Montara Oil Spill Case

AFTER THE SPILL
Investigating Australias Montara

oil disaster in Indonesia
About us
The Australian Lawyers Alliance is a national association of lawyers, academics and other
professionals, dedicated to protecting and promoting justice, freedom and the rights of the individual.
We receive no government funding and are funded entirely by our members.
www.lawyersalliance.com.au
Copyright Australian Lawyers Alliance, July 2015.
Copyright in this material is retained by the publisher, ALA Ltd. No part of this material may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without permission
in writing from the publisher, ALA Ltd.
For media enquiries, please contact Nick Buchan, Media Manager at nick@lawyersalliance.com.au
or (02) 9258 7700. For further information about this report, contact Emily Mitchell, Legal and Policy
Officer at emily@lawyersalliance.com.au or (02) 9258 7700.
Acknowledgements
Author: Emily Mitchell
Design: Tianli Zu
Cover image: Boys in Oesapa fishing village, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance.
Images: AAP One, Brooke Nolan, Bright Day Films, Kristen Roy, Office of Senator Rachel Siewert,
MapsoftheWorld.Com, West Timor Care Foundation.
The Australian Lawyers Alliance acknowledges the independent contributions of lawyers, researchers
and West Timor Care Foundation to this publication and thanks all people interviewed in Indonesia.
We also acknowledge the dedicated efforts of Ferdi Tanoni, Chairman of the West Timor Care
Foundation, for his tireless advocacy for Indonesian communities claiming to be affected by the
Montara spill. In 2012, Mr Tanoni was presented with the Australian Lawyers Alliance National Civil
Justice Award in recognition of his work.
Disclaimer
This report has attempted at all times to represent factual information. The Australian Lawyers Alliance
acknowledges both the geographic and linguistic limitations in accurately assessing the full extent of
information. The single most important conclusion to this report is that there is also an obvious need
for further scientific research.
In this report, we have chosen to focus on adverse impacts reported in Indonesia, rather than
environmental impacts in Australian waters. We acknowledge the experience, expertise and advocacy
of non-government environmental organisations on this issue in Australia.
This report focuses on investigating issues relating to transboundary damage in Indonesia, rather
than reiterating the findings of the Montara Commission of Inquiry; the full response undertaken by
the Australian government to the Montara oil spill; or providing an overview of associated legislative
change that has since occurred.
Research was conducted in West Timor by the Australian Lawyers Alliance between 13 19 August
2013 and 26 October 3 November 2014 in West Timor and Rote Island, Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT),
Indonesia. Fieldwork research for this report was collated with the assistance of the West Timor Care
Foundation.
Figure 1: Kupang, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
Foreword
In August 2013 and October 2014, representatives of the Australian Lawyers Alliance travelled to Nusa
Tenggara Timur, the closest Indonesian province to Australia.
We travelled there to see and hear first-hand what had happened to individuals and their communities,
following reports from local communities of impacts that were sustained during and after Australias
Montara oil disaster.
This report also draws on the independent work of lawyers and researchers who have travelled to the
region and media reports.
The evidence we have collated points to a larger environmental and social disaster than has been
officially acknowledged by the Australian government or the polluting company PTTEP Australasia.
To date, there has not been a full, comprehensive, independent study examining the scale of the
damage of the Montara oil spill in Indonesian waters and upon Indonesian communities that has been
accepted by the Australian government or PTTEP Australasia.
Thousands of people have struggled to make a living and educate their children following devastation
of their livelihoods. Their plight has been ignored.
The Australian Lawyers Alliance calls upon the Australian government to facilitate the negotiation
of a full, independent study of the affected areas, with the mutual agreement of the governments of
Indonesian, Timor Leste and the agents of those affected.
This report does not and cannot provide a complete overview of the story of the Montara oil spill and
all the stories of people affected. There is far more yet to be discovered.
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Australian Lawyers Alliance
Executive summary
About the spill
The Montara oil spill was the worst oil spill in the history of the Australian offshore petroleum industry.1
The spill commenced on 21 August 2009, when the Montara wellhead, operated by oil company
PTTEP Australasia, began spewing oil into Australian waters in the Timor Sea. Oil flowed unabated
for 74 days until 3 November 2009. The total amount of spilled oil is unknown, with estimates ranging
from 400 to 1,500 or 2,000 barrels of oil per day. The total volume of the spill could therefore be
estimated between 4,750 tonnes and 23,630 tonnes.2
During the response to the spill, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) sprayed 184,135
litres of dispersants onto the seas surface in an attempt to disperse the oil. AMSAs response included
seven types of dispersants, some of which are now known to be toxic. Two of those dispersants,
Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A, have since been found by scientists to amplify the toxicity of oil 52
times. Of the total dispersants used, only one is approved for future use in Australia.
Geographical extent of reports of damage
Communities in the closest Indonesian province to Australia, Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) claim to have
been severely impacted following the spill.
Adverse effects have been reported in West Timor in the villages of Oesapa, Tablolong, Lifuleo; the
West Timorese regencies of Belu, South Central Timor, North Central Timor and the sub-district of
Kefamenanu.
The island of Rote has been particularly affected, with villagers from Daiama, Pepela, Oenggaut,
Oeseli, Londalusi, Oebou, Tesebela and the islands of Landu and Usu also reporting experiencing
damage to their seaweed farms, fishing or human health or witnessing oil or tarballs.
Damage to the seaweed industry has also been reported on Semau Island, approximately 3 kilometres
from Kupang with a population of approximately 13,000 people.3
Damage has also been reported in Lembata Island, 190 kilometres north of Kupang, and in the Sabu
Raijua islands, which lie west of Rote Island across the Sabu Sea. The islands of Alor, Sumba and
Flores may also have been affected.
Damage has also been reported in Timor Leste; the enclave of Oecusse is located proximate to West
Timors coast.
Damage reported
Communities say that in 2009 they saw oil washing into seaweed farms, onto beaches, onto the hulls
of boats, and fouling fishing grounds and trawler nets. Witnesses described coral turning white; the
precious farmed seaweed turning yellow, then white and falling off its ropes, destroyed.
Communities described the white sickness that later appeared on the seaweed and which worsened
with specific currents. Fishermen said that there are no longer any fish to catch in fishing grounds
which they have fished for years. The death of mangroves removed a crucial bulwark to the ocean and
there was subsequent flooding of villages.
4
Some communities also experienced adverse impacts on public health, including skin conditions,
such as rashes, pus-filled cysts and inexplicable bruising following exposure to the ocean. Incidences
of food poisoning were also reported in the spills aftermath. Communities now fear for the health,
livelihoods and futures of themselves and their children.
Indonesias Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies has estimated that the economic loss to the
fishing and seaweed industries in NTT amounts to approximately AU$1.5 billion per year since 2009.4
Many young people across NTT have been withdrawn from education due to financial pressures
associated with the spill. In some cases, villagers have banded together and contributed their own
savings in the face of financial struggle to attempt to keep the children of their fellow villagers in
university.
It is also worth examining if, in the aftermath of the spill, there was an increase in of the number of
unemployed NTT fishermen and seaweed farmers recruited as crew on boats carrying asylum seekers
to Australia as a means of earning an income.
The extent of environmental damage associated with the spill is yet unknown. Reports of dead
seagrass and mangroves; decreased fish stock; dead whales washed up on the Indonesian coast;
and vanished dolphin pods, all indicate that there may have been extensive impacts across the ecosystem. However, to this day, no proper analysis or remediation of the environment has occurred.
Investigations
To date, studies have been undertaken by Indonesian officials indicating that there have been severe
impacts in Indonesia following the Montara oil spill. However, there is yet to be a comprehensive
investigation within Indonesian territory of the geographical spread of hydrocarbons and dispersants
from the Montara spill, or its associated impacts, that is accepted by the Australian government or
PTTEP Australasia.
The Montara Commission of Inquiry, established by the Australian government, noted in 2010 that
evidence before the Inquiry indicated that hydrocarbons entered Indonesian and Timor Leste waters
to a significant degree.5 However, the terms of reference for the Commission of Inquiry did not include
transboundary damage.
Research commissioned by the company responsible for the spill, PTTEP Australasia, a subsidiary
of Thai-state owned oil and gas company PTT, found that oil never reached the Indonesian coast.
However, these findings contradict the many eyewitness accounts of oil that our investigations
uncovered in NTT.
Data
The data relied on by PTTEP Australasia to assert that the oil never reached the Indonesian coast
contains significant deficiencies.
Observations of the spread of the oil via overflight may not have been adequate, as the planes did not
travel close to the coast of Rote, or into the Sabu Sea. Similarly, the form of satellite imagery utilised
did not involve radar, which would have been more accurate in observing the oil.
5
What has happened to resolve the issue

More than five years after the spill, there has been no remediation of areas claiming to be affected.
To date, no compensation or assistance has been paid to any of the communities asserting to have
been affected.
Other than Senator Rachel Siewert of the Australian Greens, no Australian parliamentarian has visited
NTT to satisfy themselves as to the impact of the spill.
The Montara Commission of Inquiry
The Montara Commission of Inquiry held that the polluting company, PTTEP Australasia, did not come
within a bulls roar of sensible oilfield practice.6 The Inquiry further noted that PTTEP Australasia did
not observe sensible oilfield practices at the Montara oil field. Major shortcomings in the companys
procedures were widespread and systemic, directly leading to the blowout.7
The Commission found that the authority to whom regulation was delegated, the Northern Territory
Department of Resources, was not a sufficiently diligent regulatorit also adopted a minimalist
approach to its regulatory responsibilities. The way the regulator conducted its responsibilities gave it
little chance of discovering PTTEP Australasias poor practices.8
Following the Montara Commission of Inquiry, a national regulator was appointed: the National
Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environment Management Authority (NOPSEMA). NOPSEMAs
prosecution of PTTEP Australasia resulted in a $510,000 fine in August 2012. Legislative change has
since strengthened penalties.
PTTEP Australasias actions
PTTEP Australasia has funded research assessing impacts within Australian waters of the Timor Sea.
However, no research has examined reports of significant damage in Indonesian waters. The Australian
government has not yet facilitated or negotiated for such research to occur and ignores calls from the
region to do so.
Further exploration licences have since been granted to the polluting company, allowing expansion of
its activities in the Timor Sea.
In March 2014, reports emerged that PTTEP Australasia was hoping to sell its assets in the Montara
field for $2 billion.
PTTEP Australasia continues to assert that evidence of damage in Indonesia is unverifiable.
The Indonesian government
In 2010, the Indonesian government requested compensation from PTTEP Australasia for damage.
In September 2014, the Indonesian government wrote to the Australian government, requesting
the Australian government to encourage PTTEP Australasia for the solution of Montaras case and
pending the negotiation.9
The Indonesian government also recognised the efforts of Indonesian non-government organisation
West Timor Care Foundation (WTCF), who has acknowledged its readiness to conduct a scientific
6
study with PTTEP AA to determine the social, economic and environmental impact of the Montara oil
spills in Indonesian water[s].10
The Australian government
The Australian government has not, at any stage, required that PTTEP Australasia take any action to
ensure that Indonesia was not adversely affected by the spill. Instead, the Australian government has
continued to assert that any negotiations must be between the Indonesian government and PTTEP
Australasia.
The Australian government and PTTEP Australasia have continued to rely on two studies funded by
PTTEP Australasia in asserting that the oil did not reach the Indonesian coast.
In fact, while the Australian government has worked with PTTEP Australasia to commission studies
within Australian waters, there does not appear, at any time, to have been significant pressure exerted
by the Australian government upon PTTEP Australasia to investigate, remediate, or negotiate in good
faith regarding claims of damage emanating from Indonesia.
No attempt has been made by the Australian government to assist Indonesian communities and
governments towards investigation, remediation, financial assistance or justice. The Australian
governments official position on Montara is that it is beyond the Australian governments jurisdiction
to compel a titleholder to perform any investigative or monitoring activities in the waters of another
country.11 This stands in contrast to international obligations on transboundary damage.
A contrast to BP Deepwater Horizon spill
The Australian governments response stands in stark contrast to the response by US President
Barack Obama to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon spill, the worst oil spill in US history, which
occurred just months after Montara in April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico. President Obama imposed a
six month moratorium on deepwater drilling and ensured that $20 billion was paid as a down-payment
by BP soon after the spill began.
Thousands of claimants continue to make claims for economic loss and personal injury. In 2014, BP
was found to have been grossly negligent. In July 2015, a $USD18.7 billion agreement was reached
with BP to settle civil claims. At time of writing, the settlement requires court approval.
Scientists also continue to make significant findings regarding the toxic impacts of hydrocarbon
exposure and dispersant application on the environment and public health in the Gulf of Mexico.
These findings would be relevant to consider in assessing the impact of the Montara spill in Indonesia,
especially considering that some of the same dispersants were used.
A contrast to the PTT Gulf of Thailand spill
Subsidiaries of PTTEP Australasias parent company, PTT, have since been implicated in a major
spill in the Gulf of Thailand, in the heartland of Thailands fishing industry near idyllic tourist island Ko
Samet.
Affected citizens are now taking the case through the courts, following rejection of one-off payments
from the company to settle the case amounting to less than AUD$1,000 per person.
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Significance of NTT
The province of NTT was rated among the top five priority provinces in Indonesia for Australian aid in 2008.
The province is also geopolitically significant to Australia. Many citizens of NTT have been
apprehended or imprisoned in Australia for foreign fishing offences or people smuggling. The region
has also previously been a point of departure for boats travelling to Australia. Some vessels carrying
asylum seekers have also washed up on the shores of Rote Island, NTT after attempting to travel to
Australia and being pushed back by the Australian navy.
Global significance
The Montara oil spill and how the Australian government reacts to claims of damage in Indonesia is a
case of global significance.
The offshore exploration industry continues to expand internationally, however there is a clear lack of
international guidance in cases where transboundary damage emanates from the offshore industry.
In the future, climate change may also play a role in exacerbating risks of damage.
These risks are significant.
Transboundary damage is a serious issue that has the scope to threaten economies all over the world
and is an issue of regional and global security.
Australias opportunity
In Australia, the offshore exploration industry continues to expand, with activities occurring off the
coast of every state and territory.
Australia is uniquely placed to lead the conversation on offshore damage, as a nation with one of the
largest maritime domains in the world, a thriving offshore industry, heritage-listed marine environments
and a robust fisheries management regime.
Our response to Montara provides an opportunity for Australia to demonstrate global leadership.
Failure to act means that transboundary damage will have to take place in another jurisdiction before
real change at an international level begins.
What needs to happen
The Australian Lawyers Alliance calls for the Australian government to work with the governments of
Indonesia and Timor Leste, PTTEP Australasia, WTCF and affected communities towards resolution of
the issue.
This should include negotiating towards the commencement of an independent investigation of the
affected areas, to be funded by PTTEP Australasia, and to be conducted with the mutual agreement of
all parties involved, including the affected communities and their agents.
In light of the Indonesian governments 2014 request for assistance, the Australian government has the
responsibility to undertake appropriate action and to ensure that negotiations commence towards a
resolution.
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Contents
Executive summary............................................................................................................................... 4
Tables................................................................................................................................................... 14
Table of images.................................................................................................................................... 14
Abbreviations........................................................................................................................................ 18
Glossary............................................................................................................................................... 19
Report overview................................................................................................................................... 20
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 22
Chapter 1: Background to the Montara oil spill............................................................................ 25
1.1 Background.................................................................................................................................... 25
1.2 The blow out................................................................................................................................... 26
1.3 The response.................................................................................................................................. 29
1.4 The Montara Commission of Inquiry.............................................................................................. 29
1.4.1 Findings regarding Indonesia in the Commission of Inquiry report........................................ 30
1.4.2 Submissions from Indonesian organisations.......................................................................... 31
1.5 Australian workers.......................................................................................................................... 31
Chapter 2: Indonesia.......................................................................................................................... 33
2.1 Nusa Tenggara Timur..................................................................................................................... 33
2.2 Impacts reported in Indonesia........................................................................................................ 35
2.3 Eyewitness accounts of oil............................................................................................................. 36
2.4 Media reports of eyewitness accounts.......................................................................................... 38
2.4.1 Sightings of oil............................................................................................................................. 38
2.4.2 Dead fish..................................................................................................................................... 42
2.5 Timor-Leste.................................................................................................................................... 43
2.6 Anecdotal adverse impacts on human health................................................................................ 45
2.6.1 Skin conditions....................................................................................................................... 46
2.6.2 Food poisoning and diarrhoea............................................................................................... 58
2.6.3 Potential long term impacts on lipids and major organs........................................................ 59
2.7 Economic impacts.......................................................................................................................... 59
2.7.1 The plight of seaweed farmers............................................................................................... 60
2.7.1.1 Rote Island.................................................................................................................... 61
2.7.1.2 Oenggaut...................................................................................................................... 62
2.7.1.3 Daiama.......................................................................................................................... 64
2.7.1.3 Usu Island..................................................................................................................... 70
9
2.7.1.4 Tablolong, West Timor.................................................................................................. 71

2.7.1.5 Lembata Island............................................................................................................. 81
2.7.2 Fishing communities............................................................................................................... 82
2.7.2.1 West Timor.................................................................................................................... 83
2.7.2.2 Oesapa......................................................................................................................... 87
2.7.2.3 Evidence submitted to Montara Commission of Inquiry.............................................. 90
2.7.2.4 Australians affected in Indonesia.................................................................................. 91
2.8 Rote Island, provincial government report..................................................................................... 91
2.8.1 Fishing.................................................................................................................................... 92
2.8.2 Pearl farming.......................................................................................................................... 92
2.9 Lost education................................................................................................................................ 93
2.10 The local governments................................................................................................................. 95
2.11 Surfers and tourists?.................................................................................................................... 95
2.12 Ongoing stranding of whales....................................................................................................... 97
2.12.1 Triggering of research........................................................................................................... 99
2.13 Advocacy of the West Timor Care Foundation........................................................................... 100
2.13.1 Ferdi Tanoni........................................................................................................................ 100
2.13.2 Submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry........................................................... 101
2.13.3 Submission on the Draft Government Response to
the Montara Commission of Inquiry.............................................................................................. 101
2.13.4 Authority given for legal claim............................................................................................ 102
2.13.5 Recipient, Australian Lawyers Alliance Civil Justice Award............................................... 103
2.13.6 International seminar, Kupang............................................................................................ 105
2.13.7 Recognised by the Indonesian government....................................................................... 109
Chapter 3: Evidence to consider................................................................................................... 110

3.1 Overview of the conflicting evidence........................................................................................... 110
3.2 How much oil?.............................................................................................................................. 110
3.3 How far did the oil go?................................................................................................................. 114
3.4 Embassy discussions................................................................................................................... 115
3.5 Overflight maps............................................................................................................................ 116
3.5.1.1 Selectivity.......................................................................................................................... 123
3.5.1.2 Proximity to the Indonesian coastline................................................................................ 125
3.5.1.3 Recording of sheen .......................................................................................................... 126
3.5.1.4 Similarity to natural occurrences....................................................................................... 127
3.5.1.5 Wax and low concentrations............................................................................................. 127
3.5.1.6 Other challenges to observations...................................................................................... 128
10
3.6 Satellite images............................................................................................................................ 128

3.6.1 Analysing released satellite images...................................................................................... 128
3.6.2 MODIS satellite data............................................................................................................. 132
3.6.3 Use of radar.......................................................................................................................... 133
3.6.4 ALOS.................................................................................................................................... 133
3.6.5 Envisat.................................................................................................................................. 134
3.6.5 Further examination needed................................................................................................. 134
3.7 Studies relied upon in relevance to Indonesia.............................................................................. 135
3.7.1 The first study....................................................................................................................... 136
3.7.2 The second study................................................................................................................. 137
3.8 Scientific testing........................................................................................................................... 138
3.8.1 Leeder Consulting................................................................................................................ 138
3.8.2 Samples analysed in Indonesia............................................................................................ 139
Chapter 4: Dispersants.................................................................................................................... 145

4.1 The use of dispersants................................................................................................................. 145
4.2 Approval for future use................................................................................................................. 146
4.3 Ardrox 6120.................................................................................................................................. 147
4.4 Corexit products........................................................................................................................... 147
4.4.1 Corexit EC9527A.................................................................................................................. 148
4.4.2 Corexit EC9500A.................................................................................................................. 148
4.5 Use of Corexit in the Gulf of Mexico............................................................................................ 149
4.6 Effectiveness of dispersant.......................................................................................................... 151
4.6.1 Rainbow water...................................................................................................................... 153
4.6.2 Milky water........................................................................................................................... 153
4.6.3 What about underwater plumes?......................................................................................... 155
4.6.4 Did the oil sink?.................................................................................................................... 155
Chapter 5: The response to Montara............................................................................................ 157

5.1 PTTEP Australasia........................................................................................................................ 157
5.1.1 Public relations strategy....................................................................................................... 157
5.1.2 The Montara Action Plan...................................................................................................... 159
5.1.3 Penalties............................................................................................................................... 159
5.1.4 Approval of expansion of activities in the Timor Sea........................................................... 160
5.1.5 No verifiable evidence in Indonesia.................................................................................... 161
5.1.6 Contemporary response regarding Indonesia...................................................................... 161
5.1.7 Response to Lateline............................................................................................................ 162
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5.2 The Government of Indonesia...................................................................................................... 163

5.2.1 PTTEP AA and the Government of Indonesia...................................................................... 163
5.2.2 International Maritime Organisation Legal Committee......................................................... 164
5.2.3 The Indonesian governments request for assistance.......................................................... 164
5.3 The Australian Government.......................................................................................................... 165
5.3.1 Incomplete response............................................................................................................ 165
5.3.2 The 2014 response............................................................................................................... 166
5.3.3 Transboundary incidents and the National Plan................................................................... 167
5.3.4 Memorandum of Understanding on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response......................... 169
5.3.5 Historical response to the spill............................................................................................. 171
5.3.5.1 Show cause notice..................................................................................................... 171
5.3.5.2 Deed of Agreement between the Commonwealth and PTTEP AA............................. 172
5.3.5.3 Environmental monitoring........................................................................................... 173
5.3.5.4 Activation of the triggers............................................................................................. 174
5.3.6 Senator Siewerts advocacy................................................................................................. 176
5.3.7 A lack of action by the Australian government regarding reports in Indonesia.................... 177
Chapter 6: International considerations....................................................................................... 178

6.1 PTTGC, Gulf of Thailand, 2013.................................................................................................... 178
6.1.1 Claims for compensation...................................................................................................... 179
6.1.2 Complexities of expert evidence demonstrated .................................................................. 179
6.1.3 Reference to Montara........................................................................................................... 180
6.2 BP Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, 2010............................................................................. 180
6.2.1 US government response..................................................................................................... 180
6.2.2 Health warnings.................................................................................................................... 181
6.2.3 Compensation in the US...................................................................................................... 181
6.2.3.1 The Medical Benefits Settlement................................................................................ 181
6.2.3.2 The Economic and Property Damages Settlement.................................................... 182
6.2.4 Amount of oil........................................................................................................................ 183
6.2.5 Gross negligence.................................................................................................................. 183
6.2.6 Fines under the Clean Water Act.......................................................................................... 184
6.2.7 Environment still affected..................................................................................................... 184
6.3 A comparison............................................................................................................................... 185
6.3.1 Type of oil............................................................................................................................. 185
6.3.2 Remoteness.......................................................................................................................... 185
6.3.3 Access to technology........................................................................................................... 186
6.3.4 Public health......................................................................................................................... 186
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6.3.5 Fines..................................................................................................................................... 186

6.3.6 Economic loss...................................................................................................................... 186
6.4 International transboundary damage........................................................................................... 187
6.4.1 International instruments...................................................................................................... 187
6.4.2 The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea........................................................................... 187
6.4.3 Calls for change.................................................................................................................... 189
6.4.4 The Rio Declaration.............................................................................................................. 190
6.4.5 Common but differentiated responsibility............................................................................ 191
6.4.6 International change required............................................................................................... 193
Chapter 7: A co-operative approach in the Timor Sea............................................................. 195

7.1 Background.................................................................................................................................. 195
7.2 Lest we forget............................................................................................................................... 195
7.3 Links to the Australian aid program............................................................................................. 196
7.4 Indonesia, the Timor Sea and the Australian justice system........................................................ 197
7.4.1 The breaches of Indonesian waters...................................................................................... 198
7.4.2 The treatment of foreign fishers............................................................................................ 200
7.4.3 People smuggling................................................................................................................. 203
7.4.3.1 The treatment of minors............................................................................................. 204
7.4.4 Parliamentary inquiries......................................................................................................... 206
Chapter 8: The bigger picture security...................................................................................... 207

8.1 Future considerations................................................................................................................... 207
8.1.1 Regional insecurity............................................................................................................... 207
8.1.2 Overfishing............................................................................................................................ 208
8.1.3 Climate change..................................................................................................................... 208
8.2 Offshore petroleum industry......................................................................................................... 209
8.2.1 Long-term damage............................................................................................................... 209
8.2.2 The impacts of climate change and storms......................................................................... 210
8.2.2.1 Typhoon Haiyan and the oil spill in Estancia............................................................... 210
8.2.2.2 Australia...................................................................................................................... 211
8.3 Economic considerations............................................................................................................. 213
8.3.1 The oil and gas industry....................................................................................................... 213
8.3.2 Southern bluefin tuna........................................................................................................... 214
Chapter 9: Australias opportunity................................................................................................. 217

9.1 Global leadership......................................................................................................................... 217
Conclusion: There must be an investigation............................................................................... 218

13
Recommendations............................................................................................................................ 220
1. An independent investigation ........................................................................................................ 220
2. Future transboundary damage....................................................................................................... 220
3. Future transboundary partnership.................................................................................................. 220
4. Transboundary damage on the international agenda..................................................................... 221
5. Review dispersant application and transitional dispersant use..................................................... 221
6. Human rights review of treatment of Indonesian fishermen........................................................... 221
7. Human rights review of Timor Sea policy....................................................................................... 222
8. Renegotiation of delineation of maritime boundaries..................................................................... 223
9. Defence and Customs Review....................................................................................................... 223
Overview chronology of events...................................................................................................... 224

References.......................................................................................................................................... 230
Tables
Table 1
Fish catch, Kefamanu [sic] sub-district, 2005-2010 ........................................................... 90
Table 2
Fish catch, South Coast District of West Timor, 2007-2010 .............................................. 91
Table 3
Production Fisheries and Aquaculture, Rote Island ........................................................... 92
Table 4
Summary of alternative estimates of total amount of oil .................................................. 113
Table 5
Results Sea Water Sample Analysis Monitoring Phase I ................................................. 139
Table 6
Results Sea Water Sample Analysis Monitoring Phase II ................................................. 141
Table 7
Results from 4-5 November 2009 ..................................................................................... 144
Table 8
Amounts of dispersants used during the Montara response ............................................ 146
Table 9
Foreign fishers apprehended and detained in Australia ................................................... 201
Table 10
Birthplace of individuals suspected of people smuggling offences who say they were
children (September 2008 November 2011) .................................................................. 205
Table of images
Figure 1
Kupang, August 2013............................................................................................................ 3
Figure 2
Location of Montara wellhead............................................................................................. 25
Figure 3
The Montara oil spill, 28 August 2009 ................................................................................ 27
Figure 4
The Montara oil spill, 28 August 2009 ................................................................................ 27
Figure 5
Montara oil spill, 27 August 2009 ....................................................................................... 28
Figure 6
Map of Nusa Tenggara Timur, Indonesia ............................................................................ 33
Figure 7
Oesapa village, West Timor, August 2013 .......................................................................... 35
14
Figure 8
Indonesian fishermen encounter oil, 6 October 2009 ......................................................... 39
Figure 9
Indonesian fishermen encounter oil, 6 October 2009 ......................................................... 39
Figure 10 Waxy substance encountered by Indonesian fishermen, 6 October 2009 ......................... 40

Figure 11 Waxy substance encountered by Indonesian fishermen, 6 October 2009 ......................... 40
Figure 12 A fishermen dives in to obtain a dead fish as a sample in the Timor Sea,
6 October 2009.................................................................................................................... 41
Figure 13 Fisherman collects waxy substance from the Timor Sea, 6 October 2009 ........................ 41
Figure 14 Dead fish collected in the waxy slick, Timor Sea, 6 October 2009 .................................... 42
Figure 15 Dead whale, Oecusse, Timor Leste, 22 September 2009 .................................................. 44
Figure 16 Seaweed farmers hands in Tablolong, August 2013. ......................................................... 47
Figure 17 Seaweed farmer displays skin rashes, Tablolong, August 2013. ........................................ 48
Figure 18 Seaweed farmer displays skin rashes on his arms, Tablolong, August 2013. .................... 49
Figure 19 Skin rashes, Tablolong, August 2013. ................................................................................. 50
Figure 20 Skin conditions affecting children in Pepela, Rote, 2010. .................................................. 51
Figure 21 Skin conditions affecting children in Pepela, Rote, 2010 ................................................... 52
Figure 26 Cyst on fishermans neck, 31 October 2011. ...................................................................... 56
Figure 27 Denny Avan*s hand, 31 October 2011 ............................................................................... 57
Figure 28 Family mourn the death of Philipus Liman, April 2014........................................................ 58
Figure 29 Seaweed farming, Rote, 2014............................................................................................. 60
Figure 30 Bupati of Rote indicates areas of damage with a laser pointer, Rote Island,
October 2014 ...................................................................................................................... 62
Figure 31 Oenggaut, October 2014. ................................................................................................... 62
Figure 32 Seaweed farms at Oenggaut, November 2014................................................................... 63
Figure 33 Seaweed, Soao, 2010 ........................................................................................................ 65
Figure 34 Seaweed in Soao, March 2010 .......................................................................................... 66
Figure 35 Deposits on seaweed, Soao, March 2010 ......................................................................... 66
Figure 36 Daiama community meeting, October 2014 ....................................................................... 67
Figure 37 Daiama community meeting, October 2014 ....................................................................... 68
Figure 38 The wall at Daiama, October 2014 ..................................................................................... 70
Figure 39 The wall at Daiama, October 2014 ..................................................................................... 70
Figure 40 Community gathered to give evidence, Tablolong, August 2013 ....................................... 72
Figure 41 Community gathered to give evidence, Tablolong, August 2013 ....................................... 72
15
Figure 42 Community gathered to give evidence to Senator Rachel Siewert, Tablolong,

February 2014 ..................................................................................................................... 73
Figure 43 Tablolong beach, August 2013 ........................................................................................... 73
Figure 44 Tablolong beach, August 2013 ........................................................................................... 74
Figure 45 Tablolong villagers have separated the diseased quantities of the seaweed,
August 2013 ........................................................................................................................ 75
Figure 46 Damaged seaweed in Tablolong village, August 2013 ....................................................... 75
Figure 47 Seaweed, Tablolong, August 2013 ..................................................................................... 76
Figure 48 Abandoned ropes previously used for seaweed cultivation, Tablolong, August 2013 ....... 76
Figure 49 Damaged seaweed, Tablolong, 17 November 2014 ........................................................... 78
Figure 50 Damaged seaweed, Tablolong, 17 November 2014 ........................................................... 79
Figure 51 Seaweed, Tablolong, June 2015 ......................................................................................... 80
Figure 52 Seaweed, Tablolong, June 2015 ......................................................................................... 81
Figure 53 Boats in Kupang, February 2014 ........................................................................................ 83
Figure 54 Abandoned fish markets, Kupang, February 2014 ............................................................. 84
Figure 60 Oesapa, August 2013. ........................................................................................................ 87
Figure 61 Fishermen point to their old fishing grounds, Oesapa, August 2013 ................................. 88
Figure 62 Oesapa village, August 2013 .............................................................................................. 89
Figure 63 H. Mustafa, Head of local fishing association, Oesapa, August 2013 ................................ 90
Figure 64 Textbooks in Rote, 2010 ..................................................................................................... 93
Figure 65 Children playing in Oesapa, August 2013. .......................................................................... 94
Figure 66 Dead whale, Oecusse, 22 September 2009 ....................................................................... 97
Figure 67 Dead whale, Lembata Island, October 2014 ...................................................................... 98
Figure 70 Ferdi Tanoni travels to an affected community, NTT, October 2014 ................................. 100
Figure 71 Ferdi Tanoni listens to a seaweed farmer whose livelihood has been affected,
October 2014 .................................................................................................................... 102
Figure 72 Ferdi Tanoni accepts the National Civil Justice Award 2013 from Australian Lawyers
Alliance 2013 National President Geraldine Collins .......................................................... 103
Figure 73 International seminar, Kupang, 18 February 2014 ............................................................ 106
16
Figure 74 Attendees at the international seminar, Kupang, 18 February 2014 ................................. 106
Figure 75 West Atlas Extent of oil slick, 30 31 August 2009 ....................................................... 117
Figure 76 Montara Well Extents of observed oil, 4 September 2009 ............................................. 118
Figure 77 Untitled, 13 September 2009 ............................................................................................ 119
Figure 78 Montara Well Flight Report Sortie 1, 16 September 2009 .......................................... 120
Figure 79 Location of oil reported 21 September 2009
(closest reported oil to Indonesian coastline) ................................................................... 121
Figure 80 Montara Well Flight Report Sortie 5, 23 September 2009 .......................................... 122
Figure 81 Montara Well Spill, 6 November 2009 .............................................................................. 124
Figure 82 Montara well- composite map from observations recorded on 16-09-2009 and
17-09-2009, 16 17 September 2009 .............................................................................. 126
Figure 83 Montara Well Spill, 28 November 2009 ............................................................................ 127
Figure 84 Satellite Imagery (TERRA), 10 September 2009 ............................................................... 129
Figure 85 Untitled, 17 September 2009 ........................................................................................... 130
Figure 86 Untitled, 22 September 2009 ........................................................................................... 131
Figure 87 Colour modified image of Untitled, 22 September 2009 .................................................. 132
Figure 88 Montara Well Spill, 29 October 2009 ................................................................................ 215
17
Abbreviations
AEST
AFMA
AFP
AFZ
AHRC
AIP
ALOS
AMOSC
AMSA
ANEDO
ATSEA
AUD
AusAID
AWST
CILIS
CST
DEWHA
DFAT
DIBP
DIMC
DO
DSEWPaC
EEZ
FAO
GAP
HDI
IMO
ITOPF
IUCN
JAXA
MAP
MDGs
MODIS
MOU
NGO
NOPSA
NOPSEMA
NT DoR
NTU
NTT
Australian Eastern Standard Time

Australian Fisheries Management Authority
Australian Federal Police
Australian Fishing Zone
Australian Human Rights Commission
Australia Indonesia Partnership Country Strategy 2008 2013,
created by AusAID.
Advanced Land Observing Satellite
Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices
Arafura and Timor Seas Ecosystem Action Program
Australian dollars
Australian aid program, now part of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Australian Western Standard Time
Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, University of Melbourne
Central Standard Time
Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Department of Immigration and Border Protection
Department of Immigration and Citizenship
Dissolved oxygen
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and
Communities
Exclusive Economic Zone
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
Government Accountability Project
Human Development Index
International Maritime Organisation
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
International Union for Conservation of Nature
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
Montara Action Plan
Millennium Development Goals
Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer
Memorandum of Understanding
Non-government organisation
National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority
(precursor to NOPSEMA)
National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority
Northern Territory Department of Resources
Nephelometric Turbidity Units
Nusa Tenggara Timur (also, East Nusa Tenggara)
18
OCHA
OPGGS Act
PAHs
PCCC
PPM
PPRWA
PTT
PTTEP AA
PTTGC
Rp
SARs
TDS
TSS
UNCLOS
UNEP
UNESC
UNTAET
USD
VoO
WHO
WTCF
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth)
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
Pressure containing anti-corrosion cap
Parts per million
Professional Public Relations WA
PTT Public Company Limited
PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Ltd Australasia (Ashmore
Cartier) Pty Ltd (PTTEP Australasia)
PTT Global Chemical Public Company Limited
Rupiah (Indonesian currency)
Synthetic Aperture Radars
Total dissolved solids
Total suspended solids
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
United Nations Environment Program
UN Economic and Social Council
UN Transitional Administration of East Timor
US dollars
BPs Vessels of Opportunity program
World Health Organisation
West Timor Care Foundation (Yayasan Peduli Timor Barat, also YPTB)
Glossary
Bupati
(Indonesian) The Indonesian term describes the head of a regency, who is an

elected official. This differentiates from the role of mayor, who governs over
a city.
Cottonii
Used by villagers to refer to the seaweed species most likely to be Eucheuma

cottonii.
Kalimantan
(Indonesian) The island of Borneo.
Pulau Pasir
(Indonesian) Ashmore Reef (also, Sand Island, or Pasir Island)
Regency
A regency (kabupaten) is a local level of government beneath that of the

provincial level. It is equivalent in power to that of a mayor of a city.
For example, the Bupati of South Central Timor Regency.
Rote Island
The terms for Rote Island have been used interchangeably throughout this
document to preserve the original text. These terms include Roti Island; Pulau
Roti; Pulau Rote; Rote Ndao.
Trepang
Species of sea cucumber.
Used to denote pseudonym.
19
Report overview
The structure of this report is as follows:
The introduction highlights the significance of this issue, at both a national and international level.
Chapter 1 provides background to the Montara oil spill, the response, key findings of the Montara
Commission of Inquiry, and impacts on Australian workers.
Chapter 2 highlights impacts that have been reported in Indonesia since the time of the spill. This
includes never-heard eyewitness accounts of witnessing oil, and information given to Indonesian
media sources. This chapter also considers the significant social and economic impacts that have
been experienced: adverse impacts on human health; the loss of livelihoods for thousands of seaweed
farmers and fishermen; evidence of damage in Rote Island; and the lost education of the next
generation.
This chapter also explores the views of local governments; the possibility of damage to surfers and
tourists; and ongoing strandings of whales. It also highlights the advocacy undertaken by Indonesian
non-government organisation, the West Timor Care Foundation.
Chapter 3 assesses evidence regarding the spill. This includes the conflicting evidence regarding the
volume of oil and how far it travelled, overflight maps, satellite images, scientific studies and scientific
testing that has taken place in Indonesia.
Chapter 4 considers the dispersants used during the response to the spill. The use of Corexit is
especially assessed, given that it was also used during the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of
Mexico.
Chapter 5 considers the responses of the polluting company PTTEP Australasia, the Indonesian
government and the Australian government, providing a contemporary update on their positions in
response to claims of damage in Indonesia.
Chapter 6 provides an overview of two international comparator oil spills: the 2013 Gulf of Thailand
spill, which flowed from a Thai subsidiary of PTT, PTTEP Australasias parent company; and the 2010
BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Both spills provide similarities in the responses
taken by the polluting company, and serve to highlight the inadequacies of the response to Montara.
This chapter also highlights the issue of transboundary damage.
Chapter 7 highlights the need for a cooperative approach in the Timor Sea, and highlights how citizens
in NTT have also experienced the flaws of Australian policy in relation to the pushback of asylum
seekers boats and treatment of foreign fishing. There is also cause to question as to whether Montara
has increased the vulnerability of citizens to recruitment as crew in people smuggling, including
Indonesians suspected of people smuggling offences who said that they were children.
Chapter 8 highlights the larger issue of security, and that failure to act decisively on transboundary
damage will have flow on effects in the future for regional insecurity. The possible impacts of climate
change in exacerbating the risk of future damage are also explored, as is the potential economic
damage that Australia may experience. This includes a focus on the oil and gas industry and South
Australias southern bluefin tuna industry.
20
Chapter 9 highlights Australias unique opportunity to become an international leader on this issue,
and that Australias response to Montara sets an international precedent.
The conclusion sets out the need for an independent investigation and our further recommendations.
21
After the Spill
Introduction
Introduction
The Montara oil spill began in Australian waters of the Timor Sea on 21 August 2009. It flowed for
74 days until 3 November 2009, becoming the worst spill in the history of the Australian offshore
petroleum history.12
In September 2009, coastal communities in Indonesia witnessed oil close to or on the shore.
Since then, they have experienced significant losses in their seaweed farming, fishing and pearling
industries. However, these claims of damage have not received adequate public attention.
The Montara spill is one of the largest offshore oil spills in recent history, and has often been cited
internationally when other spills have occurred. This has included the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon
spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the 2013 PTT spill in the Gulf of Thailand. The Montara spill has featured
prominently in global news coverage and has been discussed across the world in reports, board
rooms and parliaments and at the United Nations.
However, despite this global attention, little is known about the effects felt by the Indonesian
economy and people following the spill. The lack of effective negotiation, remediation, or any form of
compensation has not been brought to light.
In August 2013 and November 2014, the Australian Lawyers Alliance travelled to Kupang, West Timor,
to meet with communities.
Five years on from the spill, inaction on Montara has compounded the difficulties that coastal villages
face. Families have experienced desperation, anger, tragedy and rising debts. Communities have
missed opportunities and undergone additional economic hardship in already one of Indonesias
poorest and most remote provinces.
The Montara oil spill illustrates how a regions remote location and poverty can assist in hiding such
transboundary events from public scrutiny and liability. It also exemplifies the unique vulnerability of
communities living in transboundary areas, and the interconnecting impacts upon human rights.
While the Montara Commission of Inquiry examined the cause of the blowout, delivering its report to
the Australian government in June 2010, its ambit did not include examining potential transboundary
damage. Regardless, the Montara Commission of Inquiry found that evidence before the Inquiry
indicated that hydrocarbons did enter Indonesian and Timor Leste waters to a significant degree.13
However, despite these findings, no further action was taken by the Australian government to
investigate the geographical extent of the spread of hydrocarbons that crossed into Indonesian waters
or the subsequent implications of such pollution.
The contrast between the reaction to the Montara spill, which occurred in August 2009, and the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico just months later in April 2010, speaks
volumes of the value Australia places on communities in one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia, its
northern neighbour.
In 2010, the Indonesian government provided scientific evidence of damage to Indonesian
communities to PTTEP Australasia, evidence which the company rejected as not verifiable.
While PTTEP Australasia has refused to reach a solution, the Australian government has continued to
maintain that the matter remains an issue between the company and Indonesia. This is despite the fact
22
After the Spill
Introduction
that the Indonesian government has appealed to the Australian government for assistance to resolve
the issue.
We anticipate that there will be people that dismiss this report and its findings, asserting that there
is no evidence to assert a causal link between damage in Indonesian communities and the Montara
oil spill.
We submit that it is unscrupulous for either the Australian government or PTTEP Australasia to make
this assertion.
We submit that it was the responsibility of both the Australian government and PTTEP Australasia to
ensure that transboundary damage did not occur.
At a bare minimum, eyewitness accounts describe washing onto the beach and coast. Scientific data
compiled by PTTEP Australasia asserting that oil never reached the Indonesian coast is incompatible
with these witness accounts and should be rejected.
This report aims to document the impacts reported in NTT and hopes to be the start of a centralised
record in English of this issue.
This report has been written to inform the public, media, non-government sector and government
alike about the miscarriage of justice that has occurred in connection with the Montara oil spill.
This report reveals the need for a break in the stalemate. A key way forward would be for there to
be an independent investigation that is mutually accepted by all relevant parties. This would enable
communities in NTT to know to what extent their local environment has been polluted, and how best
to proceed towards the remediation of their environment, economy and communities.
This report also highlights that there is a significant need for policy change towards mutual cooperation with Indonesia and Timor Leste in the Timor Sea that is founded upon human rights and
respect for the norms of international law. Many citizens of Nusa Tenggara Timur have experienced the
undertones of Australias self-interest and aggression on a number of justice issues, of which inaction
to Montara is one of the most recent.
There is a severe knowledge gap in the international community surrounding the failures of the
Montara oil spill. Vital lessons that could be learned at an international level are subsequently lost
for want of investigation and disclosure. These include the types and longevity of damage sustained;
environmental impacts; regulatory failure in transboundary cases; gaps in the commissioning of
studies; the use of dispersants; ways in which responsibility is evaded; and the serious consequences
when transboundary damage occurs from an offshore platform.
As a result, the calls for international attention and change regarding transboundary damage are still
to be heard. The challenges experienced by the residents of NTT are likely to be repeated in another
jurisdiction before real change occurs.
Damage resulting from future offshore exploration may become one of the largest issues of the 21st
century. The offshore exploration industry continues to expand into the coastlines of Brazil, India,
Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, the Persian Gulf, Russia, Thailand, the United States and Australia.
Increasing storm severity due to climate change may ultimately lead to further damage to offshore
platforms, making another offshore disaster all the more likely.
23
After the Spill
Introduction
In Australia, an OECD country in which 95 percent of its petroleum industry is based offshore, the
regulator was held to have failed and more than five years on, transboundary damage has still not
been appropriately investigated. If this is the case in Australia, what will be the outcome in other
nations?
The global economic and environmental risk demands attention. Failure to acknowledge the significant
risk posed could perpetuate adverse consequences to our regional, national and even global security
in decades to come.
The Australian government has an opportunity to be a leader on this issue. As a nation with one of
the largest maritime jurisdictions and coastlines in the world, a rapidly expanding offshore exploration
industry, and countless businesses and industries depending on the ocean, it is in Australias interest
to commit to leading the global conversation about transboundary damage. That conversation can
only successfully commence if we begin with where we went wrong: our reaction to Montara and its
impact on our neighbours in Indonesia.
24
After the Spill
Chapter 1: Background to the Montara oil spill

1.1 Background
The Montara wellhead is remote and lies far from scrutiny in Australian waters of the Timor Sea, being
more than 100 kilometres from land in any direction, and over 200 kilometres from any mainland.
The Montara wellhead lies in the Timor Sea, located at 12 40 20.470 S,124 32 22.158 E14
approximately 685km west of Darwin and 254km north-west of Truscott Airbase. At its closest point,
the Australian mainland lay approximately 212km away from the wellhead. Indonesias closest point
(Rote Island), lay 250km over the horizon.
Figure 2: Location of Montara wellhead. Courtesy: Angus Macpherson
The wellhead was operated by PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Ltd Australasia
(PTTEP Australasia, or PTTEP AA), a wholly owned subsidiary of Thai state-owned conglomerate
petrochemical company PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited (PTT).15 PTT is
one of Thailands largest publicly listed companies16 and the Thai Ministry of Finance is its largest
shareholder.17 PTT operates more than 40 projects around the world and has a workforce of
approximately 4,000 people.18
The Montara oil field was originally developed by Coogee Resources Ltd. Coogee Resources also
operated the Challis and Jabiru oil fields just to the north of Montara. In February 2009, Coogee
Resources and all of its assets was acquired by PTT and renamed PTTEP Australasia Ltd.19 The West
Atlas drilling rig was owned by Seadrill,20 and contracted to PTTEP AA. Houston-based Halliburton
had been engaged to undertake cementing work in setting up the rig, which became critical to
25
After the Spill
following events.21 Halliburton was also involved in cementing work at the BP Deepwater Horizon site
in the Gulf of Mexico, which exploded in April 2010. BP has since claimed that Halliburton botched
the cement work on the failed rig.22 In 2014, while BP was found to be grossly negligent by a US
court, Halliburton was found to be negligent and allocated 3 per cent of the fault.23
1.2 The blow out

What would become the largest oil spill in the history of the Australian offshore petroleum industry was
first detected at 5.30am AWST on 21 August 2009.
The Montara oil spill was first detected when an uncontrolled burp of oil and gas escaped from the
H1 wellhead at the platform.24
At about 5.30am, workers on the wellhead platform observed a blowout of fluid coming from the H1
well. The volume was estimated at between 40 and 60 barrels (approximately 6,360 9,640 litres). Gas
alarms on the West Atlas rig were triggered and emergency response procedures were activated.25 The
flow appeared to subside and the West Atlas rigs Offshore Installation Manager gave the all-clear at
around 5.55am.26
At approximately 7.23am the same day, the H1 well kicked again, this time with such force that a
column of oil, fluid and gas was expelled from the top of the well. This oil column broke through the
hatch on the top deck of the wellhead platform, hitting the underside of the West Atlas drilling rig and
cascading into the sea27. A further uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from the H1 well occurred
and continued unabated. 28 Emergency response procedures were once again activated, and the
decision was made to evacuate personnel.29 The H1 well continued to eject a mixture of oil, water,
condensate and gas.
Sixty-nine Australian workers were evacuated, as an uncontrolled flow of oil condensate, gas and
water began to spew forth from the well, and light crude oil began gushing into the surrounding ocean.
Some workers conducted last-minute tests as the waters bubbled and popped around them.
Between about 7.35am and 7.45am, all nonessential personnel were evacuated from the West Atlas
in two lifeboats. At approximately 8.10am, all remaining personnel were evacuated from the West Atlas
using a third lifeboat to a nearby vessel and flown to Darwin later that day.30
Oil continued to flow unabated into the ocean for 74 days. During this time period, patches of sheen or
weathered oil could have affected an area as large as 90,000 square kilometres.31
26
After the Spill
Figure 3: The Montara oil spill, 28 August 2009. Courtesy: Office of Senator Rachel Siewert.
Figure 4: The Montara oil spill, 28 August 2009. Courtesy: Office of Senator Rachel Siewert.
27
After the Spill
Figure 5: Montara oil spill, 27 August 2009. Courtesy: Office of Senator Rachel Siewert.
The oil released from the wellhead was driven by currents, rather than wind.32 The spill occurred
in an area characterised as a marine life superhighway33. During the next few months, reports of
whales, turtles, sea snakes and marine life immersed in the slick were publicised as non-government
organisations independently ventured out on the open ocean to attempt to record the damage.
PTTEP AA considered a number of options for stopping the Blowout from the H1 Well before
deciding to drill a relief well to intercept the H1 well. The West Triton rig was engaged by PTTEP AA
to undertake this drilling and then to kill the H1 Well by pumping in heavy mud and plugging it with
cement.34
After several attempts, the leaking H1 Well was intercepted on 1 November 2009. This allowed the
pumping of heavy mud to commence. Nevertheless, fire broke out on the Montara wellhead platform
and West Atlas rig.35
About 3,400 barrels of heavy weight mud were used to stop the leak, after an undetermined quantity of
lighter mud had unsuccessfully been injected.36 The mud was a complex mixture of fluids, solids and
chemicals.37
On 1 November 2009, during an attempt to stop the leak, a fire broke out on the West Atlas drilling
rig and burned for two days at temperatures of 350 degrees Celsius.38 The fire continued to burn at
high temperatures until the H1 Well was killed with the further pumping of heavy mud on 3 November
2009.39
On 3 November 2009, the Montara oil spill ceased.
28
After the Spill
1.3 The response

More than 130 surveillance flights were conducted by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
throughout the duration of the response to Montara, commencing on the first day of the incident.40
On 23 August 2009 (two days after the spill began) AMSA began spraying dispersants, and continued
to do so until 1 November 2009.41
AMSA commenced recovery and containment operations on 5 September 2009, the sixteenth day of
the spill42 and continued until 30 November 2009, although no recoverable oil was located after
15 November 2009.43
184,135 litres of dispersants were released, including Slickgone, Tergo R-40, ShellVDC, Corexit
EC9500, Corexit EC9527A and Ardrox 6120.44 Two of these dispersants, Corexit EC9500A and Corexit
EC9527A, were deployed in the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Australian
current affairs program 60 Minutes subsequently reported that when Corexit mixes with oil, its toxicity
to biological matter increases 52-fold.45
In August 2012, PTTEP AA was held liable in the Northern Territory District Court for breaches of the
Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). PTTEP AA was fined $510,000.
1.4 The Montara Commission of Inquiry

The Montara Commission of Inquiry (the Commission) was established by then-Minister for Resources
and Energy, the Hon. Martin Ferguson, on 5 November 2009. It was tasked with reporting on the
uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons at the Montara wellhead platform and subsequent events.46
The Commission was established under Part 9.10A of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas
Storage Act 2006 (Cth), and had nearly all the powers of a Royal Commission.47
The subsequent Inquiry Report was presented to the Federal government on 17 June 2010 by
Commissioner David Borthwick AO. The report, along with the draft government response to the
report, was released on 24 November 2010.
The Commission found that it was most likely that hydrocarbons entered the wellhead through the
9 5/8 cemented casing shoe and flowed up the inside of the casing.48 This casing had not been
pressure tested in accordance with the companys Well Construction Standards, and the cement in
the casing shoe was likely to have been compromised.49 In addition to this, while two secondary well
control barriers (pressure containing anti-corrosion caps or PCCCs) had been selected for use and
installation, only one was ever installed. The PCCC that was installed was not tested and verified in
situ as required. The Montara Commission of Inquiry held that the absence of tested barriers was a
proximate cause of the Blowout, yet this itself reflected systemic errors of a more deep seated kind
within PTTEP AA.50
The Commission was highly critical of PTTEP AA, noting that the Commission had little confidence
in PTTEP AAs capacity to apply principles of sensible oilfield practice51 and recommended that the
Minister for Resources and Energy consider a review of PTTEP AAs licence to operate at the Montara
oil field.
29
After the Spill
The Commission found that:

The way PTTEP AA operated the Montara oilfield did not come within a bulls roar of sensible
oilfield practice. The Blowout was not a reflection of one unfortunate incident, or of bad luck.
What happenedwas an accident waiting to happen; the companys systems and processes
were so deficient and its key personnel so lacking in basic competence, that the blowout can
properly be said to have been an event waiting to occur.52
The Commission further noted systemic and interrelated factors indirectly contributing to the
blowout. 53 These included a lack of risk management, a lack of experience, a manifestly inadequate
understanding of standards, deficiency in decision making, defective records and communication
management, systemic failure in communication between PTTEP AA and the rig operators West Atlas,
and a far too comfortable relationship with the regulator.54
The Commission concluded that PTTEP AA did not observe sensible oilfield practices at the Montara
oil field. Major shortcomings in the companys procedures were widespread and systemic, directly
leading to the blowout.55
The Commission also noted that PTTEP AA did not seek to properly inform itself as to the
circumstances and the causes of the blowout. The information that it provided to the regulators was
consequently incomplete and apt to mislead.56
The Commission of Inquiry was also highly critical of the role played by the Northern Territory
Department of Resources (NT DoR), which was in this instance, responsible for oversighting the
requirements bearing on the integrity of the H1 Well, including the general requirement that good
oilfield practice be followed.57
The Commission of Inquiry found that the NT DoR did not take adequate steps to ensure that
PTTEP AA actually complied with the requirement of good oilfield practice.58 None of the multiple
deficiencies were apparent to the NT DoR: the NT DoR never placed itself in a position so that it
could properly inform itself and the relationship between the NT DoR and PTTEP AA was far too
comfortable. 59 The Commission of Inquiry stated that one contributing factor to PTTEP AAs own
poor practices was the minimalist approach to regulatory oversight by the NT DoR.60
1.4.1 Findings regarding Indonesia in the Commission of Inquiry report

However, the Commission of Inquiry was about where the oil did not go, not where it actually went.61
The terms of reference provided to the Commission of Inquiry did not specifically address transboundary
damage.62 Despite this constraining limitation, the Montara Commission of Inquiry found that:
The evidence before the Inquiry indicated that hydrocarbons did enter Indonesian and Timor
Leste waters to a significant degree.63
The Commission of Inquiry also noted that:
Sheen and weathered oil was observed in Indonesias Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in
September 2009, reaching to within 94km of the island of Palau Roti. Some weathered oil was
also observed in the Joint Petroleum Development Area established by the 2002 Timor Sea
Treaty between Australia and Timor Leste.64
It must be asked why no further effort appears to have been made by the Australian government to
30
After the Spill
further investigate such findings, and to determine via field-based scientific research the geographic
spread of the weathered oil.
1.4.2 Submissions from Indonesian organisations

The Government of Indonesia did not provide a submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry.
The only Indonesian organisation to provide a submission was the West Timor Care Foundation
(WTCF), a non-government organisation based in Kupang, West Timor. WTCF provided a late
submission to the Inquiry, as when initial calls for submissions were first released, the Foundation did
not feel it had the requisite information or evidence to make a submission.65
The Commission of Inquiry was announced on 5 November 2009, and submissions were required
by 22 December 2009. This was a fairly tight deadline, especially for organisations based in
Indonesia, considering that there were reports of damage scattered across an archipelago of remote
communities.
WTCF provided its submission in May 2010, noting that it had to wait a longer period for clear
evidence of environmental damage and evidence upon the livelihoods of seaweed collectors and
fishermen in the region of NTT to become apparent.66 WTCF also noted that it did not have access
to the funding nor local expertise needed to bolster its submission with expert research.67 WTCF also
cited the existence of affidavits taken in Bahasa Indonesia recording damage within communities.
WTCF submitted that it believed that the Nusa Tenggara Timor Province of Indonesia, with particular
emphasis on the West Timorese region and the Roti and Sabu Islands, has incurred significant
environmental and economic damage due to the uncontrolled release [of oil from the Montara oil spill].68
This included reductions in seaweed harvest income in some areas by as much as 80 per cent.69
1.5 Australian workers

It is important to note that Australian workers also suffered in the aftermath of the Montara spill.
Sixty nine workers were evacuated from the Montara wellhead. The Australian Lawyers Alliance does
not know how many of these workers have finalised or are still fighting compensation claims.
However, news reports in 2011 revealed that two Australian workers, Bruce Taplin and Peter Dowse,
were fighting for workers compensation. Mr Taplin and Mr Dowse were among the last to leave
the Montara platform after the blowout on 21 August 2009. Mr Taplin and Mr Dowse were seeking
compensation for mental and emotional trauma and for loss of earnings.70
The West Australian reported on the issue on 8 August 2011:
In the minutes prior to his evacuation Mr Douse had been instructed to take gas and water
samples from the leaking platform.
His wife Chris said her husband, a rouseabout on the rig, took the samples while gas and liquid
spurted and gurgled around him.
She said that following the incident her husband returned home a changed man.
31
After the Spill
It has turned our lives upside down. Before the incident he was a family man who related well
to his children. That is not the case anymore, Mrs Dowse said.
[The mens lawyer] Tim Kucera said neither man wanted to speak publicly about the incident
due to the trauma it evoked.71
On ABC Radio National in March 2012, WA lawyer Tim Kucera said that PTTEP AA, through its insurer,
was still fighting claims for compensation:
What their defences do is they deny that they breached the duty of care, which they
acknowledge they owed our clients.
The difficulty that creates for us is this: theres a Commonwealth government inquiry report
which clearly sheets responsibility home to PTTEP for the whole disaster.
I think everyone in the community wouldve thought that the findings in that report wouldve
brought those issues to a close. But in reality whats taking place is that our clients are about
to go into a fight for compensation. 72
Mr Kucera also spoke about his clients experiences:
Mr Taplin has run out of money. His compensation payments under our West Australian
workers comp system ran out some months ago. Mr Dowse is looking down the gun barrel of
a similar problem come July. Those blokes are up against it when it comes to meeting day-today expenses and their bills.
Despite public promises to make good their mess were seeing our clients being put under the
same sorts of pressures you typically see in these kinds of compensation cases.73
32
After the Spill
Chapter 2: Indonesia
Communities in Indonesia reported witnessing oil on the Indonesian coast
following the Montara spill. Since then, they have experienced damage to their
economy, community and public health. The extensive geographical spread of
villagers stories throughout NTT points to a wider calamity that deserves further
investigation.
2.1 Nusa Tenggara Timur

The province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) Indonesia, lies 832 kilometres from Darwin.
NTT (or East Nusa Tenggara) itself means east southeast islands and is comprised of 566 islands,
including West Timor, Rote, Semau, Flores, Sumba, Sabu, the Alor Islands and Solor Islands.
INDONESIA
NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR PROVINSI (PROVINCE) MAP
Flores
Sea
Flores
Timur
Manggarai
Manggarai
Timur
Barat
Ngada
Manggarai
Nagekeo
Alor
Lembata
Sikka
Ende
EAST
TIMOR
N u s a Te n g g a r a T i m u r
Sumba
Barat Daya
Sumba
Barat
Sumba
Tengah
Timor
Tengah
Utara Belu
Sumba
Timur
Sawu
Sea
A
Kota
Kupang
Timor
Tengah
Selatan
Kupang
" KUPANG
Sabu
Raijua
Rote
Ndao
VIETNAM
THAILAND
PHILIPPINES
MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
Legend
)
"
Coastline
International Boundary
Regency Boundary
Provinsi Capital
I N D O N E S I A
INDIAN
OCEAN
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
Copyright 2015 www.mapsofworld.com
1.6
Meters
AUSTRALIA
Figure 6: Map of Nusa Tenggara Timur. Courtesy: MapsofWorld.com
With a low income per capita, high infant mortality and an average life expectancy of 64 years, NTT
was rated as one of the poorest provinces in the Indonesian archipelago in 2009.74
33
After the Spill
The Australian foreign aid program ranked the province among its top five priority provinces in
Indonesia requiring focus.75 NTT was included alongside neighbouring province Nusa Tenggara Barat
(West Nusa Tenggara), Papua, West Papua and also Aceh, which faced the devastating losses of the
tsunami on 26 December 2004.
The Arafura and Timor Seas Ecosystem Action Program (ATSEA) notes that NTT is the poorest
province in Indonesia and experts suggest rural poverty is worsening rather than improving particularly
in Sumba, Rote, West Timor and Sabu islands and that over a million people require food aid.76 This
has been alleged to be partly a result of deteriorating productivity due to environmental degradation.77
Major industries in the region include dry land farming for livelihoods, although soilsare generally
poor, made up of coral and rock, unsuitable for many crops except cassava and maize.78 Other
industries include the service sector, fishing, seaweed farming and a growing interest in tourism,
including surfing and diving. ATSEA has noted that circa 2010, the province had approximately 808
coastal villages, 34,229 fisher households and 20,446 people engaged in seaweed cultivation.79
West Timor is historically, an area of great importance to Australia. In 1942 during World War Two, a
battle was fought in Kupang by the Australian Sparrow Force and Timorese against the Japanese.
Kupang city, the capital of the province, is perched on top of volcanic soils, scattered with igneous
rock and tall, dry brown grasses. Flying into Kupang Airport reveals a sea of sunbaked, corrugated iron
roofs glinting in the light. In the dry season, the roads are dusty.
The gap between Kupangs rich and poor is clearly evident. Some streets are filled with small shacks
made of numerous thin pieces of wood with dirt floors, topped with corrugated iron, while other streets
are scattered with coloured or white cement houses boasting windows and broken glass embedded
on the tops of garden walls as a security measure. Near the beach, tall four-star hotels are increasingly
common.
Many students from the surrounding islands travel to study in Kupang, where there are five universities.
The area used to export dried fish, including sardines to East Timor and Surabaya. Those from Kupang
were previously renowned as the regions best. Now, dried fish is imported from Kalimantan.
34
After the Spill
Figure 7: Oesapa village, West Timor, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance.
2.2 Impacts reported in Indonesia

Since 2009, impacts have been reported or identified across the province of NTT, with the local
economy appearing to have suffered significant damage, in particular, seaweed farms. Fishermen also
report that their catch has disappeared from their fishing grounds. Their subsequent economic loss
has been significant, with many families struggling to afford an education for their children. A wide
range of piecemeal, anecdotal reports of impacts to human health have sprung up across the region,
warranting further research.
Potential adverse effects have been experienced in West Timor in Kupang; the villages of Oesapa,
Tablolong, Lifuleo; the regency of Belu; the regency of South Central Timor, including Kolbano beach;
the regency of North Central Timor; and the sub-district of Kefamenanu.
The island of Rote has been particularly affected, with villagers from Daiama, Pepela, Oenggaut,
Oeseli, Londalusi, Oebou, Tesebela, and the islands of Landu and Usu also reporting witnessing oil or
tarballs, or experiencing damage to their seaweed farms, fishing or health.
Damage to the seaweed industry has also been reported on Semau Island, approximately 3 kilometres
from Kupang with a population of approximately 13,000 people.80
Damage has also been reported in Lembata Island, 190 kilometres north of Kupang; in Sabu Raijua,
islands west of Rote Island across the Sabu Sea; the Timor Leste enclave of Oecusse and further
afield. The West Timor Care Foundation (WTCF) reports that Sumba, Flores and Alor have also been
affected.
The vast geographical scope of reported damage, and the variety of effects reported, demands further
investigation.
35
After the Spill
2.3 Eyewitness accounts of oil

Villagers in NTT witnessed oil and sheen in Indonesian waters that continued to move towards the
Indonesian coast in the weeks and months following the spill.
The following summaries of accounts were recorded in interviews in Indonesia.
On or around 19 August 2009, fishermen went fishing from Oesapa, West Timor. They usually go
for about one week. On or about 25 or 26 August they stopped, they came back, and reported on
25 or 26 August 2009 that there was a lake of milky oil within Indonesian fishing grounds south of
West Timor, to the Chairman of Antralamor, the local fishermens association, H. Mustafa.81 On the
way back, they obtained a water sample. It was only when they arrived back in Indonesia that the
fishermen found out about the Montara spill.82
A few days before an international surfing competition that was held on 16 19 September 2009,
the village of Oenggaut on the south of Rote Island witnessed oil wash up on their beach.83 The oil
remained on the sand for a number of days, before strong currents washed it away. Many villagers,
when asked where they thought the oil had come from, said that they didnt know. Then they heard
from fishermen from the village of Pepela that it had come from Australia.84
Between 16 and 19 September 2009, an employee of the Rote Island government who was working
in a patrol boat for the 2009 Rote Open Surfing Competition, noticed that when he came to shore
that oil was all over the bottom of his boat, which he had to clean off. While patrolling around the surf
competition, he saw about a hectare of oil on the water, about 50 to 100 metres from the surfers.85
In September 2009, people from Daiama village in the north of Rote Island witnessed oil off the
coast of their beach. The coral turned white and the mangroves began to die. The oil moved into
their seaweed farms. Their seaweed turned yellow, then white, then fell from its ropes. The water
turned milky white and remained so for approximately one month. Since then, they have tried to
plant new mangrove trees but they are unable to grow. As a result, the village, which is based at least
one kilometre from the beach, has been flooded on a number of occasions in the years since. The
Indonesian government provided a grant to the village so that they could build a 1.1 kilometre concrete
seawall to protect against flooding.86
In September 2009, people from Tablolong village on the southern coast of West Timor witnessed the
water became a shiny colour around their seaweed farms. The seaweed turned yellow, then white.87
Since then, they have struggled to grow new seaweed harvests. In August 2013, the seaweed was
still covered with a white sediment.88 In October 2014, the seaweed, while partially recovered, is still
affected.
In November 2009, seaweed farms in Lembata Island began to die.
In each of the villages visited by the Australian Lawyers Alliance, there was at least one eyewitness
who had seen oil, whether in Indonesian fishing grounds, seaweed farms or on the beach.
Villagers have also reported incidences of tar-balls washing ashore, dead fish and birds.
An Australian fisherman operating out of Kupang also described witnessing the oil while fishing in the
Timor Sea near Fantome Shoal:
36
After the Spill
I was fishing at lat 11 42.0086 S long 123 58.8329 E near Fantome Banks, which is a bit
east of Ashmore Reef. The next one across is Mangola grounds (lat 11 25.0542 S long 125
07.9069 E).
I was talking to a friend, he was taking a boat from Darwin to South Africa, he was steaming
through [the oil] in Australian waters, a bit south of Ashmore Reef, but he left Darwin and at the
same time I was fishing, he commented oh I know, Ive been steaming through it for a day, it
was bloody huge. It was quite amazing how much ocean it was covering. He would have been
a good 100 or more nautical miles away from me, steaming.
There was a lot of it, there was no doubt about that, it was just because it was so far away
from everyone at the time when it occurred, nobody really noticed it, the public didnt notice it.
The oil was all around the ship, all around the boat, throughout the product.
I couldnt retrieve the product to the boat because it was all contaminated and you cant wash
it if the waters arent clean.
I brought the product up it was all contaminated, covered in oil. Its like if you buy a box of
prawns and just tip diesel all over it you cant eat it once youve done that.
[The oil] wasnt that dark, it was a brown, muddy colour. Because we were moving all the time
it wasnt that thick, it was thick enough at the time, my impression was the whole place was
covered in it. It was maybe 5 10mm thick? Or it just seemed that way.
The oil was all over the water- and when you bring the nets up theyre external to the boat, and
all the nets are basically floating, semi-floating on the surface, and you lift them onto your boat,
everything semi-floating has to come through that surface oil.
You definitely could see oil on the top of the water. Some places was like it was mixed, an
emulsion, some places it was completely like oil.
It was like a clear browny colour, not very noticeably dark oil. Not noticeably a dark oil. Like a
cleaner diesel. It smelt like dirty oil out of a truck like used oil, but more of a diesel spill, it smelt
like diesel. It was quite noticeable.
I originally thought Id spilt some oil out of the boat, but then it was all around me.
I have a slight reaction to diesel, I get like an allergic reaction, normal diesel gives me
headaches. I got a headache.
Later, in town [in Kupang], you couldnt get away from it and I got headaches then too.
After the oil was in our nets, we moved twice within a three day period. I thought it will go
away the first time we moved was about 14 hours away, we fished for one shot about 6
hours, when I winched the nets up you could smell the oil at night. I moved to a place between
Fantome [Shoals] and Mangola [Shoals], after that I went to Mangola, then I stopped fishing
and headed to port and told the harbourmaster. The dates are in my letter.
I kept going and going and going, it wasnt something that you could control, the scope of it, I
was moving trying to get out of it. It seemed like it was chasing me.
37
After the Spill
When it hit Indonesia they had no idea what it was or what the impact was going to be and at
the time, everyone was like oh my God, what is this stuff?
I smelt the oil in the harbour that was the most noticeable thing, at night you had no idea
what was going on you could smell it, that smell when you went into port that was how I
knew it had arrived in town. This was about a week later after I got back.
I cant say 100 per cent that I saw oil all over the harbour, but I could see streaks through the
area, it is a very difficult harbour for oil to get through there, but it was definitely affected. You
could see it on the beaches in the way it foamed. You could see the water movement and you
could see that something wasnt right, stirring up of the oil on the beaches. You could see that
the water wasnt clean. You could just tell that it wasnt quite right.
At the time, the government had just spent a fortune to put all the seaweed plantations and
within a month they were all dead. They were everywhere and then all of a sudden they were all
gone.
You could physically see the seaweed plantations see that the plastic bottles and that were
gone.
It was there one minute and then it was gone straight after the oil spill.
Its very rarely that you see something that visually impacts like that all the beaches covered
in plastic bottles and string and then all of a sudden its all gone its quite noticeable.89
2.4 Media reports of eyewitness accounts

A number of journalists have conducted interviews with eyewitnesses of oil, tar-balls, dead fish and
adverse health conditions. Many reports that featured in Indonesian news did not receive similar
coverage in English. A few of these reports are listed below.
2.4.1 Sightings of oil

On 1 October 2009, the Jakarta Post reported that a 34-year-old fisherman from Oesapa subdistrict in
Kupang, Ridwan, who had just returned from fishing in the Timor Sea, said that the sea was filled with
a crude oil slick:
The surface of the sea is covered by masses of crude oil resembling sand, said Ridwan.90
Video footage was recorded by WTCF on 6 October 2009, 130 kilometres (about 70 nautical miles)
off the south coast of West Timor. The video, which contained a GPS reading on the ocean at 11 38,
46 1 S, 124 30 81 7 E showed a thick waxy oil slick on the seas surface and dead fish.91 A copy
was sent to Senator Rachel Siewert, Senator for Western Australia, and was published online on 11
November 2009.92
38
After the Spill
Figure 8: Indonesian fishermen encounter oil, 6 October 2009. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation/ Office of Senator Rachel Siewert
Figure 9: Indonesian fishermen encounter oil, 6 October 2009. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation/ Office of Senator Rachel Siewert
39
After the Spill
Figure 10: Waxy substance encountered by Indonesian fishermen, 6 October 2009.

Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation/ Office of Senator Rachel Siewert
Figure 11: Waxy substance encountered by Indonesian fishermen, 6 October 2009.

Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation/ Office of Senator Rachel Siewert
40
After the Spill
Figure 12: A fishermen dives in to obtain a dead fish as a sample in the Timor Sea, 6 October 2009.
Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation and Office of Senator Rachel Siewert.
Figure 13: Fisherman collects waxy substance from the Timor Sea, 6 October 2009.
Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation/Office of Senator Rachel Siewert.
41
After the Spill
Figure 14: Dead fish collected in the waxy slick, Timor Sea, 6 October 2009.
Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation/Office of Senator Rachel Siewert.
A Jakarta Post report on 24 October 2009 noted that:

Traditional fishermen operating off Pasir Island found an oil slick resembling a pool around
20 miles from Tablolong beach in Kupang, or around 30 nautical miles from Kolbano, South
Central Timor regency.93
Media also cited that a number of Indonesian fishermen and soldiers from the Navy Marine Corps
found clumps of crude oil not far from Oeseli village on the coast of Rote Island.94
2.4.2 Dead fish

Dead fish have been witnessed throughout the region, from out in the Timor Sea, to the coasts of Rote
Island and Kolbano beach in south-central Timor.
Antara News reported in October 2009 that:
Thousands of fish of different species were seen dead floating in Timor Sea waters,
presumably caused by crude oil spills from a blast at Montara oil refinery last August.
We saw the dead fish floating in an area at 11-29 degrees southern latitude and 124-30
degrees western longitude, Gab Oma (33), a fisherman from Oesapa, Kupang, who just
arrived from fishing in the area, told reporters on Wednesday, while showing pictures of the
floating fish taken with his phone camera.
42
After the Spill
Some of the fish are already in a state of decay. We had taken some to keep for use as
evidence but later we threw them back into the sea because we could not stand the smell,
he said.
He said, he, along with 17 other fishermen from Oesapa, had just returned from fishing in Timor
Sea waters by boat. We returned only carrying four red fish compared to usually hundreds in a
day and night of fishing, he said.
Haji Mustafa (34), another fisherman who is also chief of the Association of Timor Sea
Traditional Fishermen, said the polluted area was a habitat of the red fish NTT fishermen
usually caught.
We believe the fish have gone to other areas or died, he said.
Gab Oma said when they were in an area 10-30 degrees southern latitude and 24-30 eastern
longitude they found balls of crude oil in an area around 20 miles from Tablolong beach, West
Kupang, or around 30 miles from Kolbano southern coast in South Central Timor.95
The Jakarta Post reported that Mr Oma said:
So many different kinds of fish died, namely red kakaps [snapper], tunas, and even dolphins.
They smell very bad, he said.
The fishermen predicted the oil spill would reach the shore in a week.
Mr Oma said that his financial earnings had dropped drastically in the last few weeks. I used
to catch at least 100 red kakaps in one night. But last night, I only got four, he said.96
In late October 2009, the district head of Rote Ndao, Leonard Haning said he had received information
that fishermen from Rote and Kupang districts had discovered hundreds of dead fish in Indonesian
waters.97
In January 2010, 40-year-old fishermen Zulfikar, from Oesapa, spoke about his experiences after a
two-week fishing trip in the Timor Sea. He said that he was forced to go home with an inadequate
catch:
The fish disappeared. The sea was full of oil. When we dive, the smell of oil is very pronounced
and our bodies become slippery.98
2.5 Timor-Leste
Reports have also emanated from Timor-Leste, in particular the enclave of Oecusse.
Richard Mounsey, an Australian Fisheries Management expert, and former Head of UN Transitional
Administration of East Timor (UNTAET)s Department of Fisheries and the Marine Environment in 2000
to 2002, was in the area at the time of the spill, working as a senior economic adviser to the Secretary
of State Office, in the Timor-Leste enclave of Oecusse.
A 22 September 2009, a blue whale washed onto the beach in Oecusse: a photo depicts Mr Mounsey
in the foreground.
43
After the Spill
Figure 15: Dead whale, Oecusse, Timor Leste, 22 September 2009. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation
In September 2014, ABCs Lateline reported his experiences:

I used to go to the beach in my small boat every morning. And I noticed in early September
2009, when I jumped in the water to have a snorkel and to look around at the fish and the
corals, it was like jumping into foggy water, it was all milky.
I hadnt seen that and Id been in East Timor off and on for the last eight years.
He said he did not realise there had been an oil spill.
At the time I had no idea, I thought, you know, whats going on? Then I moved the boat
three or four kilometres somewhere else and the water was the same, and then I went in to the
fishermen, they said there [were] small fish dying along the beaches.
But everywhere I jumped in the water, there was nothing, it was like a dessert, except for this
milky sort of fog.
I found out later after going to Indonesia and finding out what was going on, and it appears
that it was a dispersant that was mixed with the oil so it was this film that had spread.99
Mr Mounsey commented that dead fish, sharks and dolphins began washing up on the beaches,
and that seaweed and sponges started dying and the corals became coated with some type of
sediment.100
He said a pod of dolphins native to the area disappeared and some turned up dead on the beach as
well as a blue whale.101
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After the Spill
In January 2010, Mr Mounsey wrote a report to the Timor Leste government, titled Effects of the Timor
Sea oil spill.102
The report surveyed fishermen from 4 6 January 2010, with assistance from staff from the Oecusse
Secretary of State office and the Department of Fisheries in Oecusse. Surveys were undertaken at the
major fish landing sites, including Citrana, Tiboco, Maqalab, Lafua, Misan, Costa and Sacato, which
account for approximately 95 per cent of Oecusses fishermen.
Without giving information on the oil spill or any prompting whatsoever, collective independent data
was gathered from representatives of 193 boat owners and combined with general observations along
the entire Oecusse coast.
The report identified that:
fishing over the last few years until September 2009 has been relatively steady, reliable and
predictable;
in the second half of September 2009, catches were down by at least 50 per cent, and in some
locations by as much as 70 per cent and generally deteriorated by 80 per cent up until the end
of December 2009;
incomes and protein intake over the corresponding months reduced, causing malnutrition in
some very young children;
dead fish were observed in September/October in the western and central regions, including,
squid, trevally, sharks and dolphins (first time most old fishermen had seen a dead dolphin on
the beach);
resident schools of dolphins along the entire Oecusse coast vanished;
migratory whale sightings for October through to December were less than 10 per cent of that
seen in the previous three years;
the first dead whale in many years washed ashore on 21 September 2009;
schools of mature sardine species, which account for the bulk of fish catches, vanished;
the water clarity in mid-September to early October was un-seasonally poor. All described it as
milky in colour.103
2.6 Anecdotal adverse impacts on human health

Significant health impacts have been experienced by villagers across the region following the Montara
oil spill. These have included skin conditions (including rashes and cysts), bruising, breathing problems
and food poisoning.
Reports are piecemeal, scattered across the region, and at this stage, anecdotal. Further research is
required to assess the cause of such illnesses, and how far and how prominently such illnesses have
occurred.
45
After the Spill
In considering these impacts, it is also important to note that 184,135 litres of dispersants were used
during the response to the Montara oil spill, including over 44,000 litres of Corexit.
US scientists and researchers are continuing to discover the toxic impacts of dispersant on human
health, following the application of 7.5 million litres of Corexit 9527A and 9500A dispersant during the
response to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico.104
A report released by US non-government organisations Earthjustice and Toxipedia, The Chaos of
Clean Up, highlighted that:
although it is impossible to establish causal certainty without research, reports among
Gulf residents and cleanup workers of breathing problems, coughing, headaches, memory
loss, fatigue, rashes and gastrointestinal problems match the symptoms of blood toxicity,
neurotoxicity, adverse effects on the nervous and respiratory system, and skin irritation
associated with exposure to the chemicals found in Corexit.105
Following the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, researchers from the University
Cancer and Diagnostic Centers, in Houston, Texas found that workers exposed to crude oil and
dispersants display significantly altered blood profiles, liver enzymes and somatic symptoms
compared to an unexposed control group. Their findings, reported in the American Journal of
Medicine, revealed that platelet counts were significantly decreased in the exposed group, while both
hemoglobin and hematocrit levels were notably increased. Their findings suggest that oil spill cleanup
workers are at risk for developing hepatic or blood-related disorders.106
It is relevant to consider this background in thinking about the impacts that have been reported in
Indonesia.
2.6.1 Skin conditions

Rashes
WTCF reports that itchy skin conditions have been and continue to be experienced in South Central
Timor.
In August 2013, during a community consultation in Tablolong village, West Timor, seaweed farmers
revealed extensive skin rashes.
The symptoms were experienced by a number of people in the village. Villagers say the rashes
commenced after oil from the Timor Sea polluted local waters. These symptoms included:
One man with extensive callouses and a white rash all over his hands.
Other men with the same rash on their legs, arms; one man complained of it being on his
buttocks. The rash is extremely itchy and is aggravated by time spent in the sea.
One man complained of a fever lasting for two hours as well as developing a rash, on a number
of occasions after spending time in the sea.
46
After the Spill
Figure 16: Seaweed farmers hands in Tablolong, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
47
After the Spill
Figure 17: Seaweed farmer displays skin rashes, Tablolong, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
48
After the Spill
Figure 18: Seaweed farmer displays skin rashes on his arms, Tablolong, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance.
49
After the Spill
Figure 19: Skin rashes, Tablolong, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
Skin conditions have also been reported in Pepela village on Rote Island. The following case study was
recorded by a researcher in 2010:
A young girl living in Pepela was between 10 and 12 years old, and the daughter of a
fisherman. A rash developed on her limbs. Her father was a fisherman, who had large debts
to boat owners, and had no way of paying them off with no income following the oil spill.
Subsequently, he couldnt afford any medication. The trips to the doctor were also not helpful.
The treating doctor, (who was from Java and in the first year out of medical school) said that
it was bad air in the house. (This can often be code for blaming poor people for their poverty
and resulting ill health. Javanese often say that houses without windows in them, like many
Rotinese houses, have bad air).
The family were so ashamed of their daughters skin disease that they took her out of school
so that other people would not know about the condition. The girl is now sick, poor and
uneducated.
The same thing has happened to other children. Many children in the village of Pepela had
these sorts of skin diseases, with many trying to hide the condition by wearing long sleeves.
50
After the Spill
I came back from Java with skin cream to treat this girls ailment and was swamped by nearly
all the other children in Pepela suddenly lifting up their shirts and shorts to show me they had
the same condition and where was their skin cream.107
Figure 20: Skin conditions affecting children in Pepela, Rote, 2010. Courtesy: Brooke Nolan
51
After the Spill
52
After the Spill
53
After the Spill
54
After the Spill
55
After the Spill
Bruising
In the years since the spill there have also been reports (including from government officials) of
fishermen emerging from the ocean bruised. While fishing, they dive into the ocean and swim, herding
the fish to encourage the fish into the nets.
Cysts
Figure 26: Cyst on fishermans neck, 31 October 2011. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation
In October 2011, WTCF were contacted after a fisherman in his mid-20s from Oesapa subdistrict had
developed a cyst on his neck (pictured). He was single, with no wife and no children.
Denny Avan*108
In the village of Oesapa, 47-year-old fisherman Denny Avan* developed bruising and a hole on his
hand and upper leg after going fishing. Denny was married and had three children. However, he did
not have enough money for a doctor, and could not afford medical treatment. Photos of his hand also
demonstrate pale discolouration of the skin on his hand.
56
After the Spill
Figure 27: Denny Avan*s hand, 31 October 2011. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation
Philipus Liman
In April 2014, a seaweed farmer in the village of Lifuleo, West Timor, died suddenly.
After suffering rashes and an itchy skin condition since 2010, Philipus Liman died one evening, his wife
finding his body when she went to wake him in the morning. 109
57
After the Spill
Figure 28: Family mourn the death of Philipus Liman, April 2014. Courtesy: AAP Image/Gabrielle Dunlevy.
Following his death, only three seaweed farmers remain in Lifuleo.110

His widow, Maria Liman Mulik, said her husband took up the seaweed business in 2002. The rashes
appeared in 2010.
They disappeared then came again. I dont know why, she said.111
Reluctantly, Maria now tends what little seaweed will grow - she has little choice. 112
Requests were made by WTCF to the family after the funeral as to whether the body could be
exhumed for an autopsy. They did not provide consent.
2.6.2 Food poisoning and diarrhoea

Food poisoning and diarrhoea were reported soon after the spill among residents of NTT.
The Jakarta Post reported that a resident from Kolbano in South Central Timor, Daniel Missa, said that
dozens of residents had experienced nausea and skin irritation after eating dead fish found along the
beach.113
Residents didnt know why the fish were dead, so they picked them up and ate them. They
apparently suffered from itchiness, felt nauseous and vomited, said Daniel.114
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After the Spill
Anecdotal reports abound of food poisoning across the region and should be subject to further
investigation.
WTCF received reports of 30 poisonous cases after the consumption of fish in the waters around the
contaminated areas.115
Although any increases in the incidence of diarrhoea in the region cannot be directly attributed to the
Montara spill at this stage, there is a clear need for further systemic research of the types and numbers
of health conditions reported throughout the NTT region in the months following the spill.
Further research is necessary to ascertain if there were indeed any systemic impacts upon public
health that can be attributed as caused by the Montara spill.
2.6.3 Potential long term impacts on lipids and major organs

It is also still unknown as to whether people will suffer long term health issues associated with the
Montara spill.
In a report released by US non-government organisations Earthjustice and Toxipedia, The Chaos of
Clean Up, chemicals identified as being present in Corexit 9500 and 9527 were cited to have a number
of adverse impacts on human health:
One chemical, although not registered as a carcinogen, should be handled as a carcinogen
with extreme caution, according to the New Jersey Department of Health;116
The same chemical, with prolonged or repeated exposures, can damage liver and kidneys.117
It is possible that that further long-term health effects (including cancer), could follow other effects
already experienced in communities, and have the potential to impact upon the kidneys, liver and
other major organs.
Again, this highlights the importance of a comprehensive investigation into systemic public health
reporting across the province since the Montara oil spill.
2.7 Economic impacts

In 2012, a team led by Dr Mukhtasor of the Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies in Jakarta
produced an interim report estimating economic loss in the NTT region, following nine months of
research. The report found that the oil and chemical dispersants used in the clean-up are still affecting
marine ecosystems and costing coastal communities more than $1.5 billion per year in lost earnings.118
The Hon. Martin Ferguson, Resources Minister at the time, dismissed this, releasing a statement
asserting that:
Claims of environmental and economic damage to Indonesias maritime domain around West
Timor dont appear to be backed up by verifiable evidence.119
However, seaweed farmers and fishermen across the region continue to assert that in the days, weeks
and months after witnessing oil, their incomes have been significantly reduced.
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After the Spill
2.7.1 The plight of seaweed farmers

Once a thriving industry across NTT, seaweed was formally and informally farmed along its coastline,
with thousands of farmers cultivating regular harvests. Seaweed is used for a range of purposes,
including producing food additives and fertiliser.
Figure 29: Seaweed farming, Rote, 2014. Courtesy: Kristen Roy
Ibrahim Agustinus Medah, the Chairman of the NTT Legislative Council, asserted in November 2010
that according to data compiled by the NTT Parliament, the Montara oil spill caused seaweed death
in almost all areas affected by pollution. This included areas such as the waters around Rote Island,
Sabu, Timor and waters of Semau. A month after the Montara oil field exploded almost all locations in
NTT seaweed business [were] destroyed, he said.120
In the years since the spill, seaweed farmers have attempted to regrow their harvests. However
significant reductions in pre-spill production have been reported, and continue to be reported, across
the province.
According to Professor Mukhtasor, a 2011 survey showed that seaweed production in 2009 averaged
1,360 kilograms per batch and declined by 71 percent to 400 kilograms per batch after the oil rig
incident.121
On Rote Island, communities report significant reductions in seaweed production. Significant
losses were experienced in the seaweed farming villages of Tesabela (which had approximately 350
farmers)122 Oenggaut, Daiama and the islands of Landu and Usu off Rotes coast in the years since the
Montara spill. 123
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After the Spill
Communities report that there have been significant reductions in production in West Timor. This has
included Kupang and the villages of Lifuleo (which had about 250 farmers) and Tablolong (which had
about 233 farmers) both on West Timors southern coast. Villagers also spoke of destroyed coral reefs
and mangroves, and reported that all of West Kupang regency is affected.124
Reductions in the seaweed harvest were also reportedly significant on the island of Semau which had
an industry three times the size of that on Tablolong,125 and on Lembata Island, 190 kilometres north of
Kupang, and the islands of Sabu, west of Rote Island across the Sabu Sea.
East Nusa Tenggara Province Head of Fisheries Abraham Maulaka described that the production of
seaweed in Sabu Raijua and Kupang regency, in 2009 reached 6,000 tons per year with a value of
about 19 billion rupiah. However, production reduced to 500 tonnes per year up to 2013. 126
The impact of the oil spill was strongly felt by the seaweed farmers and fishermen in the province,
said Mr Maulaka.127
2.7.1.1 Rote Island

Impacts to the seaweed industry were experienced on Rote Island, impacts which the Bupati of Rote,
Leonard Haning, says commenced in August 2009. Damage is reported in both the north and south of
the island.
He explained that the communities within his jurisdiction continue to be affected and that there still
hasnt been an appropriate resolution.
Indonesian media reported that before the oil spill, seaweed farmers in Rote Ndao could produce at
least 7,334 tonnes of seaweed per year. In 2009, after the pollution-related oil spill, their production
drastically dropped to 1,512 tonnes and until June 2010, the production of seaweed stood at 341.4
tonnes.128
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After the Spill
Figure 30: Bupati of Rote indicates areas of damage with a laser pointer, Rote Island, October 2014. Courtesy: Bright Day Films
2.7.1.2 Oenggaut
The village of Oenggaut, in Rotes south, is located just 2 kilometres from an internationally renowned
surf break at Boa beach. Homes are scattered across the soft white sand, tall coconut trees stab
at the sky and frangipani trees wave beside the road. An idyllic paradise, the village sits beside blue
waters and its seaweed farms face out towards the open ocean. There are strong currents along this
shoreline, drawing surfers from all over the world.
Figure 31: Oenggaut, October 2014. Courtesy: Bright Day Films
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After the Spill
Prior to the spill, Oenggaut had received a national award for the quality of its seaweed production.
Bupati Leonard Haning explained that in August 2009, villagers in Oenggaut witnessed oil.
Government officials were subsequently ordered to go and visit the community. There was a yellowybrownish substance on the beach - along the whole of the 7-kilometre beach with only some breaks.
Almost all of the seaweed farmers saw it. It also smelled very strong. The substance was present for
about 2 to 3 weeks and then it was not seen again. Soon after, a smaller quantity washed up on the
beach, the same colour, but not as thick. Fish, squid and crabs were also dead. It was reported to the
sub-district.
Before 2009, the village grew cottonii. In 2009, the seaweed became very sticky, and turned yellow to
white in colour, then dropped to the seabed, absolutely destroyed. The villagers were unable to harvest
anything.
Villagers tried to sow seeds for 5 or 6 months afterwards and stopped cultivating altogether for 2 years
until 2012.
In 2012, villagers started seaweed farming again, now using seeds of an alternative variety.
Figure 32: Seaweed farms at Oenggaut, November 2014. Courtesy: Kristen Roy
Ade Mondu*
Seaweed farmer Ade Mondu, a 62-year-old seaweed farmer, was born in Oenggaut, and he has five
children.
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After the Spill
In 2008, seaweed from his farm sold for approximately 7 million to 8 million rupiah/month to a private
buyer.
In 2009, he saw a substance in his seaweed farm, among the ropes. He didnt know what it was.
Someone told him it was oil, but no one told him where it came from: he still doesnt know where it
came from.
In 2014, Mr Mondu was asked if he had ever heard the name Montara. He said he did not know of that
name until now.
After the oil, his harvest was totally damaged, and for two years after the spill, he didnt do any
seaweed farming. Instead, he tried to make ends meet by farming palm sugar, and his wife created
traditional rugs from palm fibres.
Herman and Liani Tedjo*
Herman and Liani have six children. In 2005, Herman began seaweed farming. Prior to that, he was a
fisherman.
Their oldest daughter was studying a masters degree at university in Jakarta when the oil crept into
the villages seaweed farms.
They heard from fishermen in Pepela that there had been an oil leak in Australia. They said they
thought, Why has this happened? Was the oil sent by the Australian government to kill us?
They said they felt a mixture of sad and angry when it happened. Their immediate concern was how
they were going to have enough money to get their six children to school.
Lianis eyes grew misty and shed tears as she remembered the despair she felt at their dead seaweed
crop. Their dream, their hopes for their children to have an education might never come true. Their
oldest daughter would perhaps have to be withdrawn from university, never to complete her studies.
However, the community rallied around them. Although all other villagers were also financially affected,
they banded their savings together to have enough to pay for the oldest daughters education so that
she could remain at university. She has now graduated.
Their other children, although they went to a government school, were able to stay as Herman was
able to explain that he would pay for certain things when the situation got better. The government
supplied rice to the village for one year.
It was not until April 2012 that Herman and Liani were able to grow seaweed again.
2.7.1.3 Daiama
At the end of a long, twisted road through dry brown fields, smattered with green rice fields, palm
groves and thorny bushes, lies the village of Daiama in the north of Rote Island, also known as Soao.
In March 2010, WA barrister Philip Vincent and PhD candidate Brooke Nolan met with communities in
this village, as reported in Inside Indonesia:
In 2001, villagers in Soao, a 20 minute boat trip from Pepela, established a seaweed farm as
an alternative source of livelihood. The farm involves the use of long submerged ropes with
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After the Spill
plastic string tying embryonic weeds to the ropes and empty plastic water bottles to act as
floats. Locals then use canoes to collect mature weed for sale. The project is well managed,
runs at low cost and has allowed most Soao men to stop fishing in the Timor Sea. This
seaweed farm, which was supported by a grant of Rp.27M (AU$3,200) from the Australian
Embassys Direct Aid Program, made a profit of Rp.265M (AU$31,300) in 2008.
Following the leak [the Montara oil spill], profits from the seaweed farm dropped by about 80
per cent to just over Rp.58 million (AU$6,850). This economic loss had repercussions for the
education, health and standard of living of Soao families.
While the villagers children were still enrolled in school, many people reported that they
wouldnt be able to continue paying for their education if the profits from seaweed farming did
not pick up again.
Despite being aware of the risks to their own welfare and that of their families, men from Soao
claimed they would have no alternative but to return to fishing if seaweed farming remained
unprofitable.129
Villagers were forced to arduously wash their minimum harvests of seaweed daily with lontar palm
fronds. Villagers attributed seaweed damage to the oil leak from the Montara platform.130
WTCF submitted that the financial loss demonstrates the overall impact. In 2008, the seaweed farm
made a profit of c. Rp. 265 million (c. AUD $33,125). However, in 2009 this figure dropped by 80% to
only Rp. 58, 200,000 million (c. AUD $7,275).131
Figure 33: Seaweed, Soao, 2010. Courtesy: Brooke Nolan.
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After the Spill
Figure 34: Seaweed in Soao, March 2010. Courtesy: Brooke Nolan.
Figure 35: Deposits on seaweed, Soao, March 2010. Courtesy: Brooke Nolan.
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After the Spill
In October 2014, villagers gathered to speak with the Australian delegation. Approximately 225 people
had waited in the small community hall next to the church and opposite the school for three hours for
our arrival.
The Daiama community consists of approximately 519 households and approximately 1,250 people
involved in seaweed production.132
People watched from outside the windows, at the doorways, and the hall itself was full to capacity, as
more and more plastic chairs were added, until only two were vacant at the very front.
Figure 36: Daiama community meeting, October 2014. Courtesy: Bright Day Films
Afterwards, the entire village gathered under the trees to witness their fellow villagers provide evidence
of the damage that they had all experienced.
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After the Spill
Figure 37: Daiama community meeting. October 2014. Courtesy: Bright Day Films
The seaweed industry had started in the village in 1999, and after 2000, nearly everyone was involved
in seaweed farming.
In 2008, it was a good crop; the community says it was the best, and other villages subsequently
came to buy their seeds as the harvest was of such great quality. However, in September 2009, the
water changed to a milky colour and soon after the seaweed crops turned yellow, then white and were
utterly destroyed.
James Lie*
James is a 45-year-old seaweed farmer from Daiama village. He and his wife Lily, have four children,
aged 20, 17, 8 and 7. All of his children live in the village, except his oldest daughter, who is attending
university.
James started seaweed farming in 1999, and began seaweed farming full-time in 2001. He grew green
cottonii. In 2008, the harvest was a golden year, with seaweed earning 15,000 rupiah/kilo. The 2008
crop was so good, that many people in the village sold small amounts of their seeds to other villages.
James spoke about the oil which was drifting on the surface of the sea water, it was in the water where
his seaweed ropes were. He described that after this the water changed to a milky colour. The oil
smelled very stinky and it was also in the sand. There were also countless dead fish.
The coral turned white, and the seaweed turned yellow, then it became soft. After softening up, the
seaweed immediately turned white, and then it fell apart. All the seaweed fell apart.
He was brokenhearted.
He said he was so sad and desperate that he was thinking he should take people on boats to Australia
as a way to support his family: Even if I was to go to jail, maybe I should carry the people.
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After the Spill
When this happened, his oldest daughter was at university studying maths. He was concerned that
she would have to stop her university education. However, he was able to borrow money from other
people in the village, for example, his neighbours, and also his brother-in-law in Pepela village. He was
charged 10 per cent interest on this loan.
In 2010, the government stepped in to help his daughter. He said the local government are trying to
help poor people who are unable to continue.
He tried to grow the seaweed, but the yields were very poor. This continued from 2010 to 2013. In
2014, he harvested twice, with one more harvest to come before the years end. In October 2014, this
harvest was not looking good.
He said that since 2009, the worst months for seaweed harvest are the end of October, November,
December, January, February and March.
James continues to feel guilty as he is not being responsible for his wife and family.
Alexander Guntar*
Alexander is a 46-year-old seaweed farmer from Daiama. He explained the taxation arrangements on
Rote. January December is the taxation year, and approximately 100 rupiah per kilo was previously
provided in taxation to the local government tax account, on the 15th and 30th of each month.
In 2010, the local government decided it would not seek tax from Daiama village. This continues to this
day. The village of Daiama is not paying tax as their seaweed yields are so low.
He said that whats definite is, that it was in September. He said the oil came through the mangroves,
the coral turned white. The oil, it was like grease which was scattered on top of the shore.
One week later, his seaweed was not fresh anymore. The next day, it turned white, was slowly
destroyed and fell off its string.
He felt very sad.
If I cant grow anymore, how can I support my family?
The ocean later flooded the village, which sits inland from the beach. Villagers say that they attempted
to plant new mangroves, perhaps 45,000 seeds, with no success.
The Indonesian government supplied a grant to the village to build a 500-metre seawall, which was
subsequently extended to become 1.1 kilometres long. Villagers also contributed their own savings
towards the cost of the wall.
The seawall now sits as concrete evidence of the fact that the mangroves that once protected the
village, are gone.
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After the Spill
Figure 38: The wall at Daiama, October 2014. Courtesy: Bright Day Films
Figure 39: The wall at Daiama, October 2014. Courtesy: Bright Day Films
2.7.1.3 Usu Island

Wira Darma* is a 43-year-old seaweed farmer from Usu Island. He has been married to his wife Eka for
thirteen years and they do not have any children.
He started seaweed farming in 1999, and his business expanded from 10 ropes in 1999 to 40 ropes in
2008. He grew red cottonii.
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After the Spill
In 2007, seaweed was selling for 12,000 rupiah to 13,000 rupiah/kilo and each line was producing 70
80 kg per harvest, with a total harvest of around 6 or 7 tonnes. In 2008, depending on the crop, the
price increased to 15,000 rupiah to 20,000 rupiah/kilo. Seaweed was booming, with approximately
90kg per line, a total harvest of around 8 tonnes, and total income of more than 100 million rupiah.
In June 2009, the harvest was good, not as good as 2008, but still good, at around 60kg per line.
In September, the water changed and looked oily. He saw the oil in his ropes; it was like grey, a sheen,
and smelt like kerosene. The coral also changed colour, and went all white.
He said that for three days, the oil was in the water. Then the water turned white, like the colour of
milk.
He said that the oil was in the water for one month or more; and the water remained milky for just as
long.
Fresh seaweed is always hard. However, the seaweed turned a yellowy colour, went very soft and
slippery, and then turned white. Destroyed, it fell off the rope to the ocean floor.
Up to this day, he doesnt know where the oil came from.
In 2010, the government gave the villagers some red cottonii seeds. In the whole year, he was able to
grow 500 - 600 kg. In 2011, he put out 10 strings, and it was better, he harvested about 1000kg for
the whole year. In 2012, putting out 20 strings he harvested about 1.5 tonnes. In 2013, he put out 30
strings and harvested 4 tonnes, and 2014, he put out 30 strings and had harvested 3.5 tonnes as of
October 2014.
However, this is still only approximately half of his pre-spill yields.
2.7.1.4 Tablolong, West Timor

In August 2013, more than 100 Indonesian citizens comprising villagers, government officials, navy
officers, police and the local mayor gathered in the seaweed-farming village of Tablolong, to speak
with the Australian Lawyers Alliance in a community consultation about the devastation of their
seaweed industry.
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After the Spill
Figure 40: Community gathered to give evidence, Tablolong, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
Figure 41: Community gathered to give evidence, Tablolong, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
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After the Spill
In February 2014, approximately 800 villagers gathered to give evidence to Senator Rachel Siewert
about the economic losses they have sustained.
Figure 42: Community gathered to give evidence to Senator Rachel Siewert, Tablolong, February 2014. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
The village, immediately proximate to a beach filled with small boats and seaweed farms, features
brightly painted houses and a large church at its entrance. It was once quite prosperous, with seaweed
harvested five times per year on long ropes by the 269 families of the approximately 233 seaweed
farmers living there.133
Figure 43: Tablolong beach, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
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After the Spill
Figure 44: Tablolong beach, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
The seaweed that used to be grown was the fat, green sakol, described by villagers as the green gold
of their community. Before the spill, the average price for seaweed was 15,000 rupiah per kilo, with the
highest price 22,000 rupiah per kilo.
In December 2007, seeds were damaged by wind and high tides. In January 2008, typhoon-like
conditions also impacted upon the industry.
In August or September 2009, the water surface in the village became glossy. The colour of the
seaweed turned to yellow and the stalk became rubbery and hard to break.
A mysterious, off-white blotchy sediment, sometimes along with red dots, appeared on the stalk. The
yields were very bad, to the extent that seaweed farmers stopped cultivating.
Indonesian media reported that in 2007, approximately 523 tonnes of dried seaweed were sold in
the village, in 2008 this reduced to approximately 427 tonnes, due to damage to seed and typhoonlike conditions. In 2009, only 247 tonnes of seaweed were harvested. This plummeted in 2010 to 10
tonnes, in 2011, to 5 tonnes and in 2013, to only 3 tonnes.134
The seaweed industry, which used to be the economic lifeblood of the community, had been
devastated.
Along the beach, where harvested seaweed lies on drying platforms, the Australian Lawyers Alliance
witnessed blotchy sediment spread throughout the harvests.
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After the Spill
Figure 45: Tablolong villagers have separated the diseased quantities of the seaweed, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
Figure 46: Damaged seaweed in Tablolong village, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
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After the Spill
Figure 47: Seaweed, Tablolong, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
Ropes previously used to grow seaweed laid coiled and unused, as some villagers had abandoned
their efforts to grow it.
Figure 48: Abandoned ropes previously used for seaweed cultivation, Tablolong, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
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After the Spill
Villagers said that the value of the pre-spill annual production of the village seaweed crop was
approximately US$625,000. In 2013, it dropped to less than US$3,600: less than one per cent of its
previous income.
The quality of the seaweed being produced also significantly dropped since the spill: seaweed used
to fetch 12,000 rupiah (AU$1.20)/kg, but due to a reduction in quality as well as quantity, was sold for
7,000 rupiah (AU$0.71)/kg in 2013.
A seaweed farmer spoke to the Australian Lawyers Alliance in October 2014:
Graham Lesunti*
The water turned into a shiny colour in September. I saw the change in the water what was
clear was that we knew that it was an indication of an oil spill. It was around about 1 kilometre
away [from the shore].
It was from September to December.
After the water changed, the seaweed, which was initially green, changed to become yellow.
A yellow colour. In the end, because of the yellow colour, thats where the white disease came
from.
And so before the change occurred in the water, which caused the seaweed to have this
disease, the income for one village, in this village, in 2007, it was more than 500 tonnes.
As for my income, in one year, Id get more than 3 tonnes.
In 2009 it declined. [I didnt get] not even 1 tonne: I got over 500 kilos.
So since that incident, our income continued to decrease. Our kids, who we were able to
provide for initially through seaweed cultivation some of them had to leave school early, some
of them didnt go ahead with university studies because our earnings continued to go down.
We hope that, if possible, from both the government and those who are struggling for our fate,
that they might show concern for our future, especially the future of our children. Because
through this seaweed cultivation we can provide for our families and our children can go and
do well at school.135
In 2013, many villagers had turned to gardening, fishing and laboring as alternative ways to try to
source an income.
In 2014, the village started growing an alternative type of seaweed.
However, villagers say that when currents and wind are blowing a certain way, the condition of the
seaweed changes once more. This was the case in November 2014.
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After the Spill
Figure 49: Damaged seaweed, Tablolong, 17 November 2014. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation.
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After the Spill
Figure 50: Damaged seaweed, Tablolong, 17 November 2014. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation.
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After the Spill
Figure 51: Seaweed, Tablolong, June 2015. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation
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After the Spill
Figure 52: Seaweed, Tablolong, June 2015. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation
2.7.1.5 Lembata Island

Damage to the seaweed industry has also been experienced in Lembata Island, which is located
190km north of Kupang, and is part of the Lesser Sunda Islands.
William Sanjaya*
William is a 27-year-old seaweed farmer who had spent his entire life on the island of Lembata.
Two years ago, William married Melati*, a 19-year-old girl from his village, and together they have a
12-month-old boy. William left school in eighth grade, and did not return, as his father passed away.
The seaweed industry started in the early 1990s when it was introduced into the area. William has
been a seaweed farmer for more than ten years, following his father into the profession. His entire
family farmed seaweed; in his village on the south-west tip of the coast, there are 300 to 400 seaweed
farmers.
When William started his own harvesting operation in 2004, he began with just 20 ropes. This then
grew to 100 ropes about 30 metres long. William would harvest two crops per month, one tonne per
harvest, which amounted to annual harvests of 24 tonnes.
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After the Spill
He would earn 15,000 rupiah per kilogram (approximately AU$1).

William has now come to Kupang to try and find a job.
From November 2009 onwards, his seaweed crops died. Each crop had white coloured sediment
dotted on the seaweed that never previously appeared. He grew it, it died again, and he could not sell
any of it.
He has been trying ever since to grow his seaweed. However, despite trying different varieties, the
result is always the same. He cant sell any of it.
In August 2013, William said that on his island, there is no more seaweed, or only a very small amount.
He had also heard from the islands of Alor that they also are not growing as much as they used to.
Agents used to travel between villages, make a down payment, pick up the crop, and then provide
small financing for the next crop.
William didnt have a licence from the government to grow seaweed, he was simply able to go ahead
and farm it. Once he informed the head of his village that he wanted to grow in a particular area, he
could go ahead.
Before the oil spill, William had some savings. In small villages such as his, there is no bank, and the
Catholic Church acts as the cooperative. He now has few savings left. Given this informal style of
economy, the true scale of the impact on seaweed farmers is difficult to know.
William says that he is trying to find a job in Kupang, to live there with his wife.
I am feeling very bad, I am stressed and have no more income, he said.
When asked what he hopes for the future, he answers, I cant do anything, what can I hope for?
Now, many men, most of them were seaweed farmers, have migrated from his village to Malaysia and
Kalimantan.
2.7.2 Fishing communities

Local fishermen report reductions in fish stocks in fishing grounds south and south-west of the island
of Timor.
The low quantity of fish stocks is an issue on the national agenda in Indonesia: in part due to
overfishing and illegal fishing. Indonesian President Joko Widodo has stated that there are 5,000
foreign fishing boats operating illegally in Indonesian waters, costing the local fishing industry US$24
billion.136
Following the lake of milky oil reported in Indonesian fishing grounds, dramatic reductions in fish
catches were and continue to be experienced.
In June 2010, Ibrahim Agustinus Medah, called for a study to determine how long the current spell of
poor catches would last. Is it going to be one year, five, ten perhaps? he said. Will it be permanent?
Because if it is, it wont be a small problem anymore and those responsible must pay.
This issue should be deemed a national tragedy, because it has already affected three districts in the
province.137
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After the Spill
Head of Fisheries East Nusa Tenggara Province Abraham Maulaka described that since the Montara
oil spill, there had been a decline in the productivity of fishermen in East Nusa Tenggara. In 2009, the
catch reached 117,189 tonnes. The results continue to decline, with 92,261 tonnes caught in 2010.
This reduced further to 72,623 tonnes of catch in 2013. 138
Professor Mukhtasor reported that prior to the spill, fishermen caught an average 1.92 tonnes/trip with
a gross income of Rp 17.24 million (US$1,824), which declined to an average 0.53 tons/trip for a gross
income of Rp 3.93 million after the incident.139
In addition, there have been losses of oysters.
We lost at least 6,000 oysters by September 2009, just a few weeks after the oil spill began, Mustafa
said. Each oyster costs an average Rp 1 million [$110], so the loss to local farmers was Rp
6 billion.140
Figure 53: Boats in Kupang, February 2014. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
2.7.2.1 West Timor

H. Mustafa, Chairman of Antralamor, the local fishermens association, explained in June 2010
that since the Timor Sea was polluted by an oil spill from a blowout in the Montara field. local
fishermens fish catches have dwindled drastically. Now they are thinking of migrating to Sumatra to
build a new life.141
These days you get fish being sold for up to Rp 50,000 each, when before they would only cost
between Rp 20,000 and Rp 25,000 each, he said. The reduced supply is driving the price up, which
affects everyone, not just the fishermen.142
An article in the Jakarta Post on 8 August 2012 noted that:
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After the Spill
A number of fishermen in Kupang acknowledged their catches had drastically dropped

because waters in the south of the province that border immediately with Australia have been
polluted with oil so the bottom-dwelling fish have migrated to other waters.
The fishermen have been searching for fish in the north of Timor Island around Batek Island
and the Alor island chain and its surroundings over the past year, said Simon Lakona, a
fisherman who catches bottom-dwelling fish in Kupang.
Fish resources in the south of NTT have dropped drastically. Fishermen even have to become
construction laborers because their catches have dropped up to 90 per cent, he added.
Lakona said that a large number of seaweed farmers in Kupang and Rote Ndao were also
facing economic failure after the oil explosion and none of them was engaged in seaweed
farming now.
I still recall the heyday of seaweed production when people could earn between Rp 15 million
[US$1,590] and Rp 30 million each harvest. However, none of them grow seaweed now due to
harvest failure, said Semin Polin, village chief of Kuanheun in West Kupang district.143
Figure 54: Abandoned fish markets, Kupang, February 2014. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
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After the Spill
85
After the Spill
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After the Spill
2.7.2.2 Oesapa
The sub-district of Oesapa, based just 10 kilometres outside of Kupang, continues to feel the impact.
In August 2013, the Australian Lawyers Alliance spoke to three fishermen, Budi Hermanto*, Henry
Oesman* and Adi Halim* in Oesapa who shared their stories.
Figure 60: Oesapa, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance.
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After the Spill
The fishermen said that to this day, there are no fish in their old fishing grounds south of Timor. When
asked if they are fishing, Henry explained that they are unable to fish where they used to, as there are
no fish there. In fact, no one is fishing there anymore. They attribute this to the 2009 Montara oil spill.
The fishermen say that more than 1,000 fishermen have moved away from the village to find work and
to make a living to support their families; in real terms this means approximately 70 per cent of the
village population has gone. Many people have moved to Kalimantan or to cities in other provinces,
such as Surabaya. Previously there were 120 boats in the village; 30 boats were burned in April 2008
by the Australian government for fishing offences. Now, only about 15 to 16 boats are left.
The fishermen have to travel further for fishing: instead of a six hour journey, they must sail about two
days to fishing grounds east of Timor Leste.
Figure 61: Fishermen point to their old fishing grounds, Oesapa, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
Before the Montara spill, the fishermen used to go on 21 trips for around seven months of the year.
(Winds and bad weather prevail for about three months). Each trip would usually last one week, in
which they would make gross earnings of 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 rupiah (AU$1,224 to AU$1,326).
Now, incorporating the additional travel required, with added fuel costs and reduced catches, they go
on approximately one trip per month when conditions allow, which roughly equates to only seven trips
per year. Now, they make only about 3,000,000 rupiah (AU$306) in profit per trip.
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After the Spill
As a result, people are turning to other ways to make an income. Henry has become a carpenter. Adi
works casually on boats fishing close to Timor-Leste and is acquiring large debts which are owed
to his father-in-law, with whom he and his family now live. Budi has retired as a fisherman, but lends
finances to other fishermen. (In 2014, he also had to move away as there was no prospects in the
village.)
Figure 62: Oesapa village, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
When the fishermen go fishing, they let down their nets, and swim in the water, herding the fish into the
nets. Sometimes the fishermen dive to the ocean floor to seek out trepang. In these areas, they report
that the seagrass is a yellowy colour and dead or dying. At a depth of 30 to 40 metres, they say that
the coral is dead.
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After the Spill
Figure 63: H. Mustafa, Head of local fishing association, Oesapa, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
2.7.2.3 Evidence submitted to Montara Commission of Inquiry

WTCF documented the dramatic loss in fish catch volumes in the subdistrict of Kefamenanu (in
north-central West Timor) and the south coast district of West Timor in its submission to the Montara
Commission of Inquiry. The gradual reduction in catches in the two regions can be seen clearly below.
Table 1. Fish catch, Kefamanu [sic] sub-district, 2005-2010
Year
Production (tonnes)
2005
3,962
2006
4,109
2007
4,956
2008
6,376
2009
5,892
2010
1,473 (June 2010)
In the south coast district of West Timor, reductions in fish catch as at 2010 were most significant in
the villages of Kolbano and Nunkolo and surrounding regions. Fish catch was reduced to less than
10 percent of catches of previous years in both areas.
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After the Spill
Table 2. Fish catch, South Coast District of West Timor, 2007-2010

Sub-district water areas
2007
2008
2009
2010
Amanuban Selatan village and surrounding regions
150
210
120
20
Kualin village and surrounding regions
600
670
300
30
7,890
8,230
3,000
600
372
637
200
37
7,870
7,990
3,000
300
16,882
17,737
7,020
987
Kolbano village and surrounding regions

Kotolin village and surrounding regions
Nunkolo village and surrounding regions
TOTAL
The media has also reported that there has been a decrease in production of pelagic species of fish
caught in East Flores, such as tuna, skipjack, tuna, mackerel, trevally, halfbeak, flying fish, and song.
In 2008, fish production reached 11,745,499 kilograms. However, in 2009, production only reached
4,658,332 kilograms,144 not even half of the yield of the previous year.
2.7.2.4 Australians affected in Indonesia

In September 2009, Indonesian companies CV Intan Timor and PT Hitra Mina Perkasa,with their
principal investors,Australians Bartolo and Antony La Macchia, were involved in a trawling operation
in Kupang, West Timor catching deep sea scampi and champagne lobster. The company employed
about 70 people from West Timor and was a profitable business, with two boats: a 32 metre boat and
a 22 metre, both converted to catch scampi and deep sea lobster.
The Indonesian companies were overseen by Bartolo and Antony and had been in operation since
1999, selling 90 per cent of its product in Australia. Before the Montara spill, the company had been
catching 15 25 tonnes of product per month, selling product at an average of $20/kg.
When fishing for scampi in 2009, approximately 70 miles from the wellhead, the vessels had to be
ordered back to port as the nets were fouled with oil and it was impossible to keep fishing.145
At first, their catches were only minimally affected by the oil, but after three days of trying to avoid oil
contamination of their catch, they had to abandon the fishing expedition and discard their product as it
was so contaminated with oil. Nets being brought onto deck were filled with oil. In 2011, WTCF noted
that the company has been forced to sell or give away its vessels as they can no longer operate in the
Timor Sea, due to the massive drop in usable catches since late 2009. T
he companies have incurred a
146
loss of approximately two million Australian dollars.
The business is now all but lost.
2.8 Rote Island, provincial government report

The Rote Island provincial government compiled a report of estimated economic loss, with visits and
questionnaires taking place in February 2010 and July 2010 in the fishing village of Londalusi, seaweed
farming village of Daiama, and with cultured pearl farmers in Oebou in southern Rote.147
The report claimed that there had been significant losses to the seaweed farming industry, reductions
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After the Spill
in catch of fish and squid, reductions in pearl farming, and damage to coral reefs, mangroves and the
coastal environment. The estimated total of damages in these areas alone was estimated in 2011 at
1,909,201,856,000 rupiah (approximately AUD$180,275,622).148
2.8.1 Fishing
The Rote Island government subsequently interviewed fishermen in Pepela village, and at a seminar in
2014 identified that fishermen usually caught one tonne of fish in a day, but now there is a maximum
of 10 kilograms.149
Media reported in 2010 that seaweed farmers and fishermen in the villages of Oeseli and Pepela had
also suffered losses.150
2.8.2 Pearl farming

The government found that average production was previously 45,000 seeds of pearl per year, with
approximate value of 1 million rupiah per gram. However, the report found that there had been a
potential loss of thousands of seeds of pearl. Rote Island government staff say that there is now no
pearl farming.151
The Rote Island government presented the following statistics regarding production in February
2014.152
Table 3. Production Fisheries and Aquaculture, Rote Island
Type of
commodity
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Fish
Pelagic
fish (t)
Demersal
fish (t)
TOTAL
2,040.13
946.1 1,433.2
1,647
1,902
2,100
1,800
594
811
747
204.48
662.11 1,014.7
1,138
1,268
1,400
571
396
706
814
2,244.61
1,608.21 2,447.9
2,785
3,170
3,500
2,371
990
1,517
1,559
903
2,179
Non- fish
Dried
seaweed (t)
1,935
3,964
5,086
6,505
6,127
7,334
1,512.5
946
Pearl
(gram)
5,122
4,777.9
Dried
squid (t)
1.9
3.12
19.98
35.71
52.17
8.96
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20.48 49.134
After the Spill
2.9 Lost education

Reports of children across the region not attending school for financial reasons are too many in
number to be ignored. Given the significant economic losses described, families struggle to afford
school fees or the modest associated costs such as textbooks, uniforms and transport.
Figure 64: Textbooks in Rote, 2010. Courtesy: Brooke Nolan.
Villagers say that students have been withdrawn from all levels of education, elementary and,
secondary and at a tertiary level. The costs of university education in particular, are difficult for villagers
to meet.
In Tablolong, villagers emphasised that education is very important, and that they are worried about
the lack of access to education for the next generation.
In Tablolong, the community is struggling to find another source of livelihood. Villagers say they
sometimes catch just a few fish and sell them in Kupang to raise money for the schoolchildren.
When the seaweed was the green gold for fishermen in Tablolong, we were able to send our sons and
daughters to pursue higher education. Now, all hope has vanished along with the destruction of green
gold seaweed along the beach of Tablolong, said Gustav Lay, a 34-year-old seaweed farmer.153
Adi* and his children
In August 2013, Adi*, a 43-year-old fisherman from the village of Oesapa, spoke to us about his two
children: seven-year-old son, Fajar* and twelve-year-old daughter, Aulia*.
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Figure 65: Children playing in Oesapa, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
Both children were unable to attend school, as there was not enough money to pay for their education.
An initial registration fee to attend school must be paid each time a child re-enrols after having
dropped out. As at 2013, this was approximately 2 million rupiah (AU$204) for primary school and
5 million rupiah (AU$500) for secondary school.
Additional costs, such as textbooks and uniforms, make attending school prohibitively expensive,
given the dramatic change in the familys income. While some schools are free, including a government
school just up the road, it is very hard to gain admission without connections. In any case, the school
is already full and unable to accept further admissions. As a result the children stay home. Adis wife
did not complete schooling either, so cannot help the children to study.
Aulia stopped attending school three years ago. Her younger brother has only ever attended
kindergarten.
In contrast, Adis friend Henrys children are ten years older, and have gone on to study medicine in
Jakarta. Adi shared similar dreams for his children.
Adi used to have two boats, a small boat that he bought in 2008, and a bigger boat that he purchased
in 1999. About six or seven men used to work for him on board.
Now, he is a crewman on other fishermens boats if they need him. For four months, there was no
other work.
His family now lives with his father-in-law, who is very old, and has retired from fishing. His father-inlaw is now looking after the family financially and also producing cakes, which Adis wife helps to cook.
Adi now owes his father-in-law very much.
The Aryan Jaya fishing company has offered Adi a job, but it would be a year before he could come
back to see his wife and children. He is still contemplating what he should do next.
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2.10 The local governments

The Mayor of Kupang, Mr Jonas Salean, spoke to the Australian Lawyers Alliance in August 2013
with concern about the impact of the spill on the area under his jurisdiction. Due to reductions in his
communitys income, the collection of taxes has dropped and the councils revenue has reduced.
He has personally heard of instances of fishermen experiencing difficulty in breathing. He also reported
that the pearling industry, which previously was quite prosperous and exported product to Japan, has
suffered losses.
The Bupati of Rote Island, Leonard Haning, and the Bupati of West Kupang regency, Mr Ayub Titu
Eki, also continue to be actively engaged in assessing the issue and promoting the needs of their
citizens. On many occasions, local governments have also provided rice to their constituents suffering
economic hardship following the Montara spill, to ensure that families do not go hungry.
In 2012, in an effort to join together with a collective voice, five regencies provided power of attorney
to Ferdi Tanoni, Chairman of WTCF, citing damage within their respective regencies to their fish, shrimp
and seaweed industries, the pollution of sea water, and the need to champion and advocate for the
rights of communities. These included:
Rote Ndao (covering Rote Island);
Belu (West Timor);
North Central Timor regency (West Timor);
South Central Timor regency (West Timor); and
Kupang (West Timor).
2.11 Surfers and tourists?

It is possible that international and Australian tourists could have suffered exposure to hydrocarbons
and/or toxic chemicals while surfing.
The southern end of Rote Island is internationally renowned as a surf break, described as a surfers
paradise.154 The Rote Open International Surfing Competition was convened at Boa Beach, on Rotes
southern coast, in 2009, 2010 and 2011.155
In 2009, the Rote Open International Surfing Competition was held from 16 -19 September. It was
presented by the Coca-Cola Indonesian Surfing Championship Tour and sponsored by the government
of Rote Ndao, PTR Communications, Garuda Indonesia, Merpati Airlines, Trans Nusa Airlines, and
Heineken.156
The event was open to international and Indonesian surfers, with 90 surfers from Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Switzerland, Uruguay and the USA competing in
four divisions: Open Pro, Masters, Womens and Local.157
Renowned international surfers competed in the competition, including Marlon Gerber, Lee Wilson and
Garut Widiarta, who took out the US$2,000 prize.158
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However, 2 kilometres away from this famous surf break, villagers in Oenggaut had witnessed a
yellow-brown substance wash up on their beach before being washed away days later by strong
currents in the period prior to the competition.
A district neighbouring Boa has also been considerably impacted since the spill. Oebou, a pearl
farming district, was cited in the Rote Island governments report of economic loss, which had
collected data from regions across Rote from 25 - 27 July 2010, including Oebou.
Significantly, in October 2014, an individual came forward who had worked for the Rote Island
government on a patrol boat for the surf competition in 2009. He said that his job was to monitor the
area around the surfers.
Ivan Pranoto*
At that time, my job was to be the back-up from the sea for the surfing event, the international
surfing competition held at the time [the Indonesian Surfing Championship 2009].
Because the activities were in fact related to the surfing event itself the focus of attention
was aimed at the competition.
But it was only after that I discovered that there was something which was not right on the
seas surface... it was as though grime had stuck to the hulls of my boats.
After I cleaned it up, I felt as though there was an oily substance in the water there. Thats the
first thing that I discovered.
Early on, what I found was there were fluids on the waters surface which were of a rainbowlike colour because incidentally that morning the water was very calm.
So like normal if we find oil on the waters surface, it turns into a rainbow colour. Thats the first
thing that I discovered.
So after that I was thinking that these were maybe just oil spills, scatterings of oil, from fishing
boats which were around there... in that location.
But when I went off-duty... in the evening I rested at Nemberala Harbour beach... in order to
offload logistics to the beach I used a rubber boat.
After coming back from the beach, I realised that, this rubber boat is really dirty. What is this?
After I touched it, it was like that oil...
And there I realised that it was dirty. And so then the next morning that I got the opportunity to
clean the boat. I cleaned it up and I knew, oh, this smells of oil. It smelt like oil waste.
That area was not far from the shoreline, approximately 50 to 100 metres from the surfing area.
But when I was resting... it was 4 - 50 metres from the shore... the place where I docked.
I thought that maybe because the boat was stationary, it wasnt moving... and so this thing was
able to stick to the boat. As long as the boat is still in motion its not easy for things to stick to
the boat. I had been docked there for one night.
Yes, from the location of where the surfing event was held, the distance between the surfing
event to the area that I talked about earlierwas approximately 4 to 50 metres...
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But because I was going around, I could even go out to one mile and also find it there, the
thing which was like a rainbow.
[The area was] maybe around 1 hectare.
In my opinion, it was like maybe there had been a spill, who knows, maybe a ship had sunk...
an oil tanker had sunk... or whatever it was that had contained oil... because its common being
the sea and all.
But when I was off-duty, when I came to the office and I shared about what I had discovered,
I heard rumours that there was a fisherman from East Rote that had come across an offshore
oil spill, at the back part of Rote Island.159
We do not know whether any adverse impacts have been experienced by surfers or tourists in the
area.
In the Gulf of Mexico, anecdotal reports emerged of surfers coming out of the water with skin
irritations, chemical burns and skin rashes.160
In the US, an individual spoke to the media, saying: I was on vacation last week at the panhandle of
Florida and I heard reports that surfers were coming out of the water with skin irritations and chemical
burns and skin rashes, says Windham. Its almost like youre taking a big chance by getting in the
water even if you dont see oil in the water.161
To this day, no health warning appears to have been issued to the international surfing community in
the aftermath of the Montara spill.
2.12 Ongoing stranding of whales

On 22 September 2009, a dead blue whale was photographed ashore in Oecusse, Timor-Leste.
Figure 66: Dead whale, Oecusse, 22 September 2009. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation
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After the Spill
Whale strandings continue in NTT, including blue whales, which are listed as endangered.
In October 2012, over 40 pilot whales were stranded on the islands of Sabu, which was an unusual
event.162 The whales, most of which subsequently died, were eaten by villagers.
In October 2014, reports emerged of five blue whales stranded on the coast at Lembata Island. One
whale subsequently died, pictured below, and was then eaten by villagers.
Figure 67: Dead whale, Lembata Island, October 2014. Courtesy: West Timor Care Foundation
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2.12.1 Triggering of research

The Montara Monitoring Program, agreed between PTTEP AA and the Australian Governments
Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, cited that effects of oil spills on whales are
unlikely but any disturbance due to the oil or response may require dedicated monitoring of whale
behaviour.163 This included aerial surveillance to note the presence of any whale carcasses. The Plan
also stated that carcasses obtained should be assessed to determine whether the oil or other factors
were the cause of death.164
The Department of Environments website states that:
Marine megafauna assessment surveys are designed to identify the diversity and abundance of
marine wildlife, including whales and dolphins, in the region to determine the level of exposure to
oil. The triggers associated with the implementation of this study are:
observed proximity of marine megafauna to oil slick or response operations combined with
suggestion of significant harm (i.e. not an isolated incident); or
observed incident of harm attributable to oil or the response.
While daily aerial and vessel-based surveillance observed dolphins in the vicinity of the oil spill,
no confirmed reports of impacts were received; therefore this study has not been triggered.165
(emphasis added)
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However, by the time that this agreement was in place, a whale carcass had already been spotted one
month earlier on the coast of Oecusse by fisheries expert Richard Mounsey, around the same time that
he witnessed a milky fog in the water.
Following the Gulf of Mexico spill, research has found that assessments of the impact of
anthropogenic events based solely on the numbers of carcasses recovered are deceptively biased.166
Researchers describe that a problematic issue arises when policymakers, legislators, or biologists
treat these carcass-recovery counts as though they were complete counts or parameters estimated
from some representative sample, when in fact, they are opportunistic observations.167 In short, the
findings of carcasses can be an underestimation of the larger picture of damage.
2.13 Advocacy of the West Timor Care Foundation

2.13.1 Ferdi Tanoni
In 1997, Mr Ferdi Tanoni founded the West Timor Care Foundation (in Indonesian: Yayasan Peduli
Timor Barat, or YPTB) (WTCF), following the independence of Timor Leste. He continues to serve as
chairman of WTCF.
WTCFs extensive advocacy and achievements in raising awareness of impacts experienced in
Indonesia cannot be overstated.
Figure 70: Ferdi Tanoni travels to an affected community, NTT, October 2014. Courtesy: Bright Day Films
Ferdi Tanoni was already well-known to fishermen in the area before the spill. Author of 2008s Skandal
de Laut Timor (The Scandal of the Timor Sea), Mr Tanoni, a businessman, has become a renowned
grassroots advocate for communities in the area.
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In April 2003, regional leaders and kings gathered at a conference in Kupang, concerned about
agreements held between Australia and Indonesia that were inflicting a loss upon the present and
next generations of people in West Timor, Rote Ndao, Sabu and Alor.168
The holders of customary/traditional rights of the Timor Sea gave full mandate to Ferdi Tanoni as the
Chairman of the Timor Gap and Ashmore Reefs Task Force to represent their traditional rights and
interests. This became known as the Insana Declaration.
2.13.2 Submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry

In 2010, WTCF was the only Indonesian organisation to provide a submission to the Montara
Commission of Inquiry.
With the Inquiry announced on 5 November 2009, and submissions due by 22 December 2009,169 a
small window was provided for opportunity to comment.
WTCFs submission was submitted late, on 11 May 2010, and acknowledged its difficulties in
gathering evidence within the time frame provided, citing the wish to appropriately assess the oils
progress in the province before providing comment:
However, we ask [the submission] to be considered due to exceptional circumstances. First,
following the initial uncontrolled release in September 2009, the oil moved at a slower pace
into Indonesian waters and then more slowly again into the direct fishing and seaweed farming
regions of NTT, Indonesia. Thus, when the initial calls for submissions were first released, the
Foundation did not feel it had the requisite information or evidence to make a submission.170
2.13.3 Submission on the Draft Government Response to the

Montara Commission of Inquiry
WTCFs subsequent submission to the Draft Government Response to the Montara Commission of
Inquiry was also the only submission provided by an Indonesian body.
WTCF raised its concerns that the recommendations did not cover marine casualties and pollution by
oil and hazardous noxious substances beyond Commonwealth waters.171
WTCF detailed the shortcomings of the Draft Government Response, including failure to address:
the overall evidence of oil and dispersants in Indonesian waters following the Montara blowout;
AMSAs decision to use Corexit EC9500 and other dispersants, and the impact that it has had
on the environment, health and economic livelihoods of the peoples of West Timor;
Australias obligations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and under the 1996
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and Indonesia on oil
pollution preparedness and response.172
WTCF stated concerns about the use of dispersants, including Corexit EC9500 and Corexit EC9527A,
citing their wide use in the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, and subsequent links to widespread long-lasting
health impacts among people from surrounding areas, including respiratory, nervous system, liver,
kidney and blood disorders.173
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After the Spill
WTCF cited that the data regarding the number and amounts of dispersants used indicated the lack of
knowledge that AMSA possessed throughout critical stages of the Montara blowouts development.174
2.13.4 Authority given for legal claim

In 2011, Mr Tanoni sought contemporary authority, and the issue of legal representation was raised at
a conference sponsored by the Ministry of Tourism of NTT Province (referred to as The Dialogue of the
Kings of NTT Province on 11 June 2011). The new conference endorsed the Reaffirmation of the Insana
Declaration.
Mr Tanoni addressed the June 2011 conference of 700 officials including high-ranking army, police, and
attorneys at provincial and regency levels, the mayor ofthe South Central Regency, church leaders,
university representatives, the Deputy-Governor of NTT and the Kings. Mr Tanoni, as chairman of the
Task Force, was endorsed by the delegates specifically to represent their interests in the matter of the
Montara oil spill.
Mr Tanoni was thus elected to represent the communities of NTT in all discussions and negotiations
concerning their traditional rights and interests in relation to the Timor Sea.
Figure 71: Ferdi Tanoni listens to a seaweed farmer whose livelihood has been affected, October 2014. Courtesy: Bright Day Films
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After the Spill
2.13.5 Recipient, Australian Lawyers Alliance Civil Justice Award

In October 2013, Mr Tanoni was presented with the Australian Lawyers Alliance National Civil Justice
Award, in recognition of his dedicated efforts to raise international awareness about the reported
impacts of the Montara oil spill in the region.
Since 2009, Mr Tanoni has built up an extensive network of international experts, scientists, lawyers
and academics who have offered support. He has regularly featured in the local, domestic and
international media, from the local Kupang dailies and Indonesian television networks, to the Jakarta
Globe, Australian news sources such as ABC News, SBS, The West Australian, Nine News, and
international news sources such as Antara, Aljazeera, NBC News, the Shanghai Daily and many other
publications.
Figure 72: Ferdi Tanoni accepts the National Civil Justice Award 2013 from Australian Lawyers Alliance 2013 National President Geraldine Collins.
Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance
In his acceptance speech, (an edited extract of which was published on New Matilda175) Mr Tanoni
stated:
I am deeply honoured to receive this Civil Justice Award which I humbly accept on behalf of
the fishermen and their families in West Timor.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Ms Geraldine Collins and all the members of the
Australian Lawyers Alliance for your diligence in seeking out our cause for justice against
multinational companies who were more concerned about their balance sheets and diplomatic
affairs than the lives and tribulations of poor fisher folk.
I would also like to thank the many organizers working behind the scenes. And to you the
audience, I salute you and truly hope this award is only the beginning of the support we can
muster for the impoverished people living so very, very close to Australia.
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Many people ask me why I do it.

Why do I stand up for the rights of traditional fishermen who wander into Australian territorial
waters, often with little more than a leaky boat, a raggedyold sail and a simple fishing line?
Why do I continually support fishers and their families in the province of NTT against threats
from nature? Why do I take on multinational polluters of Indonesian waters that has resulted in
immense fish losses and massive aquaculture collapses?
Well, I tell you its not from my love of fish.Nor do I have a close affiliation with the sea. Im
allergic to seafood and prone to chronic sea sickness.
Why? Because of the people. When I hear the saying the salt of the earth I cant help but
think they mean the salt of the sea.
The poorer the fishing community, the more united the people, and my lot are extremely poor.
To see these people toiling to help each other, the friendship and generosity they bestow on
strangers, the love of family and friends and their closeness with nature are traits most of us
have lost generations ago.
But it is not only my people.Over the years I have been privileged to meet others, mostly
Australians, who also open their hearts and freely share their skills and knowledge to advance
our endless struggles for justice.
From data collecting volunteers to lawyers, from fisheries managers to leading marine
scientists, I have an array of experts who are willing to help whenever it is humanly
possible.However, we need more, and we need funding to take on the big guns.
Unfortunately, even with a mountain of evidence the shutters have come down; unfortunately
some members of your past government were quick to bury their heads in the sand.
There are many horror stories which in all appearance are directly connected to poisoning from
chemical dispersants and oil flowing from the Montara oil spill disaster.
194,000 litres of toxic dispersants were sprayed onto millions of litres of oil which gushed from
Montara for 74 days into the Timor Sea to create a poisonous cocktail which has ruined the
simple life of thousands of East Nusa Tenggara citizens.
Fishermen across the region have been forced out of fishing following the Montara oil spill in
2009.
The Montara oil spill not only affected fishing along the border but devastated fisheries and
seaweed farms throughout East Nusa Tenggara province. For 4 years now we have been
fighting with the oil company to face its responsibility to the communities.
Why does the oil company refuse to conduct proper scientific research? The answer is
obvious, the oil company is scared of what will be found in the beautiful waters of the
Timor Sea.
104
After the Spill
We will not give up. We must have an independent investigation as to the environmental,
social and economic impacts. When this is done we can begin to discuss remediation and
compensation and rebuild the life of our communities.
We will not rest until this happens. We will not rest until the poison in the Timor Sea is cured;
the fisheries are restored; seaweed farms have returned to production; people are released
from poverty; thousands of children from across the islands are able to return to school again;
it is safe to eat the fish from the sea; the sickness is cured; and those who have lost loved ones
are compensated.176
2.13.6 International seminar, Kupang

On 18 February 2014, WTCF and the University of Nusa Cedana Kupang hosted a two-day seminar in
Kupang, West Timor, highlighting the injustices faced by communities in the NTT region since 2009.
The seminar, entitled The Humanitarian Tragedy Due to the Explosion of the Montara Wellhead
Platform in the Timor Sea, included prominent experts, researchers and government officials as
speakers:
Dr Robert B Spies, President of Marine Applied Science and Head Scientist, US Government
for Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Disaster in Alaska, 1989;
Senator Rachel Siewert, Senator for Western Australia;
Professor Ir Frederik L Benu, MSi, PhD , Rector of Nusa Cendana University, Kupang;
Dr. Leonard Haning, Bupati (Mayor) of Rote Ndao Regency;
Ayub Titu Eki PhD, Bupati (Mayor) of Kupang Regency;
Professor Ir. Mukhtasor, M Eng PhD, Member of National Energy Council (DEN), Executive
Director of Indonesian Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies;
Greg Phelps, Lawyer, Ward Keller, Darwin.
105
After the Spill
Figure 73: International seminar, Kupang, 18 February 2014. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance.
Figure 74: Attendees at the international seminar, Kupang, 18 February 2014. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance.
Extracts of their speeches are highlighted below.

Dr Leonard Haning, Bupati of Rote Ndao Regency, said that:
The Rote Ndao community are crying for their lives, because of the Montara oil spill [that has]
killed their livelihoods.
106
After the Spill
Inevitably, this situation forced me to answer the [suffering] of the people to appoint a third
party that is considered capable, credible and competent to represent the government and
the people of Rote Ndao in the settlement of the Montara oil spill disaster. My expectation at
that time [was that] the steps that I took will be followed by other regents whose area was also
affected.
The third-party supported and designated was WTCF, which will immediately initiate efforts in
resolving this case.177
The Mayor of Kupang Regency, Ayub Titu Eki, stated:
My view is not much different with the opinion of the Regent of Rote Ndao. To prove whether
it is true or not that the people of NTT have been affected by the Montara oil pollution, I have
invited Senator Rachel Siewert to witness it first hand in Tablolong village, West Kupang a
direct dialogue was held between the people affected and the Senator.
The step of the Regent of Rote Ndao to appoint [WTCF] as a third party in order to expedite
the resolution of the Montara oil spill disaster is a right step and I have done the same. The
[people] in this area must and should unite our collective attitudes and actions to show not
only the central government in Jakarta, but also the Australian government in Canberra and the
international community that unfair treatment has been imposed on our brothers and sisters
who are affected by the disaster in our area. 178
Professor Ir Frederik L Benu stated that:
The presence of [the university] in the midst of the NTT population, is not merely focused on
the learning process, in addition it has [a] greater role of finding solutions to social problems
encountered by NTT citizens.
As such, [the university] believes that the Montara oil spill disaster, which has lasted for almost
5 years, has not seen any sign of the settlement, while the people of NTT who have become
the victims of it, continue to suffer from a disaster affecting their life.
It deserves serious attention in the form of a proper, independent, and transparent scientific
study that involves all stakeholders in order to accurately determine the social, economic and
ecological loss and the impact to the health of NTT citizens.179
Dr Spies noted:
There is no doubt in my mind that a great volume of oil has affected the sea around West
Timor. I have no doubt in my mind based on my experience, and the statement of among
others, the fishermen and seaweed farmers in Indonesia and an Australian NGO which
confirmed that they have witnessed the large oil spill in Indonesian waters after the explosion
of the Montara well head.
In addition, there were many witnesses, and there are pictures and videos [which] showed oil
and dead fish on the surface of the sea. Moreover, an American satellite company, SkyTruth,
confirms the same by showing the satellite images which depicted the oil spill from Australian
waters [intruding] far into Indonesian waters. Therefore, there are five main aspects of the oil
spill which must be studied immediately:
107
After the Spill
a) The presence of oil residue;

b) Impact to the sea ecosystem;
c) Impact to fish products and cultivation;
d) Socio-economic impact; and
e) Steps to restore Timor Sea to its initial condition.180
Professor Mukhtasor noted that:
There is no doubt that Indonesian waters in the Timor Sea have been highly polluted as the
result of Montara oil spill disaster that occurred on August 21, 2009.
The existing scientific evidence has clearly confirmed that Indonesian waters have been
polluted.
Supporting data includes:
a) Results of satellite imaging;
b) Field observation in Indonesian waters;
c) Modelling;
d) Laboratory testing to water quality in Indonesian and Australian waters;
e) Fingerprints of oil samples;
f) Secondary data concerning fishing;
g) Statistical questionnaires; and
h) Lessons learned from oil spills all over the world.
In addition, there has also been credible scientific research and the research results have
also clearly indicated that there are very significant social and economic losses. A more
accommodative and comprehensive study is highly needed to resolve this matter.
The resolution of this case is not only relevant to the Montara oil spill, but also serves a
reference on how the Indonesian government would handle similar cases in the future.181
Ferdi Tanoni highlighted the Agreement of the National Team on the Oil Spill Emergency Response
At Sea with WTCF. He outlined that on May 31, 2012, a meeting was held by the Timor Sea Pollution
Advocacy Team at the Aryaduta Hotel Jakarta which was attended by all relevant ministries as well as
representatives from the local governments in NTT and WTCF. In that meeting, it was agreed that:
If, as of June 2012 and not later than the end of July 2012, The Envoy Of The Government
Of The Republic Of Indonesia who is sent to meet PTTEP, the parent company of PTTEP
Australia and the Government Of Thailand in Bangkok experiences a failure and or fail to
[secure] a mutual agreement, the Chairman of [the] Timor Sea Pollution Advocacy Team will
write to WTCF Chairman to assign [these] matters to advocate for the compensation claim
108
After the Spill
rights and the interests of the civil society who have been suffered as a result of the Montara oil
pollution in the Timor Sea.182
2.13.7 Recognised by the Indonesian government

In September 2014, the efforts of WTCF and its readiness to commence a scientific study were
recognised in writing by the Indonesian governments Minister for the Environment, Professor Dr.
Balthasar Kambuaya, in correspondence to Australias Ambassador to Indonesia, Greg Moriarty.183
This presents a significant development, which should compel the Australian government into action.
109
After the Spill
Chapter 3: Evidence to consider

With PTTEP Australasia asserting that oil never reached the Indonesian coastline,
it is important to assess the available evidence.
3.1 Overview of the conflicting evidence

There is conflicting evidence as to how far the oil progressed into the Indonesian EEZ, with PTTEP
AA maintaining that it never reached the Indonesian coastline. Instead, official reports state that the
closest patch of weathered oil was observed 94 kilometres south-east of Rote Island. This figure was
provided by AMSA to the Montara Commission of Inquiry184 and is featured in PTTEP AAs Montara
Environmental Monitoring Program, Report of Research.185
However, the evidence relied upon to assert these claims is questionable. Furthermore, these claims
stand in strong contrast to eyewitness accounts in Indonesia.
Here we provide an overview of the contention surrounding the volume of oil and how far it travelled,
embassy discussions, overflight maps, satellite images, the studies relied upon by PTTEP Australasia
to assert that oil never reached the Indonesian coastline, and scientific tests that have been conducted
in Indonesia.
3.2 How much oil?

It may never be known exactly how much oil gushed into the sea during the Montara spill.
Figures regarding the number of barrels of oil spilled range from as little as 200 to 2,000 barrels per
day. (Note: one barrel is equivalent to approximately 159 litres.186) Sources on the issue continue to
disagree, with PTTEP AA, the Montara Commission of Inquiry, the Australian government and NGOs
citing differing estimates.
The first day
At approximately 5.30am on 21 August 2009, a small burp of oil and gas,187 a blowout of fluid was
reported to have been observed emanating from the H1 well. The volume was estimated at between
40 and 60 barrels188 which would be equivalent to approximately 6,360 litres to 9,540 litres.189 The flow
appeared to subside and the West Atlas rigs Offshore Installation Manager, gave the all clear at around
5.55am.190
Two hours later, at around 7.23am on 21 August 2009, the H1 Well kicked again, this time
discharging a large quantity of fluid and gas from the wellbore,191 and blowing a column of oil and
gas to the underside of the rig floor.192
Therefore, it appeared that the second kick discharged with greater force, meaning that potentially
higher volumes of oil were flowing.
While the time that the small burp of fluid began is not clear, if it is assumed to have commenced at
5.30am, at the time that it was first observed, and was flowing 40 to 60 barrels in under half an hour,
a simple extrapolation over a 24 hour period of this rate would equate to 80 to 120 barrels per hour,
110
After the Spill
or 1,920 barrels to 2,880 barrels per day (daily total: 305,280 litres to 457,920 litres). However, it is
possible that following the second kick, the oil may have been discharging at an even higher rate.
PTTEP AA
On the first day of the spill, PTTEP AA notified AMSA that the volume of the oil spilling as a result of
the blowout might be between 200 to 400 barrels per day.193 (400 barrels is equivalent to roughly 64
tonnes.194)
PTTEP AA estimated the total amount of the spill to be approximately 30,000 barrels or 4,750
tonnes.195
The Montara Commission of Inquiry noted that the well possibly leaked between 400 and 1,500
barrels of oil per day, and unknown amounts of gas, condensate and water196 during the 74-day
duration.
The Commission stated that:
In evidence given during the Inquirys public hearing, Mr Jacob of PTTEP AA advised that the
initial release of oil could have been as high as 1,000 to 1,500 barrels per day. It is possible that
the total volume may therefore have been much higher than initially estimated by PTTEP AA.197
The Commission of Inquiry also noted that patches of sheen or weathered oil products could have
affected at various times an area as large as 90,000 square kilometres.198 This is more than the total
area of Tasmania and the ACT combined.199
Australian Government
In October 2009, the Australian Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism estimated that the
volume of oil may have been as high as 2,000 barrels/day, five times the 400 barrels/day estimated by
PTTEP AA.200
At Supplementary Budget Senate Estimates on 21 October 2009, the Department of Resources,
Energy and Tourism noted that the Department had sought calculations from Geoscience Australia of
the rate of flow if the well was entirely unsealed. It was cited that the maximum leakage rate from that
well could be as much as 2,000 barrels of oil a day, with condensate as well, in addition to oil.201
This would lead to a total estimate of approximately 23,680 tonnes of oil, in contrast to PTTEP AAs
estimate of 4,750 tonnes.
Non-government organisations
Kimberly Whale Watching noted in its submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry that
estimates of total spill volumes range from 4.6 million litres to 23.2 and 34.8 million litres
respectively.202
Production at the Montara field
The Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism also cited comparator wells in the Montara field:
111
After the Spill
The Montara H1 ST1 well [the wellhead that exploded in 2009] had not been tested for
production at the time of the uncontrolled release, nor was any drilling being undertaken on the
well.
However, there were three exploration wells drilled at Montara, which were drilled in different
locations to the Montara wellhead platform. Two of these exploration wells had production
tests undertaken.
Montara-1 (drilled in 1988) flowed oil at a maximum rate of approximately 5,700 barrels per day
while Montara-3 (drilled in 2002) flowed oil at a maximum rate of approximately 5,000 barrels
per day.203
On 4 June 2013, production commenced at the Montara oilfield,204 with a capacity to initially produce
21,000 barrels of oil per day. The development of a fourth production well was planned for the second
half of 2013.205
In July 2014, production forecasts released by Argus Media identified that Montaras output
accelerated to 25,000 barrels/day in April-June 2014, up from 12,000 barrels/day in the first quarter.206
Comparison to other major incidents in Australia
The Montara Commission of Inquiry noted that:
Based on the estimate of 400 barrels per day, the volume of oil spilled from the Montara
wellhead platform makes the blowout Australias thirdlargest oil spill. Only two oil spills from
the tanker Kirki in 1991 and the Princess Anne Marie in 1975 were larger.207
The following table depicts summaries of estimated totals of approximate volumes of oil.208
112
Total volume of oil
34,099t
33.886 million litres
113
5,000 barrels
April June 2014
25,000 barrels/day
n/a
January April 2014
12,000 barrels/day
Maximum production amount at

Montara-3 (drilled in 2002)
Production at the Montara wellhead

in 2014
n/a
n/a
Maximum production amount at

Montara-1 (drilled in 1988)
142,080t or
n/a
Lower estimate of
production over 74 days
Comparator wells production
296,000t or
59,200t or
67,488t or
Higher estimate of
production over 74 days
14,800t210
22,732t or
Princess Anne Marie tanker spill, 1975
5,700 barrels
2,880 barrels
17,760t or
4,736t or
23,680t or 23.523 million

litres
4,736t or
2,368t or
n/a
Subsequent
high estimate total
Subsequent
low estimate total
17,280t209
1,920 barrels
2,000 barrels
1,500 barrels
400 barrels
Higher estimate
(per day)
Kirki tanker spill, WA, 21 July 1991
Major incidents in Australia
Simple extrapolation based on initial

volume of oil dispersed on 21 August 2009
until 5.55am
n/a
400 barrels
Department of Resources, Energy and

Tourism
200 barrels
Lower estimate
(per day)
PTTEP Australasia
Organisation
Table 4. Summary of alternative estimates of total amount of oil
After the Spill

After the Spill
Following the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, similar contention existed regarding
the volume of oil.
While both the US government and BP agreed that 810,000 barrels (129 million litres) of escaped oil
were captured before it could pollute the Gulf,211 the totals were quite different. Government experts
estimated that 4.2 million barrels (666 million litres), spilled into the Gulf.212 By contrast, BP urged the
courts to use almost half this estimate: an estimate of 2.45 million barrels, (or nearly 390 million litres),
in calculating any Clean Water Act penalties (which are determined per barrel). In 2015, Judge Carl
Barbier ruled that the total was 3.2 million barrels,213 a decision which has since been appealed by the
US government.
3.3 How far did the oil go?

No precise evidence currently exists as to how far the oil and dispersants travelled.
Although water samples were taken during the response, this was primarily directed at operational
matters associated with the clean-up. Water samples were also not directed at establishing the
spread of the oil/dispersant mix, which mainly affects the five metres of the water column below the
surface.214
The Commission of Inquiry noted, at Finding 84, that:
The Inquiry has not seen data that indicated the distribution of the oil and dispersant mix
beneath the sea surface.
This is a major shortcoming of the response.
There should have been a thorough subsurface sampling of the oil/dispersant mix. This was
important to inform judgements about the environmental consequences of the blowout.215
In considering the distance that the oil may have travelled, it is relevant to consider the operations
undertaken to contain the oil.
Dispersant operations commenced on 23 August and continued until 1 November 2009.216 Therefore,
it appears that for the first two days of the spill: 21 and 22 August, there was potentially no barrier,
chemical or otherwise, to the spread of the oil.
Offshore containment and recovery operations commenced on 5 September 2009 and continued
until 30 November 2009, although no recoverable oil was located after 15 November 2009.217 AMSA
response operations continued until 3 December 2009.218
These containment and recovery operations involved:
two vessels working together joined by a 300-metre containment boom, with a skimmer
operating in the boom pocket to recover the oil.
For much of the response, two pairs of vessels undertook these operations. A total of 844,000
litres of product was recovered. It is estimated that some 493,000 litres of this oil-water mixture
was oil.219
114
After the Spill
Therefore, for the first fifteen days of the response from 21 August 2009 to 5 September 2009,
dispersants may have been the only barrier to the spread of oil.
A number of leading non-government organisations made submissions to the Montara Commission
of Inquiry, noting their concerns as to environmental damage and the inadequacy of the clean-up and
ongoing monitoring. These included, among many others, WWF, the Australian Marine Conservation
Society and the Australian Conservation Foundation.220
Representatives of Kimberley Whale Watching noted that:
I was shocked to see the extent of the oil spill and to see that no effort was being made to
contain the oil around the rig or to recover the oil. Sea surface conditions around the rig were
smooth because of the continuous heavy sheen of oil on the surface. Boom equipment could
have been successfully deployed to contain the oil under these conditions.
Observations made on the 28th August did not support claims by PTTEP, AMSA, the Federal
Minister for Resources and the Federal Minister for Transport that the spill was being contained
by dispersants and that the light oil would evaporate naturally.221
Since the incident, PTTEP AA has been involved in assessing the damage in the Timor Sea, with 12
reports recorded in its Montara Environmental Monitoring Program. However, none of this research has
taken place within Indonesian waters.
As PTTEP AA details:
Working through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, PTTEP AA requested
permission from Jakarta to conduct environmental testing in Indonesian waters during the spill.
Permission was not granted.
Instead, Indonesia dispatched one of its navy ships to the immediate coastal areas. It reported
that no oil was found. PTTEP AA subsequently offered to reimburse the government of
Indonesia for the costs incurred by the naval mission.222
Instead, research organisations commissioned by PTTEP AA have collated evidence and researched
within Australian waters.
To date, PTTEP AA claims that no valid scientific evidence has been presented by the Indonesian
government to provide support for claims of any inshore or onshore impacts.223
3.4 Embassy discussions

The Australian embassy in Indonesia cited in a media release in November 2009 that:
The Australian Embassy in Jakarta notified Indonesia as soon as possible after satellite
imagery showed on 1 September 2009 that small patches of weathered oil had crossed into
Indonesias EEZ
Overflights have indicated that isolated patches of weathered oil and sheen have remained
within Indonesias EEZ. The closest patch of weathered oil was observed on 21 September
some 94 kilometres south-east of Roti Island. Overflights indicate primarily sheen within the
115
After the Spill
Indonesian EEZ, with occasional small patches of weathered oil. The main part of the oil spill
is now more than 248 kilometres from the Indonesian coastline. The sheen is of a silver colour
in appearance and is typically around 0.0001 mm in thickness. It poses no environmental
hazard for shorelines but can be of concern to birdlife. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority
(AMSA) assesses that the type and amount of oil that has been observed in Indonesias EEZ
poses no significant threat to the marine environment.224
However, this figure of 94 kilometres as the closest point of weathered oil appears to be at odds with
a presentation from the Indonesian government to the Australian government on 10 November 2009
which revealed that:
On 10 September 2009, the position of the oil spill on the sea surface closest to the
Indonesian coast was 67.7km (37.76 Nm) south-east of the island of Rote, NTT [as measured
by MODIS imagery].225 (emphasis added)
The presentation furthermore concluded that if the spread of oil slicks after 17 October 2009 was not
significantly visible, this did not mean that there was no pollution impact, but may be explained by the
inability of satellites to operate beyond the maximum depth of 20 metres.226 (MODIS imagery does not
have the capacity to recognise objects at depths of more than 20 metres underwater.227)
It is clear that a number of sources identify the oil as encroaching further than the official report of 94
kilometres from Rote.
3.5 Overflight maps

Maps were released to the Australian Lawyers Alliance under freedom of information laws that were
also provided by AMSA to the Montara Commission of Inquiry. These maps demonstrate that AMSA
observed oil and sheen on several occasions far closer to the Indonesian coastline than the official
figure of 94 kilometres from Rote Island. The maps also indicate that oil moved quickly from the
wellhead.
It is important to remember that the Commission of Inquiry considered that AMSA responded
exceptionally well to an incident that was beyond its first-hand experience and in a remote and difficult
location. AMSA should be commended.228
However, it must be noted that there may have been a number of limitations regarding the evidence
provided by the surveillance flights, including geography, selectivity, and difficulty in monitoring the
type of oil, especially considering its similarity to natural phenomena.
In viewing these maps, it is important to note AMSAs response to the spill and recovery operations
outlined: with chemical dispersants applied from day 3, and boom and recovery operations acting as a
physical barrier to oil commencing on day 15.
116
After the Spill
A map dated 30 31 August 2009 (day 9 10 of the spill) indicated that oil was observed crossing
into the Indonesian EEZ. Patches of heavy oil were also observed moving north towards the EEZ. It is
questionable as to what attempts were made to recover these patches of oil, especially considering
the fact that offshore containment and recovery operations commenced on 5 September 2009, and
that dispersant operations (commencing 23 August) were mainly located in proximity to the Montara
wellhead.
Figure 75: West Atlas Extent of oil slick, 30 31 August 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
117
After the Spill
Figure 76: Montara Well - Extents of observed oil, 4 September 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
A map dated 4 September 2009 indicated that patchy oil/sheen had significantly traversed into the
Indonesian EEZ.
118
After the Spill
A map contained in a folder marked 13 September 2009 (day 24 of the spill) noted that sheen was
observed within 37 nautical miles (approximately 69 kilometres) off the southern coast of Rote Island,
and 48 nautical miles (approximately 89 kilometres) from the northern coast.
AMSA noted in a media release in October 2014 that these figures reflect surface and aerial
observations made at the time. However, while the figures quoted on these maps are accurate, these
maps were produced as power point slides for briefing material and are not to scale. Consequently
these maps cannot be used to extrapolate accurate distances.229
Figure 77: Untitled, 13 September 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
119
After the Spill
A map dated 16 September 2009 (day 27 of the spill) revealed that 10 per cent sheen had been
observed 31 nautical miles (57 kilometres) from the coast of Rote.
Figure 78: Montara Well Flight Report Sortie 1, 16 September 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
Given that the closest point of the overflight was more than 31 nautical miles from the coast, it is
unknown how much closer sheen would have been observed had the flight path travelled closer to the
Indonesian coastline.
120
After the Spill
A map marked 21 September 2009 (day 32 of the spill) noted that the coverage of oil is 10 to 50 per
cent sheen. This map appears to be the map utilised for official estimates, with closest reported oil to
the Indonesian coastline recorded at a distance of 51 nautical miles, or 94 kilometres, recorded from
Rote Island. 230
Figure 79: Location of oil reported 21 September 2009 (closest reported oil to Indonesian coastline) Courtesy: AMSA
It must be noted that this was the closest that the overflight came to the coast of Rote on the date of
21 September.
It is questionable as to whether oil or sheen may have been sighted closer to the Rote coast had the
flight path traversed closer to the coastline.
Strangely, the flight path to monitor the oils reach did not travel even to the same distance from the
coast of Rote of 37 nautical miles, as it did on 13 September 2009; or 31 nautical miles, as it did on
16 September 2009.
It may have been a reasonable expectation that observations of sheen or oil made on these days
would have been closely followed to ensure accurate monitoring of the oils movement.
Furthermore, it does not appear that flight paths travelled substantially closer than 31 nautical miles
from the coast of Rote at any time during the response to monitor the oil.
121
After the Spill
A map dated 23 September 2009 (day 33 of the spill) indicated that sheen, and sheen with orange
patches, was observed off the West Timorese coast.
Figure 80: Montara Well Flight Report Sortie 5, 23 September 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
Assuming that the maps coordinates are accurate, this could mean that the sheen could have
been within approximately 27 nautical miles off the West Timorese coast: far closer than the 94
kilometres estimated just two days earlier on 21 September 2009.
This raises the question: what was the true position of the sheen on 21 September 2009, 31 days into
a 74 day spill?
It is also questionable as to whether these orange patches sighted on 23 September 2009 could
indicate the formation of water-in-oil emulsions, or mousse.
The Bonn Agreement Oil Appearance Code was adopted as the standard method for assessing the
volume of oil on water for the purposes of response and prosecution. It provides a description of
appearances of oil (including colours), while also noting that:
the colour of an oil film depends on the way the light waves of different lengths are reflected
off the oil surface, transmitted through the oil (and reflected off the water surface below the oil)
and absorbed by the oil. The observed colour is the result of a combination of these factors; it
is also dependant on the type of oil spilled.231
122
After the Spill
The Bonn Agreement notes that:

Spills of crude oil and some fuel oil are frequently attended by the rapid formation of waterin-oil emulsions (mousse) which are often characterised by a brown/orange colouration and
a cohesive appearance. The Appearance Code SHOULD NOT be used to quantify areas of
emulsion.232 (emphasis original)
The Bonn Agreement further notes that:
Reliable estimates of water content in an emulsion are not possible without laboratory
analysis, but accepting that figures of 50% to 80% are typical, approximate calculations of oil
quantity can be made, given that most floating emulsions are 1 mm or more thick.233
In remarks at Senate Estimates in October 2010, the reports of AMSAs surveillance aircraft were
discussed in relation to claims of damage in Indonesia.
Senator Rachel Siewert asked:
Could the Minister inform the Senate whether impacts on Indonesian fishers and communities
on Rote Island and in West Timor have been identified? Is the government prepared to ensure
that reparations are provided to the fishers and those communities? 234
Senator the Hon. John Faulkner, then-Minister for Defence, representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs
said:
I can certainly say, that the Australian government intends to continue to keep Indonesia
closely informed of developments, including the implementation of the environmental
monitoring plan. I can say to you that Australia will continue to act fully consistently with
international law and our strong bilateral relationships in responding to this incident.
AMSA assesses that, based on the reports of surveillance aircraft during the response, the oil
observed in Indonesias EEZ posed no significant threat to the marine environment.
The reports of significant quantities of oil in Indonesian waters, I am informed, are not
consistent with observations from surveillance aircraft throughout the incident, so I am not
aware of a basis for a compensation claim.235 (emphasis added)
3.5.1.1 Selectivity
While 130 surveillance flights were conducted throughout the entire duration of the operation,236 over
the duration of the spill, there was a large area requiring response, with an area as large as 90,000
square kilometres of patches of sheen or weathered oil at various times.237
Given the large area to survey, geographical areas were needed to be selected for overflight
surveillance. Any observation of oil via surveillance flight on any particular day was limited to the
geographic area in which flights were undertaken.
While overflight maps contain the phrase distance from Indonesia to closest observed oil, it must be
noted that this is the distance measured to oil that has been observed only, and is not a conclusive
record of the position of all oil on that day, some of which may not have been the target of observation.
For example, in the satellite image below dated 6 November 2009, a large dark patch is apparent at
the top of the image. However, no surveillance flights were deployed on this particular day to assess
its characteristics.
123
Figure 81: Montara Well Spill, 6 November 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
124
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Distance from East Holothuria Reef to

closest observed oil
22 kilometres / 12 nautical miles
Distance from West Atlas rig to most

easterly observed oil
163 km / 88 nm
No Oil/Sheen
Natural Phenomena
Natural Phenomena/Patches White
Patches Orange/Yellow
Windrows Orange/Yellow
Windrows White
Windrows Yellow
Windrows White/Yellow
Windrows Yellow
Patches Orange
Patches Orange/Sheen
Sheen
Streaks/Lines Orange
Streaks/Lines White
Streaks/Lines Yellow
Australian Maritime Boundaries 2006 3nm
Joint Petroleum Development Area
Aust-Indo Delimitation Treaty 1997 (EEZ)
Cessna, Sortie 1
Cessna, Sortie 2
Dornier, Sortie 1
Dornier, Sorite 2
Flight_Paths_06Nov09
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Aerial Observations 06 Nov 2009

Classification
Legend
Maluku
Northern Territory
Western Australia
_Montara
Nusa Tenggara Timur
Timor Leste
- Aerial observation points from Surveillance Flight Reports 06 November 2009.

- Points labelled with Reference numbers from report (Red Cessna) (BlackDornier).
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Distance from WA coastline to

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Distance from Cartier Island to

44 kilometers / 24 nautical miles
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Distance from Indonesia to

66
Bayu Undan Bayu Undan
06 November 2009
11S
12S
13S
14S
Montara Well Spill
After the Spill

After the Spill
3.5.1.2 Proximity to the Indonesian coastline

Further, as seen in the maps above, the progression of the oil was not monitored by overflight data
significantly closer to the Indonesian coastline than a distance of 57 kilometres. We are also unaware
as to whether any arrangements were made by the Australian government with the Indonesian
government for surveillance flights to significantly enter into Indonesian airspace.
In addition, aircraft did not significantly monitor the spread of oil in the western Timor Sea to the west
of Rote Island, including in proximity to the island of Dana (near Rote Island) and Sabu Islands.
The closest points of the flight paths to Rote Island in September 2009 appear to have been
(approximately):
13 September 2009 unknown, however sheen was witnessed within 37 nautical miles from
Rote;
(15 September 2009 a decision was made to monitor the spread of the oil near the Western
Australian coast, far from the coast of Rote);
16 September 2009 31 nautical miles from Rote;
18 September 2009 60 nautical miles from Rote;
19 September 2009 75 nautical miles from Rote; and
21 September 2009 51 nautical miles from Rote.
Some maps recording observations are also missing Rote Island, such as a composite map recording
observations over 16 and 17 September 2009, in which Rote Island is absent from the top left
quadrant. It is unknown as to why this may have occurred.
125
After the Spill
Figure 82: Montara well- composite map from observations recorded on 16-09-2009 and 17-09-2009, 16 17 September 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
3.5.1.3 Recording of sheen

It also appears that there is inconsistency throughout some of the maps, with the legend recording in a
singular unit no oil/sheen and simply sheen in others.
For example, a composite map dated 28 November 2009, the last map of the response, indicates this
inconsistency, with Dornier Sortie 1 identifying no oil/sheen and Cessna Sortie 1 identifying sheen 82
nautical miles from the West Timorese coast.
126
After the Spill
Figure 83: Montara Well Spill, 28 November 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
3.5.1.4 Similarity to natural occurrences

Natural phenomenon occurring in the Timor Sea are similar in appearance to oil and wax in
appearance, including algal blooms and coral spawn.
In some of the overflight maps, areas which were previously in close proximity to oil, such as the West
Australian coast, have had anomalies noted as natural phenomenon. However, it is questionable
whether, on the balance of probabilities, these observations were in fact, correct.
Further exploration is required of the checks and balances that were in place to ensure objectivity
of observation in determinations of quantities of sheen and the determination of natural phenomena
(versus oil) during surveillance flights.
3.5.1.5 Wax and low concentrations

The limited ability of surveillance aircraft to observe low concentrations of oil has also been identified
in studies commissioned by PTTEP AA.
PTTEP AAs Report of Research noted in its study of oil fate and effects assessment, spill trajectory
analysis, that:
127
After the Spill
persistent compounds of spilt liquids, particularly its wax content, were likely to continue
to exist and may have travelled beyond the extent shown but at concentrations/coverage
which was so low as to be difficult to accurately place or observe from the overflight or satellite
images.238 (emphasis added)
AMSA later found waxy substances deposited on the coast of Ashmore Reef. However, the movement
of oil in the surveillance flights did not appear to indicate the presence of such substances.239 The
oil stranding was analysed and found to be highly weathered wax residues, indicating the likely
characteristics of any occurrences at these distances from Montara.240
While surveillance aircraft made a number of observations regarding the movement of oil and sheen,
eyewitness observations were also made from the boats of fishermen and from the coastline of NTT.
These observations should also be taken into account.
3.5.1.6 Other challenges to observations

It is also questionable as to whether the colour of Montara oil made it difficult to witness, especially
when combined with dispersant.
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), described as the leading not-for-profit
marine ship pollution response advisers,241 states that:
Visual observation of effectiveness [of dispersant] from a vessel or aerial platform is key
but may be difficult in poor weather conditions, in waters with high sediment content, when
dispersing pale-coloured oils, or in poor light.242 (emphasis added)
We note that Montara oil has been recorded as light orange or brown in colour.243
3.6 Satellite images

During the incident response to Montara, extensive daily overflight observations were undertaken by
AMSA. This overflight data made it possible to accurately map daily slick positions and to interpret
observations made by the MODIS (Aqua and Terra) and LandSat (5 and 7) satellites when these were
available.244
3.6.1 Analysing released satellite images

AMSA released a number of satellite images to the Australian Lawyers Alliance alongside the overflight
maps in October 2014.
128
After the Spill
Satellite imagery captured on 10 September 2009 (day 21) appears to indicate a large dark patch.
However, the upper quadrants in the imagery, which would have been relevant to assess the proximity
to Indonesia, has not been captured.
Figure 84: Satellite Imagery (TERRA), 10 September 2009. Courtesy: AMSA
129
After the Spill
A satellite image dated 17 September 2009 (day 28 of the spill) appears to indicate small dark patches
north of Rote Islands coast and south of the coast of West Timor. It is unclear as to whether these
dark patches could be oil or the shadows of clouds.
However, the positioning of scattered dark patches close to Rotes western coast appears to correlate
with eyewitness accounts provided in the south coast of Rote that heavy oil washed onto their beach
on or about 13 - 16 September 2009. Villagers reported that the strong currents across the base of
Rotes southern coast swept the oil away from the beach after a number of days.
A large dark patch also appears present to the north of the line of cloud running through the centre of
the image.
130
After the Spill
A close up of a satellite image in a folder marked 22 September 2009 (day 33 of the spill) appears to
record a dark patch north of Sabu Island, which could be cloud cover. However, there are also dark
patches off the coast of Rote Island and the southern coast of Semau Island which appear to be
consistent with the map above. The dark patch at the south of West Timor as seen on 17 September
2009 appears to have moved west through the channel between Rote and West Timor, the Rote Strait,
and is off the south-western coast of Semau Island.
So too, the scattered dark patches off Rotes southern coast appear to have moved east towards the
middle of Rotes northern coast.
131
After the Spill
Figure 87: Colour modified image of Untitled, 22 September 2009.
A colour-modified version of the map more clearly reveals the position of these dark patches.
Non-profit organisation SkyTruth also recorded satellite imagery surrounding the Montara oil spill.245
SkyTruth noted that the slick will not be visible in every image; viewing conditions have to be perfect
for a thin sheen of oil or droplets to be visible in photo-like satellite imagery.246
SkyTruth also noted that:
Oil spills are usually difficult to see in natural-colour (photo-like) satellite images, especially
in the open ocean. Because the ocean surface is already so dark, the additional darkening or
slight colour change that results from a spill is usually imperceptible, especially once it starts to
disperse. Occasionally, viewing conditions are right, however, and the location of the oil slick
coincides with the sun glint area of an image. What that happens, the slicks become more
visible.247
3.6.2 MODIS satellite data

However, there were shortcomings in the MODIS satellite data. Asia-Pacific ASA acknowledged this in
their spill trajectory analysis, noting that MODIS satellite data was:
more problematic to utilise due to cloud cover and slight daily changes in satellite over-pass
times. On average, about one satellite image per week provided a wide area view of the spill
region that enabled any slicks to be observed.248 (emphasis added)
Asia-Pacific ASA also noted that MODIS satellite data was also more easily interpreted when used in
tandem with other evidence:
[MODIS satellite data was] more easily interpreted when the AMSA geo-referenced overflight
data was overlayed upon the geo-referenced image. By incorporating the field observations
over the satellite images, it was possible to identify what features evident within the satellite
image were spill related. 249
132
After the Spill
Asia-Pacific ASA also noted that:

features that could be seen within the satellite image that did not correspond to an overflight
observation were still assumed to be spill related
Additional LandSat imagery was available less frequently and usually 2 to 3 weeks after
the acquisition date but at a higher resolution (30m x 30m) to the MODIS sensors (250m x
250m).250 (emphasis added)
It is unclear whether these assumptions regarding relationship to the spill were attributed to any
features in the satellite image that significantly crossed the Indonesian EEZ, or that came close to the
Australian coastline.
In 2010, Li et al, researchers at the University of NSW, further identified the shortcomings of the
MODIS satellite data, noting that cloud cover presents a serious challenge to observation.251
This could especially be of relevance to the finding that no recoverable oil was identified in the Timor
Sea by overflight or MODIS satellite surveillance after 15 November 2009.252
The prevailing weather patterns in November in the Timor Sea would mean that there were large
amounts of cloud cover, which could hinder the quality of MODIS satellite surveillance.
Heavy rain accompanies north-westerly winds between November and March in the Timor Sea.253
November and April also act as transitional months, as from December to March northwest to
southwest winds prevail, bringing the principal wet season for the year to most parts of Timor.254
3.6.3 Use of radar

Li et al identified that the major disadvantage of using optical data for oil spill monitoring is the
limitation presented by solar illumination and clouds.255
By contrast, radar, an active remote sensing system which can image the Earths surface day and
night, emits electromagnetic waves in the microwave spectral region that allows the system to operate
in all weather conditions.256
When there is an incident of an oil spill:
the smooth surface of an oil slick does not reflect the incident radar waves back to the satellite
and so it appears as a dark area in the radar image, surrounded by lighter, oil-free areas.
This means that in radar images, such as those created with the Synthetic Aperture Radars
(SARs) on board the ALOS, Envisat, TerraSAR-X and COSMO-SkyMed satellites, oil-covered
areas appear dark.257
3.6.4 ALOS
The Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS) was launched by Japans Aerospace Exploration
Agency in 2006 and incorporated three remote-sensing instruments, one of which was the PALSAR,258
providing for day and night and all-weather land observation.259 For ALOS, also known as Daichi,
one of its objectives was to conduct disaster monitoring around the world.260 Communication with the
ALOS satellite ceased in 2011.261
133
After the Spill
PALSAR imagery has provided further evidence of oil in the Timor Sea.262
Li et al obtained images from the ALOS PALSAR, which revealed that the oil was migrating to the north
and east direction of the Montara Platform.263
In 2010, a study conducted by Indonesian researchers, Susantoro et al, went further and utilised
PALSAR imagery to monitor the Montara spill. Researchers obtained PALSAR imagery dated 2
September 2009; 3 October 2009 and 6 October 2009 and found that oil was detected in the north of
Seba Coast, Sabu Islands, in the Sawu Sea.264
3.6.5 Envisat
The Envisat was launched by the European Space Agency in 2002.
Li et al obtained ASAR ScanSAR data from the Envisat on 8 September 2009, which revealed that the
oil impacted a large ocean area in the north of the wellhead only 19 days after the spill.265
Li et al compared data recorded in the same region on 8 September 2009 from the MODIS (optical
data) and Envisat (radar data). Li et al found that radar image does have some advantage in detecting
oil spill events on the sea.266
3.6.5 Further examination needed

There is a need for further examination of alternative satellite imagery throughout the Timor Sea and
Sawu Sea in 2009, beyond the MODIS and LandSat data.
Other satellites that may be of utility to provide further surveillance data include the Italian Cosmo
Skymed;267 the South Korean KOMPSAT; and the German TerraSar-X which followed the growth of the
slick as it occurred 268 - an image is publicly available of slicks identified on 21 September 2009.269
It is important to note, that Geoscience Australia would potentially have had access to this data in
2009 as a distributor of imagery from the ALOS. A five-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with theJapan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)had granted Geoscience Australia the data
distribution rights for Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific Islands. This
MOU expired in December 2010.270
In February 2009, Geoscience Australia had acquired 103 satellite scenes over areas affected by
the Black Saturday fires in Victoria. Data was provided by satellites operated by the United States
(MODIS and LandSat), Korea (KOMPSAT) and Japan (ALOS), including radar datasets from the ALOS
PALSAR.271
It is important to ask: did the Australian government acquire comprehensive satellite scenes in the
Timor Sea (and Sabu Sea) from other satellites apart from the American MODIS and LandSat?
If the Australian government did not obtain data from other satellite sources, how was this decision
made?
This must be weighed especially in consideration of the fact that the ALOS was specifically designed
to provide information to the Asia-Pacific and to conduct disaster monitoring; and that alternative
satellite sources were sought just months earlier by Geoscience Australia in relation to the 2009 Black
Saturday fires.
134
After the Spill
3.7 Studies relied upon in relevance to Indonesia

The Montara Commission of Inquiry noted that, in the Inquirys view, the prolonged delay in
undertaking Scientific Monitoring of the impact of the oil spill was unacceptable272 and held that it is
unlikely that the full environmental consequences of the blowout will ever be known.273
PTTEP AA has funded a Montara Environmental Monitoring Program, with a second edition report of
research released in September 2013. The ten studies recorded, which were conducted in Australian
waters, assess shoreline via aerial surveys (one study) and ground surveys (three studies); assessment
of fish (three studies); offshore banks (one study); and oil fate and effects assessment (two studies).274
These two last studies, Oil fate and effects assessment spill trajectory analysis and Oil fate and
effects assessment dispersant oil modelling are most relevant to consider when addressing questions
of potential transboundary damage in Indonesia.
These two independent studies were undertaken by Asia-Pacific ASA and found that no dispersed oil
reached the Australian mainland or Indonesian coast.275
PTTEP AAs 2013 Report of Research notes that no oil reached the Australian mainland or Indonesian
coast the closest recorded from Australia was 35 kilometres; the closest recorded from Indonesia
was 94 kilometres.276
In February 2014, the Australian Lawyers Alliance provided a submission to the Senate Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trades Inquiry into Australias overseas development
assistance program, citing concerns regarding the above findings, concluding that we believe that
studies that claim that no oil reached the Indonesian coastline can no longer be relied upon in the face
of the evidence that lies in NTT, Indonesia.277
Data for the studies was gathered from real time field and overflight data and satellite observations,
and integrated into hind cast oil spill trajectory modelling, a statistical calculation used to determine
likely past conditions.278
We have described the limitation of the overflight data and satellite imagery above.
The oil fate and effects assessment spill trajectory analysis cites that:
extensive daily overflight observations were undertaken by AMSA. This overflight data made
it possible to map accurately daily oil slick positions and to interpret observations made by
the MODIS (Aqua and Terra) and LandSat (5 and 7) satellites when these were available.279
(emphasis added)
Having viewed the flight paths of AMSAs overflight observations, we submit that it is not possible to
claim that the overflight data collected was able to accurately map daily oil slick positions, and that
instead, overflight data collected was only able to observe slick positions within areas of observation.
We provide the following qualifiers to this statement:
there was a significant deficiency of overflight data recorded within Indonesian waters;
the wide geographic area requiring coverage by overflight data inevitably meant that
135
After the Spill
decisions were required that actively selected areas of the Timor Sea for overflight monitoring.
These included a focus on monitoring within the Australian EEZ, with limited crossover into
Indonesian waters. We also query how these decisions were reached;
there were a number of days during the response on which no overflight data appears to have
been recorded;
the limited ability of overflight surveillance to accurately record sub-surface oil and dispersant
mix, including the sinking of any weathered oil,280 or waxy content - a factor noted by PTTEP
AA in its report of research.281
Both studies also may have used one of the lowest estimates provided of the amount of oil spilled.
PTTEP AAs Report of Research cites that overflight observations by AMSA-directed response
personnel of the slick, which developed on the waters surface within the first 24 hours, indicated the
spill rate of the crude oil component of the oil spill was initially 400 barrels (64,000 litres) per day as a
worst-case estimate.282
While Asia-Pacific ASAs first study notes that the spill modelling effort assumed worst-case
parameters and overestimated possible oil slicks to minimise the chances of losing track of the oil283,
it is questionable as to whether worst-case parameters in reality utilised PTTEP AAs highest estimate
of the total number of barrels spilled per day: 400 barrels.
Earlier in this report, we highlighted the lack of consensus regarding the amount of oil spilled per day,
with 400 barrels per day being the most conservative estimate. The Montara Commission of Inquiry
found that the number of barrels of oil released could have ranged from 400 to 1,500 barrels per day.284
This is highly significant. The results calculating the oils movement would differ greatly in magnitude
depending on the initial calculations made regarding the volume of oil.
3.7.1 The first study

The first study, Oil Fate and Effects Assessment - Spill Trajectory Analysis, aimed to document the
location of oil released from the Montara oil spill.285 It concluded that the highest occurrence of oil
was within a distance of 23 kilometres from the release site. Beyond the immediate spill area, oil
occurrences were generally patchy and more highly weathered.286 The study also found that large
amounts of the oil spill in the Timor Sea were in the form of a sheen, a significant percentage of which
were 10 microns or thinnerit is about 100 times lower than what is likely to be considered as being of
environmental concern.287
This study gathered data from field and overflight data and satellite observations.288 The data was
integrated into hind cast oil spill trajectory modelling, a statistical calculation used to determine likely
past conditions.289 Our commentary on overflight observations was explored above.
The study also observed that:
it is important to note some persistent components of the spilt liquids, particularly its
wax content, were likely to continue to exist and may have travelled [further] but at
concentrations/coverage which was so low as to be difficult to accurately place or observe
from the overflight or satellite images.290
136
After the Spill
PTTEP AAs report of research notes that one confirmed oil stranding on Ashmore Reef was analysed
and found to be highly weathered wax residues, indicating the likely characteristics of any occurrences
at these distances from Montara.291 (emphasis added)
Waxy content was evidently present in the Timor Sea in video footage recorded by WTCF, 130
kilometres south of West Timor.292 On the face of it, the presence of this waxy content so far from the
Montara wellhead does not appear to have been accounted for within the results of this first study.
Asia-Pacific ASA, noted that:
the results covered the entire 92-day duration of oil on the waters surface (21 August 2009 to
19 November 2009) at hourly intervals. These results from the hind cast model, which included
the daily observations and the satellite data, were then loaded into ananalysis grid which
covered the entire Timor Sea.293
Being a hind cast model, it appears that data was not collected or added into the study after 19
November 2009, and that no forecasts were made about the movement of any oil beyond November
2009.
This is despite the fact that the study also noted the presence of circular current eddies in the Timor
Sea at the time of the spill event294 which meant that on occasions, highly weathered oil returned to
the area [23 kilometres from the release site].295
Furthermore, the role of significant storms in spreading any oil or sub-surface mix also does not
appear to have been factored into oil dispersant modelling. In the months following the Montara spill,
large storms occurred in the Timor Sea. The area, which is prone to monsoons between November
and March,296 sustained the impacts of:
Tropical Cyclone Magda, January 21, 2010, a relatively weak Category 2 cyclone, which moved
through the Timor Sea near the fire-damaged Montara platform; 297 and
Tropical Cyclone Laurence, December 15, 2010, a Category 5 storm.298
3.7.2 The second study

The second study, Oil fate and effects assessment dispersant oil modelling, aimed to gain an
understanding of the potential concentrations and movement of dispersed oil in the Timor Sea which
occurred as a result of chemical dispersant spraying operations during the spill response.299 The study
also aimed to quantify possibly environmental exposure of surrounding habitats such as submerged
shoals.300
Dispersant operations commenced on 23 August and continued until 1 November 2009.301 Dispersants
were applied in an area fairly close to the Montara wellhead.302
Eleven significant dispersant events were simulated using three-dimensional (3D) modelling, the first
being 24 August and the last, 10 October 2009.303 The events were selected based on the scenarios
that would lead to the maximum amount of area affected; their location; and the amount of dispersant
applied.304
Of these 11 dispersant events, three indicated potential to reach some of the underwater shoals
if mixing conditions were at the lower range of what is possible for the Timor Sea and dispersant
efficiency was at a maximum of 100 per cent.305 Two of the dispersed oil plumes were estimated to
137
After the Spill
have made contact at depth with Barracouta Shoal and one event made contact with Goeree Shoal,
all at low concentrations and for short-periods of time due to tidal oscillations.306
The maximum hydrocarbon concentrations found within the 3D modelling were 3.48 parts per million
(ppm).307
PTTEP AAs Report of Research cites:
Thus, hypothetically, the modelling indicated very low level hydrocarbon concentrations might
have been possible under the worst-case assumptions.308
It is unclear whether worst-case assumptions were in relation to worst-case conditions for
dispersant application to the water column (i.e. 100 per cent effectiveness), whether this related to
the conservative estimate of 400 barrels of oil spilled per day, or both assumptions.309 Again, these
assumptions would have a significant impact on the results.
The research cites that:
the amount of oil to be dispersed by one litre of dispersant was calculated at a ratio of
1:20 (1L of dispersant to 20L of oil dispersed as per manufacturers recommended dosage
rates) [and thus] as a consequence of this ratio, it is also possible to calculate the in water
concentrations of the dispersant, being 1/20 of the concentration of hydrocarbon indicated by
the mode at any given time. 310 (emphasis added)
However, this assumption regarding ratios could be challenged as a result of the lack of consensus
regarding the amount of oil spilled. In addition, the total amount of dispersant applied appears to have
been totalled following the response, as indicated during Senate Estimates in 2010. Senator Rachel
Siewert asked: Can you give me the amount of each dispersant that was used for each specific
dispersant, the actual amounts used? A representative of AMSA stated:
We are still calculating that, from the actual count of the empty containers. We are just doing
an audit to make sure we have exact figures
I have numbers [of containers] here, but they are really meaningless unless we give you the
actual size of those containers.311
The 3D modelling indicated that the maximum concentration of hydrocarbons in the water column at
any depth at any time following the dispersant events studied was 3.48ppm.
The second study depended strongly upon the original data of the previous study.
These studies were completed in late 2009 through to mid-2010.312
3.8 Scientific testing

3.8.1 Leeder Consulting
In 2009, WTCF arranged for water samples to be collected from the south coast of West Timor, which
were forwarded to Senator Rachel Siewert and sent to Leeder Consulting for testing analysis.
138
After the Spill
The testing method utilised by Leeder was the Nordtest methodology, which is referred to informally
as fingerprinting oil.
The subsequent Leeder Report detailed that three samples of Timor Sea water with oil received by
Leeder Consulting on 18 January 2010 were analysed against a known sample of Montara oil.
Two samples were found to be similar to the whole oil ratios of fresh Montara crude and Leeder
Consulting determined that the correlation plots show a match of diagnostic ratios within the 95%
confidence interval and suggest a positive match of the samples to the fresh Montara crude.313
3.8.2 Samples analysed in Indonesia

In Indonesia, water samples were obtained by the regional environmental agency of NTT on 10
October 2009, 23 October 2009 and 5 November 2009.314
10 October 2009
A water sample was obtained on 10 October 2009 on West Timors south central coast, at KolbanoOetune, in the village of Taufanu, in Kualin district, at coordinates 10 1022, 8S; 124 239, 40 E.
The results of the samples obtained are below and were provided to the Australian Lawyers Alliance by
WTCF.
Table 5. Results Sea Water Sample Analysis Monitoring Phase I
No.
Parameter
Unit
Value
Marine Water Quality

Standards KRPMEN LH
Number 51, 2004
For Marine
Tourism
For Marine
Life
Information
Colour (Visual
observations)
Slightly
Cloudy
30 Pt. co
Odour
Not
smelling
Not smelling
Natural
Oil layer
Present
Nothing
Nothing
Exceed
pH
8.34
7 8.5
7 8.5
Water temperature
31.7
Natural
Natural
Air temperature
30.9
TDS (total dissolved solids)
mg/L
386
DHL
S/cm
726
DO (dissolved oxygen)
mg/L
4.22
>5
>5
Exceed
10
Salinity
400
(natural)
(natural)
11
TSS (total suspended

solids or total soluble salts)
mg/L
20.8
20
20
Exceed
12
Fatty Oils
mg/L
107.2
Exceed
These results appear to indicate that the waters off Kolbano were cloudy, with an oil layer present.
Fatty oils far exceeded normal by more than 100 times the normal quality standards, with a value of
107.2mg/L.
139
After the Spill
It may also be important to note that the total dissolved solids (TDS), at 386mg/L are far lower than
the normal TDS level for seawater. Seawater is typically valued at TDS > 35,000mg/L. 315 By contrast,
groundwater, which is located beneath the earths surface, is more variable, with TDS ranging from 20
mg/L to approximately 1,000 mg/L. 316
It is questionable as to why the TDS value off the coast of Kolbano is so low.
Waters with low visibility can have low TDS (~200mg/L) because particles that obscure visibility are not
dissolved, and can be easily filtered from the water. 317
It is questionable whether this sample, which was slightly cloudy contained a large number of
particles that were not dissolved.
The TSS value also slightly exceeds normal, at 20.8mg/L.
It is also significant to note that the total of dissolved oxygen in the sample is slightly lower than
normal, however is not hypoxic or anoxic. Hypoxia, meaning low oxygen usually involves a
concentration of less than 2-3 milligrams of oxygen per litre of water (mg/L). A complete lack of
oxygen (0 mg/L) is called anoxia.318
The Jakarta Globe reported on 28 October 2009 that the head of the regional environmental agency of
NTT, noted that Montara oil had been identified:
Water samples we took on 10 October tested positive for oil suspected to have come from
the Montara oil field, said Oematan, the head of the agency, which is also known as the
Regional Environmental Research Agency.
He added that the samples had been taken from the waters off Kolbano Beach in Kualin
village, South Central Timor district.319
The Jakarta Post also reported on 29 October 2009 that:
A laboratory analysis conducted by the NTT Environmental Impact Management Agency
(Bapedalda) has confirmed the West Timor Sea was contaminated by a crude oil spill.
The test conducted on seawater samples taken on October 10, 2009 indicated that a litre of
seawater contained 107.2 milligrams of crude oil.
We believe the pollution was caused by an oil spill from the Montara oil field in the Timor Sea,
NTT Bapedalda head Alexander Oematan said.
According to him, the water samples were taken from several points along the Kolbano coast
in Tuafanu village, Kualin district in the South Central Timor regency.320
23 October 2009
On 23 October 2009, four samples were collected at the following locations to conduct research to
determine the extent of oil pollution in the Timor Sea:
1. Sample Point 1: in the sea around the island of Rote, above five miles from the island of Rote in
the district Landu Ndaonese (S: 11 00 2.13; E: 122 59 5.30);
140
After the Spill
2. Sample Point 2: in marine waters near Nemberala, approximately 10 miles from Ndana Island
(S: 11 09 3.72; E: 122 56 9.60);
3. Sample Point 3 in the Timor Sea within the Indonesian EEZ, about 10 miles from Ashmore Reef
(S: 11 31 7.97; E: 123 24 9.99);
4. Sample Point 4 in marine waters between Kupang and Kolbano, the south coast of South
Central Timor (S: 10 43 20.5; E: 125 51 0,14).321
The results of these samples are provided below and were provided to the Australian Lawyers Alliance
by WTCF.
Table 6. Results Sea Water Sample Analysis Monitoring Phase II
Parameter
Odour
Unit
Point
Point
Point
Point
Marine Water
Samples Samples Samples Samples Quality Standards
1
2
3
4
KRPMEN LH
Number 51, 2004
Smelling Smelling
For
Marine
Tourism
For
Marine
Life
Not
smelling
Not
smelling
Not
smelling
Natural
Information
Sample points
1, 2 Exceeds
the Standard
Quality
Turbidity
NTU
165.5
569
175
548
>5
Points 1, 2,
3, 4 Exceeds
Standard
Quality
TSS
mg/L
11.20
19.20
17.60
24.80
20
20
Sample point
4 Exceeds
Standard
Quality
33.60
33.40
32.70
32.20
Natural
Natural
Present
Present
Nothing
Nothing
Nothing
Nothing Sample points

1, 2 Exceeds
the Standard
Quality
8.24
8.25
8.28
8.20
7-8.5
7-8.5
Dissolved
Oxygen
(DO)
mg/L
9.33
5.73
3.42
11.52
>5
>5
Sample point 3
Exceeds
Oil fat
mg/L
8.80
6.80
54.00
27.60
Sample points
1,2,3,4 Exceed
Water
temperature
Oil Layer
pH
141
After the Spill
An oil layer and odour was present in Samples 1 and 2, both of which were collected from Rotes
southern coast, near Landu Island and Nemberala respectively. However, an oil layer and odour were
not apparent in Samples 3 and 4, which were collected approximately 10 miles from Ashmore Reef in
the Timor Sea, and near the southern coast of West Timor.
All of the samples indicated a level of oil fat that exceeded the standard quality (1mg/L), however the
highest levels were recorded by Sample 3, at 54mg/L, and Sample 4, at 27.6mg/L, both of which had
not evidenced odour.
All of the samples indicated extremely high levels of turbidity, however especially Sample 2, and
Sample 4, which both measured in excess of 500 Nephelometric Turbidity Units (NTU).
Sample 4 exceeded the standard quality of total suspended solids of 20mg/L, at 24.8mg/L.
The level of dissolved oxygen in Sample 3, measured about 10 miles from Ashmore Reef in the Timor
Sea, indicated that with a rating of 3.43 mg/L, the water was dangerously close to a hypoxic level (2
3mg/L).
The pH and water temperature appeared to be normal.
These results were reported in Indonesian media via Antara News on 27 October 2009:
The results of physical analysis conducted at the NTT BLHD [Regional Environmental
Research Agency] laboratory showed that a water sample taken at the coordinate of 11.31.213
degrees southern latitude and 122.59.530 degrees eastern longitude, around five miles [from]
Landu [Island], smelled oily, with turbidity at 165.5 NTU, and had an oil layer.
At the second point at the coordinate of 11.09.372 degrees southern latitude, and 122.56.960
degrees eastern longitude, around 10 miles from Ndana [Island] in Rote Ndao District, the
water sample also smelled oily, with 569 NTU.322
The Australian embassys response on 2 November 2009 to these results was:
We are aware of reports from NTT of positive tests for oil in coastal waters. Australia will be
discussing these reports with the Government of Indonesia and seeking to test the samples
against samples from the Montara oil or oil naturally present in Eastern Indonesian waters
It is highly unlikely that any Montara oil would have come close to Indonesian coastal waters
Australia is discussing with Indonesia a possible visit by a team of Australian officials and
company representatives to Jakarta in early November [2009] for discussions with Indonesian
officials and to arrange testing of samples
We are aware of reports of dead fish in Indonesian waters. Australia has undertaken toxicity
tests on fish collected in the vicinity of the oil spill in Australian waters, and results showed
no oil contamination. The type and amount of oil observed in Indonesias EEZ is considered
to pose no significant threat to the marine environment. Nevertheless, Australia will offer to
conduct further toxicology tests to resolve this issue
142
After the Spill
Consistent with Australias desire to cooperate with Indonesia to protect the marine
environment, Australia has provided regular and detailed updates to Indonesian authorities in
relation to the type, amount and nature of the oil present in Indonesias EEZ and Australias
clean-up response efforts. Australia will discuss with Indonesia any concerns it has about the
presence of oil in its EEZ. Australia will continue to act fully consistently with international law
and our strong bilateral relationship in responding to this incident.323 (emphasis added)
4 - 5 November 2009
On 4 - 5 November 2009, 11 samples were taken. The 11 sample points were:
1. (4 November 2009). Coordinates S: 11 31 14, 2; E: 124 25 12, 7
11. (5 November 2009). Coordinates S: 10 35 54, 5; E: 123 22 43, 8.
The results of 9 of these samples were recorded and are available in Table 7.
Only one of these samples, Sample 1, recorded an odour of oil. This sample was also the only sample
recorded to have an oil layer and dispersant present.
Sample 8 exceeded the standard quality of total suspended solids (20mg/L), with a value of 35.2mg/L.
Four samples exceeded the standard quality of fatty oils present (1mg/L): Sample 1 (4.4mg/L); Sample
3 (1.2mg/L); Sample 5 (10mg/L); and Sample 6 (2.4mg/L).
Levels of dissolved oxygen do not appear to have been measured.
There is a clear need for further comprehensive scientific investigation in NTT. This is especially the
case when considering the impacts that have been experienced and reported in Indonesia in the five
years since the spill commenced.
143
144
Oil Layer
Fatty oils
mg/L
Dissolved
mg/L
oxygen (DO)
pH
Water
temperature
mg/L
NTU
Turbidity
TSS
Unit
Odour
Parameter
4.4
8.26
Dispersant
Present +
30
16
0.60
0.4
8.26
Nothing
30.8
0.45
1.2
8.29
Nothing
31.4
10
0.22
8.24
Nothing
29.4
0.48
10
8.24
Nothing
28.6
0.8
0.4
2.4
8.21
Nothing
28.6
10.8
0.27
8.26
Nothing
28.6
6.8
0.57
0.4
8.31
Nothing
31.4
35.2
0.82
8.18
Nothing
31.1
2.33
Smelling No smell No smell No smell No smell No smell No smell No smell No smell

Oil
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Samples Samples Samples Samples Samples Samples Samples Samples Samples
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Table 7. Results from 4-5 November 2009
>5
7-8.5
Nothing
Natural
20
No smell
For
Marine
Tourism
>5
7-8.5
Nothing
Natural
20
Natural
For
Marine
Life
Marine Water Quality

Standards KEPMEN
LH No. 51 of 2004
Sample
Points 1,3,5,6
Exceeds
Standard
Quality
Sample Point
8 Exceeds
Standard
Quality
Sample Points
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9 Exceed
Standard
Quality
Sample Point
1 Exceeds
Standard
Quality
Information
After the Spill
Chapter 4: Dispersants
Dispersants were used in the response to the Montara oil spill that have since
been proved by researchers to increase the toxicity of oil to biological matter
52 times.
4.1 The use of dispersants

In efforts to contain the spill, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) sprayed 184,135 litres
of dispersants onto the Timor Sea, including Slickgone; Tergo R-40; ShellVDC; Corexit EC9500 and
EC9527A; and Ardrox 6120.324
Dispersant spraying operations commenced on 23 August 2009 and continued until 1 November
2009.325 Offshore containment and recovery operations, by contrast, commenced on 5 September
2009 and continued until 30 November 2009.326
Therefore, for the first two days of the spill, it appears that no method was employed to disperse the
oil; and offshore containment did not occur until the sixteenth day of the spill.
AMSA described that the dispersant operations were:
conducted in a very limited area, primarily within an approximate 30 kilometre radius of the
Montara Wellhead Platform. This was due in part to the fact that dispersant needs to be
applied before the oil weathers and this weathering process is relatively rapid for this oil type
due to the high temperatures in the Timor Sea.
All dispersant operations were conducted well within the Australian EEZ. The nearest
dispersant operation to Indonesian waters was approximately 50 nautical miles to the south of
the EEZ boundary some 124 nautical miles from the Indonesia coastline.327
With the dispersant operations fairly localised to the Australian EEZ and containment and recovery
operations commencing on 5 September 2009, it is questionable as to how much oil escaped across
the EEZ in the initial sixteen days of the spill. This is especially the case given that communities in
Indonesia report seeing oil in their seaweed farms in September 2009.
Similarly, it is questionable as to how far dispersed oil treatments travelled after 23 August. This is
particularly important given that the toxicity of dispersed oil treatments can be far higher than oil alone.
The Montara Commission of Inquiry noted that dispersants are not typically used in open ocean
situationsbecause they involve effectively putting more pollution in the water.328 However, the
Commission of Inquiry concluded that the use of dispersants was appropriate, in view of modelling
which indicated that the movement of untreated oil could have threatened sensitive environmental
areas around Ashmore Reef and Cartier Island as well as the Western Australia coastline. AMSA acted
expeditiously and had regard to the available information.329
The amounts of dispersants used were revealed at a Senate Budget Estimates Hearing in May 2010:330
145
After the Spill
Table 8. Amounts of dispersants used during the Montara response

Dispersant
Amount Used (Litres)
Slickgone NS
63, 415
Slickgone LTSW
38,000
Ardrox 6120
32,000
Corexit EC9527A
27,720
Corexit EC9500
17,000
Shell VDC
5,000
Tergo R-40
1,000
TOTAL
184,135
The Montara Commission of Inquiry noted that:

The water quality sampling that was undertaken may have met operational requirements but
it was not adequate for environmental purposes. It did not produce adequate information
about the horizontal and vertical distribution of oil and dispersants that was important to
understanding the impact of the oil spill on wildlife and ecosystems.331 (emphasis added)
4.2 Approval for future use

Of the seven dispersants used in 2009, only one, Slickgone NS, has been approved for future use in
Australia in combatting oil pollution incidents and subsequently listed on the National Plan Register of
Oil Spill Control Agents.332 Product information for Slickgone NS states that an effective treatment rate
for dispersants indicated by extensive field trials in the UK, is approximately 1 part dispersant to 20
30 parts of oil.333
Of all of the dispersants used by AMSA on the spill, only Slickgone NS and Corexit 9500A were
approved for use in the UK in 2014.334 In 2013, Corexit EC9500A did not make the list.335 Slickgone
LTSW has not maintained UK approval and its producer stated on its website in 2004 that it could no
longer be sold for use in UK waters.336
Four of the dispersants used in the Montara response are no longer held by AMSA or the Australian
Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC): Tergo R-40, Corexit 9527A, Corexit 9500A and Shell VDC.
AMSA reports that it has disposed of more than 300,000 litres of obsolete dispersants since 2011. 337
AMSA indicates that it has no intention of using Corexit 9500A during response operations under its
control until such time as it is demonstrated to meet Australian standards.338
The remaining dispersants used in 2009, Ardrox 6120 and Slickgone LTSW have not passed the
requisite new tests for approval on the National Plan Register. However, these can continue to be used
in National Plan responses, until stocks are used or disposed of. Once used up, the listing expires for
these stocks.339
Essentially, while all new stocks of dispersants must conform to new arrangements regarding their use
and listing on the Register, these leftover dispersants are all deemed to be listed on the register, and
can be used even though they have not passed the requisite new tests for approval. 340 Not wasting
dispersants appears to have been given greater priority than ensuring public safety.
146
After the Spill
We examine three of the dispersants used in the response below. Of note, 32,000 litres of Ardrox 6120;
27,720 litres of Corexit EC9527A and 17,000 litres of Corexit EC9500 were used in 2009.
4.3 Ardrox 6120

The toxicity of Corexit EC9500, Corexit EC9527A and Ardrox 6120 was examined in relation to
seagrass in a 2011 project conducted by Kim Wilson, and coordinated by the University of Technology,
Sydney; AMSA; and the National Plan Environmental Group.
The results found that non-dispersed oil, in general, leads to less photosynthetic stress to certain
types of seagrass, compared with the addition of a chemical dispersant.341
It also found that, for both types of seaweed tested, Ardrox 6120 dispersed oil was slightly more toxic
than Corexit EC9527 dispersed crude oil.342 This finding may be of special significance, especially
considering findings about Corexits own toxicity.
In AMSAs 2008 Material Safety Data Sheets, the Ardrox 6120 profile states that there is no ecological
information available for this product, however, large quantities should not be discharged into drains,
sewers or waterways.343
However, 32,000 litres of Ardrox were discharged into the waters of the Timor Sea.
The product statement further provides that no adverse health effects are expected, if the product is
handled in accordance with this Material Safety Data Sheet and the product label.344
Symptoms and effects that may arise if the product is mishandled and overexposure occurs include:
irritation to the eyes: depending upon duration of exposure, eye damage may occur;
irritation to the skin, with effects including redness, itchiness, and possible dermatitis; and
irritation to the nose, throat and respiratory system with effects including dizziness, headache
and loss of co-ordination.345
The product statement further provides that in disposal, whatever cannot be saved for recovery or
recycling should be handled as hazardous waste by an approved waste agency.346
4.4 Corexit products

Corexit is produced by Nalco. On its website, Nalco cites that Environment Canada studies show
that Corexit 9500 is more than 25 times as safe as common dishwashing liquid.347 However, scientific
research has found that when Corexit mixes with oil, toxicity to biological matter increases 52 times.348
In 1998, Corexit EC9500A and EC9527A were removed from the UK Marine Management
Organisations approved list, as they proved too toxic in instances where they might end up on rocky
shorelines.349 In 2014, Corexit EC9500A was again added to the approved list. 350 Of the two, Corexit
EC9527A is the more toxic.351
147
After the Spill
In 2010, 2,000 litres of Corexit 9527 was used in the emergency response to the Shen Neng 1 disaster
in the Great Barrier Reef off Gladstone.352 In October 2011, 3,190 litres of a combination of Corexit
9500 and 9527 were used in New Zealand, when the Rena ran aground, leaking about 350 tonnes.353
4.4.1 Corexit EC9527A

AMSAs Material Safety Data Sheet specifically states that Corexit EC9527A is harmful to aquatic
organisms. Do not contaminate surface water.354
The Material Safety Data Sheet records that health impacts may include:
moderate irritation to the eyes;
moderate skin irritation, harmful if absorbed through skin;
may be harmful if swallowed. May cause liver and kidney effects and/or damage. There may be
irritation to the gastro-intestinal tract; and
harmful by inhalation; repeated or prolonged exposure may irritate the respiratory tract.355
Furthermore, as Corexit EC9527A contains ethylene glycol monobutyl ether (butoxyethanol), chronic
hazards include that, where there has been prolonged and/or repeated exposure through inhalation
or extensive skin contact with ethylene glycol butyl ether, there may be resulting damage to the blood
and kidneys.356
The product statement listed that no toxicity studies have been conducted on this product regarding
ecotoxicological effects.357
4.4.2 Corexit EC9500A

AMSAs Material Safety Data Sheet regarding Corexit EC9500A notes that the potential environmental
hazard was estimated to be moderate.358 It is recommended to prevent material from entering sewers
or waterways.359
The Material Safety Data Sheet also specifically states that health hazards may include:
skin irritation;
nausea and vomiting;
chemical pneumonia, if aspirated into lungs following ingestion;
repeated or prolonged exposure may irritate the respiratory tract; and
repeated or prolonged exposure may cause skin irritation and rash (dermatitis).360
No toxicity studies have been conducted on this product.361
148
After the Spill
4.5 Use of Corexit in the Gulf of Mexico

Corexit EC9500 and Corexit EC9527 were deployed in significant quantities during the response to
the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010: approximately 1.84 million gallons362
(approximately 4,481,927 litres) were used.
Corexit EC9500 was the primary dispersant deployed during the response, with Corexit EC9527 used
particularly at the beginning of the response.363 The dispersants were applied directly underwater to
the spills source, which had never been done before.364
Corexit EC9500A is designed to break up the slick at the waters surface and sends the oil into the
water column, and from there, to the bottom of the seabed where bottom-residing organisms such as
shrimp, crabs and oysters reside.365
At the time of the response, Corexit was often referred to by representatives of BP as being as safe as
Dawn dishwashing soap.366
Earthjustice, a non-profit environmental law firm, applied under freedom of information laws to obtain
information about the composition and safety of the dispersants listed as eligible for use. When the
federal agency did not comply, Earthjustice sued on behalf of the Gulf Restoration Network and the
Florida Wildlife Federation.367
On June 9, 2010, after at least 1.12 million gallons of Corexit had already been applied in the Gulf, the
US Environmental Protection Agency made an aggregate list publicly available of the 57 ingredients
in the 14 dispersants. The aggregated list did not identify the ingredients of each dispersant, instead
citing that such details constituted confidential business information.368 However, the full ingredient
lists for Corexit 9500 and 9527 were disclosed. 369
In August 2011, a review was published by Earthjustice in collaboration with Toxipedia, an online
toxicology Wiki, on each of the 57 chemical ingredients that were found in dispersants used in the
2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. The review, The Chaos of Clean-Up, highlighted the range of
potential impacts arising from chemical exposure.
The review addressed the specific ingredients found within Corexit products, with chemicals listed as:
A suspected neurotoxicant;
Toxic to blood;
Strong irritant to eyes;
Ingestion causes diarrhoea and intestinal bloating;
Prolonged exposure may lead to drying of the skin, causing dermatitis;
Confirmed animal carcinogen with unknown relevance to humans.370
However, the review also identified that while the ingredients list had been released, the percentage
composition of these specific chemicals within Corexit was not. In order to determine more fully the
impacts, the percentage composition of these chemicals must also be known. 371
The chemicals found in Corexit products were also identified to be potentially toxic to fish and aquatic
149
After the Spill
organisms, with further research required to ascertain the dose levels that would elicit negative
impacts.372
Research conducted in 2013 also identified that the application of dispersant was highly toxic to coral
reefs, concluding that:
The demonstrated effects of pollution by [Deepwater Horizon] crude oil and the dispersant
Corexit 9500 on P. astreoidesandM. faveolataplanulae [coral] strongly suggest that the use
of dispersants to mitigate oil spills in the vicinity of coral reefs should be avoided.373
Dr William Sawyer, who led the group of toxicologists assessing the BP Deepwater Horizon spill,
commented that:
The dispersants used in the BP clean-up efforts are also known as deodorised kerosene.
With respect to marine toxicity and potential human health risks, studies of kerosene
exposures strongly indicate potential health risks to volunteers, workers, sea turtles, dolphins,
breathing reptiles and all species which need to surface for air exchanges, as well as birds and
all other mammals. Additionally, marine species which surface for atmospheric inhalation such
as sea turtles, dolphins and other species are especially vulnerable to aspiration toxicity of
Corexit 9500 into the lung while surfacing.374
Dr Susan Shaw, director of the Marine Environmental Research Institute, studied the impacts of
Corexit following the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. A consensus statement drafted by Dr Shaw asserted
that:
Corexit dispersants, in combination with crude oil, pose grave health risks to marine life and
human health and threaten to deplete critical niches in the Gulf food web that may never
recover.375
Dr Shaw also described Corexit dispersants as facilitating the entry of oil into the body as a delivery
system:
The properties that facilitate the movement of dispersants through oil also make it easier
for them to move through cell walls, skin barriers, and membranes that protect vital organs,
underlying layers of skin. 376
Dr Shaw noted that polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), which are present in crude oil, can
damage every system in the body, which can cause a wide range of diseases and conditions that may
be immediately evident, or appear months or years later.377 Potential human health effects include:
burning skin, difficulty breathing, headaches, heart palpitations, dizziness, confusion,
and nausea which have already been reported by some workers as well as chemical
pneumonia and internal bleeding.
These are more often noticed than more serious effects that dont have obvious signs and
symptoms: lung, liver and kidney damage, infertility, immune system suppression, disruption of
hormone levels, blood disorders, mutations, and cancer.
Coastal communities could also experience more extreme health consequences, including
long-term neurological effects on children and developing foetuses, and hereditary
mutations.378
150
After the Spill
In the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, 11 people died instantaneously and were incinerated on the rig.
However, many more people have suffered significant chemical exposure, and some people have died
as a result of chemical exposure.379
In April 2013, the whistleblower protection and advocacy organisation Government Accountability
Project (GAP), published a groundbreaking report, Deadly Dispersants in the Gulf: Are Public Health
and Environmental Tragedies the New Norm for Oil Spill Clean-Ups?380
The report detailed the devastating long-term effects on human health and the Gulf of Mexico
ecosystem stemming from BP and the Federal governments widespread use of Corexit in response
to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill.381 Data and evidence were collected from over two dozen
employee and citizen whistle-blowers who experienced the clean-ups effects first hand. Evidence
suggested that:
the clean-up has been more destructive to human health and the environment than the spill
itself. Conclusions from the report strongly suggest that the dispersant Corexit was widely
applied in the aftermath of the explosion because it caused the false impression that the oil
disappeared. In reality, the oil/Corexit mixture became less visible, yet much more toxic than
the oil alone.382
Environmental activist Jo Billups helped people to obtain blood tests:
The saddest part is the children, she said. Were seeing young children with extremely high
levels of chemicals. Were altering our DNA and our bodies forever. Were a bunch of guinea
pigs. 383
Paul Doom, a 22 year old from Navarre, Florida, was training in preparation to join the US Marines,
until he became extremely ill from swimming in the Gulf of Mexico. In an interview to Al Jazeera he
said:
A toxicologist that interpreted my blood results told me they didnt know how I was alive. My
Hexane was off the charts, and I have 2 and 3 Methylpentane, Iso-octane, Ethylbenze, and
mp-Xylene.
I have documentation and images showing lesions in my brain. Lesions that are the same as
lesions on the brains of marine life from the Exxon Valdez spill from marine necropsies. This is a
life and death situation and a race against time.384
4.6 Effectiveness of dispersant

The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) notes that:
It is essential that the effectiveness of chemical dispersion is monitored continually
and dispersant use terminated as soon as it is no longer effective. Visual observation of
effectiveness from a vessel or aerial platform is key but may be difficult in poor weather
conditions, in waters with high sediment content, when dispersing pale-coloured oils, or in
poor light.
151
After the Spill
Effectiveness can also be monitored using ultra-violet fluorometry to provide real-time

data on the concentration of dispersed oil in the water column. Ideally, it should be used in
combination with visual observations to decide whether dispersant application is providing a
worthwhile response.385 (emphasis added)
While fluorometry readings are generally obtained in order to assess the effectiveness of dispersant
application, it is clear that AMSA faced challenges in utilising fluorometry.
AMSA noted the challenge in conducting fluorometry readings:
The number of clean readings taken within the impacted area was limited due to the
widespread distribution of the waxy films. These are the residues from weathered oil.386
In fact, there appears to have been frequent commentary on the presence of wax during the Montara
response. This is significant as researchers in 2014 noted that since waxes promote oil emulsification,
oils with high wax content probably have low dispersibility.387
AMSA noted that the most significant property of Montara oil, regarding its anticipated behaviour at
sea, is its high pour point, which in turn is due to the wax content.388 AMSA also noted the presence
of solid wax rafts in overflight and ship positional data that was provided to Asia-Pacific ASA.389
Asia-Pacific ASA noted that the duration of the spill incident ensured some patches of oil eventually
drifted into deep waters where fast moving currents associated with the Indonesian Thru-Flow carried
weathered oil patches some significant distances from the source.390 Asia-Pacific ASA also noted that:
these were typically small patches that were observed to continue to weather until ultimately
becoming waxy residues including solidified waxy residues.391
Asia-Pacific ASA further identified that:
Overflight observations indicated any hydrocarbons found in these far-field locations were
typically small patches of highly weathered oil surrounded by wax sheets. One confirmed oil
stranding on Ashmore Reef was analysed and found to be highly weathered wax residues,
indicating the likely characteristics of any occurrences at these distances from the Montara
release site.392
Ashmore Reef is approximately 157 kilometres from the Montara wellhead;393 Rote Island is
approximately 250 kilometres from the Montara wellhead.
Observations were also recorded of wax pieces floating in the Ashmore Reef lagoon between 26
30 October 2009.394 During the Montara response, AMSA notes that there was only one confirmed
shoreline impact; a single sample of wax residue was identified on 30 October 2009 during a shoreline
survey.395
AMSA noted that Tergo R-40 spraying operations indicated little or no dispersion,396 however, despite
this, 1,000 litres of the substance were utilised.
How effective were the remaining dispersants, and what was their full impact on the environment?
152
After the Spill
4.6.1 Rainbow water

An eyewitness in Rote, NTT reported seeing rainbow water in September 2009.
The US governments National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration released an Open Water Oil
Identification Job Aid for Aerial Observation.397 It notes that oil that appears rainbow in colour, may
have a layer of 0.3 5.0 microns (m).
However, the appearance on the surface of the water of a relatively low level of oil may not be
indicative of the toxicity of the oil/dispersant mix. Given that dispersants facilitate the movement of oil
into the water column, it may be questioned as to the toxicity of the water to marine life, which may
have been invisible to the naked eye.
Further, there is the possibility that dispersants may have caused the oil to sink to the ocean floor.
4.6.2 Milky water

The village of Daiama, on Rote Island, reported that in September 2009, oil was seen in the water
within metres of their local beach; the coral turned white, the seaweed began to die, and the water
turned the colour of milk for approximately one month. In the Timor-Leste enclave of Oecusse,
fisheries expert Richard Mounsey witnessed a milky fog.398
There could have been a number of reasons for this milky water; we highlight some possibilities
below, although these possibilities are not conclusive. Ultimately, expert opinion on this issue is
required, and further investigation is warranted.
Ineffectiveness of dispersant
When dispersants are initially sprayed, they may reveal a white, milky colour. However, if they miss the
oil during application or do not appropriately mix with the oil, they may form a milky cloud beneath the
surface.399 Oil in the water column will appear anywhere from milky-white to red-brown to orange after
being treated with dispersant. 400
Milky white plumes surrounding unchanged oil have also been described as indicating that dispersant
has not penetrated the oil layer and therefore has had no significant effect.401
Following the BP Gulf of Mexico spill, a mysterious white, milky substance was observed seeping from
the wreckage;402 it does not appear to have been publicly identified to date.
Reductions in dissolved oxygen
Reductions in dissolved oxygen have significance effects on aquatic organisms.
When the amount of dissolved oxygen in the ocean decreases to below 2mg/L the water becomes
hypoxic, and below 0.5mg/L and near zero it becomes anoxic.403
Hypoxia can cause direct mortality, reduced growth rates and altered behaviour and distributions
offish and other organisms.404
The Department of Environment, Labour and Justice of Prince Edward Island cites that:
153
After the Spill
Milky white or cloudy green coloured water in an estuary (the area where fresh and salt water
mix) is generally a sign that an anoxic event has occurred. These events happen when large
amounts of algae or sea lettuce decompose. Decomposing plant material uses all, or most, of
the oxygen in the water.Anoxic events result in a cloudy white to grey or green discolouration
of the water as well as a rotten egg or rotten turnip type smell.405
It is questionable as to whether the milky water described by communities in Indonesia could
potentially be attributed as a result (and not cause) of the large amount of seaweed decomposing in
the water.
If this was the case, it must be questioned: what was the cause of the mass decomposition of the
seaweed?
While some may conclude that decomposition may have occurred as the result of a natural event, it
is clear from speaking with communities that they saw oil or shiny coloured water in their seaweed
farms, and within a short period of time, the seaweed then began to die. Communities on two different
islands that would likely never have communicated with each other described the same symptoms:
witnessing the oil, seaweed turning yellow, then white, then dropping from the ropes onto the ocean
floor.
A key question to consider is: could this be due to the use of dispersant?
In 2010, researchers tested the impacts on a pelagic algae (Sargassum) of exposure to dispersant.
The research found that in the experiments conducted, both experiments demonstrated significant
effects on the vertical position of Sargassum. Within the dispersant only and dispersed-oil treatments,
Sargassumsank to the bottom within 2448 hours. In contrast,Sargassumin the oil only and control
treatments remained at the surface of the tank for the majority of the experiment.406
Therefore, it appears that in the experiment, the use of dispersant, as opposed to hydrocarbon
exposure alone, was the cause of the algae sinking to the bottom.
The researchers also identified that:
another mechanism for injury is also evident in the dissolved oxygen dynamics under static
conditions in their first experiment. The addition of dispersant to mesocosms rapidly depleted
oxygen with the greatest oxygen consumption observed in the dispersed-oil and dispersant
only treatments, likely caused by increased microbial respiration. Within 12 hours, hypoxic
(dissolved oxygen <2 mg/L) conditions formed in the two treatments with dispersant and
from 2436 hours anoxia (0 mg/L) had developed in the dispersed-oil treatment. 407(emphasis
added)
The researchers further concluded that:
Surface water hypoxia/anoxia would be accentuated under oiled conditions because surface
slicks form a physical barrier that resists wind stress leading to less mixing of the water column
and retarding gas exchange from the ocean to atmosphere. Under these conditions, the
presence of low oxygen waters represents a major indirect effect that could lead to injury.408
It follows that there is the possibility that dispersed oil could have depleted the oxygen in the water
column, and that this depletion of oxygen could have contributed to the death of seaweed in NTT.
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After the Spill
The impact on algae is multi-faceted in that it is a vital component of an ecosystem. Researches have
noted that the loss and degradation of structurally complex brown algae (Fucus) in Prince William
Sound in the USA following theExxon Valdezoil spill resulted in ecosystem wide effects. 409Corexit
was also utilised in the Exxon Valdez spill.410
While the death of seaweed, mangroves and coral as described by villagers in NTT is indicative of
a significant issue within the eco-system, there is also the potential that significant impacts have
occurred to the unseen base of the ecosystem, including algae and microbial communities.
Microbial communities present in the Gulf of Mexico rapidly responded to theDeepwater Horizonoil
spill.411 Researchers noted that while the spill occurred in April 2010, by September, oxygen anomalies
could be traced several hundred kilometres to the southwest.412
It is questionable as to whether and how microbial communities were affected by the presence of
hydrocarbons and dispersant in the Timor Sea, what impact this may have had on dissolved oxygen
and on the ecosystem as a whole.
4.6.3 What about underwater plumes?

Following the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, researchers identified in 2010, the
presence of a continuous plume of oil, more than 35 kilometres in length, at approximately 1,100
metres depth that persisted for months without substantial biodegradation.413
In 2014, scientists at the University of South Florida found that the oil that spilled into the Gulf of
Mexico has killed off millions of amoeba-like creatures that form the basis of the gulfs aquatic food
chain. 414
David Hollander, a chemical oceanographer, noted that the death of these creatures stretched through
the mile-deep DeSoto Canyon and beyond, following the path of an underwater plume of oil that
snaked out from the wellheadEverywhere the plume went, the die-off went.415
Could a similar event have occurred in the Timor Sea?
Asia-Pacific ASA simulated eleven dispersant events using 3D modelling. Asia-Pacific ASA found that
three of these eleven events indicated some potential to reach some of the underwater shoals that
exist in the Timor Sea.416
The hindcast modelling indicates that two dispersant events may have resulted in a dispersed oil
plume that potentially passed over Barracouta Shoal; and one dispersant event may have resulted in a
dispersed oil plume that potentially passed over Goeree Shoal.417
While the commissioned study found that the concentrations of hydrocarbons reached at the shoals
were very low,418 we question the toxicity of such concentrations when combined with dispersants.
4.6.4 Did the oil sink?

In the Government Accountability Project (GAP)s report, eyewitnesses recorded that in the Gulf of
Mexico:
In late July of 2010, after the well had been capped and they were trying to wind down the
clean-up, we started finding oil daily on the bottom of the bays and sanctuaries. That is when
we realised it was sitting on our sea floor.419
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After the Spill
Witnesses revealed underwater footage to GAP of an oiled seafloor equivalent to a marine Death
Valley where aquatic life formerly flourished and documented widespread damage to coral
communities.420
Furthermore, in the US in 2014, scientists identified a fallout plume of hydrocarbons from the Macondo
Well contaminating the ocean floor over an area of approximately 3,200 square kilometres. Analysing
data from more than 3,000 samples collected at 534 locations over 12 expeditions, scientists identified
that 2 to 16 per cent of the discharged oil was deposited on the deep sea floor421 anywhere from one
kilometre to 1.6 kilometres below the surface.422 Oil levels inside the bath rub ring were as much as
10,000 times higher than outside the area.423
The researchers said that their analysis suggested the oil initially was suspended in deep waters
and then settled to the underlying sea floor.424 They also suggested that a significant quantity of oil
was deposited on the ocean floor outside this area but so far has evaded detection because of its
heterogeneous spatial distribution.425
In 2015, US researchers identified that potentially six to ten million gallons of oil were buried in the
sediment at the bottom of the gulf.426
Villagers in NTT continue to assert that when currents are flowing in certain directions and at certain
times of year; the condition of the seaweed worsens. Whether this could be linked to the movement
of toxic sediments on the seafloor remains unknown. On the account of experienced fishes and
seaweed farmers, it is a phenomenon only seen in the five years since the Montara spill.
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After the Spill
Chapter 5: The response to Montara

The responses of PTTEP Australasia, and the governments of Indonesia and
Australia indicate an indefinite stalemate regarding resolution of this issue. Here,
we provide a brief overview of some of their responses, including issues which
have previously not been widely publicised.
5.1 PTTEP Australasia

The response of PTTEP Australasia during the clean-up is appropriately covered in the Commission of
Inquiry report, and was commended. The Commission of Inquiry highlighted that:
PTTEP AA should be commended for not only fully meeting the costs incurred by AMSA in
undertaking the clean-up program, but for providing AMSA with considerable operational and
logistical assistance.427
Further detail regarding PTTEP AAs response to the clean-up of the oil is available within the Montara
Commission of Inquiry report. Therefore, this report will provide general overview as well as address
issues that were not covered by the Commission of Inquiry.
5.1.1 Public relations strategy

The timing surrounding the response to the spill is confused by the use of alternative forms of time
(Australian Western Standard Time (AWST); Central Standard Time (CST) and Australian Eastern
Standard Time (AEST), which varies between one and a half hours and two hours respectively), and
the usage of different forms of time in different reports. We attempt to accurately outline timing below.
The Montara Commission of Inquiry noted that the wellhead kicked and discharged approximately
40 barrels of oil and gas, starting at approximately 5.30am CST, ceased, and then re-kicked again at
7.30am CST (6.00am AWST or 8.00am AEST) on Friday 21 August 2009.428
Approximately one and a half hours after the re-kick at the wellhead, a public relations company,
Professional Public Relations WA (PPRWA) was called out to manage PTTEP AAs crisis
communications, media relations and stakeholder communication, at 9.00am CST (7.30am AWST or
9.30am AEST).429
AMSA was advised of the uncontrolled release at approximately 9.30am CST (8.00am AWST or
10.00am AEST),430 at least two hours after the spill had commenced. Within 15 minutes, AMSA
activated the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and Other Noxious and Hazardous
Substances.
At 9.49am,431 PTTEP AA notified the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) and at an
unspecified time, left a message at the Northern Territory Department of Resources.432
At 10.05am CST (8.35am AWST or 10.35am AEST)433 the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre in Geelong
was advised by AMSA.
Following a formal request by PTTEP AA, AMSA assumed the role of Combat Agency by
approximately 9pm that evening.434
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After the Spill
PPRWA operated a 24-hour roster for the first two days of the incident. This reverted to an 8am
6pm rolling seven-day roster with dedicated overnight media contacts for the next 11 weeks,435 until
November 2009.
A description of the companys public relations strategy was submitted in 2010 to the Public Relations
Institute of Australias Golden Target Awards, the premier national annual awards recognising
excellence in the public relations industry436 and, at time of writing, is available on the UTS library
website.
Noting that the national and international media interest was huge and sustained,437 the public
relations strategy involved:
Within days of the blow-out - at PPRWAs recommendation - the Perth-based PTTEP AA
Chief Operating Officer (COO) brought PTTEPs Chief Executive Officer from the head office in
Bangkok to Australia to meet with key government stakeholders in Canberra and Darwin.
The communications goal was to impress upon the Australian government that PTTEP AA:
took responsibility for what had happened and committed to pay all costs for the oil
spill clean-up; and
was committed to doing whatever was necessary to fix the problem.
This was to be one of the most significant strategic decisions during the crisis.
It helped give the company credibility with the key decision-makers in Canberra and establish
a trust-based relationship from the outset.
The Hon. Martin Ferguson MP, Minister for Resources and Energy and Tourism was quickly
established as the lead spokesperson in responding to claims from groups such as the Greens
party an area of political debate the company had decided not to engage in.438
The use of key federal government representatives to convey messages appears to have been relied
on heavily by PPRWA:
AMSA issued updates of daily aerial reconnaissance on the extent of the slick and success
of oil dispersal and skimming/retrieval/recycling of oil. That information was more credible
sourced from a government agency, than from the company.
PTTEP AA COO maintained constant communications with key advisers in the office of the
Minister for Resources and Energy; Tourism, which had taken the lead role in media for the
Federal government. When the Greens claimed the Montara oil slick was 20 kilometres from
the WA coast, it was Minister Ferguson who handled media and showed the claims to be false.
A denial from the company would have had limited impact.
PPRWA also liaised with DEWHA communications managers and they provided advice and
information to the Hon. Peter Garrett Minister for Environment Protection, Heritage and the
Arts. He responded publicly to many claims about environmental impacts. Again, this was
much more effective than any denial from PTTEP AA.439
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After the Spill
However, most significant is PPRWAs statement that:

Later, when it was claimed oil had reached Indonesian islands, the Jakarta embassy of the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade proved the most effective in denying the claims.440
5.1.2 The Montara Action Plan

After the well kill in November 2009, PTTEP AA began developing the Montara Action Plan (MAP),
which aimed to address the root causes of the incident.441 The MAP detailed the changes that had
to occur for the company to meet industry best-practice standards, and focused on short, medium
and long-term actions across key areas: governance, organisation and capability, technical systems,
safety, security, health and environmental culture and management.442
The Montara Commission of Inquiry noted that the Inquiry is not in a position to make any assessment
of PTTEP AAs implementation of the Action Plan. Whilst the Action Plan is an impressive document,
it was produced very late in the Inquirys process and awaits implementation.443 Very late referred to
the MAP being submitted to the Inquiry well after the close of the public hearing.444
An independent review was commissioned to be undertaken by Noetic Group,445 an international
consulting firm. The review considered whether implementation of the Montara Action Plan would
ensure that the operations and procedures of PTTEP Australasia met industry best practice standards.
5.1.3 Penalties
In August 2012, PTTEP AA was facing four charges under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse
Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) relating to the spill and was facing a potential maximum penalty of $1.7
million.
The charges included three charges contrary to clause 9(4) of Schedule 3, and one count contrary
to section 569(1), relating to failure to ensure that operations were conducted in a proper and
workmanlike manner and in accordance with good oilfield practice.446
On 31 August 2012, PTTEP AA pleaded guilty to the charges and was fined a total of $510,000 for the
breaches in the Darwin Magistrates Court.
The magistrate offered PTTEP AA a 25 per cent discount on its fines as a result of pleading guilty.
The first three charges, which related to breaching the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas
Storage Act 2006 (Cth), would have attracted a legislated maximum penalty of $500,000 for each
breach. Instead, these three charges were aggregated, and the company was fined a total of $495,000.
A fourth charge, of failing to ensure that operations were conducted in a proper and workmanlike
manner and in accordance with good oilfield practice earned PTTEP AA a $15,000 fine, which was
well below the legislated maximum penalty of $50,000.
The judgment was delivered orally by Dr Lowndes in the Darwin Magistrates Court, the transcript
running to six pages.447 Dr Lowndes noted:
The maximum penalties for the first three charges is $550,000. The fourth charge carries a
maximum penalty of $55,000.
Of course, that on its face is a surprising low maximum penalty, but it is one of course that I am
bound by.
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After the Spill
But, just as a matter of observation, it seems to be somewhat out of kilter with the maximum
penalties for the other offences; but of course that is the problem of Parliament and if penalties
are to be increased, that is a matter for Parliament. 448
In his decision, Dr Lowndes further held:
However, the real, the gravemente of the offending here, was the potentiality for risk to the
health and safety of others and it is the potentiality of that risk that really must be kept firmly in
mind when dealing with these matters.
I just want to make it patently clear that in determining what is the appropriate sentence
today, I have tried to, I have divorced from my mind, recent deaths on an oil rig in Australia.
I think it is important that I dont try to factor into sentencing process those circumstances.
Again basically it is the potentiality for the risk to the safety and health of others that must be
foremost in my mind. 449
Dr Lowndes also held:
Clearly the offending, both individually and collectively, is of a very serious nature. It is indeed
fortunate that no one lost their lives or was injured.450
However, at that time, injuries sustained from the spill to Australian workers, and impacts reported by
communities in Indonesia, had been widely reported in the Australian and international media.
Initially, the media reported that the National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental
Management Authority (NOPSEMA) was considering options for appeal against the level of the
fines.451 However, it appears that NOPSEMA has not pursued these options and will not be pursuing
them. It must be recognised that the NOPSEMAs powers at the time of the offence and the limitations
thereupon under the previous legislation were considerable.
5.1.4 Approval of expansion of activities in the Timor Sea

On 4 June 2013, production commenced at the Montara oilfield,452 with a capacity to initially produce
21,000 barrels of oil per day.453 The development of a fourth production well was planned for the
second half of 2013.454
In addition, PTTEP AA plans to expand its activities in the Timor Sea. Three new groups of gas fields
are currently awaiting approval from the Commonwealth government, which may produce Liquefied
Natural Gas and Floating Liquefied Natural Gas. PTTEP AA anticipates that between 11 and 21
production wells will be required across the three groups of fields.455
In March 2014, reports also emerged that PTTEP AA was planning to downsell its assets in the
Montara field, reputedly for $2 billion.456
In July 2014, production forecasts released by Argus Media identified that Montaras output
accelerated to 25,000 barrels/day in April-June 2014, up from 12,000 barrels/day in the first quarter.
According to reports, the company was paid an average of $67.70/barrels of oil equivalent for its oil
and gas in the period, up 3.9 percent.457 The sale of one days production in June 2014 could therefore
be more than $1.6 million.
Was the $510,000 fine paid by PTTEP AA equivalent to less than the sale of one days production at
the Montara wellhead?
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After the Spill
5.1.5 No verifiable evidence in Indonesia

PTTEP AA has significantly improved many of its prior errors, a fact which the Australian Lawyers
Alliance is pleased to acknowledge. In conjunction with the Australian government, PTTEP AA has
also undertaken significant environmental monitoring in an area where previously there was little to no
baseline research.
However, PTTEP AA continues to deny the existence of a link between the Montara oil spill and
associated reported impacts in Indonesia:
To-date, no verifiable, valid scientific evidence has been presented to PTTEP AA by GOI [the
Government of Indonesia] to provide support for claims of any inshore or onshore impacts.458
PTTEP AA continues to rely on two oil spill trajectory studies in its report of research that asserted that
the oil did not reach the Australian mainland or Indonesian coast, cited earlier in this report.459
It is these studies that are utilised to support PTTEP AAs continued emphasis that:
no oil reached the Australian mainland or Indonesian coast the closest recorded from
Australia was 35 kilometres; the closest recorded from Indonesia was 94 kilometres.460
PTTEP AA asserts that they have always accepted full responsibility for the Montara wellhead blowout
and subsequent uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons into the Timor Sea. We paid the full cost of the
clean-up operations.461
5.1.6 Contemporary response regarding Indonesia

In May 2014, the Australian Lawyers Alliance provided a submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade inquiry into the role of the private sector in promoting economic growth and
reducing poverty in the Indo-Pacific region.
In our submission, we highlighted claims of damage in communities in NTT, and, more generally, that:
any discussion regarding the role of the private sector inaccelerating poverty alleviation must
include acknowledgement of the capacity ofthe private sector to also reap enormous damage
via actions (such as unethicalinvestment) or omission (such as a breach of duty of care).462
We noted that the devastation being experienced in NTTis potentially one of the most expensive and
recent man-made disasters in the Indo-Pacific that is currently requiring vital assistance.463
We further submitted on a general note that:
It is inappropriate for operating companies to escape liability for their actions, and thus expect
other dedicated members of the private sector to invest in a geographical area to clean up
their mess.464
PTTEP AA were invited to respond to our May 2014 submission. PTTEP AAs response provides one
of its most recent and the most comprehensive public statements regarding claims of damage in
Indonesia. In its five-page submission, PTTEP AA submitted that:
The information that the ALA seeks to rely upon is not evidence of the cause of any of the
alleged damage or loss, and the making of adverse comments about PTTEP AAs conduct on
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After the Spill
the premise that a causative link exists where it does not and in the absence of all the facts is
reckless.465
PTTEP AA further elaborated that:
no verifiable evidence has been presented to support the claimed reports from Indonesian
communities that oil was seen in their fishing grounds, waves of milky oil washed up on their
coast and the seaweed and fishing industries have been affected.
By contrast, there is a credible body of scientific evidence including surveys and studies
that have been carried out by PTTEP AA in conjunction with the Australian government that
critically establish that:
no oil reached the Indonesian coast or had impact on Indonesian shorelines or inshore
waters...
the nearest detectable hydrocarbons to the Indonesian coastline were more than 90 km
from the shore; and
98 per cent of the oil remained within Australian waters.466
Regarding claims of health impacts in Indonesia, PTTEP AA submitted that:
no verifiable evidence has been presented to support any such impacts on Indonesian health
and society.467
Regarding ALAs critique of previous research undertaken, PTTEP AA submitted that:
The oil spill trajectory studies performed on behalf of PTTEP AA utilised all available
information, including aerial surveillance reports and photography, recorded observations from
vessels and the media, satellite imagery, tidal, wind and dispersant data sets.468 (emphasis
added)
PTTEP AA further elaborated on the challenges in securing an investigation within Indonesian waters:
PTTEP AA took steps to obtain additional data from within Indonesian waters. Requests
by PTTEP AA after the incident to allow scientific studies and sampling to be undertaken in
Indonesian waters alleged to have been impacted, were, however, rejected.
More recently, PTTEP AA has been endeavouring to agree with the Indonesian government
to undertake further studies and surveys in Indonesian waters, however these proposed
arrangements have not been able to be finalised.469
Again, PTTEP AA asserted that no verifiable evidence has been presented by the ALA that challenges
the research undertaken by PTTEP AA and the findings on the reach and impact of Montara oil.470
In conclusion, PTTEP AA submitted that the ALA submission relies on unproven causation links and
provides no credible evidence to substantiate the alleged damages claims.471
5.1.7 Response to Lateline

In September 2014, ABCs Lateline program reported on Indonesias request for Australian intervention
to assist in the situation.
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After the Spill
PTTEP AA provided the following statement to Lateline:

PTTEP Australasia is aware of the claims that the 2009 Montara incident negatively impacted
West Timorese fishing and seaweed farming communities. To date, we have not received any
credible evidence that oil from Montara caused damage to the environment in West Timor.
Independent studies published by the Australian Department for the Environment found that
98 per cent of Montara oil stayed in Australian waters. The Montara Environmental Monitoring
Program showed there was no long term damage to the marine environment, notably at
various reefs and shoals in Australian waters closest to Montara. All these studies are publically
available through both the DoE and PTTEP Australasia websites.
We have been consistently willing to engage with the Government of Indonesia to address
these claims. We have always acted cooperatively and in good faith in our past discussions
with the Government of Indonesia, and we will continue to do so.472
5.2 The Government of Indonesia

The Government of Indonesia has previously sought $2.5 billion compensation from PTTEP AA
following the Montara oil spill.473
5.2.1 PTTEP AA and the Government of Indonesia

PTTEP AA cited in its 2013 Financial Statement that:
On August 26, 2010, PTTEP AA received a letter claiming for compensation relating to
the Montara oil spill from the Government of Indonesia. On September 1, 2010, PTTEP AA
submitted the letter rejecting the claim for the compensation because the evidence provided
by the Government of Indonesia is considered unproven and unsubstantiated. No verifiable
scientific evidence has yet been provided to support the claim.
Currently, there are uncertainties for this claim and charge, and the Company is in discussion
with the Government of Indonesia to agree on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The
discussion is ongoing and the conclusion regarding to this matter has not yet finalised.474
PTTEP AA had rejected the Indonesian Governments letter of 26 August 2010 seeking compensation,
in less than a week.
The following questions are pertinent to ask:
1. How did PTTEP AA determine that the evidence provided was unproven and unsubstantiated
within such a short period of time?
2. How could PTTEP AA have reached this decision, given that PTTEP AA had never conducted
research within Indonesian waters?
3. Does the Australian government consider that this rejection of Indonesias request for
compensation was conducted in good faith?
PTTEP AA has continued to maintain that to date, no verifiable, valid scientific evidence has been
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After the Spill
presented to PTTEP AA by the Government of Indonesia to provide support for claims of any inshore
or onshore impacts.475
PTTEP AA has also continued to bar the claims of WTCF. PTTEP AA cites that it has received claims,
and been targeted in numerous media reports, by Indonesian NGOs, such as WTCF. [PTTEP AA]
sought clarification from the Government of Indonesia about the status of such groups, who stated
that the NGOs had no status in the claim and directed that PTTEP AA was only to deal with its
ministerial delegation.476
5.2.2 International Maritime Organisation Legal Committee

The Indonesian government provided a proposal to the 97th session of the International Maritime
Organisation Legal Committee, in September 2010, stating that:
Through laboratory studies by relevant institutions on tarball, sediment and oil sampling from
the Montara platform in Australia, the Government of Indonesia has found that the oil spill from
Montara wellhead has damaged the marine environment in Indonesias waters in the Timor
Sea.
Furthermore, it has caused socio-economic damage to the coastal communities whose living
depends on the sea and its living resources. The total catch of fishermen in Kupang, the
closest Indonesian village to the affected area, has drastically decreased in the period following
the Montara incident. A reduction in the production of seaweed in the affected coastal area
during the period from September 2009 to January 2010 has also been observed.477
On 25 November 2010, the Chairman of the NTT Parliament, Ibrahim Agustinus Medah, wrote to the
central government in Jakarta, copying the NTT provincial government, urging both governments to
reject the results of research conducted by the Australian government.478
In comments to the media, Mr Medah said:
If the Australian government said the Timor Sea is not polluted, it was only a trick to avoid its
responsibilities.479
On 21 August 2014, the five year anniversary of the spill, AAP reported that Indonesias Deputy
Environmental Minister, Imam Hendargo Abu Ismoyo, was hoping that the Australian government
would help persuade PTTEP to act appropriately to resolve the situation:
PTTEPs activities are in Australia and Australia can pressure PTTEP to solve this problem
The government of Australia has the power, the authority.480
5.2.3 The Indonesian governments request for assistance

On 25 September 2014, the Indonesian government sought Australias assistance in further resolution
of the matter, in correspondence from Professor Dr. Balthasar Kambuaya, Minister for the Environment,
to Australias Ambassador to Indonesia, Greg Moriarty.
The correspondence asserted that:
the devastating impact of the Montara incident has been strongly felt by the people living in
the coastal area in the southern part of the Nusa Tenggara island, as oil from the Montara well
spilled over and crossed into Indonesias Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which created a
transboundary pollution problem
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After the Spill
The provincial government of Nusa Tenggara Timur has reported that there was substantial
impact caused by the oil spill, especially for the fishermen and the local coastal area. 481
The correspondence further requested the Australian governments co-operation in resolving the issue:
I am fully convinced that our bilateral co-operation respectively in the Memorandum of
Understanding between Australia and Indonesia on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response
and the Perth Treaty between Australia and Indonesia could be explored in Montaras case
by exchanging information toward the incident of oil pollution, field inspection in the incident
location of oil spills
It is highly appreciated if your government could encourage PTTEP AA for the solution of
Montaras case and pending the negotiation.
Crucially, this letter recognised the work of WTCF, thereby granting WTCF legitimacy to pursue a
study:
[The] Indonesian government has also recognised the effort of WTCF and has acknowledged
its readiness to conduct a scientific study with PTTEP AA to determine the social, economic
and environmental impact of the Montara oil spills in Indonesian water[s].482
In October 2014, AAP reported that DFAT says it is in discussions with the Australian Maritime and
Safety Authority about a request for assistance from the Indonesian Ministry of Transport.483
AAP also reported that the head of international co-operation in Indonesias Marine and Fishery
Industry, Anang Nugroho, has concerns about whats happening in West Timor and believes people
there have waited long enough for answers:
The evidence shows weve really got to get the Australian government concerned with this
matter, as well, of course, as the company, which needs to act responsibly. We hope we can
open this dialogue.484
5.3 The Australian Government

5.3.1 Incomplete response
The response of the Australian government to the Montara oil spill remains incomplete.
A number of large-scale actions have been undertaken, including the co-ordination of the response;
initiation of the Montara Commission of Inquiry; the companys formation of a Montara Action
Plan; the signing of a Deed of Agreement between the Commonwealth and PTTEP AA; a long term
environmental monitoring program funded by PTTEP AA; and legislative change.
However, these actions have largely focused upon damage within Australian waters and have not
sufficiently considered the possibility of transboundary damage to Indonesia and Timor Leste.
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After the Spill
5.3.2 The 2014 response

The Australian governments response in 2014 to the issue of transboundary damage emanating from
the Montara oil spill, was that the issue must be resolved between the government of Indonesia and
PTTEP AA.
The Secretary of DFAT commented at Senate estimates in February 2014, when quizzed regarding
communications with Indonesia on the issue of the spill, that:
But now the issue has been brought more or less to a resolution we have not had much
contact with them in recent timescertainly not in Canberra.485
While DFAT and the Australian embassy in Indonesia have previously met with Indonesian government
officials regarding this issue, the Australian Lawyers Alliance is unaware as to when contact on this
issue decreased or ceased.
In June 2014, the Australian Lawyers Alliance provided correspondence to senior ministers and
shadow ministers, noting our concerns regarding reported impacts in Indonesia, as referred to in this
report.
Despite the extensive range of impacts raised, the Hon. Ian Macfarlane, Minister for Industry, said in
correspondence received 22 July 2014 that:
I note your claims of possible environmental impacts in Indonesian waters attributed to
hydrocarbons from the Montara oil spill. The Australian Government has not been approached
by the Indonesian Government to undertake any environmental monitoring. It is beyond the
Australian Governments jurisdiction to compel a titleholder to perform any investigative or
monitoring activities in the waters of another country.
We understand the titleholder, PTTEP Australasia, and the Government of Indonesia have
been in direct contact since the spill occurred. Any issues relating to environmental damage in
Indonesian waters are a matter for the Indonesian Government to take up with the company.486
In news reports on the fifth anniversary of the spill in August 2014, a spokesperson for Mr Macfarlane,
stated:
Any further issues relating to waters outside Australia are matters to be addressed by the
company in consultation with the relevant government.487
A similar position appears to have been adopted by NOPSEMA. In correspondence received by the
Australian Lawyers Alliance on 21 August 2014, Chief Executive Officer of NOPSEMA, Jane Cutler,
wrote:
NOPSEMA does not have the jurisdiction or powers to recommend further investigation of
claims of environmental damage in waters beyond our jurisdiction.488
Following receipt of this correspondence, the Australian Lawyers Alliance sent further correspondence
to the Australian government, providing greater detail of reports of damage emanating from Indonesia.
Despite these revelations, the position of the Minister for Industry continued in 9 September 2014:
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After the Spill
The position outlined in my previous correspondence remains unchanged. It is beyond the

Australian governments jurisdiction to compel a titleholder to perform any investigative or
monitoring activities in the waters of another country. Any issues relating to environmental
damage in Indonesian waters are a matter for the Indonesian government to take up with
PTTEP Australasia.489
Given that since this time, the government of Indonesia has submitted an official request for
assistance, it must be questioned as to whether this will have an impact on the Australian
governments position.
The Minister for Industry, also noted:
As identified in your letter, the Australian government has strengthened Australias regulatory
system following the Montara and Gulf of Mexico incidents. These reforms include clarifying
transboundary arrangements for incidents involving international waters, as reflected in the
referenced Oil Spill Contingency Plan. 490
At time of writing, these arrangements for transboundary incidents also remain incomplete.
5.3.3 Transboundary incidents and the National Plan

As highlighted in correspondence from the Australian Lawyers Alliance to the Minister for Industry,
AMSAs National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies now appears to envisage a more
proactive responsibility for DFAT and AMSA in relation to transboundary incidents.
AMSAs National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies states that the functions of AMSA in
[the management of the National Plan] include international liaison as necessary.491
The National Plan provides for the co-ordination of stakeholders during major incidents through the
application of four core concepts, the fourth being co-ordination with international governments.492
The National Plan further acknowledges that:
Major or catastrophic maritime environmental emergencies have the potential to significantly
impact on the national interests of Australia and may require extraordinary strategic coordination across governments and stakeholders for their effective management.
Such incidents will generally be of a large scale and require the coordination of national
and international level interests, and may include circumstances where the
incident impacts across an international boundaryor NOPSEMA or the responsible
Commonwealth minister, due to the titleholders failure to fulfil their spill response
obligations, is required to act.493 (emphasis added)
The National Plan further acknowledges that:
The Australian government is party to a number of international conventions and agreements
that include obligations to report, co-ordinate with, and provide assistance to other countries
during a marine pollution incident. These conventions include UNCLOS and the OPRC
Convention and its HNS Protocol
These convention and agreement obligations rest with the Australian government and
cannot be delegated to another party. The National Plan includes a Guideline on the Coordination of International Incidents, which includes arrangements for:
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assessment of incidents and notification arrangements;

engagement with DFAT and relevant diplomatic posts;
engagement with the Department of the Environment in relation to PACPLAN matters;
co-ordination of response operations across trans-national boundaries; and
co-ordination of international assistance under PACPLAN and other MOU
arrangements.494 (emphasis added)
Given that the Guideline on the Co-ordination of International Incidents could be expected to form
an important part of the new framework for action to be taken in future transboundary incidents, the
Australian Lawyers Alliance sought a copy of the Guideline from AMSA and DFAT.
We were subsequently informed that the guideline was still in draft form only and not publicly available.
The Australian Lawyers Alliance applied under freedom of information laws for the release of the most
recent draft of the Guideline on the Coordination of International Incidents.
Our request was rejected on the basis that the document was an unapproved draft. It was therefore
described as exempt from release under s47C(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).495 It
was further noted that AMSA would publish the Guideline after its approval in November 2014. We did
not appeal this decision to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. The fact that it has
taken five years to create such a guideline is certainly questionable.
In October 2014, AMSA released the Guidance for International Incidents: Notification Arrangements
(the Guidance). The document does not appear to be complete, as it states that:
the document does not consider other arrangements foreshadowed to be part of the Guideline
for Coordination of International Incidents. These arrangements may be incorporated into an
expanded guideline at a later date.496
However, the Guidance notes the Australian governments obligations:
The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Responses and Co-operation and
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea oblige Australia to immediately notify a
potentially affected country when it becomes aware that that countrys interests, including the
marine environment, are affected or likely to be affected by pollution.
Furthermore, it is in Australias national interest to ensure we undertake timely, appropriate and
ongoing communication with our neighbours regarding incidents in our waters that may or will
impact upon the territory and maritime areas, activities and interests of the other country.497
Further, the Guidance notes the role of DFAT in co-ordinating communication:
DFAT will take the necessary steps to meet Australias international notification obligations
and coordinate official communication between the Government of Australia and the foreign
government concerned. 498
Regardless, both the Guidance, and the outline of the Guideline on the Co-ordination of International
Incidents appears to attach importance to the role of the Australian government in assisting with the
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co-ordination of international incidents, including the fact that its obligations under international law
are non-delegable.
Given the envisaging of this important role, we question why DFAT has not been more proactive
in engaging with the provincial and national governments of Indonesia regarding negotiation for
independent research.
Furthermore, PTTEP Australasias Oil Spill Contingency Plan now explicitly expects the Australian
government to undertake co-ordination and assistance in cases of transboundary damage.
PTTEP Australasias Oil Spill Contingency Plan provides that:
Spills from PTTEP AA activities may pass into Indonesian or Timor Leste waters. AMSA will
coordinate trans-border responses in consultation with the DFAT.499(emphasis added)
Furthermore, the Plan provides that:
If government assistance is required a liaison officer [may be appointed] to keep
government agencies informed and to coordinate assistance. This may be required if a spill
moves across a national boundary requiring government assistance (DFAT and AMSA).500
(emphasis added)
Given that current oil contingency plans explicitly provide for the role of the Australian government
and its agencies in cases of transboundary damage, the reticence of the Australian government to be
involved in such a manner in the ongoing transboundary case of the Montara oil spill is puzzling.
5.3.4 Memorandum of Understanding on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response

The prospect of transboundary damage in the Timor Sea, and subsequent steps expected to be taken,
was addressed within the Memorandum of Understanding on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response
signed between the Australian and Indonesian governments in 1996. The MOU did not appear to be
publicly available, and the Australian Lawyers Alliance applied to AMSA under freedom of information
laws for the release of this document.
The MOU begins:
Bearing in mind the adoption of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) of the
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990,
recognising the serious threat posed to the marine and coastal environments of both Parties,
recognising further the desirability of strengthening mutual co-operation at the operational
level, noting the need to maintain and promote co-operation in combating marine pollution in
cases of marine emergencies in the region, taking into account the Australia/Indonesia Oil Spill
Response Action Planattached to this MOU, have reached the following understandings501
The MOU cites inter alia that:
the Parties will promote mutual cooperation on oil spill preparedness and response;
(Paragraph 1)502
that the Parties will exchange information on oil pollution incidents when necessary and
appropriate; (Paragraph 3)503 and
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that the Parties will give particular attention to facilitate expeditious trans-boundary mobility of
personnel, materials and equipment in case of emergency (Paragraph 4).504
In the MOU, the parties committed to use the Action Plan as a basis for co-operation at the operational
level and to promote its implementation.505 The Action Plans objective is to provide a cooperative plan
for mutual assistance in the event of a major oil spill incident which exceeds the response capability of
either national government.506
The Action Plan cites that the area of application for the Action Plan includes all waters within the
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of both Parties and waters outside these areas in
which an oil spill could affect one or both countries. Spills that occur within this geographic area will be
monitored by the country whose area of responsibility is most likely to be affected by the movement of
the spill as a result of wind and ocean current.507
Under the Action Plan, in the event of a marine oil pollution incident, the national authority responsible
for marine oil pollution control can request assistance from the other party.508
In a submission addressing the Draft Government Response to the Montara Commission of Inquiry,
WTCF asserted that:
Paragraph 1 [of the MOU] refers to mutual cooperation on oil preparedness and response.
First, the Australian Government, as it has conceded in its numerous documents, including the
one currently being discussed, was ill prepared for an oil spill of the magnitude of the Montara
Blowout. As a result, West Timor has suffered the consequences of this lack of preparedness.
Second, after the Montara Blowout the Australian Government failed to respond in any
meaningful way besides meeting with the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to update
them on the situation.
The exchange of information discussed in Paragraph 3 did take place to what we believe
was a limited extent. The WTCF concedes that members of the Australian and Indonesian
Governments did meet and discuss the Montara crisis at different times after the September
2009 Montara Blowout. However, the extent and outcome of their meetings in no way fit with
the spirit and clauses within the MOU.
This is most strongly reflected in Paragraph 4 (d). After the Montara Blowout took place, the
Australian Government failed to facilitate expeditious transboundary mobility of personnel,
material and equipment in the case of an emergency.
Without a doubt, we believe that what took place in September 2009 and the continuing
ramifications of this event are indeed a case of an emergency that extend into Indonesian
waters and continue to cause tremendous damage to West Timor and its surrounding Islands.
Such an emergency called for expeditious transboundary mobility of personnel, materials and
equipment from the Australian Government. However, to date, the Australian Government has
not met this obligation to any extent. For these reasons we believe the Australian Government
has breached its obligations under the MOU.509
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5.3.5 Historical response to the spill

Following the June 2010 release of the Montara Commission of Inquiry report, the Australian
government took a number of additional steps. This included the release of draft and final government
responses to the report,510 released on 24 November 2010 and 25 May 2011 respectively, as well as
further actions.
On 24 November 2010, then Minister for Resources and Energy, The Hon. Martin Ferguson noted in a
statement on the Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry and the Australian Government Draft
Response, that:
From an international perspective, I note that evidence was presented to the Inquiry that some
weathered oil had crossed into Indonesias EEZ.
This was consistent with AMSAs observations and was reflected in the Governments formal
advice to the Indonesian Government nine days after the spill commenced.
Throughout the response AMSA was in direct contact with Indonesias Directorate General
of Sea Transport and provided updates in relation to the type, amount and nature of the oil
present in Indonesias EEZ and Australias clean-up response effort.
The Government has continued to keep the Indonesian Government informed of further
developments.
I am aware that the Indonesian Government is seeking compensation from the operator of the
Montara oil field, PTTEP AA. This is a matter between the Indonesian Government and PTTEP
AA.511
5.3.5.1 Show cause notice

The Montara Commission of Inquiry recommended that:
the Minister should, as the joint authority for the offshore area of the Territory of Ashmore and
Cartier Islands, undertake a review of PTTEP AAs permit and licence to operate at the Montara
Oilfield.512
The Montara Commission of Inquiry also recommended that the Minister give consideration to the
question of cancellation (by issuing a show cause notice to PTTEP AA under s 276 of the OPGGS
Act).513 This recommendation was based on the following factors:
a. the nature and extent of PTTEP AAs deficiencies with respect to the H1 Well at the Montara
Oilfield;
b. the nature and extent of PTTEP AAs deficiencies with respect to all other wells at the
Montara Oilfield;
c. PTTEP AAs failure to properly investigate the circumstances and likely causes of the
blowout;
d. PTTEP AAs provision of palpably false and misleading information to NOPSA and to this
Inquiry;
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After the Spill
e. PTTEP AAs withholding of relevant information from NOPSA and the NT DoR;
f. the selfjustifying and deflective position adopted by PTTEP AA throughout most of this
Inquiry. In this regard, PTTEP AA only really acknowledged the nature and extent of its
deficiencies in managing well control at the Montara Oilfield toward the very end of the
Inquirys public hearing that is, after compulsory powers were exercised to test (and
find wanting) the blame avoidant position which PTTEP AA had, to that point, steadfastly
adopted.514
On 4 February 2011, the Hon. Martin Ferguson AM MP, released the report of the Independent Review
of the PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore-Cartier) Pty Ltd (PTTEP Australasia) Montara Action Plan, which
found that the Montara Action Plan effectively responds to the issues identified by the Montara
Commission of Inquiry and sets PTTEP AA on the path to achieving industry best practice standards
for both good oil field practice and good governance.515 On the same day, he announced that he
would not be issuing a show cause notice to the company that might lead to the cancellation of its
petroleum titles at this time. This move was criticised by environmental organisations such as WWF.516
A PTTEP AA spokesperson was quoted in the national media, saying that the action plan would help
the company to ensure a disaster like the Montara oil spill would never happen again. On the question
of environmental impact, the spokesperson said so far, all scientific evidence and studies had shown
that the spill caused minimal damage and was relatively concentrated. 517
The spokesperson said that different independently verified studies had shown that no oil reached
Australias coasts but it was concentrated in an area of 1,100 square kilometres more than 90km off
the Indonesian coast.518
The Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices (ANEDO) submission on behalf of
environmental representatives raised concerns with the decision of the Minister for Resources and
Energy not to issue a show cause notice to PTTEP Australasia, and suggested that the Minister
should cancel the companys Montara production licence or suspend the licence until the requisite
remedial action had been taken. ANEDO also suggested cancelling all other production licences held
by PTTEP AA to send a message to other oil field operators.519
5.3.5.2 Deed of Agreement between the Commonwealth and PTTEP AA

The Ministers decision not to issue a show cause notice was conditional upon PTTEP AA entering
into a binding Deed of Agreement with the Australian Government which agreed in its terms that the
Montara Action Plan would be implemented in full, in respect of all of PTTEP AAs operations.520
The content of the Deed of Agreement largely dealt with governance, technical requirements,
environmental contingency planning, training and development, regulatory liaison, documentation,
communications and reporting.521
On 22 February 2011, the Deed of Agreement was finalised by PTTEP AA and senior officials from
the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism.522 The implementation was to be subject to an
18-month monitoring program undertaken by independent experts appointed by the Department of
Resources, Energy and Tourism, which would provide assurance that the Montara Action Plan was
fully completed and properly implemented by PTTEP AA across its Australian operations. 523
On 23 February 2011, the day the Australian government signed the Deed, it would have been aware
of the struggle of the Indonesian government to negotiate compensation for communities.
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However, at no instance did the Montara Action Plan refer to Indonesia.

There also did not appear to be a requirement that compensation be paid immediately to Australian
workers or sub-contractors affected whose claims were still outstanding, and continued to be reported
in the media until March 2012.
However, of note, the Deed of Agreement did require revision of PTTEP AAs Oil Spill Contingency
Plan, which now relevantly provides certain expectations regarding the role of DFAT in transboundary
damage.
On 21 June 2013, the-then Minister for Resources and Energy, Small Business and Tourism the Hon
Gary Gray AO, concluded that:
the company has successfully implemented the Montara Action Plan and has met its
obligations under the deedit has improved its systems, processes and culture, to ensure
these changes are sustainable, and has taken an industry lead in developing new and
innovative techniques for ensuring safe operations. The Montara incident in 2009 was a wakeup call for industry and government.524
The deed concluded on 21 June 2013, with the government continuing to have oversight of the
companys operations through NOPSEMA, as it does for all petroleum operations.
5.3.5.3 Environmental monitoring

PTTEP AA also developed an environmental monitoring program, in close consultation with and
in partnership with the Australian governments Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water,
Population and Communities (DSEWPaC).525 The monitoring program was agreed on 9 October
2009,526 more than a month and a half after the spill commenced.
The plan, known as the Monitoring Plan for the Montara Well Release Timor Sea, was prepared for
PTTEP AA. The plan consisted of five operational monitoring studies (which were implemented during
the response to the incident) and seven scientific monitoring studies. Implementation of the scientific
studies is determined by information provided by the operational studies and components of other
scientific studies.
Experts from the Australian Institute of Marine Science, CSIRO and relevant state and territory
agencies provided input into the Monitoring Plan and into its implementation to ensure that the
monitoring program was appropriate and robust. The Plan covered both short-term and long-term
environmental effects of the Montara oil spill, and included marine life surveys, wildlife and habitat
studies, continued water quality testing and shoreline ecological assessments.
The Monitoring Plan stated that the scientific monitoring study will be managed by PTTEP AA.527
Proposals developed by leading research organisations are submitted to PTTEP AA for initial
approval.528
The study proposals are then sent to DSEWPaC and subjected to a detailed review by an agencyappointed Technical Advisory Board. (This is managed independently by DSEWPaC with no direct
involvement by PTTEP AA). If all parties agree, PTTEP AA engages and funds the expert research
group to undertake the study and commission the development and submission of a final report.529
The Commission of Inquiry noted that:
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concerns were raised about a potential conflict of interest that might arise for PTTEP AA given
its involvement in the design and implementation of the scientific monitoring and the reporting
of results.530
5.3.5.4 Activation of the triggers

At Senate Estimates in February 2010, Senator Rachel Siewert asked the Department of the
Environment, Heritage and Water about the activation of triggers associated with the Montara oil spill.
The response was as follows:
The broad process is, in summary form, firstly, when we get information available to us that
suggests a trigger has been hit and those triggers are defined in the environmental monitoring
plan, we then consult with relevant agencies and relevant experts regarding the breaching of
that trigger, essentially to get confirmation from independent experts and agencies that that is
the case.
We then liaise with the company, PTTEP, and together with the company determine that a
scientific monitoring study or a stage of a study is required; the company then initiates a tender
process for the work. As part of the memorandum of understanding there is an attachment
that sets out a range of experts who would be considered competent in their field to undertake
those sorts of studies. PTTEP then seeks, essentially from that panel, tenders to undertake the
monitoring program.
The company receives proposals and then selects the proposal that best meets the
parameters for that study, looking at qualifications, value for money, the quality of the proposal,
and adequacy and timeliness of reporting. The company then submits the successful bid to
the department for approval and at that point in time the department then seeks peer review of
the proposal from the Australian Institute of Marine Science, the CSIRO and relevant agencies
in the WA and Northern Territory governments to be assured that the study proposal is robust
and is being implemented by appropriately qualified and independent experts.
We then go ahead and issue an approval for the study to be undertaken. There may be, as
part of that process, requests for the detail of the study to be amended to better fit the advice
that we are getting from that peer review. The company, once it has approval, then goes
on and implements the studies and then, once completed, final reports are provided to the
department.531
Senator Siewert asked, Who triggers? Is it the company and the department?
A representative of the Department said that:
It can be either. It could be also as a result of stakeholders coming to us with information that
indicates that a trigger has been met.
It could be one of the research agencies coming to us and indicating that, in its view, the
trigger has been met and, therefore, we would take that information, come to an agreement on
the triggering and then move into that process.532
Of the triggers listed, many were reported in WTCFs submission to the Montara Commission of
Inquiry, and in its commentary on the Draft Government Response. WTCF has also continued to
advocate in the media regarding the impacts.
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WTCF was the sole Indonesian organisation to provide feedback to the Montara Commission of
Inquiry. However, reports of damage in Indonesia have not at any time triggered independent research.
These reports include:
Oil contamination in Indonesian waters, with sample testing of waters south of West Timor to
contain high levels of lead, oil and grease;533
Significant destruction of seaweed farms, in some areas by 80 percent;534
Significant reductions in fish catches;535 and
Concern regarding adverse health impacts that have in other cases, been associated with
dispersant use.
It was cited that a number of the triggers will be activated if oil spill trajectory modelling predicts such
impacts. For example, the following would be triggers if observed or predicted by oil spill trajectory
modelling:
Impact of oil on sensitive reef, island or mainland shorelines or inshore habitats (seagrasses,
corals);536 and
Impact of oil on shoreline associated fauna (for example, seabirds, sea snakes, turtles,
dugongs or other species as advised by DEWHA).537
No reports emanating from communities in NTT have triggered a requirement for independent
research.
Many of the reports of damage in communities occurred prior to the monitoring plan being put into
place, therefore the plan may have been put into place too late.
A summary of issues investigated in this report include:
reports of oil in fishing grounds and Indonesian waters in August 2009;
reports of oil and sheen washing into seaweed farms in September 2009;
reports of oil washing onto beaches of the Indonesian coast in September 2009;
death of seaweed industry and milky water in September 2009;
a whale carcass washed onto coast in September 2009;
reports of fishermens nets fouled with oil, making it impossible to collect product, around
September 2009;
the devastation of mangroves, causing flooding of villages;
bleaching of coral and discolouration of seagrass following oil witnessed on the water.
Many of these issues should be encapsulated by the monitoring plans intended studies, except for the
fact that they occurred in Indonesia.
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5.3.6 Senator Siewerts advocacy

Senator for Western Australia, Senator Rachel Siewert, has been a strong advocate regarding impacts
of the Montara oil spill since the spill was still flowing.
During the spill, Senator Siewert chartered a plane and flew over the location of the explosion of the
Montara wellhead, as only officers of the Australian Government and PTTEP Australasia were allowed
to enter the disaster area.
Senator Siewert also provided oil samples for testing to the Montara Commission of Inquiry that had
been collected by WTCF in Indonesian waters.
She has continued to highlight the issue on multiple occasions in the Australian Senate, including
seeking answers of AMSA in Senate Estimates.
She has highlighted the issue on multiple occasions in the Senate, including during second reading
speeches for legislation strengthening regulation of the offshore petroleum industry in February 2013:
We are still concerned about the impact of the Montara oil spill on the Timor Sea and on the
livelihoods of Indonesian fishers. To this day, those fishers are still trying to keep this issue on
the agenda and to get a study done of the potential impacts on the marine environment, on
coastal environments and on their livelihoods.
There has still been no compensation to those fishers, despite the fact that we clearly
established that the oil went into Indonesian waters, that it impacted on the fishers and that
they had to stop fishing. Those fishers in those communities still have not been compensated.
We have written to both the federal government and the company to ask them to speed up this
process, because it is those people who have suffered significantly.538
To date, Senator Rachel Siewert is the only representative from the Parliament of Australia to have met
with communities claiming to have been affected.
In March 2014, Senator Siewert spoke again about the issue in the Australian Senate following her
meetings with communities in West Timor:
We have no understanding of what impact this spill had on Indonesian waters.
Two weeks ago, I visited East Nusa Tenggara to meet with officials, fishers, community
members and seaweed farmers, and it looks like the Montara oil spill has had a significant
impact on those communities...
Two weeks agoI met with communities in Tablolong, where 800 concerned community
members came to a public meeting, there were so many people gathered in the church and
many people outside. And I got to hear their accounts of what has happened to them and the
impacts felt by their communities.
I heard how their production had fallen very significantly for example, in the village I was in, 500
tonnes production of seaweed was down to 10 tonnes. I heard from a regional fisheries officer,
how production of fish had gone to what was originally 180,000 tonnes, down to what is now
70,000 tonnes, I heard from the fishers how red snapper, lobster, sardines; now they couldnt
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fish those, they couldnt catch them, they had to change their fishing grounds
I heard how the number of fishing boats had significantly reduced from hundreds to less than a
hundred.
I heard how fishers had lost their jobs, because they could no longer fish.
I believe it is incumbent on the Australian government to takeleadership, because it was our
poor regulatory practice, along with the companywho have a responsibility, it was failures
by both it was failures of our regulatory practice and gross failures on the companys behalf.
So the company has a responsibility. But if they are not going to take up the responsibility,
we need leadership by the Australian government to require a study to be done of what these
impacts are.
I heard from experts at the seminar that you could still do the studies, and establish if the oil
and dispersants [are] still in the marine environment, still in the sediments. So we can establish
whether its had impact.
We owe it to those communities to carry out those studies and I urge the Australian
government to take some leadership here. I desperately urge the company, PTTEP Australasia,
to talk to these fishers, put the money into the study and lets establish what has really
happened to these villages.539
5.3.7 A lack of action by the Australian government regarding reports in Indonesia

If the kinds of impacts being reported in NTT, Indonesia, had been experienced by Australian
communities, these reports would undoubtedly have activated an immediate response, triggering the
research process.
While the Australian government has worked with PTTEP AA to commission studies within Australian
waters, there does not appear, at any time, to have been significant pressure exerted by the Australian
government upon PTTEP AA to investigate, remediate, or negotiate in good faith regarding claims of
damage emanating from Indonesia.
At the time of writing, apart from Senator Rachel Siewert, it does not appear that parliamentary
representatives of Australia have met with regencies from NTT or with members of communities
claiming to be affected.
It seems that the Australian government has left Indonesia alone to negotiate compensation with
PTTEP AA, despite the fact that the spill commenced in Australian waters.
Further assistance could potentially have been exerted to assist our closest neighbour, especially
in light of the fact that poor regulatory practicecan be regarded as having contributed to poor
operational practices on the part of PTTEP AA.540
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Chapter 6: International considerations

Oil spills in the Gulf of Thailand in 2013, and the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, provide
useful comparisons of the response of governments and polluters, the use of
dispersants, damage reported within communities and the access to justice
for communities claiming to be affected. The lack of international guidance on
transboundary damage is also an ongoing issue.
6.1 PTTGC, Gulf of Thailand, 2013

The Montara Commission of Inquiry highlighted that:
a contributing factor of PTTEP AAs systemic errors extends to its onshore management
and governance structurethere is a direct line of reporting through the CEO to the parent
company in Thailand.
There was insufficient attention paid to putting in place mechanisms, to assess and manage
project risks, the competence of key personneland the interaction with contractors. More
attention needed to be paid to high level governance procedures and to how this translated
into field operations and procedures.541
The conduct of other subsidiaries of PTTEP AAs parent company, PTT Public Company Limited (PTT),
is relevant to consider. In 2011, Fortune magazine listed PTT as No. 128 in its Global 500 listing of the
worlds largest corporations.542
In July 2013, another subsidiary of PTT, PTT Global Chemical Public Company Ltd (PTTGC), was
involved in an oil spill in the Gulf of Thailand, via a leak from an offshore pipeline being unloaded by an
offshore tanker.
It was PTTs fourth major oil spill in Thai waters, according to the Energy Ministry.543
The idyllic tourist island of Ko Samet was ravaged by thick slicks of crude oil that turned the beaches
black.
The company admitted that around 50,000 litres of crude oil had leaked into the sea.544 However, some
experts have suggested that the amount could be far greater. Somporn Chuai-aree of Prince Songkhla
University said that based on his analysis of satellite images from the beginning of the accident, the
likely amount of oil spilled could have ranged from 108,000 litres to 190,000 litres.545
Approximately 32,000 litres of dispersant Slickgone was used to break up the spill. This was described
as an excessive amount, given that the appropriate dispersant to oil ratio is 1:10.546
Associate Professor Siwat Pongniumchan from Thailands National Institute of Development
Administration, questioned not only the amount of oil spilled, but also the long-term environmental
impact of chemical dispersants.Mr Siwat said despite numerous oil spills involving the company,
PTTGC invested little in clean-up equipment.547
The oil spill affected tourism operators, ferry operators, restaurant owners, fishermen and seafoodrelated entrepreneurs. The Bangkok Post reported that piles of tar balls are washed ashore every
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day. Shells of young cuttlefish were also found on the beach, which academics have reported as an
indication of chemical pollution in the water.548
In August 2013, seafood shop owner Kaniita Sridongrak reported that sales at the restaurant had
dropped by more than 10,000 baht from 40,000 baht a day.549
In October 2013, the Bangkok Post reported that villagers said that fish and marine life appeared to
have disappeared from the sea. Fishermens daily catches dropped from approximately 40 kilograms
to two kilograms. Many of the fishermen were thinking of giving up their fishing jobs and returning to
construction work.550
6.1.1 Claims for compensation

In October 2013, PTTGC offered paltry compensation to fishermen and business owners in Rayong
province, the heart of Thailands seafood and fish industry: a one-time payment of 30,000 Thai baht
(approximately AUD$998).551 These offers were dismissed by local non-government groups, with the
National Human Rights Commission advocating for the rights of local fishermen.
In October 2013, it was reported that the Thailand Natural Resources and Environment Ministry
decided not to take legal action against PTTGC as the company had agreed to pay compensation for
the damage sustained.552
However, in July 2014, it was reported that over 450 fishermen from Rayong province had filed a civil
lawsuit against PTTGC, seeking 400 million baht (over AUD$13.3 million) in damages.553 Fishermen
alleged that many people had been forced to abandon their jobs and commence working as labourers.
The Bangkok Post reported the motivations of one of the fishermen involved, Paibul Lekrat: Money is
not our priority. We want to create a precedent for future environmental cases.554
The fishermen also filed a separate case in the Rayong Administrative Court against the company, the
provincial governor and five government agencies involved for failing to properly handle the spill.555
In a separate claim, over 70 operators of local hotels, restaurants, entertainment places, tour guide
firms and souvenir shops were reported to have banded together to sue PTTGC, estimating the
damage at 1 billion baht (over AUD$33 million), and asserting that environmental rehabilitation would
take a decade.556
6.1.2 Complexities of expert evidence demonstrated

The complexities of expert evidence have been demonstrated in Ko Samet, where research regarding
seawater quality has been contested. The Nation reported that Burapha Universitys aquatic scientist,
Vichaya Gunbua, found that marine life had returned to the affected area, indicating that the seawater
was clean. However, Thon Thamrongnawa-sawat, Deputy Dean at Kasetsart Universitys Faculty of
Fisheries who had also been conducting a study in the area, said the number of marine organisms
at Ao Phrao was still less compared with other beaches, and that the area had not yet returned to
normal.557
By way of contrast to the lack of immediate scientific monitoring within Indonesian waters following
the Montara oil spill, in Thailand it was reported that the Pollution Control Department would test the
quality of seawater and air around the Ko Samet National Park for one year.558
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6.1.3 Reference to Montara

Following the Gulf of Thailand spill, common references were made in Thai and international media to
the fact that a subsidiary of PTT was involved in the Montara oil spill.
However, the lack of information about the Montara spill, including reports of adverse impacts in
NTT communities, has limited international commentary from drawing comparisons between the two
events.
International commentary has been particularly limited in its ability to draw any comparisons between
the companys response in each instance, and the manner in which it has battled claims of liability.
Similarly, potential information exchange regarding the type of damage experienced, and the severity
and longevity of such damage, may potentially have been of assistance to the court in consideration
of damages, especially considering that Rayong, like the Timor Sea, has traditionally been an area
renowned for fishing.
The Gulf of Thailand spill took place against a background in which PTT had been recognised with
a swathe of awards, including Asias Best Corporate Social Responsibility Award, in April 2013, by
Corporate Governance Asia Magazine in Hong Kong.559 In 2012, PTT was listed on the Dow Jones
Sustainability Work Index in the Oil and Gas Producers Sector; the first Thai company to be listed.560
These are just a few of the many accolades PTT has earned,561 while reports of damage in NTT by one
of its subsidiaries have continued to go unrecognised.
Most recently, on 8 November 2014, PTT was involved in the leak of 10,000 litres of fuel from a PTT
pipeline into a community canal in Chiang Mai. Thai media reported that the leak occurred while a pipe
was being repaired, at an aircraft stand in Chiang Mai International Airport.562
6.2 BP Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, 2010

The BP Deepwater Horizon spill, which occurred in the Gulf of Mexico, is also relevant to consider. The
spill commenced on 20 April 2010, and flowed for 87 days until it was capped on 15 July 2010. It was
the worst offshore environmental disaster in American history.
6.2.1 US government response

President Barack Obama was highly engaged on the issue of the spill, exerting pressure and
conducting negotiations with BP before the spill had even ceased. A six month moratorium on
offshore drilling was also put into place, reported as intended to address lax safety and environmental
regulation that contributed to the BP crisis.563The suspension affected 33 deepwater drilling rigs.564
In June 2010, the President wrung an apology from BP and an agreement that US$20 billion the
equivalent of two years of dividends for BP would be paid as a down payment into a special
compensation fund for victims of the Gulf oil spill.565 President Obama clarified that this was not a cap,
stating, the people of the Gulf have my commitment that BP will meet its obligations to them.566 He
also extracted a commitment from BP for a $100 million fund for oil rig workers put out of work by the
moratorium on drilling, which the oil company had been resisting.567
In 2012, BP agreed to accept criminal responsibility for the disaster and agreed to pay $4.5 billion to
the US government, thus settling its criminal liability in the spill.568
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By October 2013, BP had already incurred more than $42 billion of charges for cleanup costs, fines
and compensation related to the spill.569
6.2.2 Health warnings

In the US, information was released to individuals soon after the spill, including information for
specific stakeholders, such as coastal residents, pregnant women, parents and health professionals.
Information was also released regarding water and food contamination, use of beaches, fishing and
recreational activities.570
In November 2014, it was announced that $11 million in funding has been provided for researchers to
examine the impact of oil, dispersed oil and dispersant on the Gulf of Mexicos ecosystem and public
health. The research, a consortium led by the University of South Mississippi, will be conducted from
2015-2017.571
6.2.3 Compensation in the US

In In Re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico,572 two settlements, one
for medical claims and another for economic and property damage claims, were reached with BP
Exploration & Production Inc and BP America Production Company.
On 21 December 2012, the court issued an Order and Reasons and Order and Judgment certifying the
Economic and Property Settlement Class and granting final approval of the Economic and Property
Damages Settlement Agreement.573 On 11 January 2013, the Court issued an Order and Reasons and
Order and Judgment certifying the Medical Benefits Settlement Class and granting final approval of
the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement.574
6.2.3.1 The Medical Benefits Settlement

The Medical Benefits Settlement offered benefits to qualifying people who resided in the United
States as of April 16, 2012, who were either Deepwater Horizon oil spill clean-up workers or who
were residents in certain defined beachfront areas and wetlands during certain time periods in 2010.
In general, the zones included certain beachfront areas within at least half a mile of the water, and
wetlands areas within at least 1 mile of the water.575 As identified by GAP in their 2013 report, while
the Gulf of Mexico is home to 21 million people (just slightly less than the total population of Australia),
approximately only 110,000 residents would fulfil the criteria regarding proximity to qualify.576
The Medical Benefits Settlement listed a matrix of Specified Physical Conditions that may be eligible
for compensation, depending on the timespan of the condition; the level of proof submitted; and the
individuals qualifying circumstances. These conditions included:
vision conditions and symptoms;
upper airways/respiratory conditions and symptoms;
ear, nose and throat conditions and symptoms;
skin conditions and symptoms;
neurophysiological/neurological/odour-related conditions and symptoms;
gastrointestinal or stomach conditions and symptoms; and
health-related conditions (clean-up workers only).577
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If individuals proceeded as Medical Class members, their health would be monitored for a further
21 years, under the Periodic Medical Consultation Program, with an initial medical visit, followed by
an additional visit every three years. The Claims Administrator would assist Program participants in
scheduling medical visits.578
In addition, the Medical Benefits Settlement would provide $105 million to fund the Gulf Region Health
Outreach Program, consisting of projects to strengthen the healthcare system in the area.579 BP would
also fund an online library of health and environmental-related materials pertaining to the Deepwater
Horizon incident for 21 years.580
The inadequacies of the medical benefits settlement were further identified by GAP in their 2013
report. GAP noted that of the estimated 140,000 qualifying clean-up workers, only 90,000 would be
covered under the medical benefits settlement. Further, while providing a short list of specific health
conditions, the settlement will not account for the most severe problems resulting from oil and
dispersant exposure, including cancer, neurological disorders and birth defects.581
An individual may claim a maximum of $60,700 under the medical benefits settlement, which is
contingent on medical documentation and the extent of their illnesses. 582 As GAP notes, even the
maximum payment is woefully inadequate to cover current and future medical bills and individuals who
accept the settlement are unable to sue BP for punitive damages later. 583 This includes people who
become terminally ill after accepting the settlement: their heirs will be unable to sue BP.584
Many people who failed to meet the high test of medical causation opted to receive one-off payments.
GAP reported that ultimately 95,000 claimants accepted the quick payments of $5,000 and 45,000
claimants accepted payments that averaged $15,000, however the payments barely dented their
already accumulated medical bills and cost them the opportunity to bring a future lawsuit against BP
for medical damages.585
6.2.3.2 The Economic and Property Damages Settlement

Claimants who suffered economic loss and property damage as a result of the spill may have been
eligible to claim compensation under any one of the following categories:
seafood compensation program (covering damages suffered by commercial fishermen,
seafood crew, or seafood vessel owners who owned, operated, leased, or worked on a vessel
that was home ported in the Gulf coast area, and oyster leaseholders);
individual economic loss;
individual periodic vendor or festival vendor economic loss;
business economic loss;
start-up business economic loss;
failed business economic loss;
coastal real property damage;
wetlands real property damage;
real property sales loss;
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subsistence loss;
VoO Charter payment (covering natural persons or entities who registered their vessels to
participate in BPs Vessels of Opportunity (VoO) program); and
vessel physical damage.586
The Deepwater Horizon Claims Centre noted that:
there is no limit on the total dollar amount of the settlement, but BP will pay no more than $2.3
billion to compensate qualified claimants who are in the Seafood Compensation Program.
While BP has estimated that the total costs of the Settlement will be approximately $7.8 billion,
there is no limit on the total amount of the settlement (with the exception of the Seafood
Compensation Program). The actual total amount paid out will depend on the number of
qualified claims made, and could be higher or lower than BPs estimate.587
As at 11 August 2014, $4,022,596,632 had been paid in compensation to 49,203 claimants for
economic and property damage.588
6.2.4 Amount of oil

As claims have come to the courts, BP has asserted that damage was not as bad as purported by
other parties, or could not be causally linked.
While US government experts proposed that 5.0 million barrels of oil were spilled into the Gulf,
resulting in a net discharge of 4.19 million barrels once adjusted for the collected oil, BP estimated that
3.36 million barrels of oil were released, resulting in a net discharge of 2.45 million barrels.589
In January 2015, Judge Carl Barbier ruled that 4.0 million barrels of oil were released from the
reservoir. After deducting the collected oil from this amount per the parties stipulation, the Court
[found] for purposes of calculating the maximum possible civil penalty under the Clean Water Act that
3.19 million barrels of oil discharged into the Gulf of Mexico.590 An appeal against this decision was
lodged in March 2015 by the US government.591
BP has also claimed that some claims for compensation were fictitious and that some payments were
too generous or not causally linked.
6.2.5 Gross negligence

On 31 August 2012, the US Department of Justice filed proceedings against BP, alleging gross
negligence and wilful misconduct.592
On 4 September 2014, Judge Carl Barbier held that BP was grossly negligent, with BP 67 per cent
responsible for the accident; Transocean, the rig operator, 30 per cent responsible and contractor
cementer Halliburton 3 per cent responsible.593
This decision was questioned by BPs attorneys who filed a motion in October 2014.594 In November
2014, Judge Barbier rejected BPs call to either amend his judgment or hold a new trial.595
Of note, Halliburton was also engaged to undertake cementing operations at the Montara wellhead
platform, a role which was quite limited.596 The Montara Commission of Inquiry in its report, found that:
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Halliburton undertook the cementing job but this was at PTTEP AAs direction. It was PTTEP
AA personnel that called the shots, and it is they who must bear primary responsibility for
oversighting this failed task.597
6.2.6 Fines under the Clean Water Act

An October 2013 article in The Guardian (UK) cited that:
In the USA, under the Clean Water Act, BP and its partners face fines of up to $1,100 for each
barrel of oil spilled if they are found to have been negligent. The fines could rise to $4,300 per
barrel if the judge is persuaded that BP and its partners action constituted gross negligence or
willful misconduct.598
In its 2013-2014 annual report, BP said it had set aside $3.5 billion for fines.599 However, the fines
could potentially have escalated to $18 billion following the finding of gross negligence.600
At a minimum payment of $1,100 per barrel, and taking the courts estimate at 3.19 million barrels, BP
stood to lose at least $3.509 billion.
However, in July 2015, the US Justice Department reached an agreement with BP to settle civil claims
for US$18.7 billion. The agreement comprised US$5.5 billion in Clean Water Act penalties, US$8.1
billion in natural resources damages and an additional US$700 million to respond to environmental
damages unknown at the time of the agreement.601
At time of writing, the agreement is yet to be approved by the court, but could avert years of litigation.
6.2.7 Environment still affected

A report released in March 2015 by the National Wildlife Federation, Five Years and Counting: Gulf
Wildlife in the Aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, suggested that at least 20 species are still
being affected by the spill.602
Wildlife from sperm whales to marsh ants are still feeling the effects of the disaster, said Ryan Fikes,
the National Wildlife Federations Gulf of Mexico restoration scientist.603
But BP seems to prefer attacking scientists over accepting responsibility. Its time for BP to quit
stalling so we can start restoring the Gulf. 604
In March 2015, BP released its own five year report addressing environmental damage: Gulf of Mexico,
Environmental Recovery and Restoration.605 The report cited the science is showing that most of
the environmental impact occurred immediately after the accidentin areas near the wellhead and
along oiled beaches and marshes. Areas that were affected are recovering and data BP has collected
and analysed to date do not indicate a significant long-term impact to the population of any Gulf
species.606
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6.3 A comparison
6.3.1 Type of oil
It is interesting to note that the type of oil spilled in both the Montara oil spill and the BP Deepwater
Horizon spill was of a similar type. In Montara, the oil was a light, sweet, crude:
Light sweet crude oil at Montara contained a low level of sulphur and was a light orange and
brown colour unlike the thick black crude oil often associated with spills.607
In the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana sweet crude oil was released.608 Light crude oil has a greater
percentage of smaller molecular weight compounds that include natural gas and volatile organic
compounds; correspondingly, there are a lower percentage of the high molecular weight compounds
that have denser characteristics. Sweet crude oil indicates low amounts of sulphur in the crude oil.609
While the Gulf of Mexico was initially compared to the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, the Exxon Valdez
spill was a tanker spill with heavier crude oil that drenched the rocky coast of Prince William Sound in
Alaska with a cold climate. This differs from the Gulf spill in distance from the shoreline, the depth of
the leaking well, the type of crude oil and the hot climate.610
It may be speculated that the Deepwater Horizon spill, a spill which occurred from a deepwater rig,
with a similar type of oil and which was dispersed with some of the same dispersants, may have many
more similarities with the Montara oil spill than has previously been acknowledged.
6.3.2 Remoteness
The Montara oil spill occurred in a remote area, in the middle of the ocean more than 200 kilometres
from any mainland, a factor which has been significant in coverage of the issue.
In the Gulf of Mexico and Gulf of Thailand spills, damage occurred fairly close to the coast: the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil rig was located just 66km from the Louisiana coast611 and the Gulf of Thailand
spill was located just 20km from the Rayong coast.612 By way of contrast, the Montara oil spill was
over 200km from either the Australian mainland or Indonesian coast. The coastline of NTT is scattered
throughout some 566 islands.
In both the Gulf of Mexico and the Gulf of Thailand, the damage was highly visual, including
explosions, flames or thick oil washing onto the beach. The media frequently reported, with new
graphics emerging on a regular basis. By way of contrast, the geographic isolation of the Montara spill
meant that images were released by PTTEP AA, or by independent organisations that ventured out to
document the situation.
So too, when damage began to be experienced in Indonesia, the remoteness of the villages, some
more than a flight, two-hour fast-ferry ride and one-hour drive from Kupang airport, meant that
comparatively fewer journalists were available to report directly on the situation than in both the US
and Thailand, and few English-speaking media outlets had correspondents based in Kupang. The lack
of communication to communities also allegedly led some individuals to assume that the situation
that they were experiencing was the gods punishing them,613 driving a perpetuation of confusion and
shame that continued to hide the impacts that they were experiencing.
The Gulf of Mexico and the Gulf of Thailand both also hosted a large number of operating commercial
businesses, including fishing and tourism industries. So too, NTT maintained a strong fishing business,
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exporting dried fish prior to the spill. However, NTT is also one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia,
with many villagers selling seaweed directly to agents. While many of its beaches are white sandy
paradises, its tourism sector, while growing, is perhaps inhibited by the remoteness of many areas.
6.3.3 Access to technology

We can assume that in both the Gulf of Mexico and the Gulf of Thailand, affected communities had
relatively strong access to the internet, technology and the outside world. However in some areas of
NTT, local access to technology is extremely limited.
6.3.4 Public health

Individuals and communities in Indonesia had little to no hope of mitigating their exposure to the sea,
as was proposed during the US spill by the US Department of Health and Human Services. For many
communities in NTT, the sea is their livelihood and main source of income. Many individuals also
lacked the economic mobility to move away from areas claiming to be affected. We are also unaware
if official warnings were issued by local authorities to communities regarding how to minimise their
exposure to Montara-related pollutants. Many villagers throughout the region, while having seen oil in
their seaweed farms, had no idea where it had come from.
Individuals who have experienced health complaints in the aftermath of the spill in the US have been
able to seek to lodge a claim for compensation. In the US, local health systems are being bolstered
with extra funding, while extensive research is being undertaken to assess the impact of oil and
dispersants on ecosystems and public health.
However, in NTT no equivalent research has been undertaken to monitor at a systemic level the
impact that oil and dispersants may have had on public health, including the many anecdotal reports
of adverse health impacts. These include skin conditions, breathing problems, gastrointestinal illness,
cysts and possibly more severe illness.
Such reports appear to be locked in the seeming stalemate created by PTTEP AAs position that no
causal link to the Montara spill has been proven, and the Australian governments stance that the
Indonesian claims are a matter between Jakarta and the oil company. Neither PTTEP AA nor the
Australian government appear to have investigated the Indonesian reports of damage to establish or
disprove a causal link, but has simply denied them on face value as unverified.
6.3.5 Fines
In the US, the Court found that BP exercised gross negligence and wilful misconduct. As a result, fines
could have been awarded to a potential value of $18 billion. This stands in stark contrast to PTTEP
AAs breaches of the OPGGS Act, which could have led to a potential maximum penalty of $1.7 million,
but was reduced to $510,000.
6.3.6 Economic loss

While economic losses suffered by small business owners from the BP spill has been recognised in the
US, and hundreds of operators are currently bringing claims against PTTGC in Thailand, the types of
economic loss experienced by communities in NTT have gone unrecognised to date.
In the US, the scope of the disaster led to a 2012 settlement which assumed a causal link that was
subsequently relied upon by individuals to lodge claims of economic loss. BP appealed to overturn
judicial approval of the settlement, albeit it was unsuccessful.
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In Australia, the failure to secure a negotiation for a comprehensive, independent transboundary

investigation has stymied progress.
No form of agreement assuming a causal link has ever been secured in assessing claims of economic
loss in NTT. Instead, it appears that, contrary to the approach taken by the US government regarding
BP, PTTEP AA has been able to assert that no causal link exists in the absence of such investigation or
agreement.
The response of the Australian government in no way compares with the proactivity of that of the US in
ensuring the release of information, remediation and compensation.
Ultimately, the poverty and remote nature of the NTT region, combined with the splintered nature of
reports of damage across the wide geographic area, has potentially been a key contributor towards
obscuring the full adverse impacts of the Montara spill experienced by local communities.
However, the key difference is that both the US and Thai governments were responding to damage
caused among their own citizens. In the case of Montara, where claims of transboundary damage to
non-citizens arise the situation is more complex. This is potentially due to the lack of precedent and
guidance on the issue, possible confusion about the role of state sovereignty, and in part, a lack of
political will.
6.4 International transboundary damage

6.4.1 International instruments
In their 2015 text, Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy,
S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh, Robert Beckman and Hao Duy Phan highlight the strong history
recognising transboundary pollution:
As the international community has become more cognizant of the social and economic costs
of transboundary pollution, it has sought to establish international legal principles to address
the issue.
The Trail Smelter arbitral tribunal in 1941 stated that no State has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another. Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment declared that States have the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States.
The International Court of Justice confirmed that the obligation of States to ensure that
their activities respect the environments of other States has become part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment.614
6.4.2 The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea

The primary source of international law that governs the worlds oceans is the 1982 UN Convention of
the Law of the Sea615 (UNCLOS).616
Australia participated in all three United Nations conferences on the Law of the Sea (1958, 1960
and 1973-82) and became party to UNCLOS in 1994617 and ratified it on 5 October 1994. The
government of Australia further declared under Article 287(1) that it chose that the settlement of
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disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention should take place in either
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI of the
Convention; and(b) The International Court of Justice. 618
WTCF highlighted UNCLOS in its submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry, asserting that it
is clear that the Australian government has breached their obligations under UNCLOS due to failing to
take adequate care, skill and diligence in the aftermath of the Montara oil spill.619
The following articles are especially relevant to consider in light of the issues raised within this report.
Under Article 192, States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.
Article 194(2) recognises that:
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction
or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or
control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance
with this Convention.
Article 194(3) notes that:
The measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of the marine
environment. These measures shall include,interalia, those designed to minimize to the fullest
possible extent
(c) pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular measures for preventing
accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea,
and regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such
installations or devices (emphasis added)
Article 198 provides regarding a duty to notify:
When a State becomes aware of cases in which the marine environment is in imminent
danger of being damaged or has been damaged by pollution, it shall immediately notify other
States it deems likely to be affected by such damage, as well as the competent international
organizations. (emphasis added)
Article 199 provides regarding contingency plans against pollution:
In the cases referred to in article198, States in the area affected, in accordance with their
capabilities, and the competent international organizations shall cooperate, to the extent
possible, in eliminating the effects of pollution and preventing or minimizing the damage. To
this end, States shall jointly develop and promote contingency plans for responding to pollution
incidents in the marine environment. (emphasis added)
Youna Lyons comments that although UNCLOS highlights the importance of preparedness (or
preventative measures) and contingency planning in the context of offshore installations and devices
used in exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, it does not detail
the specific steps that states must take in this context.620
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Other articles that may be relevant to consider include Article 195, which may be relevant regarding
the use of dispersants:
In taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, States
shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another
or transform one type of pollution into another. (emphasis added)
Article 235 of UNCLOS also makes provision regarding liability that:
(1) States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable in accordance with
international law.
(2) States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems for
prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of
the marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.
(3) With the objective of assuring prompt and adequate compensation in respect of all
damage caused by pollution of the marine environment, States shall cooperate in the
implementation of existing international law and the further development of international law
relating to responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for damage
and the settlement of related disputes, as well as, where appropriate, development of criteria
and procedures for payment of adequate compensation, such as compulsory insurance or
compensation funds.
Article 208 provides that:
Coastal States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of
the marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed activities subject to their
jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures under their jurisdiction
However, it is evident that there is still an international legal gap on this matter.
6.4.3 Calls for change

At present, there is no international convention specifically addressing pollution that occurs from
offshore platforms, as opposed to ships.621 There are also no internationally agreed standards
addressing the consequences of transborder oil spill accidents caused by oil drilling platforms
engaged in exploration and exploitation.622
Some countries have represented that there is a need for such an international convention.
In September 2010, Indonesia submitted a proposal to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
Legal Committee to add a new work programme to address liability and compensation for oil pollution
damage resulting from offshore oil exploration and exploitation.623
This has been a position adopted by the government of Indonesia since the Montara spill, which has
emphasised that the Montara and Deepwater Horizon incidents demonstrate there is a compelling
need to establish an international regime for liability and compensation for pollution damage from
offshore drilling activities in connection with exploration and exploitation of oil.624
In Bali in September 2011, the government of Indonesia convened the first International Conference
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on Liability and Compensation Regime for Transboundary Oil Damage Resulting from Offshore
Exploration and Exploitation Activities. The second conference was convened in November 2012.
At the 100th session of the IMO Legal Committee from 15 19 April 2013, liability from offshore
oil exploration was further discussed. This included Indonesia providing a submission containing
Principles for Guidance on Model Bilateral/Regional Agreements or Arrangements on Liability and
Compensation Issues Connected with Transboundary Pollution Damage from Offshore Exploration and
Exploitation Activities. 625
At the session, the Committee recalled its previous decision to further analyse such issues, with the
aim of developing guidance to assist states interested in pursuing bilateral or regional arrangements,
following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident and the 2009 Montara oil spill. The Committee agreed
that assistance should be provided to those states who are in need of guidance for bilateral and
multilateral agreements.626
At the 101st session of the IMO Legal Committee from 28 April 1 May 2014, the Committee:
expressed its appreciation to Indonesia and Denmark for their offer to stand ready to co-chair
an intersessional consultative group, to develop guidance on bilateral and regional agreements
or arrangements related to the liability and compensation issues connected with transboundary
pollution damage resulting from offshore oil and explorationactivities.627
Other nations, such as Norway, have also considered bilateral agreements to be more appropriate in
the circumstances.
Ultimately, the Montara disaster forms part of a global picture surrounding the international regulation
and liability of offshore oil platforms. There is a need for an examination of the viability of an
international convention on transboundary damage that results from the operations of the offshore
petroleum industry.
This approach has been supported by other leading scholars in Australia, such as the Hon. Steven
Rares, a judge of the Family Court of Australia.628
In the words of Justice Rares:
The interests of the international community are poorly served by the current lack of an
appropriate convention to address the significant risks from off-shore hydrocarbon exploration
and exploitation. Inaction, however, is not an option.629
6.4.4 The Rio Declaration

The United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration), developed in
1992, provides guidance as to the direction in which we must move on transboundary damage.
Australia signed the Rio Declaration in 1992. Although non-binding and a soft law instrument, the
Rio Declaration sets out important principles to guide the international discussion on transboundary
damage.
The Australian governments position at time of writing is that:
It is beyond the Australian governments jurisdiction to compel a titleholder to perform any
investigative or monitoring activities in the waters of another country. Any issues relating to
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environmental damage in Indonesian waters are a matter for the Indonesian government to
take up with PTTEP Australasia.630
It is clear that such a position fails to acknowledge the relevance of UNCLOS, as well as key principles
of the Rio Declaration to the ongoing issue of the Montara oil spill.
A key principle of international environmental law is common but differentiated responsibility.
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration provides that:
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the
health and integrity of the Earths ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities.
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international
pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global
environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.631 (emphasis
added)
In addition, Principle 2 provides for the responsibility of states regarding transboundary damage:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. (emphasis added)
In a report authored by the UN Economic and Social Council (UNESC) to the UN Secretary General in
1997, the UNESC identified that
Principle 2 restates a rule of customary law, observing that the existence of the general
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment.632 (emphasis added)
Principle 15 identifies the importance of a precautionary approach to damage, providing that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.633 (emphasis added)
Lastly, it is relevant to note Principle 19, which provides that
States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected
States on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and
shall consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith.
6.4.5 Common but differentiated responsibility

In assessing Australias response to the Montara oil spill, and the arrangements in place under the
1996 Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and Indonesia on Oil Spill Preparedness and
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Response, it appears that Australias approach has not been previously characterised by a common
but differentiated responsibility.
Instead, Australias approach within the MOU appears to have focused more on exercising our
sovereign rights, and on shared global responsibility.
Shared global responsibility has been referred to as the [Howard] governments approach
to participation with other states in the development of international and regional regimes for
management of the shared environment or coordination with other countries to combat common
environmental problems. 634 Essentially, this approach fails to acknowledge the heavier responsibility
required of developed countries (such as Australia) regarding global environmental problems.
Most crucially, the MOUs Action Plan places an onus on the jurisdiction whose area of responsibility
is most likely to be affected by the movement of the spill, to monitor its movement.635 This does not
place a positive obligation on the part of the polluting state to retain their responsibility to ensure that
damage within their jurisdiction of control does not cause damage to the environment of other states.
Instead, this could even shift the responsibility to the state experiencing transboundary damage, which
appears at gross odds with Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration.
While the objective of the MOU Action Plan was to provide a cooperative plan for mutual assistance
in the event of a major oil spill incident which exceeds the response capability of either national
government,636 it is clear that this Action Plan was more likely than not, on the balance of probabilities,
to have been activated by Indonesia. While the MOU may have been expected to apply to damage
emanating from ships, the proliferation of offshore exploration in the Timor Sea on the Australian side
of the EEZ meant that Indonesia was uniquely vulnerable to any oil spill occurring within Australian
territory. Similarly, the existence of an incident exceeding the response capability of a national
government, was more likely than not to be experienced by Indonesia, especially considering the
poverty and low-resourcing in the far-flung eastern provinces bordering transboundary areas.
While under the Action Plan, the national authority responsible for marine oil pollution control can
request assistance from the other party in the event of a marine oil pollution incident, the requesting
authority [the affected party] will be the sole judge of the need for such assistance.637 It could be
argued that this provision attempts to dismantle responsibility for the polluting state to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States, as
assistance will be reactively provided following a request.
In fact, until September 2014, the Australian government continued to assert that there had been no
formal request from the government in Jakarta to avoid providing further assistance:
I note [the Australian Lawyers Alliances] claims of possible environmental impacts in
Indonesian waters attributed to hydrocarbons from the Montara oil spill. The Australian
Government has not been approached by the Indonesian Government to undertake any
environmental monitoring.638
The requests for such assistance are also presumably based on the quality of the information provided
to the affected jurisdiction, including whether relevant information has been provided, and in good
faith.
During the response to Montara, there was a lack of monitoring significantly close to the Indonesian
coast, and no flight paths appear to have monitored the Indonesian coastline in early September 2009:
a time at which communities report witnessing oil.
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After the Spill
As detailed by PTTEP AAs public relations strategy, it was in fact the Australian embassy in Jakarta
that proved most effective639 when denying claims of oil reaching Indonesian islands.
It is questionable as to whether such actions appropriately fulfil Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration,
for States to provide relevant information to potentially affected states on activities that may have
a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and for States to consult with [potentially
affected] States at an early stage and in good faith.
While good faith is required on both sides, the efficacy of diplomatic communications between the two
nations in the aftermath of the spill must be questioned, including why the Australian government did
not monitor, or negotiate for the monitoring, of overflights in closer proximity to the Indonesian coast.
Under the principles of the Rio Declaration, it appears that the Australian government was required to
act in good faith and retained a responsibility, as the polluting state, to communicate relevantly with
Indonesia to ensure that damage did not occur.
Considering that Indonesia did not make a submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry, it must
be questioned whether Australias communication regarding the significance of the spill was adequate
and in keeping with our requisite responsibilities.
Given that the majority of offshore exploration occurring in the Timor Sea is on the Australian side of
the EEZ, it can be seen that even the MOU dealing with oil spill preparedness and response appears to
have been weighted unfairly towards Australias interests and does not appear to adequately enshrine
the principles of the Rio Declaration.
It would be appropriate for the Australian government to review Australias bilateral arrangements
on oil spill preparedness and response with all relevant parties, including with a view to more
appropriately and practically enshrine Australias relevant responsibilities under international
environmental law. Following the negotiation of these arrangements, in order to ensure compliance,
it may be deemed appropriate for NOPSEMA to review the oil spill contingency plans of companies
proximate to transboundary areas. NOPSEMA may wish to consider the inclusion of a transboundary
plan to be an essential requirement. In addition, the Australian government must review Australias
own national maritime emergency response plans.
It is questionable as to whether the yet-to-be-released Guideline on International Co-ordination will go
far enough in acknowledging common but differentiated responsibility and Australias responsibility
to ensure that damage within its jurisdiction of control does not cause damage to the environment of
other states.
6.4.6 International change required

However, it is clear that the need for such change is not limited to Australia alone. These changes, if
implemented in Australia, will still not resolve the larger problem that there is a lack of international
guidance on the transboundary damage of oceans: one of the worlds largest shared resources, a fact
which could be significant in decades to come.
There is a clear need for further recognition of the issues posed by transboundary damage at an
international level. Further development is required regarding liability and compensation for damage
arising from offshore exploration.
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After the Spill
Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration provides that

States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious
and more determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and
compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their
jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction. (emphasis added)
Agenda 21 provides at Article 18.40(h) that:
All States, according to their capacity and available resources, and through bilateral or multilateral
cooperation, including United Nations and other relevant organizations as appropriate, could
developnational and international legal instruments that may be required to protect the quality of
water resources, as appropriate, particularly for:
i.
Monitoring and control of pollution and its effects in national and transboundary waters;
ii.
Control of long-range atmospheric transport of pollutants;
iii.
Control of accidental and/or deliberate spills in national and/or transboundary water

bodies;
iv.
Environmental impact assessment.640
Australia has an opportunity to commence the international conversation, and to contribute to the
development of further international law on transboundary damage. As we will elaborate further,
Australia is well-placed to undertake this leadership role.
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After the Spill
Chapter 7: A co-operative approach in the Timor Sea

The impacts reported in NTT have compounded with existing human rights issues
resulting from Australias policy approach in the Timor Sea such as poverty, foreign
fishing, people smuggling and the detention of children.
7.1 Background
The Montara oil spill is symptomatic of what can be seen as an inflexible and unyielding Australian
policy regarding the Timor Sea. The province of NTT has historically borne the weight of this burden,
with imprisoned foreign fishers and people charged with people smuggling offences originating from
this area.
This forms a deep contrast to the historical friendship shared by Australians and West Timorese during
World War II.
Ultimately, there is a need for a shift towards a more co-operative approach in the Timor Sea. Such a
shift would be in the national interest.
7.2 Lest we forget

In World War II, Timor became a battleground against the Japanese, with the Timorese assisting
Australians in a guerrilla war against the Japanese.
The Australian War Memorial remembers:
Three months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese occupation of south-east Asia
reached its southern limit with the invasion of Timor on 20 February 1942.
At the time the island was divided between two colonial powers, the Dutch in the west and the
Portuguese in the east.
As early as February 1941 Australia had agreed with Dutch and British officials that Allied
troops, under Australias command, would reinforce Timor should Japan enter the war. Thus
Sparrow Force, as the Allied presence on Timor was known, landed on the island five days
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. This was part of a strategy of seeking to defend
forward airfields and also involved deploying Lark Force at Rabaul and Gull Force at
Ambon.
Although agreeing to garrison Timor with troops, Allied commanders did not envisage a largescale Japanese attack on the island. Nor did they have the agreement of the Portuguese
to occupy the eastern part of the island; the colonial administration took the extravagantly
optimistic view that Japanese forces would respect Portuguese neutrality.
Kupang, the centre of Dutch rule, was the focus of the Japanese attack. Facing them were
troops from the Australian 2/40th Battalion, a squadron of Royal Australian Air Force Hudson
bombers, a battery of Australian coast artillery, and 1,000 Dutch troops. Surrounded and
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After the Spill
short of ammunition, they held out for four days but were forced to surrender on 23 February.
A Japanese force had also been sent against Dili, the Portuguese capital, where it faced
only limited resistance, but, importantly, forestalled the planned arrival of Portuguese troops
between 19 and 20 February. A further 250 men of the Australian 2/2nd Independent Company
had been sent to the Portuguese part of the island before the Japanese attack. They did not
directly oppose the invasion but acted as a guerrilla force.
After the surrender of the main Allied force around Kupang, 140 members of the 2/40th and
some Dutch troops were able to avoid the encirclement; some were handed to the Japanese
by West Timorese, while the remainder made their way across the island to join the 2/2nd.641
A small war memorial lies 28 kilometres outside Kupang at Oesau, and is located at the site of the
battle which occurred in February 1942 between Australian and Japanese forces. The battle lasted
4 days finishing on 23 February 1942 with the surrender of the Australians. During the battle, 84
Australians died and 132 were wounded or incapacitated by illness.
The plaque at the memorial reads:
In memory of the men of the 2/40th Australian Infantry Battalion (Sparrow Force) and the
Timorese people who died on their mission here in 1942.
7.3 Links to the Australian aid program

NTT is one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia. AusAID noted in its Australia Indonesia Partnership
Country Strategy 2008 2013 (AIP) that NTT rated 60.3 on the Human Development Index, contrasting
with Indonesia on average, as 71.4.642
NTT was recognised as one of the five priority provinces for geographic focus in the AIP. The five
priority provinces all have low development indicators, with West Papua and Aceh, the province
devastated by the 2004 tsunami, also featuring in the top five.643
Data from Indonesias national statistics body indicated that in 2009, NTT was among the lowest
scoring provinces for the Human Development Index (HDI) in Indonesia ranking 31st out of 33
provinces (West Papua ranked 30th, and Papua ranked 33rd).644
Failure to acknowledge and address substantial reports of damage in the region will undermine the
potential to work towards poverty alleviation and sustainable development.
In the AIP, Australia signified its intention to assist around 300,000 poor farmers [in Indonesia] to
increase their incomes by at least 30 per cent by 2017.645
On the contrary, thousands of seaweed farmers and fishermen across the NTT region have
experienced a significant reduction of their livelihoods in the months and years following the Montara
oil spill.
In 2011, in an article in the Jakarta Globe, the Jakarta government noted that there was more scope
to boost seaweed production to capitalise on high global demand, which would in turn not only benefit
Indonesian fishermen but the economy as a whole.646 North Sulawesi, Maluku, NTT, Central Sulawesi
and Gorontalo provinces were considered to be key to developing the countrys seaweed industry.
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After the Spill
However, to date, there has been no holistic assessment addressing causation of either the disease
affecting seaweed throughout NTT, or the reduction of fish stocks in fishing grounds south of Timor.
Progress has been made towards fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Indonesia,
especially meeting targets surrounding the first four goals: eradicating extreme hunger and poverty;
achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; and
reducing child mortality.
However, the reported impacts of the Montara oil spill could have undone progress towards the
fulfilment of the MDGs in NTT. These impacts are most likely to have reversed many of the gains made
in achieving primary education, and also in achieving environmental sustainability.
DFAT noted that its 2012/13 total overseas development expenditure647 in Indonesia was $541.6
million. In 2013/14, proposed expenditure was $583.6 million.648
Remembering that a report compiled by Dr Mukhtasor of Indonesias Centre for Energy and
Environmental Studies cited a potential estimate of damage at AUD$1.5 billion per year since the spill,
overseas development assistance expenditure is clearly insufficient to remedy an issue so significant
in scope.
The amount of Australias total overseas development assistance proposed to be spread over the
entire nation of Indonesia in 2013/14 is not equivalent to even 40 per cent of the economic loss which
is being felt every year in the province of NTT.
In December 2014, it was announced that further cuts would be made to foreign aid.649
7.4 Indonesia, the Timor Sea and the Australian justice system
Prime Minister Tony Abbott, leading up to the 2013 federal election, pledged that if elected, his first
overseas visit would be to Indonesia, advocating that in the great scheme of things, [the relationship
with Indonesia], its our most important relationship.650
During 2014, tension also rose between Australia and Timor-Leste, with an arbitration held in the
International Court of Justice in The Hague regarding allegations of Australia spying on maritime
boundary negotiations. Furore erupted regarding the Attorney-General of Australia permitting ASIO
raids on Canberra lawyers representing Timor Leste, which were viewed dimly by the Court.
In 2014, the Northern Territory Bar Association and the Timor-Leste Bar Association passed a joint
resolution, calling on the Australian government to:
give up its unlawful and unjust claim to a continental shelf boundary north of the median line
between Australian and Timor Leste;
support the immediate commencement of negotiations to settle the eastern and western
boundaries of the Timor Gap between Australia, Timor Leste and Indonesia;
take immediate steps to conduct a comprehensive scientific investigation into the effect of the
Montara oil spill in 2009 in the waters of Indonesia and Timor Leste;
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After the Spill
require the Federal Parliament to conduct a full and proper inquiry into allegations that the
Australian Secret Intelligence Service unlawfully entered Timor-Leste government premises at
Dili to conduct an eavesdropping operation in Timor-Leste during negotiations preceding the
CMATS Treaty between Timor-Leste and Australia.651
During 2014, tensions were heightened between Australia and Indonesia, with reports emerging that
the Australian navy breached Indonesian waters652 and allegations of the Australian navy forcing
asylum seekers to burn their hands on boats engines.653 In 2013 and 2014, reports emerged of the
Australian navy turning back boats that subsequently washed up on Rote Island.654
These incidents all appear to be symptomatic of a larger issue: the lack of a coherent approach
regarding the Timor Sea based on mutual co-operation, international law and respect for human rights.
The failures of the Australian government to engage on the issue of the Montara oil spill presents the
most recent failure in recognising the importance of the Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship and
regional co-operation.
Instead, Rote Island, the gateway to NTT, has often become the dumping ground and experiential
microcosm of the failures of Australias maritime and border protection policy.
Individuals from communities which historically fished the oceans between Australia and Indonesia
have often been charged, detained and imprisoned for unlawful fishing or people smuggling. They
have also been subjected to strenuous and dangerous conditions regarding their boating equipment,
suffered destruction of property without compensation, and minors have been detained alongside
adults in Australian prisons.
Some of these issues have been exacerbated by damage experienced in communities following
Montara.
We outline these significant human rights issues below.
7.4.1 The breaches of Indonesian waters

In 2014, the Defence and Customs review of breaches into Indonesian waters held that Australian
officials had breached Indonesian waters six times in just two months, between December 2013 and
January 2014. These six breaches were said to be inadvertent:
on each occasion the incursion was inadvertent, in that each arose from incorrect calculation
of the boundaries of Indonesian waters rather than as a deliberate action or navigational error.
The intent for each patrol was advised to operational headquarters in advance of each mission
and was approved by Operational Commanders.655 (emphasis added)
The Review found that Australian Customs and Border Protection Services Enforcement Commanders
were appropriately trained in the application of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for
operations that occurred inside the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone. However:
they did not have the requisite professional training to be aware of the operational implications
of UNCLOS archipelagic baseline provisions in the calculation of Indonesian Maritime
Boundaries.656 (emphasis added)
The incursions also did not appear to have been revealed via a methodical process, but instead were
initially identified as the result of an ad hoc intervention by planning staff.657
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After the Spill
The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee conducted an inquiry into the breaches of
Indonesian waters, releasing a report in March 2014.658
The Committee expressed its concern that officials who appeared at the public hearing on 21 March
relied on the public interest immunity claim previously used by the Immigration Minister as the basis
for refusing to answer questions on the committees terms of reference. The committee believed this
was not a proper use of the Senates resolution of August 2009 establishing a process to be followed
by officials in making a public interest immunity claim.659
The Defence and Customs Review did not specify how many of these six breaches were specifically
conducted by Customs, or by the Australian navy, and no indications were given as to how many of
these breaches related to the policing of foreign fishers versus towing asylum seeker boats.
The Australian Lawyers Alliance, in its submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Committees inquiry into the breaches of Indonesian waters, submitted that we believed that
incursions into Indonesian waters are not isolated to the time periods being investigated by this
Inquiry.660 We believed that further breaches may have occurred in the policing of foreign fishers in the
Timor Sea.
A former RAN senior officer, Dr Sam Bateman was critical of an apparent lack of maritime awareness
by policy makers and commented:
For a maritime country with a huge area of maritime jurisdiction, there should be a higher level
of maritime awareness in government agencies, especially regarding fundamental issues of
maritime jurisdiction.
Commanding officers of all our maritime enforcement vessels should have a clear
understanding of the law of the sea, including how it relates to our close neighbours, most of
which are archipelagic states. Responsible authorities ashore should ensure this is the case.
All departments and agencies in Canberra concerned with managing the maritime domain,
particularly law enforcement aspects, should have the requisite maritime knowledge and
awareness.661
ABC News reported that Tubagus Hasanuddin, a former Indonesian general and current member of
Indonesias foreign affairs commission said that:
It is impossible that Australian Navy ships ended up in Indonesian waters without intending
to, as Mr Morrison and his border protection chief have claimed. He said that experience and
training told him that the incursions were unlikely to have been unintentional.
I studied in Australia - in the military academy. The Australian Navy doesnt have wooden
boats, they have warships equipped with modern technology, he said.
They should have known which part of the water is Indonesia and which is not. 662
Following the discovery of the breaches, the Australian government promptly apologised to the
Indonesian government.663
However, no penalty appears to have meted out for these breaches. This approach contrasts starkly
with the punishments meted out to Australias closest neighbours who cross Australian borders (or fish
close to them) in the Timor Sea.664
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After the Spill
7.4.2 The treatment of foreign fishers

On 30 January 1968, Australia legislated for a 12 nautical mile Declared Fishing Zone under the
Fisheries Act 1968 (Cth).
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was drawn in 1974 between the Indonesian and Australian
government, which outlined the division of seabed resources and maritime boundaries.665 It designated
a boxed area within the Australian Fishing Zone where Indonesian fishermen could have limited rights
of access to fishing. The MOU area incorporated five reefs, the largest of which is Ashmore Reef,
(Pulau Pasir) which is important culturally and historically to Indonesian fishermen. Significantly, the
MOU also provided that beche de mer or trepang, a form of sea cucumber, would not be permitted to
be taken from the seabed except in certain areas.666
Fishermen were also subjected to stringent rules regarding the type of fishing that could be undertaken
in the MOU box, including the types of technology and equipment that they were permitted to
utilise. Such conditions included the use of longline wooden boats without engines. These stringent
conditions could be leading to many deaths at sea during bad weather.667
On 1 November 1979, Australia declared a 200 nautical mile Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ).668 This
has been described as the modern maritime equivalent of terra nullius,669 given that for centuries,
Indonesian communities fished these waters and conducted trade and relations with local Indigenous
people in Australia.
On 1 August 1994, Australia officially declared and extended its EEZ to 200 nautical miles from its
coastline.670
The combined impact of these changes, and the manner in which they have been enforced, has had a
significant impact on fishing communities in NTT.
Between 2004 and 2014, approximately 1,052 boats have been apprehended for foreign fishing
offences and, with minor exceptions, subsequently destroyed. In this period, there have also been
approximately 7,893 apprehensions of people for foreign fishing offences.671 Of these, approximately
only 1,626 individuals (about 20 per cent) have been prosecuted.672 Many of these individuals are
Indonesian.
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After the Spill
Table 9. Foreign fishers apprehended and detained in Australia673
Year
Boats
apprehended
Boats
destroyed
People
apprehended
People
prosecuted
People
convicted
2013 - 2014
26
18
169
26
Unclear
2012 - 2013
53
10 (all
Indonesian)
Unclear
2011 2012
12
12
68
22
22
2010 2011
15
23
86
25
25
2009 2010
23
27
141
51
51
2008 2009
27
27
216
67
67
2007 2008
156
140 (15 PNG long

boats to be sold)
1,327
292
291
2006 2007
216
213 (3 banana boats

to be returned to
PNG from Thursday
Island)
1,391
404
2005 2006
368
368
2,962
468
460
2004 2005
202
Unclear
1,480
261
250
TOTAL
1,052
> 845
7,893
1,626
>1,166
In addition, from 1999 2004, Australian Fisheries Management Authority officers and contractors
apprehended approximately 4,500 illegal Indonesian fishers and well over 600 illegal fishing vessels.674
Therefore, from 1999 2014, there were approximately 12,393 apprehensions.675
However, despite the large number of people being apprehended, it was not until June 2005 that
Indonesian fishermen were detained on land. Prior to this, fishermen suspected of foreign fishing
offences were detained on board their boats, which were strung to wharves in Darwin Harbour.676 This
practice was abandoned following the deaths of two fishermen while detained in 2003 and January
2005: 23-year-old fisherman Mansur La Ibu, and 37-year-old Mohammed Heri.677 Individuals are now
detained at the Northern Immigration Detention Centre in Darwin.
Phillip Vincent and Brooke Nolan recorded the impacts of detention of fishermen upon their families:
The detention of fishermen increases the debts of entire families to boat owners. When
fishermen leave Rote, they must borrow from these bosses to buy provisions for their
families. Captains in Pepela explained that they usually leave their wives and children with
Rp 500,000 (A$59) and 50kg of rice for the one or two months they expect to be at sea. Crew
members leave their families with between Rp 50,000 - 150,000 (A$6 18) and 20 to 50
kilograms of rice for the same period.
These supplies soon run out if husbands are detained and, in order to survive, wives must
sell fish or snack foods or firewood as well as jewellery or other personal items of value. They
also farm seaweed, grow onions, beans and other vegetables to sell or borrow money from
neighbours or boat owners.
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After the Spill
Sometimes they are forced to take their children out of school because, although the schooling
itself is free, the cost of taking a motorcycle taxi to school and paying for books often becomes
unaffordable. In these situations children usually drop out of school between the ages of
10 and 12 years. The boys start working as fishermen and girls stay at home to help with
domestic chores. The women we spoke with expressed a strong desire for their children to get
a good education, but their meagre economic situation makes this impossible.678
The Australian Fisheries Management Authority has noted the policy rationale behind the destruction
of fishermens boats as the most effective measure available to deter illegal foreign fishing in
Australian waters.679 Further, the loss of a vessel has a direct negative financial impact on owners who
otherwise stand to profit from illegal fishing operations.680 However, this approach does not consider
the impact of spiralling debt in communities.
One of the fishermen impacted by these laws was Muslimin, who originated from a village in West
Timor. In April 2008, Muslimin was apprehended for foreign fishing offences, in the waters above a part
of the Australian continental shelf, but not within the Australian Fishing Zone.
In 2010, in the case of Muslimin v The Queen, he was acquitted by the High Court of Australia.681 The
Court held that Muslimin could not be charged with foreign fishing outside the Australian Fishing Zone.
In March 2014, the Federal Court of Australia handed down the landmark decision of Sahring v the
Commonwealth of Australia.682
Sahring, a West Timorese fisherman, was apprehended on his boat in the Timor Sea within a week of
Muslimins own apprehension in April 2008. Sahring was fishing in Indonesian waters. Sahrings boat,
the Eka Sakti, was destroyed by Australian officials at sea. He was detained for a total of 82 days
before being deported to Kupang.
On 10 March 2010, the High Court delivered its decision in Muslimin v The Queen. As a result of that
decision, the prosecution against Sahring could no longer be sustained.683
Justice Mansfield held that Sahring was eligible to receive compensation for the unlawful destruction
of his boat by Australian officials within Indonesian waters in April 2008, and for unlawful detention. He
was awarded $44,000 by the Federal Court of Australia.
However, within that same 2007- 2008 year, more than 1,200 fishermen were apprehended at sea by
Australian officials for foreign fishing offences.684
Both Muslimins and Sahrings cases took years to be resolved, and progressed to the highest courts
in Australia, indicating the severe lack of clarity that has surrounded the policing of offences involving
boundaries in the Timor Sea.
Their fight for justice contrasts strongly with the lack of penalty for Australian breaches of Indonesian
waters.
In the policing of foreign fishing offences, from 1999 2014, there were approximately 12,393
apprehensions of people. So too, approximately 1,652 boats were apprehended - the majority of which
were destroyed. If their cases were presented to the courts today, it is questionable as to how many of
the people that were apprehended, would have received an alternative outcome.
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After the Spill
In a report for Environment Australia in 2002, researchers identified the socio-economic issues facing
traditional Indonesian fishermen, and how the destruction of fishing boats affected people at an
economic level:
One clear effect of the Australian apprehension policy has been to put pressure on individual
and small-scale perahu [wooden boat] owners whose capital is limited. Without sufficient
capital to recover from the loss of their vessel, these individuals and families have been forced
into debt or out of fishing altogether.685
ABCs Background Briefing program revealed that Muslimin had returned to his village, and began
work people smuggling as a means to make an income.686 Many other individuals charged with
unlawful fishing have later turned to people smuggling as a means to make an income.687
Whether the destruction of individuals boats is lawful, or as in the cases of Sahring and Muslimin,
unlawful, the Australian government may be failing to adequately consider the wider implications of
such destruction.
7.4.3 People smuggling

In discussions regarding people smuggling, it is clear that a large number of individuals from NTT have
previously been involved in people smuggling.
A 2013 report released by Monash Universitys Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society (CILIS),
Trials of People Smugglers in Indonesia: 2007-2012, noted that:
Until 2011, the Nusa Tenggara Timor [NTT] was one of the most frequently used departure
areas [for transporting asylum seekers to Australia], because journeys from there to Australias
Ashmore Reef are short.
As a result of increased border control in eastern Indonesia, people smugglers now more often
depart from the shores of Southern Java and Southern Sulawesi.688
Between 2007 and 2011, CILIS reported that 15 individuals had been subject to judicial decisions
under Law 9/1992 on Immigration in Indonesia. Seven individuals came from Rote Island, NTT: three
organisers, and four crew members.689
From May 2011 until December 2012, there were at least 30 prosecutions for people smuggling
brought to court under Law 6/2011 on Immigration.690 CILIS noted that:
A large number of these cases were in East Java and West and Central Java, although there
were also a number in outer provinces such as West Kalimantan, Riau Islands, and NTT.
The reason for the concentration of cases in Java is partly because police are often better
equipped there than in the outer islands, which also present greater geographical challenges
for the monitoring of people smuggling activities.691
At least four of these 30 cases involved people from NTT: in 2011, one organiser and two crew
were sentenced to seven years and five years respectively, and received fines of 500 million rupiah
(approximately AUD$45,890 each).692 In the same year, an organiser from Rote Island received a
six-year sentence, and the same fine.693 A 21-year-old crew member received a five-year sentence,
and the same fine, in 2012; and in 2011, a 17-year-old crew member received a two-and-a-half year
sentence, and a fine of 250 million rupiah (approximately AUD$22,945).694
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After the Spill
In 2012, the Department of Customs and Border Protection released a document titled Strategic
Assessment of Counter People Smuggling Communications Activities (November 2011) under freedom
of information laws. The document was a strategic assessment of the efficacy of past and current
communications activities to counter maritime people smuggling.695 The 2009-10 federal budget had
provided $7.8 million in funding over four years to Customs and Border Protection to achieve the
Australian governments counter-people smuggling communications objectives in Sri Lanka, Australia,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Malaysia.696
The research cited that one of the key target audiences of people being susceptible to becoming
involved in people smuggling in the Indonesian community included boat owners, boat builders, and
coastal industry workers.697
The International Organisation of Migration identified five areas of focus within Indonesia and selected
villages within each area in which to target communications activities, based on market research
undertaken over a 13-week period in February 2010.698
Two of these areas were located within NTT: in the region of Flores, and Kupang. The research
acknowledged that Kupang was an exit point.699
Within Kupang, four villages were targeted: Oesapa, Fatubesi, Namossain and Tablolong.700 These
villages were targeted with communications campaigns aimed at awareness raising about people
smuggling. Both Oesapa (a fishing village) and Tablolong (a seaweed farming village) were referred to
earlier in this report as sustaining significant economic loss following the Montara oil spill.
At the consultation at Tablolong in August 2013, community members described that people
smuggling had increased following the spill.
The Strategic Assessment noted that for Indonesian communication activitiesresults are
inconclusive due to a seemingly incomplete method of evaluation.701
There is a clear need for further research examining the place of origin of people charged with
people smuggling, including a geographical assessment of hotspots for recruitment, as well as an
assessment of potential cause in those areas for recruitment into people smuggling.
There is also a clear need for further research assessing the role that apprehension and detention for
foreign fishing offences may play in subsequent charges for people smuggling offences.
7.4.3.1 The treatment of minors

In 2012, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) initiated an inquiry into the treatment of
individuals suspected of people smuggling who say that they are children. The subsequent report, An
Age of Uncertainty, released in 2012, identified 180 individuals of concern to the AHRC.702
Four out of the five case studies listed as appendices to the report describe individuals charged with
people smuggling who are explicitly stated to have come from areas within NTT province: Flores,703
Rote Island704 and Alor.705
These individuals were all apprehended in Australian waters, on 18 December 2009; 30 December
2009; 20 February 2010, and 28 March 2010 respectively. The individuals were imprisoned for lengthy
periods of time: 878 days; 864 days; 631 days, and 245 days.
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Dr Catherine Branson QC, former Human Rights Commissioner, commented: there is a possibility that
some of them realistically might be seen to be victims of trafficking.706
In 2011, Indonesian embassy officials emphasised that the detention of Indonesian minors in
Australian adult prisons was an issue of great concern, and required diplomatic negotiation.707 At the
time, the embassy estimated that there were 25 individuals claiming they were children that were being
detained in Australian adult prisons.708
In 2012, media reported that a number of Indonesian minors were seeking compensation for unlawful
detention.709
While it is impossible to ascertain a causal link without interviewing the individuals involved, all
individuals described in the case studies were apprehended in the months following the Montara oil
spill.
In 2014, the Australian Lawyers Alliance applied for the release of information under the Freedom of
Information Act 1982 (Cth) regarding the place of origin, including birthplace and most recent address,
of all 180 minors.
The information released to us recorded discernible data for 177 individuals. 158 of these cases
provided a place of birth. All but one of these 158 people were from Indonesia, with the other individual
being from Urazagan, Afghanistan.
Over 57 per cent of the individuals originated from NTT. Of the 90 people born in NTT, 45 people were
born on the island of Rote.
A further 7 individuals were from Flores; 2 from Lembata Island; 2 from Sumba; 13 from Kupang; and
19 from Alor.
Table 10. Birthplace of individuals suspected of people smuggling offences who say they were
children (Sept 2008 Nov 2011)
Birth place in Indonesia

(province)
Number of people
Percentage of total
(to nearest .5%)
NTT
90
57.5
Sulawesi
29
18.5
Java
19
12
Other
19
12
Total
157
The data released to us also meant that we were able to discern, in some cases, the specific villages
and subdistricts from which these individuals originated. We question whether this specific data has
been analysed by the Australian government.
The format of the released data prevented the Australian Lawyers Alliance from being able to identify
the date of apprehension on the individual files. Therefore, we were unable to draw any causal link
between increases in people smuggling from a particular area.
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After the Spill
However, in total, of the 180 individuals of concern:

14 people were apprehended prior to the commencement of the spill on 21 August 2009;
14 people were apprehended during the course of the spill, between 21 August 2009 and 3
November 2009; and
22 people were apprehended after 3 November 2009 until the end of the year (thus, a total of
50 people in 2009);
73 people were apprehended in 2010; and
52 people were apprehended in 2011.710
Further, we found that there did not appear to be any systemic record-keeping of the specific origin
of people charged with people smuggling in Australia beyond nationality. There did not appear to
be any systemic record keeping by the Australian government regarding village, district or province.
Monitoring of the village, district or even province from which people originated was data that
appeared to be confined to individual files only.
This appears to have wide implications for the effectiveness of data-keeping and monitoring of the
origins of individuals recruited into people smuggling. This would also have wider implications for
prevention at a community level. Surely, more could be achieved through greater systemic monitoring
and greater interdepartmental co-operation across the Department of Customs and Border Protection,
the Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, the Attorney-Generals Department and the
Australian Fisheries Management Authority.
7.4.4 Parliamentary inquiries

The treatment of Indonesian citizens in the Australian civil and criminal justice system has been the
subject of focus of numerous parliamentary inquiries over recent years, revealing that this is an issue
requiring holistic attention.
Over the past three years, various parliamentary committees have examined Bills that impact on the
treatment of foreign fishers, people apprehended for people smuggling offences (including minors),
and incursions into Indonesian waters.711 Many of these Bills have proposed amendments to the
Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
However, in many respects, these legislative amendments and parliamentary inquiries are failing to
grapple holistically with the ways in which laws aimed at asylum seekers and affecting non-citizens
continue to impact on the human rights of Indonesians.
Issues regarding the Timor Sea demonstrate a clear interconnection. A change in approach is required,
including recognition of this interconnection, and developing policy that is more grounded in mutual
co-operation between the governments of Australia, Indonesia and Timor Leste, and that is founded
upon respect for human rights.
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After the Spill
Chapter 8: The bigger picture security

A long term vision is required that recognises the interconnected nature of the
environment, law, economies and human rights, as well as recognition of the
global risk posed by inaction on transboundary damage. There is a need to look
at the bigger picture and how the offshore petroleum industry fits into the wider
framework of overfishing, climate change, the economy, and human rights.
8.1 Future considerations

As acknowledged by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, long term economic progress is only
ensured if it is linked with the protection of the environment. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration
further specifically acknowledges the interdependence and indivisibility of peace, development and
environmental protection.
As well as acknowledging the significant impacts reported in Indonesia following the Montara oil spill,
there must be recognition of the potential for future damage to emanate from the offshore petroleum
industry in Australia. There is the potential for this damage to compound with other significant
transboundary issues in our region, such as climate change and overfishing, to undermine regional and
national security.
8.1.1 Regional insecurity

In the long term, a lack of appropriate vision involving the holistic nature of the issues that we have
raised within this report could lead to regional insecurity in marine resources, with flow-on impacts for
the economy of Australia, and for the economies of our closest neighbours.
The importance of the ocean as a significant economic resource must be acknowledged.
The lack of appropriate fish stocks in Indonesia is already an issue of national significance, with
about 90 per cent of Indonesian reefs threatened by overfishing and disruptive fishing.712 In addition,
Indonesia ranks among the top three largest producers in the world of aquatic plants, and with China
and the Philippines is collectively responsible for almost 90 per cent of global production.713
Loss of income, and of a primary income source, destabilises communities and will impede progress
towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, including environmental sustainability,
education, gender equality, and health. The inequality that is intertwined with poverty can also
sometimes be a foundational stone for dissatisfaction, discrimination and violence.
As has been seen in Indonesia, the destruction of livelihoods (via transboundary pollution and
via Australias aggressive policy of destroying foreign fishers boats) significantly contributes to
communities spiralling into poverty and to seek alternative forms of livelihoods in the face of mounting
debts and expenses.
In some cases, these livelihoods may be high-income generating, unlawful and not in Australias
interest, such as people-smuggling.
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After the Spill
It is in Australias interests to develop a more appropriate transboundary policy in the Timor Sea, which
encapsulates the environment, human rights, climate change, the economy and the offshore petroleum
industry.
Ultimately, ensuring environmental health in the Asia-Pacific region and in the backyards of our closest
neighbours should be viewed as an issue of national security for Australia. This is another reason why
a solution for transboundary damage, and setting a precedent for that now through our reaction to
Montara, is so important.
8.1.2 Overfishing
On a global level, these issues are amplified. Approximately three billion people live within 160
kilometres of the sea, and the oceans produce three trillion dollars of goods and services each year
and untold value for the Earths ecology.714 Fish and seafood are an important global food source, with
500 million people in the poorest countries deriving at least 50 per cent of their intake of animal protein
and minerals from seafood715 and about three billion people obtaining a fifth of their protein from fish,
making it a more important protein source than beef.716
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) notes that with global populations
set to rise to 9-10 billion by 2050, the demand for food and the importance of fisheries resources will
become even greater.717 The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has identified that it is
not possible to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of hunger eradication without improving
fisheries management.718 The FAO asserts that maintaining the long-term prosperity and sustainability
of marine fisheries is not only of political and social significance but also of economic and ecological
importance.719
The UNEP reports that global marine fish catches peaked in the late 1980s and have since been
declining steadily,720 requiring conservation and management of global fish stocks.
In the FAOs 2011 review of the state of the worlds marine fishery resources, the FAO noted that of the
fish stocks assessed, 86 per cent were estimated to be fully exploited or overexploited in 2009.721
In the long term, decimation of adequate fish resources could lead to increased food insecurity for
thousands of people in the Asia-Pacific region. This is an issue that Australia must assist to address.
This is especially as Australia has been recognised as a global leader in fisheries management:
Most Australian fisheries are well managed and very few are classified as overfished. [The
State of the Tropics] report shows there is certainly a mentoring role for Australia to play in
south-east Asia, and we should share the lessons we have learned domestically.722
However, current global trends regarding decreasing fisheries could be further compounded by climate
change, as recently explored by researchers.
8.1.3 Climate change

The health of the oceans is imperative to human life. The ocean has been described as the heart and
lungs of the earth, producing half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbing 30 per cent of humangenerated carbon dioxide.723
In 2010, scientists from the University of Queenslands Global Change Institute and the University
of North Carolina released the first comprehensive synthesis of the effects of climate change on the
worlds oceans, finding that they are changing at a rate not seen for several million years.724
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After the Spill
Lead-author of the report Professor Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, stated that:

We are entering a period in which the very ocean services upon which humanity depends
are undergoing massive change and in some cases, beginning to fail. Further degradation
will continue to create enormous challenges and costs for societies worldwide ignoring the
science is not an option.725
The report identifies fundamental and comprehensive726 changes to marine life, including:
rapidly warming and acidifying oceans, changes in water circulation and expansion of dead
zones within ocean depths. In turn, these are driving major changes in marine ecosystems,
less abundant coral reefs, sea grasses and mangroves (important fish nurseries), fewer, smaller
fish, a break-down in food chains, changes in the distribution of marine life, and more frequent
diseases and pests among marine organisms. 727
The authors concluded, these challenges underscore the urgency with which world leaders must act
to limit further growth of greenhouse gases and thereby reduce the risk of these events occurring. 728
8.2 Offshore petroleum industry

The role to be played by the offshore petroleum industry within this vulnerable context is significantly
heightened: both by the scope of potential damage it may wreak, and the way that climate change
could increase the risk of damage.
8.2.1 Long-term damage

It is well known that oil spills wreak long-term damage upon ecosystems.
The year 2014 marked the 25th anniversary of the Exxon Valdez spill which occurred in 1989 in Prince
William Sound, Alaska. To this day, scientific research continues to highlight adverse impacts on
marine life.
The FAO notes that in 1993, four years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the pacific herring population
in Prince William Sound collapsed. The cause has yet to be determined and the population has shown
little sign of recovery. Indications are that disease may have been a factor, but factors related to habitat
modification from the oil spill cannot be excluded as a cause.729
The severity and extent of overfishing has fostered the creation of a new ecosystem-based paradigm
for fisheries management which aims to conserve the structure and functions of ecosystems.730
Given the way in which ecosystems are devastated by oil spills and the application of chemical
dispersants, there is a need for a movement towards a transboundary ecosystem-based paradigm for
oil spill damage, rather than the current model which is too state-centric.
The long-term future of marine ecosystems, when combining the impacts of climate change and
overfishing with pollution by hydrocarbons and the application of dispersants, could be dire.
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After the Spill
8.2.2 The impacts of climate change and storms

It is also imperative to note the role that climate change may play in the future in contributing to further
incidents of damage to offshore rigs, through rises in sea level, severity in winds, waves and storms.
In 2011, researchers noted that the effects of climate change on coastal and offshore oil and gas
development include a combination of direct and indirect impacts. Climate change impacts can
cascade among different oil and gas facilities and operations (from exploration to processing and
transportation), in a way that is similar to the cascading effects that have been observed in many
ecosystems. 731
In the US, approximately 4,000 platforms that have been installed in the outer continental shelf in the
Gulf of Mexico and off the western coast of the United States were not designed to accommodate a
permanent increase in the mean sea level.732
Hurricanes have been shown to have substantial and costly impacts on offshore platforms in the
Gulf of Mexico. Storm surge effects include flooding and structural damage to drilling and producing
platforms as well as onshore support facilities.733
In 2005, following Hurricane Katrina, 44 separate oil spills were scattered in southeast Louisiana.734
The US Coastguard reported that:
There were hundreds of oil spills, including seven major and five medium spills, totalling over
9.4 million gallons from storage tanks, refineries, pipelines and marine facilities across 130
miles of area waterways. Of the 2,068 oil and gas platforms in the Gulf, 52 were reported lost
and another 58 were damaged.735
The damage to pipelines and refineries also carried economic impacts.736
In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew damaged more than 480 pipelines and flow lines with most of the
pipeline failures in depths less than 30 metres of water.737
8.2.2.1 Typhoon Haiyan and the oil spill in Estancia

In November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines. It was potentially the most severe tropical
cyclone on record to make landfall, with winds close to 313km/h.738
In the municipality of Estancia, storm surges brought by Typhoon Haiyan carried ashore a power
barge. The hull was punctured, causing 800,000 litres739 of bunker oil to leak into coastal waters, along
with toxic fumes.740
The subsequent joint assessment report by the World Health Organisation (WHO), UNEP and the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) identified that most of the spilled oil had
washed ashore, contaminating the coast and mangroves up to 10 kilometres downstream.741
The main industries affected by the oil washing ashore were tourism and fishing. A significant number
of homes (200 500 households) were estimated to be immediately adjacent to the shoreline of the
affected area. In addition, the houses were severely damaged by the typhoon, and were without power.
Most residents relied on open flame improvised kerosene lamps and cooking fires.742
The report further identified that the bunker oil could have potential adverse impacts on human health,
and also contaminate marine organisms, including fish and shellfish. 743 The report recommended
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After the Spill
suspending consumption of contaminated or potentially contaminated seafood. 744 Villagers identified

that oil had contaminated areas as far as three kilometres inland, and that 10 hectares of mangroves
were affected,745 which would also have long-term impacts.
The report identified that the oil spill was a threat to the livelihoods of the population who depend
mainly on fishing and tourism [who were already] heavily affected by the typhoon. This increases
the vulnerability of the population who has been severely affected by the typhoon with many houses
severely damaged.746
At the UN climate change talks in Warsaw Poland, in November 2013, Nadarev Sano, lead delegate for
the Philippines, linked Typhoon Haiyan to manmade climate change, calling for nations to wake up and
take action. His passionate speech led to a standing ovation.747
Scientists assert that currently there is insufficient data to categorically link any specific weather
event to climate change, such as Typhoon Haiyan. 748 However, while there is a lack of existing data
on tropical cyclones, research is indicating that while there may be fewer tropical cyclones in the
future, their intensity will increase.749 The global averaged intensity of tropical cyclones is projected to
increase by 2 - 11 per cent by 2100.750 The damage that such storms could wreak via damage to the
offshore petroleum industry could be considerable.
8.2.2.2 Australia
In the Australian context, Kimberley Whale Watching noted in its submission to the Montara
Commission of Inquiry that the Australian government and the NT and WA state governments are now
facilitating the rapid expansion of the offshore oil and gas industry in some of the most unique and
sensitive marine ecologies in the world.751
As Kimberly Whale Watching outlined:
The Ashmore Cartier, Bonaparte Basin and Browse Basin petroleum development areas also
lie in a region of severe intensity storms.
The risk of damage to rig and production platforms is likely to increase as more infrastructure is
put in place and the severity of storms increases.752
Any future damage in Australian waters could adversely impact not only upon the environments and
economies of our neighbours, but also our own, especially given that offshore exploration continues
to expand around Australias coast, with new areas being released every year, under the Australian
governments Offshore Petroleum Exploration Acreage Release.753
Offshore activity is occurring in some form off the coast of every state and territory in Australia.754
In 2015, it was reported that during a review of marine sanctuaries, the federal government had
quietly granted permits that would allow industry to look for petroleum in marine sanctuaries. 755
The permits could lead to seismic testing in areas off the West Australian coast, where no mining
exploration could have occurred if the government had not called a review. 756 The permit will give the
company authority to conduct exploration activities other than drilling a well.
In South Australia, production of oil and gas from offshore facilities does not yet occur, but the South
Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy notes that exploration is intensifying in the Great Australian
Bight.757
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After the Spill
Companies exploring in the Bight include BP, Statoil, Chevron, Bight Petroleum, Santos and Murphy
Australia Oil. 758
BP has completed seismic testing in four exploration licence areas and is currently determining
targets, with a view to commence drilling in late 2015. 759
In the Northern Territory, Paltar Petroleum applied for an exploration lease covering over 1,500
kilometres of Arnhem Land coastline.760 Over 32 ocean parcels have been declared as offshore mining
exploration sites, with many of these areas bordering Arnhem Land.761
Some of these areas are located off the coast of Elcho Island,762 an area hit by Cyclone Lam as a
Category 4 storm in February 2015.
The damage caused by Cyclone Lam to Elcho Island, has been estimated at more than $47 million.
It is just one of three remote communities, including Ramingining and Milingimbi, hit hardest by the
cyclone. The repair bill is estimated at more than $80 million.763
In March 2015, tropical Cyclone Nathan moved from Darwin across the Gulf of Carpentaria, hitting
the town of Nhulunbuy on 22 March, packing more force than any other cyclone in living memory.764
Cyclone Nathan passed through areas declared as offshore mining exploration sites.
Community elders continue to protest against the drilling plans as reported by SBS:
If you come and drill in my country...I will, lose my identity, I will be a nobody, says traditional
owner Eddie Mason.
With what I got at home, that gives me identification that gives me, to be somebody. But if the
oil comes in, you will destroy everything that I believe in.
Traditional owner Alice Ether says the potential for harm is just too high and traditional owners
are not interested in the development plans.
We stood strong saying to them, Look, we just want you to withdraw all your applications, all
across the Arnhem coast. We dont want you to destroy our waters. Leave us alone, leave us in
peace. 765
The jurisdiction of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976, which grants inalienable freehold title to
traditional owners under federal law, including the right to veto applications for development or
exploration, ends at the low-tide mark and therefore gives no clear rights over sea activity.766
Hunting and fishing still constitute a significant dietary source for people living in Maningrida. The
Traditional Owners are very concerned that mining will threaten this food source which will cause
physical and cultural damage to their people.767
If drilling operations had been in place at the time of Cyclone Lam, how significant was the risk that we
could have seen another Montara occur?
Australias own submission to Rio+20, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 2012 stated that:
Ocean ecosystem considerations need to be better integrated into economic and social
decisions with the objective of deriving economic and social benefits from the oceans in ways
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After the Spill
that are efficient, equitable and sustainable in both the short and long term.
Within this context, economic and social development strategies should prioritise effective
marine management in order to address poverty eradication, food security, sustainable
livelihoods and conservation.768
Ultimately, ensuring environmental health in our own waters, the Asia-Pacific region and in the
backyards of our closest neighbours should be viewed as an issue of national security for Australia.
A crucial element of this, is considering the significant role that damage from offshore exploration can
play in stymying progress and undermining security. This is why a solution for transboundary damage,
and setting a precedent for that now through our reaction to Montara, is so important.
8.3 Economic considerations

Australia must consider the potential economic impacts that could arise in the event of any future spills
emanating from the offshore petroleum industry, to our own economy, and to our neighbours.
As acknowledged by the Australian government, ensuring that Australias offshore petroleum
regulatory regime has appropriate measures in place regarding well regulation, environmental
monitoring and management, and arrangements for incident response are imperative for a strong
economy.769
8.3.1 The oil and gas industry

In 2011, the Australian government delivered its Regulation Impact Statement, Government Response
to the Montara Commission of Inquiry, acknowledging that Australia is one of the top five producers
of the worlds key mineral and energy commodities,770 and that, historically, about 95 per cent of
Australias petroleum production has come from our offshore basins.771 Around 70 per cent of
Australias crude oil and condensate production occurs off the northwest coast, and more than half of
Australias production is exported given the proximity of this region to Asia.772
In 2013, Deloitte identified in its report: Positioning for prosperity? Catching the next wave, that the
oil and gas industries were among the next big five industries expected to inject $250 billion into the
Australian economy.773
The report found that:
the oil and gas industry will soon make up about 2 per cent of Australias economy, with the
majority of that now coming from gas. Australias output of liquefied natural gas is expected to
rise by 250 per cent between now and 201718. If we achieve that, we could surpass Qatar to
become the worlds top liquefied natural gas producer.
With another $180 billion in gas projects under consideration in Australia, the report says that
if these were to proceed, they could create 150,000 jobs and deliver tax revenue of $5 billion a
year.774
The Australian governments Regulatory Impact Statement to the Montara Commission of Inquiry also
noted the economic benefits of the industry:
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After the Spill
in 2008-09, the upstream oil and gas sector generated oil and gas sales revenue of
approximately $28.3 billion and total revenue of about $35.6 billion, directly employing about
20,000 people; 775
in 2009-10, Australia exported $9.5 billion of crude oil, $7.8 billion of liquefied natural gas and
$1.1 billion of liquefied petroleum gas. 776
Clearly, the revenue streams from offshore exploration are flowing strongly. However, at the same
time, agribusiness and tourism were noted by Deloitte to also feature in the top big five industries.
It appears that these industries are more vulnerable to damage in the event of any lack of due care
undertaken within the oil and gas industries.
It also must be remembered that the significant economic loss and environmental damage faced by
the people of NTT could also be experienced in northern Australia in the future. Fishing industries,
multi-million dollar pearling industries and tourism industries could stand to be impacted if another
offshore platform were to experience a leak. In fact, Australian industries could have been adversely
impacted in the case of Montara had winds and currents flowed in an alternative direction.
The statement issued by Mr Gary Gray AO, on the conclusion of the Deed of Agreement with PTTEP
AA continues to be relevant today:
The Montara incident in 2009 was a wake-up call for industry and government.
We need to make Australias oil and gas exploration and production operations the best and
safest in the world and it is the collective responsibility of industry and government to make
sure that we reach this goal.777
8.3.2 Southern bluefin tuna

The potential economic impacts on Australias fishing industry in the event of future offshore damage
must also be considered. This can be seen in the example of the southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus
maccoyii).
In 2013, the farming of southern bluefin tuna generated the highest farm-gate sales in South Australias
aquaculture industry,778 where mostly immature fish (2-4 years of age) are removed from the wild and
fattened in farms.779 A single fish can reputedly be worth up to $10,000 and are often used in the
preparation of sashimi in Japan. The total value of the southern bluefin tuna fishery is estimated to be
about AUD$1 billion.780
The depletion of stocks of southern bluefin tuna became of such concern that a Commission for
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna was established in 1994, with membership comprising
Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Fishing Entity of Taiwan.
In 2004, the FAO rated the stocks of southern bluefin tuna as depleted.781 The southern bluefin
tuna continues to feature on the International Union for Conservation of Natures (IUCN) red list of
critically endangered species. IUCN reports that the estimated spawning stock biomass has declined
approximately 85 per cent over the past 36 years (1973-2009) and there is no sign that the spawning
stock is rebuilding. Effective conservation and management measures are urgently needed.782
In 2012, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority stated in its Status of key Australian fish stocks
report that of the 111 classified stocks, southern bluefin tuna was among only two species in Australia
classified as overfished.783
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After the Spill
The fish breed in warm waters south of Java from September to April, with the juveniles migrating
south down the west coast of Australia. During summer months, the fish tend to congregate in the
coastal waters off the southern coast of Australia.784
The southern bluefin tuna migration occurs around an area filled with offshore exploration: the Timor
Sea, the waters of northern Australia, the Great Australian Bight and the Bass Strait.785
Maps released by AMSA clearly indicate southern bluefin tuna spawing grounds as being proximate to
the Montara oil spill on 28 October 2009.
ll
29 October 2009
Sulawesi Selatan
Montara Well Spill

Nusa Tenggara Timur
Maluku
29
October 2009
Sulawesi Selatan
Timor Leste
Nusa Tenggara Timur
Ti
_M
_Montara
Northern Territory
Western Australia
12S
12S
HIBERNIA REEF
ASHMORE REEF
Extent of oil/sheen at time

of imagery capture
CARTIER IS
Montara Well
12S
Legend
SBT Spawning G
WEST HOLOTHURIA REEF
EAST HOLOTHURIA REEF
SERINGAPATAM REEF
Aust-Indo Delimitatio
Australian Maritime
LONG REEF
SCOTT REEF
122E
15
30
124E
60 Nautical Miles
30
60
WEST HOLOTHURIA REEF
126E
Legend
1:2,000,000
0
Truscott Airbase
Satellite imagery captured 28 October 2009
SBT Spawning Grounds
120 Kilometres
EAST HOLOTHURIA REEF

Aust-Indo Delimitation Treaty 1997 (EEZ)
Joint Petroleum Development Area
REEFWell Spill, 29 October 2009. Courtesy: AMSA

FigureLONG
88: Montara
Truscott Airbase
14S
Australian Maritime Boundaries 2006 3nm
In January 2010, the CEO of the Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna Industry Association acknowledged
that it was difficult to get information about fish stocks in the area of the spill, but that the spill
occurred in the single global spawning ground for southern bluefin tuna.
215
126E
14S
14S
Extent of oil/sheen at time

of imagery capture
Joint Petroleum Dev
After the Spill
In an interview with the ABC, CEO Brian Jeffries said:

The way that that spawn sits in the water column and then moves down the west coast of
Western Australia indicates that this could be very damaging to us. What we do know in the
two years after the fish spawn, then we can start to tell whether there is an impact. But that
certainly wont be for two or three years What we want is for this to be shown and then
taken into account in a scientific assessment for this species.
I think government departments have tried their very hardest. But this is a very remote zone
and with this large scale exploration in oceanic areas, the work really has to be done and the
consultation take place.786
The majority of Australias offshore exploration is occurring in regions likely to affect the southern
bluefin tuna: the Timor Sea, the coast of Western Australia and off the coast of the Great Australian
Bight.
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After the Spill
Chapter 9: Australias opportunity
Chapter 9: Australias opportunity

Australia is uniquely positioned as a nation to lead the global conversation, and
global action, on transboundary damage and offshore platforms.
9.1 Global leadership

Australia is uniquely posited to commence a regional and global discussion surrounding offshore
petroleum exploration, transboundary damage and the many human rights issues we have raised in
this report.
Australia has the fifth largest coastline in the world, following Russia, Canada, Greenland and
Indonesia (which rates second);787 and has maritime jurisdiction covering 11 per cent of the oceans
surface.788 Australias coral reefs constitute 15 per cent of the worlds reefs.789 Australia is also seen as
a world leader in fisheries management.
Conversely, Australia also has a growing offshore petroleum industry, with 95 per cent of Australias
petroleum production originating from offshore basins.790 The Garnaut Climate Change Review also
identifies that Australias per capita greenhouse gas emissions are nearly twice the OECD average and
more than four times the world average.791
Australia is uniquely positioned to lead the global agenda in calling for a regional and global discussion
of the intersection of these issues. In fact, it is in the national interest for this discussion to begin as
soon as possible.
There is also a need for regional leadership regarding the effective oversight and regulation of the
petroleum industry, and a regional commitment to press for remediation and effective, comprehensive
environmental monitoring in the face of adverse events. This includes commitments to effective
transboundary monitoring and remediation.
The imperative for such commitment can only grow as offshore exploration continues to expand and
spread forth throughout the world: Brazil, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, the Persian Gulf,
Russia, Thailand and the United States. The imperative for this commitment can also only grow in
urgency as climate change potentially increases the propensity for storm damage to wreak havoc on
offshore petroleum operations.
In Australia, an OECD country where 95 percent of its petroleum industry is based offshore, the
regulator was held to have failed. It is not difficult to imagine the implications that may be drawn for
the expansion of the offshore industry in developing nations.
It furthermore must be remembered that the ocean is also not a stagnant resource. In 2012, following
the 2011 Japanese tsunami and associated meltdown at Fukushima, a young Japanese boys soccer
ball was found washed up on the beach in Alaska.792 In 2014, a boat which capsized in Exmouth,
Western Australia, was found eight months later wrecked on the coast of Madagascar.793 While policing
of damage has historically been confined by state sovereignty, it is clear that this approach is outdated
when applied to catastrophic damage that may arise due to offshore oil spills.
We have an opportunity now to set a precedent for future generations as to how to respond to cases
of transboundary damage, and how to ensure that our oceans will continue to be a vibrant source of
life and economic benefits for years to come.
Now is the time for action.
217
After the Spill
Conclusion: There must be an investigation

Australia is uniquely able to break the stalemate that has formed regarding the Montara oil spill and the
deficiency of independent scientific transboundary research, through negotiation with the governments
of Indonesia, Timor Leste and their agents and PTTEP AA. In fact, it is in the national interest to break
this stalemate, given that our relationship with Indonesia has previously been described as perhaps
our most important relationship.
It is also clear that the Australian government is now expected to play a more proactive role in future
transboundary spills: both via AMSAs National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies and
PTTEP AAs own updated Oil Spill Contingency Plan.
This report does not and cannot cover the breadth of issues, the extensive geographical scope, and
the scientific evidence demanded by such a mammoth issue.
While PTTEP AA asserts that no verifiable evidence has yet been established regarding where the oil
went beyond Australian territory, we submit that this assertion should be rejected as erroneous. We
submit that the information we have consolidated within this report constitutes sufficient grounds to
trigger an independent, scientific investigation into transboundary damage flowing from the Montara
oil spill.
More than five years have now passed since the Montara oil spill began. In that period, miscarriages
of justice have abounded. Communities have carried the burden of financial losses on their own
shoulders. Some communities have continued absolutely unaware as to the cause of the devastation
that they have endured, not knowing that an oil spill leaked into Australian waters of the Timor Sea that
may have been entirely preventable.
Following the spill, some communities believed that the gods were punishing them, or that Australia
was trying to kill them. People have been denied the answers that they should have duly received.
The Indonesian government has requested assistance from the Australian government to press PTTEP
AA for resolution. This is a matter of political will.
We believe that it is appropriate and well overdue for Australia to ensure that appropriate information is
received by communities about what happened to their homes and livelihoods, and for that information
to be factual, accurate and based on independent science.
Such independent science must be mutually agreed for acceptance by the governments of Australia,
Indonesia and Timor-Leste and would be appropriate to be funded by PTTEP AA. This is essential in
order to evade a protracted battle over the validity of such evidence, and to ensure that communities
do not have to wait any longer than they already have.
As we have highlighted throughout this report, the case of the Montara oil spill is symptomatic of a
global failure on transboundary damage. The world is watching to see what we will do. Australia is
presented with a unique opportunity to act to change history and to set a precedent for the many
nations whose own offshore petroleum industries are expanding.
This was the worst offshore spill in the history of Australias offshore petroleum industry. Our reaction
to this case sets a dangerous precedent if it fails to secure adequate answers.
218
After the Spill
Failure to act will ultimately have repercussions, both for the people of NTT and across the world.
In NTT, the continuation of the current stalemate will stifle a generations opportunity for education. The
environment upon which the provinces economy largely depends will continue without remediation undermining communities livelihoods and impacting upon the provincial governments ability to deliver
essential services. Adverse health conditions will go unmonitored and will depend upon an individual
or communitys financial situation for effective treatment. Debts will grow. Poverty will spiral. Justice
will be denied.
Further, the global lessons about transboundary damage and the impacts of oil and dispersants
in such coastal communities will be forever lost. The ripple effect of potential change will vanish
until another crisis arises; until other communities are needlessly injured; human rights violated and
economies broken.
Communities have now been waiting more than half a decade. But it is not too late for the Australian
government to act to assist the citizens of NTT and work in partnership with the Indonesian and Timor
Leste governments, PTTEP AA and affected communities, towards a resolution.
We close this report with the words of Ferdi Tanoni, Chairman of the West Timor Care Foundation, who
has been appointed to speak for the communities affected:
We will not give up. We will not rest until it happens. I look forward to that day and I know it
is coming. The time is right for Australia and Indonesia to bolster ties and work together for a
better future.794
219
After the Spill
Recommendations
Recommendations
1. An independent investigation
The Australian government should respond to the request of the Indonesian government and the NTT
community for assistance in good faith.
The Australian government should negotiate with the governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste;
affected communities and their agents, and PTTEP Australasia to ensure commencement of
an independent investigation that will assess the geographical spread of the oil and dispersant
contamination in NTT.
The Australian government should consider negotiating for the mutual acceptance of the findings of
this independent research, and for such research to be funded by PTTEP Australasia.
We suggest that areas of focus may include (however, not be limited to) relevant testing in Rote,
Sabu, West Timor, Semau, Lembata, Sumba and Alor and within Timor-Lestes enclave of Oecusse.
Investigation may also be undertaken to examine impacts on the Timor and Sabu Seas and on
Indonesian fishing grounds.
2. Future transboundary damage

The Australian government should approve and release its Guideline on the Co-ordination of
International Incidents.
3. Future transboundary partnership

The Australian government should consider negotiating agreements with relevant parties that have the
potential to be affected by transboundary damage emanating from offshore exploration, in order to
develop a transboundary partnership action plan regarding oil spill preparedness and response.
This should include considering negotiating with:
a. The local governments of Nusa Tenggara Timur and the government of Indonesia,
including updating the Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and
Indonesia on Oil Spill Preparedness and Response (1996);
b. The government of Timor-Leste;
c. The government of Papua New Guinea;
d. Companies operating in offshore exploration in areas proximate to Australias maritime
boundaries.
e. Relevant non-government organisations and scientists to ensure best practice.
These negotiations may also address resourcing of recovery operations, the use of dispersants,
transboundary models for long-term environmental monitoring and the establishment of baseline
environmental research, especially of a transboundary nature.
220
After the Spill
Recommendations
These negotiations should have consideration of the international environmental principle of common
but differentiated responsibility.
4. Transboundary damage on the international agenda

The Australian government should support and endorse Indonesias requests for the International
Maritime Organisation Legal Committee to progress work on transboundary damage.
5. Review dispersant application and transitional dispersant use

The Australian government should consider destroying the stockpiles of dispersants previously used in
the Montara oil spill that are accepted for transitional arrangements under the National Plan Register of
Oil Spill Control Agents and are held by AMSA and the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC).
This includes Ardrox 6120, which scientists have held to be more toxic to seagrass than Corexit 9500.
Currently, these dispersants will be made available and used for National Plan responses until used or
disposed of.795 We submit that it would be more appropriate that these stockpiles be destroyed, given
that they do not qualify under new testing arrangements to be approved for use within the National
Plan.
6. Human rights review of treatment of Indonesian fishermen

We believe that it would be appropriate for the Australian Human Rights Commission to consider
inquiring into the treatment of Indonesian fishermen by Australian officials in the Timor Sea, as
the potentially unlawful destruction of individuals assets outside the Australian Fishing Zone may
constitute an act or practice that may be inconsistent with or contrary to any human right as per
section 11(1)(f), Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth).
We believe that this may be appropriate as there have been more than 7,000 apprehensions for foreign
fishing offences from 2004 to 2013.
This could encapsulate:
a. A review of breaches of Indonesian waters that have occurred in the policing of
Indonesian fishermen, including full publication of the Defence and Customs Review in
2014.
b. The appropriateness of methodology utilised by the Royal Australian Navy and the
Department of Customs and Border Protection Service to determine that an offence
against the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) has occurred, including adequacy of:
i. training on and application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
ii. technology utilised to determine positioning of Indonesian vessels;
iii. adequacy of language translation;
iv. standards in place to ensure a presumption of innocence.
c. Review of the powers of maritime officials in the use of force against Indonesian
fishermen.
221
After the Spill
Recommendations
d. Review of the checks and balances in place to ensure that the human rights of
fishermen are protected and that the use of powers is subject to adequate scrutiny.
e. Review of relevant records to determine whether charging persons with fishing offences
may be a causative element in a person being involved in people smuggling offences.
f. Review of individual records to assess the geographical areas from which Indonesian
fishermen originate who are charged with foreign fishing offences, and people
smuggling offences.
g. Review of the appropriateness of legislative powers available to charge foreign
fishermen for the cost of their imprisonment.
h. Review of licensing arrangements in the Timor Sea and Memorandum of
Understanding 1976 Box area, with the potential to extend permit areas, especially in
light of reported damage to Indonesian fishing grounds resulting from the Montara oil
spill.
7. Human rights review of Timor Sea policy

The Australian government may consider hosting a national and transparent consultation in order to
develop a new policy approach to the Timor Sea, and the treatment of citizens of Nusa Tenggara Timur
and Timor Leste within Australia, based on human rights and mutual co-operation.
This could encapsulate the following issues:
a. The development of an effective and long-term response to remediate damage
experienced in Nusa Tenggara Timur and Timor Leste;
b. Developing new transitional arrangements for licensing for Indonesian fishers during
remediation of the Indonesian environment;
c. Reviewing the treatment of foreign fishers by Australian officials and relevant legislation
and international agreements, including a review of areas permitted for fishing in or
near the Australian EEZ, and review of efficacy of the destruction of boats;
d. Reviewing the treatment of asylum seekers, including a new co-operative approach to
accepting increased numbers of asylum seekers from Indonesia;
e. Reviewing people smuggling, including the development of systemic records regarding
place of origin of all persons charged with an offence, and addressing destruction
of livelihood as a cause for recruitment into crewing boats through targeted poverty
alleviation programs;
f. Poverty alleviation and working towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals,
including in Nusa Tenggara Timur;
g. Working towards regional and transboundary management of marine resources and
establishing baseline research;
h. Ways in which to promote economic growth in Indonesia and Timor Leste;
222
After the Spill
Recommendations
i. Increasing community ties between Australia and Nusa Tenggara Timur, and Timor
Leste.
This consultation could be conducted with the input of academics; historians; lawyers; Legal Aid; nongovernment organisations (Australian and international); businesses; relevant government agencies;
and local governments of Nusa Tenggara Timur, Timor Leste, the Northern Territory, Western Australia
and Queensland.
The findings of this consultation could build on the economic opportunities already identified within
the Joint Select Committee on Northern Australias inquiry into the development of Northern Australia,
released in July 2014.796
8. Renegotiation of delineation of maritime boundaries

The Australian government should commit to renegotiate appropriate maritime boundaries with both
West Timor and Timor Leste.
9. Defence and Customs Review

An additional review should examine other breaches into Indonesian waters that have been committed
over a longer time period. The fact that six breaches were exposed within two months in 2013-2014
indicates that there were likely a higher number of breaches of Indonesian waters that should be
brought to light dating back at least thirteen years to 2001, when legislative arrangements regarding
foreign fishers were tightened.
The findings of this review should be made public in full. It may be appropriate for this review to take
the form of a Royal Commission into breaches of Indonesian waters committed by the Royal Australian
Navy and the Department of Customs and Border Protection.
223
After the Spill
Overview chronology of events
Overview chronology of events

Event
Detail
Notes
21 August 2009
Montara wellhead gushes oil into

Australian waters of the Timor Sea
PR agency may have been appointed

by the company responsible before
notifying authorities of the spills
existence.
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
(AMSA) notified.
69 Australian workers evacuated
from the wellhead as the oil bubbles
around them.
23 August 2009
AMSA commences spraying

dispersants onto the oils surface.
More than 180,000 litres of a cocktail

of seven different dispersants sprayed
onto the oils surface in total.
Dispersant application ceased on
1 November 2009.
Late August/early
September 2009
Indonesian fishermen spot a lake

of milky oil in their fishing grounds,
and formally report it to the head
of Antralamor, the local fishing
association.
Late August/early
September 2009
Communities on Rote Island spot

milky water 200 metres from their
coastline. Two days later, the
seaweed farms begin to die.
September 2009
Australian and Indonesian

government conduct a briefing. It is
estimated that in weeks the oil will
reach the Indonesian coastline.
16-19 September
2009
Rote Open 2009 International Surfing

Championships held at Rote Island,
Indonesia.
22 September
2009
Large whale found dead on the coast

of Oecusse, Timor Leste
224
Renowned for its famous surf breaks,

Rote Island remains one of the worst
affected areas following the spill.
International championships were also
held in the region in 2010 and 2011. To
date, no warning has ever been issued
to surfers or Australian tourists about
the dangers of exposure to hydrocarbon
or dispersant during surfing.
After the Spill
Event
Detail
Notes
6 October 2009
West Timor Care Foundation records

footage of a large floating waxy lake
of mousse in the Timor Sea,
60 kilometres from land.
The footage is subsequently sent to

Senator Rachel Siewert and published
on her website.
October 2009
Department of Resources, Energy

and Tourism estimates that the spill
could be discharging up to 2,000
barrels per day of oil
1 November 2009
Wellhead catches fire
Wellhead burns relentlessly through the

night
3 November 2009
Wellhead plugged, spill ceases.
The wellhead has been flowing

unabated for 74 days.
5 November 2009
Federal government announces the

Montara Commission of Inquiry: an
inquiry to be held with nearly all the
powers of a royal commission to
examine the cause of the spill
Only weeks are provided for

submissions, with a deadline of 22
December 2009.
15 November
2009
No further oil identified in the Timor

Sea
This conclusion is reached largely via

satellite data rather than via gathering
samples.
3 December 2009
AMSA operations cease in the Timor

Sea
22 December
2010
Submissions close for the Montara

Commission of Inquiry
18 January 2010
Three water samples collected in the

Indonesian exclusive economic zone
by NGO West Timor Care Foundation
were sent to Leeder Consulting for
testing.
The samples matched Montara
crude.
225
The testing method utilised by Leeder

was the Nordtest methodology,
which is referred to informally as
fingerprinting oil.
The subsequent Leeder Report
detailed that three samples of Timor
Sea water with oil received by Leeder
Consulting on 18 January 2010 were
analysed against a known sample
of Montara oil. Two samples were
found to be similar to the whole oil
ratios of fresh Montara crude and
Leeder Consulting determined that
the correlation plots show a match
of diagnostic ratios within the 95%
confidence interval and suggest a
positive match of the samples to the
fresh Montara crude.
After the Spill
Event
Detail
Notes
Post 16 April
2010
PTTEP AA provided a copy of the

Montara Action Plan (which aims
to address the root causes of the
incident, covering governance,
organisational capability, safety and
environment and management) very
late to the Montara Commission of
Inquiry, well after public hearings. The
Commission of Inquiry noted that it
thus did not have the opportunity to
appropriately review its content.
Public hearings were convened in

Canberra from 15 March to 16 April
2010.
20 April 2010
BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the

Gulf of Mexico
The spill is to last for 87 days and is the

largest offshore oil spill in the history of
the industry.
There is a strong difference between
the manner in which the spills were
handled by the Australian and American
governments, with President Barack
Obama personally ensuring that BP
pays US$20 billion into a trust fund for
survivors.
11 May 2010
Indonesian NGO, West Timor Care

Foundation, provides a submission to
the Montara Commission of Inquiry
WTCF asserted that following the initial

uncontrolled release in September
2009, the oil moved at a slower pace
into Indonesian waters and then more
slowly again into the direct fishing
and seaweed farming regions of NTT,
Indonesia.
26 August 2010
The Government of Indonesia writes

to PTTEP AA, submitting that they
wish to pursue compensation.
1 September
2010
PTTEP AA rejects the Government of

Indonesias claim that damage has
occurred in Indonesia, saying that
there is no verifiable evidence.
PTTEP AA also rejects the role of
WTCF.
24 November
2010

report, and the draft government
response, released
226
The report condemns the inaction of

the company responsible, saying that
operations did not come within a bulls
roar of good oilfield practice.
The NT regulator is also held to have
failed, and did not bark.
After the Spill
Event
Detail
Notes
Between 24
November 2010
and 25 February
2011
West Timor Care Foundation provides

a submission to the draft government
response to the Montara Commission
of Inquiry
WTCF raised its concerns that the

recommended implementations did
not cover marine casualties and
pollution by oil and hazardous noxious
substances beyond Commonwealth
waters.
February 2011
Resources Minister the Hon. Martin

Ferguson AM releases independent
review of the Montara Action Plan,
and announces that he would not
be issuing a show cause notice to
PTTEP AA, which may have led to
cancellation of its petroleum titles at
the time.
23 February 2011
PTTEP AA and the Department of

Resources, Energy and Tourism sign
a Deed of Agreement regarding the
implementation of the Montara Action
Plan.
June 2011
Mr Ferdi Tanoni, Director of the West

Timor Care Foundation, granted legal
agency by traditional leaders and
provincial governments to pursue a
legal claim for damage.
September 2011
PTTEP Group Executive Vice

President announces at a press
conference in Jakarta that PTTEP
had concluded that the Montara oil
spill had not affected Indonesias
environment.
March 2012
Lawyer for Australian workers reveals

to ABC that PTTEP AAs insurer is still
fighting against the workers claims
for compensation.
18 August 2012
Australian Lawyers Alliance provides

submission to the Expert Panel on
Asylum Seekers, noting the impacts
of the Montara oil spill in Indonesia
and its potential contribution towards
people smuggling in the area.
227
At this time, there was an awareness of

damage in Indonesia. However, at no
instance was there any reference within
the Montara Action Plan regarding
Indonesia.
After the Spill
Event
Detail
Notes
31 August 2012
PTTEP Australasia charged with four

breaches of the Offshore Petroleum
and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act
2006 (Cth), paying a $510,000 fine.
It was the first ever successful
prosecution by the National Offshore
Petroleum and Safety Authority
(NOPSEMA) under the Act, with an
oral decision.
July 2013
Another subsidiary of PTT, PTT

Global Chemical Company (PTTGC)
is involved in an oil spill in the Gulf
of Thailand that turned idyllic tourist
beaches of Ko Samet black. The local
fishing industry was also devastated.
It was PTTs fourth oil spill in
Thailand.
August 2013
Delegation from the Australian

Lawyers Alliance meet with affected
communities in Kupang, West Timor
and provincial governments.
11 September
2013
PTTEP AA released Montara

Environmental Monitoring Program
of Research report, stating that no oil
reached the Australian or Indonesian
coast.
3 February 2014

provides a submission to the
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Committee in its inquiry into
Australias overseas development
assistance program, regarding the
ongoing economic degradation in
Nusa Tenggara Timur, Indonesia.
February 2014
Senator Rachel Siewert, of the

Australian Greens, meets with
over 100 individuals from affected
communities and government
officials in Kupang, West Timor.
228
Communities assert that the economic,

social, environmental and health
impacts are ongoing and unresolved.
An international seminar is convened,

with Dr Robert Spies, the US
governments former senior adviser
in the Exxon Valdez spill providing
evidence at the seminar.
After the Spill
Event
Detail
Notes
March 2014
Media report that PTTEP Australasia

plans to downsell its assets in the
Montara field.
May 2014
Australian Lawyers Alliance provides

a submission to the Joint Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Inquiry into the
role of the private sector in promoting
economic growth and reducing
poverty in the Indo-Pacific
April 2014
Seaweed farmer Philipus Liman dies,

West Timor
July 2014

delegation meets with officials
in Canberra to discuss concerns
regarding damage sustained in
Indonesia
July 2014
PTTEP AA provides its response to

Australian Lawyers Alliances May
2014 submission, asserting that no
verifiable evidence of damage exists.
21 August 2014
Five years since the spill

commenced.
September 2014
Indonesian Minister for the

Environment writes to the Australian
government requesting assistance
September 2014
Lateline investigates claims by

communities in West Timor of
damage to seaweed farms
October November 2014
Delegation from the Australian

Lawyers Alliance visits Rote Island
and West Timor
229
After the Spill
References
1
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Montara Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, (June

2010) at 38. Accessed at http://www.industry.gov.au/AboutUs/CorporatePublications/
MontaraInquiryResponse/Documents/Montara-Report.pdf
The first estimate of 4,750 tonnes has been provided by PTTEP Australasia. The latter estimate
has been calculated based on remarks given to the Montara Commission of Inquiry (at 301), by
the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, estimating that 2,000 barrels of oil were spilt
per day, for 74 days, estimating that 400 barrels is equivalent to approximately 64 tonnes.
Ria Gondowarsito, Community Development in East Nusa Tenggara, in Kathryn Robinson and
Sharon Bessell (eds) Women in Indonesia: Gender, Equity and Development (2002: Institute of
South East Asian Studies, Singapore) at 253.
ABC News, Australian oil disaster costing Indonesians billions, Thursday 26 July 2012.
Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-07-26/australian-oil-disaster-costingindonesians-billions/4155474
Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 26.
Ibid, at 11.
Ibid, at 6.
Ibid, at 6.
Professor Dr. Balthasar Kambuaya, Minister for the Environment, Government of Indonesia
to His Excellency Greg Moriarty, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, 25 September 2014,
at 2. Accessed at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1306491-letter-to-australiasambassador-in-jakarta.html
Ibid.
Correspondence from the Hon. Ian Marfarlane to the Australian Lawyers Alliance, 22 July 2014.
Ibid, at 26.
PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd, Montara H1 ST1 Well Release Incident Report,
Document No: #143203, (2009). Accessed at http://www.montarainquiry.gov.au/downloads/
Exhibits/day009/PTT.9001.0008.0062.PDF
PTTEP Australasia (PTTEP AA) comprises a group of companies being PTTEP Australasia
(Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd and other Australian companies which are subsidiaries of PTTEP. See
PTTEP, http://www.au.pttep.com/
See PTTEP, http://www.au.pttep.com/
PTT, Background. Accessed at http://www.pttplc.com/EN/About/pages/Background.aspx
PTTEP, About PTTEP. Accessed at http://www.pttep.com/en/aboutPttep.aspx
Kimberley Whale Watching, Submission to the Inquiry into the Montara Platform Uncontrolled
Hydrocarbon Leak, (22 December 2009) at 9. Accessed at http://issuu.com/kimberleymedia/
docs/letter_montara_commission_of_inquiry
Northern Territory Government, Department of Resources, Montara Wellhead Platform Incident,
(June 2011). Accessed at http://www.nt.gov.au/d/Content/File/p/ks/RG_Montara1.pdf
See Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 10: the failure of personnel to subsequently
recognise the problems in the cementing job reflects poorly on them. Halliburton undertook
the cementing job but this was at PTTEP AAs direction. It was PTTEP AA personnel that called
the shots, and it is they who must bear primary responsibility for oversighting this failed task.
Dominic Rushe, BP sues Halliburton for Deepwater Horizon oil spill clean-up costs, The
Guardian, 4 January 2012. Accessed 7 February 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2012/jan/03/bp-sues-halliburton-over-deepwater
Halliburton, US Court rules on Macondo Liability, 4 September 2014. Accessed at http://www.
halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press_release/2014/corpnews-090414.html
The oil and gas had travelled a distance of over four kilometres from the reservoir beneath the
sea bed. See Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 5.
230
After the Spill
Ibid, at 52.
Ibid.
Ibid, at 5.
PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd, above n 14.
Ibid, at 235.
Ibid, at 5.
Ibid, at 302.
Wilderness Society, cited in Narelle Towie, Oil slick endangers whales, turtles, Perth Now, 29
August 2009. Accessed 4 March 2014 at http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/oil-slick-endangerswhales-turtles/story-e6frg12c-1225767366498
34 Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 39.
35 Ibid.
36 Youna Lyons, Transboundary pollution from offshore activities: a study of the Montara offshore
oilspill, in S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh, Robert Beckman, Hao Duy Phan (eds), Transboundary
Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (2015: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd,
USA) at 163.
38 AAP, Oil rig spill potentially catastrophic, 15 March 2010. Accessed at https://au.news.yahoo.
com/thewest/a/6934811/oil-rig-spill-potentially-catastrophic/
40 Ibid, at 2.
41 AMSA, Response to the Montara Wellhead Platform Incident, Report of the Incident Analysis
Team, March 2010, at 4. Accessed 13 February 2014 at http://www.amsa.gov.au/forms-andpublications/Publications/Montara_IAT_Report.pdf
42 Ibid, at 5.
43 Ibid.
44 Parliament of Australia, Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee,
Answers to Questions on Notice, Budget Estimates May 2010, Infrastructure and Transport at
125 (26/05/10). Accessed at http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates/Live/rrat_ctte/estimates/
bud_1011/infra/amsa.ashx
45 See the full report at 60 Minutes, Crude Solution, Thursday August 15, 2013. Accessed at http://
sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=8706910
46 Montara Commission of Inquiry, Issues Paper. Accessed at http://www.montarainquiry.gov.au/
downloads/Issues%20paper.pdf
47 Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 32; and Australian Government, Department of
Industry, Montara Inquiry Response (last updated 6/2/2013). Accessible at http://www.ret.gov.au/
department/responses/montara/Pages/MontaraInquiryResponse.aspx
49 See Ibid, at 7.
50 Ibid, at 9.
51 Ibid, at 12.
52 Ibid, at 11.
53 Ibid, at 10 -11.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid, at 6.
56 Ibid, at 12.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid, at 14.
59 Ibid, at 217.
60 Ibid.
61 Greg Phelps, cited in Montaras forgotten victims, NT News, 2 August 2014. Accessed at http://
territorystories.nt.gov.au/bitstream/handle/10070/252340/NTN02AUG14PG019-MAI-COLOURPRIMARY.PDF?sequence=18&isAllowed=y
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
231
After the Spill
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 31-32.

Ibid, at 26.
Ibid, at 302.
West Timor Care Foundation, Montara Well Head Platform Uncontrolled Hydrocarbon Release,
Submission to the Montara Commission of Inquiry, (11 May 2010). Accessed at http://www.
montarainquiry.gov.au/downloads/submissions/Final%20Submission.pdf
Ibid, at 2.
Ibid, at 3.
Ibid, at 2.
Ibid, at 5.
ABC Radio National AM, Montara oil spill workers call for compensation settlement, Monday
March 12 2012. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2012/s3450955.htm.
Jane Hammond, Montara workers seek damages, The West Australian, 8 August 2011.
Accessed at http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/9990520/montara-workers-seekdamages/
ABC Radio National AM, above n 70.
Ibid.
Budy P Resosudarmo and Frank Jotzo (ed), Working With Nature Against Poverty, Development
Resources and the Environment in Eastern Indonesia (2009) Indonesian Project, The Australian
University, ISEAS Publishing, Singapore, at 1 - 7.
NTT is cited alongside Papua, West Papua, Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) and Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam (Aceh). AusAID, Commonwealth of Australia, Australia Indonesia Partnership Strategy
2008 2013, (2008) at 3. Accessed 5 February 2014 at http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/
Documents/aip_strat_2008-13_english.pdf
Arafura and Timor Seas Ecosystem Action (ATSEA) Program, Socio-economic profile of the
Arafura Timor Seas, Report prepared for the Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis component of
the Arafura Timor Seas Ecosystem Action Program (August 2011) at 2. Accessed at http://www.
atsea-program.org/publication-1/socio-economic-profile/at_download/file
Ibid.
Ibid, at 13.
Ibid, at 34.
Ria Gondowarsito, above n 3, at 253.
See Timor Oil Spill Forcing NTT Fishermen to Migrate, Jakarta Globe, 24 June 2010. Accessed
at http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/timor-sea-oil-spill-forcing-ntt-fishermen-to-migrate/
Interview conducted in October 2014, Oesapa village.
Interviews conducted in October 2014, Kupang, West Timor.
Interviews with villagers conducted in October 2014 in Oenggaut, Rote Island.
Interview conducted in October 2014, Kupang, West Timor.
Interview conducted in Daiama village, Rote Island, October 2014.
Interview conducted in Tablolong village, West Timor, October 2014.
As witnessed by Australian Lawyers Alliance, August 2013.
Conversation with Australian Lawyers Alliance, 15 April 2015.
Yemris Fointuna, NTT residents concerned about oil spill in Timor Sea, The Jakarta Post, 1
October 2009. Accessed at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/01/ntt-residentsconcerned-about-oil-spill-timor-sea.html
SBS, Video could prove that oil has reached Timor coast, 10 November 2009. Accessed at
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2009/11/10/video-could-prove-oil-has-reached-timor-coast.
This footage can be viewed at: http://rachel-siewert.greensmps.org.au/content/video/indonesianfishermen-encounter-oil-montara-wellhead-spill.
Yemris Fointuna, Ministry team examines oil spill in Timor Sea, The Jakarta Post, 24 October
2009. Accessed 12 November 2014 at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/24/
ministry-team-examines-oil-spill-timor-sea.html
Minyak Mentah Cemari Rumput Laut, Kompas, 20 October 2009. Accessed at http://regional.
kompas.com/read/2009/10/20/14401995/minyak.mentah.cemari.rumput.laut
232
After the Spill
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
Thousands of fish found dead in Timor Sea, Antara News, 7 October 2009. Accessed 12
November 2014 at http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/1254929146/thousands-of-fish-founddead-in-timor-sea
Yemris Fointuna, Kupang fishermen complain over fish-killing oil spill, The Jakarta
Post, 8 October 2009. Accessed 12 November 2014 at http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2009/10/08/kupang-fishermen-complain-over-fishkilling-oil-spill.html
Eras Poke & Fidelis E Satriastanti, Indonesian govt says Australian spill has polluted parts
of Timor Sea, The Jakarta Globe, 28 October 2009. Accessed 12 November 2014 at http://
thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/indonesian-government-says-oil-from-australian-spillhas-polluted-parts-of-timor-sea/338113/
Bencana Minyak de Laut Timor, 20 January 2010. Accessed 12 November 2014 at http://
migasnet01asnop8005bolgspotcom.blogspot.com.au/2010/01/bencana-minyak-di-laut-timor.
html
ABC Lateline, Montara oil spill: Indonesia requests Australias cooperation on resolving dispute
over impact on coastal communities, 30 September 2014. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2014-09-29/indonesia-pleads-for-australias-cooperation-on-montara-oil-spill/5777840
Sea life lost after oil spill, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 2010. Accessed at http://
www.smh.com.au/environment/conservation/sea-life-lost-after-oil-spill-20101125-1896r.
html#ixzz3JOU4Cpm0
ABC Lateline, above n 99.
Richard Mounsey, Effects of the Timor Sea oil spill, 8 January 2010.
Ibid.
Douglas Main, Dispersant Makes Oil 52 Times More Toxic, Live Science, 30 November 2012.
Accessed at http://www.livescience.com/25159-oil-dispersant-increases-toxicity.html
Earthjustice and Toxipedia, The Chaos of Clean Up, Analysis of Potential Health and
Environmental Impacts of Chemicals in Dispersant Products (August 2011) at 12. Accessed at
http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/Oil_Dispersants_Report.pdf
The American Journal of Medicine, News release: Study reveals link between oil spill exposure
and hematologic and hepatic toxicity, 17 September 2013. Accessed 12 November 2014 at
http://www.amjmed.com/pb/assets/raw/Health%20Advance/journals/ajm/AJM_Nov13_DAndreaReddy.pdf
Correspondence with Brooke Nolan, 18 February 2015.
* indicates pseudonym.
Montara leaves questions across the Timor Sea, AAP, 13 June 2014. Accessed 6 August 2014
at http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/06/13/montara-leaves-questions-across-timor-sea
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Yemris Fointuna, above n 90.
Ibid.
Australia contaminates Indonesia sea with toxic chemicals, Antara News, 31 October 2010.
Accessed at http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/1288540844/australia-contaminatesindonesia-sea-with-toxic-chemicals
Ethanol,2-butoxy, CAS# 111-76-2 (only found in Corexit 9527). See Earthjustice and Toxipedia,
above n 105, at 11.
Ibid.
ABC News, Australian oil disaster costing Indonesians billions, Thursday 26 July 2012.
Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-07-26/australian-oil-disaster-costingindonesians-billions/4155474
ABC Radio National, AM, Forgotten tragedy: Montara oil spill, Saturday July 28 2012. Accessed
at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2012/s3555577.htm
Soal Montara, DPRD NTT Surati Jakarta, Tempo.co, 24 November 2010. Accessed at http://
www.tempo.co/read/news/2010/11/24/179294116/Soal-Montara-DPRD-NTT-Surati-Jakarta
233
After the Spill
121 Sita W. Dewi, Probe on Montara oil spill urgent: Experts, The Jakarta Post, 27 July 2012.
Accessed at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/27/probe-montara-oil-spill-urgentexperts.html
122 Information provided at community delegation at Tablolong, August 2013.
123 Conversation at Rote Island, October 2014.
124 Community delegation at Tablolong, August 2013.
125 As attributed by representatives at community delegation at Tablolong, August 2013.
126 Senator Rachel Siewert perjuangkan kompensasi korban ledakan kilang Montara, Antara News,
17 February 2014. Accessed at http://www.antaranews.com/berita/419371/senator-rachelsiewert-perjuangkan-kompensasi-korban-ledakan-kilang-montara
127 Ibid.
128 President: prioritised Montara oil spills compensation for fishermen, farmers, Antara News,
5 August 2010. Accessed at http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/1280992197/presidentprioritized-montara-oil-spills-compensation-for-fishermen-farmers
129 Philip Vincent, Brooke Nolan, Australian law on Rote? (Oct-Dec 2012) 102 Inside Indonesia.
Accessed at http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/australian-law-on-rote
130 Ibid.
131 West Timor Care Foundation, Submission by the West Timor Care Foundation, Kupang
(West Timor) Republic of Indonesia, to the Draft Government Response to the Report of
the Montara Commission of Inquiry at 9. Accessed at http://www.industry.gov.au/AboutUs/
CorporatePublications/MontaraInquiryResponse/Documents/11_West_Timor_Care_Foundation.
pdf
132 Information Aquaculture Indonesia, Montara oil spill IMPACT OF FISHERIES SECTOR IN KAB.
ROTE Ndaonese, NTT, 29 July 2010. Accessed at http://infoperikananbudidaya.blogspot.com.
au/
133 Utusan Pemerintah Australia, Greg Phelps Dan Australia Alliance, Emily Mitchell, Bertemu
Masyarakat Desa Tablolong,Terkait Kebocoran Pipa Minyak Australia, Jurnal Kota, 16 August
2013. Accessed at http://jurnalkota.com/utusan-pemerintah-australiagreg-phelps-dan-australiaallianceemily-mitchellbertemu-masyarakat-desa-tablolongterkait-kebocoran-pipa-minyak-australia/
134 Ibid.
135 Interview in Tablolong, October 2014.
136 Johnny Langenheim, Indonesias new marine laws threaten sustainable fisheries, The Guardian,
14 January 2015. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/the-coral-triangle/2015/
jan/14/indonesias-new-marine-laws-threaten-sustainable-fisheries
137 East Nusa Tenggara Fishermen Fear for Future After Oil Spill, The Jakarta Globe, 28 June 2010.
Accessed at http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/east-nusa-tenggara-fishermen-fearfor-future-after-oil-spill/382928/
138 Antara News, above n 126.
139 Sita W. Dewi, above n 121.
140 The Jakarta Globe, above n 137.
141 See Timor Oil Spill Forcing NTT Fishermen to Migrate, Jakarta Globe, 24 June 2010. Accessed
at http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/timor-sea-oil-spill-forcing-ntt-fishermen-to-migrate/
142 The Jakarta Globe, above n 137.
143 Yemris Fointuna, Fishermen suffer from oil spill, activists to file lawsuit, The Jakarta Post, 8
August 2012. Accessed at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/08/fishermen-suffer-oilspill-activists-file-lawsuit.html
144 Fish and seaweed in NTT drastic decline Tempo, 6 August 2010. Accessed at http://www.
tempo.co/read/news/2010/08/08/090269593/Produksi-Ikan-dan-Rumput-Laut-di-NTT-MenurunDrastis
145 See ABC Drive, How to stop an oil spill, (Blog) 25 September 2012. Accessed at http://blogs.
abc.net.au/nt/2012/09/how-to-stop-an-oil-spill.html?site=alicesprings&program=darwin_drive
146 WTCF, above n 131, at 11.
234
After the Spill
147 Government of Rote Ndao, Lampiran Montara at Slide 7. Copy provided to the Australian
Lawyers Alliance by WTCF.
148 Ibid, Slide 9.
149 Montara Dan Tangis Rote Ndao Pagar Selatan Nkri. Paper presented at International Seminar in
Kupang, February 2014.
150 Staf Khusus Presiden Pantau Rote, Dos Kupang, 27 July 2010. Accessed at http://kupang.
tribunnews.com/2010/07/27/staf-khusus-presiden-pantau-rote151 Interview in Oenggaut, October 2014.
152 Dr Leonard Haning, Montara, Rote Ndao Tears and the South Fence Homeland, 17 February
2014. Presentation at international seminar on the Montara oil spill, Kupang, 2014.
153 Kuasa Hukum YPTB Investigasi Dugaan Pencemaran, 15 August 2013. Accessed at http://
www.iyaa.com/berita/nasional/umum/2889604_1124.html
154 Indra Febriansyah, Laid-back Rote Island, where the living is easy but the journey there is
one long haul, The Jakarta Post, 23 June 2013. Accessed at http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2013/06/23/laid-back-rote-island-where-living-easy-journey-there-one-long-haul.html
155 See Garut Widiarta Defeats Marlon Gerber to Win the Rote Open 2009, Bali Waves, 19
September 2009. Accessible at http://www.baliwaves.com/2009/09/garut-widiarta-wins-roteopen-2009/ ; Opening Ceremony and Good Waves on Day One of Rote Open 2010 presented
by Billabong, Baliwaves, 14 September 2010. Accessed at http://www.baliwaves.com/2010/09/
opening-ceremony-and-good-waves-on-day-one-of-rote-open-2010-presented-by-billabong/;
First Day of Rote Open 2011 presented by Billabong, Baliwaves, 16 September 2011. Accessed
at http://www.baliwaves.com/2011/09/first-day-of-rote-open-2011-presented-by-billabong/
156 Bali Waves, Garut Widiarta Defeats Marlon Gerber to Win the Rote Open 2009, 19 September
2009. Accessible at http://www.baliwaves.com/2009/09/garut-widiarta-wins-rote-open-2009/
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Interview, Kupang, West Timor, October 2014.
160 BP Oil Crisis, Surfer Mag, 20 September 2010. Accessed at http://www.surfermag.com/
features/sixty-six_days_later_surfers_lament_the_largest_oil_spill_in_us_history/
161 Ibid.
162 See Kate Hodal, Beached whales become food for Indonesian islanders, The Guardian, 3
October 2012. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/03/beached-whalesmeat-indonesia-locals; and 44 blue whale offshored, The Bali Times, 8 October 2012. Accessed
at http://www.thebalitimes.com/2012/10/08/44-blue-whale-off-shored/.
163 PTTEP Australasia, Monitoring Plan for the Montara Well Release Timor Sea, as agreed between
PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd and Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage
and the Arts (9 October 2009) at 40. Accessed at http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/
pages/e73e8ac7-2143-4540-9a3a-fa709f54db39/files/montara-monitoring-plan.pdf
164 Ibid, at 34.
165 Australian Government, Department of Environment, Montara oil spill Scientific monitoring
studies. Accessed at http://www.environment.gov.au/marine/marine-pollution/montara-oil-spill/
scientific-monitoring-studies#one
166 Rob Williams, Shane Gero, Lars Bejder, John Calambokidis, Scott D. Kraus, David Lusseau,
Andrew J. Read & Jooke Jobbins, Underestimating the damage: interpreting cetacean carcass
recoveries in the context of the Deepwater Horizon/BP incident, (2011) 4 Conservation Letters
228 - 233 at 232. Accessed at http://www.seaturtle.org/PDF/WilliamsR_2011_ConservLetters.pdf
167 Ibid, at 231.
168 Insana Declaration, signed at Oelolok, 30 April 2003.
169 See Montara Commission of Inquiry, http://www.montarainquiry.gov.au/
172 Ibid, at 8.
173 Ibid, at 6.
235
After the Spill
174 Ibid, at 8.
175 Ferdi Tanoni, We Will Not Give Up, New Matilda, 30 October 2013. Accessed at https://
newmatilda.com/2013/10/30/we-will-not-give
176 Ferdi Tanoni, Speech delivered at the Australian Lawyers Alliance National Conference, 24
October 2013, Canberra.
177 Transcript result of the international seminar, The Timor Sea Pollution, Humanity and
Environmental Ecology Tragedy as the Result of the 2009 Montara Well Head Platform Explosion,
Cooperation of the Nusa Cedana University Kupang and the West Timor Care Foundation, held at
Undana campus Kupang, 18 February 2014.
178 Ibid, at 6.
179 Ibid, at 2.
180 Ibid, at 3.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid, at 8.
183 Professor Dr. Balthasar Kambuaya, above n 9.
184 See Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 302.
185 PTTEP AA, Montara Environmental Monitoring Program, Report of Research, Edition 2,
(September 2013) at 6. Accessed at http://www.au.pttep.com/download/montara-environmentalmonitoring-program-report-of-research/
186 The Montara Commission of Inquiry noted that one barrel is equivalent to approximately 159
litres. See Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 2.
187 Ibid, at 5.
188 Ibid, at 52.
189 Estimated based on one barrel is approximately equivalent to 159 litres. See above n 186.
191 Ibid, at 235.
192 Ibid, at 52.
193 Ibid, at 301.
194 AMSA, Montara Wellhead Platform. Accessed at http://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/majorhistorical-incidents/Montara_Wellhead/index.asp
195 PTTEP AA, Montara Environmental Monitoring Program (August 2012) at 9. Accessible at http://
www.ppr-digital.com.au/docs/brochures_pttep.pdf
197 Ibid, at 301.
198 Ibid, at 5. Note, that this was the accumulative size across the 74 day incident, and not the
size of the slick at any given time. See PTTEP AA, Montara Environmental Monitoring Program
(August 2012) at 7.
199 The island of Tasmania covers an area of 64, 519 square kilometres. The ACT covers 2,358
square kilometres. The spills impact would have been a tenth of the size of New South Wales.
See Australian Government, Geoscience Australia, Areas of Australia States and Territories,
(2010). Accessed at http://www.ga.gov.au/education/geoscience-basics/dimensions/area-ofaustralia-states-and-territories.html
200 Oil leaking five times faster than thought, ABC News, 22 October 2009. Accessed at http://
www.abc.net.au/news/2009-10-22/oil-leaking-five-times-faster-than-thought/1113420 on 24
March 2012.
201 Parliament of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Resources, Energy and
Tourism Portfolio, Supplementary Budget Senate Estimates, Answers to Questions on Notice,
21 October 2009. (Question: SR-7; Topic: Flow rate Montara Well; Proof Hansard Page:
E84). Accessed at http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates/Live/economics_ctte/estimates/
sup_0910/RET/answers/sr7.ashx
202 Kimberley Whale Watching, above n 18, at 16.
203 Ibid.
236
After the Spill
204 PTTEP AA, Annual Compliance Report 2012-2013, at 3. Accessed at http://www.au.pttep.com/

media/24296/montara%20field%20epbc%20approval%20-%20annual%20compliance%20
report%202012-2013.pdf
205 PTTEP AA, Media release: Oil production begins from PTTEP AAs Montara field, 20 June 2013.
Accessed at http://www.au.pttep.com/news/2013/june/oil-production-begins-from-pttep-aasmontara-field
206 Argus Media, PTTEP cuts production forecast again, 25 July 2014. Accessed 22 August 2014 at
http://www.argusmedia.com/News/Article?id=917597
208 Calculated on the basis of one barrel is equivalent to approximately 159 litres; and 400 barrels is
equivalent to approximately 64 tonnes, over 74 days.
209 See AMSA, Kirki, Western Australia, 21 July 1991. Accessed at https://www.amsa.gov.au/
environment/major-historical-incidents/Kirki/
210 AMSA, Princess Anne Marie, offshore Western Australia, 14 July 1975. Accessed at https://
www.amsa.gov.au/environment/major-historical-incidents/Princess_Anne_Marie/index.asp. A
further list of historical incidents is available at https://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/majorhistorical-incidents/
211 BPs reckless conduct caused Deepwater Horizon spill, judge rules, The Guardian, 5 September
2014. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/04/bp-reckless-conductoil-spill-judge-rules
212 Ibid.
213 Terry McAlister, BP Deepwater Horizon fine capped at $13.8bn, The Guardian, 17 January 2015.
Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/16/bp-deepwater-horizon-spill-finecap-14bn
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid, at 283.
217 AMSA, above n 41, at 5.
218 Ibid, at v.
219 AMSA, Major Oil Spills in Australia, Montara Oil Platform. Accessed at http://www.amsa.gov.au/
environment/major-historical-incidents/Montara_Wellhead/index.asp
220 A full list can be seen at Montara Commission of Inquiry, at 389.
222 PTTEP Australasia, Fact Sheet: Government of Indonesia compensation claim, at 2. Accessed at
http://www.au.pttep.com/media/20778/government%20of%20indonesia%20compensation%20
claim.pdf
223 Ibid, at 1.
224 Australian Embassy, Indonesia, Media release: Indonesia: Montara oil spill, 2 November 2009.
Accessed 12 November 2014 at http://www.indonesia.embassy.gov.au/jakt/MR09_086.html
225 OIL SLICKS CAUSED BY OFFSHORE BLASTING AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS TO
INDONESIA SEA REGION, Montara Blasting Case, Status : 10 November 2009, Berny A. Subki,
Kepala Balai Riset dan Observasi Kelautan - BRKP, at slide 20. (Powerpoint)
226 Ibid, Slide 20
227 Ibid.
229 AMSA, Media release, Maps provided to Commission of Inquiry, 24 October 2014. Accessed at
https://www.amsa.gov.au/media/documents/24102014MontaraMediaRelease.pdf
230 PTTEP Australasia, above n 185, at 6.
231 Appendix 6 Appearance of Oil on Water, Bonn Agreement Oil Appearance Code, at 82.
Accessed at https://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/maritime-environmental-emergencies/
national-plan/Contingency/Oil/documents/Appendix6.pdf
232 Ibid, at 89.
233 Ibid, at 90.
237
After the Spill
234 Senate, Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Official Hansard, No. 3, 2010, 9 March 2010,
Questions without notice, at 1334. Accessed at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/
display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansards%2F2010-03-09%2F0038%22
235 Ibid.
238 Asia-Pacific ASA, Montara Well Release Monitoring Study S7.1, Oil Fate and Effects Assessment:
Spill Trajectory Analysis, Final, Prepared for PTTEP Australasia (4 October 2010) at 6. Accessed
at http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/pages/bcefac9b-ebc5-4013-9c88-a356280c202c/
files/trajectory-analysis-s71.pdf
239 Ibid, at 9.
240 Ibid.
241 ITOPF, http://www.itopf.com/
242 ITOPF, Dispersants. Accessed at http://www.itopf.com/knowledge-resources/documentsguides/clean-up-techniques/dispersants/
244 Asia-Pacific ASA, above n 238, at 6.
245 See some of these images at https://www.flickr.com/photos/skytruth/sets/72157622226354812/
246 SkyTruth, Oil Slick in the Timor Sea, Accessed at http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/
NaturalHazards/view.php?id=40123
247 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 Xiaojing Li, Linlin Ge, Zhe Hu, Hsing Chung-Chang, The Montara oil spill in the Timor Sea
as observed by Earth observation satellites, (2010) at 1 (Li et al). http://www.researchgate.
net/publication/267232112_THE_2009_MONTARA_OIL_SPILL_IN_THE_TIMOR_SEA_AS_
OBSERVED_BY_EARTH_OBSERVATION_SATELLITES
252 AMSA, Montara Wellhead Platform. Accessed at https://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/majorhistorical-incidents/Montara_Wellhead/
253 X. Ding, F. Bassinot, F. Guichard, N.Q. Fang, Indonesian Throughflow and monsoon activity
records in the Timor Sea since the last glacial maximum, (2013) 101 Marine Micropaleontology
115126 at 115.
254 East Timor Climate Summary, accessed at http://timoragri.fhost.com.au/ta300/TimorMetData/
TIMOR/climate/summary.shtml
255 Li et al, above n 251, at 3.
256 Ibid, at 3.
257 Ibid.
258 The Phased Array type L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (PALSAR) is an active microwave
sensor using L-band frequency to achieve cloud-free and day-and-night land observation. It
provides higher performance than theJERS-1s synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Fine resolution in
a conventional mode, but PALSAR will have another advantageous observation mode. ScanSAR,
which will enable us to acquire a 250 to 350km width of SAR images (depending on the number
of scans) at the expense of spatial resolution. This swath is three to five times wider than
conventional SAR images. See Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) 1997. Accessed at
http://www.eorc.jaxa.jp/ALOS/en/about/palsar.htm
259 Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, About ALOS, Accessed at http://www.eorc.jaxa.jp/ALOS/
en/about/about_index.htm
260 Australian Government, Geoscience Australia, ALOS PALSAR. Accessed at http://www.ga.gov.
au/scientific-topics/earth-obs/satellites-and-sensors/legacy/alos-palsar
261 JAXA, Media release: Daichi (ALOS) Operation Completion,12 May 2011. Accessed at http://
global.jaxa.jp/press/2011/05/20110512_daichi_e.html
238
After the Spill
262 Tri Muji Susantoro, Suliantara, Djoko Sunardjanto, Oil spill detection using Palsar data in the
Timor Sea, (2010) 33(2) Lemigas Scientific Contributions 135 142 at 136 (Susantoro et al).
Accessed at http://202.46.252.13/ojslemigas/index.php/SCOG/article/view/110/110
263 Li et al, above n 251, at 5.
264 See Figure 6, Susantoro et al, above n 262, at 140.
265 See Figure 3, Li et al, above n 251, at 7.
266 Ibid, at 9.
267 An example of an image recorded by Cosmo SkyMed on 29 August 2009 can be accessed at
http://www.scanex.ru/news.local/news/img/n36242141IMG_1.jpg
268 DLR Portal, News archive 2009, http://www.dlr.de/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-5103/8592_
read-20853/
269 Ibid.
270 Australian Government, Geoscience Australia, above n 260.
271 Australian Government, Geoscience Australia, AusGeo News, Issue 94, June 2009, at 29.
Accessed at www.ga.gov.au/webtemp/image_cache/GA14232.pdf
273 Ibid, at 26.
275 PTTEP Australasia, above n 195, at 30, 31.
277 Australian Lawyers Alliance, Australias overseas development assistance program and the
Montara oil spill, Environmental degradation in East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, Submission to
the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into Australias
overseas development assistance program (3 February 2014) at 15. Accessible at http://www.
lawyersalliance.com.au/documents/item/74
279 Ibid.
280 Weathered oil, as a result of loss of its water-soluble elements, is more viscous than fresh crude,
and is often dense enough to sink. See Goodbody-Gringley G, Wetzel DL, Gillon D, Pulster E,
Miller A, et al. (2013) Toxicity of Deepwater Horizon Source Oil and the Chemical Dispersant,
Corexit 9500, to Coral Larvae. PLoS ONE 8(1): e45574. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045574
282 Ibid, at 89, 95.
283 Ibid, at 89.
285 PTTEP Australasia, above n 185, at 84
286 Ibid, at 86.
287 Ibid, at 91.
288 Ibid, at 85.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid, at 88.
291 Ibid, at 87.
292 SBS, above n 91.
293 Asia Pacific ASA, above n 238, at 26.
295 Ibid.
296 Judith Ireland, Too early to call Operation Soverign Borders a success: General Angus
Campbell, 15 January 2014. Accessed at http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/
too-early-to-call-operation-sovereign-borders-a-success-general-angus-campbell-2014011530ubj.html
297 Skytruth, MODIS / Terra satellite image taken on January 21, 2010, showing tropical cyclone
Magda as it moved through the Timor Sea near the fire-damaged Montara platform. Magda, a
relatively weak Category 2 cyclone with sustained winds in the 60-70 knot range, was moving
239
After the Spill
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
to the south. The eye of the storm was 186 km southwest of the platform when this image
was taken at 0:50 hours GMT: http://www.flickr.com/photos/skytruth/4293209925/in/set72157622226354812
MODIS / Aqua satellite image taken on December 15, 2009, showing tropical cyclone Laurence
as it moved through the Timor Sea and past the fire-damaged Montara platform. A powerful
Category 5 storm, Laurence was moving to the southwest at about 15 miles per hour. The
well-developed eye of the storm, about 19 miles in diameter, was 130 miles southeast of the
platform. Compare with Terra image taken three hours earlier: http://www.flickr.com/photos/
skytruth/4190808338/in/set-72157622226354812
PTTEP Australasia, above n 185, at 93.
Ibid.
See Figure 2, Location and extents of dispersant operations (dispersant application area) and the
location of the Montara WHP, in Asia-Pacific ASA, Montara Well Release Monitoring Study S7.2
Oil Fate and Effects Assessment Modelling of Chemical Dispersant Operation, Prepared for
PTTEP Australasia (4 October 2010) at 8. Accessed at http://www.environment.gov.au/system/
files/pages/bcefac9b-ebc5-4013-9c88-a356280c202c/files/dispersant-modelling-s72.pdf
Ibid, at iii.
Ibid.
Asia-Pacific ASA, above n 302, at 9.
Ibid, at 93.
Worst-case is used to describe both situations in the research. See Asia-Pacific ASA, above n
302, at 3, 6.
Ibid, at 6.
Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard, Senate, Rural and Regional Affairs and
Transport Legislation Committee - Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local
Government Portfolio - Australian Maritime Safety Authority (26 May 2010) at 177. Accessed at
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/13019/toc_pdf/7648-3.pdf;file
Type=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/estimate/13019/0004%22
PTTEP Australasia, above n 195, at 30, 31.
Leeder Report: Cooper L, Certificate of Analysis for Montara Commission of Enquiry (2010)
Leeder Consulting, Report No: M100047R1.
Copies of these results were supplied by the West Timor Care Foundation to the Australian
Lawyers Alliance.
Salinity Management Guide, Learn about salinity and water quality, Accessed at http://www.
salinitymanagement.org/Salinity%20Management%20Guide/ls/ls_3d.html
State Water Resources Control Board, Division of Water Quality, GAMA Program, Groundwater
information sheet salinity (March 2010) at 2. Accessed at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/
gama/docs/coc_salinity.pdf
Ibid.
Ecological Society of America, Hypoxia at 1. Accessed at http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/
named/msbasin/upload/hypoxia.pdf
Eras Poke & Fidelis E Satriastanti, above n 97.
Yemris Fointuna, West Timor Sea contaminated by oil spill, Jakarta Post, 29 October 2009.
Accessed 8 August 2014 at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/29/west-timor-seacontaminated039-oil-spill.html
Information compiled from document supplied by West Timor Care Foundation, and Penelitian
Awal BLDH NTT: Terbukti Positif Mencemari, accessed at http://lautkita.blogspot.com.
au/2010_01_01_archive.html
Agency confirms Timor Sea contaminated by Montara oil spill, Antara News, 27 October 2009.
Accessed at http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/1256637673/agency-confirms-timor-seacontaminated-by-montara-oil-spill
240
After the Spill
323 Australian Embassy, Indonesia, above n 224.

324 Parliament of Australia, Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, Answers
to Questions on Notice, Budget Estimates May 2010, Infrastructure and Transport, Question
No: AMSA 01, Topic: Dispersant usage during the Montara oil spill response, Hansard page 125
(26/05/10). Accessed at http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates/Live/rrat_ctte/estimates/
bud_1011/infra/amsa.ashx
326 Ibid, at 5.
327 AMSA, Use of Dispersants, Fact Sheet 5. Accessed at http://www.industry.gov.au/AboutUs/
CorporatePublications/MontaraInquiryResponse/Documents/FS_5%20_USE-OF-DISPERSANTS.
pdf
329 Ibid.
330 Parliament of Australia, above n 324.
332 However, note that Dasics Slickgone EW, a product similar to Slickgone LTSW (and produced
by the same company) has also been approved. Seven dispersants are listed on this register.
See AMSA, National Plan, List of Oil Spill Control Agents, http://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/
maritime-environmental-emergencies/national-plan/General-Information/control-agents/list/
index.asp
333 Dasic International, Slickgone NS. Accessed at http://www.dasicinter.com/oil-dispersant/
products/range/oil-dispersant-product-range/show/slickgone-ns
334 Marine Management Organisation (UK), Oil spill treatment products approved for use in the
United Kingdom, (last updated 19 February 2014). Accessed 27 February 2014 at http://
marinemanagement.org.uk/protecting/pollution/documents/approval_approved_products.pdf
335 See, added a new entry for Corexit EC9500A, in Marine Management Organisation UK,
Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, February 2014, at 25. Accessed 27 February 2014 at http://
marinemanagement.org.uk/protecting/pollution/documents/contingency_plan_external.pdf
336 Dasic International Pty Ltd, Oil spill dispersants, last updated 11 October 2004. Accessed 27
February 2014 at http://www.dasic.co.uk/dasic_disp_prod.htm
337 See AMSA, National Plan, Approved Oil Spill Dispersants, accessed 27 February 2014 at http://
www.amsa.gov.au/environment/maritime-environmental-emergencies/national-plan/GeneralInformation/dispersants/oil/index.asp
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid.
340 Ibid.
341 Kim Wilson, Professor Peter Ralph, Final Report: Effects of oil and dispersed oil on temperate
seagrass: scaling of pollution impacts, Plant Functional Biology & Climate Change Cluster (C3)
Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Technology, Sydney (August 2010), at 2.
Accessed at http://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/maritime-environmental-emergencies/
national-plan/Contingency/documents/Final%20Report.PDF This project was funded through
The National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and other Noxious and Hazardous
Substances and an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage Grant (LP05616333). The project
was co-ordinated by the University of Technology, Sydney, the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority and the National Plan Environmental Working Group.
342 Ibid, at 12.
343 AMSA, National Plan to Combat the Pollution of the Sea by Oil and Other Noxious and Hazardous
Substances, Oil Spill Response Occupational Health and Safety Manual, Annex 4, Material Safety
Data Sheets (March 2008) at 94, see Ardrox 6120LT. Accessed 26 February 2014 at https://
www.amsa.gov.au/environment/maritime-environmental-emergencies/national-plan/SupportingDocuments/documents/NatPlan_OHS_Manual_Annex4.pdf
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
241
After the Spill
347 Nalco Environmental Solutions, Seven Facts about Corexit 9500 Dispersant, http://www.
nalcoesllc.com/nes/1601.htm
348 See Gulf of Mexico clean-up makes 2010 spill 52-times more toxic; Mixing oil with dispersant
increased toxicity to ecosystems, Science Daily, 30 November 2012. Accessed at http://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/11/121130110518.htm. See also 60 Minutes, above n 45;
Roberto Rico Martinez, Terry W. Snell, Tonya L. Shearer, Synergistic toxicity of Macondo crude
oil and dispersant Corexit 9500A to the Brachionus plicatilis species complex (Rotifera), (2013)
173 Environmental Pollution 5 10. Accessed at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0269749112004344
349 UK Parliament, UK Deepwater drilling implications of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, Annex
1 Chronolopgy of the Deepwater Hoirzon Incident (2010) at 240. Accessed at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/450/45012.htm
350 Marine Management Organisation (UK), above n 334.
351 David Kirby, Corexit, Oil Spill Dispersant Used by BP, Is Destroying Gulf Marine Life,
Scientists Say, The Huffington Post, 25 March 2013. Accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/04/25/corexit-bp-oil-dispersant_n_3157080.html
352 60 Minutes, above n 45.
353 Michele Hunter, Toxic chemical ready for use in Bay, Bay of Plenty Times, 19 September
2013. Accessed at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/bay-of-plenty-times/news/article.cfm?c_
id=1503343&objectid=11126950; and The University of Waikato, Effect of Rena to be known
by Christmas, 24 November 2011, accessed at http://www.waikato.ac.nz/news-events/
media/2011/11effect-of-rena-to-be-known-by-christmas.shtml.
355 Ibid, at 108- 109.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid, at 109.
358 Ibid, at 101.
359 Ibid, at 97.
360 Ibid, at 100.
361 Ibid.
362 Earthjustice and Toxipedia, above n 105, at 4.
363 Ibid at 11.
364 See Joanna M. Forster, Impact of Gulf Spills Underwater Dispersants is Examined, The New
York Times, 26 August 2011. Accessible at http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/impactof-gulf-spills-underwater-dispersants-is-examined/?_r=0
365 Gulf Oil Spill: Dispersants have potential to do more harm than good, PR Newswire, May 11
(year undated). http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/gulf-oil-spill-dispersants-havepotential-to-cause-more-harm-than-good-93424899.html
366 See, for example, GAP, Corexit: Deadly Dispersant in Oil Spill Clean Up. Accessed at http://
www.whistleblower.org/program-areas/public-health/corexit
367 Joanna M. Forster, above n 364.
368 Earthjustice and Toxipedia, above n 105, at 8.
369 Ibid, at 5.
370 For further detail see Ibid, at 11.
371 Ibid, at 12.
372 Ibid.
373 Gretchen Goodbody-Gringley, Dana L. Wetzel, Daniel Gillon, Erin Pulster, Allison Miller, Kim B.
Ritchie, Toxicity of Deepwater Horizon Source Oil and the Chemical Corexit 9500 to Coral
Larvae, (2013) PLoS ONE 8(1): e45574. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045574
374 PR Newswire, above n 365.
375 Consensus Statement: Scientists oppose the use of dispersant chemicals in the Gulf of Mexico,
16 July 2010, drafted by Dr Susan Shaw, at 1. Accessed at http://www.meriresearch.org/
Portals/0/Documents/CONSENSUS%20STATEMENT%20ON%20DISPERSANTS%20IN%20
THE%20GULF%20updated%20July%2017.pdf
242
After the Spill
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See 60 Minutes, above n 45; and Dahr Jamail, BP: Four Years On No Restoration in Sight, Truth
Out, 21 April 2014. Accessed at http://truth-out.org/news/item/23147-bp-four-years-on-norestoration-in-sight
380 Government Accountability Project, Deadly Dispersants in the Gulf: Are Public Health and
Environmental Tragedies the New Norm For Oil Spill Clean-Ups? (19 April 2013). Accessed at
http://www.whistleblower.org/sites/default/files/Corexit_Report_Part1_041913_compressed.pdf
381 Government Accountability Project, Corexit: Deadly Dispersant in Oil Spill Clean Up, 2014.
Accessed at http://www.whistleblower.org/program-areas/public-health/corexit/.
382 Ibid.
383 Dahr Jamail, Gulf spill sickness wrecking lives, Al Jazeera, 9 March 2011. Accessed at http://
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/03/201138152955897442.html
384 Ibid.
385 ITOPF, above n 242.
386 AMSA, Operational Monitoring Study 02, Monitoring of Oil Character Fate and Effects, Report 03
Dispersant Treated Oil Distribution (8 November 2009) at 7. Accessed at https://www.amsa.gov.
au/forms-and-publications/environment/publications/NP-Reports/documents/AMSA-Oil-Report03P.pdf
387 Carolyn Federici, Jonathon Mintz, Oil Properties and their impact on spill response solutions,
Literature Review, CNA Analysis and Solutions, May 2014 at 25. Accessed at http://www.
bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/Research_and_Training/Oil_Spill_Response_Research/
Reports/1017%20-%20AA%20-%20CNA%20Oil%20Spill%20Literature%20Review%20
FINAL%20IRM-U-2014-007490.pdf
388 AMSA, Montara Well Release Timor Sea, Operational Monitoring Study 02, Monitoring of Oil
Character Fate and Effects, Report 01 Oil Character (24 September 2009) at 4. Accessed 13
November 2014 at http://www.amsa.gov.au/forms-and-publications/environment/publications/
NP-Reports/documents/AMSA-Oil-Report-01P.pdf
390 Ibid, at 6.
391 Ibid, at 36.
392 Ibid, at 26.
393 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Fact Sheet 3 Montara Incident and
Response, (undated). Accessed at http://www.industry.gov.au/AboutUs/CorporatePublications/
MontaraInquiryResponse/Documents/FS_3_INCIDENT-AND-RESPONSE.pdf
395 Ibid.
397 US Government, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Open Water Oil
Identification Job Aid for Aerial Observation Version 2 (July 2012). Accessed at http://response.
restoration.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/OWJA_2012.pdf
398 ABC Lateline, Indonesia asks for Australian intervention, 29 September 2014. Accessed at
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2014/s4097046.htm
399 Spillprevention.org, Fate of oil and weathering, at 1. Accessed at https://dec.alaska.gov/Spar/
perp/docs/Fate-of-Oil-and-Weathering.pdf
400 Ibid.
401 Helen Chapman, Karen Purnell, Robin J. Law, Mark F. Kirby, The use of chemical dispersants
to combat oil spills at sea: A review of research and practice needs in Europe, (2007) 54
Marine Pollution Bulletin 827 838 at 832. Accessed at http://documents.plant.wur.nl/imares/
dispersants/05marpollbull.pdf
402 Sharyl Atkisson, Unknown substance leaking from Deepwater Horizon site, CBS News, 31
January 2013. Accessed at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/unknown-substance-leaking-fromdeepwater-horizon-site/
376
377
378
379
243
After the Spill
403 Geoscience Australia, OzCoasts Australian Online Coastal Information, Anoxic and hypoxic
events, (2013). Accessed at http://www.ozcoasts.gov.au/indicators/anoxic_hypoxic_events.
jsp; and US Geological Survey, Volatile Organic Compounds in the Nations Ground Water and
Drinking-Water Supply Wells: Supporting Information: Glossary. Accessed at http://water.usgs.
gov/nawqa/vocs/national_assessment/report/glossary.html
404 Geoscience Australia, above n 403. For further description of hypoxia and anoxia, see VIMS,
Physical characteristics: Dissolved Oxygen. Accessed at http://web.vims.edu/bio/shallowwater/
physical_characteristics/dissolved_oxygen.html
405 Prince Edward Island, Canada, Department of Environment, Labour and Justice, Red, Green
and Brown: Whats in the water? last updated 23 May 2013. Accessed at http://www.gov.pe.ca/
environment/whats-in-the-water#Milky_White_or_Cloudy_Green_Coloured_Water
406 Sean P. Powers, Frank J Hernandez, Robert H. Condon, J. Marcus Drymon, Christopher M.
Free, Novel Pathways for Injury from Offshore Oil Spills: Direct, Sublethal and Indirect Effects of
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Pelagic Sargassum Communities, 25 September 2013. DOI:
10.1371/journal.pone.0074802
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
409 Ibid.
410 Corexit: an oil spill solution that is worse than the problem? Huffington Post, 23 April 2013.
Accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/23/corexit-oil-spill-gulf_n_3134963.html.
Media have also reported that almost all of the Exxon Valdez oil spill workers are dead: see
Tim King, Almost all of the Exxon Valdez oil spill workers are dead, Salem News, 30 June 2010.
Accessed at http://www.salem-news.com/articles/june302010/oil-lifespans.php
411 Molly C. Redmond and David L. Valentine, Natural gas and temperature structured a microbial
community response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, (2012) 109 (50) Proceedings of the
Natural Academy of Science 2029220297. Accessed at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3528494/
412 Ibid.
413 Richard Camilli, Christopher M. Reddy, Dana R. Yoerger, Benjamin A. S. Van Mooy, Mcihale V.
Jakuba, James C. Kinsey, Cameron P. McIntyre, Sean P. Sylva, James V. Maloney, Tracking
Hydrocarbon Plume Transport and Biodegradation at Deepwater Horizon (2010) 330 (6001)
Science 201 204. DOI:10.1126/science.1195223
414 Craig Pittman, Three years after BP oil spill, USF research finds massive die off, Tampa Bay
Times, 4 April 2013. Accessed at http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/water/gulf-oilspill-killed-millions-of-microscopic-creatures-at-base-of-food/2113157
415 Ibid.
417 Ibid.
419 Government Accountability Project, above n 380, at 59.
420 Ibid, at 5.
421 Julie Cohen, Where Did All the Oil Go? The Current, 27 October 2014. Accessed at http://www.
news.ucsb.edu/2014/014454/where-did-all-oil-go
422 BPs Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon oil spill left a bathtub ring on the sea floor scientist
David Valentine says, News.com.au, 28 October 2014. Accessed at http://www.news.com.au/
technology/environment/bps-gulf-of-mexico-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-left-a-bathtub-ring-onthe-sea-floor-scientist-david-valentine-says/story-e6frflp0-1227105384738
423 Ibid.
424 David L. Valentine, G. Burch Fisher, Sarah C. Bagby, Robert K. Nelson, Christopher M. Reddy,
Sean P. Sylva, Mary A. Woo, Fallout plume of submerged oil from Deepwater Horizon, (2014)
111 (45) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
15906 15911. Accessed at http://www.pnas.org/content/111/45/15906.abstract
425 Ibid.
244
After the Spill
426 Jeffrey Chanton, Tingting Zhao, Brad E. Rosenheim, Samantha Joye, Samantha Bosman,
Charlotte Brunner, Kevin M. Yeager, Arne R. Diercks, and David Hollander, Using Natural
Abundance Radiocarbon To Trace the Flux of Petrocarbon to the Seafloor Following the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, (2015) 49(2) Environmental Science and Technology 847854. DOI:
10.1021/es5046524
428 Ibid, at 235. Note, that this differs from AMSAs statement that the spill began at 5.30am WST
(https://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/major-historical-incidents/Montara_Wellhead/ and http://
www.amsa.gov.au/forms-and-publications/Publications/Montara_IAT_Report.pdf at 1); and
PTTEP AAs PR agency, PPRWA, who cited that it began at 5.30am WST (http://www.lib.uts.edu.
au/gta/14525/montara-incident)
429 UTS Library, The Montara Incident (Golden Target Awards). Accessed at http://www.lib.uts.edu.
au/gta/14525/montara-incident
431 The Montara Commission of Inquiry does not use a time standard, however given the context, it
may be assumed to be CST.
433 AMSA, Montara wellhead platform. Accessed at https://www.amsa.gov.au/environment/majorhistorical-incidents/Montara_Wellhead/
435 UTS Library, above n 429.
436 UTS Library, Award: Golden Target Entry, http://www.lib.uts.edu.au/gta/award-type/goldentarget-entry
438 Ibid.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
441 PTTEP Australasia, Montara Action Plan, http://www.au.pttep.com/our-response-to-montara/
montara-action-plan
442 Ibid.
444 Ibid, at 319.
445 PTTEP Australasia, above n 441.
446 PTTEP AA, Media release: PTTEP AA accepts Montara penalty, 31 August 2012. Accessed at
http://www.au.pttep.com/pttep-aa-accepts-montara-penalty/
447 See National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority and PTTEP Australasia (Ashmore Cartier)
Transcript of Proceedings at Darwin on Friday 31 August 2012, Northern territory Court of
Summary Jurisdiction, No. 21229374 (Continued from 30 August 2012). The Australian Lawyers
Alliance obtained the certified true transcript of the record.
448 Ibid.
449 Ibid.
450 PTTEP fined $510,000 over Montara, Australian Financial Review, 31 August 2012.
Accessed at http://www.afr.com/p/business/companies/pttep_fined_over_montara_
ggEVjTd8ZX7rTUSBSOiyMI
451 See NOPSEMA, Successful prosecution over Montara platform blowout, Media release: 31
August 2012. Accessed at http://www.nopsema.gov.au/assets/media/Media-Release-31-August2012-Successful-prosecution-over-Montara-platform-blowout.pdf
453 PTTEP Australasia, Media release: Oil production begins from PTTEP AAs Montara field,
20 June 2013. Accessed at http://www.au.pttep.com/oil-production-begins-from-pttep-aasmontara-field/
454 Ibid.
455 PTTEP Australasia, Proposed Projects Cash Maple Development. Accessed at http://www.
au.pttep.com/projects/proposed
245
After the Spill
456 Thais in $2bn WA gasfield selloff, The Australian, 28 March 2014. Accessed 11 August 2014 at
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/thais-in-2bn-wa-gasfield-selloff/storye6frg9df-1226866833239
457 Argus Media, PTTEP cuts production forecast again, 25 July 2014. Accessed 22 August 2014 at
http://www.argusmedia.com/News/Article?id=917597
459 PTTEP Australasia, above n 185, at 30, 31.
460 Ibid, at 6.
461 See Ibid, at 2.
462 Australian Lawyers Alliance, Accountability for damage: Taking responsibility must be a core
contributor towards poverty alleviation, Submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, Inquiry into the role of the private sector in promoting economic growth and
reducing poverty in the Indo-Pacific region, 7 May 2014, at 3. Accessible at http://www.aph.gov.
au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=67dd1de7-6aa5-4f2d-8403-ab5d8f9d8ab4&subId=252481
463 Ibid, at 4.
464 Ibid.
465 PTTEP Australasia, Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Inquiry on the Role of the Private Sector in Promoting Economic Growth and Reducing
Poverty in the Indo-Pacific Region, 21 July 2014, at 2. Accessed at http://www.aph.gov.au/
DocumentStore.ashx?id=9e32e8a1-48f0-4c5d-8e5f-13393b7bc3d8&subId=252481
466 Ibid, at 2.
467 Ibid, at 3.
468 Ibid.
469 Ibid, at 4.
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid, at 5.
472 ABC, Lateline, above n 398.
473 See PTTEP AA, above n 222, at 1.
474 Office of the Auditor General, Auditors Report On Review Of Interim Financial Information
And Financial Information Of PTT Exploration And Production Public Company Limited And
Subsidiaries For The Three-Month And Six-Month Periods Ended June 30, 2013, at 77. Accessed
at http://www.pttep.com/en/InvestorRelations_FinancialStatements.aspx
475 PTTEP AA above n 222, at 1.
476 Ibid, at 2.
477 International Maritime Organisation, Legal Committee, 97th session, Agenda item 14. LEG
97/14/1, 10 September 2010. Accessed at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/
Indonesias-proposal-for-a-new-programme-to-develop-an-international-regime.pdf
478 Soal Montara, DPRD NTT Surati Jakarta, Tempo, 24 November 2010. Accessed at http://www.
tempo.co/read/news/2010/11/24/179294116/Soal-Montara-DPRD-NTT-Surati-Jakarta
479 Ibid.
480 Gabrielle Dunlevy, AAP, Aust rejects Indonesia Montara entreaty, The Australian, 21 August
2014. Accessed 22 August 2014 at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/after-fiveyears-aust-montara-study-urged/story-fn3dxix6-1227031727382
481 Professor Dr. Balthasar Kambuaya, above n 9, at 2.
482 Ibid.
483 Gabrielle Dunlevy, AAP, Indonesia lobbying on Montara spill grows, The Australian, 1 October
2014. Accessed at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/indonesia-lobbying-onmontara-spill-grows/story-fn3dxix6-1227075890064
484 Ibid.
485 Commonwealth of Australia, Proof Committee Hansard, Senate, Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Committee, Estimates, Thursday 27 February 2014, at 48.
486 Correspondence to Australian Lawyers Alliance from the Hon. Ian Macfarlane MP, Minister for
Industry, 22 July 2014.
246
After the Spill
487 Gabrielle Dunlevy, AAP, above n 480.

488 Jane Cutler, NOPSEMA, Correspondence to the Australian Lawyers Alliance, received 21 August
2014.
489 Correspondence from the Hon. Ian Macfarlane, Minister for Industry, to the Australian Lawyers
Alliance, 9 September 2014.
490 Ibid.
491 AMSA, National Plan for Marine Environmental Emergencies, at 27. Accessed 7 August 2014 at
https://www.amsa.gov.au/forms-and-publications/Publications/national_plan.pdf
492 Ibid, at 30.
493 Ibid, at 30.
494 Ibid, at 32.
495 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Correspondence to the
Australian Lawyers Alliance, 7 October 2014.
496 AMSA, National Plan: Guidance for International Incidents: Notification Arrangements, October
2014. Accessed at https://www.amsa.gov.au/forms-and-publications/Publications/GUI007.pdf
497 Ibid.
498 Ibid.
499 PTTEP Australasia, PTTEP AA Oil Spill Contingency Plan, at 36. Accessed at http://www.
au.pttep.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/PTTEP-Oil-Spill-Contingency-Plan.pdf
500 Ibid, at 55.
501 Preamble, Memorandum between the Governments of Australia and Indonesia of Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response, signed 1996.
502 Ibid, Paragraph 1.
507 Ibid, Paragraph 2.1.
509 WTCF above n 131, at 12.
510 See Commonwealth of Australia, Draft government response to the report of the
Montara Commission of Inquiry (2010); Commonwealth of Australia, Final government
response to the report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry (2011) http://www.
industry.gov.au/resource/Documents/upstream-petroleum/op-environment/assurance/
FinalMontaraCommissionInquiryReport.pdf
511 Statement by the Minister for Resources and Energy, the Hon Martin Ferguson AM, MP, The
Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry and the Australian Government Draft Response
(24 November 2010), at 15. Accessible at http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/Documents/MIR/
montara-ministerial-statement.pdf
512 Montara Commission of Inquiry, above n 1, at 342 (Recommendation 101).
513 Ibid, at 319-20.
514 Ibid.
515 Commonwealth of Australia, Final government response to the report of the Montara Commission
of Inquiry (2011).
516 Andrea Hayward and Ed Logue, Montara decision sends wrong signal: WWF, Sydney Morning
Herald, 4 February 2011. Accessed at http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/montaradecision-sends-wrong-signal-wwf-20110204-1ag9z.html
517 Montara spill firm pleads for Australian license, Australian Financial Review, 25 November
2010. Accessed at http://www.afr.com/p/world/montara_spill_firm_pleads_for_australia_
EntWuZtsvL0jJKEwGSBwcK
518 Ibid.
519 Australian Government, Regulation Impact Statement, Government Response to the Montara
Commission of Inquiry (April 2011) at 16. Accessed at http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/06/
Montara_RIS.pdf
247
After the Spill
520 Australian Government, Department of Industry, Deed of Agreement between the Commonwealth
and PTTEP. (Last updated 25/5/2011). Accessible at http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/
responses/montara/deed-of-agreement/Pages/PTTEP.aspx
521 Ibid.
522 Ibid.
523 Ibid.
524 PTTEP AA, Media release: Agreement ends with best practice in place at Montara, 21 June
2013. Accessed at http://www.au.pttep.com/agreement-ends-with-best-practice-in-place-atmontara/
527 PTTEP Australasia, above n 163, at 8 [2.4.2].
529 Ibid.
531 Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard, Senate Environment, Communications
and the Arts Legislation Committee, Estimates, Tuesday 9 February 2010, at EC78. Accessed 8
August 2014 at http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates/Live/commttee/S12744.ashx
532 Ibid, at EC79.
533 WTCF, above n 65, at 3. Also WTCF, above n 131, at 6.
534 WTCF, above n 65, at 4; WTCF, above n 131, at 9.
535 WTCF above n 131, at 9-11.
537 Ibid.
538 Senator Rachel Siewert, Senate, Hansard, Second reading speech, Offshore Petroleum and
Greenhouse Gas Storage Amendment (Compliance Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth), 28 February 2013
at 1295.
539 YouTube, The Australian Greens, The ongoing impact of the Montara oil spill, published on 5
March 2014 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABqYEGE07w4#t=18
541 Ibid, at 10.
542 Global 500, Fortune. Accessed at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/
full_list/index.html
543 PTT Global Chemical, Thailand State-Owned Energy Company, Slammed for Oil Spill,
Huffington Post, 1 August 2013. Accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/globalchemical-thailand_n_3688297.html
544 Zoe Daniel, Sailors, workers fight to clean up massive oil spill on Thailands Koh Samet Island,
ABC News, 30 July 2013. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-30/oil-spill-on-kohsamet/4851866
545 Piyaporn Wongruang & Tunya Sukpanich, No slick explanation for huge PTT oil spill, Bangkok
Post, 4 August 2013. Accessed at http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/topstories/362925/no-slickexplanation-for-huge-ptt-oil-spill
546 PCD says PTTGC used excessive amounts of dispersant, The Bangkok Post, 1 August 2013.
Accessed at http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/362445/pcd-says-pttgc-used-excessiveamounts-of-dispersant
547 Piyaporn Wongruang & Tunya Sukpanich, above n 545.
548 Spill still with us, Rayong fishers say Locals complain of tar balls, lower fish stocks, The
Bangkok Post, 1 October 2013. Accessed at http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/372310/
spill-still-with-us-rayong-fishers-say
549 Suriyan Panyawai, janjira Pongrai, Jumpol Nikomrak, Samet region to be tested for a year: PCD,
The Nation, 6 August 2013. Accessed at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/natinoal/Sametregino-to-be-tested-for-a-year-PCD-30211976.html
550 Parrita Wangkiat, Spill still with us, Rayong fishers say, Bangkok Post, 1 October 2013.
Accessed at http://m.bangkokpost.com/topstories/372310
248
After the Spill
551 Rights group to probe oil spill, Bangkok Post, 9 October 2013 .http://www.bangkokpost.com/
news/local/373711/rights-group-to-probe-oil-spill
552 Ministry elects not to sue over oil spill Govt satisfied with firms response to Samet
crisis, The Bangkok Post, 29 October 2013. Accessed at http://www.bangkokpost.com/
breakingnews/376884/ministry-elects-not-to-sue-over-oil-spill
553 Paritta Wangkiat and Nareerat Wiriyapong, PTTGC sued over Rayong oil spill, Bangkok Post, 28
July 2014. Accessed 8 August 2014 at http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/422546/pttgcsued-over-rayong-spill
554 Ibid.
555 Ibid.
556 Koh Samet businesses seek redress, Bangkok Post, 29 July 2014. Accessed 8 August 2014
at http://www.bangkokpost.com/most-recent/422994/koh-samet-businesses-seek-redress-forrayong-oil-spill
557 Expert differs with report of Ko Samet, Phuket Gazette, 1 August 2014. Accessed 8 August
2014 at http://www.phuketgazette.net/thailand-news/Expert-differs-report-Koh-Samet/32379
558 Suriyan Panyawai, Janjira Pongrai, Jumpol Nikomrak, above n 549.
559 PTTEP, Awards and recognitions (2013). Accessed at http://www.pttep.com/en/aboutPttep_
AwardsRecognitionsDetail.aspx?ContentID=115
560 PTT, Collaboration. Accessed at http://www.pttplc.com/en/SUSTAINABILITY/PTTSUSTAINABILITY/Pages/Collaboration.aspx
561 PTTEP, Awards and recognitions. Accessed at http://www.pttep.com/en/aboutPttep_
AwardsRecognitions.aspx?CatID=0&Year=&page=all
562 See National News Bureau of Thailand, PTT speeds up oil removal after oil leak at Chiang
Mai airport, 10 November 2014. Accessed 11 November 2014 at http://thainews.prd.go.th/
centerweb/newsen/NewsDetail?NT01_NewsID=WNECO5711100010010#sthash.PO3Ff9Ku.dpuf;
Nisanath Kungwanwong, Clean up after leak from PTT pipe by Chiang Mai airport, The Nation,
10 November 2014. Accessed 11 November 2014 at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/
Clean-up-after-leak-from-PTT-pipe-by-Chiang-Mai-Ai-30247366.html
563 Peter Baker and John M. Broder, White House Lifts Ban on Deepwater Drilling, The New York
Times, 2 October 2010. Accessed 11 August 2014 at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/
us/13drill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
564 Ibid.
565 Suzanne Goldenberg, Barack Obamas pound of flesh: $20bn compensation and no BP
dividends, The Guardian, Thursday 17 June 2010. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2010/jun/16/barack-obama-bp-dividends-compensation
566 Ibid.
567 Ibid.
568 BP found negligent in Gulf oil spill, BBC News, 4 September 2014. Accessed at http://www.bbc.
com/news/business-29069184
569 BP welcomes US Court of Appeal ruling on Gulf of Mexico payouts, The Guardian, 3 October
2013. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/oct/03/bp-us-court-appealruling-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill
570 See for example, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, BP Gulf Oil Spill HHS
Health Response, http://www.hhs.gov/gulfoilspill/index.html; Centres for Disease Control and
Prevention, What to Expect from an Oil Spill and How to Protect Your Health. Accessed at
http://emergency.cdc.gov/gulfoilspill2010/what_to_expect.asp; and Centres for Disease Control
and Prevention, Emergency Preparedness and Response: 2010 Gulf of Mexico Spill, (last
updated September 9 2010). Accessed at http://emergency.cdc.gov/gulfoilspill2010/index.asp
571 Greg LaRose, $11m study to examine oil, dispersant impact on Gulf of Mexico, New
Orleans City Business, 24 November 2014. Accessed at http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/
blog/2014/11/24/11m-study-to-examine-oil-dispersant-impact-in-gulf-of-mexico/
572 See US District Court, MDL-2179 Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon. Accessed at
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/OilSpill.htm
249
After the Spill
573 See Deepwater Horizon Economics Settlement, (Item 46 and 47). Accessed at http://www.
deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com/docs/12212012OrderAndJudgment(Settlement).pdf
574 See Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Settlement, Court Orders. Accessed at https://
deepwaterhorizonmedicalsettlement.com/en-us/courtbrdocuments/courtorders.aspx
575 United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana, A medical benefits settlement related
to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill will provide payments and benefits to clean-up workers and
certain Gulf Coast residents. Accessed at http://www.deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com/
Documents/Medical%20Detailed%20Notice.pdf
577 United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana, A medical benefits settlement related
to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill will provide payments and benefits to clean-up workers and
certain Gulf Coast residents, at 6.
578 Ibid, at 8.
579 Ibid, at 9.
580 Ibid, at 9.
582 Ibid.
583 Ibid.
584 Ibid.
585 Ibid, at 80.
586 Deepwater Horizon Claims Centre. Accessed 12 August 2014 at http://www.
deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com/. For further explanation of the category areas, see
Part V: Summary of the Settlement Claim Categories, at https://cert.gardencitygroup.com/dwh/
fs/faq?.delloginType=faqs#Q5
587 Deepwater Horizon Claims Centre, see https://cert.gardencitygroup.com/dwh/fs/faq?.
delloginType=faqs#Q1
588 See Deepwater Horizon Claims Centre, Economic and Property Damage Claims, Public Statistics
for the Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement, August 11, 2014.
Accessed 12 August 2014 at http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com/docs/
statistics.pdf
589 BP Deepwater Horizon ruling, The New York Times, 15 January 2015, at [257] [258]. Accessed
at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/01/15/business/energy-environment/document-bpdeepwater-horizon-ruling.html
590 Ibid, at [277] of the decision.
591 US appeals ruling on size of BP oil spill, Reuters, 14 March 2015. Accessed at http://uk.reuters.
com/article/2015/03/14/bp-trial-appeal-idUKL1N0WG0GP20150314; and
592 DOJ accuses BP of gross negligence in Gulf oil spill, CNN Money, 5 September 2012.
Accessed at http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/05/news/companies/bp-oil-spill/index.html
593 BP found grossly negligent in 2010 Gulf oil spill, BBC News, 4 September 2014. Accessed
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29069184
594 Kevin McGill, Judge sticks to BP gross negligence ruling, ABC News, 13 November 2014.
Accessed at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/judge-sticks-bp-gross-negligenceruling-26899950
595 Ibid.
597 Ibid, at 10.
598 BP welcomes US Court of Appeal ruling on Gulf of Mexico payouts, The Guardian, 3 October
2013. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/oct/03/bp-us-court-appealruling-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill
599 BP found negligent in Gulf oil spill, BBC News, 4 September 2014. Accessed at http://www.bbc.
com/news/business-29069184
600 Daniel Gilbert and Justin Sheck, BP facing $19bn gross negligence bill for Deepwater Horizon
disaster, The Australian, 6 September 2014. Accessed at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
business/wall-street-journal/bp-facing-19bn-gross-negligence-bill-for-deepwater-horizondisaster/story-fnay3ubk-1227049367716
250
After the Spill
601 Ellen Nakashima, BP will pay $US18.7 billion for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Sydney
Morning Herald, 3 July 2015. Accessed 3 July 2015 at http://www.smh.com.au/world/bp-willpay-us187-billion-for-the-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-20150702-gi414p.html
602 National Wildlife Federation, New Report: Five Years after Deepwater Horizon, Wildlife Still
Struggling, Media release, 30 March 2015. Accessed at http://www.nwf.org/News-andMagazines/Media-Center/News-by-Topic/Wildlife/2015/03-30-15-New-Report-Five-Years-afterDeepwater-Horizon-Wildlife-Still-Struggling.aspx
603 Ibid.
604 Ibid.
605 BP, Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Recovery and Restoration, Five Year Report (March 2015).
Accessed at https://www.thestateofthegulf.com/media/1508/bp_year-five-report-final.pdf
606 Ibid, at 3.
608 Office of Response and Restoration, Emergency Response Division, Deepwater Horizon Oil:
Chracateristics and Concerns, (15 May 2010) at 1. Accessed at
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/deepwater_horizon/documents/pdfs/fact_sheets/oil_characteristics.pdf
609 Luann E. White, Toxicology and Public Health Factors for the Use of Dispersants in the Gulf
Oil Spill, in R. Ragiani (ed) International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies,
E Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice Italy, 19 24 August 2010 at 159. http://books.
google.com.au/books?id=VemjbZfvry8C&pg=PA159&dq=louisiana+sweet+crude+oil+gulf+of+me
xico&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ohJ9VOL8PI_q8AW59oDgBA&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=louisia
na%20sweet%20crude%20oil%20gulf%20of%20mexico&f=false
610 Ibid.
611 Encyclopedia Britannica, Deepwater Horizon spill of 2010. Accessed at http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/1698988/Deepwater-Horizon-oil-spill-of-2010
612 Gulf of Thailand oil spill hits tourist island, Environment News Service, 30 July 2013. Accessed
at http://ens-newswire.com/2013/07/30/gulf-of-thailand-oil-spill-hits-tourist-island/
613 Richard Mounsey, above n 102.
614 S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh, Robert Beckman, Hao Duy Phan (eds), Transboundary Pollution:
Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (2015: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, USA) at 1.
615 Robert Beckman, State responsibility and transboundary marine pollution, in Ibid, at 137.
616 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
617 Australian Government, Geoscience Australia, The Law of the Sea. Accessed at http://www.
ga.gov.au/scientific-topics/marine/jurisdiction/law-of-the-sea
618 UN Oceans and Law of the Sea, Declarations or statements, Australia. Accessed at http://www.
un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Australia
620 Youna Lyons, above n 36, at 168-169.
621 Conventions relevant to oil spill pollution by ships include: The International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 (CLC 1992) and the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 (FUND
1992) together provide the international liability and compensation regime for pollution damage
resulting from spills of persistent oil from tankers. Source: International Maritime Organisation,
Legal Committee, 97th session, Agenda item 14. LEG 97/14/1, 10 September 2010. Accessed
at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Indonesias-proposal-for-a-newprogramme-to-develop-an-international-regime.pdf
622 International Maritime Organisation, Legal Committee, 97th session, Agenda item 14.
LEG 97/14/1, 10 September 2010 at 4. Accessed at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/Indonesias-proposal-for-a-new-programme-to-develop-an-internationalregime.pdf
623 United Nations Environment Programme, Mediterranean Action Plan, 1st Offshore Protocol
Working Group Meeting, Valetta, Malta 13-14 June 2013, A Legal Discussion on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Offshore Oil Rigs in the Light of the Recent Deepwater
Horizon Incident, at 31.
251
After the Spill
624 International Maritime Organisation, above n 622, at 3.

625 International Maritime Organisation, Legal Committee: 100th session: 15 19 April 2013, 18
April 2013. Accessed at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Legal/Pages/LEG100th-session.aspx
626 Ibid.
627 International Maritime Organisation, Legal Committee: 101st session, 28 April 1 May 2014,
May 1 2014. Accessed at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Legal/Pages/
LEG-101.aspx
628 Such as the Hon. Justice Steven Rares, who has written: In my opinion there is an imperative
need for an international convention to regulate the risks and consequences of existing and
future off-shore drilling activities. See Steven Rares, The Need for an International Convention
to Deal with Off-Shore Hydrocarbon Leaks, (2011) Biennial Mini Conference of the Maritime Law
Association of Australia and New Zealand (NSW Branch), Katoomba, 11 March 2011, at 7 [17].
Accessed at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/admiralty-papers/20110311
629 Ibid, at 21 [62].
630 Correspondence from the Hon. Ian Macfarlane, Minister for Industry, to the Australian Lawyers
Alliance, 9 September 2014.
631 UN Declaration on the Environment and Development 1992 (the Rio Declaration), Principle 7.
632 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Sustainable Development, Fifth session, 7
25 April 1997, Rio Declaration on Environment: application and implementation, Report of the
Secretary General, 10 February 1997. Accessed at http://www.un.org/esa/documents/ecosoc/
cn17/1997/ecn171997-8.htm
633 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3 14 June 1992. Annex I, Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development (12 August 1992). Accessed at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/
aconf15126-1annex1.htm
634 Gregory Rose, Australian Approaches to International Environmental Law During the Howard
Years, (2008) 27 Australian Year Book of International Law at 115. Accessed at http://www.austlii.
edu.au/au/journals/AUYrBkIntLaw/2008/7.pdf
635 Memorandum between the Governments of Australia and Indonesia of Oil Pollution Preparedness
and Response, signed 1996, Australia/Indonesia Oil Spill Response Plan, paragraph 2.1
638 Correspondence from the Hon. Ian Macfarlane MP, Minister for Industry, to the Australian
Lawyers Alliance, 22 July 2014.
640 Agenda 21 U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,AgendaItem21, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (1992), Article
18.40(h). Accessed at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf
641 Australian War Memorial, Fighting in Timor, 1942. Accessed at https://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/
timor/
642 AusAID, Commonwealth of Australia, Australia Indonesia Partnership Strategy 2008 2013,
(2008) at 3. Accessed 5 February 2014 at http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/aip_
strat_2008-13_english.pdf
643 NTT is cited alongside Papua, West Papua, Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) and Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam (Aceh). See AusAID, above n 642, at 6.
644 Arafura and Timor Seas Ecosystem Action Program (ATSEA), Socioeconomic profile of the
Arafura Timor Seas, (2011) at 2. Accessed at http://www.atsea-program.org/publication-1/socioeconomic-profile/at_download/file
645 DFAT, Indonesia, Economic Development. Accessed 5 February 2014 at http://aid.dfat.gov.au/
countries/eastasia/indonesia/Pages/home.aspx
646 Minister casts his nets at growing appetite for seaweed, The Jakarta Globe, 27 February 2011.
Accessed 4 February 2014 at http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/minister-casts-his-nets-atrising-appetite-for-seaweed/425490/
252
After the Spill
647 This includes DFATs bilateral program. In 2014, the Government announced that the proposed
bilateral expenditure in Indonesia will extend from $484.7 million (2013-14) to $532.4 million
(2014-15), see DFAT, Five billion dollar aid budget to focus on the region, last reviewed 17
January 2014. Accessed at http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/program-allocations.
pdf
648 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Indonesia, How we are
helping. Accessed 3 February 2014, last reviewed 18 January 2014 at http://aid.dfat.gov.au/
countries/eastasia/indonesia/Pages/home.aspx
649 David Wroe, Foreign aid faces further cuts, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 December 2014.
Accessed at http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/foreign-aid-faces-furthercuts-julie-bishop-confirms-20141203-11z45n.html
650 Peter Hartcher, I would be an Asia-first Prime Minister, says Abbott, Sydney Morning Herald, 4
September 2013. http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/i-would-be-anasiafirst-prime-minister-says-abbott-20130903-2t3do.html
651 Northern Territory Bar Association, Resolution concerning the Timor Gap boundaries, 10-12 July
2014, Dili.
652 George Roberts, Australian border protection vessels breached Indonesian territorial
sovereignty, Scott Morrison, ABC News, 4 February 2014. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2014-01-17/australia-breached-indonesian-territorial-sovereignty-morrison/5204746
653 George Roberts, Acting Prime Minister Warren Truss defends Navy amid claims asylum seekers
beaten and burned, ABC News, 18 February 2014. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2014-01-22/australian-navy-accused-of-beating-burning-asylum-seekers/5211996
654 ABC, Indonesia says Australian navy pushed back asylum seeker boat that ran aground, 4
February 2014. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-07/indonesia-says-australiannavy-towed-back-asylum-seeker-boat/5187232; ABC, The World Today, Asylum seekers
return to Indonesia after Australian escort, 7 May 2014. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/
worldtoday/content/2014/s3999527.htm
655 Joint Review of Positioning of Vessels Engaged in Operation Sovereign
Borders - Executive Summary (2014), at 2. Accessed at http://www.aph.gov.a u/Parliamentary_
Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Breach_of_Indonesian_
Territorial_Waters/Report/~/media/Committees/Senate/committee/fadt_ctte/Indonesia/report/
e05.pdf
656 Ibid, at 4.
657 Ibid, at 5.
658 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Breaches of Indonesian
territorial waters, (March 2014). Accessed at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/
Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Breach_of_Indonesian_Territorial_
Waters/Report/index
659 Ibid, at 24.
660 Australian Lawyers Alliance, Where waters meet: The breach of Indonesian waters and the
need for review of Australias aggressive maritime policy, Submission to Senate Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Inquiry into the breach of Indonesian waters, 20 March 2014 at 5. Accessible
at http://www.lawyersalliance.com.au/documents/item/147
661 Dr Sam Bateman, cited in Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
above n 658, at 9.
662 Acting Prime Minister Warren Truss defends Navy amid claims asylum seekers beaten and
burned, ABC News, 18 February 2014. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-22/
australian-navy-accused-of-beating-burning-asylum-seekers/5211996
663 David Crowe, Australia apologises to Jakarta for territorial waters breach, The Australian,
17 January 2014. Accessed at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/
australia-apologises-to-jakarta-for-territorial-waters-breach/story-fn9hm1gu-1226803863921
664 For more detail, see Emily Mitchell, One rule for our navy, another for Indonesian fishermen, The
Guardian, 11 April 2014. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/11/
cowboys-on-the-timor-sea-one-rule-for-our-navy-another-for-indonesian-fishermen
253
After the Spill
665 Memorandum between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia Regarding the Operations of Indonesian Traditional Fishermen in Areas of the Australian
Exclusive Fishing Zone and the Continental Shelf, (7 November 1974). Accessed at http://press.
anu.edu.au/apem/boats/mobile_devices/apb.html
666 Beche de mer will not be taken from the seabed from high water marks to the edge of the
continental shelf, except the seabed adjacent to Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Browse Islet
and the Scott and Seringapatam Reef. See Article 4, Memorandum between the Government
of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Regarding the Operations of
Indonesian Traditional Fishermen in Areas of the Australian Exclusive Fishing Zone and the
Continental Shelf, (7 November 1974).
667 See for example, anecdotes told to Vanessa Jaiteh in Pepela, Rote Island, as recorded in Radio
Australia, Nelayan Pulau Rote Alih Profesi jadi Penyelundup Manusia, 14 November 2013.
Accessed at http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/indonesian/2013-11-14/nelayan-pulau-rote-alihprofesi-jadi-penyelundup-manusia/1219570
668 Royal Australian Navy, Semaphore: August 2013, The Economic Value of Australian Fisheries.
Accessed at http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/semaphore-august-2013
669 Ruth Balint, The Last Frontier: Australias Maritime Territories and the Policing of Indonesian
Fishermen, (1999) Australian Public Intellectual Network, 30. Originally published in Murphy and
Warner (eds), New Talents 21c Writing Australia: Journal of Australian Studies no. 63 St Lucia,
Queensland Press 1999.
670 Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, The Australian Fishing Zone, http://www.
agriculture.gov.au/fisheries/domestic/zone
671 These figures have been extrapolated from the Annual Reports of the Department of Customs
and the Australian Fisheries Management Authority from 2004-2005 to 2013-2014.
672 These figures have been extrapolated from the annual reports of the Department of Customs and
the Australian Fisheries Management Authority from 2004 to 2013.
673 These figures have been extrapolated from the Annual Reports of the Department of Customs
and the Australian Fisheries Management Authority from 2004-2005 to 2013-2014.
674 AFMA, Annual Report 2004-05, at 9.
675 Some of these apprehensions would have been for repeat offenders.
677 Ruth Balint, A Death in the Harbour, The Monthly, April 2007. Accessed at http://www.
themonthly.com.au/issue/2007/april/1268884589/ruth-balint/death-harbour
678 Philip Vincent and Brooke Nolan, above n 129.
680 Ibid.
681 Muslimin v The Queen [2010] HCA 7.
682 Sahring v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 246.
683 Ibid, at [17].
684 Department of Customs and Border Protection, Annual Report 2007-8 states that 1,232 illegal
foreign fishers were taken into detention in that year, at 2.
685 James J. Fox & Sevaly Sen, A study of socio-economic issues facing traditional Indonesian
fishers who access the MOU Box, (October 2002) at 31. Accessed at http://www.environment.
gov.au/system/files/resources/65c651bd-2b19-4e83-a30b-076f75639c9d/files/ashmore-study.
pdf
686 ABC Radio National, Background Briefing, Casualties in the war on people smuggling, 30
October 2011. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/backgroundbriefing/stories/2011/3347689.
htm
687 This includes the case of Joni Balu, see The Queen v Riki Selan SCC, referenced in Submission
No. 3, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Inquiry into the Detention of Indonesian
Minors. Accessible at https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.
aspx?id=84e1c6c8-d501-4ccb-b9ca-c813ba944877
254
After the Spill
688 Melissa Crouch and Antje Missback, Trials of People Smugglers in Indonesia 2007 - 2012,
Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, Policy Paper (2013) at 12. Accessed at http://www.
law.unimelb.edu.au/download.cfm?downloadfile=6B85C2B0-BC50-11E2-97770050568D0140&t
ypename=dmFile&fieldname=filename
689 Ibid, 25-33.
690 Ibid, at 14.
691 Ibid.
692 Ibid, at 40-41.
693 Ibid, at 40.
694 Ibid, at 38.
695 Department of Customs and Border Protection, Strategic Assessment of Counter People
Smuggling Communications Activities (November 2011) at 2. Accessed at http://www.customs.
gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2012-018673_Document04_Released.pdf
696 Ibid, at 4.
697 Ibid, at 6.
698 Ibid, at 5.
699 Ibid, at 25.
700 Final Activity Report, Public Information Campaign to Curb Irregular Migration and People
Smuggling in Indonesia, at vii. Accessed at http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/
files/2012-018673_Document05_Released.pdf
701 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Strategic Assessment of Counter People
Smuggling Communications Activities, November 2011, at 3. Accessed 5 December 2013 at
http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/2012-018673_Document04_Released.pdf
702 Australian Human Rights Commission, An age of uncertainty: Inquiry into the treatment of
indviduals suspected of people smuggling offences who say that they are children, (2012).
703 See Ibid, Case Study 1: Ali Jasmin, at 340.
704 Two individuals cited in the case studies came from Rote Island: DUR041 and OSB051. See Ibid,
at 345- and 362.
705 Ibid, at 356.
706 Paul Maley, Asylum boat crew may be victims of trafficking, The Australian, 7 May 2012.
Accessed at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/asylum-boat-crew-may-be-victimsof-trafficking/story-fn59niix-1226348213436
707 Debbie Guest, Child smugglers concern Indonesia, The Australian, 13 June 2011. Accessed
at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/child-smugglers-concern-indonesia/storyfn59niix-1226073973982
708 Ibid.
709 Kesha West, Asylum boat boys sue Australia, ABC News, 12 September 2012. Accessed at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-11/an-australian-government-to-face-civil-compensationsuit/4255490; ABC Radio National AM, Detained Indonesian minors seeking compo, 12
September 2012. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2012/s3588101.htm
710 Ibid.
711 See, for example, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Deterring People
Smuggling Bill 2011 (Cth) (November 2011); Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee,
Crimes Amendment (Fairness for Minors) Bill 2011 (Cth) (January 2012); Senate Legal and
Constitutional Affairs Committee, Migration Amendment (Removal of Mandatory Minimum
Penalties) Bill 2012 (Cth) (April 2012); Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee,
Maritime Powers Bill 2012 (Cth) (August 2012); Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Committee, Detention of Indonesian minors in Australia (October 2012);Australian Human
Rights Commission, Inquiry into the treatment of individuals suspected of people smuggling
who say that they are children (July 2012); Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry
into the breach of Indonesian waters (March 2014); Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Committee, Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 (August 2014); Senate Legal and
Constitutional Affairs Committee, Inquiry into the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (report due November 2014).
255
After the Spill
712 Indonesia has a lot to lose by losing its coral reefs, The Jakarta Post, 29 July 2013. Accessed
at http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/29/indonesia-has-a-lot-lose-losing-its-coral-reefs.
html
713 State of the Tropics, 2014 Report, Section 2 The ecosystem, at 101. Accessed at http://
stateofthetropics.org/the-report
714 In deep water, The Economist, 22 February 2014. Accessed at http://www.economist.com/
news/international/21596990-humans-are-damaging-high-seas-now-oceans-are-doing-harmback-deep-water
715 FAO, Review of the state of the world marine fishery resources, (2011) at 279. Accessed at http://
www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2389e/i2389e.pdf
716 In deep water, The Economist, 22 February 2014. Accessed at http://www.economist.com/
news/international/21596990-humans-are-damaging-high-seas-now-oceans-are-doing-harmback-deep-water
717 FAO, above n 715, at 279.
718 UNEP, Overfishing and other threats to Aquatic Living Resources, at 55. Accessed at http://www.
unep.org/dewa/giwa/publications/finalreport/overfishing.pdf
719 FAO, above n 715, at iv.
720 UNEP, above n 718, at 67.
721 FAO, above n 715, at 13.
722 Melissa Davey, Fish stocks depleted in tropics as poorer nations feed themselves, The
Guardian, 10 June 2014. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/10/
fish-stocks-depleted-in-tropics-as-poorer-nations-feed-themselves
723 Ocean changes may have dire impact on people, Science Daily, 19 June 2010. Accessed at
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/06/100618103558.htm
724 Ibid.
725 The University of Queensland, Media release: Ocean changes may have dire impacts on people,
17 June 2010. Accessed at http://www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2010/06/ocean-changes-mayhave-dire-impacts-people
726 Ibid.
727 Ibid.
728 Ibid.
729 FAO, above n 715, at 159.
730 UNEP, above n 718, at 67.
731 Virginia Burkett, Global climate change implications for coastal and offshore oil and gas
development, (2011) 29 Energy Policy 7719 -7725 at 7724.
732 Ibid, at 7722.
733 Ibid.
734 Miguel Lanos, 44 oil spills found in south-east Louisiana, NBC News, 19 September 2005.
Accessed 8 August 2014 at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9365607/ns/us_news-katrina_the_long_
road_back/t/oil-spills-found-southeast-louisiana/#.U-LoB_mSzO4
735 U.S. Coastguard, Scott Price, Deputy Historian, U.S. Coastguard, A Bright Light on the Darkest
of Days: The U.S. Coastguards Response to Hurricane Katrina, at 47. Accessed 8 August 2014
at https://www.uscg.mil/history/katrina/docs/DarkestDay.pdf
736 For further information, see for example, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Daily Report
on Hurricane Katrinas Impact on U.S. Energy, September 15 2005. Accessed at http://www.eia.
gov/oog/special/eia1_katrina_091205.html
737 Virginia Burkett, above n 731, at 7722.
738 Typhoon Haiyan hits Philippines, The Guardian, 7 November 2013. Accessed at http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/07/philippines-worst-typhoon-haiyan
739 UNEP, Joint UNEP/OCHA Environmental Unit, OCHA, WHO, Oil Spill in Estancia, Iloilo Province,
Western Visayas, Philippines, Resulting from Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) 8 November 2013, Joint
Assessment Report (30 November 2013), at 8. Accessed at http://www.who.int/hac/crises/phl/
sitreps/philippines_oil_spill_joint_assessment_30november2013.pdf?ua=1
256
After the Spill
740 IRIN Asia, Displaced first by Typhoon Haiyan, now an oil spill, 29 November 2013. Accessed 7
February at http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/99231/displaced-first-by-typhoon-haiyan-now-anoil-spill
741 UNEP, Joint UNEP/OCHA Environmental Unit, OCHA, WHO, above n 739, at 4.
742 Ibid, at 9.
743 Ibid, at 6.
744 Ibid, at 7.
745 Ibid, at 10.
746 Ibid, at 4.
747 John Vidal and Damian Carrington, Is climate change to blame for Typhoon Haiyan? The
Guardian, 13 November 2013. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/12/
typhoon-haiyan-climate-change-blame-philippines
748 Ibid.
749 Peter Hannam, Typhoon Haiyan influenced by climate change, scientists say, Sydney Morning
Herald, 11 November 2013. Accessed at http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/
typhoon-haiyan-influenced-by-climate-change-scientists-say-20131111-2xb35.html
750 Thomas R. Knutson, John L. McBride, Johnny Chan, Kerry Emanuel, Greg Holland, Chris
Landsea, Isaac Held, James P. Kossin, A. K. Srivastava & Masato Sugi, Tropical cyclones and
climate change, (2010) 3 Nature Geoscience, 157 163. Accessed at http://www.nature.com/
ngeo/journal/v3/n3/abs/ngeo779.html
752 Ibid, at 13.
753 Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science, Geoscience Australia, Previous
releases. Accessed at http://www.petroleum-acreage.gov.au/2014/previous-releases
754 Australian Government, National Offshore Petroleum Titles Authority, Australian offshore
petroleum tenements. Accessed at http://www.nopta.gov.au/spatial-data/spatial-maps.html
755 Lisa Cox, Marine sanctuaries face new mining threat after permits issued for petroleum
exploration, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 April 2015. Accessed at http://www.smh.com.au/
federal-politics/political-news/marine-sanctuaries-face-new-mining-threat-after-permits-issuedfor-petroleum-exploration-20150416-1mlvge.html
756 Ibid.
757 South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy, Oil and Gas in South Australia, http://www.
sacome.org.au/policy-and-advocacy/environment-a-social/oil-gas.html
758 Ibid.
759 Ibid.
760 Protect Arnhem Land, Paltar Petroleum have applied for an exploration lease covering
over 1500km of Arnhem Land coastline. Accessed at http://www.protectarnhemland.
org/#!background/cgsp
761 Protect Arnhem Land, The Issues. Accessed at http://www.protectarnhemland.org/#!the-issue/
cwa3
762 See a full map of the ocean parcels at http://www.respectandlisten.org/uploads/images/content/
Arnhem_Land/Paltar-oil-exploration-map.jpg
763 Laura Murphy-Oates, NITV News, Residents in remote NT communities question governments
response to Cyclone Lam, 25 February 2015. Accessed at http://www.sbs.com.au/news/
article/2015/02/25/residents-remote-nt-communities-question-governments-response-cyclonelam
764 Cyclone Nathan: Elcho Island battered as storm intensifies off NT coast, ABC News, 23 March
2015. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-23/elcho-island-battered-as-nathanintensifies-off-nt-coast/6339608
765 Traditional owners protest drilling plans, SBS, 26 August 2013. Accessed at http://www.sbs.
com.au/news/article/2013/07/19/traditional-owners-protest-shore-drilling-plans
766 Zoe Holman, Offshore fracking fight washes up on the pristine shores of Arnhem Land, The
Guardian, 13 June 2014. Accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/13/offshorefracking-fight-washes-up-arnhem-land
257
After the Spill
767 Protect Arnhem Land, above n 760.

768 Australian Government, Australias Submission to the Rio20+ Compilation Document, at 3.
Accessed at http://www.unaa.org.au/pdfs/Australian%20National%20Submission%20to%20
Rio20%20Compilation%20Draft.pdf
769 Australian Government, above n 519, at 3.
770 Ibid.
771 Ibid.
773 Nassim Khadem, Deloitte names the five super-growth sectors set to add $250bn to Australias
economy, BRW, 8 October 2013. Accessed at http://www.brw.com.au/p/business/deloitte_
names_economy_five_super_BGVXzIjs9gMXhlSq4GOR3O
774 Ibid.
776 Ibid.
777 http://www.au.pttep.com/news/2013/june/agreement-ends-with-best-practice-in-place-atmontara
778 Government of South Australia, Primary Industries and Regions SA, Southern bluefin tuna, last
modified 13 December 2013. Accessed at http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/aquaculture/aquaculture_
industry/marine_aquaculture/southern_bluefin_tuna
779 Collette, B., Chang, S.-K., Di Natale, A., Fox, W., Juan Jorda, M., Miyabe, N., Nelson, R., Uozumi,
Y. & Wang, S. 2011.Thunnus maccoyii. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version
2014.3. <www.iucnredlist.org>. Downloaded on17 November 2014.
780 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, About Southern Bluefin Tuna, http://
www.ccsbt.org/site/about_bluefin_tuna.php
781 Food and Agriculture Organisation, General situation of world fish stocks, Note: stock
assessment based on 2004 data, catch based on 2002 data. http://www.fao.org/newsroom/
common/ecg/1000505/en/stocks.pdf
782 Collette, B., Chang, et al, above n 779.
783 Australian Government, Fisheries Research and Development Corporation, Status of key
Australian fish stocks report (2012), at 10. Accessed at http://fish.gov.au/Pages/SAFS_Report.
aspx
784 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, About Southern Bluefin Tuna.
Accessed at http://www.ccsbt.org/site/about_bluefin_tuna.php
785 See the migratory path map at Figure 1: Distribution of Bluefin tuna catch off the Australian
coast, in David Campbell, Change in Fleet Capacity and Ownership of Harvesting Rights in the
Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna Industry. Accessed at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y2498e/
y2498e0d.htm; See offshore exploration in Australia in Thomas Bernecker and Jennifer Totterdell,
Geoscience Australia, New opportunities for offshore exploration, June 2012. Accessed at
http://www.ga.gov.au/ausgeonews/ausgeonews201205/acreage.jsp
786 David Weber for PM, Environmental monitoring tardy and superficial, ABC News, 25 January
2010. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-01-25/environmental-monitoring-tardyand-superficial/307886
787 CIA, World Factbook. Accessed at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/as.html
788 See Australian Customs and Border Protection, Annual Report 2013-14, at 22.
789 State of the Tropics, above n 713, at 105.
791 The Garnaut Climate Change Review, Australias emissions in a global context. Accessed at
http://www.garnautreview.org.au/chp7.htm
258
After the Spill
792 AAP, Prized ball lost in tsunami found in Alaska, CBC News, April 23 2012. Accessed at http://
www.cbc.ca/news/world/prized-ball-lost-in-japan-tsunami-found-in-alaska-1.1145233. The
article further reports that debris from the tsunami initially formed a thick mass in the ocean
off Japans north-eastern coast and has since spread out across the Pacific. In February, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration said currents would carry much of the debris
to the coasts of Alaska, Canada, Washington and Oregon between March 2013 and 2014, though
they noted that some of it could arrive in 2012.
793 Graeme Powell, Wrecked WA vessel found off the coast of Madagascar after eight months at
sea, ABC News, 6 January 2014. Accessed at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-06/wavessell-found-off-the-coast-off-madagascar-after-eight-month/5186068
794 Ferdi Tanoni, above n 176.
795 Australian Government, AMSA, Approved Oil Spill Dispersants. Accessed at https://www.amsa.
gov.au/environment/maritime-environmental-emergencies/national-plan/general-information/
dispersants/oil/index.asp
796 Parliament of Australia, Joint Select Committee on Northern Australia, Inquiry into the
development of Northern Australia (July 2014) http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/
Committees/Joint/Northern_Australia/Inquiry_into_the_Development_of_Northern_Australia/
Tabled_Reports
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AFTER THE SPILL

Investigating Australias Montara

Figure 1: Kupang, August 2013. Courtesy: Australian Lawyers Alliance

What has happened to resolve the issue

2.7.1.4 Tablolong, West Timor.................................................................................................. 71

Chapter 3: Evidence to consider................................................................................................... 110

3.6 Satellite images............................................................................................................................ 128

Chapter 4: Dispersants.................................................................................................................... 145

Chapter 5: The response to Montara............................................................................................ 157

5.2 The Government of Indonesia...................................................................................................... 163

Chapter 6: International considerations....................................................................................... 178

6.3.5 Fines..................................................................................................................................... 186

Chapter 7: A co-operative approach in the Timor Sea............................................................. 195

Chapter 8: The bigger picture security...................................................................................... 207

Chapter 9: Australias opportunity................................................................................................. 217

Conclusion: There must be an investigation............................................................................... 218

Overview chronology of events...................................................................................................... 224

Fish catch, Kefamanu [sic] sub-district, 2005-2010 ........................................................... 90

Fish catch, South Coast District of West Timor, 2007-2010 .............................................. 91

Production Fisheries and Aquaculture, Rote Island ........................................................... 92

Summary of alternative estimates of total amount of oil .................................................. 113

Results Sea Water Sample Analysis Monitoring Phase I ................................................. 139

Results Sea Water Sample Analysis Monitoring Phase II ................................................. 141

Results from 4-5 November 2009 ..................................................................................... 144

Amounts of dispersants used during the Montara response ............................................ 146

Foreign fishers apprehended and detained in Australia ................................................... 201

Kupang, August 2013............................................................................................................ 3

Location of Montara wellhead............................................................................................. 25

The Montara oil spill, 28 August 2009 ................................................................................ 27

The Montara oil spill, 28 August 2009 ................................................................................ 27

Montara oil spill, 27 August 2009 ....................................................................................... 28

Map of Nusa Tenggara Timur, Indonesia ............................................................................ 33

Oesapa village, West Timor, August 2013 .......................................................................... 35

Indonesian fishermen encounter oil, 6 October 2009 ......................................................... 39

Indonesian fishermen encounter oil, 6 October 2009 ......................................................... 39

Figure 10 Waxy substance encountered by Indonesian fishermen, 6 October 2009 ......................... 40

Figure 42 Community gathered to give evidence to Senator Rachel Siewert, Tablolong,

Australian Eastern Standard Time

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(Indonesian) The Indonesian term describes the head of a regency, who is an

Used by villagers to refer to the seaweed species most likely to be Eucheuma

(Indonesian) The island of Borneo.

(Indonesian) Ashmore Reef (also, Sand Island, or Pasir Island)

A regency (kabupaten) is a local level of government beneath that of the

For example, the Bupati of South Central Timor Regency.

Species of sea cucumber.

Used to denote pseudonym.

After the Spill

After the Spill

After the Spill

After the Spill

Chapter 1: Background to the Montara oil spill

Chapter 1: Background to the Montara oil spill

Figure 2: Location of Montara wellhead. Courtesy: Angus Macpherson

After the Spill

Chapter 1: Background to the Montara oil spill

1.2 The blow out

After the Spill

Chapter 1: Background to the Montara oil spill

After the Spill

Chapter 1: Background to the Montara oil spill

After the Spill

Chapter 1: Background to the Montara oil spill

1.3 The response