Fire Safety Journal, 8 (1984/85) 9 - 14

S o m e M a j o r A c c i d e n t I n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f F i r e s in U n d e r g r o u n d
Transit Systems

Rail Rapid

WILLIAM H. GOSSARD

National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC 20594 (U.S.A.)

(Received August 15, 1983)

INTRODUCTION

The National Transportation Safety Board

is an independent U.S. federal accident investigation agency. The Safety Board's mission
is to determine independently the "probable
cause" of transportation accidents and to formulate safety recommendations to improve
transportation safety.
The Safety Board is required by law to
determine the probable cause of:
-- Civil aviation accidents
Highway accidents selected in cooperation
with the States (U.S.)
All passenger train accidents. Any fatal railroad accident. Any railroad accident involving
substantial damage. (This category includes
rail rapid transit accidents.)
Major marine accidents. Any marine accident involving a public and a nonpublic vessel.
-- Pipeline accidents involving a fatality or
substantial property damage.
Additionally, the Independent Safety Board
Act of 1974 requires the Board to:
-- conduct special studies on safety problems,
for example, fire concerns in underground rail
rapid transit systems;
evaluate the effectiveness of government
agencies involved in transportation safety;
evaluate the safeguards used in the transportation of hazardous materials.
The safety recommendation is the Board's
end product. The Safety Board issues a safety
recommendation as soon as a problem is identified and documented. Each recommendation issued by the Board designates the person, or the party, expected to take action,
describes the action the Board expects, and
clearly states the safety need to be satisfied.
The Safety Board's involvement in rail rapid
transit accidents has increased markedly over
the last ten years. A number of these accidents
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0379-7112/84/$ 3.00

have involved fire and emergency evacuation

in underground rail rapid tunnel locations.
In order to advance the safety level in the area
of fire safety, I have selected ten accidents
for review. These accidents occurred in the
years 1979 to 1981 on systems of the Bay
Area Rapid Transit District (BART), the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA), and the accidents on the
New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA).

BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT FIRE ON

TRAIN No. 117
" A b o u t 6:06 p.m., on January 17, 1979, the fifth
and sixth cars of the seven-car westbound train
No. 117 of the Bay Area Rapid Transit District
(BART) caught fire while moving through the
tunnel under the San Francisco Bay between Oakland and San Francisco, California. Forty passengers and two BART employees were evacuated
from the burning train through emergency doors
into a gallery walkway located between the two
single-track tunnels and then into a waiting train
in the adjacent tunnel. One fireman died when the
gallery suddenly filled with heavy black toxic
smoke. Twenty-four firemen, seventeen passengers, three emergency personnel, and twelve BART
employees were treated for smoke inhalation. Property damage was estimated to be $2 450 000" [ 1 ].

This was the introduction to the Safety

Board's accident investigation of a near catastrophe. Only by the earnest efforts of BART
and emergency response personnel was a
worse disaster mitigated.
The tunnel under the San Francisco Bay,
called the Transbay Tube, is approximately
3.7 miles long. As can be imagined, an emergency response would be difficult under any
circumstances with the addition of a fire which
was extremely hazardous and life threatening.
Figure 1 depicts a cutaway of the Transbay
Tube and the approximate location of the
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10

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Fig 1. Cutaway of Transbay Tube

fire of January 17, 1979 on an abbreviated
map.
The damage to train No. l 1 7 ' s seven cars
was extensive. The first three cars sustained
interior smoke damage. The fourth car had
extensive smoke and fire damage. The fifth
through seventh cars were totally destroyed.
The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was the breaking
of collector shoe assemblies on train no. 117,
when it struck a line switchbox cover, which
had fallen from an earlier train. This resulted
in a serious short circuit condition and fire.
The fire was ignited on train No. 117 in the
fifth and sixth cars on the electrified third
rail side above the damaged collector shoe
assemblies. The broken collector and attached
wires carrying 1-kV d.c. current struck the
100-1bs/in 2 air suspension equalization tanks,
causing arcing and fire. The air bags located
above the collector shoes burned and the stainless steel plates between the air bags and car
floor melted. Their contact with the aluminum
car body caused it to burn and a hole above
the plates to develop. The hole exposed the
polyurethane core and interior of the car to
extreme heat and fire. The interior floor covering pads and carpet over the hole and adjacent area then caught fire. Fire progressed
through the interiors of the fifth and sixth

cars, burning the carpet, seats, walls, and ceiling liners. Fire continued to the remaining
cars via the adjoining car and exit doors.
The Safety Board's investigation indicated
that severe arcing occurred. Since the 1-kV
d.c. current from the third rail can generate
3000 ~F, the plastic, rubber, aluminum, and
stainless steel car components were quickly
ignited and destroyed. These components have
ignition temperatures from 500 to 2200 OF
and were quickly destroyed.
The BART fire of January 17, 1979, involved polyurethane seat cushions that burned
to produce a dense, black smoke and hydrogen cyanide gas.
EIGHT SUBWAY TRAIN FIRES ON NEW YORK
CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY WITH EVACUATION OF PASSENGERS
During a 13-month period in 1980 and
1981, eight serious subway train fires involving passenger evacuation occurred on the New
York City Transit Authority (NYCTA). Four
of the train fires occurred in the Motor control group (Fig. 2), located under the floor at
the center of the rail rapid transit cars and
four occurred in the current collectors which
extend from the side of the car and ride on
top of the electrified third raft (Fig. 3).

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Fig. 2. New York City Transit Authority subway car. 1, Motor control group; 2, current collector; 3, truck; 4,
master controller. Courtesy New York City Transit Authority.

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Fig. 3. Diagram of a current collector.

These eight accidents resulted in 53 injuries

and property damage to subway cars in excess
of $500 000.
Accidents investigated -- Four motor control
g r o u p fires

The first accident investigated occurred on

June 25, 1980; a NYCTA train with ten cars

was departing 86th Street Station when the

conductor reported to the m o t o r m a n that an
explosion had occurred and smoke was issuing
from the sixth car in the train. The m o t o r m a n
immediately stopped the train and went back
to investigate the problem.
All ten cars of the train were in the tunnel
approximately 275 feet south of the station.

12
Because heavy smoke was issuing from under
the sixth car, the c o n d u c t o r moved the passengers f r o m the sixth car into the forward
cars but was unable to reach the passengers
in the rear cars because of the heavy smoke.
The m o t o r m a n returned to the operating cab
and a t t e m p t e d to start the train to proceed to
the n ex t station. This ef f or t was unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, a following train discharged
passengers at the station and proceeded to the
rear of the disabled train to function as a
bridge between the passengers in the last four
cars and the station platform. T w e n t y - o n e
minutes after the fire was discovered the passengers were evacuated f r o m the rear of the
train. The m o t o r m a n joined by a trainmaster
were finally able to cut away the five f r o n t
cars and those passengers proceeded to the
n e x t station.
The fire d e p a r t m e n t arrived and one hour
and three minutes after the fire began, it was
extinguished. The fire, which originated in
the m o t o r control group, had destroyed the
groups switch box, burned away metal conduits and p o wer cables, and burned through
a t w o - f o o t by eight-foot area of the floor.
Damage to the car was estimated at approximately $75 000. Five passengers, the conductor, and f o u r police officers were treated for
smoke inhalation; two of the police officers
were hospitalized.
The second accident occurred on December 10, 1980, when a ten-car train was standing at a station. The m o t o r m a n noticed smoke
issuing f r o m under the eighth car. He discharged passengers at the station and started
to move the train to a storage track; however,
en r o u t e the tram brakes went into emergency
and the train stopped in a tunnel 100 feet
from the n ex t station. Heavy smoke conditions
in the tunnel reduced visibility to near zero.
Thirty-eight minutes after the fire began, the
fire d e p a r t m e n t was notified. The fire was
brought under cont r ol two hours and thirtyseven minutes after the fire began. The intense
fire began in the m o t o r control group and dest r o y e d the m o t o r control group, all main line
cables and control wires, and melted the wire
conduits. Additionally, the fire consumed the
interior switch panel and burned through the
floor in the center of the car, it destroyed the
center section o f fiberglass seats. No damage
estimate was provided but the car was substantiaUy burned.

The third accident occurred on December

11, 1980, when a ten-car train was departing
a station and went into emergency braking
application and smoke began issuing from
under the eighth car. The train stopped with
the two rear cars in the station and the head
eight cars in the tunnel. While the m o t o r m a n
a t t e m p t e d to recharge the train brakes, the
c o n d u c t o r discharged the passengers from the
rear two cars ont o the station platform; he
was unable to reach the passengers ahead of
the eighth car because of the heavy smoke.
The m o t o r m a n failing in several attempts to
recharge the brakes and move the train began to evacuate passengers off of the seven
cars o n t o the tunnel catwalk and through an
emergency exit to the street thirty-seven minutes after the fire began.
The fire originated in the m o t o r control
group and dest royed the m o t o r control group,
lines, cables and wire conduits. The intense
fire distorted the underframe structure of the
car and burned through the plymetal floor
(pl yw ood floor with aluminum sheeting on
the b o t t o m and vinyl asbestos tile on the car
interior floor). Damage was estimated at a b o u t
$6O 000.
The final m o t o r group control fire investigated occurred on April 29, 1981, when a
nine-car train was entering a station. The mot o r m a n r e p o r t e d t hat smoke was coming from
under the second car in the train. The passengers were discharged at the station. The smoke
became so intense t hat at anot her station, 17
blocks south, the m o t o r m a n discharged passengers. This fire closed the line for about
1 i/~ hours.
Accidents investigated -- Current collector
fires

All of the cars involved m the current collector fires investigated were R-46 cars purchased by the NYCTA at a cost of $275 000
each. R-46 cars are 75-feet long, have a capacity of 300 passengers, and are designed to
operate in pairs.
R-46 cars are equipped with four current
collectors -- t w o on each side -- which are
m o u n t e d to the truck side frame. The current
collectors transfer the 600-V electrical power
from the electrified third rail through cables
on the car to the various electrical systems.
The first accident investigated by the Safety
Board occurred on April 21, 1981, when an

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eight-car train went into an emergency brake

application. It was observed by two NYCTA
employees that the train blew the circuit
breakers to third rail power as it was leaving
the station. The train stopped 600 feet from
the station. The passengers heard explosions,
saw the flame and smoke, and believing they
would be engulfed by flames started breaking
out end door windows which NYCTA locks.
Eleven such windows were broken out. Passengers began to scramble through the windows, jumping down to the track level; a few
fell from the windows to the track. The passengers walked to the next station through a
dark, smoke-filled tunnel.
Power was cut off on the tracks adjacent
to the crippled train which stalled three more
trains in the vicinity of the smoke-filled tunnel. During this emergency, more than 1000
passengers were on the three trains. Fortunately, only 24 passengers were treated for
smoke inhalation.
The fire originated in the current collector,
which had broken loose and grounded against
the car truck frame. The current collector was
destroyed and the grounding caused an arc
and flash fire up the side of the car. The fire
burned the truck side frame, cables, air pipes
and the rubber air bag suspension system.
The second accident involving current collectors occurred on May 15, 1981, when an
eight-car train was leaving a station. The motorman heard an explosion and stopped the
train. When he attempted to restart the train,
another explosion occurred. The second car
was burning.
The passengers on the disabled train panicked and trampled each other as they tried
to kick open the locked train end doors. Unable to open the doors, the passengers kicked
out the windows. Eventually, NYCTA employees were able to open the doors and the
passengers were evacuated from the train.
Fourteen passengers were treated at the scene
and two were taken to the hospital for injuries
received when they were trampled during the
panic.
The fire originated at the current collector
when it grounded against the car frame.
Two other similar fires occurred on May 15
and July 29, 1981, on the NYCTA. In these
two accidents the fires originated at the current collectors.

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITYS E P T E M B E R 6, 1979

On September 6, 1979, a five-car SEPTA

train approached a station when there were
loud explosions, electrical arcing and flames
beneath the second car. This was followed by
fire and heavy smoke. The train's brakes applied in emergency and the train, filled with
a standing room crowd of an estimated 1100
passengers, came to a stop with the first two
cars alongside the station platform. The station and tunnel filled with smoke.
When the train's doors did not open, passengers panicked and began smashing windows
and climbing out on both sides of the train.
The m o t o r m a n opened the door of his compartment in an a t t e m p t to get to the side doors
so he could open them manually with his key.
At this point the automatic car door controls
were inoperable. When the motorman's door
opened, the passengers, seeing his open window in the compartment, pushed the motorman back through the window onto the station platform and begun climbing through the
window to escape.
The conductor, in the fourth car of the
train, heard the explosions and saw the smoke.
Visibility at his location was about three feet.
Since the fourth car was in the tunnel he did
not a t t e m p t to open the doors at this location.
Instead he forced his way through the crowded
cars to the lead car, where he unlocked a car
door on the station platform side to permit
remaining passengers to evacuate the train.
Electrical power was shut-off to the third
rails on all tracks and two trains were stopped
in the tunnel. These passengers were evacuated through the station and others were evacuated through emergency exits to the street.
As a result of the accident 148 persons were
injured, suffering from smoke inhalation, cuts,
bumps, and bruises.
It was evident from the frayed electrical
cable that arcing had occurred between the
cable and the electrified third raft which caused
fire throughout the cars' electrical system.

CONCLUSIONS
All of these accidents involved evacuation
of passengers under difficult circumstances.

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However, in these accidents only one person,

a firefighter, lost his life. There were a number of passenger injuries which generally involved smoke inhalation. The Safety Board's
general recommendations as a result of these
accidents included but were not limited to the
following areas:
increased training of rail rapid transit
employees to enhance their capability to evaluate emergencies;
improved instructions for passengers on
what to do in the event of an emergency;
-- improved notification procedures between
the rail rapid transit systems and the responsible fire departments;
--revision of rail rapid transit systems emergency procedures to prevent dispatch or operation of trains with revenue passengers aboard
into an area where there is an emergency involving fire and smoke;
-- increased safety oversight by an independent State agency;
improved testing and evaluation of materials used in the construction of rail rapid transit cars with particular interest in their smoke
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generation, combustibility and toxicity properties;

removal or fire shielding for materials
which exhibit poor combustibility properties;
-- study and evaluation of the need for fire
suppression systems;
increased coordination and communication on a continuing basis between rail rapid
transit authorities and local fire and emergency medical service officials.
As a result of the Safety Board's recommendations, the U.S. rail rapid transit industry has
exhibited a heightened interest in taking constructive actions to address the concerns and
shortcomings the Board identified from its
accident investigations.
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REFERENCE
1 National Transportation Safety Board, Bay Area
Rapid Transit District Fire on Train No. 117 and
Evacuation o f Passengers while in the Transbay
Tube, San Francisco, California, January 17,
1979, Report No. NTSB-RAR-75-5, Washington,
DC, July, 1979.