Chapter VI APOSTASY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Fred Ruiz Castro* It might be apt to commence my speech by adverting to and narrating an interesting incident that happened in one of the intermediate appellate courts in Spain. A barrister was arguing a case before a panel of appellate judges. presided by the most brilliant and at once the ugliest judicial magistrate in Spain. Realizing that he was arguing against overriding odds because his side of the case was rather infirm, and already piqued because the presiding judge had asked a number of questions about the case which he encountered great difficulty in answering, to his embarrassment of course, the barrister wanted to get even with the presiding judge. So in the course of his argument he said: “Your Honors, for the first time in my life as a barrister who has argued before practically all of the appellate courts of Spain, Lam.confronted with the spectacle of a presiding judge-who is as double-faced as his questions.” As he was about to continue his argument, the presiding judge interrupted to remark: “Mr: Gounsel;:you-called me doublefaced: If I had two'faces;doryou think I would-wear this one?”, pointing to his own face. I say this incident is apt, because it indicates in a substantive way the theme of my speech. For, this morning I will discourse on what t bélieve judges expect from lawyers who, when they took their oath of office, were formally invested with the distinguished appellation of “officer of the court.” It was indubitable that the barrister desired soulfully to insult-the presiding judge of the appellate court — and this surely evokes an important topic, which is, that as officers of the court, lawyers have no burden more asic, more exacting and more imperative than that of good fidelity tothe courts and respectful behavior towards the judges, who preside them. “Fred Ruiz Castro later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 136CHAPTER VI APOSTASY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1. Upon his investiture into the legal profession, a lawyer vows solemnly to conduct himself “with-allgood fidelity to thecourte,” and the Rules of Court constantly remind him “to observe and meintainr the reapect due to. courts of justice and.judiciat officers.” And yet you and I are fully cognizant that we have a great number of lawyers who are apostates to their exalted position as officers of the court, who have not only intentionally transgressedthe ethics of theprofeasion but also.shunted-aside the constraints of the lawyer's oath. This may be pointedly illustrated by the following examples: a. The lawyer who, with alwerity,_recklessly.denounced themembers'of.the Supreme, Court as recreant to their office because they allegedly “do not themselves pass upon” petitions forreviewfied-withthe Gourt, asserting, of course incorrectly, that only.the.clerk.of court himself-decides whether to deny or i course to'such Petitions. 4 b. The lawyer who, because of frustration resulting from the denial of his petition for review, libeled the Court as manned by-“people-who'commit culpable violations of the-Constitution. withdmpunity” and who administer justice that is “not only blind but also deafand.dumb,” and proclaimed to the world that “his'elient:-had become one of the sacrificial victims before. thealterofhypocrisy.” c. The lawyer who, suddenly from nowhere, entered-hie appearance'in the Court’in' 4 ¢asé more than two years after. . thecompleted.execution.in the court below ofthe final judgment ofthe Court. d. The lawyer, if he can be considered one, who filed a petition that was completelyunintelligible and undecipherable. e. The lawyer who, facing charges of moral:turpitude that could lead to his disbarment, instead of throwing himself at the mercy of the Court, compounded his malfeasance by:eub- saquently,-submitting.tothe Court:documents*malicioushy. falsified by.him. f. The lawyer who petitioned the Court for tranisferof venue,of-aease (where he was a counsel) on the completely i ion i; that-his. lit Séveral:+timies by.the opposing litigants. g. The lawyer who advised his client to escape from 137LEGAL PROFESSION ‘Readings and Materials after the petition for habeaseorpus filed by him inbenay Pre client was decided adversely. ed by him in behalf h. The lawyers who, because of thei i right of appeal:to the Supreme.Court was ae oslo ofthe reglementary-period, later filed special.civil actions fe. review, in the hope that the Court would fail to discover their duplicity. i, The lawyers who argue*beforeithe,Court:completely unprepared. j. ‘The lawyers who lneleondorentornreinteltecta aliz;dishonest when arguing before the Court. k. The lawyers who file petitions so cleverly prepared that while Such petitions do not intentionally tell a lie, they.do notitell:the:whole.truth in the sense that they omit to state unfavorable or adverse facts. 1. The lawyers who so desperately Warit'to*witreases aalely.on.the basis of technicality. m, The lawyers who foist bigargestheeries:upon the Court. 2. Permit me, at this juncture, to dwell briefly on the matter of the Courtsicontroversial- minute resolutions: We are quite aware of the criticisms expressed against the Court’s practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For'we know-the'abject-frastration of a. Jawyer-who tediously eollates:the facts and for. many weary hours meticulously. meatshallshis arguments, only to have his. efforta ultimately rebuffed with.a terae unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by the Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to withstand critical scrutiny. Were.we.to.accept.every:casé of write's fulliopinion for.every petition we reject,-we would. be unable to carry out effectively the burden‘placed-upon us by.the.Constitution. The proper rote of the Supreme Courts to decide “only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance, beyond the ‘particular facta and parties involved.” 188CHAPTER VI APOSTASY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION If the Court is to do its work, it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The time that would be required is prohibitive — and this apart from the fact that different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular. time makes review undesirable. In Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31, 1963, the Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioner's counsel urged that #*latk-of merit” resohition violates Section 12.0f Asticls Vilkef the [1936] Constitution. Replied Chief Justice Bengzon “The same question has been raised before, and we held that these ‘resolutions"are tot ‘decisions’-within the above constitutionalrequirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should:not be‘entertained.in view ofsthe: provitionsof section:4 of Rule 46.of the Rules of Gowrt [July 1, 1940] and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. A petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals issnot:-a-matter of right,.but of sound judicia) discretion; and so there is no.need to fully explain the Court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.” We underscore the fact that cases taken to the Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the bendfit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress - such petitions if the Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon the Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court [January 1, 1964] which recites: “Review of Court of Appeals’ decision, discretionary. — A*Peview is Hot x nidtter of Tight but of sound judicial diseretion;and:will be-granted only when thereare special and,important reasone:therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully. measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons which will be considered: “(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a 139LEGAL PROFESSION Readings and Materials question of dubstatice, not theretofore determinca the Supreme Court, or has decided it ine wen ably not in accord with law or with the meee: decisions of the Supreme Court; plicable “(b) When the Court of Appeals lum parted fram the ééeepted ana want Veet proceedings, or-so far sanctioned such: a lower, court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.” 3, And now, Jet an ae to the related matter of It is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. This is why lawyers are given widellatitude tediffer with, andwoiee their disapproval of, not only.the courts’ rulings but.alao the manner in which they.are handed down- oe Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especial.y recognized where the critietemy cotitertie'd concluded litigation, because then the courts’ actuations are thrown open to public consumption. “Our decisions and all our.official actions,” said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, “are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them. Judicial officers, like other public servants must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion.” Gourte thus treat with forbearance and restraints lawyer.whe vigorously: assails their actuations. For, courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as a citizen and an officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise -the-right;‘bat alsdto'tonsiderithis daty::to.eeposathe'whorttdtiiings-and indiscretions, of courts and \endgesu: Courts. and.judges: are-not:sacrosanet.:They should expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted.in the soil of demons cractie sotiety,'siourished by the periodic appraisal: of the, citizens whi it is expected to sérvé.CHAPTER V1 APOSTASY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION ———— Well-recognized therefore is the rightofelawyer, both as an rightofe| ‘lewyer, both as an oGiner-al tha.courtandes e-citizen, to criticize i i terms the acts of courts and judges. a Criticisms of the court has, indeed, been an important partof thetratitions+work of the lxwyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In articles written for law journals he dteseete.withydetachment.the doctrinal pronouncements.. of.courteand’ fearlessly lays-bare.for-all:to-see. the flawe-and inconsistencies uf the-doctrines. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood, ‘No.clase-of-the comumunityought:to-be allowed freer stope in’ theexpressionor Bublication-as tothe capacity impartiality or integrityofjudges tim members of the Bar. They have the best opportunities for obsetving and forming a correct judgment. To say that an attorney can; only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his-duty toattack and-expose, is a position too monstrows'to be:entertained.” Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, ashewyeris expected«notonly toexercite the-righty but-alse-to- consider it:his * déityito'avaiFof stich right. No law may abridge this right. “Above all others, the members of thé Bar have the best opportunity to beoome: conversant with-the character andefficiency:of our judges. No.class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as‘great an interest in the preservation-ofan-able and.upright-bench.” But it is the cardinal condition of every criticism of the courts that it shall be benefide, and shalimotepilloverthe walls of decenciie andupsoptiety. A wide chasm exists between fair eriticismyomthe. oneihandy-and abuse'and'slander‘of'courts atid the judges:thereofy., on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. I must stress the Supreme Court's enplicissiiceacnent inamunity, gxiticiam. Like any other Government entity in a viable een the Court is not, and should not be, above critigism. Buta critique of the Court must be intelligent.and discriminating... hiphfunetion:asthe'courtof last-resort. And.more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. 1LEGAL PROFESSION, Readings and Materials Ts Court must possess the quality apna jticism of the Court must possess the quality of judici a rit pe informed by perspective and infused oy eae 4, Finally, in relation to all that I have already said, I feel compelled to say & few words about the term-*officer-of the court,” Spe trae meaning of which has eluded many of our brethren in the profession. A person takesidmeath when he is admitted to the Bar whichis designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an “afficeroftthe'cottft” on whose shoulders rests thmgnave responsibility. of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedyand inistration. of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigididiscipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion, be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, the paraphrasing of Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking;‘2 high: sense.of. honor;full-candor;*intellectual-honesty,.and the strictest observance. of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout "the centuries, have been compendiously described as “moral character.” Membership in the Bar.is.in the categoryofa. mandata te. public sexuice.of the-highest order.A lawyer is an oath-bound'servantoof society-whose conduct is clearly. circumscribed: by inflexiblemorms ofdew-eand-ethies, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest-oftruth.and justice; for which he has sworn to be a cungadetnn Unfortunately, as I have on another occasion observed, many a law practitioner, forgettifighis*sactéd mission’as #*sworn public si t and his exalted position'as an “officer of thé'court,”has allowed himself to ‘become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying the benefits of his enlig atened advocacy in direct Proportion of a litigant’s financial posture instead of a faithful pea a courts in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and As conclusion and in summation, I adjure all la oni 7 wyers, as men of advocacy and ministers of the law, toxadopt as the guiding light of,« UOTssejoad:4By} Jo 1auUeg ayZ.aapun SUPER EN Atyiow: qySn0y] 03 “YMod Kary Leu ‘pooyusur 4[Iwe.4UL aaa yensou ‘uonlqure AU Useq Sey 4] “We 7 {ey ouL-epeuL seqqeuy ‘ensand.4[e OM yarn eoTa10s SUIT Gns-48y4 ‘UoIssajoid a}qR}0U 3203 ACL eus-8r41 Sorqycue we | J] eey Aut jo w107},0q oy} woz 20UY J ‘yi Aouo0y oy |e onop pure ‘uoissajoid uourm02 ino PAOP’],, -Laqsqayy [eTURC. yepomLUTT oqf Wey worzejonb sry Jo ‘Suleour pus quompuayuy-oyz-eenTpateu) NOISSH40Ud 1VD4T AHL NI ASVISOdV iA UALAVHO