Do International Organisations constrain or facilitate the major world

powers?
International Organizations have proliferated in recent decades and this has
made it an increasing study of focus. They are attracting more attention for both
positive and negative reasons. The question of whether IOs constrain or
facilitate major world powers can be located within the neo- liberal and neorealist debate and their view on the functioning of power in IOs. The neo-liberal
view considers that power seeking behaviour can be mitigated by facilitating the
realization of absolute gains and overcoming cheating. The latter, emphasizes
the constraints posed by the issue of relative gains and therefore views IOs as
epiphenomenal of state power. This essay will locate its argument mainly within
the neo-realist camp by drawing attention on the way the institutional design of
IOs is biased towards facilitating major world powers. It will argue that the
constraints posed by IOs through formal rules are not sufficient and are
overshadowed by the functioning of informal rules in IOs which matter more in
facilitating major world powers. This will be achieved by firstly, overviewing how
formal rules appear to constrain state behaviour namely through the
enforcements mechanism of sanctions and reputational costs. It will use this to
consider how predominant powers evade from their obligations so that the
constraining effect is minimized and their interests maximised.
Stone (2011) notes, that informal power is not a subversion of IOs but rather it is
explicitly built into the system. Formal rules include: compellence, constitutional
bureaucracy and legal reforms. On the other hand, informal rules include ad hoc
interventions by powerful states especially in times of crisis and mostly related
to dynamics of alliances. The most explicit case is that of structural power which
involves the rules and structures of IOs designed with exit options in mind.
Informal and formal power co-exist with each other and should not be considered
incompatible. In fact the result, is a deal struck between major and minor powers
where there is both a catalysing and constraining pole within the IOs. The US
can leave the organization when it pleases because it would be unrealistic for an
organization to function without the biggest trading better. In this sense,
structural power is biased and reserved exclusively by the capacity of outside
influence. Nonetheless, most scholars would note that there is a balance
between informal and formal power with both doing the pushing and pulling at
different times. On one hand structural power is only used in extraordinary times
when the major interests of great powers are at stake. It needs to be used with a
degree of sensibility because if minor powers observe that the biases in the
design of IOs are surpassed too often will realize that the costs of leaving the IO
being more beneficial than staying in such a continuously unbalanced system. As
mentioned if this power is used cautiously then IOs will have the support and
participation of minor powers. This is because it is not as easy for minor powers
to leave because it would mean they would risk losing certain benefits including
foreign direct investment and trading benefits.
Firstly as Carporoso and Madeira (2012) note, it is central to discuss the degree
to which IOs can have an independent effect on state behaviour as this
determines the constraining capability of IOs. In other words one of the key
underlying arguments is whether interdependence generates more cooperation
or whether IOs are simply a new forum for traditional power politics (Barkin,
2006). At first sight states seem to oscillate between the constraining and
catalysing pole of IOs showing the complex interplay of both. However, it is
important to determine at what point one outbalances the other.
The liberal instituionalist perspective observes that the interest in absolute gains
translates into self-imposing constraints through IOs to realize them. From this
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vantage point, shared economic interests create a demand for international

institutions and rules ( Keohane, 1984:7). The effectiveness of these rules in IOs
is bound to their view on the international system and the way power works
(Archer, 2011). The starting point and the view on the international system is
one that accommodates neo-realist insights of the international environment
being a self-help anarchical system peopled by egoist and rational actors (Milner,
1991). So despite a mutual interest to cooperate, the systemic obstacles depict
the cooperative environment as a prisoners dilemma where the possibility of
cheating creates discord ( Argawal and Dupont).
The role of IOs is thus viewed as being central in providing the right framework
for cooperation to occur (Martin and Keohane, 1995). This is highlighted by
Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod (1985) who note that IOs are able mitigate
power-seeking behaviour by altering the payoff structure, lengthening the
shadow of the future and control the number of actors .In this sense the function
of IOs is to provide a neutral arena for cooperation rather than it being an
instrument of state power ( Archer, 2001). A symmetry of power must exist
within the institution if the system is to endure. This is because if organizations
were simply run by the most powerful, the defects of accountability would not
withstand its maintenance (Koremenos, 2013).In sum, states are interested in
cooperating when there is sufficient mutual interest however the assumptions of
the international system translates into a compliance puzzle, where rules and
focal points need to be created within an organization to constrain state
behaviour.
The extent that institutions can have an independent effect on state behaviour is
thus dependent on its legitimizing capacity. Keohane (2002) identifies three legal
features determining the potential for legalization. Firstly the obligation of rules,
followed by how precisely they are defined and finally whether these rules are
delegated to a third party to ensure they are properly enforced. From this legal
perspective Steinberg (2004) observes, that these combined factors, of rules and
sanctions have the potential to constrain more powerful WTO members from
engaging in unilateral or rule-breaking behaviour. The compliance towards these
rules are achieved by non-legal concerns such as the reputational costs of noncompliance with reciprocity as well as more direct punishments such as
sanctions (Keohane, 2002). Martin (1992) shows how the effectiveness of
economic sanctions works best in an institutional framework that provides
information and makes cheating less likely. The logic here, is that sanctions and
enforcement of formal rules constrain state behaviour by punishing acts of
cheating and non- compliance whilst rewarding acts of cooperation. Chayeses
(1995) argues that no matter how powerful a state is, it is constrained from
consistently breaching international law because of the centrality of complex
interdependence where the possibility of potential linkages makes states accept
rules and engage in compliance. The power of IOs is thus measured in its ability
to make the costs of cooperation more favourable than the option on defection.
Finally, they note the trend of increasing legalization in IOs resulting in more
constrains on major powers and producing important consequences on the way
international cooperation works.
On the other hand the neo-realists are much more sceptical about the ability of
IOs in constraining state behaviour and highlight the limits of cooperation. The
nature of the anarchical system emphasizes the constraint of relative gains being
more important than the interest in absolute gains (Carporoso and Madeira,
2012).In other words military-security issues are harder to constrain than it is to
promote political-economic reasons for cooperation. This, distances itself from
the notion of IOs being used for cooperation and the promotion of the welfare of
others to dominance. Instead IOs are used as instruments of state power which
2

have no independent effect because they simply reflect the distribution of state
power defined in material capabilities (Carporoso and Madeira, 2012). Therefore,
it is the underlying material interests and power relations which shape how
states act and not rules. This is exemplified by the disproportionate asymmetry
of power developing counties have concerning environmental policy
negotiations. The US refusal to join the Kyoto protocol reflects Krasners
observation where; stronger states have done simply what they have pleased
(1991: 337).
A further critique observes that institutional theory help us understand the rise
of IOs but not the form that it will take (Parisi, 2012: 321).Along these lines
Mearsheimer (1995) argues that legal scholarship is nave in thinking that states
would grant IOs enough enforcement capacities to truly constrain them. As a
consequence IOs are viewed as being of little interest as they do not constrain
states. Here, Mearsheimer acknowledges the inefficacy of the constraining power
of IOs but underestimates its utility in facilitating great powers. Consequently,
IOs should not be entirely dismissed because they function as a great strategic
asset to pursue power politics and veil domination though the perceived
legitimacy of IOs.
A framework for understanding the utility of IOs to great powers and how they
facilitate them is suggested by Stone(2011) and his observations on the
consequences of informal rules in IOs. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that
states comply with rules and norms in good and bad times. However, Stone
(2011), notes that when important interests of a state are at stake they are able
to side line formal rules. This is achieved through the use of informal rules which
allow for a broader impact of power. In general, great powers can choose not to
be constrained by institutions and so formal power only works when they are
arguably needed the least (Carson and Thompson, 2014). Furthermore, great
powers can easily make adjustments through structural power which is the
availability of attractive outside options which impose negative externalities on
other states (Stone, 2014:8). In this sense, the focus on formal rules is
misleading because whilst formal rules look at how IOs are designed on paper
the function of structural power demonstrates that it does not always function
the way it is laid out.
Moreover, Stone (2011) notes that the accessibility to informal rules is biased
towards great powers who have an advantage over weaker states. This is
because they benefit from the asymmetry of information and access to executive
figures. What is most salient, is, that this is not an unintended outcome but one
that is explicitly built into the design of IOs.The IMF which is strategically located
in Washington demonstrates this point, as it allows the United States to use it as
a backdoor for informal influence, particularly in maintaining secrecy which is
needed to manage economic packages. (Stone, 2011). A further channel of US
influence reflected in the design of IOs is the politicization of the staff. Chwieroth
(2013) suggests that the real power of the IMF is located within the staff, and this
is what explains the lending decision of the fund which is based more sociological
factors versus procedural ones. Consequently, this reflects the strategic interests
of its powerful member states rather than the needs of the country in question.
These channels of informal influence demonstrate how with only 17 % of the
formal vote the US can manage the IMF so effectively (Stone, 2013). Whilst the
IMF is the most explicit case affected by informal influence the World Bank and
World Trade Organization also show how the informal procedure of consultations
and discussions behind closed doors contributes to the systematic decision
making of the major powers (Stone, 2013). This analysis shows that even if
formal rules were effective, political action takes place in the shadow of these
rules.
3

The design of the IOs is central in determining the likeability of the above
channels of informal influence. Indeed, The United States for example would not
ascribe to formal legalistic constraints on its behaviour unless it was guaranteed
excuses and exit passes from informal power. Therefore, the bias for strong
powers is inherent in the system and reflects the origins of human agency (Cohn,
2008). This suggests that the construction of IOs are designed rationally so
within this logic, IOs facilitate major powers more than they constrain them.
Similarly, Mearsheimer (1994) suggests that most powerful states create and
shape IOs deliberately so that they can maintain their share of power. Therefore
major powers are the driving force behind international law, where power and
the use of law are intertwined in an institutionalized framework (Parisi, 2012).
Ultimately, Krisch (2010) argues that international law is one of the different
epochs of great power dominance. Major powers use it to stabilize the system
whilst improving their position allowing to evade it when necessary.
Stone (2011) nonetheless, depicts the complexity involved in IOs and reaches a
middle ground conclusion arguing that formal and informal power coexist with
each other. There is an equilibrium where strong states cede formal power to
weaker states in exchange for exercising informal power in extraordinary times.
However, this relationship of power and institutions is not quite as balanced as
Stone sets it out to be and there is clearly an asymmetry in power in the social
contract where formal procedure are often overruled by informal ones and shape
formal institutional outcomes in important ways ( Barkin, 2006). This is shown
by the negative attitudes there are towards the IMF, WTO and World Bank which
are considered ineffective and in need of restructuring since they are orientated
to promote the interests of the developed countries (Milner et al 2009).
Ultimately, this questions the role of IOs if they are not able to constrain major
powers. Change especially in environmental could be better envisioned if great
powers were constrained instead of allowing them outlets to pursue unilaterism.

The pushing of the constraints and the pulling of informal power in IOs explains
why it is difficult to determine whether they facilitate major powers or not. On
one hand it seems that IOs matter because they enable cooperation through
rule-based rather than power-based disputes. However, the effectiveness of IOs
is overestimated as formal rules do not constrain major powers in significant
ways. This is reflected by the increasing distrust in IOs and the outcomes they
produce leaning more towards the catalysing pole of facilitating major powers
IOs. Nonetheless, the ability for great powers to manipulate multilaterism needs
to do so in a way that induces the weak states to participate in the structure and
operation of the IOs. Ultimately, the way that IOs work as instrument of state
power is much more diffused and indirect than it would be if great powers simply
pursed their interests without them. It is precisely the ambiguity of the IOs and
the power of opacity which facilitate major powers to cajoling weak states into
the set-up of IOs.

Trade related aspects of intellectual property:

The trade related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS), shows the important
link between trade and intellectual property which links into questions of
development. It is an important issue in the economics of innovation and it
demonstrates how the decision making power of developing countries is outrun
by the delegating power provided to IOs. Intellectual property is concerned
about the ownership of the work of the mind that the innovators ideas are
protected. These encompass a series of rules: patents which is ownership on
products and designs whereas copyrights are ownership on the expression of an
underlying idea rather than the object in question. Finally there are trade secrets
and geographical indicators amongst other less prominent IP characteristics.
The reason why IP is so important is because it is categorized as a non-rivalrous
product, which means that once the idea is out there many people can use it
once without contributing to the costs of the product. The consequence is that
the owner of the product would sell almost or below zero making hardly any
profit. Therefore, IP has been created as a legal construct, in order to create an
artificial scarcity so that a reasonable profit can be created for the incentives of
innovation to remain unharmed. The arguments behind this are firstly, desert
which is a normative stance where the innovator has employed a lot of time and
effort into the product or idea in mind and should hence be rewarded. Finally, to
protect the production of innovation and high quality needed in sectors such as
technology.
However, in a way an excess of IP can hinder innovation because a large remit of
new ideas actually rely on old ideas. Moreover, it constrains capacity for
development and often imposes costly legal burdens such as litigation costs and
patent trolls. The origins of IP lie in the early pioneering patents of 15 th Century
Venice. This propelled the IP movement leading to the Paris and Berne
convention which eventually established the WIPO. Nonetheless, the structure of
the WIPO is similar to that of the GATT, very weak in enforcement which meant
that the basic structure simply did not work. This weakness led to the formation
of the TRIPS in the 1980s. It was a key geo strategic time because it was clear
that the technological movement was embarking. It was a movement pushed by
developed countries especially the US. Deerebeck suggests that it was a major
loss for developing countries and it was a movement which was imposed rather
than negotiated with the developing countries. As developing countries become
more developed, naturally they are more interested in the TRIPs as has been the
shift of Indias position and increasingly Chinas. It is too soon to predict the
TRIPS dynamics however the future is ambiguous and concerning, a battle that
will not end.
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As Deerebeck suggests, the decision making was pretty much determined by

the major powers. Most of the decision making occurred in the green room. The
issue was that it worked through a system of concentric circles where the minor
powers were excluded in the outer circles. The fact that WIPO is placed in the
WTO is a geostrategic decision of the US in order to allowe for a broader impact
of power and also a more systematic method of enoforcement. In essence the
TRIPS implementation was a hard blow for developing countries. This is mainly
demonstrated the case A of the Indian pharmaceutical companies. Although now
it could be said that as they becoming more developed, they are naturally more
interested in a more systematic TRIPS implementation in order to be able to reap
from the benefits of technological adavancement. This is true of Indias strong
software sector. The same cannot be said of China whose export led industry still
heavily relies on piracy methods. To a certain extent, Chinas position is not
entirely criminal because a large remit of new ideas, relies on old ideas.
Developed countries have had a chance to copey the basic technology and build
from there whereas as developing countries have not. In this sense, the TRIPS
implementation and reform have been done in such a way that excludes the
necessities and economic structure of developing countries. Ultimately, a one
size fits all solution is simply a disguise for unequal negotiations which lacks
sensibility to the needs of developing countries, notably after the failed
negotiation of the Doha round.

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International Organizations have proliferated in recent decades and have

attracted attention for both positive and negative reasons. The question of
whether International Organisations constrain or facilitate major world powers
can be located within the neo-liberal and neo-realist debate and the way they
view the functioning of power in IOs. The neo-liberal stance, considers that
power seeking behaviour can be mitigated by the pursuit of absolute gains and
the prevention of cheating. The latter, emphasizes the constraints posed by
relative gains and therefore viewing IOs as epiphenomenal of state power. This
essay will locate its argument, mainly within the neo-realist camp by drawing
attention on Stones notion of structural power and the way this is built into the
IOs design to facilitate major world powers. It will argue that the constraints
posed by IOs through formal rules are insufficient and overshadowed by the
functioning of informal rules which matter more in the outcomes of IOs. This will
be achieved by firstly examining the ways in which formal rules appear to
constrain state behaviour through reputational damage and the enforcement
mechanisms of sanctions. It will suggest that powerful states consciously choose
constraints on themselves to a certain extent to manipulate multilaterism
through the pursuit of informal power. Next it will consider the extent that the
working of the informal rules minimize the constraining effect of formal rules so
that powerful states interests are maximised. It will show that states oscillate
between the constraining and catalysing pole of IOs, reflecting the complex
interplay of both. Nevertheless, when the sufficient interests of major powers are
8

at stake they lean towards the empowering and informal pole of IOs which is an
outlet purposely embedded in the design of IOs.