Critical Commentary on Moral Minimalism

By: Lazuardi Fachrul Nizar (u5867510)

Michael Walzer (1994), an American political theorist of the Institute of Advanced
Studies in Princeton, New Jersey, in his writing entitled Moral Minimalism, proposes
the notion of moral values, using historical and comparative methods in the framework
of two different but interrelated moralities: minimalism and maximalism. While
Walzers approach seems reasonable, his argument is weak when he advocates
democracy as a universal value.
Welzer constructs the notion of minimum and maximum morality, using the
universalism and relativism perspective. He exposes the dualism in the nature of moral
terms. Both perspectives can be used in different contexts and for different purposes. By
framing the picture of people in Prague marching on the streets, Walzer shows that
everyone else in the world who saw the event will immediately become universalist by
supporting the values that Prague people desired to express: the liberation from tyranny
and the return of justice. This is what he calls the thin, universal meaning of moral
minimalism. Thin arguments therefore shape our views about justice in foreign places
and international affairs. On the other hand, Welzer believes that Prague people will
become relativists when they articulate justice at home, debating about taxation,
healthcare, and welfare policy, for example. In other words, they will aim at what is best
for themselves and suits their highly-cultivated history and cultural background. This is
what he calls the thick, relative meaning of moral maximalism. Thick arguments
therefore determine our views about domestic justice and local regulatory.
Welzers premise that common understanding about minimalism as the foundation of
maximalism is misleading. Conversely, he insists that moral maximalism precedes
moral minimalism. He argues that morality is elaborated deeply into our cultural system
and historical process, so it is thick from the beginning. When we see the Prague
demonstration in the name of justice, we figuratively join the march, but we have our
own parade, creating our own meaning of justice that fits our own culture and history.
Thus, Walzer believe that maximalism is more important moral reasoning than
minimalism. Without maximalism, we would have no understanding about moral values
whatsoever.
Walzer supports the universal value of democracy. He, along with other proponents of
democracy, has been trapped in the belief that we are all in favour of democracy
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(Bentham 2005, p.1) and thus we have to embrace democracy as a universal value (Sen
1999 pp.11-13). Walzers support of the universality of democracy weakens his idea
about the dualism of morality, as he disregards relativist, maximal morality. Although
democracy might be accepted internationally because it is the least bad political virtue
in the world today, its minimum morality is not enough to make it universal. As the
people outside Prague creating their own parade, every nation would also make their
own judgement to implement democracy in the way that suits their own culture and
history. This may result in different variants of values between the old Western-root
democratic countries with their new Eastern counterparts, showing that democracy may
not become a universal value.
This demonstrates the weakness of the comparative method Walzer used. Comparative
politics cannot answer the question of values as they are matters of subjective
judgement, not for empirical research. In addition, every country has its unique
characteristics, so comparison is difficult (Newton & van Deth 2010, pp-5-8).
In summary, Walzer reveals the dualism of morality and shows that moral maximalism
comes before moral minimalism because every morality needs to be engaged in an
elaborate process involving historical and cultural systems within the society. This
implies that there is no single, universal way in human affairs that can be applied
everywhere.
Word count: 598
References
Bentham, D 2010, Democracy: A beginners guide, Oneworld, Oxford.
Newton, K & van Deth, J 2010, Foundations of comparative politics, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Sen, A 1999, Democracy as a universal value, Journal of Democracy, vol. 10, no. 3,
pp.11-13.
Welzer, M 1994, Moral minimalism, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and
Abroad, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, pp. 1-19.