Plato's Laches

Author(s): Robert G. Hoerber

Source: Classical Philology, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Apr., 1968), pp. 95-105
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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CLASSICAL

PHILOLOGY

VOLUME LXIII, NUMBER

April 1968

PLATO'S LACHES
ROBERTG. HOERBER

generally not considered Also the dramatic date of the Laches is

one of Plato's masterpieces, the a question on which general agreement
Laches has been the subject occasion- should not be difficultto attain, even though
ally of specific study during the twentieth a specific year may not be obtainable. The
century.1 Only two scholars, according to dialogue itself furnishes both a terminusa
our findings, have questioned its genuine- quo and a terminusad quem. The references
ness-Ast2 and Madvig;3 other skeptical to the battle at Delium (181B, 188E-189B)4
students of the nineteenth century, such as set the one date at 424 B.C.; the presence of
Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Socher, Suse- Laches, who fell in battle at Mantinea,5
mihl, and Steinhart, regarded the Laches as limits the other extreme to 418 B.C. To
genuine. Both Ast and Madvig base their narrow the range between these poles is
negative judgment on completely subjec- more a matter of conjecture. Adam Fox
tive standards; the former on the basis of sets the date at 422, but offers no reasons.6
alleged logical and dramatic defects, the Kurt Hildebrandt suggests 421-418, after
latter on the fact that in the Laches (as well the Peace of Nicias, when ". . . Nikias,
as in the Lysis and Charmides) Socrates der Aristokrat, die politische Fiihrung des
treats young and uneducated dialogists in Staates hat.. ."7 Paul Shorey sets the
the same manner in which he handles the scene "about the year 420 during the Pelosophists in the genuine dialogues. Since the ponnesian War"; his notes, however, refer
subjective judgment of Ast and Madvig merely to the two terminimentionedabove.8
apparently has influenced no other Plato- A. E. Taylor prefers 423 B.C.: "The refnists, we may consider the possible spuri- erences to the comparative poverty of
ousness of the Laches a dead issue and Socrates-it is not said to be more than
assume its genuineness.
comparative (186c)-may remind us that
LTHOUGH

NOTES

1. K. Joel, "Zu Platons Laches," Hermes, XLI (1906),

310-18; R. Meister, "Thema und Ergebnis des platonischen
Laches," WS, XLII (1920), 9-23, 103-14; G. Ammendola,
Platone:

II "Lachete"

(Naples,

1928);

W. Steidle,

Plato's Laches," CJ, LVI (1960), 123-32; M. J. O'Brien, "The

Unity of the Laches," YCS, XVIII (1963), 131-47; P. Vicaire,
Platon: Laches et Lysis (Paris, 1963).
2. Leben undSchriften Platons, pp. 451-56, referred to by G.
Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates (London,
1875), I, 481.
3. Adversaria Critica, I, 402, discussed by H. Raeder,
Platons philosophische Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1905), p. 91.
4. Cf. Symp. 220E-221B; Apol. 28E.
5. Thuc. 5. 74. 3; cf. 5. 61. 1.
6. Plato for Pleasure (London, 1962), p. 168.
7. Platon: Logos und Mythos (Berlin, 1959), p. 76.

"Der

Dialog Laches und Platons Verhdltnis zu Athen in den

Fruihdialogen," Mus. Helv., VII (1950), 129-46; G. Galli,
"Sul Lachete di Platone" (Turin, 1953); H. H. Martens, Die
Einleitung der Dialoge Laches und Protagoras: Untersuchungen
zur Technik des platonischen Dialoges (diss., Keil, 1954); P.
Grenet, "Note sur la structure du Laches," Melanges dephilo-

sophie grecque(Paris, 1956), pp. 121 ff.; G. Galli, Socrate ed

alcuni dialoghi platonici

(Turin,

1958), pp. 153 ff.; E. V.

Kohak, "The Road to Wisdom: Lessons on Education from

8. WhatPlato Said (Chicago, 1957), pp. 106, 484.

95
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96

ROBERT G. HOERBER

Aristophanes and Amipsias both made this

a prominent feature in their burlesques of
him (the Clouds of Aristophanes and the
Connus of Amipsias), produced in 423. It
points to the same general date that the
two old men should be thinking of the
speciality of Stesilaus as the thing most
desirable to be acquired by their sons.
After the peace of Nicias, which was expected to put an end to the struggle between
Athens and the Peloponnesian Confederation, it would not be likely that fathers
anxious to educate their sons well should
think at once of o&rAo/aiaXas the most
promising branch of education."9 Since
the arguments of Hildebrandt and Taylor
are not overwhelming, we probably should
not attempt to dogmatize whether the discourse supposedly occurred preceding or
following the Peace of Nicias. That the
dramatic date is near 421 is about as
specific as we should be, noting further that
both Laches and Nicias, who are the chief
dialogists with Socrates, were instrumental
in negotiating the Peace of Nicias.10
At first glance the referenceto Damon as
still alive may appearto be an anachronism.
Since he was the teacher of Pericles,' 1being
in his prime around 460 and born about
500 B.C., his introduction by Socrates to
Nicias as a teacher of Nicias' son Niceratus
(180C-D) may seem strange for a dramatic
date around 421; for Damon would be
approximately an octogenarian and possibly too old to continue his profession.
Taylor notes, however, that since Laches
has not even met Damon (200B), we may
assume that "Damon is living in retirement

from society generally."12 Other Greeks,

moreover, continued mental activities
either as octogenarians (e.g., Plato) or far
beyond that age (e.g., Isocrates); and
references to Damon as still alive occur
also in the Republic(40GB-C,424C), whose
dramatic date is around 421 B.C.13Socrates
then would be under fifty, and Plato correctly depicts him as relatively youngyounger than Nicias and Laches (181D),
much younger than Lysimachus (180D-E)
and the octogenarian Damon. Of Socrates'
vigor his prowess at Delium, only a few
years previous, is a proof.14 The references
to Damon as still living and to Socrates as
relatively young, therefore, offer no obstacles to a dramatic date of approximately
421.
Concerning the scene of the Laches there
is no decisive evidence. Only one scholar
ventures a guess, supposing the place of
the discussion to be an Athenian palestra.15
His statement may very well be correct,
but it must remain an assumption.
The time of composition is another
question on which there is no conclusive
evidence, although almost all Platonists
prefer an early date. Schleiermacher,Stallbaum, Socher, and Steinhart assign the
Laches to 406-404 B.C., or several years
before Socrates' death.16 Stallbaum and
Socher see in it adolescentiaevestigia, while
Schleiermacherregardsthe Lachespartially
as a defense of Plato, a young man, for
having attacked Lysias and Protagoras,
much older men, in the Phaedrus and
Protagoras respectively. R. S. Bluck,17
G. C. Field,18 R. C. Lodge,19 D. Ross,20

NOTES
9. Plato: The Man and His Work (London, 1949), p. 58.
10. Thuc. 5. 43. 2.
11. Isocr. Antid. 235. For Damon, cf. K. Freeman, Ancilla
to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford, 1948), pp. 70-71;
The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford, 1949), pp. 207-8;
P1. Alc. I. 118C.
12. Op. cit. (n. 9), p. 58, n. 1.
13. Cf. Fox, op. cit. (n. 6), pp. 168-69.

14. Cf. Symp. 221A-B; Apol. 28E. Cf. Prot. (317C, 361E)
for Socrates as "young."
15. Shorey, op. cit. (n. 8), p. 106.
16. Cf. Grote, op. cit. (n. 2), I, 481.
17. Plato's Life and Thought (London, 1949), p. 60.
18. The Philosophy of Plato (Oxford, 1956), p. 209; Plato
and his Contemporaries (London, 1948), p. 105.
19. Plato's Theory of Art (London, 1953), p. 3.
20. Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford, 1953), p. 10.

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97

PLATO'S"LACHES"

P. Vicaire,21 E. Dupreel,22 K. Hildebrandt,23 A. Fox,24 H. Raeder,25 and C.

Ritter26 also place the Laches early, but
after the death of Socrates, without
stressing any particular reason. The remarks of Grote,27 Taylor,28 Shorey,29 G.
M. A. Grube,30J. Gould,31and A. Koyre32
imply general agreement with such a date.
In the opinion of R. Robinson the "discussion of What-is-X ?," as found in
the Laches, is characteristic of early dialogues.33 Several scholars, also assuming
a comparatively early date of composition,
attempt to relate the Laches to other dialogues. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff
would place the Laches before the Lysis,
Charmides, and Euthyphro, but after the
Protagoras, which it attempts to correct.34
Von Arnim35 and Schleiermacher36 also
consider the Laches as an improvement on
the Protagoras. Raeder37 and H. J.
Krimer,38 however, put the Laches before
the Protagoras. According to E. R. Dodds
the Laches preceded the Gorgias, since the
reference to courage at Gorgias 507B presupposes the fuller discussion of the
Laches.39Both Schleiermacherand Raeder
date the Laches before the Mleno,because
in their opinion the Meno solves the problem posed in the Laches and Protagoras.40

Thus there seems to be general agreement,

with or without substantiating evidence,
that the Laches is probably an early dialogue, although its specific relation to
certain other early compositions remains
a moot point.41
In previous studies of particular dialogues we found that Plato apparently employed dramatic techniques as clues to the
philosophic content of the composition.42
In the Laches the dramatic clue which
seems most predominant is the use of
"doublets" or "pairs." The characters, in
the first place, appear in pairs: Lysimachus
and Melesias; their children, Aristeides and
Thucydides; Nicias and Laches. All of
these personae take part in the discourse,
although the children speak only once
(181A) and Melesias utters merely seven
short phrases (184E-185B). Also persons
who are present in name only occur in
pairs: the two famous fathers of Lysimachus and Melesias, also named Aristeides and Thucydides (179A-D); two
musicians, Agathocles and Damon (180D);
two poets, Solon and Homer (188B, 189A,
191A-B, 201B). The plan of pairs appears
to permeate also other characters either
taking part in the discussion or merely
mentioned: Stesilaus, who previously had

NOTES
21.
22.
1922),
23.
24.
25.
26.

Platon: Critique litteraire (Paris, 1960), pp. 8-9.

La Legende socratique et les sources de Platon (Paris,
p. 15.
Op. cit. (n. 7), p. 396.
Op. cit. (n. 6), p. 168.
Op. cit. (n. 3), p. 57.
Platon: Sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre (Munich,

1910), I, 273.
27. Op. cit. (n. 2), I, 468-81.
28.
29.
30.
31.
p. 57.

Op. cit. (n. 9), pp. 57-64.

Op. cit. (n. 8), pp. 106-12.
Plato's Thought (London, 1935), pp. 216-18.
The Development of Plato's Ethics (Cambridge,

1955),

32. DiscoveringPlato (New York, 1946), pp. 58-60.

33. Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 1953), p. 49.
34. Platon: Sein Leben und seine Werke (Berlin,

1959),

pp. 139-40.
35. Platos

"Phaidros"(Leipzig, 1914), p. 27, referred to by Shorey, op.

cit. (n. 8), p. 486.
36. Platons Werke (Berlin, 1804), I, 1, 321 and I, 2, 5,
referred to by Raeder, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 110.
37. Raeder, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 110-11.
38. Arete bei Platon

und Aristoteles

und

die

Entstehungszeit

des

1959),

the Republic (430C); namely Siebeck, Untersuchungen zur

Philosophie der Griechen (Freiburg, 1888), II, 126, as discussed by Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (Chicago,

1960), p. 78, and by H. Raeder, op. cit, (n. 3), p. 211.

42. "Plato's Euthyphro,"Phron., III (1958), 95-107; "Plato's
Lysis," Phron., IV (1959),

Jugenddialoge

(Heidelberg,

p. 493.
39. Plato: Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), p. 22.
40. Raeder, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 130, who refers to Schleiermacher, op. cit. (n. 36), II, 1, 334.
41. Only one writerventures to place the Laches subsequent
to the Republic,as the fuller discussion of courage promised in

15-28;

"Plato's Meno," ibid., V

(1960), 78-102; "Plato's Lesser Hippias," ibid., VII (1962),

121-31; "Plato's Greater Hippias," ibid., IX (1964), i43-55.

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98

ROBERT G. HOERBER

exhibited his prowess in hoplomachia,and

the individual who had recommended this
skill to Lysimachus and Melesias (178A1,
179E1-4, 183C8-184A7); Socrates, who
assumes the leading role particularlyin the
latter part of the treatise, and his father,
Sophroniscus (180D7-181BI).
In addition to the appearance of personae in pairs various doublets dominate
the dialogue. Socrates discourses with two
pairs of dialogists: (1) Lysimachus and
Melesias; (2) Nicias and Laches.43Lysimachus compares two types of training:
(1) that given him and Melesias by their
fathers; (2) that which they hope to supply
for their children (179A-180A). Two professions are represented: (1) statesmen, by
Aristeides and Thucydides, the fathers of
Lysimachus and Melesias; (2) generals, by
Nicias and Laches.44 Plato links Damon
with two individuals, Agathocles and
Prodicus, associating him with two areas
of knowledge, music and discrimination of
synonyms (180D, 197D). In music Plato
mentions Damon in two capacities: (1) a
pupil of Agathocles; (2) a teacher of Nicias'
son (180C-D). Plato refers to Nicias' son,
Niceratus, twice (180C-D, 200D). On two
occasions Laches cites the bravery of
Socrates at Delium (181B, 188E-189B).45
To convince Nicias that the discussion
should concern the soul rather than hoplomachia, Socrates gives two examples: (1)
medication for the eyes; (2) bridle for a
horse (185C-D). In stressing the need for
definition Socrates offers two comparisons:
(1) sight; (2) hearing (190A). In attacking
Nicias' definition of courage Laches pre-

sents challenges in two areas: (1) medicine;

(2) farming (195B). Laches then suggests
two other possibilities to which Nicias'
definition might refer: (1) a seer; (2) a god
(195E-196A). Parallelism with the musical
modes occurs twice (188D, 193D-E).
There are two references to Solon (188B,
189A). On two occasions Socrates quotes
Homer, citing both of his poems, and selecting two lines from the Iliad (191A-B,
201B).46 Two participants attempt to
define courage: (1) Laches; (2) Nicias
(190E-199E). Laches ventures two definitions: (1) "remaining in ranks" (19GE);
(2) "wise steadfastness" (192B-D).
Besides the pairs of personae and the
numerous doublets permeating the composition, duality is also the key in the
framework of the treatise as a whole. The
dialogue consists of two main sections:
the first comprises a general discussion on
the education of the youth; the second attempts more specifically the definition of
courage. The dramatic clue to this duality
is the presence and participation of
Lysimachus in the first section, while he
excuses himself from further discourse
approximately in the middle of the dialogue (189C-D). The first section also falls
into two divisions: in the first the subject
centers on hoplomachia;in the second the
topic concerns the education of the soul.
The dramaticclue to this duality is the brief
oral participation of Melesias, whose seven
very short sentences serve the primary
purpose of separatingthe first section of the
discourse into two divisions (184E-185A).
The second section likewise is composed of

NOTES
43. The sole sentence by the children is a reply to a query of
Lysimachus (181A). According to the Theaet. (105E-151A)
Aristeides' failure to benefit from associating with Socrates
was entirely his own fault.
44. There may seem to be some overlapping, since Aristeides
and Thucydides took part also in military campaigns and both
Nicias and Laches negotiated the Peace of 431 B.C. (Thuc.
5. 43. 2); but the predominant profession of Nicias and
Laches remained military, while that of Aristeides, primarily

a rival statesman to Themistocles and the leader in establishing the Delian Confederacy, and of Thucydides, the head of
the aristocratic party in opposition to Pericles, was statesmanship.
45. Symp. 221A-B; Apol. 28E.
46. The first quotation at 191A-B occurs both at II. 5. 223
and 8. 107, while the second phrase is from II. 8. 108; the
reference at 201B is based on Od. 17. 347.

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PLATO'S"LACHES"

two parts: in the first, Socrates queries

only Laches; in the second, Socrates and
Laches examine Nicias. Laches' desire to
be relieved from the challenge of defining
courage is the dramatic clue to the duality
of the second section (194B-C); although
Laches continues in the discussion, his

99

position in the second part (of the second

section) shifts from one who answers
Socrates to one who questions Nicias.
On the basis of the pairs, doublets,
and duality in the dialogue, an outline
of the Laches could be constructed as
follows:

I. Problemof education(178A-189C)
A. Value of hoplomachiain education(178A-184D)
1. Plea for advice on hoplomachia(178A-181D)
2. Conflictingadvice on hoplomachia(181E-184D)
B. Educationconcernsthe soul (184E-189C)
1. Advice should come from one with knowledgeand experiencein the care of souls
(184E-187B)
2. Socrates'custom of examiningsouls (187C-189C)
II. Need for definition(189D-201C)
A. SocratesexaminesLaches(189D-194B)
1. Courageis "remainingin ranks"(189D-192A)
2. Courageis "wise steadfastness"(192B-194B)
B. Socratesand LachesexamineNicias (194C-201C)
1. Courageis "knowledgeof whatshouldbe fearedand whatshouldnot" (194C-197D)
2. Socratestests Nicias' definition(197E-201C)
Another clue in the Laches may be deeds substantiate their words and those
characterized as "contrast." Plato con- whose actions do not harmonize with their
trasts the positive advice of Nicias on smooth talk (188C-189B). The courage of
hoplomachia (181E-182D) with the nega- Socrates at Delium (181B, 188E-189B)
tive remarks of Laches (182D-184C). and the failure of Stesilaus in combat
Contrast is evident also in two pairs of (183C-184A) form another marked condialogists who discourse with Socrates, trast, too manifest to be overlooked.
Lysimachus being decidedly more ag- Furthermore, the words and deeds of
gressive and talkative than Melesias, and Socrates agree, those of Stesilaus do not.
Nicias more progressive than Laches.
In fact the contrast between word and
Readers of the Laches, both ancient and deed, logos and ergon, permeates the
current, cannot fail to notice the contrast discussion, setting the stage for the delineabetween Nicias' verbal admission that a tion of several characters. Laches emseer should not control a general (199A) phasizes throughout his comments, deeds,
and Nicias' actual acceptance of the fatal actions, or erga. He is the first to use the
advice of a seer "to remain thrice nine term: en autJi toi ergoi (183C2); he then
days" during the Sicilian Expedition of compares the display by Stesilaus with his
413 B.C.47 In two speeches Laches employs
claims (epideiknymenonvs. legonta, 183D1contrast-between the claims of professed 2; i.e., ergon vs. logos; also the two senses
instructors in hoplomachiaand their failure of epideiknymenon, 183D1 and 183D3,
to perform in practical circumstances present the contrast between action and
(182D-184C), and between those whose theory); finally he finds Stesilaus' erga
NOTE
47. Cf. Thuc. 7. 50. 4.

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100

ROBERT G. HOERBER

ridiculous (183C-184A). Again, implying

that some people have become more skilful
without teachers (185E), Laches manifests
a preference for deeds (erga) to theories
(logoi). In describing his twofold reaction
to speeches his stress is on erga, which
either substantiate or refute logoi (188C189B). Laches bases his favorable opinion
of Socrates on Socrates' erga at Delium
(181B, 188E-189B). Each of Laches'
attempts to define courage stresses erga:
(1) courage defined as "remainingin ranks"
(190E) emphasizes action to the exclusion
of possible strategy (logos); (2) courage as
"steadfastness" (192B) also stresses action,
and the addition of the adjective "wise"
(192D), which Socrates construes as technical skill, leads to the complete confusion
of Laches (192E-194B). Plato underlines
Laches' preference for erga by Socrates'
appeal to Laches to "remain" and "be
steadfast" in the search for a definition;
otherwise Laches' action (erga) will not
agree with his definitions (logoi). In spite
of Socrates' plea, based on Laches' own
terms, Laches, the man of erga, cannot
continue the discussion because such logoi
prove to be beyond his ken (194A-B).
Thus Laches lacks the same harmony
which he found wanting in Stesilaus, whom
he severely criticized.
Nicias by contrast represents theory,
discussion, knowledge, or logos. He is
acquainted with Socrates through discourse
(187E-188B), not in battle at Delium. He
has accepted Socrates' advice (logos)
concerning a teacher for his son (180C-D)
although he would prefer Socrates himself
as a tutor for Niceratus (200D). Nicias
bases his favorable reaction to Stesilaus'
display of hoplomachiaon the premise that
as a knowledge or science (mathema,
episteme) it must be beneficial (181E182D); in theory hoplomachialooks promising to him, but he indicates no desire to
test the theory in practice. Also Nicias'

attempted definition of courage ("knowledge of what should be feared and what

should not") emphasizes theory or logos
(194E-195A). In defending his definition
Nicias makes a much better showing
than Laches, distinguishing both between
knowledge and technical skill (195B-196B)
and between true courage and the fearlessness of animals or children (196E-197B).
Nicias' remarks show the result of his
contact with theorists as Damon and
Prodicus (197D, 200A). His distinction
between rash daring and genuine courage,
as well as his differentiation between professional skill and a higher wisdom, underline his preference for logos substantiating
ergon and the inferiority of ergon without
logos. His eagerness for future consultation with Damon and others (200B),
furthermore, reveals his desire for logos.
While Nicias indicates a proficiency in
logos, the readers of the Laches will recall
his deficiency in ergon, when the "chips
were down" at Syracuse in 413 B.C. Also
Nicias, therefore, fails to harmonize logos
with ergon, proving himself in this respect
parallel to Stesilaus and similar to Laches.
Socrates proves to be the hero of the
dialogue. He manifested his prowess in
ergon at Delium; he portrays his wisdom
in logos by examining the attempted
definitions of courage in the dialogue.
Plato depicts Socrates' superiority to each
contestant in his respective area of speciality, surpassing Laches in ergon and
transcending Nicias in logos. Socrates
alone, furthermore, possesses the true
harmony between logos and ergon.
The dramatic technique of contrast,
particularly the contrast between logos
and ergon, as we have observed, serves a
purpose of portraying the participants of
the treatise. But does the technique of contrast, as well as the other dramatic devices
as pairs of personae, various doublets,
and duality of construction, perform any

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101

PLATO'S"LACHES"

other function in the Laches? In previous

dialogues that we studied, as noted above,48
Plato intertwined dramatic techniques
with the philosophic content of the composition. In the Laches, it appears, the
same may be true; Plato's erga of dramatic
devices should harmonize with his logoi
of philosophic content. A glance at the
philosophic content of the Laches as
observed by several students of Plato may
be revealing.
Professor Shorey states: "In the Laches,
Laches insists exclusively on the temperamental aspect of bravery which opposes it
to other virtues, Nicias on the cognitive
element which identifies it with them."49
Shorey has discerned that according to
Plato two aspects of the soul are involved
in courage: (1) the cognitive or rational;
(2) the temperamental or volitional-or in
the terms of the Republic (435-442): (1)
to logistikon and (2) to thymoeides. The
two elements of the soul must act in unison
to produce true courage. In the words of
the Republic (442 B-C):
KaF

TOVTcp Tcp /LEpEt KaAOV/LEV Eva

ZVapECov 8 7, ot/Lat,
aa
TE
EKaaTOv, oTZav aVToV TO
-roVLOELa, esaaCf
aELVOV
Av7rTjvKat 'Sovc6ivro v7T0-roo Aoyov 7rapayyEAOEv
TE KaL [Lv4
[Text of J. Adam].

The pairs, doublets, and duality in the

Laches certainly seem to point to such a
philosophic tenet.
Commenting on the double application
of the term courage in the Laches (19IDE), Professor Taylor remarks: "A man
may show himself a brave man or a
coward by the way he faces danger at sea,
poverty, disease, the risks of political life;
again, bravery and cowardice may be
shown as much in resistance to the seductions of pleasure and the importunities of
desire as in facing or shirking pain or
According to Taylor this
danger..."50

passage of the Laches (19ID-E) Aristotle

had in mind when he distinguished two
uses of the word "courage" in the Nicomachean Ethics (1115A6-16):
KacL

OPOVls
Se

S7Aov

Oappl7,

M7g7

/1Ev

oVv

EaOT

[zEa0'-r1S

yEyEv77Tac

caVEppoV

O'EaTtv

raiTa

OTl Ta
roflEpa',
Kat
rovyo

7TEpL

9ofolvEOa

WS aS7TAS

ov 6opL'ovTat 7Tpoao0K`aV

aCO

KaKa-

O'Tl

avapEtcaS.

7TEp'

TpLtrov

Kac

E17TEv

KaKOV.

Xa8o0aV 7TrEV`aV
iyEv ov'V 7Tav-rav Ta KaKa', otov
0ofloV'/1Ea
&A' ov 7TEp' 7Travra aOKEL o
Oa'varov,
cMAcav
voaov
aVapELos0

EtVacL

EVLVa

To
oe t71
0c)pV
-r0E
/17 alaXpov,
ernEtK?7Sg

AE'yeTra

yap

TL

yap

otov
ato
o

KacL aL&7/1LWV,

'

KacZ aEL qoflEacOat KacZ KaAov,

'Soot'vEV yap
Lao~x 0o tzev
9%lV/1EVOSX.
yap OogoVZv
SE
/1o

o/1oLOV

Ty

aVaLaXVvToS.

7 09oV/I1EVos9

aVSpELoS9 KarTa
aqos
avapEcc

V7TO TLvWv

/ETa0opav-

yap

TLS

eXEL
KaL 0

Aristotle, in the opinion of other Platonists,

had in mind the passage from the Lawscited
below rather than the Laches; but be that
as it may, again the literary devices of the
Lachescoincidewith its philosophiccontent.
Genuine courage must not be confused
with a lack of fear based on some technical
knowledge, as Socrates warns Laches in
discussing the definition of courage as
"wise steadfastness" (192D-193D). Taylor
comments: "We must not miss the point
of this difficulty. Socrates does not
seriously mean to suggest that 'unwise'
resolution or persistence is courage. His
real object is to distinguish the 'wisdom'
meant by the true statement that courage
is 'wise resolution' from specialist knowledge which makes the taking of a risk less
hazardous. The effect of specialist knowledge of this kind is, in fact, to make the
supposed risk unreal."'51In the Protagoras
(350A) Plato makes the same point on
technical knowledge, as does Aristotle in
the Nicomachean Ethics (1116B3-5):
aOKEL

SE

KacL 27 e/L7eLpLc`a

KaL 0 ?2WKpaT27S

7 7TEpL EKaarTa av&pEL'

27627A ErnaT

'I127v

ElvaL Tr7V

ElvaL- oOSEv
cvopELcav.

Once more the literary techniques of the

Laches harmonize with the philosophic
tenets.

NOTES
48. Cf. n. 42.

50. Op. cit. (n. 9), pp. 60-61.

49. Op. cit. (n. 41), p. 15.

51. Ibid., p. 62.

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102

ROBERT G. HOERBER

Another distinction taught in the Laches

is that between true courage and rash
action, between genuine bravery based on
knowledge and merely emotional fearlessness of beasts and infants (196E-197E).
Taylor notes that we must "distinguish
between natural high temper and fearlessness (-ro' 4colov) and genuine courage
(rO &v3pEZov) . .. Native fearlessness is a
valuable endowment, but it is only in a
human being that it can serve as a basis for
the development of the loyalty to principle
we call courage, and it is only in 'philosophers' that this transformation of mere
'pluck' into true valiancy is complete."52
Plato maintains a similar distinction in the
Protagoras (350B-351B, 360A-E); in the
Laws the distinction remains although
the nomenclature varies (963E):
A(S.

'Epd-riao'v

/E

TL

rOTe

eV

7rpOaayOpEVOVTESr

Svo Wa'AtvavTa 7rpTpoaCf7o/Ev, To tkeV

aLTLav, OTL
Opov77aLv. fpa- yap aot 7%7v
To /1EV EaTLV7TEpLOo'fOV, OV KaL Ta 07pUXa
IIETEXEL,i7S
TWV 7FCtSwv 7071 TZv 7raTvv VEWV'
KaC TO
aVSpELfaS9,
rY
aVspfEa
aveU yap Ao'yov Kat oVaaT ytyVerat
OVX7 acvv
apeT77V

allpoTEpa,
&VSpELaV, TO SC

SC

pOvtpO6 g TE
Ovy)
7w7TOTe OVT EaTv
OVs

a V AO'yov

cyEVETO
COVTOSg

KaL

VOVV

fxovaa

avOts7OTE

oVT'

yEVafTaL,

fTepOv.

The various doublets and the dual construction of the Laches again are in agreement with the teaching of the treatise.
Taking a clue from the literary devices of
the Laches and its delineation of character,
we may venture a further step in the philosophic content of the composition. Not only
are two aspects of the soul involved in
genuine courage, but also true bravery
implies both knowledge (as presented by
Nicias) and action (as emphasized by
Laches). The two aspects of the soul
(rational and volitional) and its two functions of knowledge and action present
themselves in Laches' second attempt in
defining courage and in Nicias' sole definition. "Wise steadfastness" implies both

pairs (rational and volitional; knowledge

and action); but Laches emphasizes action
or volition ("steadfastness"), and fails
to defend the definition because he does
not comprehend the proper connotation
of "wise." Nicias, on the contrary, stresses
in his definition the element of reason and
knowledge; his defense fails because he
cannot explain the object of the knowledge
which would distinguish courage from
virtue. Viewing these two definitions as
pairs which Plato is contrasting one with
the other, or as doublets which infer dual
aspects of one concept, we might notice that
each supplies the lack of the other. Laches,
in defining courage as "wise steadfastness,"
should have explained "wise" as knowledge concerning "what should be feared
and what should not." Nicias' definition,
which is accepted in other compositions of
Plato (Rep. 429B-C, 442C; Prot. 360D),
could be interpreted as a knowledge
coupled with steadfastness. M. J. O'Brien
recently has observed: "The definitions of
Laches and Nicias complement each other
too well not to suggest conscious contrivance. The dialogue, when it is interrupted,
is moving towards a conception of courage
which will join knowledge of good and evil
with a steadfast quality of soul."'53 We
wish to add that such a conceptual attainment in the Laches harmonizes with its
literary clues.
While the conceptual attainment concerning the concept of courage is one accomplishment of the Laches, another
dramatic device involving the schema of
the treatise suggests a further purpose and
deeper achievement. We refer to the fact
that four speakers carry on practically all
the discourse: Lysimachus, Laches, Nicias,
and Socrates. As noted above, the participation of several dialogists divides the

NOTES
52. Ibid., p. 63.

53. Op. cit. (n. 1), p. 140.

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PLATO'S"LAcHEs"

Laches into four principal divisions.54

The discussion, furthermore, begins by discussing the education of the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias and ends with the
dialogists planning additional education for
themselves, with the concept of courage
occupying approximately only ten of the
twenty-four Stephanus pages. The employment of the four principal speakers,
the division into four main sections, and
the prominence given to education could
suggest that the theme of the treatise is
education discussed on four distinct levels.
The suggestion seems worthy of investigation.
The mention of education on four distinct levels brings to mind Plato's figure of
the Divided Line in the Republic (506B51 IE, 533C-534A), with its division into:
(1) eikasia, (2) pistis, (3) dianoia, (4) noesis.
The parallel between the Divided Line and
the movement of the Laches is surprisingly
similar. Lysimachus in broaching the
problem of education reveals that he is
living in a world of eikasia or shadows,
images, and reflections concerning the
education of the young. The realm of
experience is one step beyond him. Although from the same deme as Socrates,
he had not made his acquaintance, but
merely had heard the children speak of
someone by that name (180C-E). In
searching for a teacher for his offspring,
likewise, he had received a recommendation concerning the value of hoplomachia,
and entertains the notion that such
"shadowboxing" may be instrumental in
the future success of his son (179E). Lysimachus is groping for something more
steady than his world of shadows; he has

103

decided to consult men who have attained

some experience. Lysimachus represents
the lowest section of the Divided Line,
the area of eikasia.
Laches is a man of experience, living on
the level of pistis. He has had experience in
actual battle, and he will die on the battle
field.55He judges Socrates on the basis of
their mutual experience at Delium (181B,
188E-189B). Laches' first attempted definition of courage ("remaining in ranks") is
limited to his very narrow military experience. Even his second attempted definition ("wise steadfastness") he cannot
defend when Socrates interprets "wise" as
technical wisdom based on the area of
experience (192E-193D). Laches is a man
of action, not of theory; his world consists

of erga, not logoi.56 Althoughsuperiorto

Lysimachus in discourse, the queries of
Socrates and the suggestions of Nicias
confuse him. Laches' level is clearly
limited to pistis, one step above that of
Lysimachus.
Nicias, according to Plato's portrayal,
is reaching toward the level of dianoia, the
area of mental concepts. Although Nicias
took a conservative stand concerning the
Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition,57 Plato depicts him in the Laches as
rather progressive. He is willing to give an
opportunity to hoplomachia in education
(181E-182D). Nicias seems to appreciate
the challenge of Socrates' elenchus (187E188C); he would welcome Socrates as a
tutor for his son (200D); currently he is
content with following Socrates' suggestion
of Damon as a teacher of Niceratus (180CD); apparentlyhe has learned from Damon
to discriminatebetween apparentsynonyms

NOTES
54. Other minor "foursomes" in the Laches are the four
references to Damon (180D, 197D, 200A?200B) and Socrates'
emphasis in the middle of the discussion that courage involves
four areas: pleasure, pain, desire, fear (19lD6-E7).

55. Cf. n. 5.
56. Laches has never seen the theorist Damon (200B).
57. Cf. Thuc. 4-7 passim, esp. 5. 16. 1, 7. 42-43, 7. 48-50;
Plut. Vitae(Nicias); Aristoph. Av. 640 and Eq. 358.

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104

ROBERT G. HOERBER

(197D). His definition of courage ("knowledge of what should be feared and what
should not") and his subsequent defense of
it betray a fairly advanced stage of mental
concepts. Not only is his definition of
courage acceptable in the Republic(429B-C
442C) and Protagoras (360D), but also his
defense of it points to some supremescience
of teleology (195B-196A). Nicias is a man
of logoi, indicating ability to follow
Socrates' questioning, and showing the
results of association with other theorists
such as Damon. His theories, hypotheses,
and mental concepts place him above the
pistis of Laches, and closer to the level of
dianoia.
Socrates, of course, would represent the
highest stage, the area of noesis. He is
reaching toward an arche or first principle
by testing the various theories or hypotheses through dialectic elenchus. Socrates
refrains from any clearly cut conclusions;
his purpose rather is to lead the dialogists
and the reader to personal reflection. He
refusesthe use of any narrativein the type of
a lecture; his method is dialectic. The opening query concerning education of the
youth Plato leads through the four stages
of the Divided Line, also giving sufficient
dramatic clues concerning the concept of
courage. The dialogue itself is Plato's
answer to the opening query: Socratic
elenchus is the key to education. Plato
no doubt named the treatise after Laches
because Laches represents the level of the
masses in need of education, and does
make a better showing than Nicias at the
conclusion of the composition by attacking
Nicias with some success. Laches portrays
the doxa of the lower half of the Divided
Line; true education consists in elevating
doxa to the level of episteme.
At the conclusion of the treatise Plato

presents another literary hint. Socrates'

suggestion for further study (201A-C)
should be a clue to the reader that the
Laches deserves several re-examinations,
if it is to serve as a tool in the mental obstetrics for which Plato intended his
dialogues. Upon re-examination, for instance, the reader, recalling the reference
to Prodicus (197D), should note that to
rise above the levels of Lysimachus, of
Laches, and of Nicias distinction must be
made between such terms as mathema
and epitedeuma,as well as between tharsos
and andreia. Lysimachus and Nicias reveal
complete lack of discrimination between
mathema and epitedeuma, consistently
regarding hoplomachia as a mathema
(179D-182C); Nicias even refers to it as
episteme (182C7). Laches proposes that
hoplomachia may not be a mathema
(182D-184C), yet he also refers to it as
episteme (184C1-4), which may reflect
irony. The final appearance of these two
terms occurs in a remark of Socrates
(190E), whose phraseology (ex epitedeumaton te kai mathematon)seems to suggest
to the reader that a differentiation between
these two nouns is in order. While both
Nicias and Laches employ cognates of
tharsos and andreia indiscriminately in
the early part of the composition (182C,
184B), the subsequent remarks of Nicias
(196E-197D) make it sufficiently clear
to the reader that a discrimination
between these apparent synonyms is
necessary.
Plato's Socratic dialogues are unique
both in the field of philosophy and in the
area of literature. His dialectic treatises,
frequently without concise conclusions as
found in prose narrative, have presented
problems to the interpreter. Some regard
these compositions primarily as literary

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PLATO'S "LACHES"

endeavors to portray the character and

method of Socrates.58 Other students,
searching for philosophic content, differ
widely, for example, in their interpretation of the Laches-either as an attack on
the thesis that virtue is knowledge,59 or as
an argument for the unity of virtue.60Such
opposing views indicate that Plato's
dialectic dialogues remain a crux to the
interpreter. In the words of V. Goldschmidt: ". . . le dialogue, en tant que genre
litte'raire,reste encore 'a definir. Nous n'en
connaissons avec certitude ni la prehistoire,
ni le but, ou les buts ... ni les lois de
composition."'6' Since Goldschmidt wrote
these wordswe have studied severaltreatises
of Plato with the premise that the proper

105

approach to a Socratic dialogue must

take into consideration both the literary
genre and the philosophic tenets.62In fact,
the two facets of dramatic devices and
philosophic theories appear to intertwine,
with the literary techniques presenting
clues to the philosophic content of the
composition. The present study of the
Laches seems to substantiate our findings in
the Euthyphro,Lysis, Meno, Lesser Hippias,
and Greater Hippias. If our approach
is sound, it should serve to demonstrate
the genius of Plato both as a master
litterateur and a pre-eminent philosopher
even in his shorter compositions.63
WESTMINSTERCOLLEGE

NOTES
58. J. Burnet, Platonism (Berkeley, 1928), pp. 3-15; A. E.
Taylor, op. cit. (n. 9), p. 21; Wilamowitz, op. cit. (n. 34), p.
141; E. Hoffman, "Die literarischen Voraussetzungen des
Platonverstandnisses," Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung,11(1947), 465-80; A. Croiset, Platon: Oeuvrescompletes
(Paris, 1921), II, 88.
59. E. Horneffer, Platon gegen Sokrates (Leipzig, 1904),
pp. 35-38.
60. G. Grote, op. cit. (n. 2), I, 480; C. Ritter, op. cit.
(n. 26), I, 295-97.
61. "Sur le probleme du 'systeme' de Platon," Rivista
criticadistoria dellafilosofia, V (1950), 173, as cited by O'Brien,
op. cit. (n. 1), p. 135.
62. Cf. n. 42.
63. The comparison we have made between the Laches and
the Republic may pose a problem of chronology for some
scholars. For the present, however, without professing to
enter the debate of Plato's "development," we may cite

apropos an observation of Professor P.-M. Schuhl (ttudes

platoniciennes [Paris, 1960], p. 33): "D'abord les difficult6s
que pr6senteparfois le classementchronologique et qui avaient
6t6 longuement discut6es jadis (a propos du Phedre en particulier) ont 6t6 mises en nouvelle lumiere a propos de certains
problemes qui n'avaient pas 6t6 approfondis au meme point
jusque-la. Je pense notamment a la remarquable 6tude que
M. Joseph Moreau a publi6e dans la Revue des etudes
grecques de 1941: 'Sur le platonisme de l'Hippias majeur'cette oeuvre qu'on range g6n6ralementparmi les dialogues de
jeunesse, dont elle a l'allure, et oui l'on trouve pourtant des
conceptions g6n6ralementattribu6es a une p6riode beaucoup
plus avanc6e. Des lors, bien des questions se posent: Platon
a-t-il compos6 des 'dialogues de jeunesse' A une date plus
tardive? Avait-il d6ja, dans sa jeunesse, les id6es qu'il n'y
expose pas encore? On sait que Shorey a soutenu la these de
l'unit6 de la pens6e platonicienne. N'y aurait-il pas mieux a
faire que d'6tudierla succession chronologique des dialogues ?"

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