Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Catherine Stone, Justice
[8] From the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas
[11] AFFIRMED
[12] David Park appeals from an order granting the Texas Department of
Health's plea to the jurisdiction, thereby dismissing Park's suit for
declaratory judgment. In his sole point of error, Park argues there is no
evidence to support the trial court's decision. We hold that because Park
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the trial court properly
concluded it lacked jurisdiction.
[14] Park is a beekeeper who collects honey from honeycombs and places it
in large containers for sale and shipment to honey processors. In May
1995, the Texas Department of Health (TDH) sent Park written
notification to renew his "food manufacturer" license which had expired
three years earlier. Under the provisions of the Texas Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, TDH regulates the licensing of food manufacturers. See
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 431.222 (Vernon Supp. 1998) *fn1 ;
25 Tex. Admin. Code § 1.33 (Food and Drug Act). Apparently Park
ignored the notifi-cation, which prompted a visit from a State Food and
Drug Investigator on October 1, 1996, who investigated Park's "firm"
and verified that Park was operating as a food manufacturer. In late
October 1996 Park received a second letter from TDH confirming the
findings of the recent inspection. The letter instructed Park to fill out
the appropriate license applications and pay the fees due, and outlined
the possible repercussions of operating as an unlicenced food
manufacturer. In response to the letter, Park filed suit against TDH
seeking a declaratory judgment. Park alleged that TDH's conduct was
outside the scope of its delegated authority, essentially arguing that he
was not a food manufacturer, but a grower or cultivator of a raw
agricultural commodity. TDH filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the
court, arguing that the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and primary jurisdiction deprived the trial court of the
authority to entertain Park's declaratory action. The trial court granted
TDH's motion, dismissing Park's suit.
[17] In reviewing the trial court's order of dismissal for want of jurisdiction,
we take as true the facts plead in Park's petition and determine whether
the petition supports jurisdiction in the trial court. See Hernandez, 946
S.W.2d at 906; Huston v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 663 S.W.2d 126,
129 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Accordingly, we must
review Park's petition to determine if the trial court properly ruled on
the jurisdictional challenge.
[19] Park asserted in his petition that his suit was brought pursuant to the
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.001 (Vernon 1997) (Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act), and not pursuant to Tex. Gov't. Code Ann.
§ 2001.001 (Vernon Pamp. 1998) (administrative Procedure Act), and
asserted that Park was unaware of any administrative filings against
him by TDH. Park also asserted that TDH entered and inspected Park's
premises, obtained a sample of honey, provided Park with an inspection
report noting certain alleged deficiencies, and thereafter sent him a
letter informing him that he needed to renew his license as a food
manufacturer. Park alleged that all of these actions by TDH were
"outside the scope of [TDH's] delegated authority" because Park was
not a "food manufacturer" as defined by Chapter 431 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code. In support of this allegation Park further
alleged that he does not combine, purify, process, or package food for
sale through a wholesale outlet and does not have a retail outlet. Rather,
Park alleged that he takes raw honey from the comb of bee hives and
sells it to processors who then put it in final form for consumption by
the public. Accordingly, Park requested a declaratory judgment that he
does not fall within the jurisdiction of TDH as a food manufacturer.
[20] Although we take as true the factual allegations in Park's petition, the
legal Conclusions asserted by Park are not binding. Thus, we need not
accept as true Park's Conclusions that he is not a food manufacturer and
that the conduct of TDH is beyond its scope of authority.
[21] Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
[23] Relying upon Texas Dept. of Health v. Texas Health Enterprises, Inc.,
871 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied) and Public Utility
Comm'n v. City of the Austin, 728 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App.-Austin
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Park urges that the "ultra vires" exception
authorizes the trial court to entertain his declaratory action. We disagree
with both Park's reliance on the above-mentioned authority and his
assertion that his case falls with the exception to the exhaustion
doctrine.
[26] Conclusion
[27] In the instant case, it is undisputed that (1) TDH has jurisdiction to
oversee the licensing of food manufacturers, see Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. §§ 431.222 (Vernon Supp. 1998); 25 Tex. Admin. Code §
1.33 (Food and Drug Act), and (2) that Park's claim does not involve a
constitutional violation. Essentially, Park's claim of "ultra vires"
involves a contention that TDH has wrongly decided that he is a food
manufacturer as defined in the Texas Food, Drug and Comestic Act.
The exhaustion doctrine allows agencies to first consider issues
legislatively assigned to them, even if they might wrongly decide them.
See North Alamo Water Supply Corp., 839 S.W.2d at 459.
Accordingly, we conclude that because Park failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, the trial court properly concluded it lacked
jurisdiction.
Opinion Footnotes
[31] *fn1 Section 431.221 (2) of the Act defines a "food manufacturer" as a
person who combines, purifies, processes, or packages food for sale
through a wholesale outlet. The term also includes a retail outlet that
packages or labels food before sale and a person who represents itself
as responsible for the purity and proper labeling of an article of food by
labeling the food with the person's name and address. Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 431.221 (2) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
19980722