011 DANTE LA.

JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative

of UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES
ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS
AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178607
December 5, 2012
PONENTE: BRION, J.
FACTS:
Jimenez(Petitioner) is the president of Unlad Shipping and Management
Corporation a local manning agency, while Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and
Avgoustis are the respondents herein and are some of the listed incorporators of
Tsakos Maritime Services Inc, a local manning agency
Aug. 19, 2013, Petitioner files a complaint affidavit with the office of the
prosecutor of Mandaluyong city against the respondents for syndicated and
large scale illegal recruitment.
Respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit and
denying the complaint. Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter
affidavit.
An Information for the said crime was filed before the RTC-Mandaluyong.
Dec. 4, 2004 the prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information and
respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their comment to the opposition
however the judge denied the motion as it found existence of probable cause
and issued warrants against the respondents.
Respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause to defer the enforcement of the warrants or arrest.
Petitioner filed his opposition with the motion to expunge, contending that
Alamil being a fugitive from justice had no standing to seek any relief and
that the RTC found probable cause.
Respondent filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Umali for being
biased or partial. The said judge voluntarily inhibit herself and the case was
re-raffled to Judge Sorongon.
The RTC granted respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration. It treated
respondent Alamils motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss
for lack of probable cause.
The petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioners notice of
appeal since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor
General, who is mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in
criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of
appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65
petition for certiorari assailing the RTCs March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and
August 7, 2006 orders.
the CA dismissed outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for lack of legal
personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It
noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal

personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was
not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of
the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their
recruitment business. The CA denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that
followed.
ISSUE(S): Whether the petitioner has the standing to assail the dismissal of the
case?
HELD: He has none.
RATIO:
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."33 Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved.34 By real interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.35 When the plaintiff or the defendant is
not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.36
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor."37 In appeals of criminal cases before the CA
and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant
to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code. This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in
his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG
can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this
Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases38 and continues
to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to
pursue the criminal action on his own behalf39 (as when there is a denial of
due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present
case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of
the criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the

criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The
petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an
offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal
action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which
pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.40
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the
jurisdiction of the court.41
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the
criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than
an application for bail.42
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt
of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No.
96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
012 PEOPLE vs EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012
TOPIC: RULE 110, Sec 6
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Estrella Sayson,
(Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station) located
at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the
celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was
held later in the evening. Estrellas son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former
policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and
managed the betting station. At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, Estrellas other
sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the
canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrellas family and other visitors ate and
enjoyed themselves at the party.
At about 10:00 oclock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the
arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of
the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan
Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to customers who
were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to
reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to
prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his
mothers warning. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force
Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accusedappellants threaten Moises with the words Gusto mo unahin na kita?
Moises replied huwag. Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell
and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground.
Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his brother Moises.
Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and

fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while
running. Joselito fell on a burger machine. After shooting the Sayson
brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime.
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced
them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the States witnesses by
pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the
finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State did not
establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
It is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not
sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of
any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its
execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and
attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime
committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance
as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular
instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically
aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal
conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest
of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information.28 In People v. Dimaano,29 the Court elaborated: For complaint or
information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of
the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must
be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and

essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of

a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused with
intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the victims
by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them] on various parts of
their bodies which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s] did
not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery
attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring
the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show
how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to
the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the
gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone,
was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in
the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his
liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is
meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against
him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the
presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is
being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried
thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain
justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in United States v. Lim San: From a legal
point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is
the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him
in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and in
which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged.
The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical
and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to
him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law
denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime
by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of
that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full
and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no
consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and
important question to him is, Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner
alleged? not Did you commit a crime named murder. If he performed the acts

alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is
and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the
crime is or what it is named.
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his
liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of
evidence that tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are
controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the
offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged included in the offense proved. In that regard, an offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and
circumstances constituting the elements of the crime charged is crucial in every
criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the State to duly
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
013 MIGUEL vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:

On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other
local officials[3] of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a lettercomplaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
(Ombudsman)[4] charging the petitioner, among others,[5] with
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the
consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and management of the
proposed Koronadal City public market (project)

The ombudsman then directed mayor miguel to file his counter affidavit

There were many extensions but he simply failed to submit his counter
affidavit.

The ombudsman found probable cause for the violation of ra 3019

and the crime of falsification of public documents.

Hence the ombudsman filed an information with the sandiganbayan.

This is the actual information: That on 10 January 1995 or sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his capacity
as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as
such while in the performance of his official functions, committing
the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official
position, conspiring and confederating with the private

[individuals] acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting
them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide
the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction
Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market,
without causing the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of
general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from
participating in said prequalification

The sandiganbayan ordered reinvestigation

Even the sandiganbayan asked mayor miguel to submit a counter

affidavit, but still he failed to submit one. (no reason given)

Since ayaw niya mag submit ng counter affidavit, Prosecutor Norberto

B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001,
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution

participate in the prequalification of consultants for the project

instead of publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation; and
3.
The petitioners actions, performed in relation to his office, gave
unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused
Issue: Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid
Sc ruling: it is valid!! SUFFICIENT

The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is

described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with
reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the
offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly
charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in
the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of
the offense charged as defined in the law; to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of

the nature and the cause of the accusation against him,[31] Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules)
[32] requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these
acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is being charged
x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment

what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrases
position, in relation with the other averments in the information

ang remedy diyan ay bill of particulars, not motion to quash the

information.

petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal

cases.
there was a motion from the special prosecutor to have the mayor
suspended
petitioner filed his Vigorous Opposition based on the obvious and fatal
defect of the [i]nformation in failing to allege that the giving of
unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the
petitioner pendente lite for 90 days
this prompted the mayor to go directly to the sc on rule 65
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in ordering his suspension despite the failure of the
information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages by the petitioner was made through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. He alleges that the
phrases evident bad faith and manifest partiality actually refers not
to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information fatally
defective.
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the
elements of the offense under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are
specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts.These elements are:
1.

The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South

Cotabato at the time material to the acts complained of;
2.
The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith
when he invited only his co-accused private individuals to

014 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BENJAMIN

SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 179031 November 14, 2012
Topic: Rule 110
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Information:
That on or about the 26th day of February, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, who is the father of private complainant "AAA", did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with force and intimidation commit
an act of sexual assault upon the person of one "AAA", a minor, 7 years of
age[,] by then and there inserting his penis into [the] genital of said
complainant, all against her will and consent, which act debases, degrades, or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said "AAA", as a human being, in
violation of said law.
Version of the Prosecution:

The victim, AAA, is the daughter of the accused. On February 26, 2000, AAA and
her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father brought home for merienda. After
eating, AAA went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant also entered the
room and positioned himself on top of AAA, took off her clothes and inserted his
penis into her vagina. AAA felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina
and thus told her father that it was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to
his daughter, stood up, and left the room. The whole incident was witnessed by
AAAs brother, BBB. The pain persisted until AAAs vagina started to bleed. She
thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a hospital for treatment. Her
mother was also immediately informed of her ordeal. AAA was taken into the
custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Medico-Legal Officer Francisco A. Supe, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Supe) examined
"AAA", which examination yielded the following results:
GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL: Fairly developed, fairly nourished
and coherent female child. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and
soft.
GENITAL: There is absent growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full,
convex, and coaptated with light brown labia minora presenting in
between. On separating the same, disclosed an elastic, fleshy type,
hyperemic and intact hymen. Posterior fourchette is sharp.
CONCLUSION: The subject is in virgin state physically. There are no
external signs of application of any form of physical trauma
Version of the Defense:
Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of AAAs
alleged rape but denied committing the same. Instead, he claimed that
the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his wife,
whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man residing in
their community. According to appellant, he could not have molested
AAA because he treated her well. In fact, he was the only one sending his
children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom
comes home.
RTC found petitioner guilty. CA on the other hand while convinced that
petitioner raped AAA they partially found merit in his petition when it
noted the prosecutions failure to present her birth certificate as
competent proof of her minority. It concluded that the crime committed
by appellant against his daughter was only simple rape and accordingly
modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to
reclusion perpetua. Hence the case.
ISSUE(S): Whether petitioner should be acquitted due to lack of proof of sexual
intercourse
HELD: No, petition lacks merit
RATIO:
Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of the crime of rape since there is no
evidence that would establish the fact of sexual intercourse. Aside from the
prosecutions failure to prove penile contact, "AAAs" testimony was also wanting
in details as to how he took off her underwear or whether she saw his penis during
the incident despite leading questions propounded on the matter by the

prosecution. The medical report even revealed that "AAAs" hymen remained
intact and that there were no notable lacerations or external physical injuries
thereon. Appellant therefore surmises that his wife merely instigated "AAA" to
file this baseless rape case against him in retaliation for his act of confronting her
about her illicit relationship with a neighbor.
Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual
assault. Rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is referred to as rape through
sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the central element and it must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article
266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator
commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another persons mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
The Information did not specify whether the crime of rape was committed
through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. The Information in this case
did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through
sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual
assault as described in paragraph 2 thereof. The Information stated that
appellant inserted his penis into the genital of "AAA," which constituted
rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the
same time, the Information alleged that appellant used force and
intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause
ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was
committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the
automatic dismissal of the case. "[W]here an offense may be committed in
any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed
in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding
the fact that the different means of committing the same offense are
prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the
information of the various ways of committing the offense should be
regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not
thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness."
Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is held to have
been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be
convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending
on the evidence adduced during trial.
The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual intercourse
but It is evident from the testimony of AAA that she was unsure whether it was
indeed appellants penis which touched her labia and entered her organ. AAA
stated that she only knew that it was the bird of her father which was inserted
into her vagina after being told by her brother BBB. Clearly, AAA has no personal
knowledge that it was appellants penis which touched her labia and inserted into
her vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact
based solely on the declaration of AAAs brother, BBB, which declaration was
hearsay due to BBBs failure to testify.
The court however found it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically
identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital.
What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into

her vagina. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established that

appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through his moral
ascendancy and influence over AAA which substituted for violence and
intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped AAA by sexual
assault.
It is also improbable for appellants wife to have dared encourage their daughter
AAA to file the charges publicly expose the dishonor of the family unless the rape
was indeed committed.
Accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by sexual
assault and is also ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity and damages.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: "[W]here an offense may be committed in any of
the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two
or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the
fact that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited
by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the
various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description
of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on
the ground of multifariousness."
015 Union Bank v. People
667 SCRA 113 February 28, 2012
TOPIC: Rule 110
PONENTE: Brion J.
FACTS:
1. Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against
Forum Shopping.
2. That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath
which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/
Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin with the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay
City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material
statement was false thereby making a wilful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood.
3. The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints
for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses
Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, was
filed before the RTC. The second complaint was filed and raffled to the
MeTC. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged

of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring

under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second
complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
4. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash citing two grounds. First, she argued
that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court
(where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used)
and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury
case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood was not alleged with particularity
without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced
involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was
no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second
complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false
testimony while the allegations in the Information make out perjury by
making a false affidavit.
5. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that
the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury. The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for
reconsideration.
6. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTCMakati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their
petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v.
Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place
where the false document was presented.
7. The RTC-Makati City ruled that

the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion

since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on
jurisprudence later than Ilusorio.

The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are
different from the facts of the present case.

the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was

improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the
principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: What the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be
Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or
Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
HELD: SC Denied the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the
proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners.

venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged

where the Information states that the offense was committed or some
of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
-

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on

the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and
information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that
the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the
crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly

shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were
not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is
the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all
the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a

proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where
the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the
actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a
written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place
where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as
the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of
the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based
on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.

RATIO:
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
-

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It

determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be
instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear
the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold.

First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined

territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases
involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.

Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the

necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the
municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for
his defense are available.

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases

carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where
the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction
over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
-

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it

can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of
its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
-

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over

criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but
also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of

merit. Costs against the petitioners.