PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency
(Annex D, Petition).
The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the
cancellation of VMPSIs license (Annex E, Petition).
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership
to VMPSI when it requested one.
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or
disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSIs application for
renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from
PADPAO (Annex F, Petition).
As the PC Chief did not reply, and VMPSIs license was expiring on March
31, 1988, VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 in the RTC-Makati, Branch 135,
on March 28, 1988 against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. On the same date,
the court issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
"from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal
of VMPSIs license" (Annex G, Petition).
The PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a "Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the
Temporary Restraining Order," on the grounds that the case is against

the State which had not given consent thereto and that VMPSIs license
already expired on March 31, 1988, hence, the restraining order or
preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose because there was no
more license to be cancelled (Annex H, Petition). Respondent VMPSI
opposed the motion.
On April 18, 1988, the lower court denied VMPSIs application for a writ
of preliminary injunction for being premature because it "has up to May
31, 1988 within which to file its application for renewal pursuant to Section
2 (e) of Presidential Decree No. 199, . . ." (p. 140, Rollo.).chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
On May 23, 1988, VMPSI reiterated its application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment of the
penalty for its failure to submit its application for renewal of its license
and the requirements therefor within the prescribed period in Section 2(e)
of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 5487, as amended
by P.D. 1919 (Annex M, Petition).
On June 10, 1998, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction
upon a bond of P100,000.00, restraining the defendants, or any one
acting in their behalf, from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSIs
license, until further orders from the court.
The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
above order, but it was denied by the court in its Order of August 10,
1988 (Annex R, Petition).
On November 3, 1988, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief by a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners PC Chief and
PC-SUSIA is hereby GRANTED, and the RTC-Makati, Branch 135, is ordered
to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent VMPSI in Civil Case No. 88-471,
insofar as petitioners PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are concerned, for lack of
jurisdiction. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 10, 1988, is
dissolved." (pp. 295-296, Rollo.)

The answer is yes.

The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government
exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the
organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or
security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PCSUSIA) may not be sued without the Governments consent, especially in
this case because VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to compel the public
respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks
actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorneys
fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the
payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State
did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that
purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus did we hold in Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA
713:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without
its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has
not been formally impleaded." (Emphasis supplied.)
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private
capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for
which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this
case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without
malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against
them in their private capacities.
We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an
implied consent by the State to be sued:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

VMPSI came to us with this petition for review.

The primary issue in this case is whether or not VMPSIs complaint against
the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.

"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into
by the PC Chief in relation to the exercise of a function sovereign in
nature. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act.

This was clearly enunciated in the case of United States of America v. Ruiz
where the Hon. Supreme Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

be imagined." (citing Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic, 29

SCRA 598.)cralawnad

"The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its functions. (136 SCRA 487, 492.)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment appealed
from is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

"In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the
PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and
to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current
rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The
execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A. 5487,
as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private
detective, watchmen or security guard agencies. (Emphasis ours.)" (pp.
258-259, Rollo.)
Waiver of the States immunity from suit, being a derogation of
sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi
juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be
sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative
act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.
The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the
inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is
obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the
instance of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and
disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the
government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA
477). In the same vein, this Court in Republic v. Purisima (78 SCRA 470,
473) rationalized:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability is not
to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be cause [by]
private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial
remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the
part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time
and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a
basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacles, could very well

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159402

February 23, 2011

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES DAVID* ELISEA RAMOS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The States immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner
because it is an agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far
from being the States exclusive prerogative.
Under challenge is the decision promulgated on May 14, 2003,1 by which
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered
on February 21, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 (RTC), in
Baguio City in favor of the respondents.2
Antecedents
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of
their land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the
Baguio City land records with an area of 985 square meters, more or less,
was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the
Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office
(ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations to
convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration
of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite
repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection
against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC (docketed as Civil
Case No. 4017-R and entitled Spouses David and Elisea Ramos v. Air

Transportation Office, Capt. Panfilo Villaruel, Gen. Carlos Tanega, and Mr.
Cesar de Jesus).

No cost.
SO ORDERED.

In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative

defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos
had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents
affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent
considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the
performance of governmental functions.
On November 10, 1998, the RTC denied the ATOs motion for a preliminary
hearing of the affirmative defense.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue
The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued
without the States consent.
Ruling

After the RTC likewise denied the ATOs motion for reconsideration on
December 10, 1998, the ATO commenced a special civil action for
certiorari in the CA to assail the RTCs orders. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailed orders
were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.3

The petition for review has no merit.

Subsequently, February 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision on the
merits,4 disposing:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is rendered ORDERING the defendant Air

Transportation Office to pay the plaintiffs DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS the
following: (1) The amount of P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of
land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the Deed of Sale,
plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed
of Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral
damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10,
more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this
suit.
SO ORDERED.
In due course, the ATO appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTCs
decision on May 14, 2003,5 viz:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the awarded cost therein is deleted,
while that of moral and exemplary damages is reduced to P30,000.00 each,
and attorneys fees is lowered to P10,000.00.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of
sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as
a sovereign, can do no wrong. Moreover, as the eminent Justice Holmes
said in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank:6
The territory [of Hawaii], of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v.
Reeves, 178 US 436, 44 L ed 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no
objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. xxx
But in the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is whether the
plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to the
source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own
permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days
of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. "Car on peut
bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner
loy." Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De
Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De
Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61.7
Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from
suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance
of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed

and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State
has to defend against.8 Several justifications have been offered to support
the adoption of the doctrine in the Philippines, but that offered in
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines9 is "the
most acceptable explanation," according to Father Bernas, a recognized
commentator on Constitutional Law,10 to wit:
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private
parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a
fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial
remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity on the
part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time
and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a
basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well
be imagined.
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested
with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages
against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is violated.11 However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and
one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or
incidental to such function;12 it has not been upheld in favor of the latter
whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government
but was essentially a business.13
Should the doctrine of sovereignty immunity or non-suability of the State
be extended to the ATO?
In its challenged decision,14 the CA answered in the negative, holding:
On the first assignment of error, appellants seek to impress upon Us that
the subject contract of sale partook of a governmental character. Apropos,
the lower court erred in applying the High Courts ruling in National
Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), arguing that in
Teodoro, the matter involved the collection of landing and parking fees
which is a proprietary function, while the case at bar involves the
maintenance and operation of aircraft and air navigational facilities and
services which are governmental functions.
We are not persuaded.

Contrary to appellants conclusions, it was not merely the collection of

landing and parking fees which was declared as proprietary in nature by the
High Court in Teodoro, but management and maintenance of airport
operations as a whole, as well. Thus, in the much later case of Civil
Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]), the
Supreme Court, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro,
declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from
suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. It went on
to explain in this wise:
xxx
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private
entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National
Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government,
but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime
objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the
travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the
exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public
roads, be undertaken by private concerns. [National Airports Corp. v.
Teodoro, supra, p. 207.]
xxx
True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated
was Exec. Order 365 (Reorganizing the Civil Aeronautics Administration and
Abolishing the National Airports Corporation). Republic Act No. 776 (Civil
Aeronautics Act of the Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20,
1952, did not alter the character of the CAAs objectives under Exec. Order
365. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs.
3 and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to consider the CAA in the
category of a private entity were retained substantially in Republic Act
776, Sec. 32(24) and (25). Said Act provides:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general
control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall
have among others, the following powers and duties:
xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the
Manila International Airport and all government-owned aerodromes except
those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including such powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design, construct, equip,
expand, improve, repair or alter aerodromes or such structures,

improvement or air navigation facilities; (b) to enter into, make and

execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private
corporation or entity;
(25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing fees, parking
space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or indirect, to any
aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare parts,
accessories and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals for the use
of any of the property under its management and control.
xxx
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or
non-governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview
of the rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in
the Teodoro case states:
xxx
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of
the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in
Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have
assumed to act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various
suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of
ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political
character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is
true, although the state may own stock or property of such a
corporation for by engaging in business operations through a corporation,
the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication
consents to suits against the corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airports
Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-207; Italics supplied.]
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v.
Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA
63], where it was held that the Philippine National Railways, although
owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it
does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions.
Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of
airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot
avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies
performing strictly governmental functions.15

In our view, the CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character

of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was
not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity.
Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We uphold
the CAs aforequoted holding.
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from
the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.16 Thus, in De
los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court,17 the trial courts dismissal
based on the doctrine of non-suability of the State of two cases (one of
which was for damages) filed by owners of property where a road 9 meters
wide and 128.70 meters long occupying a total area of 1,165 square meters
and an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long occupying
an area of 2,906 square meters had been constructed by the provincial
engineer of Rizal and a private contractor without the owners knowledge
and consent was reversed and the cases remanded for trial on the merits.
The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not
an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the
right of eminent domain, the Court explained, the State exercised its jus
imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet,
even in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation
without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit
could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the
owners.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the
States consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act
No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.
R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO, to wit:
Section 4. Creation of the Authority. There is hereby created an
independent regulatory body with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
powers and possessing corporate attributes to be known as the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), herein after referred to as the
"Authority" attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) for the purpose of policy coordination. For this
purpose, the existing Air transportation Office created under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 776, as amended is hereby abolished.
xxx

Under its Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the
ATO the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby
assumed all of the ATOs powers, duties and rights, assets, real and
personal properties, funds, and revenues, viz:
CHAPTER XII
TRANSITORTY PROVISIONS
Section 85. Abolition of the Air Transportation Office. The Air
Transportation Office (ATO) created under Republic Act No. 776, a sectoral
office of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), is
hereby abolished.1avvphi1
All powers, duties and rights vested by law and exercised by the ATO is
hereby transferred to the Authority.
All assets, real and personal properties, funds and revenues owned by or
vested in the different offices of the ATO are transferred to the
Authority. All contracts, records and documents relating to the
operations of the abolished agency and its offices and branches are
likewise transferred to the Authority. Any real property owned by the
national government or government-owned corporation or authority
which is being used and utilized as office or facility by the ATO shall be
transferred and titled in favor of the Authority.
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the
CAAP, including the power to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts of
every class, kind and description, to construct, acquire, own, hold,
operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real properties, and
to settle, under such terms and conditions most advantageous to it, any
claim by or against it.18
With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497,
the obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with
the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and
affirms the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 107271

September 10, 2003

CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of
Caloocan City, ALBERTO A. CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC
of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK (PNB), respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision1 dated August 31,
1992, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 27423, ordering the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123, to implement an alias
writ of execution dated January 16, 1992. The dispositive portion read as
follows:
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby granted ordering the Regional
Trial Court of Kaloocan City, Branch 123, to immediately effect the
alias writ of execution dated January 16, 1992 without further
delay.
Counsel for the respondents are warned that a repetition of their
contemptuous act to delay the execution of a final and executory
judgment will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.2
It is important to state at the outset that the dispute between petitioner
and private respondent has been litigated thrice before this Court: first,
in G.R. No. L-39288-89, entitled Heirs of Abelardo Palomique, et al. vs.
Marcial Samson, et al., decided on January 31, 1985; second, in G.R. No.
98366, entitled City Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
resolved on May 16, 1991, and third, in G.R. No. 102625, entitled Santiago
vs. Sto. Tomas, et al., decided on August 1, 1995. This is not to mention
the numerous concurrent efforts by the City Government of Caloocan to
seek relief from other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The present
petition for certiorari is the fourth time we are called upon to resolve the
dispute.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

The factual and procedural antecedents follow.
SO ORDERED.
Sometime in 1972, Marcial Samson, City Mayor of Caloocan City, through
Ordinance No. 1749, abolished the position of Assistant City

Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local

government of Caloocan. Then Assistant City Administrator Delfina
Hernandez Santiago and the 17 affected employees of the City
Government assailed the legality of the abolition before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33.

Appeals, et al. The petition was dismissed, through our Resolution of May
16, 1991, for having been filed late and for failure to show any reversible
error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The resolution subsequently
attained finality and the corresponding entry of judgment was made on
July 29, 1991.

In 1973, the CFI declared the abolition illegal and ordered the
reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their
back salaries and other emoluments. The City Government of Caloocan
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Santiago and her co-parties
moved for the dismissal of the appeal for being dilatory and frivolous but
the appellate court denied their motion. Thus, they elevated the case on
certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-39288-89, Heirs of
Abelardo Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial Samson, et al. In our Resolution
dated January 31, 1985, we held that the appellate court "erred in not
dismissing the appeal," and "that the appeal of the City Government of
Caloocan was frivolous and dilatory." In due time, the resolution lapsed
into finality and entry of judgment was made on February 27, 1985.

On motion of private respondent Santiago, Judge Mauro T. Allarde ordered

the issuance of an alias writ of execution on March 3, 1992. The City
Government of Caloocan moved to reconsider the order, insisting in the
main that respondent Santiago was not entitled to backwages from 1983 to
1986. The court a quo denied the motion and forthwith issued the alias writ
of execution. Unfazed, the City Government of Caloocan filed a motion to
quash the writ, maintaining that the money judgment sought to be
enforced should not have included salaries and allowances for the years
1983-1986. The trial court likewise denied the motion.

In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid respondent Santiago

P75,083.37 in partial payment of her backwages, thereby leaving a
balance of P530,761.91. Her co-parties were paid in full.3 In 1987, the
City of Caloocan appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries. This was
included in Supplemental Budget No. 3 for the fiscal year 1987.
Surprisingly, however, the City later refused to release the money to
respondent Santiago.
Respondent Santiago exerted effort for the execution of the remainder of
the money judgment but she met stiff opposition from the City Government
of Caloocan. On February 12, 1991, Judge Mauro T. Allarde, RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 123, issued a writ of execution for the payment of
the remainder of respondent Santiagos back salaries and other
emoluments.4
For the second time, the City Government of Caloocan went up to the
Court of Appeals and filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to stop the trial court from enforcing the writ of execution.
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of issuance of the
writ of execution.5 One of the issues raised and resolved therein was the
extent to which back salaries and emoluments were due to respondent
Santiago. The appellate court held that she was entitled to her salaries
from October, 1983 to December, 1986.
And for the second time, the City Government of Caloocan appealed to this
Court in G.R. No. 98366, City Government of Caloocan vs. Court of

On July 27, 1992, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo levied and sold at public
auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government of Caloocan,
with plate no. SBH-165, for P100,000. The proceeds of the sale were
turned over to respondent Santiago in partial satisfaction of her claim,
thereby leaving a balance of P439,377.14, inclusive of interest. Petitioners
filed a motion questioning the validity of the auction sale of the
vehicle with plate no. SBH-165, and a supplemental motion maintaining
that the properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. In
his Order dated October 1, 1992, Judge Allarde denied both motions and
directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction three more
vehicles of the City of Caloocan -6</p>
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Station Wagon); Motor No. C240-199629; Chassis No. MBB-910369C;
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Series 11-Diesel); Engine No.
4FB1-174328, Chassis No. MBB-910345C; Plate No. SDL-653;
ONE (1) Unit Motor Vehicle (Hunter Series 11-Diesel); Engine No.
4FB-165196; Chassis No. MBB 910349C.
All the vehicles, including that previously sold in the auction sale, were
owned by the City and assigned for the use of herein petitioner Norma
Abracia, Division Superintendent of Caloocan City, and other officials of the
Division of City Schools.
Meanwhile, the City Government of Caloocan sought clarification from the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) on whether respondent Santiago was
considered to have rendered services from 1983-1986 as to be entitled to

backwages for that period. In its Resolution No. 91-1124, the CSC ruled in
the negative.
On November 22, 1991, private respondent Santiago challenged the CSC
resolution before this Court in G.R. No. 102625, Santiago vs. Sto. Tomas, et
al. On July 8, 1993, we initially dismissed the petition for lack of merit;
however, we reconsidered the dismissal of the petition in our Resolution
dated August 1, 1995, this time ruling in favor of respondent Santiago:
The issue of petitioner Santiagos right to back salaries for the
period from October 1983 to December 1986 having been resolved
in G.R. No. 98366 on 16 May 1991, CSC Resolution No. 91-1124
promulgated later on 24 September 1991 in particular, its ruling
on the extent of backwages due petitioner Santiago was in fact
moot and academic at the time of its promulgation. CSC
Resolution No. 91-1124 could not, of course, set aside what had
been judicially decided with finality x x x x the court considers
that resort by the City Government of Caloocan to respondent CSC
was but another attempt to deprive petitioner Santiago of her
claim to back salaries x x x and a continuation of the Citys abuse
and misuse of the rules of judicial procedure. The Citys acts have
resulted in wasting the precious time and resources of the courts
and respondent CSC. (Underscoring supplied).
On October 5, 1992, the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No.
0134, Series of 1992, which included the amount of P439,377.14
claimed by respondent Santiago as back salaries, plus interest.7 Pursuant
to the subject ordinance, Judge Allarde issued an order dated November
10, 1992, decreeing that:
WHEREFORE, the City Treasurer (of Caloocan), Norberto Azarcon is
hereby ordered to deliver to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt hereof, (a) managers check covering the amount of
P439,378.00 representing the back salaries of petitioner Delfina H.
Santiago in accordance with Ordinance No. 0134 S. 1992 and
pursuant to the final and executory decision in these cases.
Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to
sign the check intended as payment for respondent Santiagos
claims. This, despite the fact that he was one of the signatories of
the ordinance authorizing such payment. On April 29, 1993, Judge
Allarde issued another order directing the Acting City Mayor of
Caloocan, Reynaldo O. Malonzo, to sign the check which had been
pending before the Office of the Mayor since December 11, 1992.
Acting City Mayor Malonzo informed the trial court that "he could

not comply with the order since the subject check was not formally
turned over to him by the City Mayor" who went on official leave of
absence on April 15, 1993, and that "he doubted whether he had
authority to sign the same."8
Thus, in an order dated May 7, 1993, Judge Allarde ordered Sheriff
Alberto A. Castillo to immediately garnish the funds of the City
Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of respondent
Santiago.9 On the same day, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo served a copy of the
Notice of Garnishment on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Sangandaan
Branch, Caloocan City. When PNB immediately notified the City of
Caloocan of the Notice of Garnishment, the City Treasurer sent a letteradvice informing PNB that the order of garnishment was "illegal," with a
warning that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be
caused by the withholding of the funds of the city. PNB opted to comply
with the order of Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a managers
check amounting to P439,378. After 21 long years, the claim of private
respondent Santiago was finally settled in full.
On June 4, 1993, however, while the instant petition was pending, the City
Government of Caloocan filed yet another motion with this Court, a Motion
to Declare in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the Garnishment and
Administrative Complaint against Judge Allarde, respondent Santiago and
PNB. Subsequently, the City Government of Caloocan filed a Supplemental
Petition formally impleading PNB as a party-respondent in this case.
The instant petition for certiorari is directed this time against the
validity of the garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan, as
well as the validity of the levy and sale of the motor vehicles belonging
to the City of Caloocan. More specifically, petitioners insist that Judge
Allarde gravely abused his discretion in:
(a) ordering the garnishment of the funds of the City of Caloocan
deposited with the PNB, since it is settled that public funds are
beyond the reach of garnishment and even with the appropriation
passed by the City Council, the authority of the Mayor is still
needed for the release of the appropriation;
(b) ordering the levy and sale at public auction of three (3) motor
vehicles owned by the City of Caloocan, which vehicles are
necessary for public use and cannot be attached nor sold in an
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the City of
Caloocan;

(c) peremptorily denying petitioner City of Caloocans urgent

motions to vacate and set aside the auction sale of the motor
vehicle with PLATE NO. SBH-165, notwithstanding that the auction
sale by the Sheriff was tainted with serious irregularities, more
particularly:
i. non-compliance with the mandatory posting of the notice
of sale;
ii. non-observance of the procedure that a sale through
public auction has to be made and consummated at the
time of the auction, at the designated place and upon
actual payment of the purchase price by the winning
bidder;
iii. violation of Sec. 21, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that sale of personal property capable of manual
delivery must be sold within the view of those attending
the sale; and,
iv. the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale contained false
narration of facts respecting the actual time of the public
auction;
(d) the enforcement of the levy made by the Sheriff covering the
three (3) motor vehicles based on an alias writ that has long
expired.
The petition has absolutely no merit. The trial court committed
no grave abuse of discretion in implementing the alias writ of
execution to settle the claim of respondent Santiago, the
satisfaction of which petitioner had been maliciously evading for 21
years.
Petitioner argues that the garnishment of its funds in PNB was
invalid inasmuch as these were public funds and thus exempt from
execution. Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by
means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property
of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by
such third person or garnishee to the defendant.10
The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the
PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of
its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit,

remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy,

in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law:11
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is
relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is
rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether
to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a
judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a
seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only
convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such
judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.12
The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.13
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception,
that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure
or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied
under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the
satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a
case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial
processes.
Thus, in the similar case of Pasay City Government, et al. vs. CFI of
Manila, Br. X, et al.,14 where petitioners challenged the trial courts order
garnishing its funds in payment of the contract price for the construction of
the City Hall, we ruled that, while government funds deposited in the PNB
are exempt from execution or garnishment, this rule does not apply if an
ordinance has already been enacted for the payment of the Citys
obligations
Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitionerappellants moved for its quashal alleging among other things the
exemption of the government from execution. This move on the
part of petitioner-appellants is at first glance laudable for all
government funds deposited with the Philippine National Bank by
any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by way
of general or special deposit, remain government funds and may
not be subject to garnishment or levy. But inasmuch as an
ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating the
amount of P613,096.00 as payment to the respondent-appellee,

then the herein case is covered by the exception to the general

rule x x x x
In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and
passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of
P439,377.14 for respondent Santiagos back salaries plus interest. Thus
this case fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and purposes,
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, was the "corresponding appropriation
as required by law." The sum indicated in the ordinance for Santiago
were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary
allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the Citys
monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could then
be validly enforced against such funds.
Indeed, this conclusion is further buttressed by the Certification issued on
December 23, 1992 by Norberto C. Azarcon, City Treasurer of Caloocan:
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that according to the records available in this
Office the claim for backwages of the HON. JUDGE DELFINA H.
SANTIAGO has been properly obligated and can be collected in
accordance with existing accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.
This is to certify further that in case the claim is not collected
within the present fiscal year, such claim shall be entered in the
books of Accounts Payable and can still be collected in the next
fiscal year x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners reliance on Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,15 and Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego,16 does not help
their cause.17 Both cases implicitly affirmed that public funds may be
garnished if there is a statute which appropriated the amount so
garnished. Thus, in Municipality of Makati, citing San Diego, we
unequivocally held that:
In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not
subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided by
statute x x x x
Similarly, we cannot agree with petitioners argument that the
appropriation ordinance of the City Council did not authorize PNB
to release the funds because only the City Mayor could authorize

the release thereof. A valid appropriation of public funds lifts its

exemption from execution. Here, the appropriation passed by the
City Council of Caloocan providing for the payment of backwages to
respondent was duly approved and signed by both the council and
then Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. The mayors signature approving
the budget ordinance was his assent to the appropriation of funds
for respondent Santiagos backwages. If he did not agree with such
allocation, he could have vetoed the item pursuant to Section 55 of
the Local Government Code.18 There was no such veto.
In view of the foregoing discourse, we dismiss petitioners unfounded
assertion, probably made more out of sheer ignorance of prevailing
jurisprudence than a deliberate attempt to mislead us, that the rule that
"public funds (are) beyond the reach of levy and garnishment is not
qualified by any condition."19
We now come to the issue of the legality of the levy on the three motor
vehicles belonging to the City of Caloocan which petitioners claimed to be
exempt from execution, and which levy was based on an alias writ that had
purportedly expired. Suffice it to say that Judge Allarde, in his Order dated
November 10, 1992,20 already lifted the levy on the three vehicles, thereby
formally discharging them from the jurisdiction of the court and turning
them over to the City Government of Caloocan:
x x x x the levy of the three (3) vehicles made by Sheriff Alberto
Castillo pursuant to the Orders of this Court dated October 1 and 8,
1992 is hereby lifted and the said Sheriff is hereby ordered to
return the same to the City Government in view of the satisfaction
of the decision in these cases x x x x
It is thus unnecessary for us to discuss a moot issue.
We turn to the third issue raised by petitioners that the auction
sale by Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo of the motor vehicle with plate
no. SBH-165 was tainted with serious irregularities. We need not
emphasize that the sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in
the performance of the functions of his office. This presumption
prevails in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary and
cannot be overcome by bare and self-serving allegations. The
petitioners failed to convince us that the auction sale conducted by
the sheriff indeed suffered from fatal flaws. No evidence was
adduced to prove that the sheriff had been remiss in the
performance of his duties during the public auction sale. Indeed it
would be injudicious for us to assume, as petitioners want us to do,

that the sheriff failed to follow the established procedures

governing public auctions.
On the contrary, a review of the records shows that the sheriff
complied with the rules on public auction. The sale of the Citys
vehicle was made publicly in front of the Caloocan City Hall on the
date fixed in the notice July 27, 1992. In fact, petitioners in their
Motion to Declare in Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the
Garnishment and Administrative Complaint admitted as much:
On July 27, 1992, by virtue of an alias writ of execution issued by
the respondent court, a vehicle owned by the petitioner xxx was
levied and sold at public auction for the amount of P100,000.00
and which amount was immediately delivered to the private
respondent x x x x21
Hence, petitioners cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the
auction sale.
Petitioners, in desperation, likewise make much of the proceedings before
the trial court on October 8, 1992, wherein petitioner Norma Abracia,
Superintendent of the Division of City Schools of Caloocan, was commanded
to appear and show cause why she should not be cited in contempt for
delaying the execution of judgment. This was in connection with her failure
(or refusal) to surrender the three motor vehicles assigned to the Division
of City Schools to the custody of the sheriff. Petitioner Abracia, assisted by
Mr. Ricardo Nagpacan of the Division of City Schools, appeared during the
hearing but requested a ten-day period within which to refer the matter of
contempt to a counsel of her choice. The request was denied by Judge
Allarde in his assailed order dated October 8, 1992. Thus petitioner Abracia
claimed, inter alia, that: (a) she was denied due process; (b) the silence of
the order of Judge Allarde on her request for time violated an orderly and
faithful recording of the proceedings, and (c) she was coerced into
agreeing to surrender the vehicles.
We do not think so. What violates due process is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard. That opportunity, the Court is convinced, was
sufficiently accorded to petitioner Abracia. She was notified of the
contempt charge against her; she was effectively assisted by counsel when
she appeared during the hearing on October 8, 1992; and she was afforded
ample opportunity to answer and refute the charge against her. The
circumstance that she opted not to avail of her chance to be heard on that
occasion by asking for an extension of time within which to hire a counsel
of her choice, a request denied by the trial court, did not transgress nor
deprive her of her right to due process.

Significantly, during the hearing on October 8, 1992, Mr. Nagpacan

manifested in open court that, after conferring with petitioner Abracia, the
latter was "willing to surrender these vehicles into the custody of the
sheriff on the condition that the standing motion (for contempt) be
withdrawn."22 Her decision was made freely and voluntarily, and after
conferring with her counsel. Moreover, it was petitioner Abracia herself
who imposed the condition that respondent Santiago should withdraw her
motion for contempt in exchange for her promise to surrender the subject
vehicles. Thus, petitioner Abracias claim that she was coerced into
surrendering the vehicles had no basis.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that there indeed existed certain legal
infirmities in connection with the assailed orders of Judge Allarde, still,
considering the totality of circumstances of this case, the nullification of
the contested orders would be way out of line. For 21 long years, starting
1972 when this controversy started up to 1993 when her claim was fully
paid out of the garnished funds of the City of Caloocan, respondent
Santiago was cruelly and unjustly deprived of what was due her. It would
be, at the very least, merciless and unchristian to make private respondent
refund the City of Caloocan the amount already paid to her, only to force
her to go through the same nightmare all over again.
At any rate, of paramount importance to us is that justice has been served.
No right of the public was violated and public interest was preserved.
Finally, we cannot simply pass over in silence the deplorable act of the
former Mayor of Caloocan City in refusing to sign the check in payment of
the Citys obligation to private respondent. It was an open defiance of
judicial processes, smacking of political arrogance, and a direct violation of
the very ordinance he himself approved. Our Resolution in G.R. No. 98366,
City Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., dated May 16,
1991, dismissing the petition of the City of Caloocan assailing the issuance
of a writ of execution by the trial court, already resolved with finality all
impediments to the execution of judgment in this case. Yet, the City
Government of Caloocan, in a blatant display of malice and bad faith,
refused to comply with the decision. Now, it has the temerity to come to
this Court once more and continue inflicting injustice on a hapless citizen,
as if all the harm and prejudice it has already heaped upon respondent
Santiago are still not enough.
This Court will not condone the repudiation of just obligations contracted
by municipal corporations. On the contrary, we will extend our aid and
every judicial facility to any citizen in the enforcement of just and valid
claims against abusive local government units.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. The
assailed orders of the trial court dated October 1, 1992, October 8, 1992
and May 7, 1993, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
Petitioners and their counsels are hereby warned against filing any more
pleadings in connection with the issues already resolved with finality herein
and in related cases.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.