Embargoed

for release November 12, 2015, 0001 GMT

Experts see rising risk of nuclear war: survey
Leading national security experts see a rising risk of a nuclear conflict, a survey conducted by the Project
for Study of the 21st Century shows. A poll of 50 national security experts from around the world
showed 60 percent concluding the risk had grown over the last decade. Overall, they predicted a 6.8
percent probability of a major nuclear conflict in the next 25 years killing more people than the
Second World War (roughly 80,000,000 at upper estimates).
The survey featured 50 individuals including leading international relations academics, former senior
military officials and private sector political risk specialists. Participants came from the UK, US, India,
Pakistan, South Africa, the Middle East, Russia, France and elsewhere.
The poll showed 52 percent saying the risk of great power nuclear conflict would grow further over the
coming 10 years. In addition, 80 percent said they expected proxy confrontations and other forms of
"ambiguous warfare" to also increase.
"This is the first survey we know of like this," said Peter Apps, executive director at the Project for Study
of the 21st Century (PS21). "There has been plenty of talk of rising tensions with Russia and China in
particular but it's very rare to try and put numbers on that. The responses we received were, frankly, very
varied. The aggregate figures show that most major potential nuclear or conventional wars seen broadly
unlikely -- but the numbers are still high enough to be worrying. Clearly this is a risk that cannot be entirely
discounted."

Mean

Median

Average

What would you

estimate the
probability of a nuclear
great power conflict
over the next 20 years
killing more people
than World War Two
(80 million)? Please
state as a percentage.

8.53%

5%

6.8%

Do you believe that

over the previous
decade the risk of this
has:

60% believe the risk has grown

Over the next decade

would you expect the
risk to:

52% expect the risk to rise

Do you expect the level

of ambiguous
confrontation between
great powers through
proxies and other
means to:

80% expect a rise in proxy confrontation

NATO States versus

Russia. (Conventional,
with or without nuclear
exchange).

20%

NATO States versus

Russia. (Nuclear
exchange).

4%

4.72%

4%

US versus China
(Conventional, with or
without nuclear
exchange).

10%

18.46%

14%

22.64%

21%

US versus China.
(Nuclear exchange).

1%

3.93%

2%

Japan versus China

(Conventional, with or
without a nuclear
exchange)

15%

22.48%

19%

Japan versus China
(Nuclear exchange
from one or both sides)

1%

2.54%

2%

Russia versus China.

(Conventional, with or
without nuclear
exchange).

Russia versus China.
(Nuclear exchange).

5%

8.79%

7%

1%

1.88%

1%

China versus India.

(Conventional, with or
without nuclear
exchange).

China versus India.
(Nuclear exchange).

12.5%

18.54%

16%

1%

3.94%

2%

India versus Pakistan.

(Conventional, with or
without nuclear
exchange).

India versus Pakistan.
(Nuclear exchange).

40%

40.70%

40%

Iran versus its

adversaries: US and/or
Israel; and/or Gulf
states. (Conventional,
with or without nuclear
exchange).

6.5%

12.30%

9%

25%

28.54%

27%

Iran versus its

adversaries: US and/or
Israel; and/or Gulf
states. (Nuclear
exchange).

US versus North Korea.
(Conventional, with or
without nuclear
exchange).

US versus North Korea.
(Nuclear exchange).

What is the chance of a
nuclear detonation by a
Non-State Actor in the
next 20 years?

What is the chance of a
Cyber Attack killing
more than 100
people by a Non-State
Actor?

What is the chance of a
Cyber Attack killing
more than 100 people
by a State Actor?

5%

6.87%

6%

15%

19%

17%

5%

6.79%

6%

12.5%

21.85%

17%

50%

45.20%

48%

39.5%

37.20%

38%

For more information, e-mail PS21Central@Gmail.com or call Peter Apps on

+44 7990 560586


A full list of participants and breakdown of results is contained at the end of this release. Below are
some quotes on results from various participants.

Mark Fitzpatrick, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation at the US State Department
and now director of the nonproliferation and disarmament programme at the International Institute
for Strategic Studies.
The survey accurately captures the Zeitgeist of renewed concern about the potential for great power
conflict. While the prospect for major war is considered to be less than 50-50 over the next two decades,
there is a significant chance of it happening. The survey also reflects the sense of unease about the
potential for a nuclear exchange -- not that it is likely but that there is a finite chance of it happening.
I agree with the view that if there is to be a nuclear war, it is mostly likely to occur between India and
Pakistan. The scenario might be one that starts with a sub-conventional attack in India by Pakistani-
based terrorists on the order of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which may spark an Indian military reprisal
this time. Pakistan's stated nuclear-use policy could see a response with tactical nuclear weapons.
India's nuclear doctrine in turn calls for massive retaliation on any attack on Indian forces, even outside
Indian territory. The ensuring nuclear exchange would kills tens of million people in the sub-continent
directly and spark a nuclear-winter dust cloud encircling the globe that could put two billion people at
risk of starvation.
Taking that scenario seriously, India and Pakistan should engage in talks spanning the sub-conventional,
conventional and strategic realm to mitigate the risk of nuclear war. They and the other nuclear powers
should also cap and reduce their nuclear arsenals and to take other steps toward the goal to which they
have ascribed of nuclear-weapons-free world.
Nikolas Gvosdev, professor of national security studies, US Naval War College
These results mark a shift from the prevailing mood a decade ago, when the emphasis was on the threat
posed by non-state actors inside failed or failing states to the fabric of the global order. Now, we see a
return to a focus on state-on-state conflict, and a corresponding erosion of confidence that globalization
and the prosperity it has engendered has dis-incentivized clashes among the leading global and regional
powers. It is the puncturing of the 21-st century version of The Grand Illusion.
They also reflect a growing pessimism that the end of the Cold War had fundamentally reshaped global
politics in a more peaceful and cooperative direction. Over the last twenty-five years, ever since the
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, the minute hand of the "Doomsday Clock" have ever more steadily
crept towards midnight, now resting at a perilous three minutes to 12. Countries are becoming more
unpredictable, while the areas in which even an unintended or accidental clash could occur are growing.

Bernie de Haldevang, founder of the Cross Border Risk Agency and former head of financial and
political risk at a major global insurance firm
This is a credible study and the methodology used to arrive at its conclusions makes logical sense. It is
important to remember what it is; the product of individuals' assessments of geopolitical reality as they
see it from where they are. As with all surveys that seek to make scientific sense of personal opinions,

even when from well informed professionals, the end result is more of a scientific art than a science,
though nonetheless valid as that. Participants were asked to look 25 years ahead; the results seem to
reflect the unsettled mood that prevails. The world has not yet found a new equilibrium nor the inherent
stability that existed when the then two superpowers were locked together in a mutual armlock. Thus
one might extrapolate that these findings speak more to the fear of uncertainty rather than genuinely
reflecting fear.
There are also other risks, of course, not least that of dirty bombs and generally more widespread
terrorist activity. These may present less risk to the wider public than war given their localised impact but
would undoubtedly have resulted in much higher scores.
Peter Apps, executive director, PS21
The sheer range of answers from participants was interesting. Many remain convinced that the overall
risk remains low, perhaps percent or less while others put it much higher -- 10 to 20 percent. The highest
estimate we had of the possibility of a conflict killing more than 80 million was 40 percent. That means
everyone believed that on balance this probably won't happen -- but then again, it just might. There was
also broad agreement that the prospect had probably increased over the last decade although a small
minority felt it had actually fallen.

In general, though, there's no doubt that news flow over the last two years in particular has pointed to
growing between the US and its principal potential adversaries Russia and China. We've seen that in
Ukraine, we've seen it in the South China Sea -- particularly in recent weeks. And, of course, we've seen
the war in Syria become much more internationalised with the beginning of Russian air strikes.

NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

PS21 surveyed 50 national security, international relations and political risk experts from around the
world with a basic survey asking them to assess the risk of a range of potential conventional and nuclear
conflict over the next 20 years. For the purpose of the definition, an armed conflict was described as a
conflict between uniformed military forces taking place over several days with at least 100 casualties.

For each measure, we then calculated both the median and the mean before taking an average of the
two. For all questions except the last (or the likelihood of cyber attacks killing more than 100 people) the
median was generally the lower of the two numbers.

Two respondents only answered the first four questions (on the risk of a conflict killing more than 80
million people, whether the risk had grown over the last decade, whether it would grow over the next
and whether the risk of ambiguous confrontation would also rise).

A number of respondents requested anonymity. The rest are named below.

Alex Ward

Associate Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic

Council

Alexey Dolinskiy

Partner at Capstone Connections

Ali Wyne

Adjunct Staff at the Rand Corporation; former Special Assistant to Samantha Power,
US State Department

Dr. Alia Brahimi

Director at Contest Global

Alastair Newton

Co-founder & Director at Alavan Business Advisory

Amjad Saleem

Country manager - Sri Lanka at International Alert

Andrea Berger

Deputy Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy and Senior Research Fellow at
RUSI

Ari Ratner

Strategic Consultant at Inside Revolution; former Appointee at US State

Department

Asha Castleberry

Adjunct Fellow at American Security Institute

Bernie de
Haldevang

Cross Border Risk Agency Limited

Chris Mackmurdo Director at Contest Global; former Head of Counterterrorism Analysis at FCO
Colonel Hariharan Retired Colonel in the Indian Armed Forces; former head of intelligence of Indian
Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka
David A. Glancy,
Ph.D.

Professor of Strategy and Statecraft at the Institute of World Politics

Derek S. Reveron

Faculty Affiliate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
University

Erik Lin-
Greenberg

Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science at Columbia University

Frida Wallnor

Global Political Analyst

Gareth Price

Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House

Gwenn Laine

Director of GL Strategic Consulting; former deputy spokesperson for the NATO

Maritime Command

Harry Kazianis

Executive Editor for TNI and Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at The Center for the
National Interest

Jacob Stokes

Associate Fellow at the Center for a New American Security

James Bergeron

Chief Political Advisor to NATO Allied Command

Jonathan Wood

Global Risks Specialist at Control Risks

Katherine Floyd

Professor at the University of William & Mary

Mark Fitzpatrick

Director - Non-Proliferation & Disarmament Programme at International Institute

for Strategic Studies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation, US
States Department

Mark Galeotti

Professor of Global Affairs at New York University

Michael Harwood retired Royal Air Force; former UK Defence Attach (US)
Milena Rodban

Independent Geopolitical Risk Consultant

Nigel Inkster

Director of Transnational Threats at the International Institute for Strategic Studies;

former director of operations and intelligence at MI6

Nikolas Gvosdev

Professor of National Security Studies at the US Naval War College

Nora Bensahel

Distinguished scholar in residence at American university

Petr Topychkanov Associate Researcher at Carnegie Moscow Center, and Senior Researcher at Center
for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International
Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Philip Thicknesse

Member of the international advisory board at PS21; former Commodore, Royal

Navy

Rachel Rizzo

Program Assistant, Strategy Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International

Security at the Atlantic Council

Scott Cheney-
Peters

Defense Processional at CIMSEC

Shannon Tiezzi

Managing Editor at The Diplomat

Steve Killelea

Executive Chairman at Institute for Economics and peace

TS Allen

Military Intelligence Officer US Army

Zachary Wolfraim Doctoral Candidate at King's College London

Francis Albert
Kornegay, Jr.

Research Associate at the Institute for Global Dialogue/UNISA

Lawrence
Freedman

Emeritus Professor at King's College London

--
Lead researcher: Anne Shannon Baxter