CASE BRIEFS

Smith v. United States

Case Name: Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993)
Facts: Petitioner Smith and his companion went from Tennessee to Florida to buy cocaine.
There smith met his acquaintance Hoag who purchased cocaine for Smith and later
accompanied him and his companion to their motel room where they were joined by a drug
dealer. Petitioner had a MAC-10 firearm which is a criminal favorite that the dealer showed
interest in buying, however petitioner was already in the process of selling it to another buyer.
Hoag had contacts with law enforcement officials and this other buyer was an undercover who
promised to provided petitioner cocaine in exchange for MAC-10. The petitioner instead of
waiting for the buyer decided to leave his motel room carrying his gun bag. After being followed
and an eventual chase by the law enforcement officials he was apprehended. A search of his
van revealed the MAC-10 weapon, a silencer, ammunition, and a fast-feed mechanism. In
addition a MAC-11 machine gun, a loaded .45 caliber pistol, and a .22 caliber pistol with a scope
and handmade silence we found as well. Petitioner also had a loaded 9 millimeter handgun in
his waistband.
Procedural History: A grand jury in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida
charged the petitioner with among other offenses, two drug trafficking crimesconspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute and attempt to possess cocaine with intent to distribute
in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and 18 U.S.C. 2. Furthermore, the indictment
alleged that petitioner knowingly used the MAC10 and its silencer during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime. Under 18 U.S.C. 924 (c)(1), if a defendant uses a firearm, he must be s
sentenced to five years of incarceration, and, if the firearm is a machinegun or fitted with a
silencer, then he must be sentenced to 30 years of incarceration. The jury charged the petitioner
on all counts. Petitioner appealed and argued that 924 (c)(1)s penalty firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense covers only the situation in which the firearm is used as a
weapon and does not extend to defendants who use the firearm solely as a medium of
exchange. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.
Issue: Whether trading a firearm for drugs can constitute use of the firearm within the
meaning of 924(c)(1).
Holding (and Judgement): The Court held that the exchange of gun for narcotics constitutes
use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. 924(c)(1). Judgement affirmed.
Rule(s) of Law Applied: 924(c)(1), 924(d) (subsection of 924(c).)

Section 924(c)(1) requires the prosecution to make two showings. First, that the defendant
used or carried a firearm, and second, it must prove that the use or carrying was during and
in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Since, it is not clearly defined if
trading a firearm for drugs can constitute use of the firearm within the meaning of 924(c)(1),
Court referred to a subsection of statute, 924(d)(1) any firearm or ammunition intended to be
used in the various offenses listed in 924(d)(3) is subject to seizure and forfeiture. Consistent
with petitioners interpretation, 924(d)(3) lists offenses not only in which guns might be used as
offensive weapons but also, in which the firearm is not used as a weapon but instead as an item
or carter or commerce. Hence, it is clear from 924(d)(3) that one who transports, exports,
sells, or trades a firearm uses it within the meaning of 924(d)(1).
Courts Reasoning: Even though the intended purpose of a firearm is its use by firing it,
however, if it is used to whip someone, that would be considered a offensive use as well.
Similarly, the petitioner used his MAC-10 in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Even though
under 924(c)(1) there is uncertainty about the scope of the phrase usesa firearm, the
remainder of 924 appropriately sets it to rest. Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation,
similarly neither could be a single provision os a statute. Lastly, because 924(d)(1) includes
both using a firearm for trade and using a firearm as a weapon, it is most reasonable to construe
924(c)(1) as encompassing both of those uses as well.
Additional Case Opinions: JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE
SOUTHER, dissenting:
A fundamental principle of the statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that
the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in
which it is used. Particularly true of an elastic word like use with meanings ranging from to
partake of to to be wont or accustomed.
The Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and
how it ordinarily is used.
To speak of using a firearm is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a
weapon. One can use a firearm in many other ways such as, as a decoration or, scratching
ones head but that will not encompass the ordinary meaning of using.
Court refers to a subsection of the statute, 924(d), which does not employ the phrase uses
a firearm, but provides for the confiscation of firearms that are used in referenced offenses
which include the crimes of transferring, selling, or transporting firearms in interstate commerce.
From this, the Court concludes that use of a firearm must include nonweapon use.

 924(c)(1) provides increased penalties not only for one who uses a firearm in relation to
a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence, but also for one who carries it. This in turn
produces an eminently reasonable dichotomy between using a firearm (as a weapon) and
carrying a firearm (carrying it in such a manner as to be ready for use as weapon).
Comments/Questions: I am in a limbo regarding this particular case. For me what constitutes a
use depends on a particular situation. In this case, even though the petitioner was not using the
firearm and was taking it for barter, I have no doubt that had the situation presented itself that
warranted an active use, he would have done so. Making way for known criminals to carry
firearms under the excuse of not being actively use poses a safety threat to other civilians,
hence, I agree with the Courts decision in this particular instance.
Bailey v. United States
Case Name: Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995)
Facts: In May 1989, Petitioner Bailey was stopped by police for a missing front license plate and
a missing inspection sticker. When the petitioner failed to produce a drivers license, he was
asked to step out during which he was seen hiding something between the seat and front
console. A passenger compartment search revealed one round of ammunition and 27 plastic
bags containing a total of 30 grams of cocaine. A further search of the trunk after the petitioners
arrest produced a large amount of cash and a bag containing loaded 9-mm. pistol.
Procedural History: Bailey was charged with several counts, including using and carrying a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). Petitioner was convicted by jury on all charges, with
his sentence including a 60 month term of imprisonment on the 924(c)(1) conviction. The
Court of Appeals rejected petitioners claim of evidence being insufficient to support his
conviction under 924(c)(1). Judge Douglas H. Ginsberg, dissented in part and referred to
United States v. Robinson, 997 F.2d 884 (C.A.D.C. 1993) as precedent, claiming that a reversal
of Baileys conviction was required. This caused inconsistencies among Courts decisions
applying 924(c)(1), hence, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
consolidated the two cases and reheard them en banc. The majority held that, one violates [
924(c)(1)], whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or ones
agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a drug crime. Applying these new
standards, convictions of both Bailey and Robinson were affirmed.
Issue: Whether evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug
proceeds is alone sufficient to support a conviction for use of a firearm during and in relation to
a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. 924 (c)(1).

Holding (and Judgement): Mere possession does not amount to use: 924(c)(1) requires
evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant,a use that
makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense. Judgement reversed
for both cases.
Because the Court of Appeals did not consider liability under the carry prong of 924(c)(1) for
Bailey or Robinson, Court remanded for consideration of that basis for upholding the
convictions.
Rule(s) of Law Applied: 924(c)(1) was challenged, as the Government was required to show
under this statue that the defendant actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the
predicate crime.
Courts Reasoning: Having determined that use denotes active employment, it must be
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support either Baileys or Robisons conviction
for use under 924(c)(1). There was no evidence that Bailey actively employed the fire arm in
any way. Similarly, in Robinsons case, the unloaded, holstered firearm that provided the basis
for her 924(c)(1) conviction was found locked in a footlocker in a bedroom closet. Hence, no
proof of active employment there as well.
Additional Case Opinions: JUDGE WALD, dissenting. JUDGE WILLIAMS, joined by
JUDGES SILBERMAN and BUCKLEY, also dissented.
Use under 924(c)(1) denotes active employment of the firearm rather than possession
with a contingent intent to use. The language, context, and history of 924(c)(1) indicates that
the Government must show active employment of the firearm.
The Court of Appeals erred in its standard for evaluating whether the involvement of a firearm
amounted to something more than mere possession. Its proximity and accessibility standard
provides almost no limitation on the kind of possession that would be criminalized; in practice,
nearly every possession of a firearm by a person engaged in drug trafficking would satisfy the
standard, thus erasing the line drawn by the Statutes, and the Courts.
It is assumed that Congress used two terms use and carry because it intended each
term to have a particular, non superfluous meaning. A firearm can be used without being carried
and vice-versa.
The original version of 924(c) read:
(c) Whoever
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony ***

Here, the phrase uses to commit indicated that the Congress originally intended to reach a
situation where the firearm was actively employed during the commission of the crime.
No evidence to show that the Congress intended to expand use so far as to swallow
carry.
Use includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and firing, or attempting to
fire, a firearm. However, use takes on different meanings depending on context.
Use is not synonymous with possession, therefore, a defendant cannot be charged
under 924(c)(1) merely for storing a weapon near drugs or drug proceeds.
Comments/Questions: I feel there is a difference between having a weapon locked away in
your home somewhere v. carrying a weapon in the trunk of your car. A weapon at home could
be expected from any individual to have for general protection agains unforeseen threats,
however, having a weapon in the trunk of your car usually implies that an individual is already
involved in some wrong doing. I might not view the two cases with the same outlook.
Watson v. United States
Case Name: Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 128 S.Ct. 579, 169 L.Ed. 2d 472 (2007)
Facts: The petitioner Watson, told a Government informant about wanting to acquire a gun. The
informant suggested Watson that instead of money he could pay in narcotics, upon which
Watson met with the informant and an undercover law enforcement agent posing as a firearms
dealer, to whom he gave 24 doses of oxycodone hydrochloride for a .50 caliber semiautomatic
pistol. Watson was eventually arrested, the pistol was found in his car, and a later search of his
house revealed a cache of prescription medicines, guns, and ammunition. Watson claimed to
have bought the gun in order to protect his other firearms and drugs.
Procedural History: The petitioner was indicted by a federal grand jury for distributing a
Schedule II controlled substance and for using the pistol during and in relation to that crime, in
violation of 924(c)(1). Petitioner pleaded guilty across the board, reserving the right to
challenge the factual basis for a 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and the added consecutive sentence
of 60 months for using the gun. The Court of Appeals affirmed, on Circuit precedents of Smith
and Bailey.
Issue: Whether a person who trades his drugs for a gun uses a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A).

Holding (and Judgement): The Court held that a person does not use a firearm under
924(c)(1)(A) when he receives it in trade for drugs. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was
reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion.
Rule(s) of Law Applied: (924)(c)(1)(A) was challenged but not applied. It was amended after
Bailey and now prohibits not only using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime, but also possessing one in furtherance of such a crime. However, a person does not
use a firearm under this statute if he receives it in trade for drugs.
Courts Reasoning: The Governments position that Watson used the pistol under 924(c)
(1)(A) by receiving it for narcotics lacks authority in either precedent or regular English. Neither
Smith nor Bailey implicitly decides the case. In Smith, the case only refers to the trader who
swaps his gun for drugs but not the trading partner. In Bailey, to satisfy 924(c)(1), the gun
must be actively used. It cannot be said if Watson used the gun at all, Bailey doesn't answer it
either. When Watson traded drugs for gun, it was the informant/agent who used the pistol like
in Smith but not Watson, the government over-read Smith as it does not tell us whether both
parties to a transfer use the gun, or only one, or which one. There is limited malleability in the
language Smith construed, and policy-driven symmetry cannot turn receipt in trade into use.
Additional Case Opinions: JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.
Distinguishing between trading a gun for drugs and vice-versa, for purposes of the 18 U.S.C.
924(c)(1) makes scant sense.
Joining in the Courts judgement, as persuaded that the Court took a wrong turn in Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1993), when it held that trading
a gun for drugs fits within 924(c)(1)s compass as use of a firearm during and in relation to
any drug trafficking crime.
Agreeing with JUSTICE SCALIAS dissenting opinion in Smith, 508 U.S., at 241, 113 S.Ct.
2050, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138, would also read the word use in 924(c)(1) to mean as a weapon,
not use in a bartering transaction.
Would overrule Smith, and thereby render our precedent both coherent and consistent with
normal usage.
Comments/Questions: I agree with the Courts opinion as well as overruling of Smith, however,
I view it as a double edged sword. This ruling might make it a lot easier for criminals to carry
weapons without worrying about facing the consequences and in turn will be a bigger security
risk.

Since, this case is a few years old, it will be interesting to see if actually it did happen, via a
follow up.