Você está na página 1de 48

FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS and
CARMELITA C. LLAMAS,
Petitioners,
- versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66
OF
THEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFMAKATI CITY and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 149588


Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
VILLARAMA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner-spouses Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas. On September 29, 2009, this Court
promulgated a Decision[1] in the above-captioned case, denying the petition for Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners. Petitioners
are assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City convicting them of the offense Other Forms of Swindling punishable under Article 316, paragraph 2, of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Briefly, the antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 14, 1984, petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati with, as aforesaid, the crime of other forms of swindling in the
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11787, which reads:
That on or about the 20 th day of November, 1978, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, well knowing that their parcel of land known as Lot No. 11, Block No. 6 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd 67036, Cadastral Survey
of Paraaque, LRC Record No. N-26926, Case No. 4896, situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, was
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Imus, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell said property to one Conrado P. Avila, falsely
representing the same to be free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever, and said Conrado P. Avila bought the aforementioned property
for the sum of P12,895.00 which was paid to the accused, to the damage and prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila in the aforementioned amount
of P12,895.00.
Contrary to law.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two months and to pay the fine of P18,085.00 each.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its February 19, 1999 Decision in CA-G.R. No. CR No. 18270, affirmed the decision of the trial court. In its December 22,
1999 Resolution, the appellate court further denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Assailing the aforesaid issuances of the appellate court, petitioners filed before this Court, on February 11, 2000, their petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
141208. The Court, however, on March 13, 2000, denied the same for petitioners failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2000, the judgment of conviction became final and executory.
With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19, 2001 Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for
her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.
On July 16, 2001, petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the
trial and the appellate courts decisions.
The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration, in
the October 22, 2001 Resolution. [2]
In its September 29, 2009 Decision, this Court held that, following the ruling in People v. Bitanga,[3] the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases.
The Court likewise rejected petitioners contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the September 29, 2009 Decision and, consequently, the annulment of their conviction by the trial court. In
their Verified Motion for Reconsideration,[4] petitioners ask this Court to revisit and take a second look at the issues in the case without being unduly hampered by any perceived
technical shortfalls of a beleaguered innocent litigant. In particular, they raise the following issues:
1.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, AND IN LIGHT OF THE CORRECT APPLICATIONS OF DOCTRINAL JURISPRUDENCE,
PETITIONERS HAD PURSUED THEIR MORE THAN TWENTY FIVE (25) YEARS QUEST FOR JUSTICE AS INNOCENT MEN, AND HAD HONESTLY
MAINTAINED THAT THEIR RESORT TO REVERSE, SET ASIDE AND/OR ANNUL, IS IN LINE WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW, ANY
TECHNICAL SHORTFALLS [OR] DEFECTS NOTWITHSTANDING[;]
2.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, AGAIN IN LIGHT OF APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION,
PETITIONERS ARE NOT BARRED FROM RAISING SUCH QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AT ANY TIME AND IN FACT MAINTAIN THAT
RESPONDNET COURTS HAD NO JURISDICTION IN LAW AND ENLIGHTENING DOCTRINES TO TRY AND DECIDE THIS CASE;
3.
AGAIN WITH ALL DUE RESPECT AND UNFORTUNATELY, THE VERY JUSTIFYING MERITS OF
PETITIONERS APPROPRIATE INSTANT REMEDY; HAD NOT CONSEQUENTLY BEEN PASSED UPON, TO UPHOLD THE PARAMOUNT
CONSTITUTIONAL CHERISED MANDATE, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE MUST BE UPHELD, EXCEPT ONLY UPON ESTABLISHED
AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND

4.
PETITIONERS VERY HUMBLY BESEECH THIS HONORABLE COURTS HIGHEST SENSE OF MAGNANIMITY,
UNDERSTANDING, JUDICIOUS WISDOM AND COMPASSION, SO THAT JUSTICE MAY TRULY AND JUSTLY BE RENDERED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONERS AS IT MUST, GIVEN THE VERY UNIQUE AND COMPELLING JUSTIFICATIONS HEREOF[.] [5]
Petitioners likewise pray for a referral of the case to the Court En Banc for oral argument or to be allowed to submit written supplementary pleadings for them to state the
compelling reasons why their motion for reconsideration should be allowed.
In the interest of justice and for humanitarian reasons, the Court deems it necessary to re-examine this case.
Admittedly, petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case, from the time it was pending in the trial court until it reached this Court, all of which could serve as enough
basis to dismiss the present motion for reconsideration. However, considering petitioners advanced age, the length of time this case has been pending, and the imminent loss of
personal liberty as a result of petitioners conviction, the Court resolves to grant pro hac vice the motion for reconsideration.
This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. [6] It has
allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is far better and more prudent
for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice to the parties.[7]
This Court notes that the case was allowed to run its course as a petition for certiorari, such that in its April 12, 2004 Resolution, it said Considering the allegations, issues
and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari x x x. Likewise, in its February 10, 2003 Resolution,[8] the Court said, It appearing that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, in
his own behalf and as counsel for petitioners, has failed to file their reply to the Solicitor Generals comment on the petition for review on certiorari within the extended period x x
x.
Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized that the petition, although captioned differently, was indeed one for certiorari.
Since we have resolved to treat the petition as one for certiorari, the doctrine in People v. Bitanga[9] no longer finds application in this case.
Next, we proceed to resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners.
Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 316. Other forms of swindling. The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the
damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:
xxx
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded;
xxx
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.[10]
For petitioners to be convicted of the crime of swindling under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution had the burden to prove the confluence of the
following essential elements of the crime:
1. that the thing disposed of be real property;
2. that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered,
whether the encumbrance is recorded or not;

3. that there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is free from encumbrance; and
4. that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.[11]
One of the essential elements of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2, is that the act of disposing the encumbered real property is made to the damage of another. In
this case, neither the trial court nor the CA made any finding of any damage to the offended party. Nowhere in the Decision of the RTC or that of the CA is there any discussion
that there was damage suffered by complainant Avila, or any finding that his rights over the property were prejudiced.
On the contrary, complainant had possession and control of the land even as the cases were being heard. His possession and right to exercise dominion over the property
was not disturbed. Admittedly, there was delay in the delivery of the title. This, however, was the subject of a separate case, which was eventually decided in petitioners favor.[12]
If no damage should result from the sale, no crime of estafa would have been committed by the vendor, as the element of damage would then be lacking. [13] The inevitable
conclusion, therefore, is that petitioners should be acquitted of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 29, 2009 is SET ASIDE and
a new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioners of the crime charged on the ground of the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 181084

Present:
-

versus -

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,


CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

BARTOLOME TAMPUS[1] and IDA


MONTESCLAROS,
Defendants.
Promulgated:
IDA MONTESCLAROS,
Appellant.
June 16, 2009
X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal is the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification,
the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the commission of
rape.
The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Tampus (Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC [4] on April 1,
1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No. 013325-L charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m.
The Information[5] in each case reads as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L[6]
That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 oclock [sic] in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Bartolome Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber due to drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with [sic] the latter, who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave
permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape [ABC].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L[7]

That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,[8] at about 1:00 oclock [sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with [sic] [ABC], who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in
Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, abarangay tanod. On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified
that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus [9] who were both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink beer [10] and after consuming three and one-half (3 ) glasses of
beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy.[11] While ABC was lying on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed
to remedyo[12] or have sexual intercourse with her.[13] Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went
to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered
pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her vagina. [14] When her mother
arrived home from work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.[15]
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her mother was at work at the beer house. [16]Tampus went inside their room and
threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone. [17] He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again
threatened to kill her if she shouted.[18] He undressed himself, spread ABCs legs, put saliva on his right hand and he applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis into ABCs
vagina and made a push and pull movement. [19] After consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored her.
[20]

On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her.
[21]
ABC, together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police. On May 9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the
Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal Report. [22] Dr.
Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC revealed a deep healed laceration at the seven (7) oclock position and a shallow healed laceration at the one (1) oclock
position on ABCs hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated
and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus to rape her. And again,
she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, against her will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the house to go to the public market ofLapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at
6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually go to the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. [23] He denied forcing ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to allow
him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. [24]Appellant Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the
following day.[25] She said that she always brought her daughter to the beer house with her and there was never an instance when she left her daughter alone in the house. [26] She
denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission to Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC. [27]
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod Headquarters between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 1995 [28] and that his
actual duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at
the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook. However, on cross-examination, Berdin could not tell whether the
signature appearing on the logbook really belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April 2, 1995 is different
from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995. [29] It was also revealed that the house of Tampus is just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the barangay tanod
outpost and that the barangay tanod on duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or without permission.[30]
Agustos B. Costas, M.D.[31] (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification, [32] which showed
that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was
provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.

The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an
accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court appreciated in Idas favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power
without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. [33] The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused Bartolome Tampus GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two
counts of rape, as principals [sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned cases.
The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal.
Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. [34]
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November 16, 2000 [35] and his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court.
[36]
Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial courts
decision with modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of intelligence
on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician, Idas schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida
Montesclaros is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay
moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 25,000.00). [37]
We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.
The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of the principal accused. Upon examination of the records of the case,
we agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that the testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the same criminal case.
The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn said findings unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. [38] The rule finds an even
more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. [39]
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC and has given full faith and credence to her testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found
that the rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape,
implicate her own mother in such a vile act, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial if she has not been a victim of rape and was impelled to
seek justice for the defilement of her person. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full credit. [40]

Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her will on April 1, 1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the
positive and direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement was committed by Tampus, circumstantial
evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [41] In cases like the
one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired before and after the victim lost consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus. [42]
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal knowledge of [ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the
circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
xxxx
The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in effect against the positive evidence given by [ABC]
that he ravished her [on] two occasions.
xxxx
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see Tampus lie down with her. What she saw was the aftermath of her deflowering
upon waking up. Nevertheless, the Court has taken note of the following circumstances: (1) The drinking session where the complainant was forced to drink beer
by both accused; (2) The conversation between the two accused when accused Tampus requested accused Ida Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter,
permission to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the complainant were the only persons left in the house when Ida
Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the request of Tampus; (4) The bloodstained pants, the pain and blood in complainants vagina and the pain in her
head, groin and buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the complainant in the dawn of April 4, 1995 that he would kill her if she would tell about
the previous incident on April 1, 1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that immediately ensued. These circumstances form a chain that points to accused
Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal knowledge of [ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated condition. [43]
After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then determined the guilt of Ida. Although Ida was charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her
liable as an accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing or intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the request of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have
sexual intercourse with ABC did not prove their conspiracy.[44] Hence, it held that, [u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in the commission of the crime by previous acts but
her participation, not being indispensable, was not that of a principal. She is liable as an accomplice. [45]
In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow her daughter to be raped. She maintained that there was no instance when she left
ABC alone in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Idas appeal as it also gave credence to the testimony of ABC.
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[46]
We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
[47]

Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
The following requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered an accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. [48]

The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and
she agreed to Tampus request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Idas acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of Tampus to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter.
During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she testified that:
Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?
A No, sir.
Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you first drank beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?
A Bartolome Tampus and Nanay, my mother.[49]
xxxx
Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not been used to drinking beer and then, why suddenly, she would let you drink beer
at that time?
A No, sir.

Q Did you not tell her that, I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer?
A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening to maltreat you if you would not drink that beer?
A Not yet.
Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not drink that beer that she proposed for you to drink?
A Because Nanay stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to you?
A Yes, sir.[50]
xxxx
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house and you overheard Bartolome asking or proposing to your mother that he
would have sexual intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan dialect remedyo, Bartolome would want to have a remedyo with you. When [sic],
particular moment did you allegedly hear this statement, while you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking beer?
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting.[51]
xxxx
Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it was you who was being referred by Bartolome Tampus when he said to your
mother in the Visayan dialect that gusto siya moremedyo nimo, he wants to have sexual intercourse with you?
A Yes, sir, but I dont know the meaning of remedyo.
Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of remedyo"?
A Not yet, sir.[52]
xxxx

Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word remedyo"?
A Yes, sir[53]
xxxx
Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 oclock [sic] in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not also bother to tell her of what you
suspected that something serious or bad had happened to you in the previous day?
A Because she already knew, sir.
Q How did you know that she already knew?
A Because I heard her telling Omeng,[54] After you have sexual intercourse with her, leave her immediately! [55]
xxxx
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, remedyo, when your mother arrived in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not confront
your mother, did you not tell her that, Is this what you mean by remedyo, as what you had agreed with Bartolome Tampus that he would do something to
my genitals?
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.[56]
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design
between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to
drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be
liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First,
because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have
consummated the act even without Idas consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They both forced ABC to drink beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if
he could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without depriving
her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months before the incident, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert
opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence at the time of the incident; but, she may have poor judgment. On Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor Celso V.
Espinosa, he testified as follows:
Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional, would you say that the patient [sic] totally deprived of intelligence or reason?

A Not totally.
Q She will be conscious of her acts?
A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?
A There could be.
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission of the crime of rape for having given her daughter to be sexually abused by her
co-accused, allegedly convinced by her co-accused on the first day of April, 1995. Now, if she was then under treatment, Doctor, from November 11,
1994 to January 12, 1995, would you say, Doctor, that having taken this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after January 12, 1995, she
must have acted with discernment?
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment, and even without any medication, it may be what we called spontaneous,
really it will get back.
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]
A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.
Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a person is totally deprived of intelligence, he has still discernment, she is
unconscious of her act, she or he may be exempted from any criminal liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal opinion for the purpose of this
proceedings she may be acting with discernment and with certain degree of intelligence?
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I think there is a motive, she wants to gain financial or material things from the
daughter if no material gain, then perhaps it was borne out of her illness. This is my opinion. [57]
xxxx
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]
A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between right or wrong.
Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her ailment?
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother alleged that the sickness could be more than one year duration, it is in acute
stage because she was allegedly destroying everything in the house according to the mother, so she was in acute stage. [58]
On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:
Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her sense of judgment?
A I think, so.

Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient lost contact with reality?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged accusation against her is true, being an expert on scizophrania, could you tell the
Honorable Court as a mother, who would allegedly do such an offense to her daughter, is it still in her sound mind or proper mental sane [sic]?
A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to gain some material things, if not, it is because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be rubbished by another person, then there must be something wrong?
A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.
A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.[59]
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused. [60] In this case, the
testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the
basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas, Idas
schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABCwho was 13 years old at the time of the incidentcould have been considered as a special qualifying
circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1)

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx

Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the victims parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve
as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.[61]
In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the
Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase
the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, [62] every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. [63] Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not

state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of
simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,
which was signed into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L."[64] The Court of Appeals, however, did not award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and proper
to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct from moral damages awarded upon such
finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. [65]
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delictoand another P50,000.00 as moral
damages. [66] However, Tampus civil indemnity ex delicto has been extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.[67] Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and,
consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though all the persons who took
part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a consummated felony. [68] The accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by the law for the crime committed[69] and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees. [70] However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly
liable. [71]Apart from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by his act or omission through
the payment of civil indemnity and damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liabilityin which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty
imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessorythe share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to
determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the basis of the
allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must
respond. Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily
liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within
their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable. [72]
As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions dealing with this matter have been grossly inconsistent.
In People v. Galapin,[73] People v. Continente,[74] United States v. Lasada,[75] People v. Mobe,[76] People v. Irinea,[77] People v. Rillorta,[78] People v. Cagalingan,[79] People v.
Villanueva,[80] People v. Magno,[81] People v. del Rosario,[82] People v. Yrat,[83] People v. Saul,[84] and People v. Tamayo,[85] the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay
jointly and severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,[86] the accomplice was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity
imposed by the trial court, while the principal was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring,[87] the principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and severally
liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity.
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal shares of the civil indemnity. This makes the accomplice who had less participation in the
commission of the crime equally liable with the principal for the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the crime was not taken into account in the apportionment of
the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the principle behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for felonies, i.e., that the liability must be
commensurate with the degree of participation of the accused in the crime committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the execution of the offense but

whose participation is not indispensable to the commission of the crime is made to pay the same amount of civil indemnity as the principal by direct participation who took a direct
part in the execution of the criminal act. It is an injustice when the penalty and liability imposed are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should be liable only for the acts actually committed by him. [88] The proportion of this individual liability
must be graduated not only according to the nature of the crime committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the degree and nature of participation of the individual
offender.
In Garces v. People,[89] People v. Flores,[90] People v. Barbosa,[91] People v. Ragundiaz,[92] People v. Bato,[93] and People v. Garalde,[94] the accomplice was held to be solidarily
liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the amount adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the civil indemnity ex
delicto but was made to pay the moral damages of P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the accomplice was held solidarily liable
for half of the combined amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the principal for half of
the actual damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the principal for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.
In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the principal for only half of the amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes of
the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the offended party. When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by whom
payment has been made shall have a right of action against the other persons liable for the amount of their respective shares. [95] As against each other, whoever made the payment
may claim from his co-debtors only the share that corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made. [96] In these cases, therefore, payment is made by either the
principal or the accomplice, the one who made the payment to the victim could demand payment of the part of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the principal
paid the victim the entire amount of the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The principal
was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total amount of civil indemnity and he was solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half. Since the principal paid for the
half which the accomplice is solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would have become ultimately liable for
three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while the accomplice would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.
In People v. Cortes,[97] People v. Budol,[98] People v. Nulla,[99] and People v. Madali,[100] the principal was ordered to pay twice the share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity.
In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts for which the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable for. The principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the
accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal and accomplice were held solidarily
liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity or half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for which each shall respond. This is consistent with Article
109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, which require that the courts should determine the amount for which the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond to
and upon specifying this amount, the principals are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves for their quota and the
accessories are solidarily liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other classes,
which shall be enforced first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories. [101]
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the amount that the accomplice is liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,[102] the civil liability of P6,000.00
was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was primarily liable for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable in solidum among themselves for the other half of the
indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire amount of civil indemnity, which is P750.00.
Similarly in People v. Bantagan,[103] the principal was required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices
should be jointly and severally liable. The three accomplices were jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in case of their insolvency the principal was secondarily liable
for such amount.
In People v. Castillo,[104] the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil indemnity, while the principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths
(3/4).
In People v. Cariaga,[105] the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the heirs of the victim amounted to P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay P101,000.00
which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay the rest of the indemnity and damages amounting to P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares of the civil indemnity and damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory is
determined. Though the responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons liable for a felony is left to the courts, this does not mean that this amount can be decided

arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation and
caprice.
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degree of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act. Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the opinion that
there are no fixed rules which are applicable in all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil liability among two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, either
because there are different degrees of culpability of offenders, or because of the inequality of their financial capabilities. [106] On this note, he states in his commentaries on the 1870
Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the determination of the amount of respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts. [107] The courts have the competence to
determine the exact participation of the principal, accomplice, and accessory in the commission of the crime relative to the other classes because they are able to directly consider
the evidence presented and the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts discretion should not be untrammelled and must be guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the
commission of the crime. The person with greater participation in the commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a minor role
in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and
damages than every accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory. Care should also be taken in considering the number of
principals versus that of accomplices and accessories. If for instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages
is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class,
have a greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the civil
liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the
principalsor P4,000.00is still divided among all the four principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous
apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the
accomplice, Ida. Idas previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even
without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal
liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for
which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does
not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the
civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and
moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds
[2/3] ofP100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity ofP16,666.67 and moral damages
of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason
of his death before the final judgment. [108] His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus share of the civil liability has
been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil indemnity
of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the principle that
the accessory follows the principal. Tampus obligation to payP66,666.67 his quota of the civil indemnity is the principal obligation, for which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon
the extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.
On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court of Appeals.
In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. [109] Also
known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. [110] Exemplary damages may be awarded only when one or more
aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during the trial.[111]

In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent
of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since the relationship
of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the Information. [112] The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the offender must both be alleged in the
information and proved during the trial in order to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance. [113] While the information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a
minor during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary
damages is not warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil
indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six
hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 174813-15

March 17, 2009

NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL
REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86,Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2 October 2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of
Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The facts of the case are as follows.
On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl
Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by
respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by
Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.
On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.
On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to
hold them liable for the crimes charged.
On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their coaccused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro A.
Arellano.
On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004
Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our
consideration:

CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE
RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND
SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?2
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station;
or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.3
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to
control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. 4
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of
Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to
compel action in those matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be
compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did
not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If
petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper
remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the
proper remedy in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou 7:
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner
of a grave abuse of such discretion.
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court
cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive.
But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before
this Court, challenging the order of the respondent Judge therein denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged
rape and homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion of two other persons in

the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at
least a prima facie case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in that case, Mayor Sanchez
should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two other persons.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion
to Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr., 9 we
reiterated the doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul, 10 that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or
dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. Thus, we held:
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of
the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary
to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused.
The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due
process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in
compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have "deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera
withdrawing the case."11 Petitioners cite the following portion of our Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12:
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the
reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new
relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand. 13
Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our Decision, carefully cutting off the portions which would expose the real
import of our pronouncements. The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for Reinvestigation filed by
the accused, proceeded nonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis of a Resolution of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done despite the disapproval of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the latter
ordered was still ongoing, since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We held that the judge should have waited for the
conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting on whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before
proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, the continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in Montesa, Jr. reads:
Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on
a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.

The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial
Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor,
for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No.
911.14
As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to establish a doctrine that the judge should just follow the
determination by the prosecutor of whether or not there is probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his
opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or
after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be
addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due
process of law.15
In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners counsel, he tries to convince us that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from
the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where there is no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners counsel states in the Memorandum:
6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9 pages which was attached to the URGENT PETITION did not
point out any iota of grave abuse of discretion committed by Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor of the sons of the Petitioners. Hence,
the ORDER issued by RJBAY is NULL and VOID in view of the recent ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216,
September 5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states that:
"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the courts bare denial of a motion to withdraw information pursuant to the Secretarys resolution is
void." (Underscoring ours).
6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of the OSG because of its falsity. 16
This statement of petitioners counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decision in Ledesma. 17 The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to
have a resemblance to the statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been amply
threshed out in petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion
for reconsideration - all of which were submitted to the court - the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the
information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and
competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the

absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for
disregarding the secretary's recommendation.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
Rule 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Counsels use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear that the passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore,
putting the words "Underscoring ours" after the text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original. Accordingly, we are
ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar.
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a
Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment of the issues presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening paragraph of
Ledesma states:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden
duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by
such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial
court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding
with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.19 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Order apparently states that there was no probable cause against petitioners:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and acts of lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw informations is
DENIED.
Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24, 2006 at 8:30 oclock in the morning. 20(Underscoring ours.)
Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no probable cause against them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of
the City Prosecutor should be granted.21
Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of the word "no" in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error.
The assailed Order states in full:
After a careful study of the sworn statements of the complainants and the resolution dated March 3, 2006 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de
Vera, the Court finds that there was probable cause against the herein accused. The actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and acts of

lasciviousness cannot be the basis of dismissal or withdrawal of the herein cases. Failure to shout or offer tenatious resistance did not make voluntary the
complainants submission to the criminal acts of the accused (People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214, 2002). The complainants affidavits indicate that the accused
helped one another in committing the acts complained of. Considering that the attackers were not strangers but their trusted classmates who enticed them to go to
the house where they were molested, the complainants cannot be expected to react forcefully or violently in protecting themselves from the unexpected turn of
events. Considering also that both complainants were fifteen (15) years of age and considered children under our laws, the ruling of the Supreme Court in People
v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004 becomes very relevant. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the
actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar circumstances. The range of emotions
shown by rape victim is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims (People v. Malones, G.R. Nos.
124388-90, March 11, 2004).
The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations
are evidentiary in nature and should be evaluated after full blown trial on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of prejudgment against the accused. 22
As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found probable cause against the petitioners, but likewise provided an
adequate discussion of the reasons for such finding. Indeed, the general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the
body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in
the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. 23
In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is
available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. 24 The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an
Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar. 25
Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding of probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed
the records of the case. After going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed probable cause against the
petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that
might result should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the
resumption of the proceedings therein. The Regional Trial Court is directed to act on the case with dispatch.
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein
discussed.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


Plaintiff-Appellee,

G .R. No. 184760


Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
PATE RNO L O RE NZO y CAS AS ,
De fend ant -Appel l ant .
April 23, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.
Assailed in this appeal via Notice of Appeal is the 14 June 2007 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR HC No. 02184 which affirmed the 05 October 2005
Decision promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, in Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, finding accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. [3]
[2]

Accused-appellant was arrested and charged following a buy-bust operation.


On 12 September 2003, two (2) Informations were filed against accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo) charging him with violating Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portions thereof reading.
Criminal Case No. 6992
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control
a total of 2.04 grams of white crystalline substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which gave positive result to the test for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[4]
Criminal Case No. 6993
That on or about the 10 th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another 0.20 gram of
white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the test for Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.[5]
The cases were raffled to Branch 76 of the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6992-93.

One Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a different Information, which case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6991. Estanislao was accused of
possessing illegal drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the Information containing the following averments:
Criminal Case No. 6994
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control of 0.05 gram
of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
On arraignment, both accused, with the assistance of counsel, entered NOT GUILTY pleas.
The three (3) cases having been consolidated, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Noel P. Pineda, who was a member of the buy-bust team.
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that on 9 September 2003, upon a series of reports relayed by a confidential informant that a certain Paterno Lorenzo
was peddling shabu in the Barangay Dulongbayan area, the team of PO3 Pineda embarked on a buy-bust operation against said drug peddler. Anticipating the operation, PO3
Pineda prepared two (2) pieces of marked P100.00 bills to be used as buy-bust money. At around 10:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, PO3 Pineda, along with SPO1
Arellano and PO3 Tougan, proceeded to Barangay Dulongbayan and secretly met with their confidential informant. According to the confidential informant, he had not seen
Lorenzo and raised the possibility that he was not in the area at the time. Assessing the situation, the police officers instructed the confidential informant to continue with his
surveillance of the area and to inform them immediately if he comes across Lorenzo.
At around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 10 September 2003, while PO1 Pineda and his companions were waiting at Gen. Luna Street, the confidential informant
reported that Lorenzo was already at the Daangbakal, Dulongbayan I area and was selling prohibited drugs. Riding an unmarked vehicle, the team proceeded to where Lorenzo
was. On their arrival, Lorenzo was talking to a man at the corner of Pulong Diablo and Daangbakal. PO3 Tougan stepped out of their vehicle and hid in a place where he was
not visible to Lorenzo. PO3 Pineda stayed close to SPO1 Arellano, who was then hiding inside a tricycle near Lorenzo. While this was happening, the confidential informant
approached Lorenzo for the transaction. Lorenzo and the confidential informant were approximately four (4) meters away from PO3 Pineda. Because PO3 Pineda knew who
Lorenzo was and considering the place was illuminated, PO3 Pineda recognized the suspect. The confidential informant and Lorenzo were talking for about one minute, after
which the informant gave the marked money to Lorenzo. After taking the marked money, Lorenzo handed theshabu to the informant. PO3 Pineda and SPO1 Arellano alighted
from the tricycle and approached Lorenzo, and introduced themselves as police officers. They arrested Lorenzo.
Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily searched and PO1 Pineda was able to retrieve the marked money and 2 other sachets of shabufrom him. Seeing what had
happened to Lorenzo, the man he was talking to and later on identified as a certain Estanislao, attempted to escape the police officers and ran, but he was soon accosted by PO3
Tougan. A search of his pockets yielded one (1) sachet of shabu.
After the buy-bust operation, Lorenzo and Estanislao were taken to the police station where the incident was recorded in the police blotter. The plastic sachets
containing 2.04 and 0.20 grams of white crystalline substance bought from Lorenzo was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The results as contained
in Chemistry Report no. D-1741-03E showed that the substance sold by Lorenzo was positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.[6]
Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-appellant Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their version of the facts.
Lorenzo was in his mountain bike on the way home to Dulongbayan sometime between 12:00 oclock in the evening and 1:00 oclock in the morning of 10 September
2003. Estanislao, who was also with him at the time, was riding in his motor cross style bike and was supposed to buy food at said place after playing tong-its.

While the two (2) were traversing Daangbakal and Delos Angeles Street, the chain on Estanislaos bike went loose. During the time Estanislao was repairing his bike, PO3
Tougan, PO3 Pineda, and SPO1 Arellano, who were then on board an owner type jeepney, arrived and arrested Lorenzo and Estanislao. According to the police officers, they were
to be brought to the Municipal Hall. The two (2) suspects protested, claiming not having done anything wrong but the police officers continued with the arrest. It was later that
they were informed that the arrest was for illegal drugs.
On 5 October 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Lorenzo for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, but acquitting Estanislao, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, first paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal
Case No. 6993) or illegal selling of 0.20 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, second paragraph, No.3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(Criminal Case No. 6992) or illegal possession of 2.04 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to Twelve years and six (months) as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).
(c) Finding accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier, for violation of Section 11, second paragraph, sub paragraph 3, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, NOT GUILTY for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Detained accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier is ordered released from detention at the San Mateo Jail unless detained for some other lawful cause.
The plastic sachets of shabu subject matter of the instant cases are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the Officer-In-Charge of the Court is hereby ordered
to safely deliver or cause the safe delivery of the same to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. [7]
Weighing the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses, as well as the other evidence presented during trial, the trial court gave more veracity to the
prosecutions version that Lorenzo was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation. The trial court gave credence to the
prosecutions evidence in accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions accorded to police officers. According to the trial court, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer in the buy-bust operation and the seller, object and consideration, including the delivery of the shabu sold
by Lorenzo and the payment of the buy-bust money.
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, questioning the procedure followed by the police operatives in the seizure and
custody of the evidence against him.
On 14 June 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC, disposing to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby dismissed and the assailed October 5, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal, Branch 76,
in Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by AM No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective
on October 15, 2004. This judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Unyielding, Lorenzo appealed before this Court on Notice of Appeal,[8] adopting the same arguments raised before the Court of Appeals:

I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5 AND 11,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165; AND
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the
burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecutions
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its behalf.In which case, the
presumption of innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of
evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to be determined. Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it is but a fundamental and settled
rule that factual findings of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court
high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. Considering that what is at stake here is the liberty of
accused-appellant, we have carefully reviewed and evaluated the records of the case and find it necessary to reverse the appellate courts decision convicting accused-appellant.
Essentially, Lorenzo questions his conviction on the basis of reasonable doubt. The defense anchors its claim on the failure of the prosecution to adopt the required
procedure under Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs. According to the defense,
this alleged failure to follow proper procedure, i.e. inventory and photographing of the retrieved evidence, raises doubts as to whether the specimen examined by the forensic
chemist and presented in court were indeed retrieved from accused-appellant. The defense also faults the police operatives for not having coordinated with the PDEA regarding
the buy-bust.
Thus, for resolution by this Court is the sole issue of whether the prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzos guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged.
We rule in the negative. The prosecutions case fails for failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drug with moral certainty.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [9] Material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale had actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.[10] The term corpus delicti means the actual commission by
someone of the particular crime charged.
On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus
delicti must be established beyond doubt.

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and
sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.

While buy-bust operations have been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust
operation is susceptible to police abuse. Thus, courts have been mandated to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses.

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down under the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) for Republic Act No. 9165 and it is the prosecutions burden to adduce evidence that these procedures have been complied with in proving the elements of the
offense.

The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1 of
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the procedure is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. Thus, the proviso stating
that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
In People v. Sanchez,[11] we clarified that this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited
justifiable grounds.
Accused-appellant claims that no physical inventory and no photographing of the drugs took place. Non-compliance by the police operatives with the foregoing
requirements in the instant case is fatal to the prosecutions case. Although the prosecution recognized its failure to coordinate with the PDEA because of the urgency of the
situation, it ignored the issue of specifically identifying the prohibited drug at the point of confiscation. There is absolutely nothing in the records to show that the inventory and
photography requirements, or their credible substitute to prove integrity and evidentiary value, were ever followed.

In People v. Lim,[12] this Court held:


xxx any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure and confiscation, have the
same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises a doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination
and presented in court was actually recovered from the appellants. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the PAOC-TF agents.

In Bondad, Jr. v. People,[13] where the prosecution did not inventory and photograph the confiscated evidence, this Court acquitted therein accused reasoning that failure to
comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized.

In People v. Ruiz,[14] this Court acquitted accused due to the failure of the prosecution to comply with the procedures under Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR as
no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required.

In People v. Orteza,[15] the Court explained the implications of the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the
deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was
arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and
the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's
failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

To reiterate, the flexibility offered by the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 is coupled with the proviso that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items must be
preserved.

Thus, in Malillin v. People,[16] the Court explained that the chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is
found until the time it is offered in evidence. [17] Failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from accused is fatal to
the prosecutions case. There can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.[18]

PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased the shabu from accused-appellant and that he only retrieved it from said informant. He further
testified that he marked the retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two other sachets of shabu that were allegedly seized from the accused, but it was not certain when and
where the said marking was done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter.

The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution witness was at least
four meters away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were. From this distance, it was impossible for him to hear the conversation between accused-appellant and
the poseur-buyer.

The foregoing facts and circumstances create doubt as to whether the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the same ones that were released
to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory examination. We therefore find that this failure to establish the evidences chain of custody is damaging to the prosecutions case. [19]

In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to support accused-appellants conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act
No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.

Accordingly, the presumption of innocence should prevail.


WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 June 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02184, is hereby REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Accusedappellant PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director General, Philippine National
Police, and the Director General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


Appellee,

G.R. No. 185209


Present:

- versus RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN,


Appellant.
REY VILLATIMA and alias
DEDONG BARGO,
Accused.

CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,


VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 28, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:


Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction that the appellant conspired with his co-accused in committing the crime of robbery with homicide. His claim that he acted
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury could not be sustained because there was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat, preventing his escape that compelled him
to take part in the commission of the offense charged.
Factual Antecedents
On July 19, 1995, an Information[1] was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, charging Rene Baron y Tangarocan (appellant), Rey Villatima (Villatima),
and alias Dedong Bargo (Bargo) with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Juanito Berallo (Berallo). The Information contained the following accusatory
allegations:
That on or about 9 oclock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one Juanito Berallo in order to rob, steal and take away the following:
1) sidecar of the tricycle which costs P16,000.00;
2) motorcycle described as Kawasaki HDX colored black with Engine No. G7E-088086 and Chassis No. HDX-849776 which is worth P103,536.00;
3) wallet with cash money of P1,250.00;
4) wrist watch and ring worth P3,800.00.
and inflicting upon the person of Juanito Berallo the following injuries, to wit:
1. Gaping incised wound, shallow at the extremeties and deeper at the middle portion, 7 cms. long, from right lateral aspect of the neck going slightly downward and to
the left of anterior neck.
2. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 14 cm. deep, directed slightly upward and to the right, located on the upper chest below wound # 1.
3. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 12 cm. deep, directed to the right, located at the left chest, level of 3rd rib.
4. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long 20 cm. deep, directed slightly downward and to the left, located at the middle of the chest, level of 5th rib.

5. Incised wound 1 cm long, right cheek.


6. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 6 cm. deep, directed downward located at the medial aspect of the upper back, right.
7. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 10 cm. deep, located at the upper outer quadrant of the back, right.
8. Incised wound, 2 cm. long, located at the middle of the upper quadrant of back, right.
9. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 4 cm. deep, directed downward located at the medial aspect of upper inner quadrant of back, left.
10. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 5 cm deep, directed downward, located at the middle of upper quadrant of back, left.
11. Incised wound, 2 cm long, located 2 cm to the left of wound # 10.
12. Stabbed wound, 2 cm. long, 7 cm. deep, directed downward located at the middle of lower back, left.
13. Incised wound, 6 cm. long, distal third left forearm.
14. Incised wound, 3 cm. long palmar surface left hand.
15. Incised wound, 5 cm. long palmar surface left hand, 2 cm. below wound # 13.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe hemorrhage due to Multiple Stabbed wounds,
which directly caused the death of the victim Juanito Berallo, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount, to wit:
P 50, 000.00 - as indemnity for the death of the victim.
P 150, 000.00 - as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, or such amount to be fixed by the court.
ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only the appellant was arrested. Villatima and Bargo remain at-large to date. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned. After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial
ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case against the appellant is as follows:
On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver, was having a conversation with Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julies Bakeshop
at Magsaysay St., Cadiz City. Berallo arrived and parked his tricycle in front of the bakeshop.The appellant approached Berallo and asked if he could take him and his companions to Hacienda
Caridad for P30.00. When Berallo agreed, the appellant called Villatima, then wearing a fatigue jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallos tricycle.
Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julies Bakeshop at around the same time Joquino and Ballesteros were in front of the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle
while the appellant was seated behind him. After buying bread, she approached Berallo and asked if he was going home to Lag-asan, hoping that she could ride with him. However, Berallo replied
that he still had to ferry passengers. She thus decided to cross the street and take a passenger jeep. While inside the jeep, she saw two more persons boarding Berallos tricycle.
On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide incident. Together with other policemen, he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City, where he saw Berallo
lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about 20 meters away from the highway. They also noticed several traces of footprints near Berallos body and a tricycle sidecar in a canal beside
the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue jacket.
Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Berallo. She found that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe hemorrhage due to multiple
stab wounds. Five of them were considered as fatal and caused the immediate death of Berallo. The wounds also indicated that they could have been inflicted by more than one person.
The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the appellant as one of the suspects. After having been apprised of his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took Berallos
tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the sidecar, brought the motorcycle to BarangayOringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at the house of Villatimas aunt, Natividad
Camparicio (Natividad).

Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that her nephew Villatima, together with the appellant, and another companion, were the ones who brought the motorcycle to her house in
Kabankalan.
Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered from the house of Natividad as the one stolen from her deceased husband. She also testified on the sum of money and the value of the
personal property stolen from her husband. She allegedly spent the sum of P2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot.
The Version of the Defense
Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995, at around 7 oclock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded to the public
transport terminal to get a ride home. A tricycle with two passengers passed by and its driver inquired if he wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He boarded the tricycle and told the driver that he would
alight at Canibugan, but the driver requested him to accompany them up to Segundo Diez. He agreed out of concern for the safety of the driver. Upon reaching Bangga Doldol, however, the
passengers announced a hold-up. Armed with guns, the passengers told him and the driver not to make any wrong move, or they would be killed. Thereafter, the passengers tied the hands of the
driver and dragged him towards the sugarcane fields. He no longer knew what happened to the driver since he remained in the tricycle. However, he suspected that the driver was killed by the two
passengers.
Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and detached the sidecar of the tricycle. They then took him to a house at Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to leave the premises. The
following morning, they returned to Cadiz City. The two passengers even accompanied him to his house and threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not to report the incident to the police authorities.
On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, policemen came to his house and asked where the motorcycle was taken. He told them of the location of the vehicle and insisted that he had
nothing to do with the incident. He stressed that the two passengers whose names he did not know, were responsible for the crime committed.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court


On February 12, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision[2] finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused RENE BARON Y TANGAROCAN (detained) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide as charged in the information and there being the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.
The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the death of the victim, Juanito Berallo and the amount
of P5,050.00 for the cash and the value of the wrist watch and ring of the victim plus the amount of P2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot by way of reparation and in
addition the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The sidecar and the motorcycle are hereby ordered returned to the heirs of the
victim.
The accused is further ordered to be immediately committed to the National Penitentiary for service of his sentence.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately forward the records of this case together with the Decision of this Court to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.
The case against Rey Villatima and alias Dedong Bargo [both of whom are] at-large is hereby ordered archived and [to] be immediately revived upon their arrest.
Cost against accused Rene Baron.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals


Before the appellate court, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as charged and in not appreciating in his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. However, the same was disregarded by the CA holding that all the requisites for said circumstances were lacking. The appellate court found that the
alleged threat, if at all, was not real or imminent.Appellant had every opportunity to escape but did not take advantage of the same. Instead, he waited inside the tricycle as if he was one of the
malefactors. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision[4] reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the APPEAL is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 12, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in
Criminal Case No. 1675-C finding accused-appellant Rene Baron y Tangarocan guilty of robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION reducing the death
penalty to reclusion perpetua without parole conformably with R.A. 9346 and reducing the award of moral damages fromP100,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Still aggrieved, the appellant comes to us for a final review of his case. In his brief, he assigns the following correlated errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF IRRESISTABLE FORCE AND/OR
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[5]
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.[6]
In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the real intention of the appellant and his companions was to rob the victim. The appellant and his
companions boarded the tricycle of the victim pretending to be passengers. Midway to their destination, one of the accused declared a hold-up and at gun point, tied the hands of the victim and
brought him towards the sugarcane field where he was stabbed to death. The victim was divested of his wallet containing P1,250.00, a wrist watch and ring. Emerging from the sugarcane plantation,
they boarded the tricycle of the victim, detached the sidecar and dumped the same in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one of the accused. They proceeded
to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan and hid the motorcycle in the house of Villatimas aunt, Natividad.

Concededly, there is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence,
which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. [7] Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [8] A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that
results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.[9]
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant and his co-accused conspired to commit robbery with
homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to them and no one else as the culprits. We thus agree with the observation of the trial court that:
A careful examination of the records of this case reveals, [that] no eye witness was presented by the prosecution pointing to the three accused to be actually responsible in the
perpetration of the crime charged except the extra-judicial narration of the accused Rene Baron but who also tried to exculpate himself from the commission of the crime by
denying his [complicity] in the crime.
Despite this finding however, this Court found from the records of this case, numerous and cumulative material circumstantial evidence from which one can derive a logical and
necessary inference clearly showing the three accused to be responsible for the crime charged and these are the following; to wit:
1. The fact that at about 8:30 in the evening of June 28, 1995 witness Ernesto Joquino, Jr. while in front of Julies Bakeshop saw the victim Juanito Berallo [park] the
latters tricycle in front of the bakeshop when accused Rene Baron hired the tricycle of the victim in going to Hda. Caridad and whose companions were Rey
Villatima and Dedong Bargo (TSN-Tan, January 18, 1996, pp. 6-10). Thus, the excerpts of the Transcript of the Stenographic Notes has this to reveal in vivid
fashion, to wit:
Q. Mr. Joquino, on June 28, 1995 at about 8:30 in the evening where were you?
A.
I was in front of Julies Bakeshop.
Q.
A.

Where is this Julies Bakeshop located x x x?


At Magsaysay Street, Cadiz City.

Q. What were you doing at Julies Bakeshop at that particular date and time?
A. I was x x x having a conversation with Canni Ballesteros.
Q. While you were x x x in front of Julies Bakeshop, was there anything that transpired?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Can you tell us what was that?
A. I saw Juanito Berallo park his tricycle in front of Julies Bakeshop.
Q. When you saw Juanito Berallo park his tricycle x x x in front of Julies Bakeshop, what transpired after that?
A. Rene Baron approached Juanito Berallo and asked him if he can conduct Rene Baron to Hda. Caridad.
Q. By the way, do you know Rene Baron before June 28, 1995?
A. Yes, maam, I know him because we are all drivers of the tricycle.
Q. What about this Juanito Berallo, do you know him before June 28, 1995?
A. Yes maam.
Q. Why do you know him?

A. Because he ran as councilor in Cadiz City.


Q. So going back to the incident where you said Rene Baron approached Juanito Berallo and asked Berallo if the latter would conduct him to Hda. Caridad, what
was the answer of Juanito Berallo to Rene Baron?
A. Juanito Berallo asked Rene Baron how much he will pay [to] him and then Rene Baron said that he will pay Juanito Berallo the amount ofP30.00 and then again
Juanito Berallo asked Rene Baron how many x x x will ride on the tricycle and Rene Baron said that there were three of them.
Q. By the way, how far were you from where Juanito Berallo and Rene Baron were talking?
A. From here up there. (Witness pointed to a distance of about four (4) meters.)
Q. After Juanito Berallo agreed with Rene Baron and his companions to conduct them to Hda. Caridad, what did Rene Baron do if there was any?
A. Rene Baron called his companions who were just across the street.
Q. Were you able to recognize x x x the two companions whom Rene Baron called from across the street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And who were they if you know?
A. Rey Villatima and Dedong Bargo.
(TSN-Tan, January 18, 1996, pp. 6-10)
2. The fact the Rey Villatima was wearing a fatigue jacket when the latter boarded the tricycle of the victim and proceeded to Hda. Caridad (ibid, p. 12) and it was the
same fatigue jacket recovered by the police from the sidecar of the tricycle at the scene of the crime and this was the last time that the victim was seen alive;
3. The fact that witness Pacita Caratao corroborated the testimony of Ernesto Joquino, Jr. and Berallo sitting on the latters tricycle parked near Julies Bakeshop and saw
Rene Baron sitting behind Juanito Berallo and the witness even asked the former if he will be going to Lag-asan to which the victim Juanito Berallo refused because
he has some passengers to be conducted (TSN-Tan, March 13, 1997, pp. 3-4) and has referred to the accused Rene Baron and his two companions (TSN-Tan,
March 13, 1997, pp. 4-5) as his passengers;
4. The fact that the during the police investigation witness SPO2 Jude de la Rama found the dead body of the victim inside the sugarcane plantation in Hda. Sta. Ana and
found many traces of footsteps inside the sugarcane fields (TSN-Tan, July 8, 1997, p. 4) indicating that more than one person conspired and co-operated with each
other in killing the victim;
5. The fact that the witness De la Rama found the sidecar of the tricycle beside the Martisan Bridge which is just beside the scene of the incident and also beside the
sidecar of the tricycle they found a fatigue jacket and has recovered inside its pocket a used soap (ibid, p. 5);
6. The fact that when the police officers invited Rene Baron for interview, Rene Baron pointed to his co-accused, Rey Villatima as the one who was wearing the fatigue
jacket the police officers recovered as well as had named his (Baron) other companion as alias Dedong Bargo (ibid, p. 7);
7. The fact that after the three accused had detached the motorcycle from its sidecar, Rey Villatima was pointed to by the accused Rene Baron as the one who drove it
while he (Rene Baron) and Dedong Bargo rode behind and all of them immediately proceeded to the house of the aunt of Rey Villatima in Brgy. Oringao,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental (ibid);
8. The fact that it was accused Rene Baron who had guided the police investigators to Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, a city in the southern portion of Negros
Occidental which is about 150 kilometers away from Cadiz City in the north, the scene of the crime; and with the cooperation of the Chief of Police of the former
place proceeded to the house of a certain Natividad Camparicio, the aunt of accused Rey Villatima (ibid, pp. 7-8);

9. The fact that Natividad Camparicio affirmed that the stolen motorcycle was brought to her house at around 1:15 in the morning of July 1, 1995 by her nephew, Rey
Villatima together with the latters companions and pinpointed to accused Rene Baron as one of them (ibid, p. 9);
10. The fact that prosecution witness, Police Insp. Eduardo Berena also confirmed they were able to recover the stolen motorcycle which was kept in the ground floor of
the house of Mrs. Camparicio (TSN-Guanzon, October 2, 1997, pp. 8-15);
11. The fact that the stolen motorcycle was positively identified by witness Nemia Berallo as the same motorcycle driven, owned and registered in the name of the
victim, Juanito Berallo (TSN-Guanzon, October 2, 1997, pp. 9-10);
12. The fact that accused Rene Baron admitted during his testimony that he rode in the tricycle driven by the victim together with the two passengers in going to
Segundo Diez but reached only the area of Bangga Doldol where the actual robbery and killing took place (TSN-Tan, May 11, 1999, pp. 9-12);
13. The fact that when the two hold-up men brought the driver inside the sugarcane field, accused Rene Baron who was left on the road outside the sugarcane field (ibid,
p. 11) did nothing and instead of escaping and seeking help, accused Rene Baron leisurely stayed in the tricycle as if everything [was] normal and nothing
[happened], thus indicating that he (Baron) [was] in conspiracy to rob and kill the victim since as the facts are depicted x x x Rene Baron would clearly appear that
he (Baron) acted as a look out while the two companions were killing the victim and to make matters worse, he (Baron) even went along with the two other accused
up to Oringao, Kabankalan City where they hid the stolen motorcycle (ibid, pp. 12-13);
14. The fact that the accused Baron was left unharmed by the killers of the victim in spite of the fact that he (Baron) is a potential witness to the serious crime of Robbery
with Homicide; and when they were in Oringao, ate breakfast with them then rode a passenger jeep with many passengers; alighted in Kabankalan proper from
Barangay Oringao; stood and waited in a public place at the Ceres Bus Terminal; rode a public transportation bus to Bacolod City for three (3) hours then alighted in
Libertad Street in Bacolod City; and again rode a passenger jeepney going to a place known as Shopping to take another passenger bus in going back to Cadiz City
(ibid, pp. 21-30).
From [this] series of proven circumstantial evidence, the inescapable and natural conclusion is the three accused were in conspiracy with one another to kill the victim
and cart away the motorcycle as the combination of these numerous circumstantial evidence [is] enough to produce the strong moral certainty from an unbiased and [unprejudiced]
mind to safely conclude that no other persons but the three accused conspired to perpetrate the crime as clearly the series of events indubitably [shows] that there was unity of
purpose, concurrence of will, and that they all acted in concert towards the same end, the accused being together with a group when they rode the tricycle of the victim; all of them
were together at the scene of the crime, they all rode in the same stolen motorcycle going to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan City; all of them were together in hiding the stolen
motorcycle in the house of Natividad Camparicio; and they were together as a group going to Cadiz City from Kabankalan City passing [through] and stopping [at] various cities
and municipalities.[10]
The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there
is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing.[11] There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually
performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all, the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal
liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same.[12]
The appellants attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting that he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury fails to impress. To avail of this
exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal
to that committed.[13] A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.[14]
We find nothing in the records to substantiate appellants insistence that he was under duress from his co-accused in participating in the crime.In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Villatima
and Bargo dragged the victim towards the sugarcane field and left the appellant inside the tricycle that was parked by the roadside. While all alone, he had every opportunity to escape since he was no

longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. Surprisingly, he opted to wait for his co-accused to return and even rode with them to Kabankalan, Negros Occidental to hide the victims
motorcycle in the house of Villatimas aunt.
The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more than 10 hours and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape
or at least request for assistance from the people around him.
Robbery with Homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. We find that the trial court correctly
appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery, which exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that
tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[15] The evidence points that one of the co-conspirators tied the
hands of the victim before dragging him to the sugarcane field.[16] Thus, he was unable to defend and protect himself against his malefactors who were superior in number and armed with knives and
guns.
As thoroughly discussed in People v. Escote, Jr.,[17] treachery is not a qualifying circumstance but a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a
crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. [18] Corollarily, Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime,
aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account.However, aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law or which are included by the law in
defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.[19] In the case at bar, treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide.
[20]
Neither is it inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.[21] As such, treachery may be properly considered in increasing the penalty for crime.
In this case, the presence of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance would have merited the imposition of the death penalty. However, in view of the subsequent passage of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, we are mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.[22]
In line with current jurisprudence, if the death penalty would have been imposed if not for the proscription in RA 9346, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000.00.[23] As compensatory
damages, the award of P2,400.00 for the burial lot of the victim must be deleted since this expense was not supported by receipts. [24] However, the heirs are entitled to an award of temperate damages
in the sum of P25,000.00.[25] The existence of one aggravating circumstance merits the award of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the award of exemplary
damages is proper. However, it must be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.[26] Moral damages must also be increased from P25,000.00 toP75,000.00.[27] Moreover, the appellant is ordered to
return the stolen items that were not recovered. Should this no longer be possible, there must be restitution in the total amount of P5,050.00 representing the cash contained in the victims wallet, as
well as the value of the wrist watch, the ring, the motorcycle and sidecar taken by the appellant and his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00638 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The appellant is hereby ordered to PAY the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Actual damages is DELETED, and in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. The appellant is
also ordered to return the cash of P5,050.00 taken from the victims wallet and the other pieces of personal property also taken but not recovered, more particularly his wrist watch, ring, his Kawasaki
HDX motorcycle and its sidecar. Should restitution be no longer possible, the appellant must pay the equivalent value of the unreturned items.
SO ORDERED.

FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 174654

Present:
- versus -

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO
Promulgated:
and DIAGA ALONTO,
August 17, 2011
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The only issue that confronts this Court is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal.
Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution [2] denying the motion for
reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision set aside the May 21, 2003 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. CBU-51385 and acquitted
the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public document by a private individual because the Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa through falsification of a public
document.[4] However, the CA still adjudged him civilly liable.[5]
Factual Antecedents
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto), [6] secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472
located in Cebu City.[7] Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by spouses Alonto
in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public.[8] Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name and
sold the lots to third persons.
On August 12, 1999,[9] an Information[10] was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
and with intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a public document consisting of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803 square meters executed before
Notary Public Gines N. Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987 of the latters Notarial Register showing that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga
Alonto sold their parcel of land located at Pardo, Cebu City, for a consideration of P130,000.00 in favor of accused by imitating, counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to be imitated
or counterfeited the signature[s] of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto above their typewritten names in said document as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact as the
accused very well knew that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto did not sell their aforestated descri[b]ed property and that the signature[s] appearing in said document are
not their signature[s], thus causing it to appear that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto participated in the execution of said document when they did not so participate[.
Once] said document was falsified, accused did then and there cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said falsified document, to the damage and prejudice
of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and Diaga Alonto in the amount of P130,000.00, the value of the land .

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.[12] After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for resolution was whether petitioner committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public document. [13] Based on the
evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of
Absolute Sale which the spouses Alonto actually signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized without the spouses Alonto personally appearing before the notary public. From these, the
trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual under Article 172(1)[14] in relation to Article 171(2)[15] of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and not estafa through falsification of public document as charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felixberto Abellana GUILTY of the crime of falsification of public document by private individuals under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to
SIX (6)YEARS, as maximum.
He is directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore ownership and possession of the real properties in question in favor of private complainants. After private
complainants shall have acquired full ownership and possession of the aforementioned properties, they are directed to pay the accused the sum ofP130,000.00 [with] legal interest
thereon reckoned from the time this case was instituted.
Should the accused fail to restore full ownership and possession in favor of the private complainants [of] the real properties in question within a period of six (6) months from the
time this decision becomes final and executory, he is directed to pay said complainants the sum of P1,103,000.00 representing the total value of the properties of the private
complainants.
He is likewise directed to pay private complainants the following:
1. P15,000.00 for nominal damages;
2. P20,000.00 for attorneys fees;
3. P50,000.00 as and for litigation expenses;
4. P30,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of the crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not specifically charged and alleged
and which is not necessarily included in the crime or offense charged. The CA, in its Decision dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the negative. [17] It held that petitioner who was charged with and
arraigned for estafa through falsification of public document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual under Article 172(1)
in relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the falsification committed in Article 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric while the falsification in Article
171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such person did not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the
conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of

the accusation against him.[18] Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial courts finding with respect to petitioners civil liability. The dispositive portion of the CAs February 22, 2006 Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to set aside the Decision dated May 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, 7 th Judicial Region, Branch 13,Cebu City only
insofar as it found the petitioner guilty of a crime that is different from that charged in the Information. The civil liability determinations are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution dated August 15, 2006.
Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the lone issue of whether he could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by
the trial court and the CA.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[20] In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. [21] When the exoneration is merely due to
the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. [22] In other words, the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might
arise did not exist.[23]
Here, the CA set aside the trial courts Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged
with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary public
for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioners conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[24] The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus
sustained the same.[25]
We do not agree.
In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,[26] we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to
spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the
subject properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the
document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged.

Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or
render void ab initio the parties transaction.[27] Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. To overcome the
presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld.
[28]
And since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the
basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alontos title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage
resulted to the spouses Alonto.
Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds
of damages. First, it has absolutely no basis in view of the trial courts finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are genuine and not forged. Second, [s]entences
should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative. [29] While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he
cannot impose both in the alternative.[30] He must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty.[31]
In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial court and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject properties to the
spouses Alonto or to pay them P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties and to pay them nominal damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are AFFIRMED insofar as
they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of falsification of public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities on the petitioner, i.e., the restoration of
ownership and possession, the payment ofP1,103,000.00 representing the value of the property, and the payment of nominal and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses,
isDELETED for lack of factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


Petitioner,

G.R. No. 173089


Present:

- versus -

Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his


capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biliran
Province, Branch 16, and JAIME
ABORDO,
Respondents.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,


CARPIO MORALES,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 25, 2010

X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June
7, 2006 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, which dismissed outright its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.
From the records, it appears that on October 7, 2002, at 12:30 oclock in the morning, respondent Jaime Abordo (Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He
was met by private complainants Kennard Majait (Majait), Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose Montes(Montes). An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the
leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen.Montes escaped unhurt.
Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N2211 before the Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch 16 (RTC). The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,[2] the
RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic
mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted.
All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity
of the Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects. For said reason, Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration
and its supplement.
On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majaits motion for reconsideration while Calvezs motion to withdraw was granted.On said date, the trial court also
dismissed Calvez appeal for not bearing the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zunos Indorsement [3] of the October 11, 2005 letter[4] of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of
Calvez, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the following grounds:
GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF THE PETITION
(Petition for Certiorari before the CA)
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD NO INTENT TO KILL, IN HOLDING HIM GUILTY OF ONLY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND LESS SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES INSTEAD OF FRUSTRATED MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. N-2211 AND N-2212,
RESPECTIVELY, AND IN ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. N-2213.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING
FOUR (4) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[5]
The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the petition forcertiorari was the wrong remedy. As the
State was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorari placed
the accused in double jeopardy. Specifically, the CA wrote:
x x x. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the
province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy. In view of
the improper action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant petition should be dismissed.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order
unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In the instant petition, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines is
assailing the judgment of the public respondent in finding the accused guilty of lesser crimes tha[n] the ones with which he was charged and of
acquitting him in another. It appears to us that the Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private complainant Calvez when it
questioned the dismissal of the latters Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with respect to the civil aspect of the case. Although the Solicitor
General is allowed to file an appeal under such rule; however, we must point out that in filing this petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby
placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of
the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.
We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to increase the
penalty imposed in a conviction because it would place him in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition is dismissible not only on the ground of
wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.
[6]
[emphases and underscoring supplied]
Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 presenting the following:
GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SEEKING TO ANNUL THE JOINT
JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN,
BRANCH 16 IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213 WHICH WAS CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THEREBY AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29,
2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN PROVINCE, BRANCH 16, IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211,
N-2212 AND N-2213.[7]
On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the order.
We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We
adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. [8] The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases,[9] the Court has
entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,[10] the Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or
a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In People v. Laguio, Jr.,[11] where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition
for certiorari. Thus:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence.
This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus,when the order of dismissal is
annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not
violated. [Emphases supplied]
In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordos acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper. Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordos
constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a
serious error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.
As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition for certiorari were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to
the CA.

A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSGs petition for certiorari, which forms part of
the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would
only prolong the disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. On many occasions, the Court, in the interest of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice,
has resolved actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case. [12]
The rule is that while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the
trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. [13] The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[14] presents an instructive
exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.[15]
A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Primarily, the OSG
petition does not mention or even hint that there was a curtailment of its right. Unlike in Galman, the prosecution in this case was never denied its day in court. Both the
prosecution and the defense were able to present their respective evidence, testimonial and documentary. Both parties had their opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and
scrutinize every piece of evidence. Thereafter, the trial court exercising its discretion evaluated the evidence before it and rendered its decision. Certainly, there was no mistrial.
The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a recalibration of the factual findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for
giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:
In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private complainants, respondent judge thus accorded full faith and credit to the
testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses Julito Bernadas and Melquiades Palconit. His findings, however, are contrary to law and the
evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [16]
It further pointed out that the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [17] Subsequently, in its
memorandum, it merely reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in appreciating and assessing the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a
review of the trial courts judgment which it claimed to be erroneous.
The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been appreciated by the trial court in its favor and against Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to
kill on his part.
What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against
double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial courts evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a
Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. TriaTirona,[18]it was written:
Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public respondent
acquitting private respondent claiming that the former abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of
the illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of
public respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have
improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed
and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the
trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error
of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie. [Emphasis supplied]

Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is,
however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition
for certiorari for being the wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the same for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Você também pode gostar