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#1 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEM IN EVIDENCE
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In a criminal case for murder, a thumbmarked affidavit was presented as evidence. The affidavit was not
testified in court by the affiant. The affidavit runs (excerpt) as follows:
Do you believe in GOD?
Yes.
What is your name?
Paulino Baquiran, Jr.
What happen (sic) to you:
I was shot.
Who shot you?
Cpl. Tuting Ugaddan.
When?
At about 9:00 oclock, January 27, 1991.
Where?
At the Geraldine (sic) Canteen, Lingaling, Tumauini, Isabela.
How do you feel?
So painful.[xxxiv][17]
QUESTION/S:
1) Is such affidavit admissible to prove the guilt of the accused? Why?
---
ANSWER:
The defense simply failed to offer any piece of evidence attributing to said prosecution witness any foul
motive to falsely accused and incriminate a fellow officer in so grave a crime. [xxxv][23] Absence of evidence
as to improper motive actuating said witness of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no such
motive existed and, thus, his credibility is strengthened[xxxvi][24] and his testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.[xxxvii][25]
Dying declaration though generally hearsay are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule pursuant to Section 37 of Rule 130. [xxxviii][26] The above declaration under the factual milieu of this case,
has the vestiges of the accepted elements for the admissibility of a dying declaration which are:
the declaration must concern the crime and sorrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
it was made at a time when the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death;
-- the declarant would be competent to testify;
-- the declaration is offered in any case in which the decedent is the victim.[xxxix][27]
Said declaration pertains to the identity of the declarants assailant and the instances that transpired
concerning what happened to him. At the time that declaration was made, the declarant was hospitalized,
wounded on the throat, and was very weak.[xl][28] Combining these circumstances with the victim-declarants
aversion of pain creates upon the latter impression that his death is imminent and immediate. The enigma
of contemplating of a death-at-hand produces the most powerful consideration that impels and induces the
mind to speak the truth a situation so solemn and awful as to be considered by law as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.[xli][29]
On his competency to testify, there is no allegation nor evidence on record which would support the
slightest impression that the declarant would have been incompetent to testify had he survived. At the time
of his death he was a member of the police force and is presumably capable of perceiving, retaining what
has been perceived and expressing what has been retained. These circumstances suffice to sustain the
presumption of his competency to testify at the material time.(UGADDAN V. CA, 124914, July 2, 1997).
#2 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.[i][4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [ii][5] a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian
Citizenship issued by the Australian government. [iii][6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. [iv][7] In
theirapplication for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[v][8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[vi][9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage [vii][10] in the
courta quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson
only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[viii][11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; [ix][12] thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[x][13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause
of action.[xi][14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[xii][15] The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [xiii][16] After they submitted their respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution.[xiv][17]
QUESTION/S:
Respondent contends that
(1) the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time.
(2) Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion. Are these contentions (1) and (2)
correct? Why?
ANSWER:
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action.[xv][41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.[xvi][42] Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [xvii][43]Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [xviii][44] The power of judicial notice must
be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
(Garcia v. Recio, GR 138322, Oct. 2, 2007).
Plaintiffs-appellants, with co-plaintiffs-appellants Leonora Prietos and Luzviminda Antig who were lessees
of the apartment units, filed a case for damages against defendants-appellees Harry John Viloriam [sic],
Margarita Milagros Viloria, and John P. Young. The complaint alleged that by reason of the gross
negligence and want of care of the construction workers and employees of the defendants-appellees, the
bunkhouse or workers' quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading rapidly, burning the adjacent
buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants. Due to the negligence of defendants-appellees which resulted in
the fire, plaintiffs-appellants suffered actual damages representing the value of the buildings and other
personal properties.
Defendant-appellee John Young, the building contractor, in his answer, contended that he can not be held
responsible even if there was negligence on the part of the employees for he had exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his workers. Plaintiffs-appellants had no cause
of action against him. As counterclaim, defendant-appellee Young sought for moral damages in the amount
of P200,000.00, and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
Defendants-appell[ees] Harry and Margarita Viloria also alleged that plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of
action against them. The fire court not have been caused by gross negligence of their workers for they did
not have any worker in the construction of their building. The said construction was being undertaken by
the independent contractor, John Young, who hired and supervised his own workers. The newly
constructed building was partially destroyed by the fire. As counterclaim, defendants-appell[ees] prayed
for moral damages in the sum ofP2,500,000.00, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees
of P20,000.00.
One of the documentary evidences offered is the Fire Investigation Report, duly signed by the officer of the
day. Petitioners assert that the Fire Investigation Report [xix][21] by an official of the Cebu City Fire Station
should have been admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Some confusion surrounds the
issue of admissibility of the Fire Investigation Report (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-4 inclusive). The record
discloses that the officer who signed the report, Fire Major Eduardo P. Enriquez, was subpoenaed at the
request of and testified in open court for petitioners. He identified the Report, which petitioners offered in
their Offer of Exhibits[xx][25] as:
(1) Part of the testimony of Major Eduardo P. Enriquez;
(2) To prove that an impartial investigation has determined that the "fire started at the generator ... within the
construction site" (Exhibit "A-3").
Private respondents objected to Exhibits A, A-1 to A-4, inclusive, for being hearsay and
incompetent evidence.[xxi][26] The trial court then denied their admission for being hearsay, this fact
admitted by witness himself, F/Maj. Eduardo Enriquez, as part of whose testimony said exhibits were
offered.[xxii][27]
QUESTION/S:
Is the Court correct in not admitting the Fire Investigation Report for being hearsay and incompetent? What
is the applicable rule on the matter ? if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report, would
your answer be different?.
ANSWER:
In light of the purposes for which the exhibits in question were offered, as aforestated, the trial court erred
in rejecting all of them as hearsay. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available
for cross-examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted
of his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the
statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the
latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer, may then be considered as independently
relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as
such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
Where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.[xxiii][28]
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances
were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44
of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer
who made the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries
in said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v.
Barcelon:[xxiv][29]
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public
officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official
sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the
greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering their deposition before an
officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public having business with
officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is
accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec.
1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty
may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and
circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his
report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 130 would have been ripe for determination, and
this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the
aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of
Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being no showing that, at the very least,
they were under a duty to give the statements for record.(Rodriguez v. Viloria, GR 121964, JUNE 17,
1997)

On May 21, 1982, petitioner Dumez Company, a French company, through petitioner Trans-Orient
Engineers, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged the
services of private respondent Veronico Ebilane as carpenter for one of its projects in the Middle East, with
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as his place of actual employment. The parties executed and signed a one-year
overseas employment agreement embodying the terms and conditions of private respondent's employment.
Private respondent commenced performance of said contract on July 3, 1982. On August 31, 1982, while
at the job site, private respondent was suddenly seized by abdominal pain and rushed to the Riyadh Central
Hospital were appendectomy was performed on him. During his confinement, he developed right-sided
weakness and numbness and difficulty of speaking which was found to have been caused by Atrial
Fibrillation and CVA embolism.
In a letter dated September 22, 1982, petitioners formally terminated private respondent's employment
effective September 29, 1982, up to which time petitioners paid private respondent his salaries under his
employment contract. Thereafter, on October 13, 1982, private respondent was repatriated to Manila.
On November 23, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Such
complaint was filed with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.
In deciding the case in favor of respondent, the POEA took judicial notice of Social Insurance Law of
Saudi Arabia.
QUESTION:
is the POEA correct in taking judicial notice of the Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia, which was
not duly proved during the hearing? Explain.
ANSWER:
The POEA Administrator, in finding petitioners liable to private respondent for medical benefits
accruing to the latter under the Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia, took judicial notice of the said
law. To this extent, the POEA Administrator's actuations are legally defensible. We have earlier ruled in
Norse Management Co. (PTE) vs. National Seamen Board[xxv][12] that evidence is usually a matter of
procedure of which a mere quasi-judicial body is not strict about. Although in a long line of cases, we have
ruled that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence must be alleged and proved, in order to be recognized
and applied in a particular controversy involving conflicts of laws, jurisprudence on this matter was not
meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies in the light of the well-settled rule
that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. (Dumez Company v.
NLRC, GR 74495, July 11, 1996)
# 5 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the
port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found
employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children.
On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A.
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his
qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No.
270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as
SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee
on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions
for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate
his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that,
upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness
against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense
that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we
are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by
which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No.
473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes
have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition
with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, and appreciated the documents annexed to the
records but which were not offered by the Solicitor General.
The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court assigning as error: that the appellate court erred in
considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the
basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally
offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued,
because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered.
QUESTION
Rule on the assigned error: was it correct for the CA to appreciate evidence not formally offered?
ANSWER:
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of
the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere
"scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"[1][12] so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[2][13] of the Rules of Court which provides
that These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only
instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable
and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the
first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering
that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.[3][14] Consequently,
a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.(Ong Chia v. Republic, GR 127240, March 27, 2000)
Private respondents are brothers who were engaged in the business of forwarding and transporting
"balikbayan" boxes from California, U.S.A. to Metro Manila, Philippines. Manuel J. Salazar (hereinafter
"Manuel") managed the Philippine side via MANSAL Forwarders, a business registered in his name with
principal office at No. 48 Scout Tobias Street, Quezon City. On the other hand, Mario J. Salazar
(hereinafter "Mario") handled the U.S. side of the forwarding business as General Manager of M.J.S.
International, Inc., a corporation with principal office at No. 3400 Fletcher Drive, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.
According to the petitioner, sometime in February of 1989, while he was in Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., Mario tried to convince him to invest some money in the said business. Mario had allegedly
represented that petitioner's money will be held in trust and administered by both him and his brother for
the exclusive use of their forwarding and transporting business. Petitioner further alleged that Mario
promised him a return on his investment equivalent to ten per centum (10%) for one month, at the end of
which, his money plus interest earned shall be returned to him.
When petitioner returned to the Philippines, it was Manuel's turn to persuade him to part with his money
under the said investment scheme. Eventually convinced by the private respondents representations and
assurances, petitioner agreed to invest the total amount of US $34,000.00 which he entrusted to his aunt,
Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who was residing in the U.S.A. Thus, petitioner issued several personal checks
made out to Liwayway Dee Tanzo, . or to "Calfed", or payable to cash. Except for California Federal Check
No. 322 which was encashed by Mario himself, private respondents received the proceeds of the above
checks through Liwayway Dee Tanzo on several occasions in August 1989.
Meanwhile, Mario encountered serious liquidity problems that prompted him to petition the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for a release from his debts on September 27, 1990. He was ordered "released from all
dischargeable debts" by the said court on January 25, 1991.
Upon the expiration of the thirty (30) day investment period, petitioner demanded from Mario in the States
and Manuel in Quezon City proper accounting of his financial investment and/or the return of his capital
plus interest earned. At the outset, private respondents avoided their obligation to petitioner by making
various excuses but after persistent demands by the latter, Manuel finally admitted that their shipments had
encountered some problems with the Bureau of Customs. Thus, on January 29, 1990, Manuel executed a
letter authorizing the petitioner to withdraw documents to assist in the release of their shipments from the
Bureau of Customs. However, when petitioner attempted to secure the release of the "balikbayan" boxes
from the Bureau of Customs, he discovered that the same had actually contained smuggled goods and were
accordingly seized and forfeited in favor of the government.
To prove that the money was not in trust, but a loan, the respondents offered as evidence its previous
transactions of loan with other friends in the U.S. . Manuel offered in evidence copies of the contracts of
loan entered into between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo, which are contracts of loan and
not trust agreements.
QUESTION
Petitioner object to the admissibility of said evidence, as they are irrelevant to the contract of trust
agreements that was entered between him and Mario.
Rule on his contention.
ANSWER:
The contention is wrong. The Supreme Court rules: We agree with the petitioner that these loan contracts
do not by themselves prove that his agreement with the private respondents was also a loan. As correctly
pointed out by the petitioner, he is not a party to these contracts that clearly stipulate
"Liwayway Dee Tanzo" as creditor and "M.J.S. International represented by its General Manager, Mario J.
Salazar" as debtor.
These loan contracts may, however, be given evidentiary value in support of Manuel's claim that the
agreement with petitioner was no different from the loan contracts with Liwayway Dee Tanzo. Under the
rule of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible
to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove
a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.[4][13]
Elaborating thus, we have held that:

[C]ollateral facts may be received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational
similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances
surrounding the issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant,
especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of
a person; it provides insight into such person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it
reveals a mistake.[5][14] (Underscoring supplied). S-jcj
The series of transactions between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo were entered into under
similar circumstances as those surrounding the contract between petitioner and Mario. Just like the alleged
trust agreement between petitioner and Mario, the loan contracts between M.J.S. International
andLiwayway Dee Tanzo provide that the creditors shall lend to the debtor a specific amount for use by the
latter in its business operations.[6][15] Petitioner also admits that he entrusted the checks
to LiwaywayDee Tanzo for investment in private respondents' business. This shows that private
respondents were transacting directly with Liwayway Dee Tanzo in the usual manner that they conduct
business, that is the loan of money for stipulated interest. Hence, private respondents' modus operandi, if
there ever was one, in raising additional capital for M.J.S. International was to borrow money from willing
investors. It is thus unlikely, considering the scheme of things, that private respondents would all of a
sudden deviate from an established business practice to enter into a trust agreement with the petitioner
(Tanzo v. Drilon, GR 106671, March 30, 2000).
In a land dispute, the parties appeared before the barangay council,which rendered a decision of the
conflicting claims which they presented before said council.Said barangay decision was contained in a
document termed as Administrative Case No. 4,
During trial said documentary exhibit was offered, which the court admitted and appreciated in
deciding in favor of the appellants.In their first assignment, appellants assail the admission in evidence over
the objection of the appellant of Exhibit "3." This exhibit is a decision in favor of the defendant-appellee
against herein plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura, by the council of Barrio of San Pascual, Tuba, Benguet, in
its Administrative Case No. 4, for the settlement of ownership and possession of the land.
Question: Is Exh. 3 admissible as evidence in court?
ANSWER: The decision of the Barrio Council of San Pascual, Tuba, Banguet, in its Administrative Case
No. 4, for the settlement of ownership and possession of the land in question is ultra vires because barrio
councils, which are not courts, have no judicial powers (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Constitution; see Sec. 12, Rep.
Act No. 2370, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter). Said administrative order if presented as exhibit is
inadmissible in a judicial proceeding as evidence for ascertaining the truth respecting the fact of ownership
and possession (Sec. 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court). (MIGUEL V. Catalino [G.R. No. L-23072. November
29, 1968.])

How would you state your objections to the following:
A) : You stated in your last testimony that you saw A driving the car, why are you now insisting that A was
not driving, when what the witness had merely said was that he had seen A seated on the front seat of the
vehicle.
B) : Does ABC or did ABC produce the goods that your company was intending to buy?
C) Tell us in your own words, what happed?
d) How is it that you can recollect a date as long ago as that and you cannot remember the day of the
week?
E) : Did you know that the accused had been beating his wife nightly?:, when there is no prior evidence
that such was the case. Or if the accused is the one asked: When did you stop beating your wife?, when
there is no evidence that he had been beating his wife.
Answers: A)Objection, Your Honor, the question is misleading.
B)Objection, Your Honor, it is compound question.
C)Your Honor, the question calls for a narrative answer.
D)Objection, Your Honor, the question is argumentative. orObjection, Your Honor, the
question is harassing the witness.
E)Objection, Your Honor, the question assumes facts not in evidence.
PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE
PROBLEM NO. 1
hearing necessary?
What is a judicial admission? When is it mandatory? Discretionary? And when is
ANSWER: Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. (1a)
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. (1a)
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case. (n)
Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
PROBLEM NO. 2 When the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a
public office, how would you prove its contents?
ANSWER: Section 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the
original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
PROBLEM NO. 3
Who are the persons under the rules of evidence who cannot testify because of
a Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.?
ANSWER: Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in
a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment,
nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he
may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to
any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made
to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
(21a)
PROBLEM NO. 4
admissible?
When is Previous Conduct as Evidence admissible and when is it not
ANSWER: 4. Previous Conduct as Evidence

Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like. (48a)
Section 35. Unaccepted offer. An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a
written instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the actual
production and tender of the money, instrument, or property. (49a)
Delfin I. Cruz and Adoracion Cruz were spouses and their children were Thelma, Nerissa, Arnel and Gerry
Cruz. Upon the death of Delfin I. Cruz, [his] surviving spouse and children executed on August 22, 1977 a
notarized Deed of Partial Partition (Exhibit 2) by virtue of which each one of them was given a share of
several parcels of registered lands all situated in Taytay, Rizal.
The following day, August 23, 1977, the same mother and children executed a Memorandum
Agreement (Exhibit H) which provided:
That the parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the following registered
real properties, all situated at Taytay, Rizal, Philippines, x x x.
xxx
That sometime on August 22, 1977, a Deed of Partial Partition was executed among us before Atty.
Virgilio J. Tamayo, Notary Public on and for the Province of Rizal, per Doc. No. 1776; Page No. 14; of his
Notarial Register No. XLIX, Series of 1977;
xxx
That as a result of said partial partition, the properties affected were actually partitioned and the
respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her;
That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of their
respective shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed among themselves and by these
presents do hereby bind themselves to one another that they shall share alike and received equal shares
from the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their individual names by
virtue of this deed of partial partition.
That this Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable among the contracting parties herein up
to and until the last lot covered by the Deed of [P]artial [P]artition above adverted to shall have been
disposed of or sold and the proceeds thereof equally divided and their respective shares received by each of
them.
This Memorandum Agreement was registered and annotated in the titles of the lands covered by the
Deed of Partial Partition.
Subsequently, the same parties caused the consolidation and subdivisions of the lands they respectively
inherited from the late Delfin I. Cruz per Deed of Partial Partition. After that, they registered the Deed of
Partial Partition and subdivision plans and titles were issued in their names. In the case of Nerissa Cruz
Tamayo, the following titles were issued to her in her name: TCT No. 502603 (Exhibit A), TCT No.
502604, (Exhibit B), TCT No. 502605 (Exhibit C), TCT No. 502606 (Exhibit D), TCT No. 502608
(Exhibit E), TCT No. 502609 (Exhibit F), TCT No. 502610 (Exhibit G), hereinafter called the lands in
question. Naturally, the annotation pertaining to the Memorandum Agreement was carried in each of said
seven (7) titles and annotated in each of them.
Meanwhile, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos filed Civil Case No. 31231 against the spouses
Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo for a sum of money. The Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVI (Quezon City) rendered a decision of June 1, 1981 in favor of Eliseo and Virginia condemning
the spouses Nerissa and Nelson Tamayo to pay them P126,529.00 with 12% interest per annum from the
filing of the complaint plus P5,000.00 attorneys fee. After the finality of that decision, a writ of execution
(Exhibit J) was issued on November 20, 1981.
Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied upon the lands in question. On June 29, 1983, these
properties were sold in an execution sale to the highest bidders, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia
Malolos. Accordingly, the sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale (Exhibit K) over
all the rights, claims, interests, titles, shares, and participations of defendant spouses Nerissa
Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo..
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo failed to exercise her right of redemption within the statutory period and so the
final deed of sale was executed by the sheriff conveying the lands in question to spouses Eliseo and
Virginia Malolos. The Malolos couple asked Nerissa Cruz Tamayo to give them the owners duplicate
copy of the seven (7) titles of the lands in question but she refused. The couple moved the court to compel
her to surrender said titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for cancellation. This was granted on
September 7, 1984. But Nerissa was adamant. She did not comply with the Order of the court and so the
Malolos couple asked the court to declare said titles as null and void.
During the trial of the civil case, some of the documentary evidence presented were mortgage and sale
transactions entered by the other sisters and brothers of Nerissa Tamayo.Said evidence were objected for
being immaterial and irrelevant.
The trial court that these pieces of evidence are applicable under the res inter alios acta rule and the
principle of independent and relevant statements. Do you agree? What do you understand concerning the
said principles?
ANSWER: Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the admission of evidence that tends to show
that what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that he has done a similar as act at
another time.[xxvi][24] Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the dependant to meet allegations that
are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and
diverts the attention of the court from the issues immediately before it. Hence, this evidentiary rule guards
against the practical inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevents surprise
or other mischief prejudicial to litigants.[xxvii][25]
The rule, however, is not without exception. While inadmissible in general, collateral facts may be
received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or resemblance
between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to
be proved.[xxviii][26] Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on
fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a persons; it provides insight
into such persons motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a mistake.[xxix][27]
In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other parcels of land they entered into, in
the concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that the parcels in issue are not coowned. The court is not persuaded. Evidence of such transactions falls under the exception to the rule on
the res inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case and
corroborative of evidence already received.[xxx][28] The relevancy of such transactions is readily
apparent. The nature of ownership of said property should be the same as that of the lots on question since
they are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and disposed by petitioners in fee simple,
in the concept of absolute owners, then the lots in question should similarly be treated as absolutely owned
in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably, the evidence in dispute manifests petitioners
common purpose and design to treat all the parcels of land covered by the DPP as absolutely owned and
not subject to co-ownership.[xxxi][29]
Under the principle of estoppel, petitioners are barred from claiming co-ownership of the lands in
issue. In estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct has introduced another to act in a particular
manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes
loss or injury to another.[xxxii][30] It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the
contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceedings of judicial or legislative officers or by the
act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in pairs.
[xxxiii][31]
In their transaction with others, petitioners have declared that the other lands covered by the same
MOA are absolutely owned, without indicating the existence of a co-ownership over such properties. Thus,
they are estopped from claiming otherwise because, by their very own acts and representations as
evidenced by the deeds of mortgage and of sale, they have denied such co-ownership. (CRUZ
V.MALOLOS, GR126713, JULY 27, 1998)
PROBLEM NO. 13 A) In a land dispute, the defendants offered to compromise the case by offering
P20,000 cash for the dismissal of the case. The plaintiffs did not agree, and so the case for recovery of
possession pushed through. During trial, the plaintiff testified about the offer of compromise. The
defendant objected to its admissibility. As judge would you admit said testimony?
B) In a criminal case for malicious mischief, the accused offered to pay 5,000 pesos to pay for the broken
bottles of beer, and asks for the dismissal of the criminal case. During the trial, the offer was used as
evidence to prove the criminal liability of the accused. Is said evidence admissible as an implied admission
of guilt? Would your answer be the same is the crime charged is reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide?
c) In a physical injuries case, the accused offered to pay the medical and hospital expenses. Can this be
considered as proof of civil or criminal liability of the accused?
ANSWER: Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is
not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to
be compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser offense, is not
admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not
admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. (24a)
PROBLEM NO. 14. Some examples of the exceptions to the hearsay rule are the following:
Section 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made underthe consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. (31a)
Section 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons. (32a)
Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (33a)
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and
the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (34a)
Section 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting
facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may
be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of
common reputation. (35)
Section 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. (36a)
QUESTION: State the other five exceptions, and explain each.
ANSWER: Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know
the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty. (37a)
Section 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Section 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law,
science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial
notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical
or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)
Problem No. 15: The general rule is that leading questions are not allowed during trial. State some
exceptions to the rule.
ANSWER: Section 10. Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the witness the
answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a
child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A::
Q:
A:
PROBLEM NO. 16. In a criminal case for murder, a thumbmarked affidavit was presented as evidence.
The affidavit was not testified in court by the affiant. The affidavit runs (excerpt) as follows:
Do you believe in GOD?
Yes.
What is your name?
Paulino Baquiran, Jr.
What happen (sic) to you:
I was shot.
Who shot you?
Cpl. Tuting Ugaddan.
When?
At about 9:00 oclock, January 27, 1991.
Where?
At the Geraldine (sic) Canteen, Lingaling, Tumauini, Isabela.
How do you feel?
So painful.[xxxiv][17]
QUESTION: Is such affidavit admissible to prove the guilt of the accused?
Why?
---
ANSWER: The defense simply failed to offer any piece of evidence attributing to said prosecution witness
any foul motive to falsely accused and incriminate a fellow officer in so grave a crime. [xxxv][23] Absence of
evidence as to improper motive actuating said witness of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no
such motive existed and, thus, his credibility is strengthened [xxxvi][24] and his testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit.[xxxvii][25]
Dying declaration though generally hearsay are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule pursuant to Section 37 of Rule 130. [xxxviii][26] The above declaration under the factual milieu of this case,
has the vestiges of the accepted elements for the admissibility of a dying declaration which are:
the declaration must concern the crime and sorrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
it was made at a time when the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death;
-- the declarant would be competent to testify;
-- the declaration is offered in any case in which the decedent is the victim.[xxxix][27]
Said declaration pertains to the identity of the declarants assailant and the instances that transpired
concerning what happened to him. At the time that declaration was made, the declarant was hospitalized,
wounded on the throat, and was very weak.[xl][28] Combining these circumstances with the victim-declarants
aversion of pain creates upon the latter impression that his death is imminent and immediate. The enigma
of contemplating of a death-at-hand produces the most powerful consideration that impels and induces the
mind to speak the truth a situation so solemn and awful as to be considered by law as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.[xli][29]
On his competency to testify, there is no allegation nor evidence on record which would support the
slightest impression that the declarant would have been incompetent to testify had he survived. At the time
of his death he was a member of the police force and is presumably capable of perceiving, retaining what
has been perceived and expressing what has been retained. These circumstances suffice to sustain the
presumption of his competency to testify at the material time.(UGADDAN V. CA, 124914, July 2, 1997).
PROBLEM NO. 17 What is an interlocking confession? What is its significance in the admissibility of
evidence?
ANSWER: Extrajudicial confessions which are independently made without collusion, identical with each
other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other are called interlocking confessions. They are,
therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show
the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible
as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented
that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and
proved. They are what is commonly known as interlockingconfession and constitute an exception to the
general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants
thereof.(SANTOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 71523, Dec. 8, 2000)
PROBLEM NO. 18. Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently
prove conveyance of title to a property?
ANSWER: In sum, considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not
sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was
incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of the said document, the exhortations of
petitioners regarding the existence of said deed of sale must fail. (EBREO V. EBREO, 71523, DEC. 8,
2000)
PROBLEM NO. 19.What do you understand by the totality of circumstances test, and how is it related to
out-of-court identification?
Answer: In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[xlii][25] the Court, through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, explained the
procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such
identification. It listed the following ways of identifying the suspects during custodial investigation: showups, mug shots and line-ups. The Court there ruled:
x x x. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thrushowups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity ofin-court identification during the trial
of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements
of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness
degree of attention at that time: (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (PEOPLE V. TIMON,GR
NO. 97841-42, NOV. 12, 1997)
PROBLEM NO. 20. Can a birth certificate be both an evidence of fact of birth and filiation?
Explain.
Answer: While under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the record of
birth appearing in the civil register,[7][80] yet the rule is where the birth certificate presented was not
signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as evidence of the
alleged filiation. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[8][81] we held:
x x x Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a
child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as
an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the
father refuses. x x x[9][82]
In Angeles v. Maglaya, we refused to give evidentiary weight to the birth certificate as proof of
filiation in a case for settlement of estate to support a claim of legitimacy because the same was unsigned
by the alleged father. With more reason we should not accord value to the birth certificate in this case
considering that its effect would be to increase the penalty to be imposed on the appellant. This is a
criminal case wherein an interpretation unfavorable to the accused is generally unacceptable.
The Solicitor General cites this Courts pronouncement in Heirs of Cabais v. Court of Appeals,[10]
[83] that [a] birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation and a high
degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public document.[11]
[84] The pronouncement is not applicable to this case. It was made merely as an elucidation of the limited
evidentiary value of a baptismal certificate in this jurisdiction vis--vis a birth certificate. In that case,
presented was the baptismal certificate of the person whose filiation was sought to be established. The birth
certificate itself was not presented. In the case at bar, the birth certificate of AAA was presented.
We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth
and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAAs biological father.
(PP V. DELANTAR, 169143, Feb, 2, 2007)
sample questions with answers
1. Petitioners Jacinto Olan and Renato Eballe were defendants in Ejectment Case No. 929 in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Los Baos, Laguna filed by herein respondent spouses Librado Villanueva and
Tomasa Ignacio. The MTC[i][3] ordered OLAN and EBALLE to entirely vacate Lot 3839 and Lot 3842,
both of the Los Baos Cadastre 450-D, situated at Brgy. Timugan, Los Baos, Laguna, which lots said
defendants are now unlawfully occupying, and to turn them over to the possession of plaintiffs LIBRADO
VILLANUEVA and TOMASA L. IGNACIO[ii][4]
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna which affirmed
the decision of the MTC. A writ of execution pending appeal was granted by the RTC which petitioners
moved to quash in the Court of Appeals[iii][5] (CA. G.R. No. 30812) on the ground that the lot occupied
by petitioners was different from the lots ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the MTC
decision.
Meanwhile, petitioners appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (C.A. G.R. No. 31618)
which affirmed the RTC decision.[iv][7] The Court of Appeals ruled that:
In their petition for review, the herein petitioners simply reiterates/repeats their above-mentioned
argument that the lot occupied by Olan is not the lot ordained or decreed to be delivered to respondents
herein in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Los Baos, Laguna, which
decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court on appeal[v][8]
Petitioners seek to compel the Court of Appeals through the Writ of Mandamus to receive into
evidence a certification made by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to the
effect that the lot possessed by petitioner OLAN is different from the lots decreed in the dispositive portion
of the decision as newly discovered evidence.
Question: 1) Can the Court of Appeals be compelled to receive said evidence?
2)What is a newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial?
ANSWERS: The Court of Appeals cannot be compelled to receive said evidence, it not being a newly
discovered evidence..
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 37 of the 1964 Rules of Court as amended[vi][13] read:
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial. Within the period for perfecting
appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial for one
or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights;
(b)
Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result;
(c) Award of excessive damages, or insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, or that the decision
is against the law.
SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial and notice thereof. The motion shall be made in writing stating
the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse
party.
When the motion is made for the causes mentioned in subdivisions, (a) and (b) of the preceding section, it
shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions. Affidavit or affidavits of merit shall also be
attached to a motion for the cause mentioned in subdivision (a) which may be rebutted with counteraffidavits. xxx
Instead of filing a petition for review of the RTC decision affirming the MTC and a motion to quash the
writ of execution issued by the RTC, merely attaching thereto the alleged newly discovered evidence,
petitioners should have filed a motion for new trial with the RTC on the ground of newly discovered
evidence in accordance with the aforequoted Rule 37 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Petitioners failed to
support their claim with affidavits to show compliance with the following requisites for newly discovered
evidence as a ground for new trial: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted will probably
change the judgment.[vii][14]
Even assuming that petitioners complied with the above-mentioned requirements, we are not convinced
that the certification in question is newly discovered evidence. Petitioners did not prove that, even with
the use reasonable diligence, they could not have obtained the certification during the trial. The fact that
petitioners request with the DENR to determine whether there was a relationship between Lot 3839 and
3842 with Lot 8253 was made only on April 13, 1993[viii][15] or almost ten years after the decision of the
MTC was rendered on May 18, 1992 shows that petitioners did not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain
this evidence (OLAN v. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 116109. September 14, 1999]
2. WHAT IS A DYING DECLARATION? WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT IT MAY
BE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN COURT?
ANSWER:The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible, to wit: (a) it concerns the
crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant
was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant was the
victim.
3. The case of PP V. GONZALES (311 SCRA 547) ENUMERATED THE THREE REQUISITES FOR A
CHILD WITNESS TO BE COMPETENT, WHAT ARE THESE?
ANSWER: 1. CAPACITY OF OBSERVATION 2. CAPACITY OF RECOLLECTION AND 3. CAPACITY
OF COMMUNICATION.
4. In the absence of a marriage certificate, how is marriage proved under the rules on evidence?
ANSWER: In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 118904, April 20, 1998, citing Pugueda vs.
Trias, 4 SCRA 849, 855 [March 31, 1962] cited also in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals 305 SCRA 138) the
Supreme Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the
matrimony; b) the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c)
the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.
5. Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two (2)
eyewitnesses as one of the killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer
Vasquez presented an incredible story because it is highly improbable that they could have distinctly
and positively recognized accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes."[i] According to
appellant, Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have
identified appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp inside the camalig where Emeterio Vasquez and
Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that
he saw his grandfather shot by appellant, could have identified appellant because of the poor lighting
coming from the gas lamp being carried by his grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by
Elmer's grandfather was a small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette and
the lamp inside the camalig was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light emanating
therefrom was upwards and not sidewise.
QUESTION: Considering said lighting conditions, in the decided cases of the supreme court, is an
illumination coming from a gas lamp sufficient to support identification? If the illumination comes from a
star light, would that be also considered sufficient illumination for identification purposes?
ANSWER: Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could
have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor
should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow
identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be
considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious.(Pp. v. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1).
6. In the early morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a tricycle driver
working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan. When they reached their destination, he
ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle. Then, accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his money and
repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground unconscious. Accused-appellant
shot him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating that
a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana rushed
to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and answer method, which he took down on two
sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio affixed his thumbmark on both sheets.The
statement is as follows:
T: Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency Hospital at kinukunan ka ng
salaysay?
S:
Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEA sa ulo at kinuha and tricycle kong
minamaneho.
T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Pea?
S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito?
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap na ika-4:15 ng umaga.
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Pea?
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.
T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Pea?
S: Opo.
T: Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
S: Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
T: Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
S: Si Rey Dagul.
T: Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S: Muntik na ho.
T: Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S: Ewan ko ho.[i][4]
Eventually, Pelagio died, and Ramil Pea was charged for the death of Pelagio. On the basis of said
statement as above-written, would you consider the same admissible as a dying declaration? Can it be
admitted as part of the res gestae? What are the elements of res gestae?
ANSWER: 1.The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have already been established in a
long line of cases. An ante-mortem statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if: (1) at
the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the
declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to
facts which the victim was competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration
is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.[i][5]
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not established with certainty whether Pelagio uttered
his statement with consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain when he made his
statement, he expressly stated that accused-appellant only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him.
2. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.[i][9]
In People v. Naerta,[i][10] this Court held that:

The term res gestae comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient
to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under
such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content.
Pelagios declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after a startling
occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no
opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.[i][11PEOPLE vs. RAMIL PEA,[G.R. No. 133964.
February 13, 2002]
7. Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict an accused? Explain.
ANSWER: Yes. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction if the
following requisites are established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been established; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
8. When is there a conspiracy? What proof is necessary to prove conspiracy? Can it be presumed?
ANSWER: Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime.[i][36] Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused
themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interests.[i]
9. What degree of proof is required to prove the qualifying circumstance of alevosia? For the court to
appreciate alevosia what burdens would the prosecution prove?
ANSWER: The prosecution was burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only the crime itself, but
also the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.[i][60] Treachery cannot be based on speculations and
surmises. In order that treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that (a) the malefactor employed means, method
or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and,
(b) the means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
(Pp. v. Buntag, GR 123070, April 4, 2004).
10. The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused. The same rule applies if the
extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased. State the exception to this
rule.
ANSWER: The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible
only against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused.The same rule applies if the
extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the
declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or admission is admissible against
both accused. The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission when repeated during the trial is
transposed into judicial admissions.
11. Distinguish an admission from a confession.
ANSWER:In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts
by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths
charged.[i][48] It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt.[i][49] A confession, on
the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.
12. In cases where the victim could not testify on the actual commission of the rape because she was
rendered unconscious at the time the crime was perpetrated, can the accused be still convicted of rape?
What rules of evidence are applicable when met with this particular prosecutorial deficiency?
ANSWER: In cases where the victim could not testify on the actual commission of the rape because she
was rendered unconscious at the time the crime was perpetrated, Rule 133, Section 4, of the Revised Rules
on Evidence sanctions the courts to rule on the basis of circumstantial evidence, viz:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)
There is more than one circumstance;
(b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
A related rule is that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proved leads to no other logical
conclusion than the guilt of the appellant.[i][9]
There have already been instances when this Court convicted an accused of the crime of rape,
committed while their victims were unconscious, based on circumstantial evidence. In People v.
Villanueva,[i][10] the Court affirmed the conviction for rape, overruling the defenses posture that the
prosecution failed to present evidence of the actual defloration. In that case, the accused-appellant claimed
that if the victim was unconscious during the sexual assault, she would be incapable of knowing that,
indeed, she was raped. Debunking the claim of the accused-appellant that the circumstantial evidence was
not sufficient to prove rape, the Court, taking into consideration the events that transpired before and after
the victim lost consciousness, i.e., the perpetrator compulsorily commanded her to remove her panty and
forced her to lie down then punched her in the stomach which rendered her unconscious and that when she
came to, she felt pain in the nest of womanhood, found accused-appellant guilty of rape.(PP. V. EDUARDO
MORAN JR. y GORDULA, GR. 170849, MARCH 7, 2007, 3rd division, decided by Justice ChicoNazario).
13. In a buy bust operation, is a prior surveillance necessary for the conviction of the accused?
Answer: Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of
the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has
left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.[i][24]
A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are
accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.[i][25] Flexibility is a trait of good police work.[i]
[26] In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the
reason that the informant accompanied the policemen to the person who is peddling the dangerous drugs.
(PP V. NICOLAS, GR 170234, Feb. 8, 2007)
14. Accused is charged of murder. The Judge issued a warrant of arrest without bail. Accused filed a motion
for bail alleging that evidence against him is not strong. The bail hearing was conducted, and Elizabeth was
offered as witness. The bail was not granted on the basis of her testimony. In the trial proper, Elizabeth was
presented as principal witness. Due to lack of material time, and in giving the defense ample time to crossexamine Elizabeth, the trial was set on another date for the cross-examination.
Before the cross-examination could be conducted, Elizabeth died of cardiac arrest.
The defense moved that the testimony of Elizabeth be expunged for lack of cross-examination.
On the other hand, the prosecution moved that the testimony of Elizabeth during the bail hearing be
adopted as part of her main testimony.
As judge how would you rule on the two motions.
ANSWER:As to the first motion, the same has to be denied. Lack of cross-examination due to the death of
the witness does not necessarily render the deceaseds previous testimony expungible. Thus, this Court in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[i][19] citing Fulgado v. CA, [i][20] said that:
The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it
prejudiced the party whose only fault was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent
alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination could
have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss. And more compelling so in the instant case
where it has become evident that the adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination
but through his own fault failed to cross-examine the witness.
"Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can
be ascribed to the plaintiff or the witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has obtained in the
direct examination." (Italics supplied)
Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine.[i]
[21] Appellants lost such opportunity when they sought the deferment of their cross-examination of
Elizabeth, and they only have themselves to blame in forever losing that right by reason of Elizabeths
demise. This Court held that the right to cross-examination
is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of
the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on
direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. x x x (W)aiver of the
right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the application
of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an
opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.[i][22] (Italics
supplied)
As to the second motion, the same should be granted.The Supreme Court ruled once that We also find
unmeritorious appellants argument that Elizabeths testimony, having been taken during the bail hearings,
cannot be used against them. Section 1(f) of Rule 115 provides that either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased x x x given in another case or proceeding, and under
Section 8 Rule 114[i][23] as amended by Circular 12-94,[i][24] evidence presented during the bail
hearings, like the testimony of deceased witness Elizabeth, are considered automatically reproduced at
the trial subject only to the possible recall of the witness for additional examination unless the witness is
dead, outside the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. (PP. V. Narca, GR 108488, July 21, 1997)
15. The accused was caught in flagrante sniffing shabu inside a beach cottage in a resort. He was arrested
by the police officers P01 Redoble and P02 Rosete,, accosted by Huling, the caretaker of the cottage, and
Romel, the errand boy of the resort.
In convicting the accused, the Judge relied on the testimony of P01 Redoble, since Huling and Romel
were not presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
On appeal the accused assigned as one of the errors the non-presentation of PO1 Rosete, Huling and
Romel, claiming that the prosecution willfully suppressed other evidence which gives the presumption that
the same is adverse to the prosecution, and could have resulted to his acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Rule on said assigned error.
ANSWER: Accused-appellant faults the prosecution for its failure to introduce the independent testimonies
of the workers at the resort, which amounts to a willful suppression of evidence and gives rise to the
presumption that the same is adverse to the prosecution if produced, pursuant to Rule 131, Section 3(e) of
the Revised Rules of Court.
The contention is without merit.
The prosecution has the prerogative to present the witnesses it needs to meet the quantum' of evidence
necessary to merit the conviction of the accused.47 Hence, the prosecution cannot be faulted for presenting
only the three (3) police officers involved in the arrest of accused-appellant. As these officers enjoy a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,48 it was likewise error for the defense to
question their testimonies solely on the ground that they were the very officers who conducted the arrest.
Besides, the trial court had sufficient opportunity to observe the demeanor of these witnesses and to
determine the truth or falsity of their testimonies. We see no reason, therefore, to overturn the findings of
facts of the lower court.(PP V. DANILO DE GUZMAN, GR 117952-53, FEB 14, 2001)
16. Arriving home one late afternoon of April 4, 1987, Amador Organez was informed by his wife that their
six (6) year old daughter, Maritess, was missing. Upon inquiry, Cristy Manalastas, one of his neighbors,
told Amador that a pregnant woman was seen near the vicinity of his house. This was corroborated by two
other neighbors, namely, Julie and Baby Wycoco. Amador searched for the pregnant woman at Tondo. She
chanced upon Shirley Martinez whose child was also missing. Shirley related to Amador that, after one,
Zenaida Isla, who was her former classmate, visited her at her house, her child disappeared. Amador,
continued his search in Caloocan and met Lola Danding whose grandchild was also missing. She told
Amador that it was appellant who took her granddaughter when the latter went to her house.
On July 18, 1987, the police authorities from Malabon went to Amadors house and informed him that
appellant had been arrested. Amador then went to the Malabon Police Headquarters where appellant told
him to proceed to San Simon, Pampanga to fetch his child. On that same day, Amador went to Pampanga
together with six Malabon policemen, Lola Danding, appellant, and Mrs. Loring whose child was also
missing. After coordinating with the police authorities of Pampanga, they proceeded to the town of Sta.
Monica, to meet Maura Orang Mabalot.
Upon reaching the house of Maura, the police authorities showed her a picture of Maritess and she
identified the child in the picture as the same child who was with appellant when the latter went to her
house in April, 1987. She also related that during the said visit, appellant told her that she was looking for
someone to adopt the child known as Maritess. Appellant, upon hearing Mauras statement reacted by
telling the group that she sold the child at Angeles City. Thereafter, the same group went to a dry goods
store at the Angeles City Market. The owner of the said store answered positively when the policemen
inquired if a child was sold to her but, upon verification, the child was not Maritess. Then the group
checked on another child, who was sold but again upon verification, did not turn out to be Maritess.
Subsequently, appellant was brought back to the Malabon Police Department but was transferred to the
Western Police District of Manila. On July 21, 1987, appellant was investigated before P/Cpl. Pablito
Marasigan, an investigator at the WPD General Assignment Section. Thereafter, she executed an
extrajudicial statement wherein she admitted that she took Maritess Organez and brought her to Teofilo
Ablaza for adoption. Said extrajudicial statement was executed with Atty. Domingo Joaquin of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Department of Justice, beside her.
Appellant on the other hand, denied the charges hurled against her. She claimed that she has no knowledge
of the contents of the sworn statement attributed to her which is marked as Exhibit B nor had she read it.
She alleged that she was lured into signing the said document when Marasigan promised to release her after
affixing her signature thereat. More so, she alleged that when she affixed her signature in the document, she
was not assisted by a counsel as Atty. Domingo Joaquin of CLAO arrived at the police station after the
document was already prepared and finished.
In this appeal, appellant interposes the following as errors of the court a quo:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of kidnapping, inasmuch as:
1.
The decision was basically based on hearsay evidence;
2.
The alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, being extracted in violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused(sic).
Rule on the assigned errors on the basis of PP. V. Isla, GR 96176, Aug. 21, 1997)..
ANSWER: PEOPLE vs. ZENAIDA ISLA,[G.R. No. 96176. August 21, 1997] 1. Based on the facts of the
case the decision was based on hearsay. Indeed, in the case at bench, the evidence presented dismally
failed to pierce the shield of presumptive innocence, as the prosecution merely relied on hearsay evidence.
As can be gleaned from the facts the testimony of the father of the victim and that of the other prosecution
witnesses were merely hearsay as they were not personally aware of the facts surrounding the alleged
kidnapping of Maritess Organez. They all just averred that they were informed or matters were merely
related to them, which, taken as a whole, could not legally sustain a conviction.
2. The extra-judicial confession is inadmissible as it was taken not in the presence of a lawyer. n Gamboa
v. Cruz, we ruled that the moment there is a move of investigator to elicit admissions or even plain
information from the suspect which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, the suspect should be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives his right, but the waiver should be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel. The legal tenet was reiterated in the case of People v. Ayson and other cases.
So, in the case at bar, when P/cpl. Marasigan started his investigation without providing appellant with
counsel of her choice, the former violated her rights as enshrined in the Constitution. It was only after he
conducted an investigation on appellant that P/Cpl. Marasigan summoned Atty. Domingo Joaquin of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office and detailed at the Western Police District as inquest lawyer, to assist the
appelant in giving a confession. This is the testimony of Atty. Joaquin:
Q: After you were summoned by Marasigan, (sic) then what did you do?
A: When I arrived at the General Assignment Section of the Western Police District, I was briefed or
informed by P/Cpl. Marasigan that he was investigating the suspect Zenaida Isla and the suspect intend to
give an extrajudicial confession.
On this basis, there is reason to believe appellants assertion that Atty. Joaquin did not assist her during the
investigation, inasmuch as the statement was already finished and prepared before he arrived at the police
station.
17. In a case for property heirship, the alleged niece testified about her being a niece to the decedent. She
testified that allegedly, her deceased childless Aunt, the owner of the property in questions, since her
lifetime had always declared her as her niece, who would be capacitated to inherit her property.
The adverse party claims that it is hearsay evidence, and hence inadmissible.
The Judge sustained the objection. Is the Judge Correct?
Answer: The Judge is wrong. The Supreme Court ruled in Tison V. Court of Appeals ([G.R. No. 121027.
July 31, 1997] The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her
lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodoras niece. Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under
Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is
dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving
the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. As the statement is a
declaration about pedigree,the same can be admitted as evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule.
18.In a rape case, the following witnesses testified as follows:
Witness Lucela testified that she saw the victim a retardate, who went voluntarily with the accused in the
bushes, where the accused had sex with her. The accused removed his pants, sat on the grasses where the
victim sat on top of him. Her affidavit beforehand submitted did not mention of said fact.
Witness Rosario, an Aunt of the retardate, testified that the accused after the incident left their place, and
even wrote a letter asking for forgiveness.
The retardate testified and pointed to the accused as the person who had sex with her in the bushes.
The trial court convicted the accused on the basis of said testimonies.
On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors:
(1) The testimony of the retardate is inadmissible and should not have been believed.
2) That his asking for forgiveness and his leaving the place are irrelevant matters and should not have been
considered by the court.
3) The testimony of Lucela should have been discredited as it did not jibe with her affidavit.
Rule on the three assigned errors.
ANSWER: 1) A retardate is not disqualified to testify. The fact that the victim in this case is a mental
retardate is no consequence, as it is a settled rule that a mental retardate, for that reason alone, is not
disqualified from being a witness. This Court has likewise held that a mental retardate who has the ability
to make perceptions known to others is a competent witness.
2) The flight of the accused and his asking for forgiveness are relevant matters, and are considered as
indicia of guilt. While the flight of an accused person after the commission of an offense creates no legal
presumption of guilt, it is nevertheless a circumstance which is admissible in evidence against him, and, if
not explained in a manner consistent with his innocence, is to be considered as tending to show that he was
the person who committed the deed.
The Supreme Court has ruled that such an act (of asking for forgiveness) is undeniably indicative of guilt.
3) the Testimony of Lucila cannot just be discredited. X x x testimonial evidence in court carries more
weight than affidavits. Testimonies given during trials are much more precise and elaborate than those
stated in sworn statements. Ex-parte affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for
varied reasons, at times because of partial or innocent suggestion or for want of specific inquiries.
Witnesses cannot be expected everytime, except when told, to distinguish between what may be
consequential and what may be mere insignificant details. (PP V. ERARDO, G.R. No. 119368. August 18,
1997]
19. Do you agree with the ruling of the judge when he decided that Neither do the tax receipts which
were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is
that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases ? Why? What is the
correct rule with respect to tax declarations used as evidence to prove ownership of land?
ANSWER: See, Palomo v. CA, G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997] and Heirs of Segunda Maningding v.
CA,G.R. No. 121157 July 31, 1997: While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and
receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
20. In a criminal case for murder, the prosecution presented as evidence the pictures of the reenactment
depicting the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. The accused objected saying
that said evidence is inadmissible as evidence, as he was not assisted by counsel when the reenactment was
done. The prosecution objected saying that the reenactment was voluntarily done by the accused before he
was charged, and the pictures were taken thereon without any objection from him.
The Judge ruled that said pictures are admissible as evidence and that they are not covered by the right
against self-incrimination.
Rule of the contentions of the parties. Is the judge correct?
ANSWER: The pictures of the reenactment depicting Lara' s role in the commission of the crime cannot be
utilized as evidence of his participation as a principal therein as that reenactment was conducted without
any lawyer assisting appellant. We have held that reenactments are covered by the right against selfincrimination. Atty. Ranin himself admitted on the witness stand that no lawyer assisted Lara during the
reenactment because he could not find any available lawyer at that time who could act as his counsel.
(People v. Suarez, G.R. No. 111193. January 28, 1997])
2. WHAT IS A DYING DECLARATION? WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT IT MAY
BE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN COURT?
ANSWER:The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible, to wit: (a) it concerns the
crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant
was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant was the
victim.
3. The case of PP V. GONZALES (311 SCRA 547) ENUMERATED THE THREE REQUISITES FOR A
CHILD WITNESS TO BE COMPETENT, WHAT ARE THESE?
ANSWER: 1. CAPACITY OF OBSERVATION 2. CAPACITY OF RECOLLECTION AND 3. CAPACITY
OF COMMUNICATION.
4. In the absence of a marriage certificate, how is marriage proved under the rules on evidence?
ANSWER: In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 118904, April 20, 1998, citing Pugueda vs.
Trias, 4 SCRA 849, 855 [March 31, 1962] cited also in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals 305 SCRA 138) the
Supreme Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the
matrimony; b) the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c)
the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.
5. Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two (2)
eyewitnesses as one of the killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer
Vasquez presented an incredible story because it is highly improbable that they could have distinctly
and positively recognized accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes."[1] According to
appellant, Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have
identified appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp inside the camalig where Emeterio Vasquez and
Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that
he saw his grandfather shot by appellant, could have identified appellant because of the poor lighting
coming from the gas lamp being carried by his grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by
Elmer's grandfather was a small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette and
the lamp inside the camalig was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light emanating
therefrom was upwards and not sidewise.
QUESTION: Considering said lighting conditions, in the decided cases of the supreme court, is an
illumination coming from a gas lamp sufficient to support identification? If the illumination comes from a
star light, would that be also considered sufficient illumination for identification purposes?
ANSWER: Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could
have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor
should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow
identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be
considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious.(Pp. v. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1).
6. In the early morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a tricycle driver
working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan. When they reached their destination, he
ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle. Then, accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his money and
repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground unconscious. Accused-appellant
shot him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating that
a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana rushed
to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and answer method, which he took down on two
sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio affixed his thumbmark on both sheets.The
statement is as follows:
T: Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency Hospital at kinukunan ka ng
salaysay?
S:
Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEA sa ulo at kinuha and tricycle kong
minamaneho.
T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Pea?
S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito?
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap na ika-4:15 ng umaga.
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Pea?
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.
T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Pea?
S: Opo.
T: Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
S: Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
T: Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
S: Si Rey Dagul.
T: Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S: Muntik na ho.
T: Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S: Ewan ko ho.[1][4]
Eventually, Pelagio died, and Ramil Pea was charged for the death of Pelagio. On the basis of said
statement as above-written, would you consider the same admissible as a dying declaration? Can it be
admitted as part of the res gestae? What are the elements of res gestae?
ANSWER: 1.The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have already been established in a
long line of cases. An ante-mortem statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if: (1) at
the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the
declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to
facts which the victim was competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration
is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.[1][5]
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not established with certainty whether Pelagio uttered
his statement with consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain when he made his
statement, he expressly stated that accused-appellant only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him.
2. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.[1][9]
In People v. Naerta,[1][10] this Court held that:
The term res gestae comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient
to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under
such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content.
Pelagios declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after a startling
occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no
opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.[1][11PEOPLE vs. RAMIL PEA,[G.R. No. 133964.
February 13, 2002]
7. Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict an accused? Explain.
ANSWER: Yes. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction if the
following requisites are established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been established; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
8. When is there a conspiracy? What proof is necessary to prove conspiracy? Can it be presumed?
ANSWER: Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime.[1][36] Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused
themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interests.[1]
9. What degree of proof is required to prove the qualifying circumstance of alevosia? For the court to
appreciate alevosia what burdens would the prosecution prove?
ANSWER: The prosecution was burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only the crime itself, but
also the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.[1][60] Treachery cannot be based on speculations and
surmises. In order that treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that (a) the malefactor employed means, method
or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and,
(b) the means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
(Pp. v. Buntag, GR 123070, April 4, 2004).
10. The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused. The same rule applies if the
extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased. State the exception to this
rule.
ANSWER: The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible
only against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused.The same rule applies if the
extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the
declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or admission is admissible against
both accused. The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission when repeated during the trial is
transposed into judicial admissions.
11. Distinguish an admission from a confession.
ANSWER:In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts
by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths
charged.[1][48] It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt.[1][49] A confession, on
the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.
12. In cases where the victim could not testify on the actual commission of the rape because she was
rendered unconscious at the time the crime was perpetrated, can the accused be still convicted of rape?
What rules of evidence are applicable when met with this particular prosecutorial deficiency?
ANSWER: In cases where the victim could not testify on the actual commission of the rape because she
was rendered unconscious at the time the crime was perpetrated, Rule 133, Section 4, of the Revised Rules
on Evidence sanctions the courts to rule on the basis of circumstantial evidence, viz:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)
There is more than one circumstance;
(b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
A related rule is that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proved leads to no other logical
conclusion than the guilt of the appellant.[1][9]
There have already been instances when this Court convicted an accused of the crime of rape,
committed while their victims were unconscious, based on circumstantial evidence. In People v.
Villanueva,[1][10] the Court affirmed the conviction for rape, overruling the defenses posture that the
prosecution failed to present evidence of the actual defloration. In that case, the accused-appellant claimed
that if the victim was unconscious during the sexual assault, she would be incapable of knowing that,
indeed, she was raped. Debunking the claim of the accused-appellant that the circumstantial evidence was
not sufficient to prove rape, the Court, taking into consideration the events that transpired before and after
the victim lost consciousness, i.e., the perpetrator compulsorily commanded her to remove her panty and
forced her to lie down then punched her in the stomach which rendered her unconscious and that when she
came to, she felt pain in the nest of womanhood, found accused-appellant guilty of rape.(PP. V. EDUARDO
MORAN JR. y GORDULA, GR. 170849, MARCH 7, 2007, 3rd division, decided by Justice ChicoNazario).
13. In a buy bust operation, is a prior surveillance necessary for the conviction of the accused?
Answer: Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of
the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has
left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.[1][24]
A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are
accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.[1][25] Flexibility is a trait of good police work.[1]
[26] In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the
reason that the informant accompanied the policemen to the person who is peddling the dangerous drugs.
(PP V. NICOLAS, GR 170234, Feb. 8, 2007)
14. Accused is charged of murder. The Judge issued a warrant of arrest without bail. Accused filed a motion
for bail alleging that evidence against him is not strong. The bail hearing was conducted, and Elizabeth was
offered as witness. The bail was not granted on the basis of her testimony. In the trial proper, Elizabeth was
presented as principal witness. Due to lack of material time, and in giving the defense ample time to crossexamine Elizabeth, the trial was set on another date for the cross-examination.
Before the cross-examination could be conducted, Elizabeth died of cardiac arrest.
The defense moved that the testimony of Elizabeth be expunged for lack of cross-examination.
On the other hand, the prosecution moved that the testimony of Elizabeth during the bail hearing be
adopted as part of her main testimony.
As judge how would you rule on the two motions.
ANSWER:As to the first motion, the same has to be denied. Lack of cross-examination due to the death of
the witness does not necessarily render the deceaseds previous testimony expungible. Thus, this Court in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[1][19] citing Fulgado v. CA, [1][20] said that:
The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it
prejudiced the party whose only fault was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent
alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination could
have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss. And more compelling so in the instant case
where it has become evident that the adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination
but through his own fault failed to cross-examine the witness.
"Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can
be ascribed to the plaintiff or the witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has obtained in the
direct examination." (Italics supplied)
Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine.[1]
[21] Appellants lost such opportunity when they sought the deferment of their cross-examination of
Elizabeth, and they only have themselves to blame in forever losing that right by reason of Elizabeths
demise. This Court held that the right to cross-examination
is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of
the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on
direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. x x x (W)aiver of the
right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the application
of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an
opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.[1][22] (Italics
supplied)
As to the second motion, the same should be granted.The Supreme Court ruled once that We also find
unmeritorious appellants argument that Elizabeths testimony, having been taken during the bail hearings,
cannot be used against them. Section 1(f) of Rule 115 provides that either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased x x x given in another case or proceeding, and under
Section 8 Rule 114[1][23] as amended by Circular 12-94,[1][24] evidence presented during the bail
hearings, like the testimony of deceased witness Elizabeth, are considered automatically reproduced at
the trial subject only to the possible recall of the witness for additional examination unless the witness is
dead, outside the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. (PP. V. Narca, GR 108488, July 21, 1997)
15. The accused was caught in flagrante sniffing shabu inside a beach cottage in a resort. He was arrested
by the police officers P01 Redoble and P02 Rosete,, accosted by Huling, the caretaker of the cottage, and
Romel, the errand boy of the resort.
In convicting the accused, the Judge relied on the testimony of P01 Redoble, since Huling and Romel
were not presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
On appeal the accused assigned as one of the errors the non-presentation of PO1 Rosete, Huling and
Romel, claiming that the prosecution willfully suppressed other evidence which gives the presumption that
the same is adverse to the prosecution, and could have resulted to his acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Rule on said assigned error.
ANSWER: Accused-appellant faults the prosecution for its failure to introduce the independent testimonies
of the workers at the resort, which amounts to a willful suppression of evidence and gives rise to the
presumption that the same is adverse to the prosecution if produced, pursuant to Rule 131, Section 3(e) of
the Revised Rules of Court.
The contention is without merit.
The prosecution has the prerogative to present the witnesses it needs to meet the quantum' of evidence
necessary to merit the conviction of the accused.47 Hence, the prosecution cannot be faulted for presenting
only the three (3) police officers involved in the arrest of accused-appellant. As these officers enjoy a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,48 it was likewise error for the defense to
question their testimonies solely on the ground that they were the very officers who conducted the arrest.
Besides, the trial court had sufficient opportunity to observe the demeanor of these witnesses and to
determine the truth or falsity of their testimonies. We see no reason, therefore, to overturn the findings of
facts of the lower court.(PP V. DANILO DE GUZMAN, GR 117952-53, FEB 14, 2001)
16. Arriving home one late afternoon of April 4, 1987, Amador Organez was informed by his wife that their
six (6) year old daughter, Maritess, was missing. Upon inquiry, Cristy Manalastas, one of his neighbors,
told Amador that a pregnant woman was seen near the vicinity of his house. This was corroborated by two
other neighbors, namely, Julie and Baby Wycoco. Amador searched for the pregnant woman at Tondo. She
chanced upon Shirley Martinez whose child was also missing. Shirley related to Amador that, after one,
Zenaida Isla, who was her former classmate, visited her at her house, her child disappeared. Amador,
continued his search in Caloocan and met Lola Danding whose grandchild was also missing. She told
Amador that it was appellant who took her granddaughter when the latter went to her house.
On July 18, 1987, the police authorities from Malabon went to Amadors house and informed him that
appellant had been arrested. Amador then went to the Malabon Police Headquarters where appellant told
him to proceed to San Simon, Pampanga to fetch his child. On that same day, Amador went to Pampanga
together with six Malabon policemen, Lola Danding, appellant, and Mrs. Loring whose child was also
missing. After coordinating with the police authorities of Pampanga, they proceeded to the town of Sta.
Monica, to meet Maura Orang Mabalot.
Upon reaching the house of Maura, the police authorities showed her a picture of Maritess and she
identified the child in the picture as the same child who was with appellant when the latter went to her
house in April, 1987. She also related that during the said visit, appellant told her that she was looking for
someone to adopt the child known as Maritess. Appellant, upon hearing Mauras statement reacted by
telling the group that she sold the child at Angeles City. Thereafter, the same group went to a dry goods
store at the Angeles City Market. The owner of the said store answered positively when the policemen
inquired if a child was sold to her but, upon verification, the child was not Maritess. Then the group
checked on another child, who was sold but again upon verification, did not turn out to be Maritess.
Subsequently, appellant was brought back to the Malabon Police Department but was transferred to the
Western Police District of Manila. On July 21, 1987, appellant was investigated before P/Cpl. Pablito
Marasigan, an investigator at the WPD General Assignment Section. Thereafter, she executed an
extrajudicial statement wherein she admitted that she took Maritess Organez and brought her to Teofilo
Ablaza for adoption. Said extrajudicial statement was executed with Atty. Domingo Joaquin of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Department of Justice, beside her.
Appellant on the other hand, denied the charges hurled against her. She claimed that she has no knowledge
of the contents of the sworn statement attributed to her which is marked as Exhibit B nor had she read it.
She alleged that she was lured into signing the said document when Marasigan promised to release her after
affixing her signature thereat. More so, she alleged that when she affixed her signature in the document, she
was not assisted by a counsel as Atty. Domingo Joaquin of CLAO arrived at the police station after the
document was already prepared and finished.
In this appeal, appellant interposes the following as errors of the court a quo:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of kidnapping, inasmuch as:
1.
The decision was basically based on hearsay evidence;
2.
The alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, being extracted in violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused(sic).
Rule on the assigned errors on the basis of PP. V. Isla, GR 96176, Aug. 21, 1997)..
ANSWER: PEOPLE vs. ZENAIDA ISLA,[G.R. No. 96176. August 21, 1997] 1. Based on the facts of the
case the decision was based on hearsay. Indeed, in the case at bench, the evidence presented dismally
failed to pierce the shield of presumptive innocence, as the prosecution merely relied on hearsay evidence.
As can be gleaned from the facts the testimony of the father of the victim and that of the other prosecution
witnesses were merely hearsay as they were not personally aware of the facts surrounding the alleged
kidnapping of Maritess Organez. They all just averred that they were informed or matters were merely
related to them, which, taken as a whole, could not legally sustain a conviction.
2. The extra-judicial confession is inadmissible as it was taken not in the presence of a lawyer. n Gamboa
v. Cruz, we ruled that the moment there is a move of investigator to elicit admissions or even plain
information from the suspect which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, the suspect should be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives his right, but the waiver should be made in writing and in the
presence of counsel. The legal tenet was reiterated in the case of People v. Ayson and other cases.
So, in the case at bar, when P/cpl. Marasigan started his investigation without providing appellant with
counsel of her choice, the former violated her rights as enshrined in the Constitution. It was only after he
conducted an investigation on appellant that P/Cpl. Marasigan summoned Atty. Domingo Joaquin of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office and detailed at the Western Police District as inquest lawyer, to assist the
appelant in giving a confession. This is the testimony of Atty. Joaquin:
Q: After you were summoned by Marasigan, (sic) then what did you do?
A: When I arrived at the General Assignment Section of the Western Police District, I was briefed or
informed by P/Cpl. Marasigan that he was investigating the suspect Zenaida Isla and the suspect intend to
give an extrajudicial confession.
On this basis, there is reason to believe appellants assertion that Atty. Joaquin did not assist her during the
investigation, inasmuch as the statement was already finished and prepared before he arrived at the police
station.
17. In a case for property heirship, the alleged niece testified about her being a niece to the decedent. She
testified that allegedly, her deceased childless Aunt, the owner of the property in questions, since her
lifetime had always declared her as her niece, who would be capacitated to inherit her property.
The adverse party claims that it is hearsay evidence, and hence inadmissible.
The Judge sustained the objection. Is the Judge Correct?
Answer: The Judge is wrong. The Supreme Court ruled in Tison V. Court of Appeals ([G.R. No. 121027.
July 31, 1997] The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her
lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodoras niece. Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under
Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is
dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving
the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. As the statement is a
declaration about pedigree,the same can be admitted as evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule.
18.In a rape case, the following witnesses testified as follows:
Witness Lucela testified that she saw the victim a retardate, who went voluntarily with the accused in the
bushes, where the accused had sex with her. The accused removed his pants, sat on the grasses where the
victim sat on top of him. Her affidavit beforehand submitted did not mention of said fact.
Witness Rosario, an Aunt of the retardate, testified that the accused after the incident left their place, and
even wrote a letter asking for forgiveness.
The retardate testified and pointed to the accused as the person who had sex with her in the bushes.
The trial court convicted the accused on the basis of said testimonies.
On appeal, the accused assigned the following errors:
(1) The testimony of the retardate is inadmissible and should not have been believed.
2) That his asking for forgiveness and his leaving the place are irrelevant matters and should not have been
considered by the court.
3) The testimony of Lucela should have been discredited as it did not jibe with her affidavit.
Rule on the three assigned errors.
ANSWER: 1) A retardate is not disqualified to testify. The fact that the victim in this case is a mental
retardate is no consequence, as it is a settled rule that a mental retardate, for that reason alone, is not
disqualified from being a witness. This Court has likewise held that a mental retardate who has the ability
to make perceptions known to others is a competent witness.
2) The flight of the accused and his asking for forgiveness are relevant matters, and are considered as
indicia of guilt. While the flight of an accused person after the commission of an offense creates no legal
presumption of guilt, it is nevertheless a circumstance which is admissible in evidence against him, and, if
not explained in a manner consistent with his innocence, is to be considered as tending to show that he was
the person who committed the deed.
The Supreme Court has ruled that such an act (of asking for forgiveness) is undeniably indicative of guilt.
3) the Testimony of Lucila cannot just be discredited. X x x testimonial evidence in court carries more
weight than affidavits. Testimonies given during trials are much more precise and elaborate than those
stated in sworn statements. Ex-parte affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for
varied reasons, at times because of partial or innocent suggestion or for want of specific inquiries.
Witnesses cannot be expected everytime, except when told, to distinguish between what may be
consequential and what may be mere insignificant details. (PP V. ERARDO, G.R. No. 119368. August 18,
1997]
19. Do you agree with the ruling of the judge when he decided that Neither do the tax receipts which
were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is
that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases ? Why? What is the
correct rule with respect to tax declarations used as evidence to prove ownership of land?
ANSWER: See, Palomo v. CA, G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997] and Heirs of Segunda Maningding v.
CA,G.R. No. 121157 July 31, 1997: While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations and
receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
20. In a criminal case for murder, the prosecution presented as evidence the pictures of the reenactment
depicting the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. The accused objected saying
that said evidence is inadmissible as evidence, as he was not assisted by counsel when the reenactment was
done. The prosecution objected saying that the reenactment was voluntarily done by the accused before he
was charged, and the pictures were taken thereon without any objection from him.
The Judge ruled that said pictures are admissible as evidence and that they are not covered by the right
against self-incrimination.
Rule of the contentions of the parties. Is the judge correct?
ANSWER: The pictures of the reenactment depicting Lara' s role in the commission of the crime cannot be
utilized as evidence of his participation as a principal therein as that reenactment was conducted without
any lawyer assisting appellant. We have held that reenactments are covered by the right against selfincrimination. Atty. Ranin himself admitted on the witness stand that no lawyer assisted Lara during the
reenactment because he could not find any available lawyer at that time who could act as his counsel.
(People v. Suarez, G.R. No. 111193. January 28, 1997])
/
1.
(a)In a labor case for the dismissal of an employee for alleged commission of a criminal act,
what quantum of proof must be established by the employer to justify the dismissal?
(b) In an agrarian dispute involving tenancy relations, what quantum of proof is required to establish
ones claim?
In an administrative case against a judge for bribery, extortion and violation of the anti-graft law
which can result to removal, what quantum of proof is required to convict him?
(d) In an administrative case against a judge, when is there substantial evidence as to justify a
conviction?
(e) In an administrative complaint against a court employee for forgery and dishonesty, what
quantum of proof is required to convict her?
Answer: (a) MERALCO V. NLRC, 198 SCRA 681 (1991) What is required is only substantial
evidence.(b) SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA 25 (1992) (c) ANG V. ASIS (2002)
proof beyond reasonable doubt (d0 Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conviction; such evidence is satisfied when
there is a reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.(Laguid v.
Camano, 2002)(e) substantial evidence (Mariano v. Roxas 2002)
2.
IN their motion to dismiss based on lack of legal capacity to sue, defendants asserted that
their transaction was not with Merrill Lynch but with another corporation. To prove this,defendants
attached documents in support of their motion. Even without the documents being offered in
evidence, the court took them into consideration and dismissed the complaint. Is the court correct?
Explain.
Answer: Yes, SEC. 7 OF Rule 133 states that when a motion is based on facts not appearing on
record the court may hear the matter on afdidavits and depositions presented by the respective
parties.( Merril LYNCH V. CA, 211 SCRA 824,( 1992).
3. In convicting the accused in People v. Ador (22004) for murder, the trial court relied on the
following circumstances to wit: (1) that he was seen fleeing from the crime scene (2) that he allegedly
surrendered the hand gun (3) that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fried from the gun
he surrendered (4) that the victim made a dying declaration identifying him and (5) paraffin test
showed that he was positive for gunpowder. IS THE CONVICTION PROPER?
ANSWER: No. For circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one
circumstance (2) the facts from which the inference are derived are proven (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. These elements are
not present in the case at bar.(People v. Ador 432 SCRA 1 (20024)
4.IN People v. Dungo (1991), the accused claims insanity as a defense in a criminal prosecution. What
degree of evidence is required in order that he would be exempted from criminal liability?
ANSWER: Proof beyond reasonable doubt. IN considering the defense of insanity, the starting
premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes
all acts to be voluntary and that it is improper to presume that the acts were done unconsciously.
WHOEVER therefore, invokes insanity as a defense had the burden of proving its existence beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense of confession and avoidance, and as such must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved in order to acquit the accused.
5. Accused in the case of People v. Barlis (1994) duly assisted by counsel, confessed to having robbed
the watches, jewelry and cash, and then killed one Honorian Balmaseda. During his trial, the
confession was presented and admitted in evidence. Insofar as the robbery is concerned, the extrajudicial statement of the accused constituted as the only evidence of the taking of the property of the
victim. Based on said premises, (a) is the conviction of the accused for the crime of robbery proper?
(b) can he be convicted of homicide?
Answer: NO. Sec. 3 Rule 133 requires that an extrajudicial confession shall not be sufficient ground
for conviction, unless corroborated by the evidence of corpus delicte. In this case the robbery was not
corroborated, only the homicide portion.He can only be convicted of homicide.(341)
6.To successfully invoke the defense of alibi as a defense in a criminal case, what evidence must be
adduced by the accused?
Answer: The accused must show that he was at some other place for such period of time and that it
was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission.(PEOPLE V. DEVARAS, 205 SCRA 676, 1992)
7.Accused together with another , was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. While the
victim did not personally know the accused, she was able to identify him through a photograph
shown to her at the police station. Can the accused challenge his out-of-court identification on the
ground that it was not done through a police line-up?
Answer: NO. There is no rule that before a suspect can be identified as the culprit, he should first be
placed in a police line-up. What is important is the positiveness of the victim that the persons
charged were the malefactors, the same to be tested during the trial. (People v. Apawan (1994).
8.What is the English Exhequer rule?
Answer: It is mid-1880 rule pursuant to which a trial courts error as to the admission of evidence
was presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost automatically required a new trial. It
had long been laid to rest, for even the English appellate courts now disregard an error in the
admission of evidence unless in its opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has been
occasioned.
9.The general rule is that documents not formally offered in evidence cannot be considered by the
court. State at least three exceptions of that rule.
ANSWER: (see p. 362 of the book)
10.When to do make an offer of a testimonial evidence? What about documentary and object
evidence?
Answer: Sec. 35 Rule 132- AS regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time
the witness is called to testify. Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the
presentation of a partys testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally, unless allowed by the
court to be done in writing.
basic questions in evidence
1.How is evidence defined under the Rules of Court.

2.The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as
otherwise provided by law or these rules. Explain the exceptions.
3.What do you mean by (a) competent (b) material (c) relevant evidence?
4.When is judicial notice mandatory? Discretionary? Explain and give examples.
5.Distinguish object evidence from documentary evidence.
6. Explain the best evidence rule and state the exceptions to the rule.
7.Explain the parole evidence rule.

8. Is a plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser offense, an
admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer? Explain.
9. Is evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time admissible to prove that he did or
did not do the same or similar thing at another time? Are their exceptions to this rule?
10.What do you mean by hearsay evidence? Is this evidence admissible? Are there exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule?
Explain how the following objections shall be used in court trials:

1. Objection, Your Honor, on the ground that the question calls for the opinion or conclusion of the
witness.
2.
Objection, Your Honor, because the question calls for an opinion of the witness who has not
been qualified to testify as an expert.
3.
Objection, Your Honor, on the ground that it is inadmissible for the purpose for which it is
being offered,
4. Objection, Your Honor, the question is leading.
5. Objection, Your Honor, it is compound question.
sample questions in evidence with answers
__________1. Which of the following best describes the best evidence rule? (a) the subject of the
inquiry is the document (b) only the original document shall be offered (c) the subject of inquiry is
not the document itself but its contents (d) no other evidence shall be admissible other than the
original itself (e) Xerox copy is admissible when the subject of the inquiry is not the contents of the
document.
__________2. During the hearing the issue of the case is whether the Deed of Sale is authentic. The
plaintiff however does not have a copy of the Deed of Sale since he lost it. Which of the following is
applicable in the case? (a) he may secure a copy of the Deed from the Notary Public (b) a certified
true copy will do (c) it is enough that he proves the contents with a certified copy duly certified by a
custodian of the same (d) the certified true copy from the Office of the Clerk of Court will suffice (e)
he should present witnesses in court to prove the Deed of Sale.
__________3. Which of the following describes the Parol evidence rule? (a) it refers to terms of an
agreement (b) the terms were not reduced in writing (c) it only applies to the parties who are
signatories to the contract (d) no other written evidence shall be admitted (e) the written agreement
controls and no oral evidence shall be admitted.
__________4. A party to a written agreement generally will not be allowed to present evidence to
modify it. Which of the following is an NOT exception to the rule? (a) there is a mistake in the
written contract (b) the agreement is imperfect (c) there is an extrinsic ambiguity (d) there was a
failure to express the true intent (e) there were other terms agreed upon after the agreement was
signed.
__________5. The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in
the (a) place where the property is situated (b) place of its execution (c) place agreed by them (d)
manner that they agreed it to be (e) place of its execution unless the parties intended otherwise.
__________6. A promissory note is stated as follows: For value received I promise to pay to Luis
Wong the sum of Three hundred Pesos (P300,000). Which is the most correct statement below? (a)
The note is negotiable for 300 pesos only (b) the word three hundred pesos is controlling (c) the
number P300,000 should be controlling (d) the intention of the parties must be ascertained (e) the
note is negotiable for 300 pesos only.
__________7. With regard to the statement that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make their known perception to others, may be witnesses. Which of the following is most correct?
(a) Children therefore cannot be witnesses (b) old people who are forgetful cannot be witnesses (c)
blind people cannot be witnesses in court (d) a deaf-mute cannot testify that the woman shouted for
help before she was murdered (e) insane persons are disqualified as witnesses.
__________8. Which of the following is true about convicted felons? (a) they are disqualified as state
witnesses (b) they cannot be admitted to a witness protection program (c) they can be witnesses,
unless otherwise provided by law (d) definitely they cannot be qualified since their credibility is
ruined (e) a convicted murderer cannot testify on a murder case.
__________9. On a case for incest, committed by the husband to his own daughter, the wife testified
against the husband. Which of the following is correct? (a) the wife cannot testify because of the
marital privilege rule (b) the wife can testify because it is her right to do so (c) the wife cannot testify
since the marriage has to be preserved (d) the wife can testify since it is an offense against her (e) the
wife cannot testify since the offended party is the daughter not her.
__________10. Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. This
provision speaks about the (a) Best evidence rule (b) Opinion Rule (c) Dead Mans Statute (d) Dead
Man Rule (e) Hearsay Rule
___________11. Which of the following is not considered as Judicial Notice? (a) history of the
Philippines (b) R.A. 6657 (C) A decision of the Court of Appeals (d) a municipal ordinance (e) the
boundary between Katipunan and Dipolog.
____________12. Which of the following is NOT correct? (a) In civil cases, an offer of compromise is
not an admission of any liability (b) generally in criminal cases, an offer of compromise is considered
as admission of guilt (c) an offer of compromise in criminal negligence is not admissible as evidence
of guilt (d) an offer to compromise a Barangay dispute is counted against the accused (e) a plea of
guilty later withdrawn is an evidence of guilt.
_____________13. Jose Santos is charged of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide. During the
hearing the mother of the victim testified that it was Jose who paid for the expenses of the
hospitalization and the funeral services amounting to P40,000. Which of the following is a correct
statement? (a) the payment of Jose is considered as an admission of guilt(b) the payment is at most
considered only a humanitarian gesture and not an evidence of guilt (c) the Judge should not have
allowed said testimony as it is irrelevant in the case (d) the receipts of said payment is admissible as
proof of criminal liability (e) the receipts can be admitted as proof of civil liability for the injury.
_____________14. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him. This provision speaks about (a) an admission by a privy (b) res gestate (c) res
inter alios acta (d) independently relevant statement (e) admission of a party.
______________15. IN a crime for murder, Jose the accused testified in Open Court that Mario and
Luis were his conspirators in the commission of the Crime. He also mentioned that it was Pedro who
masterminded the killing by paying him P50,000.
Which of the following statement is most correct under the circumstances? (a) Pedros way of
implicating Pedro and the rest is not admissible as evidence (b) Said evidence is a judicial confession
hence must be admissible (c) The statement binds him only as the same cannot generally prejudice
other people (d) the declaration is admissible provided that the conspiracy is shown by other
evidence (e) the witness still has to prove that the murder was done during the existence of the
conspiracy.
______________16. Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former This provision speaks about(a) an admission by a privy (b) res gestate (c) res inter alios acta
(d) independently relevant statement (e) admission of a party.
_____________17. Luis is a notorious person in the community who is always engaged in trouble. He
is a convicted thief, and a gambler. He is presently facing a charge of Theft. Which of the following is
at best correct? (a) The prosecutor may present evidence that he is notorious in the community (b)
Evidence that he is convicted of theft beforehand can be used as evidence against him (c) Evidence
that he stole Normas pomelo in her backyard is relevant (d) That he is an incorrigible theft as
evidence can be offered to prove that he has such a bad habit (e) Similar acts as evidence is generally
admissible as evidence against the accused
_____________18. Jose, an atheist, was shot by Pedro using an armalite. Before he died he was able
to tell his wife (who was not there during the incident) that it was Pedro who shot him because the
latter was jealous of his booming business. Which of the following statement is most correct? (a)
Joses statement is hearsay and hence not admissible (b) Joses statement is admissible because it is
true and relevant (c) Jose statement is admissible as part of the res gestae (d) Joses statement is not
admissible because he is an atheist (e) Jose statement is hearsay but admissible as an exception
thereto.
____________19. Which best describe/s what is a res gestae? (a) startling occurrence (b) statement
giving legal significance to an equivocal act (c) startling statements (d) statements made during a
startling occurrence (e) b & d.
____________20. An affidavit is (a) not admissible as evidence since it is hearsay (b) admissible
evidence when proven to be true (c) admissible evidence after being subjected to a cross examination
(d) not admissible when affiant does not testify about it (e) admissible in evidence when the affiant
testifies about it subject to a cross examination.
_____________21. A fish vendor, who was present when the act was perpetrated, testifies in court
concerning the facts of a murdered meat inspector who was newly assigned in the area. Which of the
following statements is most correct? (a) he is not qualified to testify whether the culprit was drunk
during that time (b) he is qualified to state that the cause of the death was the stab wounds inflicted
(c) he may testify that the meat inspector was insane during that time (d) his testimony that the
murderer was very angry during the commission of the crime is not admissible since he is not a
psychiatrist who knows the mechanics of anger(e) he is qualified to give the opinion that it was really
the accused who murdered the victim.
___________22. Which of the following can be considered as a disputable presumption? (a) tenancy
landlord relationship concerning a contract of lease (b) the previous statement of a principal that he
appointed Jose as his agent (c) estoppel (d) the overt acts of Luis showing that Maria is really his
wife (e) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter.
____________23. The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession
till after an absence of (a) five (b)ten (c) fifteen (d) twenty (e) thirty years.
_____________24.. If a person disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of(a)
five (b)ten (c) fifteen (d) twenty (e) thirty years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.
______________25. Which of the following is INCORRECT?
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(a) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not
been heard of for five years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(b) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for
four years;
(c) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not
been known for four years;
(d) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already death.
(e)In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove
provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage.
_____________26. Which of the following is not a Disputable presumption?
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
______________27. Which of the following is a correct disputable presumption?
(a) That money erroneously paid by one to another was not due to the latter;
(b) That a thing misdelivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(c) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been unpaid;
(d) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is concealed;
(e) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act.
______________28. Which of the following is INCORRECT? (a) the baby of a woman who marries
after 360 days of the death of her husband and who gets pregnant by her second husband is deemed
to be the child of the second marriage (b) a baby born of a woman who married before 180 days of
the death of her husband is deemed to be the child of the first marriage (c) ) A child born after one
hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage(d) A child born after one hundred eighty days after the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage (e) none of the above.
_____________29.Which of the following is considered as a public document? (a) a birth certificate
issued by the Register of Deeds (b) a certificate of Title issued by the Civil Registrar (c) a Deed of
Sale notarized by a vice mayor who is a lawyer (d) a notarized last will and testament (e) a board
examination result issued by the PRC.
_______________30.Which of the following is INCORRECT?
(A) In the construction of an instrument, where there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to what is really intended.
(B) In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general
and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former.
(C)For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the
situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the
position of those who language he is to interpret.
(D) The terms of writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation.
(E) When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it,
that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when different
constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to
the party in whose favor the provision was made
______________31. Which of the following is hearsay? (a) dying declaration (b) res gestae (c) family
reputation (d) all of the above (e) none of the above.
______________32. Jose executed a Deed of Sale of Real Property before the presence of the
Barangay captain, and his two Barangay tanods. Since there is no lawyer in the area, the deed of sale
was not notatized. Which of the following is Correct? (a) the Deed of sale is a private document (b)
the deed of sale is considered a public document since it was executed before the Barangay captain
and complete with two witnesses (c) there is no need to prove the due execution of said document (d)
there is a need to prove its authenticity by presenting the testimony of the Barangay captain at
least (e) the document is originally signed by Jose so it is a public document.
_____________33. No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants. This is known as the (a) filial privilege (b) parental
privilege (c) pedigree rule(d) a and b (e) a, b, and c
_____________34. Which of the following is considered a corpus delicti? (a) the charred body of an
arson victim (b) the can which contained gasoline (c) the fact that the accused stored rugs in the
room where the fire started (d) the information that fire started at the basement of the building (e)
all of the above.
______________35. (Simangan v. People, 2004) Accused was convicted of homicide. Among the
evidence presented against him was his admission to a classmate that he was one of those who killed
the victim. Which of the following statements is most correct? (a) the testimony is admissible because
it is an admission (b) the testimony is not admissible because it is hearsay (c) the admission of
accused to his classmate that he was one of the killers is pure hearsay (d) the testimony of his
classmate was offered to prove an extrajudicial admission (e) it is an admission against interest which
is admissible under the rules of court.
______________36. (People v. Gaudia, 2004)Accused was charged of raping a 3 year-old child. Part of
the evidence presented against him during the trial was the offer of compromise made by his parents
to the parents of the victim. Which of the following statements is at best correct? (a) it can be
considered as evidence against the accused since criminal cases are not compromisable (b) it cannot
be considered as admission since there is no evidence to show that he ordered his parent to make a
compromise (c) following the principle of res inter alios acta, the act of the parents in offering a
compromise does not bind the accused, hence the evidence is inadmissible against him(d) the
accused is bound by the acts of compromise offered by the parents since he is close to them and hence
a privy (e) it cannot be used as evidence of guilt against the accused since making an offer of
compromise is irrelevant in determining his guilt.
______________37. (Lim v. CA, Sept. 25, 1992)A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being
presented in evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on
psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the
annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report. Which of the following is at best
correct? (a) the testimony of the husband is not admissible since he is not an expert witness (b) the
testimony of the husband is inadmissible since the psychiatric report is confidential and the consent
of the wife is needed (c) the testimony is admissible since what is prohibited under the rules is the
physician to testify about it (d) the testimony is admissible since it is a relevant issue in the civil case
at bar (e) the husband is disqualified to testify on a psychiatric evaluation report as it was not him
who prepared it.
____________38.( People v. Garcia, april 1, 2003)The police arrested three persons as suspects in the
crime of carnapping. While detained at the police station, the owner of the vehicle confronted the
three accused about the crime. Two of the accused admitted having perpetrated the crime and
implicated their third companion because they were in dire need of money. The third however, kept
quiet.
Which of the following statements is most correct? (a) this is considered as an invalid admission by
silence hence not admissible against the third accused (b) the statement is not admissible as it is a
fruit of the poisonous tree (c) the statement is inadmissible different persons react differently to
different stimulus (d) the statement is inadmissible as it violates the right of the accused to remain
silent (e) the evidence may be given against him since it was made in the presence and within hearing
distance but he did not say anything which under the rules is considered as an adoptive admission.
_____________39.(Herrera v. Ballos, 2002) The MTC dismissed a forcible entry case on the ground
that it has not jurisdiction. ON appeal the RTC reversed the decision and ordered defendant to
vacate the land and pay plaintiff damages including a monthly rental of P2,000. There was, however,
no evidence presented on the rental value of the disputed premises. Which of the following
statements is correct? (a) the court can take judicial notice of the reasonable monthly rental since he
is familiar with the building (b) the court cannot take judicial notice of rental value since it is a
factual matter and must be supported with evidence(c) there is a violation of due process since
evidence is not presented (d) there is no need to present evidence since this is a summary procedure
which does not need trial (e) the rental value can be taken judicial notice since it is one of public
knowledge in the area where the judge is residing.
_____________40.(Abalos v. CA, 1999) Delfin Abalos was convicted by the RTC of murder. The
killing was witnessed by Veronica Pedrosa who testified that Abalos shot the victim, her boyfriend, in
her house at close range. Abalos argues that there is not enough evidence to convict him because the
paraffin test conducted on him yielded negative for powder burns on his hand hence confirming that
he never fired the shot that killed the victim. Which statement is best correct? (a) Abalos is correct,
he could not have killed the victim since there is no evidence against him that he fired a gun (b)
Abalos is wrong, the paraffin test is not conclusive that he did not fire a gun (c) Abalos is correct
since the paraffin test is conclusive that he did not fire a gun (d) Abalos should be acquitted since
there is no strong evidence against him (e) the evidence that he did not fire a gun was duly
established by him.
PART II. Memorandum Preparation/ or Preparation of Argument (5 points each).
1.( Abella v. CA, June 20, 1996)The lessor issued a receipt which reads as follows: RECEIVED
FROM MR. CONRADO O. COLARINA, THE SUM OF FORTY THOUSAND PESOS AS
ADVANCE DEPOSIT, TO ANSWER FOR ANY RENTAL WHICH MR. CONRADO COLARINA
MAY FAIL TO PAY DURING THE TERM OF THE LEASE AS PER CONTRACT DATED
26TH DAY OF MAY, 1987 NOTARIZED BEFORE ATTY. OSCAR VILLAMORA. In a subsequent
litigation involving the lease contract, however, the lessor presented witnesses to show that the
P40,000 is merely goodwill money.
YOU ARE HIRED BY MR. Conrado Colarina to file the case, prepare a memorandum in his
favor. In short, make an argument for him to win this case by stating the issues, and how the court
must resolve the case in his favor.
2.(People v. Tandoy, December 4, 1990) The charge against the accused was for illegal sale of
marijuana in the amount of P200.00. The prosecution,however, marked only a photocopy of the P200
bill which was used by the police in the buy-bust operation. The defense moved to disregard said
evidence as it is contrary to the evidence rule.
You are now the Prosecutor, prepare a memorandum to convince that judge that the said
evidence is admissible.

1.WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY IMPEACHMENT OF A WITNESS? IN WHAT WAYS MAY A
WITNESS BE IMPEACHED BY A PARTY AGAINST WHOM HE WAS CALLED?
2.WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND EXTENT OF RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION? ARE

QUESTIONS ON MATTERS NOT DEALT WITH DURING THE CROSS EXAMINATION BE
ALLOWED DURING RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION?
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION; ITS PURPOSE AND EXTENT. AFTER THE CROSSEXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS HAS BEEN CONCLUDED, HE MAY BE RE-EXAMINED
BY THE PARTY CALLING HIM, TO EXPLAIN OR SUPPLEMENT HIS ANSWERS GIVEN
DURING THE CROSS-EXAMINATION. ON RE-DIRECT-EXAMINATION, QUESTIONS ON
MATTERS NOT DEALT WITH DURING THE CROSS-EXAMINATION, MAY BE ALLOWED
BY THE COURT IN ITS DISCRETION. (12)
3. AFTER A WITNESS IS EXAMINED BY BOTH SIDES, CAN THE WITNESS BE RECALLED ?

EXPLAIN.
AFTER THE EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS BY BOTH SIDES HAS BEEN CONCLUDED, THE
WITNESS CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT. THE COURT WILL
GRANT OR WITHHOLD LEAVE IN ITS DISCRETION, AS THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
MAY REQUIRE.
4. IF A WITNESS MADE A STATEMENT IN WRITING WHICH IS INCONSISTENT, HOW CAN

HE BE IMPEACHED ON SAID MATTER? IF IT IS A TESTIMONY, WILL YOUR ANSWER BE
THE SAME?
SEC. 13.HOW WITNESS IMPEACHED BY EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.

BEFORE A WITNESS CAN BE IMPEACHED BY EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS MADE AT OTHER
TIMES STATEMENTS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS PRESENT TESTIMONY, THE
STATEMENTS MUST BE RELATED TO HIM, WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TIMES
AND PLACES AND THE PERSONS PRESENT, AND HE MUST BE ASKED WHETHER HE
MADE SUCH STATEMENTS, AND IF SO, ALLOWED TO EXPLAIN THEM. IF THE
STATEMENTS BE IN WRITING THEY MUST BE SHOWN TO THE WITNESS BEFORE ANY
QUESTION IS PUT TO HIM CONCERNING THEM
5. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THE ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE? WHAT ARE THE
REQUISITES?
SEC. 21.WHEN EVIDENCE OF AUTHENTICITY OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT NOT NECESSARY.

WHERE A PRIVATE DOCUMENT IS MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS OLD, IS PRODUCED
FROM THE CUSTODY IN WHICH IT WOULD NATURALLY BE FOUND IF GENUINE, AND IS
UNBLEMISHED BY ANY ALTERATIONS OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUSPICION, NO OTHER
EVIDENCE OF ITS AUTHENTICITY NEED BE GIVEN.
6. UNDER WHAT SITUATIONS ARE LEADING QUESTIONS ALLOWED? HOW ABOUT

MISLEADING QUESTIONS?
SEC. 10.LEADING AND MISLEADING QUESTIONS. A QUESTION WHICH SUGGESTS TO

THE WITNESS THE ANSWER WHICH THE EXAMINING PARTY DESIRES IS A LEADING
QUESTION. IT IS NOT ALLOWED, EXCEPT:CHANROBLES VIRTUA LAW LIBRARY
(A)ON CROSS EXAMINATION;
(B)ON PRELIMINARY MATTERS;
(C)WHEN THERE IS A DIFFICULTY IS GETTING DIRECT AND INTELLIGIBLE ANSWERS

FROM A WITNESS WHO IS IGNORANT, OR A CHILD OF TENDER YEARS, OR IS OF
FEEBLE MIND, OR A DEAF-MUTE;
(D)OF AN UNWILLING OR HOSTILE WITNESS; OR
(E)OF A WITNESS WHO IS AN ADVERSE PARTY OR AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR

MANAGING AGENT OF A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CORPORATION OR OF A PARTNERSHIP
OR ASSOCIATION WHICH IS AN ADVERSE PARTY.
A MISLEADING QUESTION IS ONE WHICH ASSUMES AS TRUE A FACT NOT YET

TESTIFIED TO BY THE WITNESS, OR CONTRARY TO THAT WHICH HE HAS PREVIOUSLY
STATED. IT IS NOT ALLOWED
7. IS EVIDENCE OF GOOD CHARACTER OF A WITNESS ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN

COURT? IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE? IF THERE IS, STATE IT.
SEC. 14.EVIDENCE OF GOOD CHARACTER OF WITNESS. EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD

CHARACTER OF A WITNESS IS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNTIL SUCH CHARACTER HAS BEEN
IMPEACHED.
8.HOW DO YOU PROVE THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF A PRIVATE

DOCUMENT? WHAT ABOUT OTHER PRIVATE DOCUMENTS?
ANSWER: SEC. 20.PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT. BEFORE ANY PRIVATE DOCUMENT

OFFERED AS AUTHENTIC IS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE, ITS DUE EXECUTION AND
AUTHENTICITY MUST BE PROVED EITHER:
(A)BY ANYONE WHO SAW THE DOCUMENT EXECUTED OR WRITTEN; ORCHANROBLES

VIRTUA LAW LIBRARY
(B)BY EVIDENCE OF THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OR HANDWRITING OF

THE MAKER.
ANY OTHER PRIVATE DOCUMENT NEED ONLY BE IDENTIFIED AS THAT WHICH IT IS

CLAIMED TO BE.
9. HOW DO YOU PROVE A FOREIGN MARRIAGE?
ANSWER:
A.
B.
THE EXISTENCE OF THE FOREIGN LAW ON MARRIAGE AS A QUESTION OF

FACT;
THE ALLEGED FOREIGN MARRIAGE BY CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
10. NORMER VELASCO WAS CONVICTED BY THE RTC OF MURDER. THE CONVICTION
WAS BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE EYEWITNESS TO THE INCIDENT,
LEONARDO LUCABAN. AFTER LUCABAN GAVE HIS TESTIMONY, THE JUDGE
RECALLED HIM TO THE WITNESS STAND. VELASCO AVERS THAT THE RECALL OF
LUCABAN HAD NO BASIS AND WAS MADE WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
IS THE ACT OF THE JUDGE IN RECALLING THE WITNESS TO THE WITNESS

STAND UPON HIS OWN ORDER VALID? EXPLAIN.
ANSWER: YES. PEOPLE V. VELASCO, 307 SCRA 684, MAY 28, 1999.(P258)
11. TO PROVE NEW YORK LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON DAMAGES, DEFENDANTS

PRESENTED THE AFFIDAVIT OF ALYSSA WALDEN, A NEW YORK ATTORNEY. THE
AFFIDAVIT DISCUSSED VARIOUS COURT DECISIONS COPIES OF WHICH WERE
ATTACHED TO THE AFFIDAVIT. IS IT SUFFICIENT AS PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW?
ANSWER: NO. UNDER SEC. 24 OF RULE 132 OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, THE RECORD
OF THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT OF SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OR TRIBUNAL MAY BE
PROVED BY: (A) AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION THEREOF (B) OR A COPY ATTESTED BY
THE OFFICER HAVING THE LEGAL CUSTODY OF SUCH. (MANUFACTURERS HANOVER
TRUST V. GUERRERO, 397 SCRA 709, FEB. 19, 2003).
12.THE DEED OF ASSIGNMENT THAT WAS INTRODUCED AS AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT

WAS IN THE CUSTODY OF PLAINTIFF AND NOT IN THE FOLDER OF THE BUREAU OF
LANDS FOR THE LOT IN QUESTION. CAN THE DEED OF ASSIGNMENT BE CONSIDERED
TO HAVE BEEN PRODUCED FROM A CUSTODY IN WHICH IT WOULD NATURALLY BE
FOUND IF GENUINE AS TO QUALIFY AS AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT?
ANSWER: YES. (SEE CLEOFAS V. ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK INC. 324 SCRA 223, FEB. 1,
2000)
13.PETITIONER DY INTERVENED IN AN ACTION OVER THE OWNERSHIP OF TWO LOTS.

TO PROVE HIS CLAIM THAT THEY WERE PREVIOUSLY SOLD TO HIM BY HIS OWN
FATHER, HE PRESENTED TWO RECEIPTS AND A DEED OF SALE FROM HIS FATHER.
CONSIDERING THAT SAID RECEIPTS ARE PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, HOW SHOULD THEIR
GENUINENESS BE ESTABLISHED?
ANSWER: IN PROVING THAT DUE EXECUTION AND GENUINENESS OF PRIVATE

DOCUMENTS, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT THAT THE WITNESS STATE IN GENERAL MANNER
THAT THE PERSON WHOSE SIGNATURE APPEARS THEREON WAS THE ONE WHO
EXECUTED THE DOCUMENT. THE TESTIMONY OF AN EYEWITNESS AUTHENTICATING
A PRIVATE DOCUMENT MUST BE POSITIVE, CATEGORICALLY STATING THAT THE
DOCUMENT WAS ACTUALLY EXECUTED BY THE PERSON WHOSE NAME IS
SUBSCRIBED THERETO. IN THIS CASE, THE DETAILS SURROUNDING THE EXECUTION
OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WERE NOT EVEN NARRATED.(DY V. CA, 204 SCRA
878) DEC. 17, 1991.
14. ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS IDENTIFIED IN COURT DURING THE MURDER TRIAL WAS
AN INVESTIGATION REPORT PREPARED BY THE REGIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL.
THE PROSECUTION, HOWEVER, MARKED AND OFFERED OLY AS EVIDENCE A PORTION
CONSISTING OF AN ENTRY IN THE POLICE BLOTTER OF MAYORGA, LEYTE. WHEN THE
TRIAL COURT DECIDED THE CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED, HOWEVER, IT TOOK INTO
CONSIDERATION THE ENTIRE DOCUMENTS CONSISTING OF NO LESS THAN FIVE (5)
PAGES. IS THE COURT CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE WHOLE DOCUMENT?
ANSWER: NO. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN THE REST INTO ACCOUNT
IN THE FORMULATION OF ITS CONCLUSIONS, BUT ONLY THE PORTION OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE, PURSUANT TO SEC. 17, RULE 132 OF THE RULES OF COURT. (PP. V. KEMPIS,
221 SCRA 628, MAY 10, 1993)
15.WHEN A PARTY INVOKES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AS A DEFENSE BUT CROSSEXAMINED THE WITNESSES OF THE ADVERSE PARTY ON THE ALLEGED ORAL
CONTRACT, WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF SAID CROSS-EXAMINATION?
ANSWER: THE CROSS EXAMINATION ON THE CONTRACT IS DEEMED A WAIVER OF

THE DEFENSE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. THE ORAL TESTIMONY BECOMES
COMPETENT AND ADMISSIBLE. (LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING V. CA, 250 SCRA 523, DEC. 1,
1995)
16.AFTER THE PROSECUTION TESTIFIED, THE ACCUSED MOVED FOR DEFERMENT OF

HER CROSS-EXAMINATION. BEFORE THE SCHEDULED DATE OF HER CROSSEXAMINATION, THE WITNESS DIED. MUST HER TESTIMONY ON DIRECT EXAMINATION
BE EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORDS?
ANSWER: NO. WHERE DEATH PREVENTS CROSS-EXAMINATION UNDER SUCH

CIRCUMSTANCES THAT NO RESPONSIBILITY OF ANY SORT CAN BE ASCRIBED TO THE
PLAINTIFF OR WITNESS, IT SEEMS A HARSH MEASURE TO STRIKE OUT ALL THAT HAS
OBTAINED IN THE DIRECT EXAMINATION. BESIDES BEING MERE OPPORTUNITY AND
NOT ACTUAL CROSS-EXAMINATION IS THE ESSENCE OF THE RIGHT TO CROSSEXAMINE. ACCUSED LOST SUCH OPPORTUNITY WHEN THEY SOUGHT THE
DEFERMENT OF THEIR CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS, AND THEY ONLY HAVE
THEMSELVES TO BLAME IN FOREVER LOSING THAT RIGHT BY REASON OF HER
DEMISE.(PP. V. NARCA, 275 SCRA 696, JULY 21, 1997)
17.AMONG THE WITNESSES IN THE KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM CASE WAS THE VICTIM
WHO WAS 6 YEARS OLD WHEN SHE TESTIFIED. AFTER THEIR CONVICTION, ACCUSED
CLAIMED THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CHILD
UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF AN OATH AND THE NEED TO TELL THE TRUTH WHEN
SHE TESTIFIED. SHOULD THE TESTIMONY BE EXCLUDED?
ANSWER: NO. SEC. 1, RULE 132 PROVIDES THAT THE EXAMINATION OF THE CHILD
WITNESS SHALL BE UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION. IN THIS CASE, THE 6 YEAR OLD
CHILD TOOK AN OATH BEFORE SHE TESTIFIED. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION ON THE
PART OF THE ACCUSED TO HER COMPETENCE; HE DID NOT BOTHER REQUESTING
THE COURT FRO LEAVE TO QUESTION THE CHILD ON THIS SUBJECT. IT WAS TOO
LATE TO RAISE THE ISSUE THEN. (PEOPLE V. BISDA, 406 SCRA 454, JULY 16, 2003)
18.TO PROVE THAT SHE WAS THE NATURAL CHILD OF A CERTAIN VICENTE PUERTA,
WHO WAS LAWFULLY MARRIED TO GENOVEVA PUERTA, AND A CERTAIN GLORIA
AUSTRA, CARMELITA PUERTA PRESENTED PICTURES,SCHOOL RECORDS, AND
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS OF VICENTE PUERTA. THE ADVERSE PARTY, FOR HER PART,
PRESENTED WITNESSES THAT GLORIA AUSTRIAL COHABITED AS HUSBAND AND WIFE
WITH A CERTAIN JUANITO AUSTRAL.
CONSIDERING THE PRESUMPTION THAT A MAN AND A WOMAN DEPORTING

THEMSELVES AS HUSBAND AND WIFE HAVE ENTERED INTO A LAWFUL CONTRACT OF
MARRIAGE, SHOULD CARMELITA BE CONSIDERED AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF
GLORIA AND JUANITO IN LINE WITH ART. 255 OF THE CIVIL CODE THAT CHILDREN
BORN DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE ARE PRESUMED LEGITIMATE?
ANSWER: NO. THE PRESUMPTION IS MERELY DISPUTABLE AND MAY BE REFUTED

WITH EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. (DE LA PUERTA V. CA, 181 SCRA 861, FEB. 6, 1990)
19.MACAGALING WAS CHARGED WITH ILLEGALLY POSSESSING AN UNLICENSED

FIREARM.THE PROSECUTION DID NOT OBTAIN A CERTIFICATION FROM THE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVE OFFICE THAT HE HAD NO LICENSE.UNDER SEC. 2, RULE
131 OF THE 1964 RULES ON EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IT WAS PROVIDED THAT: IN
CRIMINAL CASES THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO THE OFFENSE LIES ON THE
PROSECUTION. A NEGATIVE FACT ALLEGED BY THE PROSECUTION NEED NOT BE
PROVED UNLESS IT IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
UNDER THE REVISED RULES HOWEVER, THE SECOND SENTENCE WAS DELETED.
WITH THE OMISSION, MUST THE PROSECUTION STILL PROVE THAT THE
ACCUSED HAD NOT LICENSE TO POSSESS THE FIREARM?
ANSWER: YES. DESPITE THE AMENDMENT, THERE IS NO REASON T BELIEVE THAT

SUCH REQUIREMENT FOR PROOF OF A NEGATIVE ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
CHANGED HAS BEEN DISPENSED WITH, SINCE IT IS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED IN SEC. 1
RULE 131 OF THE NEW RULES OF EVIDENCE THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS THE
DUTY OF A PARTY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE FACTS IN ISSUE IS NECESSARY TO
ESTABLISH HIS CLAIM OR DEFENSE BY THE AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED BY
LAW. (PP. V. MACAGALING, 237 SCRA 299, OCT. 3, 1994).
20. WHEN THE ALLEGED FORGED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED CAN
FORGERY BE PROVED WITH THE USE OF A PHOTOCOPY AS BASIS FOR COMPARISON?
ANSWER: NO. BASIC IS THE RULE IN EVIDENCE THAT WHEN THE SUBJECT OF
INQUIRY IS THE CONTENTS OF A DOCUMENT, NO EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE OTHER
THAN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ITSELF EXCEPT IN THE INSTANCES MENTIONED IN
SEC. 3, RULE 130. MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF DOCUMENTS ARE INADMISSIBLE PURSUANT
TO THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE.(HEIRS OF GREGORIO V. CA, 300 SCRA 565, DEC. 29, 1998)
LILIBETH
SUNGA-CHAN
and
CECILIA
SUNGA
vs.
LAMBERTO
T.
CHUA
FACTS:
A civil case was filed by Lamberto Chua against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and
Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L.
Sunga(hereafter Jacinto), for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of
Shares
and
Damages.
Respondent alleged that he and the deceased Jacinto have entered into a partnership made orally for the
distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). Upon the death of Jacinto, his wife and daughter
took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's
consent.
Respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership.
Petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his
witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this
argument,
petitioners
invoke
the
Dead
Man's
Statute'
or
"Survivorship
Rule.
ISSUE
Applicability
of
dead
man
statute
RULING:
We are not persuaded. Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignors of parties
to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind."
Before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary
that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a
person
of
unsound
mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against
person
of
unsound
mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or
before
such
person
became
of
unsound
mind.
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the trial court,
and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the
ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator
or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to
occurrences
before
the
death
of
the
deceased
to
defeat
the
counterclaim.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that
she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records
show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership
between
respondent
and
Jacinto.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.
People
of
the
Philippines
vs
Lazarte
Facts
On October 14,1986 an information for murder of one Nonito Jambunganan y Hundana against Antonio
Lazarte, Ricardo Ignacio , Rodolfo Mundido and Eliseo Henares who are also known for their nicknames "
Tony, Ric, Su-ay/Suway, and Junior" accordingly , of which are the names mentioned by the deceased
when asked by Lorenzo Lara prior to the victim's death as to who stabbed him,and on the sole account of
the deductions or conclusion of Lara upon the former's dying declaration, hence it was filed.
Only Lazarte and Ignacio were apprehended, the latter was acquitted for demurer of evidence. The other
two remain at large.
The defendant denied knowing the deceased and contended that on the night of the event he was at home
taking care of his sick child while his wife was on a night shift duty which was affirmed by the latter. His
testimony was corroborated by one Teodora Damanhog, a faith healer who was asked by the defendant to
cure his child, and stayed at the defendant's home until one o'clock dawn. The same was corroborated with
the testimony of Fortunata Abe and her daughter, that on or about 11:45 in the evening of October 8, 1986
while on their way home they witnessed a person being stabbed several times by Miguel, in addition to
Fortunata's testimony, Reynaldo de Paz also testified that in between 11 to 12 in the evening of the same
date,he saw from afar at about 10 meters that a certain Miguel was stabbing a person 3 times.
Noberto Lazarte, the brother of of the defendant also testified that on that night almost of the the same time
Miguel knocked at the door, sought for his permission to sleep with the accompaniment of the following
statement "nakadisgrasya ako."
The regional court of pasig metro manila was not convinced of the testimonies of the witnesses presented
of the defense. Hence the case was elevated on appeal.
Issue
The weight given to the dying declaration vs the alibi and the testimonies of the witnesses of the defense.
Ruling
The court ruled in favor of the accused-reversed the decision of the trial court-hence the accused-appellant
was acquitted.
The court cited that, the inadmissibility of a hearsay evidence admits certain exceptions, wherein in the
case at bar, the trial court relied its judgment solely on the the dying declaration of the deceased which was
testified by Lorenzo Lara. Such exception is deemed admissible provided that it is attended with the
requisites as provided on Section 37 of Rule 130.
In this case the prosecution failed to established that the victim was conscious of his imminent death while
relaying the statement to Lara. Consciousness of the declarant of an impending death is essential,
regardless of the fact that death supervenes, hence his ante mortem statement does not constitute a dying
declaration.
The court further stated that courts should not only determine the admissibility of the evidence but also to
appreciate the weight of the oral dying declaration without prejudice to the evidence that the defense will
present. No other evidences were presented other than the dying declaration. The state should rely on the
strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
0505 : December 4, 1990.]

192 SCRA 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM,DefendantAppellant.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987, convicting Mario
Tandoy of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, is before us on appeal.
The information against the accused-appellant read as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without being authorized by law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering
tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which
are prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.
Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero
rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which declared:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Mario Tandoy y Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sec. 4, Art. II, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 and cost.: nad
The marijuana confiscated in this case is declared confiscated and forfeited and ordered turned over
to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
despite lack of evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely
a xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de
la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao
Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St.,
Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone
near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said
without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and
there two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning AntiNarcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the
accused-appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and
crushed leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for
investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having been
informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1 Microscopic, chemical and
chromotographic examination was performed on the confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic
chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later testified that the findings were positive. The
marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2
As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a different story. His testimony was that from 1:30 to 4:00
p.m. of the day in question, he was playing "cara y cruz" with 15 other persons along Solchuaga St. when
somebody suddenly said that policemen were making arrests. The players grabbed the bet money and
scampered. However, he and a certain Danny (another "cara y cruz" player) were caught and taken to the
Narcotics Command headquarters in Makati. There they were mauled and warned that if they did not point
to their fellow pushers, they would rot in jail. The accused-appellant denied he had sold marijuana to
Singayan and insisted the bills taken from him were the bet money he had grabbed at the "cara y cruz"
game. 3
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to listen to their
respective testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the arresting officers. Applying the
presumption that they had performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated
allegation that he had been manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient evidence of his
charges, let alone his admission that he had no quarrel with the peace officers whom he had met only on the
day of his arrest.
In People v. Patog, 4 this Court held:
When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.
Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to another who is a total stranger until the seller
is certain of the identity of the buyer."
The conjecture must be rejected.: nad
In People v. Paco, 5 this Court observed:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the
illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the
presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors
may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers
caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA
329; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People
vs. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140
SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).
As the Court has also held, "What matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller but
their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves." 6
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the
admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:
This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A)
which, according to the appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.
Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary document falling under
Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence
except in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing
its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of
the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the
police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an
exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his
guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge of drug
addiction upon our people.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against the accused-appellant.: nad
SO ORDERED
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Endnotes
1. TSN, October 1, 1986; TSN, November 19, 1986; TSN, January 7, 1987.
2. Exhibit "D."
3. TSN, February 16, 1987, p. 6; Exhibit "E."
4. 144 SCRA 429.
5. 170 SCRA 681.
6. People v. Rodriguez y Teves, 172 SCRA 742.

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#1 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEM IN EVIDENCE

#2 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

#3 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

#4 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

# 5 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

# 6 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

Elaborating thus, we have held that:

# 7 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

# 8 SAMPLE CASE PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE

What is a judicial admission? When is it mandatory? Discretionary? And when is

When is Previous Conduct as Evidence admissible and when is it not

ANSWER: 4. Previous Conduct as Evidence

sample questions with answers

In People v. Naerta,[i][10] this Court held that:

1.How is evidence defined under the Rules of Court.

7.Explain the parole evidence rule.

Explain how the following objections shall be used in court trials:

sample questions in evidence with answers

sample questions with answers

2.WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND EXTENT OF RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION? ARE

3. AFTER A WITNESS IS EXAMINED BY BOTH SIDES, CAN THE WITNESS BE RECALLED ?

4. IF A WITNESS MADE A STATEMENT IN WRITING WHICH IS INCONSISTENT, HOW CAN

SEC. 13.HOW WITNESS IMPEACHED BY EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.

SEC. 21.WHEN EVIDENCE OF AUTHENTICITY OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT NOT NECESSARY.

6. UNDER WHAT SITUATIONS ARE LEADING QUESTIONS ALLOWED? HOW ABOUT

SEC. 10.LEADING AND MISLEADING QUESTIONS. A QUESTION WHICH SUGGESTS TO

(A)ON CROSS EXAMINATION;

(B)ON PRELIMINARY MATTERS;

(C)WHEN THERE IS A DIFFICULTY IS GETTING DIRECT AND INTELLIGIBLE ANSWERS

(D)OF AN UNWILLING OR HOSTILE WITNESS; OR

(E)OF A WITNESS WHO IS AN ADVERSE PARTY OR AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR

A MISLEADING QUESTION IS ONE WHICH ASSUMES AS TRUE A FACT NOT YET

7. IS EVIDENCE OF GOOD CHARACTER OF A WITNESS ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN

SEC. 14.EVIDENCE OF GOOD CHARACTER OF WITNESS. EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD

8.HOW DO YOU PROVE THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF A PRIVATE

ANSWER: SEC. 20.PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT. BEFORE ANY PRIVATE DOCUMENT

(A)BY ANYONE WHO SAW THE DOCUMENT EXECUTED OR WRITTEN; ORCHANROBLES

(B)BY EVIDENCE OF THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OR HANDWRITING OF

ANY OTHER PRIVATE DOCUMENT NEED ONLY BE IDENTIFIED AS THAT WHICH IT IS

9. HOW DO YOU PROVE A FOREIGN MARRIAGE?

THE EXISTENCE OF THE FOREIGN LAW ON MARRIAGE AS A QUESTION OF

THE ALLEGED FOREIGN MARRIAGE BY CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

IS THE ACT OF THE JUDGE IN RECALLING THE WITNESS TO THE WITNESS

11. TO PROVE NEW YORK LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON DAMAGES, DEFENDANTS

12.THE DEED OF ASSIGNMENT THAT WAS INTRODUCED AS AN ANCIENT DOCUMENT

13.PETITIONER DY INTERVENED IN AN ACTION OVER THE OWNERSHIP OF TWO LOTS.

ANSWER: IN PROVING THAT DUE EXECUTION AND GENUINENESS OF PRIVATE

ANSWER: THE CROSS EXAMINATION ON THE CONTRACT IS DEEMED A WAIVER OF

16.AFTER THE PROSECUTION TESTIFIED, THE ACCUSED MOVED FOR DEFERMENT OF

ANSWER: NO. WHERE DEATH PREVENTS CROSS-EXAMINATION UNDER SUCH

CONSIDERING THE PRESUMPTION THAT A MAN AND A WOMAN DEPORTING

ANSWER: NO. THE PRESUMPTION IS MERELY DISPUTABLE AND MAY BE REFUTED

19.MACAGALING WAS CHARGED WITH ILLEGALLY POSSESSING AN UNLICENSED

ANSWER: YES. DESPITE THE AMENDMENT, THERE IS NO REASON T BELIEVE THAT

0505 : December 4, 1990.]

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